a: CHAPTER VII DEFINITIONAL CLAUSE 1. IN MODERN STATUTES, THE DEFINITIONS IN THE INTERPRETATION CLAUSE ARE SPECIFICALLY MADE SUBSERVIENT TO THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE WORDS OR PHRASES HAVE BEEN USED IN THE ACT. N.K. Jain v. C.K. Shah”! “We feel it may not be necessary to multiply the authorities on this aspect. In this background if we examine the opening words of Section 2 namely “in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,” they we necessarily feel that there is much in the context to show that the restricted meaning in the definitions should not be applied. [para 17], “So much is about the opening words to Section 2 and it, therefore, follows that the words ‘contribution’, ‘scheme’, ‘fund’ occurring in the said section should in the ‘context’ be otherwise interpreted as to appl toa private scheme also and if there is a default in ‘contribution’ by the exempted establishment, the same amounts to contravention of Section 6 punishable under Section 14(1A)”. [para 18] 2, DEPENDING ON THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE DEFINITION CLAUSE, THE DEFINITIONS COULD BE RESTRICTIVE OR EXHAUSTIVE. P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology” We will first deal with the contention urged by Shri Rao based on the pro- visions of the Act and the Rules. It is no doubt true that in view of claus (3) of Section 1 the Act applies to all private colleges. The expression “college” is, however, not defined in the Act. The expression “private col lege” is defined in clause (8) of Section 2 which can, in the absence of any indication of a contrary intention, cover all colleges including profession! 71. AIR 1991 SC 1289 = 1991 [2] SCC 495. The court relied upon the judgments in AIR 188 ‘SC 1125 = 1968 (2) SCR 589; AIR 1970 SC 426 = 1970 (1) SCR 181 72. AIR 1995 SC 1395 = 1995 [2] SCC 1479Chapter VII—Definitional Clause 75 and technical colleges. An indication about such an intention is, however, given in the Rules wherein the expression “college” has been defined in Rule 2(b) to mean and include Arts and Science College, Teachers Training College, Physical Education College, Oriental College, School of Institute of Social Work and Music College. While enumerating the various types of colleges in Rule 2(b) the rule making authority has deliberately refrained from including professional and technical colleges in the said definition. It has been urged that in Rule 2(b) the expression “means and includes” has been used which indicates that the definition is inclusive in nature and also covers categories which are not expressly mentioned therein. We are una- ble to agree. A particular expression is often defined by the Legislature by using the word ‘means’ or the word ‘includes’. Sometimes the words ‘means and includes’ are used. The use of the word ‘means’ indicates that “defini- tion is a hard and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition.” (See : Gough v. Gough, (1891) 2 QB 665; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682, at p.717.) The word ‘includes’ when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their nat- ural import but also those things which the clause declares that they shall include. The words ‘means and includes’, on the other hand, indicate “an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions.” (See : Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps, 1899 AC 99 at pp. 105-106 (Lord Watson); Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1989) 1 SCC 164, at p. 169: (AIR 1989 SC 335 at p. 339). The use of the words ‘means and includes’ in Rule 2(b) would, therefore, suggest that the definition of “col- lege” is intended to be exhaustive and not extensive and would cover only the educational institutions falling in the categories specified in Rule 2(b) and other educational institutions are not comprehended. In so far as engi- neering colleges are concerned, their exclusion may be for the reason that the opening and running of the private engineering colleges are controlled through the Board of Technical Education and Training and the Director of Technical Education in accordance with the directions issued by the AICTE from time to time. As noticed earlier the Grant-in-Aid Code contains pro- visions which, in many respects cover the same field as is covered by the Act and the Rules. The Director of Technical Education has been entrusted with the functions of proper implementation of those provisions. There is nothing to show that the said arrangement was not working satisfactorily so as to be replaced by the system sought to be introduced by the Act and the Rules. Rule 2(d), on the other hand, gives an indication that there was no intention to disturb the existing arrangement regarding private engineering colleges because in that Rule the expression “Director” is defined to mean the Director of Collegiate Education. The Director of Technical Education is not included in the said definition indicating that the institutions which76 Cases and Materials on Interpretation of Statutey are under the control of Directorate of College Education only are to be covered by the Act and the Rules and technical educational institutions in the State of Tamil Nadu which are controlled by the Director of Technical Education are not so covered. [para 19]”? 