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A RESEARCH REPORT ft?

Prepared at 5
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Knox, Kentucky
1952
 AERIAL RESUPPLY OF ARMORED UNITS

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED

BY

COMMITTEE 3.2, ARMORED OFFICER ADVANCED COURSE

THE ARMORED SCHOOL

1952 - 1953

MAJOR JOHN T. PIERCE III

MAJOR KENNETH SHIPMAN

CAPTAIN ROBERT H. BERRY

CAPTAIN REXFOHD B. NEAL

CAPTAIN FERDINAND L. SCHWARTZ

Fort Knox, Kentucky

April 1953
 SECURITY INFORMATION

This preface is being included with this research report

because of a document* that was made available to the committee
late in January. At that time basic research on the problem had
been completed and the committee was busy preparing the first draft
of the report. Normally, a new document would simply mean that more
material was on hand. It would be used to whatever advantage pos ­
sible. But, this document was unique, as will be pointed out.

First, it must be understood that the members of the commit­

tee were determined that they would present a new approach to the
problem of aerial resupply for armored units. We refused to write a
long report that would be merely a re - hash of material found as a
result of extensive research. Because of this we began to look for
a method that would speed up and facilitate the present system of
aerial resupply. The Idea of "On-Call” packets seemed to be the
answer.

This idea had crystalized and was being put on paper when
the above mentioned document came into our hands. We thought our
idea was sound, as did all those with whom we discussed it. The
document removed all doubt. A system, almost identical with the one
we had worked out, had been successfully employed for over a year in
KoreaJ True, that system was not for an armored unit but for the
18?th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. Even so, there is no reason
to believe that it would not work equally well for any type of organ­
ization.

We still feel that this research report is of value since we

have prepared sample "On-Call” packets for Armored units that would
greatly facilitate their resupply.

HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR. "Problems in the Airdrop of

Supplies and personnel", a report prepared by the Military History
Section, Headquarters Far East Command,

v^ESTRiCTED |
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Preface . » . . ii

Chapter

1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . . 1
Importance,, ............................. 3
Evaluation of Previous Studies. . . . . . . . . . 4
Review of Air R e s u p p l y . ................... .. . . 5

2 PROPOSED "ON-CALL" PACKETS . . . . . . 0 0 0 * 0 10

Catalogue, Items for Air Resupply . . 0 0 * 0 0 10
"On-Call" Packets . . . . . . . . . . 16

3 TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION . ........ 21

Army Training Program . . . . . . . . 21
Supply Request. ............... .. . o 21
Selection and Marking of Drop Zone. 21
Recovery of Supplies. . . . . . . . 22
Communication » . . . . . . . . . . 23
Security. o . . . . . . . o . . . . o ooo • 23
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 0*00 o 23

4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . 25

Conclusions » . . . . . , . . . . 25
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . 26

BIBLIQCHAPHY. . . 27

APPENDICES. . . . ........... 29
I. Air Request Check List. 29
II. Drop Zone Marking . . . 30
 1
R E S T R I C T E D ..j

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to introduce an effective,

workable system of aerial resupply for armored units,, In the past
aerial resupply has been effective but it has been thought of as
only an emergency means of support. This system would be easily
adapted to emergency conditions but that is not its primary purpose.
Instead, its main function would be to serve armored units in those
types of operations where supply lines are extended or otherwise
difficult to maintain. Thus, by its proper use, armor would gain
greater freedom of action in the accomplishment of its assigned mis ­
sion.

In developing a more efficient means of aerial resupply, the

committee a t t e s t e d to follow a logical process of thought. First,
all the available background and historical material was gathered
and studied. In this manner it was possible to become thoroughly
familiar with the physical and administrative problems that had to
be solved. Then the committee studied the logistical requirements
of armored units. And finally, an effort was made to fit the
requirements of the units to the capabilities of the supporting
aircraft.

The actual development of this system of resupply began when

the committee decided to devote its efforts to studying those items
of supply needed by armored units and then organizing them Into
•'packets" for aerial delivery. These packets are to be called "On-
Call" packets and as the name implies are to be available for im­
mediate delivery. Included in the packets are not only items of
emergency nature but also items needed for sustained operations.
The problem was established and found to be three—fold, lo What
items should be included in the various packets? Different type
units need different supplies and the supplies needed for different
operations also vary. 2. What special training will be needed by
armored units to gain maximum advantage of the "On-Call" packet
system? 3. What is the best method of delivery? Delivery by air
landing is the most desirable but at times we must depend upon air
drop methods.

In this study only the first two questions will be answered.

The third question is of great importance but it is felt that it is
outside the scope of this work since it is the subject of constant
scientific research. It is possible that proposed types of heavy-
lift helicopters nay revolutionize the present techniques of actual*
air delivery» Even if this should be the case it would cause only
minor changes in the resupply packets and troop training«

With the problem in mind there are certain facts or basic

assumptions that must be accepted before beginning the study» They
are: .

1» Aerial resupply has been successful» A brief

historical summary of aerial resupply is included in this
chapter»

2» The mobility and flexibility of an armored unit

is definitely restricted by its supply line »1

3« Aerial resupply enjoys the "freedom of movement"

that is characteristic of aircraft and is not restricted by
terrain as is ground transportation,*

4 « Ground elements must be trained to utilize aerial

resupply to the maximum degree„3

5. Air superiority is a necessity for sustained aerial

resupply»^

6» With air superiority, the use of transport for sup­

ply and evacuation by air is not costly. Supply and evacuation
by air is a definite requirement in all operations,5

7« Resupply by air can be made more efficient. It is

a faster means of supply only when items are immediately avail­
able and ready for loading and transport. This requires that
all preparatory work be completed before the supplies are re­
quested. It further requires that all supplies needed be
located close to the air fields utili*ed by the transport air­
craft.6

These are the basic assumptions that guided the committee

throughout the preparation of the report. It is by no means a
complete list of all the possibilities. Others will be brought out,
where applicable, in later chapters.

The term "On-Call" packets may be somewhat misleading. As

it was presented, it can be seen that there can be no universal
packet that would cover the requirements of all types of organi ­
zations. Obviously, the ammunition and fuel requirements of a tank
company would not be the same as those of a battery of armored field
artillery in aty type of situation. Furthermore, it would be impos­
sible to have all types of supplies prepacked and stored ready for
aerial delivery» Because of this, there should be two basic types
of packets:

1, Prepacked supplies. These supplies are bundled

and stored ready for immediate delivery. Generally, only
Class I, III, and V items are included in this category as
their primary purpose is to reconstitute basic loads. Each
packet is given a code name or number which is the only neces ­
sary identification needed for requisitioning.

2. Immediately available supplies. Class II and IV

items make up the bulk of this category. They are the items
listed in the TO&Es of the various armored units. Each item
is identified by a code symbol which is used in ordering.
These supplies must be stored in an area so as to be immediately
ready for loading into cargo aircraft.

