4 SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR IDEA OF BEING AS TRANSCENDENTAL AND

ANALOGOUS

Once we have become reflectively aware of the horizon of being as the ultimate horizon
and goal of all our inquiry, we are prepared to launch our metaphysical investigation into the
beings of our experience – and by analogous extension into all beings even beyond our
present capacity for direct experience.
As we have already said, we shall be carrying on this investigation under the most univer-
sal aspect of their being as being, as existent, trying to discover the basic laws and principles
required for their intelligibility as beings. But to deal with them under this distinctive intel-
lectual focus or perspective of inquiry (called by the Scholastics the "formal object of in-
quiry"), we must constantly make use of the idea and the term being (or its conceptual equiv-
alent) in order to talk about them at all. This idea or concept, reflectively and critically ana-
lyzed, is the metaphysical idea or notion of being, as distinct from the unanalyzed common
sense notion. Because of its unique all-embracing function, it takes on special properties
which must be understood if we are to use it accurately and effectively as an instrument of
thought and not get misled by some of its apparent paradoxes, as has often happened in the
history of thought. The two most significant properties of the idea of being for our purposes
are that it is transcendental and analogous.
Transcendental Character of the Notion of Being. Since the notion of being includes not
only all beings but every real part of every being, it is said to "transcend" all barriers of
categories and modes of being, penetrating all of them through and through: unlimited or all-
inclusive in both extension (the range of subjects to which it can be applied) and intension
(comprehension). The same is true of other transcendental properties following upon every
being. Outside of being lies only "nothing," that is, nothing lies outside of it. For this reason,
it is called "transcendental," i.e., transcending or leaping over all divisions, categories, and
distinctions within beings and pervading them all. It excludes only non-being. This is its very
purpose as a concept, to be the ultimate all-inclusive term, to express the ultimate horizon of
reality itself and everything in it.
Thus, the notion of being is the supreme all-embracing idea through which we embrace
intellectually and express to ourselves the whole of reality. It is thus the poorest and emptiest
of all ideas in its explicit content, since it mentions nothing in particular or determinate about
anything save its sheer presence; yet it is richest in implicit content, since it signifies inde-
terminately and implicitly all that there is, omitting nothing from the tiniest particle or
thought to the infinite plenitude of God.
How this notion is formed. As a result of this unique all-inclusive character, the notion of
being cannot be formed through the ordinary process of abstraction by which other more
limited concepts are formed. The ordinary process of conceptual abstraction selects some
aspect or aspects of a thing and omits the rest. But the notion of being can omit nothing
because the aspect it focuses on, being itself, includes everything in the thing, not only what
it has in common with other things but also all its distinctive differences, since all are real.
Hence it is formed by a special process of abstraction which focuses explicitly on the as-
pect of existence and expresses the kind or mode of being only implicitly and indeterminately
– a being, something which is, that which is. It highlights the is, the act of presence, and
leaves the essence or mode of being in the shadow (somewhat like faces left blurred and out
of focus in a large group photograph at a distance).
 Central Problems of Metaphysics - 26

