Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Ekaterini Mitsiou
1 Introduction
E. Mitsiou (*)
Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, Austria
e-mail: Ekaterini.Mitsiou@assoc.oeaw.ac.at
territorial expansion, “control by conquest or coercion”, and the “control of the political
loyalty of the territories it subjugates”.3
Some theorists include the empires under the notion of states, and more accurately to
the more permanent type of state formation4; other draw a clear line between state and
empire emphasising that “Empires are more than large states; they move in a world of
their own”.5 Empires bear specific hallmarks of strong ideological character. They are
the creators of order and defenders of chaos; they intervene in internal affairs of other
states in order to fulfil the imperial mission”.6
Empires are strongly connected with expansion, consolidation of power and lon-
gevity.7 Rome is the most prominent among them influencing modern scholarship on
its understanding of European imperial formations. There are, however, some empires
which collapse only a few years despite a promising start; they are the short-term
empires. Many explanations about their “failure” have been offered: structural deficien-
cies, problems in their internal organisation, a focus on war, conquest and predation, an
inability to “effectively coerce or persuade support and resources”8 and finally external
factors.
Generally speaking, short-term empires fail in reaching the so-called “Augustan
threshold”,9 the phase of consolidation after the phase of expansion. In the early stages
of their existence, they do not achieve the necessary military and economic superiority
which blocks them from moving to the next phase. Yet, military and economic power
are of paramount importance in the formative years of empires; only in the consolidation
phase, they play political and ideological power a more important role.10
The 13th century offers a unique example of a short-term empire formed through
conquest,11 which lasted less than 60 years. Interestingly, this imperial entity coexisted
with a maritime state which based its power on the economic penetration in the Eastern
Mediterranean. The first one was the Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261), the
second was Venice. The first resulted from a military confrontation at the beginning of
8Goldstone and Haldon 2009: 7: “Some historical states have been represented by claims to legiti-
macy based on consensus, having little or no power of coercion, and have survived generally for
only a relatively short time. Those state elites that have military coercion at their disposal, at least
in the early stages of their development, may remain relatively isolated from the social structures
they live off, surviving only as long as they are able effectively to coerce or persuade support and
resources.”
9Doyle 1984: 93–97.
the 13th century, the second had started taking “the command of the sea” since the 11th
century.12 Yet, after 1204 Venice transformed slowly into an Empire through the conquest
of Crete, the occupation of important strongholds in Peloponnesus and of holding prop-
erty in Euboea.13 The formation and later decline of a land Empire and its coexistence
in the same space with a maritime power should be also taken into consideration in any
discussion of short longevity.14
The Latin Empire of Constantinople is normally not included in the scholarly debate on
world Empires, probably because a thorough analysis of its entire history is still miss-
ing. Whenever studies on the neighbouring states refer to it, it is in connection to mili-
tary confrontations, diplomatic relations, as well as ideological influences. Until recently
only a few books offered a full or partial narration of its history.15 R.L. Wolff never
published his thesis but he presented his research in miscellaneous articles such as the
chapter in the “History of the Crusades”.16 Benjamin Hendrickx worked extensively
on its institutional history,17 while David Jacoby focused on the economy and its rela-
tions to the Frankish states.18 Only some conferences were dedicated exclusively to the
Latin Empire,19 whereas few studies have addressed the prosopography and the marriage
alliances.20 Otherwise, books on the history of the Crusades and the Frankish states in
Greece21 incorporated the Latin Empire in their chapters. In the last years, the schol-
arly interest grows. After 2010, various dissertations and monographs were written and
published shading light on ideological and institutional aspects, as well as on its foreign
policy.22
The Latin Empire of Constantinople lacks its own contemporary account. On recon-
structing its history, formation and organisation we rely on sources of diverse origin,
15du Cange 1826; Gerland 1905; Longnon 1949; Verlinden 1945; Carile 1978.
17Hendrickx 1974a; Hendrickx, 1974b; Hendrickx 1974c; Hendrickx 1977; Hendrickx 1999.
21Miller 1908; Lock 1995: 35–67; Balard 2006: 216–220; Dourou-Iliopoulou 2012: 77–80;
languages and aims. The corpus of written sources encompasses the chronicles of the
Fourth Crusade, foremost the ones by Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Robert of Clari.
