Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 63, No. 1, 2007, pp.

139--153

Travel Demand Management Targeting Reduced

Private Car Use: Effectiveness, Public Acceptability
and Political Feasibility
Tommy Gärling∗
Göteborg University

Geertje Schuitema
University of Groningen

The private car is fast, comfortable, and convenient. However, worldwide mas-
sive car use causes serious environmental problems. Although breakthroughs in
clean automobile technology may be under way, reducing car use seems neces-
sary in order to achieve a sustainable transportation system. Several travel demand
management (TDM) measures have therefore been proposed and some have been
implemented with this aim. The article reviews research addressing the question
of how effective, acceptable to the public, and politically feasible such measures
are. The conclusion is that noncoercive TDM measures alone are unlikely to be
effective in reducing car use. Therefore, coercive TDM measures such as increas-
ing cost for or prohibiting car use may be necessary but are difficult to implement
because of public opposition and political infeasibility. If combined with nonco-
ercive TDM measures providing attractive travel alternatives and communicating
the benefits of car-use reduction to the public, coercive TDM measures are likely
to become more effective, acceptable, and politically feasible.

Car traffic has increased rapidly during the last decades (OECD, 2001). In
the OECD countries the number of cars increased from 411 million in 1980 to
688 millions in 1998, and the total number of kilometers traveled in private cars
increased from 4,924 billion kilometers in 1990 to 8,472 billion kilometers in 1998.
Worldwide 11,000 billion kilometers were annually traveled in motor vehicles in

∗ Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Tommy Gärling, Depart-

ment of Psychology, Göteborg University, P.O. Box 500, SE-405 30 Göteborg, Sweden [e-mail:
Tommy.Garling@psy.gu.se].
139

C 2007 The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
140 Gärling and Schuitema

1998. Car ownership as well as the numbers of kilometers driven per person is
expected to further increase in the future.
In general, the car is a very attractive mode of transportation. Compared to
other travel modes, the car is fast, comfortable, and convenient. Cars provide car-
rying capacity and privacy. For many people their car is also a status symbol and
a way to express themselves. However, massive car use causes serious problems.
At a global scale, car traffic is a major user of energy and significantly contributes
to global warming (U.S. Department of Energy, 2002). Worldwide the transport
sector consumed 28% of the total energy in 2004, resulting in large emissions of
greenhouse gases such as CO2 , methane, and NOx (Energy Information Admin-
istration, EIA, 2004). Local air pollution is another recognized consequence of
increasing car use that results in health problems and odor nuisance (e.g., White-
legg, Gatrell, & Naumann, 1993). The growth in car use decreases the quality of
life in urban areas due to noise, traffic accident risks, and encroachment on land
that destroys historical/cultural, aesthetic, and restorative qualities (Greene & We-
gener, 1997). Moreover, in densely populated areas, the accessibility of various
destinations is impaired due to congestion and lack of parking space. Because of
these negative impacts, many hold the view that the current transportation system
is not sustainable. Policies are therefore needed to manage the negative impacts of
car traffic.
Various policies may be implemented to promote sustainable transportation.
Despite innovations in automobile technology, technical solutions do not as yet
solve the problems. A current assessment is therefore that policy measures must be
implemented, which decrease the demand for car use (e.g., OECD, 1997). The label
travel demand management (TDM) is used to refer to such measures (Kitamura,
Fujii, & Pas, 1997).
In this article we will first analyze the effectiveness of TDM measures in
reducing private car use. A conceptual framework is introduced indicating that in
order to be effective, TDM measures should make car use relatively less attractive,
thereby activating car-use reduction goals. The TDM measures also need to facili-
tate the implementation of such goals by decreasing the costs of various adaptation
alternatives. Second, we discuss factors that are related to public acceptability and
political feasibility of TDM measures. In the concluding section we argue that
implementing a combination of coercive and noncoercive measures is most likely
to be effective, acceptable, and politically feasible.

TDM Measures

How to change unsustainable behavior has been the focus of much empirical
psychological research (e.g., Vining & Ebreo, 2002) as well as theorizing (e.g.,
Stern, 2000). Car use has not frequently been targeted in this research. Whereas
in many other areas the targeted behavior (e.g., waste disposal) is clearly defined
in terms of antecedents and consequences, this is not generally the case with
Changing Demand for Private Car Use 141

Table 1. Travel Demand Management Measures (Adapted from Steg, 2003)