3._ IF AN EXPRESSION OR WORD HAS ACQUIRED A SPECIAL CONNOTATION IN LAW, THE DICTIONARY OR GENERAL MEANING CEASES TO BE HELPFUL IN INTERPRETING SUCH ‘AN EXPRESSION OR WORD. Thampanoor Ravi v. Charupara Ravi In State of Kerala, the Provincial Insolvency Act is applicable. Under Section 3 of the Insolvency Act, the District Court shall be the Court hav- ing jurisdiction under the Act unless by a notification in the Official Gazette any Court subordinate to the District Court is invested with such jurisdic- tion and it shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the District Court and a Court of Small Causes shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court for the purposes of this Section. Under Section 4 of the Insolvency Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or property or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice of making a complete distribution of property in any such case. Under Section 7 of the Insolvency Act, a petition for adjudication could be filed by a creditor or by a debtor and the Court may on such petition adjudge him an insolvent. Under Section 27 of the Insolvency Act it is provided that if the Court does not dismiss the petition, it shall make an order of adjudication that the debtor is an insolvent, and shall specify in such order the period within which the debtor shall apply for his discharge and the Court has power, if sufficient cause is shown, to extend the period within which the debtor shall apply for his discharge, in which case a notice of the order will have to be published. Under Section 28 of the Insolvency Act, various consequences as an effect of an order of adjudication are provided. Under Section 41 of the Insolvency Act, it is provided that a debtor may, at any time after the order of adjudication, within the period specified by the Court, apply to the Court for an order of discharge, and the Court may, after considering the objections of any creditor and, where a receiver has been appointed, on the report of the receiver- [a] grant or refuse an absolute order of discharge; or 73. See also AIR 2013 SC (Supp) 437 = 2013(16) SCC 82; AIR 2011 SC 428= 2011 (2) SCC $4 74. AIR 1999 SC 3309 = 1999 (8) SCC 74Chapter V1l-—Definitional Clause 7 [b] suspend the operation of the order for a specified time; or [ec] grant an order of discharge subject to any conditions with respect to any earnings or income which may afterwards become due to the insolvent, or with respect to his after-acquired property. [para 10] 11. Effect of an order of discharge is dealt with under Section 44 of the Insolvency Act. Except as provided under sub-section (1) of Section 44 of the Insolvency Act, an order of discharge shall release the insolvent from all debts provable under the Insolvency Act. For the purposes of Section 73 of the Insolvency Act an order of insolvency has been con- sidered as a disqualification to hold certain elective offices. An order of ischarge, however, restores the original status of an insolvent. So lon as the debtor remains undischarged he suffers from several disabilities under the Insolvency Act, The Insolvency Act is a complete Code and determination of all questions regarding insolvency including a ques- tion as to whether (1) a person is an insolvent or not, or (2) an insolvent e discharged or not and subject to what conditions, can be deci by the Court constituted under that Act alone. It is only when excep- tions are carved out as is done in the case of Section 2(8) of the Sale of Goods Act any other Court or authority can decide such questions. [para 11] The learned Judge referred to the scheme of different clauses of Article 191(1) of the Constitution and that such scheme would indicate that if a member has any pecuniary interest in any governmental or quasi- governmental body such member may not be in a position to perform his duties impartially with free mind inasmuch as he can be under pressure of the financial institution which has extended finances to him. Therefore, he was of the view that the policy of law should be borne in mind in interpret- ing the meaning of the expression “undischarged insolvent.” [para 15] Under what circumstan subj what limitations a person could be declared to have incurred disqualification is a matter of policy of law and the Courts have cautioned themselves by stating that right to vote, right to elect or contest an election is a creature of statute and circumscribed by the limitations contained therein. Therefore, as long as the Constitution or the R. P. Act indicates in clear terms as to what its policy is, it would not be open to a Court to interpret ision ing te what the intent could be by ignoring the actual expressions used. Therefore, the Supposed scheme of the provisions would not afford sufficient guidance to take the view that the expression “undischarged insolvent” should