The packet then becomes a unit for requisition. For example,

in a certain situation one of the POL packets may contain all the
Class III items needed by a tank platoon. If a company were request ­
ing this item they would order several of the packets.

Line items that make up the packets are held to a minimum

so that only necessities are included. Should greater amounts of
one item be needed or should a special item be desired, it may be
requisitioned by code name. This is most important because of thé
limited amount of cargo space available.

Importance

The importance of aerial resupply has been well established.^

There is evidence that as early as 1941, the German Army kept its
armored spearheads rolling by means of air resupply.® Since that
time the importance has increased steadily¿

But, what is the importance of "On -Call " packets for armored
units? The advantages gained by such a system would be numerous.
Such a system would be flexible. It would be easily adapted to any
form of air transportation whether it should be air drop or air ­
landing by cargo aircraft or by helicopter. It would reduce the
amount of time lost while units are waiting for supplies. It offers
an easier method of requisitioning. For operations it would permit
armored columns to operate farther away from their base of supplies.
Hilhen used to supplement ground supply lines it would reduce the
length of the supply "tail" as well as the number of personnel and
vehicles involved. It would serve as a morale factor since the men
would know that they were not dependent upon ground logistical sup­
port. The end result means, simply, that armor would enjoy greater
mobility and flexibility.
 These factors, mobility, flexibility, or freedom of action
cannot be over emphasized» They are among the basic characteristics
of armor. But, it seems that they are slowly being lost due to the
present trend in the development of armored vehicles. The greatest
problem caused by this trend is that of logistical support. Ammuni­
tion weight requirements have more than doubled when comparing the
new tanks with the old. Gasoline is even a greater problem. Today
it takes "approximately five times as much gasoline ..0in unit trains
if the same movement capacity is to be maintained."9 if for no other
reason than this, some means must be found to supplement the present
method of supply,.

There is one disadvantage that must be considered when using

the "On-Call" system. It necessitates double stockpiling. Stocks
must be maintained where they would be readily available to ground
supply columns and also near air supply bases. The committee feels
that the advantages far outweigh this disadvantage.

The ideal situation would be one where armored columns were

supplied entirely by air. At the present time such is not possible
nor is it the intention of this report to leave that impression. Air
resupply is a supplementary means of logistical support and a means
that should be used whenever necessary for the successful accomplish­
ment of the assigned mission,

Evaluation of Previous Studies

When the members of the committee began to study for the

assigned topic their attention was focused on several research
reports made by previous committees at the Armored School, In par ­
ticular, three reports seemed to form a logical background to the
study. These reports were: (1) "AIR DROP TO A TANK BATTALION",
prepared by Committee #6 1951-1952, (2) "THE HOLE OF THE HELICOPTER
IN THE ARMORED EXPLOITATION", prepared by Committee #40 1951-1952,
and (3) "SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS FOR THE MEDIUM AND HEAVY
TANK BATTALIONS", prepared by Committee #27 1951-1952, Each of
these reports covered phases of the problem that had to be considered
in the present study. They were a great help to this committee, but
none of them offered any recommendation that would change the present
method of employment. They felt that the solution would be found in
better training and equipment. Each of the reports recognized the
limitations inherent in air resupply but none offered a practical
solution.

There is a wealth of other excellent material to be found

on the various phases of aerial resupply. Through the agencies
available to the committee detailed accounts were found on such
items as combat experience, load capacities of aircraft, coordination,
 INFORMATION
STRICTED

special problems, etc. Even so, nowhere could it be found that

supplies had been set up for armored units and maintained on an
"on-call" basis. In most cases it appeared that aerial resupply
had been considered solely as an emergency means of support and
that items delivered were only those needed to get the unit "by”
until ground resupply could be re-established. An exception to
this was made by B. H. Liddell Hart who stated, "Supply to (such)
mobile forces should be as far as possible by air transport rather
than by land transport."10

Review of Air Resupply

...More than most professions the military is forced to

depend on intelligent interpretation of the past for signposts
charting the future. Devoid of opportunity, in peace, for self
instruction through actual practice in his profession, the
soldier makes maximum use of historical record in assuring the
readiness of himself and his command to function efficiently in
emergency. The facts derived from historical analysis he ap­
plies to conditions of the present and the proximate future,
thus developing a synthesis of approximate method, organization,
and doctrine.-*-1 .».

With the aforementioned thought in mind, committee members

involved in this research considered it appropriate to present a
brief review of the evolution and application of "supply from the
sky." Ho attempt is made to provide a historical narrative of the
airplane, parachute or airborne operations. Further, the review is
not intended to favor air force and airborne troops to exclusion of
all other military elements. To those unfamiliar with air resupply,
the committee feels that one or more facts presented herein will
facilitate better understanding of its operational capabilities.

A recent Department of the Array publication provides the

following definition of aerial resupply:

...The act or process by which aerial delivery of supplies

is made to ground units. It is normally employed where the
usual ground lines of communications or landing fields are not
available or are inadequate or u n e c o n o m i c a l . „0

Contrary to popular belief, aircraft landing fields for un­

loading of aircraft are excluded from the definition of aerial re ­
supply. This is further evidenced by a current explanation of the
term aerial delivery.^ Granted, terms and definitions are of
limited importance. Yet, they should be understood by all concerned.

Brigadier General Billy Mitchell has been credited with

perhaps the United State ’s initial airborne concept. His proposal,
ir*
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 SECURITY _______________

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though never ifflpIemeHfi?8, was to parachute infantry behind the German
front lines,, Logistical support, pending their link-up with friendly
ground troops, would have been by parachute. If successfully carried
out, one can only surmise its effect on World War l D

In April and October 1928, six enlisted men of the United

States Army Air Corps stages successful parachute drops in Texas0
On each occasion, a machine gun was dropped and placed in operation
immediately upon landing.^

Of particular interest is the parachute exhibition staged at

Kelly Field, Texas in 1929 0 Witnessing the drop were military attaches
of several foreign countries and a group of American officers, includ­
ing the Chief of the Air Corps 0 German Colonel Fedor von Brock (later
Field Marshal) rushed from Fort Knox.where he had been witnessing maneu ­
vers, to attend this demonstration . 15 The drop consisted of eighteen
parachutists and thirty-eight containers of machine guns. Parachutists
were on the ground and firing machine guns within four minutes of their
drop.

True, the aforementioned efforts were by and large Bparachute

exhibitionsM staged by the United States Army Air Corps. For a number
of reasons they were not expanded nor subjected to further tests until
May 1939«

Such was not the case of Russia and Germany. They had seen
and heard enough to realize the vast possibilities of air transport
and parachutists. Both began immediate and rapid experiment ation in
the airborne field. In 1939 Russia dropped the first paratroops
behind Finnish lines. Although the operation did not produce all of
the desired effects, it was a forerunner of things to come. Lack of
total success was attributed to insufficient air transports to employ
and support all elementso1®

Holland and Belgium were next to receive an attack from the

sky. Germany dropped parachutists and accompanying supplies on
strategic objectives in 19A0. The attacks materially assisted in the
invasion of the two countries. All of the above actions were early
link-up operations between airborne and ground troops. As such,
virtually all airhead,supplies were carried in, by the assault force.
Their bulk of resupply accompanied the ground link-up units. It
required little imagination however to realize that if air transport
could lift and move an assault force with accompanying equipment, the
same transport could haul vast quantities of supplies.