Villehardouin covers the years up to 1207, while Robert de Clari narrates the events up
to 1216. The chronicle of Henry of Valenciennes, the sequel of Villehardouin, deals with
the period 1208–1209. These authors present the capture of Constantinople and the exist-
ence of the Latin Empire as legitimate acts23. The letters written by crusaders and sent
to friendly Western princes and authorities during and shortly after 1204 reflect a similar
attitude.24 The Chronica by Alberic of Trois-Fontaines (written between 1227 and 1251)
is helpful for the period 1204–1241.25 Credible and valuable insight offer also Philippe
Mouskes and Matthew of Paris. The first covers the period until circa 1243, whereas the
second until 1259.26 Although of various credibility, one should also include the Venetian
chronicles which present the Serenissima’s point of view.27
The Gesta Innocentii28 endorse the papal perspective which does not always coincide
with the historiography. On the other hand, the papal registers include valuable material
on the political and ecclesiastical organisation for the period 1204–1261.29 Critical to the
events of 1204 and to the Latin Empire is the Devastatio Constantinopolitana30 Other
sources like the Hystoria Constantinopolitana emphasise the participation of monks and
priests in the Crusade. Their involvement was strongly connected to the acquisition of
relics in Constantinople and their transfer to the West.31
Only a few documents of the Latin Emperors are known, related mostly to exter-
nal affairs.32 Equally fragmentary is the material on the internal administration of the
empire, the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople,33 the monastic orders and their founda-
tions.34 The Venetian diplomatic material provides some data on the economic history of
23Faral1938–1939; Sollbach, 1998; Shaw 1963; Lauer 1924a; Dufournet 2004; Longnon 1948.
24Martène and Durand 1717; Waitz 1880: 203–208; Bouquet 1879: 517–519; Tafel and Thomas
1856–1857: vol. 1, 304–311; Pokorny 1985: 203–209; Andrea 2000: 177–201.
25Scheffer-Boichorst 1874; Andrea 2000: 291–309.
29Hageneder et al., 1964; Pressutti 1888, 1895. Some complete texts of letters, in Horov 1878–
1880; Wolff 1954: 225–303; Auvray 1899–1910; Berger 1884–1910; Bourel de la Ronciire
1902–1931.
30Andrea 1993: 131–149.
32Prevenier 1964–1971; Hendrickx 1988; Prevenier 1990. See also Longnon 1943. On the letters
of the Latin emperors see Tafel and Thomas 1856–1857; Lauer 1924b; Teulet 1866; du Bouchet
1661; Dölger 1931.
33Wolff 1948; Wolff, 1954; van Dieten 1990; Santifaller 1938.
the period. Yet, it depicts mostly the interests of the Serenissima not simply in the newly
established Latin Empire but also in the entire Eastern Mediterranean.35
Extremely valuable are the Greek sources such as Niketas Choniates, George
Akropolites and Nikolaos Mesarites.36 However, they are biased against the Latin state
focusing on the Nicaean revival. The only pro-Latin source in Greek is the Chronicle
of Morea written probably by a French with anti-Greek feelings.37 Sources from the
Kingdom of Cilician Armenia38, the Seljuk Sultanate39, the Latin States in Syria and
Palestine, and the neighbouring Islamic principalities offer additional data.40
Finally, seals and coins enlighten issues of imperial ideology and monetary policies,41
whereas archaeological findings and manuscripts enrich aspects of the monastic life and
literary production during that period.42
The reasons for the short longevity of this Empire can be traced on its weak points. At
first one should focus on the phase of its formation.
The Latin Empire is an immediate result of the Fourth Crusade.43 The collapse of
the Byzantine Empire sealed the end of destabilising processes and a period of upris-
ings that had shaken the state creating a high degree of instability.44 Τhe internal prob-
lems of Byzantium gave the opportunity to foreign powers to interfere. The invitation of
prince Alexios to the Crusaders to help his father Emperor Isaakios II to gain back the
Byzantine throne served as the excuse for the deviation from the original plan. It is not
the place here to discuss the diversion of the Fourth Crusade;45 however, what followed
the capture of Zara set the base of the events in 1204. The Crusaders started in 1202 for
the Holy Land but ended up in the Byzantine capital; for almost a year they had military
35Morozzo della Rocca and Lombardo 1940; Tafel and Thomas 1856–1857; Theiner 1863–1875;
Theiner 1859–1860.
36Van Dieten 1975; Heisenberg and Wirth 1978; Angold 2017; Heisenberg and Wirth 1978.