TDM Measure Examples
Physical change measures − improving public transport
– improving infrastructure for walking and cycling
– park & ride schemes
– land use planning to encourage shorter travel times
– technical changes to make cars more energy-efficient
Legal policies − prohibiting car traffic in city centers
– parking control
– decreasing speed limits
Economic policies − taxation of cars and fuel
– road or congestion pricing
– kilometer charging
– decreasing costs for public transport
Information and education measures − individualized marketing
– public information campaigns
– giving feedback about consequences of behavior
– social modeling

car use. Car use is instrumental for engagement in many of the nondiscretionary
and discretionary activities that make up people’s lives (Axhausen & Gärling,
1992). Furthermore, sometimes no substitutes exist, in other cases no substitutes
are equally comfortable and convenient. Therefore, an approach to changing car
use needs to be broader by focusing on the effectiveness and costs of car users’
adaptations to required changes in car use. Such adaptations are many and may not
all necessarily be more sustainable. For instance, if the workweek is compressed,
reduced commuting trips may lead to more leisure travel by car. In-home activities
may sometimes be more energy-consuming than driving to engage in out-of-home
activities.
Several different TDM measures have been proposed (see overviews in
Loukopoulos, 2007, and Vlek & Michon, 1992). In Table 1 (see also left box
in Figure 1) four types of TDM measures are distinguished which are targeting
different antecedents of travel demand and are based on different assumptions of
how behavioral changes may be elicited (e.g., Steg & Tertoolen, 1999).
First, physical changes aim at increasing the relative attractiveness of alter-
native travel modes, for instance, improving infrastructure for public transport,
walking and cycling, removing parking places, or constructing speed ramps. This
type also refers to technical improvements making cars more energy-efficient. The
underlying assumption is that people will adapt their car use to changes in physical
settings.
Second, legal measures may be implemented to enforce car use. Examples
include prohibiting car traffic in city centers, decreasing speed limits, and intro-
ducing parking regulations. The assumption is that people will comply with these
measures. In addition, it is hoped that in the longer term legal policies result in
changes in social norms.
142 Gärling and Schuitema

Fig. 1. Conceptual framework (adapted from Gärling et al., 2002).

Third, economic measures aim at making car use relatively more expensive.
Examples of economic policies are congestion or road pricing, taxation of fuels
and cars, and reducing costs for public transport. The underlying assumption is
that people’s travel choices depend on cost-benefit analyses of alternatives.
Fourth, information and education measures aim at changing people’s percep-
tions, attitudes, beliefs, values, and personal norms concerning car use. Examples
include providing information about positive and negative aspects of car use, feed-
back about environmental impacts, social modeling (e.g., prominent public figures
using alternative travel modes), and individualized marketing (providing people
with customized information about their travel options).
An important distinction should be made between coercive and noncoercive
TDM measures. In general, the extent to which measures force people to reduce
their car use indicates how coercive a TDM measure is. As such, coerciveness may
be defined subjectively. Noncoercive measures, for instance, improving alternative
travel modes give car users a choice or, in the case of information or education,
reduce car users’ positive attitudes towards car use. Generally, prohibition by
legislation or physically closing out cars will be more coercive than transport
pricing. However, for some the opposite may be true, for instance, that legislation
does not affect one’s car use while transport pricing would. Thus, coerciveness
of TDM measures depends on the extent to which such measures would actually
affect current travel behavior, and the extent to which people are able to evade the
consequences of the measure.

Effectiveness of TDM Measures

Whether TDM measures are effective or not in changing people’s car use
may be analyzed drawing on the conceptual framework proposed by Gärling et al.
Changing Demand for Private Car Use 143

(2002). This conceptual framework posits that car users choose among several
travel alternatives before they start their trip. These alternatives are described as
bundles of attributes of trip chains or tours (purposes, destinations, travel modes,
departure times, travel times, and costs; see second box from left in Figure 1). A
TDM measure is aimed at changing the attributes characterizing travel alternatives,
for instance, road pricing may increase costs of car use and reduce travel time by
car. These changes may make car users set a car-use reduction goal that they
subsequently attempt to attain.
After having set a car-use reduction goal, car users are assumed to form a
plan to attain this goal. In making such a plan, they may choose among a range
of alternatives1 to the current travel alternatives such as staying at home, thereby
suppressing car trips to out-of-home activities, perhaps using electronic commu-
nication instead of driving, carpooling, travel to closer destinations, combining
trips, changing to shorter routes, changing departure times, or using other travel
modes (see rightmost box in Figure 1). They may also consider longer term strate-
gic changes such as moving to another residence, changing work place, changing
work hours (e.g., compressing the workweek), reducing the number of cars owned,
or purchasing another type of car.
Based on the proposed conceptual framework, three conditions are identified
that need to be fulfilled to make TDM measures effective in reducing car use.
First, TDM measures should reduce the attractiveness of car use. Second, TDM
measures should activate car-use reduction goals. Third, after activating car-use
reduction goals, TDM measures should facilitate goal attainment. Each of these
conditions will in turn be discussed below.