In spite of the airborne trend abroad, the United States was

slow in realizing its far reaching capability. The War Department
proposed to the Office of the Chief of Infantry that a small unit of
 air be organized in May of 1939» However, it was 11 June 1940 before
organization of the initial "Parachute Test Platoon" began at Fort
Benning, Georgia. The Test Platoon executed its first successful
mass -jump at Lawson Field, Georgia on 29 August 1940. Shortly there­
after, the first Army parachute infantry battalion was organized.
’ This was followed, on 10 October 1941, with activation of the initial
airborne infantry battalion. Their mission — development of cargo
glider techniques. Suffice to say, gliders carried the bulk of heavy
equipment into the Normandy, Holland and Rhine airborne operations.

Meanwhile, in May 1941> Germany surprised the military world

by launching an airborne attack on the island of Crete. This was the
first large scale air movement of both troops and supplies. Although
Crete was defended by approximately 29,000 British and Greek troops,
they could not repel the invader. From this operation it became
evident that although a defender might have adequate, well trained
and well led troops in prepared positions— if the attacker could em­
ploy air support and supply of his force, he may well overcome the
defense. The handwriting was on the wallJ Air logistics had
functioned at Crete, they could and would function elsewhere.

...Thus it is a historical fact that airborne warfare, at

least in the modern sense, was originated by the Russians and
developed to a state of combat effectiveness by the Germans.
But it is also a historical fact that the American Army took
this new instrument of warfare and, with the British, refined
and improved it and unleashed upon our enemies airborne forces-
of such power and perfection as even they had not dreamed of. ...

•World War IX was the beginning of large scale aerial deliver­

ies, primarily in conjunction with airborne operations. However, it
remained for the Korean conflict and the newer type of cargo aircraft
— — _ i-to provide the greatest aerial resupply operation in history. Re ­
supply loads of World War II were primarily of the door bundle and
pararack type. Heavier loads, if attempted, were transported in
gliders. Subsequent aircraft and heavy drop developments have
rendered gliders and pararacks obsolete. Door bundles are still
utilized by airborne assault units and to a limited degree in aerial
resupply operations.

In the first year ’s operation in Korea, the 315th Air Division

(Combat Cargo) dropped nearly 18,000 tons of all classes of supply. ®

..0The mountainous Korean terrain offers few drop zones wide

* enough for more than single aircraft in trail; however, a 9-ship
(C-119) formation could pour almost 50 tons of supplies to a
ground unit in 3-1/2 seconds.19.,.

Elements of the United States 1st Marine and Army 7th Infantry
Divisions were supplied by aircraft during the period 28 November - 10

f
December 1950, During this period, approximately 1,600 tons of
vitally needed suppliesj namely ammunition, gasoline and rations
were delivered» One critical item was a lo-ton M - 2 treadway bridge.
This enabled the Marine unit to breakout of the Chinese encirclement
with much of their heavy equipment,

Air drop resupply has proven its value, both in World War II
and in Korea. Given air superiority, modern transport aircraft,
trained and equipped packaging and loading units, and proper identi­
fication of drop zones— aerial resupply will enable a ground unit to
retain the initiative and mobility inherent in armored operations,

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1

^B,H. Liddell Hart. Defense of the West (New York City:

William Morrow and Company, 1950), Chapter XIX, passim,

^Movement by Air. Special Text 71-1. (Fort Benning, Georgia,

The Infantry School, 1951), p 63,

3 Ibld. p 64o

^Ibld. p 63,

' S u p p l y and Evacuation by A j r . a report prepared by the

General-Board European Theater (Fort Monroe, Virginia, Army Ground
Forces, 1946),

fy)p cit. Movement by Air, passim,

?Alr Drop t o a Tank Battalion, a research report prepared

by Committee No 6, The Armored School, 1951-1952, (Fort Knox,
Kentucky, The Armored School, 1952), passim,

^General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York City, E. P 0

Dutton and Company, 1952) p 232,

^Supply Transportation Problems for the Medium and Heavy

Tank Battalions, a research report prepared by Committee No 27,
The Armored School, 1951-1952, (Fort Knox, Kentucky, The Armored
School, 1952), p 9» passim,

~^0p cit. Defense of the .West. p 241,

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 ^ •Report by the Chief of Staff. United States Army to the
Secretary of War, 30 J u n e 1935, a report prepared by General Douglas
MacArthur«

^ F i e l d Manual 57-30. Department of the Army, January 1952/

P 262«

13Ibid. p 262«

^ T h e Development of Vertical Attack. Infantry School Quarterly,

Volume XXXIII, Number 2, October 1948), p 12«

15Ibid, p 13.

162E £*£> P *3.

^ M a j o r General William C« Lee, (Forward), Airborne Warfare,

Majör General James M . Gavin,.(Washington: Infantry Journal' Press,
1947), p vii.

Flexible Air Transport« Headquarters, 315th Air Division

(Combat Cargo), APÖ 959, San Francisco,California, 15 November 1951,
p 24.

19Ibid. p 24«

I :1
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 f*seeu*iTr information

CHAPTER 2 1 1
%0
PROPOSED "ON-CALL" PACKETS

The system of requesting supplies discussed in this chapter

attempts to make two important contributions to aerial resupply
methods. First, if properly used, it provides maximum flexibility
which will allow any unit to use it under any circumstances. Second,
it will speed up processing of requests for supplies by the use of a
simple code number system.

There is no attempt made in this chapter to go into great

detail concerning specific type packets for specific units. Those
computations used here for the purpose of illustrations are based on
the reinforced tank battalion. The system explained here is divided
into two sections, a catalogue of equipment, and a series of "On-
Call ” Packets for use under varying conditions. Any unit can use this
system by cataloguing its equipment, and by using its own experience
factors to calculate supply requirements under specific conditions.
The first step is to catalogue equipment used by the unit based on
its T/O&E. This is done by listing the equipment shown on the T/O&E
followed by any other supplies or equipment for which air resupply
may be required. The purpose of cataloging is to provide a code
system for use in requesting supplies and equipment. This will allow
use of a simple form for request and will decrease the burden on
communications. (See Aerial Resupply Request Form on page 29 ).
The list is compiled by technical service to facilitate use and,to
simplify the code lettering system. The catalogue should include
weights of items for planning purposes. A suitable list from a tank
company T/O&E is shown below to illustrate the method of preparation.