37Kalonaros 1940; Lurier 1964; Egea 1996; Shawcross 2009; Shawcross 2012b.
39Duda 1959.
40On the Western chronicles from the Holy Land and from the neighbouring Islamic principalities,
42Jolivet-Lévy 2012.
43On the Fourth Crusade see Angold 2003; Laiou 2005. Lilie 2004: 157–180; Queller and Madden
and diplomatic confrontations in front of the city’s walls. On April 13, 1204, the soldiers
of the Fourth Crusade conquered Constantinople after a final attack from land and sea
and the Latin Empire of Constantinople was established.
Perhaps not initially planned but in the end a fact, this Empire differs from the other
Crusader States in the Near East (the county of Edessa, the principality of Antioch, the
county of Tripolis, and the kingdom of Jerusalem).46 Constantinople was the capital of a
long-lived Christian Empire47 and its new lords aimed at continuing its imperial tradition.48
Similar ideological aspirations bore also the three Greek successor states (Nicaea, Epirus
and Trebizond), which have formed in the periphery of the former Byzantine Empire.
The most successful concurrent was the Empire of Nicaea whose troops reconquered in
1261 Constantinople.49 Byzantium demonstrated once more ability of readjustment and
resilience.50
Although empires are rarely a consequence of deliberate planning, the Latin Empire
is an example of the opposite. It is as well an “Empire of conquest”. At least one month
prior to the capture of the city (13 April 1204), the leaders of the crusader army and the
Venetians (Boniface of Montferrat, Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut, Louis of Blois and
Hugh of Saint-Pol, and the Venetian Doge Enrico Dandolo) decided to capture the city.
Actually, the so-called pact of March 1204 (Partitio Romanie), followed by later agree-
ments up to October 1205, set the constitutional framework of the Latin Empire, which
had to replace the Byzantine one. From the view of political theories, Partitio Romaniae
was the planning of a “state death” which had to be later executed.51 Starting from the
centre (Constantinople) they aimed at conquering regions in Europe and Asia Minor.
One-quarter of the territories, including the imperial palaces, belonged to the emperor.
The other three-quarters were to be divided between the Venetians and the peregrini. It
has been proven that the crusaders based their knowledge on fiscal documents and on an
inspection of the Byzantine territories.52
Baldwin I, who was elected emperor on May the 9th 1204 and was crowned on the
16th of May53, had to receive part of Constantinople and of Thrace, Asia Minor and
some islands in the Aegean. However, he gave some of these lands as fiefs to high-rank-
ing crusaders: the duchy of Nicaea to Louis de Blois, the duchy of Philippoupolis (today
46Amouroux-Mourad 1988; MacEvitt 2008; Asbridge 2000; Prawer 1972; Riley-Smith 1997; Lilie
1993; Balard 2001: 69–130; Schlumberger 1882; Schlumberger 1879; Metcalf 1989; Metcalf
1995; Metcalf and Porteous 1989.
47On Byzantium in the discussion about Empires see Haldon 2009.
48Jacoby 1989.
50On the patterns of resilience see Zolli and Healy 2012: 9–23.
51Fazal 2007.
52Carile, 1965; Carile 1978; Oikonomidès 1980; Oikonomides 1992; Balard 2006: 177–179.
54Hendrickx 2015.
55Angold 1975; Stolte 1990.
56Longnon 1943: 58–61; Balard 2006: 217.
60van Tricht 2011: 43; Carile 1965; Topping 1949 and in Topping 1977.
Some roots of the later difficulties of the Latin Empire can be traced already in the pact
of March 1204 and its superficial character of the description of the relationship between
the emperor and the vassal states. Van Tricht has argued that “…the emperorship itself
was still to be assigned, which certainly must have contributed to the fact that not all the
parties involved had yet developed a definitive perspective as to the position of the impe-
rial powers within the empire as a whole. In this respect, the basic pact of March 1204
already foreshadowed the contrast between centripetal and centrifugal forces that were to
characterize the Latin Empire.”62 If we put it on the broader discussion about Empires,
we have here an example of an empire which “can be built on a congeries of client states
(or “friendly kings”) and need not rest on total subjugation and direct rule. Even when
imperial authorities remain formally sovereign over the lands they count as possessions,
they often accept varying degrees of local autonomy”.63
In spite of the original planning, enough ground was left for negotiating a better deal
with the counterparts-especially the Emperor. Agents or imperial garrisons represented
the Emperor on a local level. In many instances, the Emperor intervened whenever con-
flicts arose. These internal elite disputes proved critical for the fate of the Empire. Two
major events related to the kingdom of Thessaloniki: the confrontation of Baldwin I and
Boniface of Montferrat in relation to the rule upon the city and the second was the revolt
of the barons of Thessaloniki after the death of Baldwin I. They were demonstrations of
internal dislikes and separate aims which caused the loss of energy, money and soldiers.