Thomas calls this mental process a Judgment of Separation. First, we come to know
existence not through abstracting a form but by judging that something is. Second, by
running through many instances and comparing them we judge that being is not necessarily
restricted to this or that particular mode of existence, in particular existence in matter. We
thus separate out being from its modes not by abstracting it from them, which cannot be done,
strictly speaking, but by judging that it transcends them all, is not limited to or identified with
any one of its modes. There is much technical discussion about just how this is done. The text
explaining this special method and giving this special name to the process was only recently
discovered when the critical edition of In Boethium de Trinitate, q.5, art. 3 (Ed. Maurer, pp.
33-34) showed that where former texts had applied this method of separation to
"mathematics" the correct text was really "metaphysics."
As a notion, being is therefore formed, not by simple selection and omission of notes in
the essence of a thing, but starts from judgments of existence as its data: "This, that is..."
Running through a whole gamut of these, it focuses on the is as the common element present
in every possible this and that, or mode of being, and inexhaustibly transcending, or
irreducible, to any particular mode. It then separates out the element of is of presence to
highlight it explicitly, leaving the mode indistinct: "That which is." It can now be applied to
all beings, signifying explicitly the act of presence and that it has existence in some mode, but
not specifying which.
Being as Analogous concept, the famous “Analogy of Being”. It follows necessarily from
the above property of all-inclusiveness that the idea of being must be an analogous and not a
univocal concept. That is, it must be flexible or "stretch" concept taking on the contours of
whatever it is applied to, not rigidly predetermined to one fixed and precise meaning.
Analogy belongs only to concepts and linguistic terms, not to beings. It is the conceptual-
linguistic expression of an ontological situation of similarity, deriving for St. Thomas from
the objective metaphysical structure of participation. A better understanding of analogy must
await the doctrine of participation, causality, God. For now, we must be contented with a
streamlined introduction.
An analogous term is one predicated of many different subjects according to a meaning
partly the same, partly different. Of many different kinds, one that interests us in metaphysics
is analogy of proper proportionality: where a term is predicated of many different subjects
truly and properly (not metaphorically) according to a meaning partly the same, partly
different, based on a proportional similarity in each case. Here a common attribute is found
proportionally similar (yet different in mode) as diversely possessed by essentially different
modes of being or natures. The only terms capable of such intrinsic analogous predication are
those expressing some kind of activity (or its complement, passivity, reception); for only an
activity or act, in the broadest possible sense, can be diversely exercised by essentially
different subjects or agents, yet remain somehow proportionally, analogously, the same. A
form or essence as such is not as flexible.
Thus, there is an internal structure to all such terms and concepts expressing proportional
similarity (analogy of proper proportionality): activity A (e.g., loving, knowing, unity), as
exercised by agent or subject X in its own proper way, is proportionally similar to the same
(similar) activity A as exercised by subject Y in its own way, by subject Z....etc.
Subject/activity/mode, or subject/activity, where the subjects and modes vary essentially
without destroying the intrinsic proportional similarity of the activity itself, though each new
mode does intrinsically modify or differentiate the analogous perfection itself. The intrinsic
variation of modes within a common perfection (Being) is not possible without a duality of
terms within the concept. A simple one-piece concept or attribute is not susceptible of such
 Being as Transcendental and Analogous - 27

analogous adaptation but remains univocally the same in each case of predication: this is the
case with form and essence, which either is or is not present; no sliding scale is possible.1
In the following, we will see how terms are classified according to their rigidity or
flexibility of meaning.
(1) Univocal: when the term is applied in all instances in exactly the same meaning in
each case. For example, concepts of well determined types of things, such as "Man,"
"elephant," "typewriter," etc. It is designed to be a precise and hence rigid concept, with
clearly determined limits. It serves the need for precision in human thinking in any field. The
sciences are especially careful to define their terms precisely in this way, wherever possible.
(2) Equivocal: when the term is applied according to a completely different meaning in
each case, so that only the verbal sound remains the same, with no common conceptual con-
tent. For example, "He fell into the well. He is feeling well." It is simply a linguistic accident
of no further significance, except that we must avoid using equivocal terms in an argument,
which render it invalid.
(3) Analogous: it lies between the univocal and equivocal and occurs when a term is ap-
plied to different subjects according to a meaning partly the same and partly different in each
case. Their role is to be "bridge" terms, enabling us to draw together and compare things that
are different in kind yet somehow similar; to explore an obscure or newly discovered area in
terms of the already known and more familiar; to make metaphors, which are the lifeblood of
poetry, illumining one thing by another; to represent what is beyond our direct or ordinary ex-
perience, principally the spiritual world, God, etc.; to span the whole universe in a single
synoptic idea.
Examples: being, life, action, knowledge, power, love, goodness, strength, energy, etc.
These are all flexible or stretch concepts, which shift their meaning more or less with diverse
applications, but always holding on to a bond of similarity strong enough to warrant unifying
its applications under a common intellectual focus or idea. Thus, "strength of muscles" is not
exactly like "strength of will," but enough like it to merit the same description.
We shall now outline the principal types or structures of analogy, as used in all fields of
human thinking. Then we shall apply the notion of analogy to the idea of being in particular.
Types of Analogy:
(a) Extrinsic Attribution: This type of analogy is found when a term is applied to several
different subjects in such a way that it is predicated according to its proper meaning only of
one among them (the primary analogate) and to the others only because of some relation to
the primary analogate, usually a relation of cause, effect, belonging to, etc. (These others to
whom the term is extended are called the secondary analogates.)
This analogy does not express an intrinsic similarity between the analogates but only
some relation between them. Thus, "healthy" is predicated of man and of food: "This man is
healthy. This is a healthy food." It is predicated in its proper meaning of man but extended
only by extrinsic attribution to food: i.e., food is not properly healthy in itself but is called
healthy because it is related to health in man as cause to effect. So also: "He is an Asian. This
is an Asian car." The man is properly a citizen of one of the countries in Asia. The car is
called Asian because it is made by Asians or in Asia, not because it itself is a citizen of an
Asian country. This analogy is merely a convenient linguistic shorthand and has no further
significance. It does appear in some philosophical theories, which hold, for example, that
God alone is truly being, whereas creatures are only called beings by extrinsic denomination
because they come from God.
 Central Problems of Metaphysics - 28