CATALOGUE LIST OF CLASS II AND IV

. ,ITEMS FOR AERIAL RESUPPLY;

CHEMICAL

Item Brevity
No. Nomenclature of Item Weight Code
3-1 Decontaminating Apparatus,
Portable, 3-gal, Ml CA
3-2 Kit, Chemical Agent Detector,
M9A1 CB
3-3 Mask, Protective, Field, M9A1 411b/
(6 masks/case) case CÇ

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Item Brevi
No. Nomenclature of Item Weight Code
5-1 Compass, Lensatic, Luminous
Camped, w/case 6 oz EA
5-2 Compass, Wrist, Induction

vO
Damped

J3
o
EB
5-3 Glass, Magnifying, Self-ilium -
inated, 2" dia, 5-power 8 oz EC
5-4 Marker, Luminous, 1 ” clip back .5 oz ED
5 -5 Navigation, Eqpt Set #2, Dead
Reckoning EE
5- 6 Stereoscope, Magnifying, Pkt,
w/leather case EF
5-7 Tape, Measuring, Steel, w/case EG
5- 8 Barbed Wire, (1-roll) 100 lb EH
5-9 Picket, Long 10 lb El
5-10 Picket, Medium 5 lb EJ
5-n Sand Bag 5 oz EK

MEDICAL

8- 1 Blanket Bale .(20. blankets/bale) 88 lb/ MA

bale
8-2 Litter, Folding or Straight 50 lb/bnle MB
(2 litters/bundle)
8-3 Chest, Flight, Service 85 lb/set M
G
8—4 Medical Field Set #
4 95 lb/set MD
8-5 Medical Kit, NCO, M2 20 lb/kit ME
8-6 Medical Kit, Individual 15 lb/kit MF
8-7 Splint Set, Str splints 60 lb/set MG
8-8 Stove, Gasoline, 2-burner 38 lb MH
8-9 Case, Morphine, (100 syr-
ettes/case) 2 lb/case MI
8-10 Case, Penicillin (100 bot-
tles/case) 9 lb/case MJ
8-11 Crate, Dressings, Carlisle
(120 - 144/crate) 50 lb/crt MK
8-12 Crate, Plasma (12 units/crt) 55 lb/crt ML

ORDNANCE

9-1 Bayonet Knife, M4, w/scab ­

bard MSAl. .9 oz OA
9-2 Binocular, M17A1 4.5 lb OB
9-3 Bulldozer, Tank Mounting, M2 OC

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RESTRICT ED
 ORDNANCE - Continued

Item ' Brevity

No. Nomenclature of Item Weight Code
9-A Cabinet, Spare Parts, Type 1 GD
9-5 Carbine, Cal 30, M2 5.5 lb 0E
9-6 Chain, Tow, 7/16" x 16' 48 lb OF
9-7 Circle, Aiming, Ml 0G
9- 8 Compass-, M2 OH
9-9 Gun, Machine, Cal 50, Brg,
M2, Hvy Barrel 81 lb 01
9-10 Gun, Submachine,Cal 45, M3A1 / 8,7 lb OJ
9-11 Launcher, Rocket 3»5", M20 15 lb OK
9-12 Mount, Tripod, MG, Cal 50, M3 OL
9-13 Pistol, Auto, Cal 45, 1911A1 2. 2 lb OM
9-14 Table, Graphical, Firing M42 ON
9-15 Tank, 90-mm, M47 00
9-16 Tool, Set Arty Mechanic, Mi -
nor Maintenance OP
9- 17 Tool Set, General Mechanic 74 lb OQ
9- 18 Tool Set, Org Maint, 2d Ech-
elon, No, 1 Common OR
9-19 Trailer, Cargo, £ T 2w M100 550 lb OS
9- 20 Trailer, Cargo, ljT 2w M105 OT
9-21 Trailer, later Tank, li T,
2w M107 1500 lb OU
9-22 Truck, Cargo, 2J T, 6x6, M35 11, 050 lb OV
9-23 Truck, Utility, ¿T, 4x4, M38 OW
9-24 Vehicle, Armored Utility OX
9-25 Vehicle, Tank Recovery, M32 OY
9-26 Watch, Wrist, 7 or more jewels OZ
9-27 Cartridge, Cal 30, M2, AP,
in 8 rd clips, T1EDV, 111 lb/ OAA
(1344 rds/case) case
9-28 Cartridge, Cal 30, M2, MG,
4-1, linked Code- TIEDF ' , 82 lb/ OAB
(1100 rds/case) case
9- 29 Cartridge, Cal 30, Ml, Ball,
Carbine, Code-TICAJ (1600 rds) 59 lb/ OAC
9-30 Cartridge, Gal 45, Ball Code-
T2AAF (1200 rds/case) 69 lb/
case
9-31 Cartridge, Cal 50, M8, AP, MG,
4-1, linked Code- T310F (210 83.5 lb/ OAD
rds/case) case
9-32 Rocket, HEAT. 3.5 ” , Code - S9JNA 60 lb/ OAB
(3 rds/case) case
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ORDNANCE Continued

Item Brevity
No. Nomenclature of Item Weight Code
9-33 Cartridge, AP-T, T128 for 76-
nun Guns, T91 & T124 Code- 87.8 lb/ OAF
RANKA (2rds/case) case
9-34 Cartridge, HE, T64 w /F PD for 85 lb/
76-mra Güns-Code RANFA (4rds/c) case OAG
9-35 Cartridge, HVAP-T, 76-nun Guns 66.8 lb/ OAH
Code - RAHAA (2rds/case) case
9-36 Cartridge, Smoke, VP, 76 - mm 85 lb/case OAI
Guns, Code-RANHA (2rds/case)
9-37 Projectile, FXD, APC-Î, 90-mm 231 lb/ OAJ
Guns, Code P5RFA (2rds/case)
9 - 38 Shot, FXD, HFAP-T, 90 - mm Guns 120 lb/case OAK
Code P5RHA (2rds/case)
9-39 Shell, FXD, HE, 90 - mm Guns, Code 129 lb/case OAL
P5SVA (2rds/case)
9-40 Shell, FXD, Smoke, WP, 90-mm 130 lb/case 0AM
Guns, Code P5RKA, (2rds/case)
9-41 Grenade, Hand, Fragmentation, 53 lb/case OAN
Code S4GLA (25/case)
9-42 Flare, Trip, M4S, Code-S5IBB 42 lb/case 0A0
(4/case)
9-43 Mine, AT, HV. M6, Code - R7ARA 32 lb/case OAP
(1 mine/case)