be understood as meaning an insolvent who is a person who is in impecuniou: circumstances as is unable to repay the debt. [para 16] Th med Jud; ticed that under Article 191(1)(b) while provid- ing for di, ification on the grout “unsound mind” it i r that a person is of unsound mind if so declare a competent Court andCases and Materials on Interpretation of Satee such declaration is not required in the case of an insolvent, he. sxtendes logic applicd by the learned Judge in the case of interpreting the £Apressiem “undischarged insolvent’ is that even when such declaration has not bees formally made by a Court of competent juris ¢Llection Coun can decide such a question, Even though Article 191()) of the Constitution = ude a cason of ti : n_used that he is an “undischarged insolvent” rm tu Id become “discharged” only in t 7 : veney Act and not otherwise. It is implicit in the expr: “unde ed insolvent” that a person not become so unl - djudged insolvent and is not discharged by t! rt under the Insolvency Acts. The expression “undis-charged insolvent” has acquir ru legal connotation and such expression cannot be used otherwise than in terms of the insolvency enactments. [para 16A] The learned Judge, in this context, referred to the statement made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar in the course of the debates in the Constituent Assembly wherein he tried to impress upon the Assembly that similar words as contained in Section 73 of the Insolvency Act should be used and dis- qualification should be removed and cease to be effective if adjudication is annulled or if an insolvent obtains a discharge with certificate that it was caused by misfortune and not by misconduct. Reliance upon this part of the debate by the learned Judge, in our opinion, is misplaced. The refer- ence made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is to reduce the rigour of the disqualification in the event the adjudication is annulled or if an insolvent obtains a discharge with the certificate that it was caused by misfortune and not by misconduct. Merely because the suggestion made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is not accepted by the Constituent Assembly it does not mean that the expression used in Article 191(1)(c) as to “undischarged insolvent” will be different from what is contained under the insolvency enactments. The reference to Section 73 made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is in the background stated above and, therefore, has no effect on the interpretation of the meaning of the expression “undischarged insolvent” [para 17] The learned Judge noticed that if a person is not to be held an insolvent as in ordinary parlance it would result in non-application of disqualification even if the Court is satisfied that the returned candidate is not in a position to repay debts and could be adjudged to be insolvent. Artic! does not contemplate mere impecuniosity or incapacity of a person y e’s debts but he should not only be adjudged insolvent but also remail undischarged. Such a contingency could only arise under insolvency law. Article 191(1)(c) refers to disqualificati n from getting elected to State Legislature. The conditions for disqualification c: t_be et by importing to it any meaning other than permissible on strict interpre- tation of expressions used therein for what we are dealing with is a caseChapter V11—Definitional Clause wd of disqualification, Whenever any disqualification is imposed naturally the citizen _is cut down and in that event a narrow interpretation is fore, the liberal view taken by the Iearne ) the con- appear to be correct. [para 18] the Sale of Is Act, a_special definition of the expressi ‘insolvent’ had t ven to the effect tI rson is said to be ‘insolvent’ to pay ts in the ordinary course of business, or can- cl th me due, whether he has committed tof _ It is ‘insolvent’ even thou, rson had not judged an insolvent in the Ivency Act to be insolvent for the purposes of the Act. That definition cannot be imported into the R, P. Act. [para 19] __ The learned Judge goes on to observe that an insolvent is a person who is unable to repay his debts and as long as he remains in that position he is an undischarged insolvent, that is, as long as he has not discharged his debts he is an “undischarged insolvent”. Redundancy and tautology cannot be attributed to the Legislature. When the Legislature has used the expression “undischarged insolvent” that expression must be given its full meaning. A person on being adjudged insolvent remains so unless discharged in terms of the provisions of Section 41 of the Insolvency Act, either absolutely or conditionally, or in the absence of annulment as contained in Section 35 of the Insolvency Act. [para 20] ascertaining the ins an ex, sion in a statute. in norms are adopted. If the Legislature has used an expression which has acquired a technical meaning and such expression is used ordinarily in the context of a particular branch of law, it must be assumed that because of its Constant use the legislature must be deemed to have