Reducing Attractiveness of Car Use

In order to assess the effectiveness of a TDM measure, it is essential to consider

the effects it will have on relevant attributes of travel alternatives faced by targeted
car users (see second box from left in Figure 1). Will the implementation of the
TDM measure make car use sufficiently less attractive? If it does, it would trigger
the setting of a car-use reduction goal.
Empirical studies have revealed that noncoercive measures such as giving
information and feedback (Tertoolen, Kreveld, & Verstraten, 1998), or rewarding
bus ridership (Deslauriers & Everett, 1977) do not result in car-use reduction. A
reason may be that these measures do not successfully reduce the attractiveness of
car use. However, the underlying reasons are seldom disentangled. Typically, only
effects on travel are assessed, while underlying processes explaining changes are
not. Studying the underlying processes (such as goal setting and implementation)

1
Note that we include changes in car use that objectively may not lead to a reduction.
144 Gärling and Schuitema

is essential to understand when and why noncoercive measures are effective in

reducing car use. In contrast, coercive TDM measures have the prospect of reducing
car use more effectively. Yet, coercive measures may be evaded since they are
limited in time and spatial scale.
Addressing this last point, a few published studies have attempted to assess
possible effects of coercive TDM measures given current car use patterns. As
an example, Loukopoulos, Gärling, and Vilhelmson (2005) showed that the per-
centage of car trips that would be affected by prohibiting car use in downtown
Göteborg, Sweden (population approximately 500,000) ranges from 2% to close
to 50%. The percentage of affected car trips depended on the spatial extension of
the zone and the time of day the zone was operative (morning peak, daytime, or all
hours on weekdays). These results were based on statistics compiled from travel
surveys collected at different days of the week. For car trips that were affected, no
assumptions were made about adaptations car users would make if their car trips
to downtown were prohibited. For instance, prohibited car trips may be substituted
by car trips to other, possibly more distant destinations or to the same destinations
at another hour. Thus, the total number of car trips affected may be even lower.
Complete car-use reduction is obviously achieved only if the affected car trips are
suppressed or made by another mode.
Also a coercive TDM measure such as road pricing may fail to make car
use sufficiently less attractive. Since the impact on the household economy that
road-use fees will have depends on people’s socioeconomic status, it is essential
to analyze how different socioeconomic groups are affected. Santos and Rojey
(2004) demonstrated that the effects of road pricing are progressive, regressive, or
neutral depending on where car users live. However, the authors did not estimate
the extent to which car users were willing to pay to continue driving, nor what the
costs would be for travel alternatives. Furthermore, the extent to which road pricing
makes car use less attractive also depends on how the measure is implemented, for
instance, whether the price is differentiated in time and space, and which price level
is chosen (Schuitema, 2003). It further needs to be taken into account that travel
times may decrease, thus possibly offsetting the negative effects of increasing
costs.

Activate Car-Use Reduction Goals

TDM measures need to activate car-use reduction goals in order to be effective

(see third box from left in Figure 1). One trigger is the reduced attractiveness of car
use. In order to understand as well as promote the goal-setting process, it is impor-
tant to identify also other triggers such as individual and household characteristics
that influence the setting of car-use reduction goals and their properties. Needs
and desires are conceived of as aspired choice outcomes or goals (e.g., Austin &
Vancouver, 1996; Heath, Larrick, & Wu, 1999). Goals are assumed to have two
Changing Demand for Private Car Use 145

primary attributes: content and intensity (Lee, Locke, & Latham, 1989). Content
is divided into difficulty, specificity, complexity, and conflict. Difficulty refers to
the size of the goal and the degree of effort required attaining it, specificity refers
to whether or not the goal is quantitative, complexity refers to the number of dif-
ferent outcome dimensions, and conflicting to the degree to which the attainment
of one goal inhibits attainment of another goal. Intensity refers to commitment to
the goal, importance of the goal, and the processes engaged by goal attainment.
Improving environmental quality is a possible, individual motive to set car-use
reduction goals (Steg & Schuitema, 2006). The value-belief-norm (VBN) theory
(Stern, 2000; Stern, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999) would account for this with its
focus on moral obligations (personal norms) to behave environmentally friendly,
that is, reducing car use. This theory is essentially an extension of the norm-
activation model (NAM; Schwartz, 1977). Like the NAM, VBN theory posits that
a personal norm, referring to a feeling of moral obligation, is an important deter-
minant of intentions2 to change behavior, such as car use. Personal norms depend
on the extent to which one is aware of negative consequences of one’s behavior
and feels responsible for reducing these. VBN theory assumes that awareness of
consequences originates in value orientations related to the environment.
The NAM and VBN theory have proved to be successful in explaining inten-
tions to engage in pro-environmental behavior (Hopper & Nielsen, 1991; Stern
et al., 1999; Van Liere & Dunlap, 1978), including car-use reduction (Bamberg
& Schmidt, 2003; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003). This indicates that personal norms
may play an important role in setting car-use reduction goals. Yet, further research
is needed to examine how content and intensity of such goals relate to personal
norms.
Household characteristics also affect the setting of car-use reduction goals.
Socioeconomic status can be one factor, depending on which TDM measure is
implemented. For instance, lower-income groups more strongly intend to reduce
car use if road pricing is implemented (Jakobsson, Fujii, & Gärling, 2000). Fur-
thermore, degree of urbanization is likely to affect the setting of car-use reduction
goals; households living in urban areas are more willing to set car-use reduction
goals than households living in suburban areas (Steg, 1996). Furthermore, house-
holds living in suburban areas are more dependent on their car than people living
in downtowns, and, consequently, may be less likely to set car-use reduction goals
(Santos & Rojey, 2004).
Coercive TDM measures more strongly force people to set car-use reduction
goals, and research has shown that enforced goals do not differ in motivational
value from self-set goals (Locke, Latham, & Erez, 1988). In contrast, noncoercive
TDM measures do not invariably lead to car-use reduction goals. Some moderating