QUARTERMASTER

10 - 1 Axe, Chop, Single Bit, w/h 4 lb QA

10-2 Bag, Canvas, Water, Ster
compl w/rope, poles, cov QB
10-3 Bag, Carrying, Ammunition QC
10-4 Bar, Wrecking, Gooseneck, 24” QD
10-5 Bucket, Gen Purp, gal, 14 qt QE
10-6 Can, Corr Nest Galv — 10 gal QF
10 - 7 Can, Corr Nest Galv — 16 gal QG
10-8 Can, Corr Nest Galv • — 24 gal QH
10-9 Can, Corr Nest Galv -- 32 gal QI
10-11 Can, Gasoline, 5-gal cap 10 lb QJ
10-11 Can,,Water, 5-gal cap 10 lb OK
10-12 Case, Canvas Dispatch QL
10-13 Case, Canvas, Map Roll-type QM
10-14 Case,.,Canvas, Carbine, Cal 30 QN
10-15 Clock ' ,Alarm QO
10 - 16 ’ Container, Food, Insul, M1944 29 lb QP
10-17 Cutter, wire, M - 1938 w/case 1.4 lb QQ
'mm

13 11!X
1%!§ i»i mSI§Î I f | |
llm
l SjvS &itt/i 1 1 «tilfJt l
%J9
I K s t r i c t e d
 QUARTERMASTER - Continued

Itesi Brevity
No. Nomenclature of Item Weight Code
10 - 18 Desk, Field, Fiber, Company QR
10-19 Desk, Field, M-1945 QS -■
10 - 20 Flag, Guidon, Bunting QT
10 - 21 Flag, Set, 1^*238 QU
10-22 Fly, Tent Wall, Large, eompl/ QV
10-23 Goggles, m - 1944 ’QW
10-24 Heater, Water, Imm, Gas Op QX
10-25 Heater, Imm type, for corr can 77 lb QT '
10-26 Kit, Barber w/case QZ
10 - 27 Lant ern, Gasoline, leaded fuel QAA
10-28 Mask, Face, Launcher, Rocket QAB
10-29 Mattock Pick, w/handle 5 lb QAC
10 - 30 Outfit, Cooking, one/burner 5 lb QAD
10 - 31 Outfit, Officers Mess m -1937 QAE ,
10-32 Panel Set, AP - 50 39 lb OAF
10-33 Sange Field, M - 1937 3-unit QAG
10-34 Screen, Latrine, w/pins & poles QAH
10-35 Shovel, Gen Purp, D - handle 4 lb QAI
10-36 Tool Set, comp/ Carl Set #2 QAJ
10 -37 Tube, Flexible Nozzle 2.4 lb OAK
10-36 Typewriter. Ptble w/case QAL
10-39 Whistle, Thunderer QAM
10 - 40 Bag, Sleeping,Wool, w/cover 6 lb QAN
10 -41 Belt, Pistol k lb QAO
10-42 Blanket, Wool, CD 4.25 lb QAP
10-43 Can, Water, 5 - gal, FULL 50 lb QAQ
10-44 Can, Gasoline, 5-gal, FULL 42 lb OAR
10-45 Case, Ration, Type C (6 42 lb/
rations/case) case QAS
10-46 Packet, First Aid, eompl 1 lb QAT
10 - 47 Poncho, Lightweight 3 lb QAU
10-48 Boots, Artie, Felt 21 lb QAV
10 - 49 Boots, Mukluk 2| lb QAW
10-50 Overcoat, Parka, w/pile lnr 8 lb QAX
10-51 Shoepacs, 12", M - 1944 5 lb QAY
10-52 Bag, Sleeping, Artie, M1949 11Ì lb QAZ

SIGNAL

11-1 Chest, BC-5 35 lb SA

11-2 Flashlight, TL - 122 .48 lb SB
11-3 Emergency Switchboard SB - 18/ 2.4 lb SC
11-4 Lantern, MX - 290/GV

m m m x w i
14 [ T O y L i w u " =
 SIGNAL - Continued

Item Brevity
No, . Nomenclature of Item . Weight Code
11-5 Multimeter, TS-352/U 8 lb SE
11-6 Radio Set, AN/GRC-3 mtd £TT SF
11 - 7 Radio Set AN/GRC-3 mtd M47 Tk SG
11-8 Radio Set AN/GRC-4 mtd M47 Tk SH
11-9 Radio Set A N A R C -8 mtd ¿TT SI
11-10 Radio Set AN/VRC-13 mtd M-32 SJ
11-11 Reel, Rhs.39 SK
11-12 Telephone,. EE-8 9è lb SL
11-13 Tool Eqpt Set, TE-33 1 lb SM
11-14 Tool Eqpt Set, TE-41 23 lb SN
11 - 15 Tube, Socket Adptr Kit, MX 8 lb SO
11-16 Tube Tester, 1-177 10 lb- sp
11-17 Vibrator Pack, PP - 69/U 91 lb SQ
11-18 Voltohmeter, 1 - 107 8 lb SR
11-19 «»ire W/D - l/TT DR-8 ¿ mile 24 lb SS
11-20 Wire, W/D-l/TT MX - 306/G 48 lb/m ST
11-21 Battery, BA 270 SU
11-22 Battery, BA 272 SV
11-23 Battery, BA 30 (200/case) 25lb/case SW
11-24 Mast, MS - 116 (Antenna) 1lb SX
11-25 Mast, MS - 117 1lb SI
11-26 Mast Sections, AB 22 £ lb sz
11-27 Mast Sections, AB 24 £ lb SAA

NOTES ;

a„ The catalogue is divided into sections by technical

serviceo

b. Items authorized by the unit's T/O&E are listed first

and may be followed by other non-expendable and expendable items as
desired. For example,...the Quartermaster Section could include all
items of individual and organizational equipment and even such
special items as winter clothing and equipment,

c. Weights should be included whenever possible for

planning purposes. These weights can be compiled from shipping docu ­
ments or pertinent technical publications,

d. Code letters are assigned in any simple and conven­

ient manner. The method shown here can be expanded to include any
number of additibnal items. The first element of the code group is
the first letter of the technical service designation. The remaining
elements of the code group are determined by assigning each item
consecutively a letter or group of letters from the alphabet as
illustrated in the sample catalogue shown above 0

Based on estimated supply requirements, modified by exper­

ience, any unit can determine "On—Call" packets for use under
specific conditions. In order to maintain the maximum flexibility,
these "On-Call" packets should be designed so that various combina­
tions of packets can be used for different situations. The "On-Call"
packets are established for two purposes. They provide information
of supply requirements for use in case of emergency and also form the
basis for a request for normal resupply. They can provide the bulk
of required items and can be supplemented by items extracted from the
catalogue as needed.

The "On-Call" packets shown below are used to illustrate this

method, and are based on the requirements of a reinforced tank bat ­
talions. A maximum weight of 12,000 pounds was used in preparing these
packets, primarily because this lends itself to transportation by heli­
copter or by present conventional type aircraft. The weight of drop
equipment would bring the total weight of the packet to approximately
14»000 pounds which is still within the capabilities of present air­
craft.