used such expression in a particular sense as is understood when used in the similar context. Ifan expression has acquired a special connotation in law, dictionary or general meaning ceases to be helpful in interpreting such a word. Such an expression must be given its legal sense and no other. In this context, we may refer to the weighty observation in the decision of this Court in the State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. (Madras) Ltd., 1959 SCR 379: (AIR 1958 SC 560) that a term of well recognised import in the gen- eral law should be accepted as confining the meaning in interpreting the Constitution. If the expression ‘undischarged insolvent” has acquired a spe- cial meaning under the law of insolvency, we must understand that that is caning that is sought to be attributed to th i in Arti 191(1)(c) of the Constitution, [para 21] e, therefore, of the vii igh not ji v th th High C ified i holding that the expression ‘undischarged insolvent’ should be understood dehors the Insolvency Act in a general sense. [para 22]80 Cases and Materials on Interpretation of Statue, 4. WORDS IN A STATUTE ARE NOT TO BE INTERPRETED BY HAVING THOSE WORDS IN ONE HAND AND THE DICTIONARY IN THE OTHER. Commissioner of Gift Tax, Madras v. N. S. Getty Chettiar” As observed in Craies on Statute Law (6th Edn, p. 213) that an interpre. tation clause which extends the meaning of a word does not take away its ordinary meaning. An interpretation clause is not meant (0 prevent the word receiving its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that would be properly applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act, when there is nothing in the context or the subject matter to the contrary to be applied to some things to which it would not ordinarily be applicable. [para 14] . Bearing in mind these principles, let us now examine the scope of S. 2 (xxiv), That provision speaks of “disposition”, “conveyance”, “assignment”, “settlement”, “delivery”, “payment” or “other alienation of property.” [para 15] on A reading of this section clearly goes to show that the words * ‘dis- position”, “conveyance”, “assignment” “settlement”, “delivery” and “payment” are used as some of the modes of transfer of property. The dictionary gives various meanings for those words but those meanings do not help us. We have to understand the meaning of those words in the context in which they are used. Words in a section of a statute are not to be interpreted by having those words in one hand and the diction- ary in the other. In spelling out the meaning of the words in a section, one must take into consideration the setting in which those terms are used and the purpose that they are intended to serve. If so understood, it is clear that the word “disposition” in the context means giving away or giving up by a person of something which was his own, “convey- ance” means transfer of ownership, “assignment” means the transfer of the claim, right or property to another, “settlement” means settling the property, right or claim-conveyance or disposition of property for the benefit of another, “delivery” contemplated therein is the delivery of one’s property to another for no consideration and “payment” implies gift of money by someone to another. We do not think that a partition in a H. U. F. can be considered either as “disposition” or “conveyance” ot “assignment’ or “settlement” or “delivery” or “payment” or “alienation within the meaning of those words in S. 2 (xxiv). [para 16] 7 This leaves us with cl. (4) of S. 2 (xxiv) which speaks of a transaction entered into by any person with intent thereby to diminish directly oF indirectly the value of his own property and to increase the value of the property of another person. A member of H. U. F. who, as mentioned 75. AIR 1971 SC 2410 = 1971 (2) SCC 741f Chapter VIl—Definitional Clause 81 earlier, has no definite share in the family property before division, cannot be said to diminish directly or indirectly the value of his prop- erty or to increase the value of the property of any other coparcener by agreeing to take a share lesser than what he would have got if he had gone to court to enforce his claim. Till partition, his share in the family Property is indeterminate. He becomes entitled to a share in the family Property only after the partition. Therefore there is no question of his either diminishing directly or indirectly the value of his own property or of increasing the value of the property of anyone else. The “transaction’ referred to in cl. (d) of section 2 (xxiv) takes its colour from the main clause viz. it must be a transfer of property in some way. This conclu- sion of ours gets support from sub-clauses (a) to (c) of clause (xxiv) of S. 2, each of which deals with one or the other mode of transfer. If the Parliament intended to bring within the scope of that provision parti- tions of the type with which we are concerned, nothing was easier than to say so. In interpreting tax laws, courts merely look at the words of the section. If a case clearly comes within the section, the subject is