2
For our purposes we do not distinguish between setting of car-use reduction goals and forming
intentions to reduce car use.
146 Gärling and Schuitema

factors have been mentioned. If car-use reduction goals have been set, their attain-
ment requires that alternatives are available, that car users are aware of these
alternatives, and that car users are prepared to choose these alternatives.

Attainment of Car-use Reduction Goals

Even if a TDM measure leads to the setting of car-use reduction goals, the
measure may still not have the intended car-use reduction effects (see rightmost
box in Figure 1). This follows from the fallibility of the process of formation and
implementation of plans to attain car-use reduction goals. It is amply documented
that attitudes as well as intentions frequently have a weak correspondence with
actual behavior (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Several reasons for this have been identi-
fied in the context of car use (Fujii & Gärling, 2003; Gärling, Gillholm, & Gärling,
1998) including failing to form and execute a plan thoroughly, encountering unan-
ticipated external impediments, or abandoning or reducing the goal.
A reason for not attaining a car-use reduction goal is that the implementation
is not planned thoroughly. For instance, Bamberg (2002) showed that students
who made a plan for how and when to travel by bus traveled more often by bus
than students who only indicated that they intended to travel by bus. A related
finding in goal-setting research (Locke & Latham, 1990) is that a specific goal
leads to better performance than an unspecified (“do-your-best”) goal. If the goal
is specific, monitoring the attainment of the goal is more effective. People may
also choose to work harder to attain goals if they receive feedback about adequate
progress resulting in positive emotions (Carver & Scheier, 1990). If the evaluation
of feedback about effectiveness (goal attainment) is delayed and vague, too small
changes in car use may continue to be chosen.
The important role car-use habits play in holding back change has furthermore
been demonstrated (Gärling & Axhausen, 2003). Breaking car-use habits there-
fore becomes important. As Fujii and Gärling (2005) have shown, forced temporal
changes are effective in doing this. One result of developing car-use habits is that
people no longer search for information about alternatives (Verplanken, Aarts, &
Van Knippenberg, 1997). Moreover, the relationship between attitudes and behav-
ior becomes much weaker if car-use habits are strong (Verplanken, Aarts, Van
Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg, 1994). Therefore, a car-use habit may also have
the effect of preventing that a car-use reduction goal is triggered.
Circumstances may also change making the attainment of car-use reduction
more difficult than anticipated. In this vein, Jakobsson (2004) observed on the
basis of interviews that some car use is “compulsive,” for instance in emergencies
when no feasible alternatives are available. Thus, at least temporarily car users
may feel they have no other choice than to abandon their car-use reduction goal.
A car-use reduction goal is sometimes permanently abandoned or reduced. An-
other focus in research on goal setting (Locke & Latham, 1990) is the relationship
Changing Demand for Private Car Use 147

between difficulty or size of a set goal and performance. An important finding

is that larger goals lead to better performance than smaller goals. Goals mobilize
more energy to work toward goal attainment, with the mobilized energy or effort
being proportional to the size of the goal. Larger goals thus lead to more sustained
effort or persistence than smaller goals. On the other hand, goals must not be too
large or difficult (Beckenkamp & Ostmann, 1999); if they are, people do not even
try to attain them. In addition, if people do not commit themselves to a goal, they
are likely to abandon the goal when facing difficulties in attaining it.
Self-regulation theory (Carver & Scheier, 1998) highlights still other fac-
tors. Loukopoulos, Jakobsson, Gärling, Schneider, & Fujii (2004) proposed that a
principle of cost-minimization (with cost broadly defined) needs to be evoked to
understand how individuals and households attain set car-use reduction goals. If
the cost appears to be too high to attain the goal, it may be abandoned or reduced.
Furthermore, the closer in time one is to face the requirement to attain the goal,
costliness of attainment becomes more salient than the value of the goal (Trope
& Liberman, 2003), thus increasing the likelihood that the goal is abandoned or
reduced.