"ON CALL PACKETS"

CLASS I

TIPE I

1590 Rations, Type "C" (6 rations/ 11,130 lbs

case— 265 cases @ 42-lbs/case)

TYFE II

lo 1590 Rations, Type "5 in 1", 8,586 lbs

small det, (318 cases/2 7 lbs/case)

2. 3000 lbs assorted Class II and IV 3.000 lbs

Total 000000000 11.585 lbs

NOTE: Type I and II Packets are based on one ration for

a tank battalion reinforced by an armored infantry bat ­
talion both at 90/£ T/0&E strength. These two variations
illustrate the possible use of combinations of "On-Call"
packets. It would be very possible to include a standard
Medical, Signal, or other type packet to occupy the 3,000
pounds space gained by use of "5 in 1 " type rations.
*. ^ p i r f r 1
1 ||iif**t n ^ % i i ir I
16 'fS H _■«S' iii
s1ll% i l

T R 1C T E D
TYPE III

240 Cans of Water

(50 lbs/can-5 gal type) 12,000 lbs

NOTE: This will satisfy minimum requirements for use with

Type I Packet shown above 0

TYPE IV

1. 67SRations, Type "C" (6 rations/

bdXf - 113 cases/42 lbs) 4,746 lbs

2„ 140 Cans of Water

(50 lbs/can-5 gal type) 7.000 lbs
Total 000000000000
NOTE: Type IV Packet based on a Tank Battalion at
T/0&E strength«

CLASS III

TYPE V

1. 1410 Gallons 80 octane gas

(282 5- gal drums/42 lbs ea) 11,844 lbs

2. 45 Gallons Engine Oil

(9 5-gal drums/50 lbs ea) 450 lbs

3» 25 Pounds of Lubricants 25 lbs

4. 30 Pounds of Misc Greases 30 lbs

Total 0000000000 0. 0.12,349 lbs

NOTE: Weight factors taken from par. 98, EM 101-10,

dated August 1949» (Calculations using quantities
listed in "Reference Data for Armored Units", The
Armored School, July 1952.) This is sufficient to
move a Tank Company 10 miles cross country in combat:
or to move one tank platoon of five M - 47 Tanks approx -
imately 36 miles cross country in combat; or will move
a tank company 25 miles by road.

TYPE VI

1. 1430 Gallons 80 octane gas 10,206 lbs

(27 55-Gal drums/378 lbs ea)
 2. 55 Gallons Engine Oil
(1 55-Gal drum/455 lbs) 455 xbs

3. 25 Pounds of Lubricants 25 lbs

4. 30 Pounds of Misc Grease 30 xbs

Total 00000000000000090 10»71 £> lbs

NOTE; Same as Type V Packet except for using 55-gallon

type drums.

CUSS V

TYPE VII

le 120 Rounds 90-nun ,HE 7,740 lbs

2, 20 Rounds 90 - mm APC-T 1,310 lbs

3, 20 Rounds 90 - mm IP 1,300 lbs

4o 20 Rounds 90 -mm HVAP 1.200 lbs

Tot âl OO•9000*001...... 11,550 lbs

TYPE VIII

lo 36 Rounds ' 90 - mm HE 2,322 lbs

2, 24 Rounds 4.2 - mm Mortar HE 823 lbs

3« 8 Rounds 4«2—mm Mortar V8P 264 lbs

4° 8 Rounds 81- mm Mortar HE (light) 200 lbs

5. 420 Rounds Cal 50 M G (Ball) 167 lbs

6, 2,200 Rounds Cal 30 M G (Ball) 164 lbs

Total , 00. 0...,,. 00••e 0 o3 *9AÛXbs

NOTE: Type VII plus Type VIII Packets equal the

- .estimated Class V requirements for a tank battalion
for one day in the Pursuit,

Tt is easy to see that the possibility of predetermined

On-Call" Packets could be expanded greatly as a unit developed
experience tables. The value of these packets can be fully ex ­
ploited by prepacking certain packets based on transport -•$ f'r
able and the anticipated operations of k n o i % a | § B | « f 1
this method can be used to simplify supply r &p&Sfcs «y%% f*
\j§| te-“ *
18
normal supply situations and in situations of an emergency nature»

In addition to the Class I, III, and V, Packets, any unit

could devise various Class II and IV Packets that may be needed»
Although the catalogue section discussed previously would make it
easy for a commander to obtain individual items needed, there are
certain items such as signal batteries and wire, medical supplies
and equipment, and engineer items for which special packets should
be prepared. These serve their purpose best when based on the ex ­
perience of specific units under specific conditions.

The fact, that this method of Class II and 17 resupply is

possible and also desirable has been proven in combat. The 167th
Airborne Infantry Regimental Combat Team in action in Korea utilized
Engineer* Medical, and Signal, Heavy Drop Kits. These were to fill
anticipated«resupply requirements for various combat situations that
might arise following their combat drops. The Engineer Kit shown'
below as a n example is extracted from their Heavy Drop Loading Plan
Number 1,

ENGINEER HEAVY DROP KIT # 1 » (Defensive Kit)

This kit is designed to fill the basic Engineer

requirements for a Defensive Position* Contents of the kit are
as follower

1. 45 Rolls, Barbed Wire (at 100 lb) 4,500

2. 550 Pickets, medium (at 5 lb) 2,750
3. 275 Pickets, long (at 10 lb) 2,750
4. 2,560 Flares, trip, M49 (at 45.5 lb/
c a s e , 1 6 flares/case) 7,280
5. 240 Mines, antipersonnel, M3 (at
73.2 lb/case* 6 mines/case) 2,928
6. 30 Mines, AT, HV, M 6 (at 31.5 lb/
case, 1 mine/case) 945
Total P o u n d s ..... .. ¿1.153

It is just as possible for any unit, including armored units

to develop packets of this nature, particularly for use in case of
emergency. Coupled with the .cataloging of supplies described pre ­
viously, this will provide a speedy but still a flexible method of
obtaining Class II and IV supplies as needed.

The mission of all supply personnel is to continuously try

to improve the logistical support given the combat units. By ap ­
plying the method outlined in this chapter it is definitely possible
to simplify and speed up the processing of supply requests.
 KOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

History of the Korean War, "Problems in The Airdrop of

Supplies and Personnel," Military History Section, Headquarters, Far
East Command, p 124 0

1 fTi
l- 16
%p i §p ;l3;fSafe Jl-WSr 111
ibl aea1 n a j s e & I I
IB

20

H E STRICT ID *
 TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION

This chapter primarily concerns the training of armored

units to facilitate efficient utilization of aerial resupply»
Emphasis is placed on training of unit commanders, staff officers,
and supply personnel since they are most concerned with the actual
phases of the operation. Subjects included are those which are
most important from the viewpoint of ground personnel. They are:
method of requesting supplies, selection and marking of drop zones,
recovery of supplies, communication, and security.