taxed and not otherwise. [para 17]’6 -. A DEFINITION CLAUSE CANNOT BE INTERPRETED IN A MANNER THAT WOULD VIOLATE THE ACT OR BE CONTRARY TO THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE. M/s. Falcon Tyres Ltd v. State of Karnataka” Definition of the expression ‘agricultural produce or horticultural produce’ in Section 2(A)(1), sub-section (6) of Section 3 providing for exemption in respect of goods specified in the Second Schedule and SI. No. 2 of Second Schedule specifying “Agricultural produce including tea, coffee and cotton (whether ginned or unginned)” as relevant are extracted below: Section 2(A)(1): “‘agricultural produce or horticultural produce’ shall not include tea, coffee, rubber, cashew, cardamom, pepper and cotton; and such pro- duce as has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process for being made fit for consumption, save mere cleaning, grading, sort- ing or drying.” Sub-section (6) of Section 3: “6). No tax shall be levied under this Act on any goods specified in the Second Schedule on its entry into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein.” 76. See also Jagatram Ahuja v. Commissioner of Gift-tax, Hyderabad AIR 2000 SC 3195 = 2000 (8) SCC 249 77. AIR 2006 SC 2712 = 2006 (6) SCC 271282 Cases and Materials on Interpretation of Statue, SI. No. 2 of Second Schedule: “2. agriculture produce including tea, coffee and cotton (whether ginneg or un-ginned). [para 8] From the reading of the definition under Section 2(A)(1), it unequiy. ocally emerges that rubber and few other items enumerated therein are excluded from being agricultural produce or horticulture produce, For all intent and purposes as far as the present Act is concerned, it is the definition given in the Act which will govern the expression ‘agricultural produce’. While reading Entry 2 in the Second Schedule to the Act there is no scope to include rubber from being exempt from payment of entry tax. Entry 2 of Second Schedule creates exceptions regarding few of the excluded items from payment of Entry Tax but not all excluded items. The items for which an exception has been created in Entry 2 of the Second Schedule would only be exempt from payment of entry tax and not all the items, which have been excluded from being agricultural produce in the definition clause. While inter- preting the provisions of present Act the legislative intention will have to be given effect to in consonance with the definition as contained in the statute. [para 12] In the definition clause of Section 2(A)(1) rubber is excluded from the agricultural produce, sub-section (6) of Section 3 provides for exemp- tion in respect of goods specified in the Second Schedule. At Sl. No. 2 of the Second Schedule, only tea, coffee and cotton (whether ginned or un-ginned) have been given exemption from payment of Entry Tax and not other items such as rubber, cashew, cardamom and pepper and such other agricultural produce which has been subjected to any process for making it fit for human consumption. Intention of the leg- islature is that though tea, coffee and cotton have been excluded in the definition clause from the agricultural produce but for the purposes of the Entry Tax Act tea, coffee and cotton are exempted from payment of Entry Tax. This is an exception created by the legislature. If the legislature intended to create exception for rubber also it could have done it but it chose not to do it. Simply because the legislature has included tea, coffee and cotton in the Second Schedule exempting It from payment of Entry Tax does not mean that all other agricultural produce items which have been excluded from the definition of the agricultural produce would stand included in the Second Schedule to the Act exempting them from payment of Entry Tax. This would be doing violation to the Act as well as acting contrary to the intent of the legislature. [para 13]Ohapter VIl—Definitional Clause 83 6 WHEN A DEFINED TERM TAKES VARIOUS FORMS IT HAS TO BE INTERPRETED DIFFERENTLY IN DIFFERENT PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE. B, Kandasamy Reddiar v. O. Gomathi Ammal” In addition we find, ‘building’ as defined in sub-section (2) of Section 2 is an inclusive definition. This fictional definition is for a purpose that ‘building’ as commonly understood in a general sense may not be construed in all situations as one composite whole. There may be a situ- ation that a ‘tenant’ may occupy a part of a building, so far the purposes of the Act by virute” of the definition clause this may be construed as building. Under Section 2 (2) ‘building’ is defined as building or hut or part of a building or hut and includes, gardens, grounds and out- houses etc. The definition of building does not give a go-by to the whole structure of building as ‘building’ as generally understood, as it opens with the definition of ‘building’ to mean ‘any building’. In other words both ‘building’ and ‘part of building’ independently is to be construed as ‘building’ within this definition clause. This statutory definition fic- tionally includes various structures, huts, including