(b) Proportionality: When a term is predicated of several analogates in order to express

some proportional similarity between them. Note that the similarity expressed is not directly
between two essences or natures, as such, but between their activities, functions, or other
relations.
One might generalize and say that most significant analogies between real beings are re-
ducible to relations of activity or its correlative, receptivity. Diverse kinds of being are simi-
lar, not directly in their essences or forms, but in their operations; action is the primary bond
of similarity between diverse kinds of things. The analogous term thus signifies the same
general kind of activity but as done diversely by each agent in its own particular way. Hence
the meaning of the analogous term is partly the same and partly different in each application,
shifting internally to fit the mode of each new subject or analogate, but without breaking the
internal bond of similarity justifying one concept and one term. The structure of this type of
analogy is called proportionality because it can be expressed as a proportion (borrowed from
mathematics, where it originated) thus: subject X is similar in its operation to subject Y in its
operation. Thus, unlike extrinsic attribution, an analogy of proportionality is always rooted in
some intrinsic similarity.
But this similarity can be expressed in two different types of analogous predication
according to proportionality:
(i) Metaphorical (also called Improper) Proportionality: This occurs when the intrinsic
similarity is expressed by using a term which in its proper and literal meaning applies to only
one of the analogates and to the others only by metaphor. Thus, "He is a fox. I am the Good
Shepherd." "He is a beaver for work."
The purpose of the metaphorical predication is to express a genuine similarity in function
or action between two different kinds of beings in a vivid and striking way by a transference
of names or attributes that is not literally true. A man is not literally a fox, but like it in the
cleverness of his operations. But because of the underlying similarity supporting it, a
metaphorical analogy can always be reduced to a literal one, though the expression will then
become less striking and vivid.
Metaphor is the very stuff of which poetry is made, and one of its principal functions is to
express and illuminate psychic or spiritual realities through analogy with material ones, the
inner through the outer – or vice versa. It presupposes the recognition, explicit or implicit, of
a profound affinity, a mutual similarity and imaging, between all levels of being in the
universe, in particular between spirit and matter. The ultimate ground of this inner bond of
similitude running through all being is one of the principal tasks the metaphysician to inquire
into. Thus, metaphysics and poetry, indeed all art, are mutually illuminating. The whole
world of symbolism and the symbolic imagination depends on this hidden bond of affinity
between all things. The explanation of the ground of this affinity among beings can take two
main philosophical forms: (1) the source of all things lies at the bottom, in matter evolving
upward; or (2) the source is from the top, Spirit, God, etc., flowing downward through differ-
ent levels of participation.
(ii) Proper Proportionality: This occurs when the intrinsic similarity between analogates
is expressed by a term that is applied to all the analogates in its proper and literal meaning,
though with a proportional difference as found in each. Thus: power, knowledge, action, love,
beauty, etc. "A mouse knows. A man knows, God knows, loves..."
Where the analogous attribute is understood as participated in diverse degrees deriving
from a common source possessing it in its fullness, proportional similarity and causal relation
to a primary analogate fuse together into a single complex structure sometimes called
 Being as Transcendental and Analogous - 29