Summary

The three conditions that should be fulfilled for TDM measures too be effective
are that the measures (1) reduce the attractiveness of car use, (2) activate car-use
reduction goals, and (3) reduce uncertainty and costs of attainment of activated
car-use reduction goals. Noncoercive TDM measures may fail to make car use less
attractive. Coercive TDM measures that enforce car-use reduction goals would be
more effective in this respect. However, this is not so if coercive TDM measures
have a restricted application in space and time and would only affect a limited
number of car users.
A number of factors including attitudes, values, and personal norms affect the
setting of car-use reduction goals when it is not forced. Knowledge of such factors
would be useful in implementing noncoercive TDM measures in a way that make
them maximally effective. In addition, car-use habits counteract the attainment of
car-use reduction goals.
The likelihood that car-use reduction goals are attained depends on, among
other factors, properties of the goals such as size, specificity, and commitment.
Immediate and specific feedback is essential. Furthermore, the availability of at-
tractive and less costly travel alternatives is required.

Public Acceptability

In general, noncoercive TDM measures are more acceptable to the public

than are coercive TDM measures (e.g., Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2006).
148 Gärling and Schuitema

This may be due to the fact that noncoercive TDM measures do not make car use
less attractive, and thus do not force car-use reduction. In contrast, coercive TDM
measures are more likely to limit freedom to drive by car.
On the other hand, TDM measures are opposed by the public if they are
perceived to be ineffective in solving the most important problems resulting from
car use (e.g., congestion and environmental problems, see Rienstra, Rietveld, &
Verhoef, 1999; Schade & Schlag, 2003). For example, public acceptability of a
toll ring in Oslo increased after its introduction when traffic congestion decreased
(Odeck & Bråthen, 2002). On the other hand, acceptability decreased in a field
study implementing a toll ring in Stuttgart, Germany (Schlag & Teubel, 1997),
because in this case car users did not experience any positive effects.
It may thus be concluded that TDM measure are acceptable if they do not
limit one’s freedom to drive and if they actually reduce the problems they aim
at reducing. This seems to be a contradiction because reducing problems implies
reducing car use and thus limiting individuals’ freedom of driving. Resolving the
issue, a study by Schuitema and Steg (2005) showed that people intending to reduce
car use after the implementation of a TDM measure expected to experience greater
advantages (i.e., they expected problems resulting from car use to decrease) than
the disadvantages of feeling restricted.
There may also be public opposition if TDM measures are perceived to be
unfair, that is, people may feel that they themselves or others are unfairly treated
if a TDM measures is implemented. Research has demonstrated a positive rela-
tion between perceived fairness and acceptability (e.g., Bamberg & Rölle, 2003;
Jakobsson et al., 2000; Jones, 2003). However, this relation needs to be further
investigated. Perceived fairness may be based on different principles (Deutsch,
1985): First, the principle of equality, that is, everyone should be equally affected
by the measure; second, the principle of equity implying that everyone should be
affected in proportion to, for instance, their income or how much they contribute to
the problem (such as environmental problems or congestion); and third, the prin-
ciple of need, that is, people who need to drive more (e.g., in one’s professional
capacity) should be less affected than people who need to drive less. It is unclear
which fairness principle is most strongly related to public acceptability.
A characteristic of TDM measures that may affect their public acceptability
is the extent to which people are compensated for possible negative effects. For
example, in case of road pricing, people may be compensated by the way revenues
are allocated. It has been shown that revenues that benefit the individual car user,
for instance, by decreasing road or fuel taxes, are more acceptable compared to
revenues that benefit society as a whole, such as general public funds (Jones, 1991;
Schuitema & Steg, 2005). A possible way of increasing acceptability of economic
sanctions is therefore to let revenues compensate for the infringement on freedom
and perceived unfairness. Another way of compensating is to implement supportive
policies, for instance, improving public transport, at the same time as prohibition or
pricing measures are implemented. As was mentioned before, providing feasible
Changing Demand for Private Car Use 149

alternatives may not only increase public support for coercive TDM measures, but
may also facilitate the attainment of car-use reduction goals.
In summary, public acceptability of coercive TDM measures is related to the
perceived effectiveness of the measure. The more likely it is that a TDM measure
actually solves environmental or congestion problems, the less strongly the public
will oppose the measure. This implies among other things that the benefits of
implementing TDM measures should be communicated clearly to the public.