part of a building, which otherwise could not be a building to be ‘building’, to be applied as such in the various statutory provisions of the Act for subserving the objects of the Act. When building takes various forms it has to be used differently in different provisions of this statutes. How only one form of definition viz., ‘part of a building’ to be carried and used restrictively in sub-clause (c) of Section 10(3). The ‘tenant’ is also defined under sub- section (8) of Section 2 to mean, ‘tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a ‘building’ and includes surviving spouse, or any son or daughter, or the legal representative of a deceased tenant...If this artificial definition was not given to the word “building” then rent payable for a building as referred in the definition of tenant could only be for the whole building and not part of the building. Here ‘building’ as referred would include ‘part of a building’. So tenancy could be of part of a building. In fact, various provisions of the Act would stand testimony and legitimacy of this wider definition clause of the word ‘building’. When definition clause itself gives artificial mean- ing of ‘building’ to be not one but more than one, then how only one form of definition clause, viz., ‘part of a building’ be said to be under- stood for a ‘building’ in every provision of this statute wherever the word building is used. [para 16] It may be examined from another angle, when Section 10(3)(c) refers to the landlord occupying a part of the building it inherently refers to 78. AIR 2001 SC 1931 = 2001 (4) SCC 394 79. Note: it could have been “virtue”Cases and Materials on Interpretation of Stary, another part of the building being occupied by the tenant. It is tn, that part of the building occupied both by the tenant and the landloy would by itself constitute to be a ‘building’ under the definition clause This itself reveals, which is under current that there is another part oy the building or may be more than one part of the building either wi, tenants or landlord. If part of the building occupied by the tenant i construed to be a building then landlord could never be in a position. occupy other part of the building. Such interpretation forgets that def, nition clause itself is flexible to make a ‘building’ to be a ‘building’ ang a part of building to be a building also to be used accordingly whereve, necessary. If interpretation sought to be given on behalf of the appellan, is accepted, this would completely dismantle the purpose engrafting of opening word of Section 10(3)(c) namely, ‘the landlord who is occupy. ing only part of the building’. ... [para 17] 7. THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN TO A WORD OR PHRASE IN ONE STATUTE CANNOT BE IMPORTED INTO ANOTHER STATUTE. MIs. Qazi Noorul H.H.H. Petrol Pump v. Dy. Director, E.S.I. Corporation” The expressions “manufacturing process” as well as “power” used in the Act have been given the same meaning as in the Factories Act, 1948, vide Sections 2(14-AA) and Section 2(15-C) of the Act. Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948 defines “manufacturing process” as follows: “(k) ‘manufacturing process’ means process for ~ (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or other. wise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or (ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance, or (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power, or (iv) composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithog- raphy, photogravure or other similar process or book binding; constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels; or (vi) preserving or storing any article in cold storage.” [para 5] A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that pumping oil is alsoa manufacturing process. [para 6] v. 80. AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1729 = 2009 (15) SCC 30‘Chapter VIl—Definitional Clause * In this connection, it may be stated that the words “manufacturing Process” in different statutes have different meanings. For instance, in the Central Excise Act, 1944, the word “manufacture” means bringing into existence a different commodity, though this is not the definition of “manufacturing process” in the Factories Act, 1948. We cannot apply the definition of “manufacturing process” in one Statute to another Statute. [para 7] Section 2(k), sub-clause (ii) of the Factories Act, 1948 states that Pumping oil is a manufacturing process. Admittedly, the appellant does the work of Pumping oil. When we go to a Petrol Pump for getting pet- rol or diesel, the petrol or diesel is in a tank and it does not on its own flow from the tank to the pipe and thereafter into the vehicle, but only by means of a pump by using power. [para 8] | Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that we should see the object and intention of the Statute. It is well settled that Once the Statute is clear, the literal Rule of Interpretation applies, and there is no need to go into the object and intention of the Statute (vide article entitled ‘A Note