analogy of participation (as in the mature St. Thomas) or intrinsic attribution. The chief
application is the analogy between God and creatures.
Note, as was said above, that all analogies of proper proportionality express some kind of
activity, function, or relation exercised diversely by different agents or subjects, each in its
own characteristic way. This does not mean that the analogous concept breaks down into two
aspects, one exactly the same and the other totally different. Then it would break up into two
notions, one univocal, the other equivocal. Here the one notion is at once same and different
throughout in all its predications.
Systematic Imprecision: One consequence of this wide scope and flexibility of analogous
concepts, allowing for a wide range of differences within the unity of one meaning, is that it
is very difficult if not impossible to say exactly what a given analogous concept means with
any precision. The reason is that, since they are open-ended at the bottom or the top or both,
it is impossible to set clear limits to their meaning. One gets to understand their meaning not
by clear definition, but by running through the gamut of typical instances and grasping in a
synthetic intuitive vision what is common to them all. But such concepts always retain a cer-
tain vagueness and indeterminateness, so that one knows what he means as he actually uses
them, but cannot say clearly what this meaning is in abstraction from all instances. He can
only call attention to examples and try to evoke the inner understanding in the hearer. As a
result there is always the danger that instead of holding the meaning stretched open to its full
capacity, one tries to get it clear, pin it down too much, and ends up identifying it with one or
more of its typical instances. Thus, being becomes only observable material being;
knowledge only rational knowledge.
Note: This analogy is an indispensable tool for all philosophical inquiry especially for
metaphysics in its quest to bring together all reality in a unitary vision. All the great unifying
metaphysical concepts must thus be analogous by proper proportionality. And its principal
crucial application is to make possible thinking and speaking about the Infinite, in terms bor-
rowed from the finite world. It is here that our thought and language are stretched to the
breaking point, without quite breaking--if one knows how to use analogy carefully.
(3.2) Application of Analogy to Being: It follows from the nature and purpose of
analogous concepts as studied above that the paradigm of all analogous concepts which are
not metaphors is that of being. If any concept is intrinsically and properly analogous, surely it
must be the concept of being. For it is the fundamental bond of unity underlying and envelop-
ing all differences and all other unities. Hence it must be analogous according to the mode of
proper proportionality, the only kind of intrinsic analogy. Surely to say that something is, is
real, cannot be a metaphor, for it underlies all proper analogies. When this analogy is
unfolded fully in a God-creature context, it turns into the analogy of participation as outlined
above.
But the question now arises: How can the idea of being verify the rule explained above,
that all intrinsically analogous terms express actions, operation, or relations, not essences or
forms as such? How can being be understood as an action?
This is the beauty of the Thomistic notion of being which is our source of inspiration here.
It includes both essence as mode and existence as the radical act of presence of a being.
Being for Aquinas is not primarily a thing, or essence, form or static state, but a dynamic act
of presence, of self-presenting to other active presents, manifesting itself through its char-
acteristic modes of action and interaction with other existents. Being is thus a radical doing,
an energy, at the root of all other doing. St. Thomas calls it the virtus essendi, the power of
being, as does Paul Tillich today also. This becomes clearer when we unfold its inner struc-
 Central Problems of Metaphysics - 30