Political Feasibility

TDM measures may not be politically feasible if they are not acceptable to the
public. In particular, coercive TDM measures are not easily implemented because
lack of public support causes political restraint. Yet, there are also other reasons.
In political decision making, conflicts between different goals must be resolved,
either because different political parties prioritize different goals or because a
TDM measure may lead to conflicting effects. For instance, in Europe, reducing car
traffic is attractive to the green party but not to the social democrats or conservatives
since they view it as a threat to economic development and, in the prolongation, to
the welfare of society (Johansson, Gustafsson, Falkemark, Gärling, & Johansson-
Stenman, 2003). An additional reason for the conservatives to be against road
pricing is their trust in deregulation and free-market solutions.
A similar goal conflict exists between political decision making at the munici-
pality and national levels. Whereas the government’s goal is to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, a more important goal for the municipality may be to offer in-
expensive and convenient transportation to the residents. Furthermore, although
politicians at both levels are sensitive to public opposition, they may be so more at
the municipality level because of closer ties to their voters. It may also be the case
that the public opposition is stronger in the municipality where implementation of
the TDM measure is contemplated.
A conflict also derives from the fact that TDM measures result in both in-
tended and unintended effects. For instance, road pricing may alleviate conges-
tions if the prices are set sufficiently high. At the same time this is likely to
reduce the profits of businesses if their gains from faster transportation due to
less congestion fail to offset the increased transportation costs. In a similar vein,
poor households would no longer afford leisure travel that they consider as highly
desirable, at least not without cutting expenditures for perhaps essential other
goods and services. Prohibition of car use might have even stronger similar side
effects.
In summary, political feasibility in part depends on public acceptability. Co-
ercive TDM measures that are less acceptable to the public may therefore be
less politically feasible to implement than are noncoercive TDM measures. Goal
conflicts in political decision making also decrease political feasibility, similarly
whether the TDM measure is coercive or noncoercive.
150 Gärling and Schuitema

Discussion

Our argument is that the private car has become so attractive (and will be so
in the developing countries) that its positive effects are becoming outweighed by
a host of negative effects. The negative environmental effects constitute threats
to a sustainable future. However, reducing current car use in the industrialized
countries or the growth in car use in developing countries may constitute a threat
to economic and social sustainability. In the longer term new car technologies (e.g.,
new fuel systems) may emerge that help achieve a sustainable transport system.
Increasing accessibility by rebuilding urban areas and substituting physical travel
with virtual travel are other possible future developments that will change the
current negative trends. Changes in lifestyles (resulting in, e.g., less international
tourism) would work in the same direction.
This article has primarily focused on what needs to be done in the shorter term,
that is, to reduce travel by the private car. This is no less important because there
are urgent problems. For a reduction in car use to happen, TDM measures must
be effective, acceptable to the public, and politically feasible. We have argued and
illustrated that voluntary, noncoercive TDM measures, such as public information
campaigns, may not be effective in reducing current car use. Coercive measures,
such as prohibition of car traffic, are likely to be more effective than are noncoercive
measures. However, whether coercive measures are effective depends also on the
characteristics of the measure (e.g., time and spatial scale) and characteristics of the
targeted car users. Noncoercive TDM measures may also be made more effective
if their implementation is based on the existing knowledge of how car users react.
A major problem in implementing coercive TDM measures is public and po-
litical opposition. It is known that measures are more acceptable if people benefit
from the effects. Increasing awareness of positive consequences of car-use reduc-
tion would therefore be an important approach to enhance public acceptability. At
the same time it will increase political feasibility.
This line of reasoning leads to the suggestion that noncoercive TDM measures
should be combined with coercive TDM measures. In this way car users are forced
to activate car-use reduction goals. Improving travel alternatives would facilitate
implementation of set car-use reduction goals. Public information campaigns tar-
geting attitude change would increase public acceptability and therefore political
feasibility. In conclusion, we believe that TDM measures can be effective in reduc-
ing car use without facing strong public and political opposition if combinations
of coercive and noncoercive TDM measures are implemented.

References

Austin, J. T., & Vancouver, J. B. (1996). Goal constructs in psychology: Structure, process, and content.
Psychological Bulletin, 80, 286–303.
Changing Demand for Private Car Use 151