on Interpretation of Statutes’ by Markandey Katju, J., published in the Journal Section of AIR 2007 SC page 22). In the present case, Section 2(14-AA) of the Act states that “manufac- turing process” shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Factories Act, 1948. In the Factories Act, 1948, Section 2(k) of the Act includes Pumping oil as a manufacturing process. [para 9] | In our opinion, the only rule of interpretation which applies to the facts of the present case is the Literal Rule of Interpretation, which means that we should go simply by the wording of the Statute and nothing else and there is no scope for applying any other Rule of Interpretation. In our opinion, the language used in Section 2(k)(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948 is clear. Hence, the Act applies to the appellant and the respondent was right in issuing notice to the appellant for making contribution and interest thereon for the period in question. [para 10] 8. IF A STATUTE DOES NOT DEFINE AN EXPRESSION IT IS NOT PERMISSIBLE TO GIVE AS WIDE A MEANING AS POSSIBLE TO TERMS USED IN A STATUTE. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, A.P v. Officer-in-charge (Court of Wards), Paigah’! The Full Bench stated its conclusions on questions of law as follows: “(1) The words ‘agricultural land’ occurring in Section 2 (e) (i) of the Wealth Tax Act should be given the same meaning as the 81. AIR 1977 SC 113 = 1976 (3) SCC 864Cases and Materials on Interpretation of Statute, said expression bears in Entry 86 of List 1 and given the Widey meaning; (2) The said expression not having been defined in the Constitution it must be given the meaning which it ordinarily bears in the English language and as understood in ordinary parlance; (3) The actual user of the land for agriculture is one of the indicia fo, determining the character of the land as agricultural land; (4) Land which is left barren but which is capable of being cult. vated can also be ‘agricultural land’ unless the said land is acty. ally put to some other non-agricultural purpose, like construction of buildings or an aerodrome, runway, etc. thereon, which alters the physical character of the land rendering it unfit for immediate cultivation; (5) If land is assessed to land revenue as agricultural land under the State revenue law, it is a strong piece of evidence of its character as agricultural land; (6) Mere enclosure of the land does not by itself render it a nonagricultural land; The character of land is not determined by the nature of the prod. ucts raised, so long as the land is used or can be used for rais. ing valuable plants or crops or trees or for any other purpose of husbandry; The situation of the land in a village or in urban area is not by itself determinative of its character.” [para 13] The Full Bench rejecting the effect of such features as construction of a Palace and the location of the land within its compound said: “The land is of a large extent of 108 acres and abuts Hussain Sagar tank and has two wells in the land itself. These indicate that the land pos- sesses all the characteristics of agricultural land and that it is capable of being put to agriculture. It is also not disputed that the land is vacant and has not been actually put to any purpose other than agriculture and that the physical character of the land is not such as to render it unfit for immediate cultivation. The other relevant facts is that the land has been admittedly assessed to land revenue as ‘agricultural land’ under Section 50 of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act. These factors in our opinion, strongly indicate that the land in question is agricultural land.” [para 14] (7 (8 We think that it is not correct to give as wide a meaning as possible to terms used in a statute simply because the statute does not define an expression. The correct rule is that we have to endeavour to find out the exact sense in which the words have been used in a particular contextChapter VII—Definitional Clause 87 We are entitled to look at the statute as a whole and give an interpreta- tion in consonance with the purposes of the statute and what logically follows from the terms used. We are to avoid absurd results. If we were to give the widest possible connotation to the words “agricultural land”, as the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court seemed inclined to give to the term “agricultural land”, we would reach the conclusion that practically all land. even, that covered by buildings, is “agricultural land” inasmuch as its potential or possible use could be agricultural. The object of the Wealth-tax Act is to tax surplus wealth. It is clear that all land is not excluded from the definition of assets. It is only “agricul- tural land” which could be exempted. Therefore, it is imperative to give reasonable limits to the scope of the “agricultural land”, or, in other words, this exemption had to be necessarily given a more restricted meaning than the very wide ambit given to it by the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench. [para 15]