ture thus: it signifies (1) an agent or subject, (2) actively presenting itself, exercising the act
of existence, within the community of all existents, (3) each in its own characteristic way,
i.e., according to its particular essence or mode of being. This meaning is verified analogi-
cally of every real being in the universe, all the way from the tiniest electron to the Infinite
Plenitude of God: each is present, presents itself, in its own way, yet with an infinite range of
diversity of modes of presence.
Note that if one does not hold a notion of being centered upon the act of existence as its
core, but rather one that signifies only determinate essence or form, or thing, then it is very
difficult to hold that the notion of being is intrinsically analogous rather than univocal. For
essences and forms as such are simply diverse; it is only in their doings that they are similar.
And if the meaning of a concept contains only one element, i.e., essence, it is hard to see how
it can vary proportionately with different instances. This notion of being as signifying essence
has been predominant in the whole Platonic tradition (that is why God must be above being =
essence both for Plato and Plotinus).
(3.3) Application to God: This is the crucial and most controversial touchstone of the
doctrine of analogy: its extension to language about God, allowing us to talk positively about
God.
If one holds that being means determinate essence or form, it becomes very difficult if not
impossible to talk about God, the infinite plenitude of being, in positive terms, even more so
if one holds that the idea of being is univocal. For either (1) one tends to draw Him down to
an anthropomorphic conception based on the mode of our concepts of finite being as determi-
nate form, or (2) one opts for the so-called "negative theology" in one of its many forms. That
is, one can say nothing positive about God but must speak of Him only through negations:
God is above being, non-being, non-material, non-knowing, non-personal, etc.
There is a deep truth in this negative theology tradition, namely, that we cannot grasp
God adequately in any determinate human concept, since He is infinite, beyond all form and
determination. It is quite true that we cannot grasp positively at all the unique mode or es-
sence of the divine being. But the power of the Thomistic analogous notion of being is that it
transcends this essentialist mode of thinking. Because it focuses on the similarity of the act of
existence in all things--not of their essences or forms save as modes-of-existing--it does not
require that in applying the notion of being to God we must know or specify the mode of the
divine existence. We affirm only that He exists, is present, in His own appropriate way, i.e.,
infinitely, in a plenitude of total pure active presence to Himself and to all things, without our
trying in any way to grasp or enclose in our concept what this mode is in itself. Hence, we
can leave the mystery of the divine essence intact, yet say something positive about it that
links it with the entire community of the rest of being, His creatures. For the proportionally
analogous notion of being highlights and makes explicit only the act of presence in beings,
leaving the mode or essence completely unspecified and open to a limitless range.
Correspondingly, all other positive attributes applied to God are equally analogous and
are merely partial further specifications of this basic divine attribute of total presence, focus-
ing on some aspect of its activity and relations. It seems impossible, in fact, to speak of God
at all and still maintain consistently a pure negative theology. In practically all those who at-
tempt it, positive notions keep slipping back in implicitly without being recognized as such. I
suggest that the only fully consistent position is to allow some positive analogous predication
about God in the mode of proper proportionality as understood above, or else to keep total
silence about God, as the Buddhists claim to do--although they too sometimes inadvertently
slip; or else, best of all, to use an alternating dialectic of positive and negative predication.
 Being as Transcendental and Analogous - 31

(3.4) Analogy in St. Thomas: Aquinas combines attribution and proportion in a single
synthesis. The above presented notion of the analogy of being, as expressing the proportional
similarity of the act of existence in all things, diversified according to diverse modes of
essence, is the key to his whole treatise on the attributes of God. His use of it is clear. But he
finds himself cramped by the inadequate Aristotelian terminology he adopts and shifts back
and forth between various schemas of explanation not always mutually compatible, through-
out his works, now Aristotelian, now Neoplatonic. He finally settles on the analogy of
participation (explained above) as his favorite schema of the relations between God and crea-
tures. This is the linguistic conceptual expression in our language of an ontological
participation situation, in which all creatures share diversely in the common perfection of
existence from one Infinite Source.
1
A fuller discussion of this type of analogy will be presented later in the chapter.