Army Training Program

The success of the ”0n-Call” packet system is dependent upon
proper indoctrination and training of using organizations. There is
little emphasis on aerial resupply in the present Army Training pro­
grams. It is fait that successful use of this system requires its
Inclusion in appropriate phases of unit training. In this manner,
members of all organizations will become familiar vjith the capa­
bilities and limitations of "Supply from the Sky". The training of
an armored unit to request and receive an air drop should be in­
corporated in its advanced training. An orientation period should
be conducted early in this stage of the unit's training. This period
should be devoted,to a general familiarization on what the system is
and how it works. It should be pointed out that in many cases air
resupply is mors efficient and faster than ground supply.
As stated before, the training of oommanders, staff, and
supply personnel is of primary Importance. This can best be ac­
complished by conducting command post exeroises. All training must
be through to request, reoeive, and distribute supplies efficiently,
'fhie can only be aohieved by proper emphasis in the Army Training
Program, This chapter provides Information relative to the subjects
that should be inoluded in this program.
Supply Request. When requesting aerial resupply there are
several items of importance that must be indicated in the initial
request messags, They are: looation, description, and marking of •
drop zone, supplies needed, time air drop is desiredi and whether
a Tactical Air Control Party la present, Enemey information that
might have a direct bearing on the drop is of vital importance and
must be Inoluded, To assist a oowmander in-.preparing the request,
a form is inoluded (see Appendix l . ^ h i o h gives in detail the
neoessary information he must know, "This form should be standardized
and used by all units, •"*»
Zone. The seleotion of the
drop zon 'or >the aircraft,. Ground

21
personnel must have an understanding of these capabilities so that
they can select arias that aircraft can approach and depart from
with maximum safety. This area or drop zond must be within the units
permiter and it must be identifiable on maps. The terrain should be
flat and level as possible with some concealment from the enemy.
This means that the commander must plan far enough ahead to take and
secure an objective that meets these requirements.

The minimum size of the drop zone should be 200 yards wide
and 500 yards long. This will allow the aircraft to come in low
enough to drop the supplies and get out again. Normally, the zone
can be longer depending on the perimeter, A zone 800 yards long and
500 yards wide is more suitable , 2 This will afford the aircraft more
time over the area and will permit a better drop 0

..The marking of the drop zone will normally be done as pre ­

scribed by the. Theater SOP, However, there will be times when the
commander will have to depend upon his own initiative and the mate ­
rial available. The zone will normally be marked by using cerise
panels which are T/O&E to the tank and infantry battalion. These
panels are normally displayed on the drop zone in a nT ” formation.
The outer edge, of the zone will be marked by using additional panels.
This will assist the pilots of the aircraft by defining the limits
of the zone. The " T ” should be in the center of the drop zone,"*
This is.in variance with FM 57-30, but it has proved successful in
actual operation in Korea, .

It is possible that more than one unit within a large area

will request resupply by air. .In this case the pilots must have some
way to identify the correct drop zone. Marking of zones should fol ­
low a standard procedure, A code symbol of numbers or letters is
formed using panels. This symbol should be placed at the lower left
hand corner of the stem of the ”TM ,^ . ~

To further assist the pilots in locating the drop zone, smoke

grenades,, smoke pots, or any other available material can be used.
They should be placed so as not to obscure the vision of the pilots 0
One smoke grenade is placed on either side of the ”T ” and one near
the center of the stem* The zone should be marked - a - minimum of 30
minutes ahead of time to assure proper marking prior to the arrival
of the aircraft.5 After the aircraft have dropped their load and
departed all visible marking should be removed. This will eliminate
the possibility of confusing the pilots who might be supplying other
units, (See appendix 2 for a diagram of the proper method of marking
a drop zone,)

Recovery of Supplies. Every unit should include recovery

methods in their SOPo A suggested procedure is as follows: After
all of the supplies are dropped they will be gathered and assembled
at a predetermined location. There they will be uncrated, segregated,
and stacked according to type. Personnel from the unit will do this
work under supervision of the supply platoon« Air Force drop equip­
ment will be recovered and returned through normal supply channels«
Proper handling of Air Force equipment must be emphasised because it
is very easily damaged and is needed for future drops. It is recom ­
mended that full tracked vehicles be used in the recovery and dis­
tribution of the supplies due to their increased mobility over wheel
type vehicleso

CnmmnOrations« One of the vitally important links in the

Hpn»fla n n packet system is communications« Normally, the reinforced
battalion will request its supplies by radio« This requires that mes­
sages used in the request of supplies be clear and concise. One of
the chief advantages of this system is that it is easily adapted to
this form of communications. The information that must be included
in the message request is listed in Appendix 1 0

Security. The unit commander must realize that a determined

enemy will make fanatical efforts to keep his unit from being re­
supplied. A commander must be able to hold a three hundred and sixty
degree perimeter until he can receive and distribute his supplies.
All enemy guns must be eliminated that would be a^definite threat to
aerial resupply aircraft. How is he going to do this? ^ h a s been
determined that he must plan far enough ahead to take an objective
that is suitable for resupplying his unit. He will also consider
the terrain from a defensive standpoint.

To gain the maximum security the majority of his force should

be on the perimeter. Maximum use should be made of all available
fire support to eliminate fire on the drop zone and its approaches.
But, prior to the aircraft approach to the drop zone, all nigh
trajectory fire must cease until the planes have cleared the area.

Summary. The fundamental principles that must be considered

and perfected in the operation of aerial resupply have been pre ­
sented in this chapter. A H troops must be ;, . ^ ou^ ^ ra l^e. 1X1
each of the individual phases. The final test of a j j n d its^ .
ability to utilize the system should be included in the field maneuv r
stage of training. This test should, be i n the form of an actual air
resupply of a reinforced battalion sized unit. It should be con-
ducted under conditions as realistic as possible« The results wi
be the basis for final revision of the unit's SOP.

In this study the committee feels that it has presented a

sound and realistic solution to one of the most critical problems
facing a m o r today. This problem of logistical support must be
solved if armor is to fulfill its proper role in modern warfare 0 In
this study the problem has not only been considered, but a solution
has been offered with the means for implementation. It is hoped
that in the future the '’On-Call" system will be given a "practical
test. Should this test be successful, the system should be adopted
as a standard supplementary means of sustaining armored units in
combat.

ROTES FOR CHAPTER 3

^•Supply from the Sky, a booklet prepared by the personnel

of the 315th Air Division, (Far East Air Forces, 1951), p 1.
2
Air Drop to a Tank Battalion, a research report prepared
by Committee No 6 , The Armored School, 1951-1952, (Fort Knox,
Kentucky, The Armored School, 1952), p 73 .

cit. Supply from the Sky, p 7«

^SOP Troop Carrier/Airborne Operations. a report prepared

by OCAFF, The Armored Center, and US Air Force, 1951, sec 0, p 14.

^Op cit. Supply from the Sky, p 14.