Axhausen, K., & Gärling, T. (1992). Activity-based approaches to travel analysis: Conceptual frame-
works, models, and research problems. Transport Reviews, 12, 323–341.
Bamberg, S. (2002). Effects of implementation intentions on the actual performance of new envi-
ronmentally friendly behaviours-results of two field experiments. Journal of Environmental
Psychology, 22, 399–411.
Bamberg, S., & Rölle, D. (2003). Determinants of people’s determinants of pricing measures. In
J. Schade & B. Schlag (Eds.), Acceptability of transport pricing strategies (pp. 235–248).
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Bamberg, S., & Schmidt, P. (2003). Incentives, morality, or habit? Predicting students’ car use for
university routes with the models of Ajzen, Schwartz and Triandis. Environment and Behavior,
35, 264–285.
Beckenkamp, M., & Ostmann, A. (1999). Missing the target? Sanctioning as an ambiguous structural
solution. In M. Foddy, S. S. Smithson & M. Hogg (Eds.). Resolving social dilemmas: Dynamic,
structural and intergroup aspects (pp. 165–180). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: A control-
process view. Psychological Review, 97, 19–35.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Deslauriers, B. C., & Everett, P. B. (1977). Effects of intermittent and continuous token reinforcement
on bus ridership. Journal of Applied Psychology, 62, 369–375.
Deutsch, M. (1985). Distributive justice: A social psychological perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Fort Worth, FL: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich.
Energy Information Administration (2004). Annual Energy Review. Retrieved September 21, 2006,
from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf.
Fujii, S., & Gärling, T. (2003). Application of attitude theory for improved predictive accuracy of
stated preference methods in travel demand analysis. Transportation Research A, 37, 389–
402.
Fujii, S., & Gärling, T. (2005). Temporary structural change: A strategy to break car-use habit and
promote public transport. In G. Underwood (Ed.), Traffic and transport psychology (pp. 585–
592). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Gärling, T., & Axhausen, K. (2003). Habitual travel choice (introduction to special issue). Transporta-
tion, 30, 1–11.
Gärling, T., Eek, D., Loukopoulos, P., Fujii, S., Johansson-Stenman, O., Kitamura, R., Pendyala, R.,
& Vilhelmson, B. (2002). A conceptual analysis of the impact of travel demand management
on private car use. Transport Policy, 9, 59–70.
Gärling, T., Gillholm, R., & Gärling, A. (1998). Reintroducing attitude theory in travel behavior
research: The validity of an interactive interview procedure to predict car use. Transportation,
25, 147–167.
Greene, D. L., & Wegener, M. (1997). Sustainable transport. Journal of Transport Geography, 5,
177–190.
Heath, C., Larrick, R. P., & Wu, G. (1999). Goals as reference points. Cognitive Psychology, 38, 79–109.
Hopper, J. R., & Nielsen, J. (1991). Recycling as altruistic behaviour. Normative and behavioral strate-
gies to expand participation in a community recycling program. Environment and Behavior, 23,
195–220.
Jakobsson, C. (2004). Accuracy of household planning of car use: Comparing prospective to actual car
logs. Transportation Research F, 7, 31–42.
Jakobsson, C., Fujii, S., & Gärling, T. (2000). Determinants of private car users’ acceptance of road
pricing. Transport Policy, 7, 153–158.
Johansson, L. O., Gustafsson, M., Falkemark, G., Gärling, T., & Johansson-Stenman, O. (2003). Goal
conflicts in political decision making: A survey of municipality politicians’ views of road
pricing. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 21, 615–624.
Jones, P. M. (1991). Gaining public support for road pricing through a package approach. Traffic
Engineering and Control, 32, 194–196.
152 Gärling and Schuitema

Jones, P. (2003). Acceptability of transport pricing strategies: Meeting the challenge. In J. Schade & B.
Schlag (Eds.), Acceptability of transport pricing strategies (pp. 27–62). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Kitamura, R., Fujii, S., & Pas, E. I. (1997). Time-use data, analysis and modeling: Toward the next
generation of transportation planning methodologies. Transport Policy, 4, 225–235.
Lee, T. W., Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (1989). Goal setting theory and performance. In L. A.
Pervin (Ed.), Goal concepts in personality and social psychology, (pp. 291–326). Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Locke, E. A., &; Latham, G. P. (1990). A theory of goal-setting and task performance. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Locke, E. A., Latham, G. P., & Erez, M. (1988). The determinants of goal commitment. Academy of
Management Review, 13, 23–39.
Loukopoulos, P. (in press). A classification of travel demand management measures. In T. Gärling
& L. Steg (Eds.), Threats to the quality of urban life from car traffic: Problems, causes, and
solutions. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Loukopoulos, P., Gärling, T., & Vilhelmson, B. (2005). Mapping the potential consequences of car-use
reduction in urban areas. Journal of Transport Geography, 13, 135–150.
Loukopoulos, P., Jakobsson, C., Gärling, T., Schneider, C. M., & Fujii, S. (2004). Car user responses
to travel demand management measures: Goal setting and choice of adaptation alternatives.
Transportation Research D, 9, 263–280.
Nordlund, A. M., & Garvill, J. (2003). Effects of values, problem awareness, and personal norm on
willingness to reduce personal car use. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 23, 339–347.
Odeck, J., & Bråthen, S. (2002). Toll financing in Norway: The success, failures and perspective for
the future. Transport Policy, 9, 253–260.
OECD (1997). Towards sustainable transportation. Paris: OECD Publications.
OECD (2001). Environmental outlook. Retrieved September 21, 2006 from: http//213.253.134.29/oecd/
pdfs/browseit/9701011E.PDF
Rienstra, S. A., Rietveld, P., & Verhoef, E. T. (1999). The social support for policy measures in pas-
senger transport. A statistical analysis for the Netherlands. Transportation Research D, 4, 181–
200.
Santos, G., & Rojey, L., (2004). Distributional impacts of road pricing: The truth behind the myth.
Transportation, 31, 21–42.
Schade, J., & Schlag, B. (Eds.) (2003) Acceptability of transport pricing strategies. Amsterdam: Else-
vier.
Schlag, B., & Teubel, U. (1997). Public acceptability of transport pricing. IATSS Research, 21, 134–
142.
Schuitema, G. (2003). Pricing policies in transport. In L. Hendrickx, W. Jager, & L. Steg (Eds.), Human
decision making and environmental perception: Understanding and assisting human decision
making in real-life settings (pp. 83–102). Groningen: Department of Psychology, University of
Groningen.
Schuitema, G., & Steg, L. (2005). Factors that affect the acceptability of pricing policies in transport.
Paper presented at the 7th Nordic Environmental Social Science (NESS) Research Conference,
Göteborg, Sweden.
Schwartz, S. H. (1977). Normative influences on altruism. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experi-
mental social psychology, (Vol. 10, pp. 221–279). New York: Academic Press.
Steg, E. M. (1996). Gedragsverandering ter vermindering van het autogebruik. (Behavior Change for
Reducing Car Use.) PhD thesis, University of Groningen (NL), Department of Behavioral and
Social Sciences (in Dutch, with extensive English summary).
Steg, L. (2003). Factors influencing the acceptability and effectiveness of transport pricing. In: J. Schade
& B. Schlag (Eds.), Acceptability of transport pricing strategies (pp. 187-202). Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Steg, L., Dreijerink, L., & Abrahamse, W. (2006). Why are energy policies acceptable and effective?
Environment and Behavior, 38, 92–111.
Steg, L., & Schuitema, G. (in press). Behavioural responses to transport pricing: A theoretical analysis.
In T. Gärling & L. Steg (Eds.), Threats to the quality of urban life from car traffic: Problems,
causes, and solutions. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Changing Demand for Private Car Use 153

Steg, L., & Tertoolen, G. (1999). Sustainable transport policy: Contribution of behavioural scientists.
Public Money and Management, 19, 63–69.
Stern, P. C. (2000). Toward a coherent theory of environmentally significant behavior. Journal of Social
Issues, 56, 407–424.
Stern, P. C., Abel, T., Guagnano, G. A., & Kalof, L. (1999). A value-belief-norm theory of support for
social movements: The case of environmental concern. Human Ecology Review, 6, 81–97.
Tertoolen, G., van Kreveld, D., & Verstraten, B. (1998). Psychological resistance against private car
use reduction. Transportation Research Part A, 32, 171–181.
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological Review, 110, 403–421.
U.S. Department of Energy (2002). Annual energy review 2000. Washington D.C.: Energy Information
Administration.
Van Liere, K. D., & Dunlap, R. E. (1978). Moral norms and environmental behavior: An application
of Schwartz’s norm-activation model to yard burning. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
8, 174–188.
Verplanken, B., Aarts, H., & Van Knippenberg, A. (1997). Habit, information acquisition, and the
process of making travel mode choices. European Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 539–560.
Verplanken, B., Aarts, H., Van Knippenberg, A., & Van Knippenberg, C. (1994). Attitude versus general
habit: Antecedents of travel mode choice. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24, 285–300.
Vining, J., & Ebreo, A. (2002). Emerging theoretical and methodological perspectives on conservation
behavior. In R. B. Bechtel & A. Churchman (Eds.), Handbook of environmental psychology
(2nd ed., pp. 541–558). New York: Wiley.
Vlek, C. A. J., & Michon, J. A. (1992). Why we should and how we could decrease the use of motor
vehicles in the near future. IATSS Research, 15, 82–93.
Whitelegg, J., Gatrell, A., & Naumann, P. (1993). Traffic and health. Environmental Epidemiology
Research Unit, University of Lancaster.

TOMMY GÄRLING is a professor of psychology at Göteborg University, Swe-

den. He is also affiliated on a part-time basis with the Business Schools at Karlstad
and Umeå Universities. His research area is judgment and decision making with
applications to consumer behavior, travel behavior, and environmental issues. Re-
cent research focuses on evaluations of policy measures to reduce private car use.
He is a member of the editorial boards of Journal of Environmental Psychology
and Transportation. He is a former president of the environmental psychology di-
vision of the International Association of Applied Psychology and board member
of the International Association of Travel Behavior Research.

GEERTJE SCHUITEMA is a PhD candidate in psychology at the University of

Groningen, The Netherlands. Her dissertation focuses on factors that explain the
acceptability of transport pricing policies. This PhD project is part of a multidisci-
plinary project including economists, traffic engineers, and geographers. In 2002,
she received her Masters degree in social psychology as well as in environmental
and traffic psychology at the University of Groningen. Her Master’s thesis focused
on factors influencing people’s perception of energy use of domestic appliances.
Schuitema has presented the results of her work at various international confer-
ences, such as the International Conference on Traffic and Transport Psychology
(ICTTP) and the International Congress of Applied Psychology (ICAP).