*ff*i f*
I l i W l .$3 % 11
i In f
■ vl_h
!t 1-S%«
1 1 1tl•
*H1M ,f 11«.ft
24 -
 CHAPTER It

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

1. Armor is faced with a critical logistical problem created

by the increased supply requirement of the new family of tanks«,

2. Numerous alternatives or modifications to the present

methods of supply are being considered«, These include:

a«, An increase in the T/O&E, reference present organic

supply personnel and transportation«,

b 0 An increase in size and capability of the present day

ton truck to approximately 5 tons 0 (Organic supply elements only).

Co Conversion to a large cargo track laying vehicle for

supply purposes.

d. A decrease in the number of tanks currently authorized

by T/O&E.

e. -Replace present tank engines with a newer engine of

less fuel consumption.

f. Resupply by air.

3. Aircraft are capable of resupplying armored units with

all items except armored vehicles.

4o Due to present day requirements, preparation of a supply

request, ground or air delivery, is a time consuming process.

5» Effective utilization of a prearranged supply catalog

code system would facilitate rapid formulation, transmission, and
processing of aerial resupply requests.

6. Preplanned r,On-Call" aerial resupply packets for armored

units are feasible, particularly for logistical support of pursuit
and exploitation type operations.

7. At present, no material is included in the Armored Series

Field Manuals that sets forth the techniques to be used in aerial re ­
supply.

8. There is no required training included in the Army Train­

ing Program for armored units in respect to aerial resupply.
 Recommendations

1. Ground logistical support of armored units should be

supplemented by aerial resupply 0

2, The "On-Call" packet system should be formulated and

integrated into present logistical doctrine,

3o The subject and doctrine of air resupply should be in­

corporated into appropriate armored field manuals,

4« Training in air resupply should be included in the Army

Training Program for armored units,

5« Further study should be made to make it possible to

utilize aerial resupply at night. This should include such modi ­
fications as necessary in both equipment and technique,

6, Further study should be conducted, to include practical

tests, on resupply by air by the "On-Call" packet system.

26
 Air Drop to a. Tank Battalion« a research report prepared by
Committee Number 6, Armored Officer Advanced Course, (The Armored
School, Port Knox, Kentucky, 1951-1952),

Major General James Mo Gavin, Airborne Warfare. (Washington:

Infantry Journal Press, 1947)„

Captain B, H« Liddell Hart, Defense of the West. (New York

City: William Morrow and Company, 1950}„

Lieutenant Colonel Robert J 0 Hoffman, Deliberations on Air­

borne, (Military Review, Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, December 1952)„

The Development of Vertical Attack. (The Infantry School

Quarterly, Port.Banning, Georgia, October 1948)0

Draft Army Training Program. Tank Battalion. Humber 17 - 300.

(The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1952 ) 0 '
---- -----

Colonel William S, Bodner, Effects of New Developments in

Warfare on Logistic s « (Port Leavenworth: Military Review, October
1951) * T: ;
• 4
FieId Manual 7 - 17« (Department of the Army, March 1951 ) 0

Fjeld Manual 17-22. (Department of the Army, May 1950 ) 0

Field Manual, 17 - 33,.(Department of the Army, September 1949),

Field Manual 17-50. (Department of the Army, January 1951 ) 0

Field Manual 17-100. (Department of the Army, December 1949) 0

Field Manual 57-30. (Department of the Army, January 1952)„

Field Manual lQl -10 . (Department of the Army, August 1949)„

Flexible Air Transport. (Headquarters, 315th Air Division

(Combat Cargo), APO 959, San Francisco, California).

Helicopter Development. (Hughes Aircraft Corporation, 1952),

Armed Forces Talk, How Does it Get to You. (Washington 25,

D.C.j Office of Armed Forces Information and Education Department of
Defense, Number 412, June 1952),
i mrà ñ 0% g ft f t f i l i a l T
U V V I I » Ir
27 I i l l 111
 Joint Training Directive for Air Groond Operations, (Fort
Monroe and Langely Air Force Base, Virginia: Prepared jointly by
Chief, Army Field Forces and Headquarters, Tactical Air Command,
September 1950.)

Major Thomas J, Howard, Mobile Division of 1950-60. (Wash­

ington: Armored Cavalry Journal, 1948),

Movement by Air. Special Text 71 - 1. (The Infantry School,

Fort Eenning, Georgia, 1951)»

General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader. (New York City, E.P.

Dutton and Company, 1952).

History of the Korean War. Problems in the Air Drop of Sup ­

plies and Personnel. (Headquarters, Far East Command, Military
History Section).

Reference Data for Armored Units. (The Armored School, Fort

Knox, Kentucky, 1952).

Report by the Chief of Staff. United States Army to the

Secretary of War, 30 June 1935. a report prepared by General Douglas
MacArthur.

SOP for Troop Carrier Airborne Operations. (Fort Monroe and

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia: Prepared jointly by Chief, Army
Field Forces and Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, February 1951).

Lieutenant Colonel Jerome W. Schrader, Staff Study of Pos ­

sible Uses of a Helicopter in Connection with Armored Units Operations.
(Fort Knox, Kentucky, The Armored School, Research and Evaluation
Division, 1951)o

Supply From the Sky. (Headquarters, 315th Air Division

(Combat Cargo), APO 959, San Francisco, California).

Supply of Isolated Units and Evacuation of Casualties of

Isolated Units by Light Planes, (headquarters ETOUSA. 1 9 1 5 k

Tank Warfare — And its Future. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart,

(Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Military Review, Command and General
Staff College , November 1952),,

T/O&E 17-25. Tank Battalion. 90 - mm Gun. (Department of the

Army).

28
 APPENDIX I

CHECK LIST OF INFORMATION SENT THROUGH CHANNELS

WHEN REQUESTING AN AIRDROP, THIS FORM WILL
ORIGINATE AT THE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS
BEING RESUPPLIED

1. SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS:

(Which of the "On-Call" packet numbers most nearly

meets your requirements?) Note: You can request
a certain packet and add to or delete any number
of items necessary,

2. EXACT LOCATION OF DROP ZONE,

(Drop zone is 1000 yards on an azimuth of 80 degrees

from the town of MUNSAN-NI, It is 100 yards SE of
Road Junction 240. It is in a valley characterized
by two large mountain peaks which are 820 and 475
meters high. They are located in Grid Square 4932
and 5643. Drop zone coordinates are 623345, Map:
KOREA 1:50,000, sheet MUNSAN - NI.)

3. DROP ZONE MARKINGS.

(Drop zone will be marked with red cerise panels

which form the letter " ! " . The code letter "A"
will appear at the lower left hand corner of the
" T " .)

4. TIME AIR DROP IS DESIRED.

(060800 time)

5. TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY INFORMATION,

(TA&P is present. Call sign BOX. He is on Red

channel),

6. RECOMMENDED AXIS OF APPROACH.

(From SW to NE)

7* ENEMY INFORMATION.

(Four enemy AA guns located at 462347.)

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I IHIssS APPENDIX II

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