In reality, the vassal states followed their own policies. Some of them were extremely
successful and long lived (Principality of Achaia),64 while others (the Kingdom of
Thessaloniki until 122465) became pray of the other players in the region, Bulgarians66
and Greeks. The loss of these territories signified also the geographical, political and
economic weakening of the Empire which after the death of Henry of Hainaut in 1216
but especially after 1228 (death of Robert of Courtenay, 1221–1228) was reduced into a
city state around Constantinople.
“Empires are about elites, that means inequality and stratification.”67 The Latin
Empire was a political construction that can be characterized as fundamentally Western,
both as regards its institutional organisation and its political elite. Regarding the insti-
tutional organisation, this was organised on western models mixed with Byzantine ele-
ments. On the top were the emperor, his private council and the Council of the Empire
66Gjuzelev 1975.
consisting of the Frank barons, the Venetian doge (later the podestà), and six Venetians.68
The most important military offices were the ones senescalus, constabularius and mares-
calus.69 The buticularius, panetarius and the major cocus were responsible for the provi-
sion of the palace.70 Finally, the imperial chancery was administered by the chancellor
(cancellarius) who had at his service the notaries and scribes (notarii, scriptores, capel-
lani and clerici).71 However, Byzantine administrative mechanisms have been retained
on a central level. Also, titles and offices of Byzantine origin such as protovestiarus
(defence of the city and the palace) are attested.72 Finally, in the justice system, a system
of special jurisdiction was at work in mixed Byzantine-Latin cases.73
In the decision-making procedures was involved the political elite concentrating
power in the hands of a small number of persons. This was the private council of the
emperor and the Council of the Empire. However, up to 1217, they did not represent
the aristocracy of the entire empire. Only the territories and principalities surrounding
Constantinople were represented in the imperial politics. After the death of Emperor
Henry I started a period of tension within this group. The reason was the arrival of
Western newcomers in the capital. The newcomers wished to assure themselves of a
place at the imperial court and in policymaking, and to some extent, therefore, needed to
enter into competition with the established elite. Because of their Western background,
it was in a way natural that in doing so they contested an existing model of cooperation
between Westerners and Greeks.74
Another crucial factor was the relations of the Emperor to the local Greek elites.75
We must not forget that “empires are a particular form of state organization in which
the elites of differing ethnic or national units defer to and acquiesce in the politi-
cal leadership of the dominant power”.76 Moreover, “all empires rest on transnational
elites…empire came to mean rule over others”.77 But certainly “the elites who accept
an empire by conquest is different from the style of rule accepted by those who believe
they are joining a federation designed to hold off a greater evil”.78 Many members of the
Byzantine elite abandoned the conquered areas and fled to the Greek successor states in
the periphery of the former Byzantium; however, other aristocratic families remained and
75Gilles 2010.
cooperated with the Latin rulers. The citizens of Constantinople were given the choice
of staying or leaving; some stayed and worked for the new administration.79 Among
them was Constantine Tornikes, whose son, Demetrios Tornikes, served in the Empire of
Nicaea. The most prominent example, however, is Theodore Branas who governed three
cities in Thrace and even married his daughter to a Westerner.80 The names of various
other Greeks serving at the Latin administration are known; nevertheless, key-positions
were occupied by Latins.
Venice played a prominent role in the Fourth Crusade using the crusader armies for the
consolidation and expansion of its power in the Eastern Mediterranean in the disad-
vantage of its enemies. Its penetration in the area started already in the 9th century81
but the privileged position of Serenissima in Byzantium was strengthened and sealed
through a series of chrysobulls (gold bull documents) by the Byzantine emperors espe-
cially after 1082.82 However, the “anti-Latin” measures and the attacks in 1171 against
the Venetians emphasised the necessity for a Western control of the Straits, in order to
secure the Venetian mercantile activities.83 A maritime Empire in the making profited
from the presence of a land empire in Constantinople, in which it had an exclusive and
privileged position keeping possessions and rights attained prior to 1204. Through these
possessions, the Serenissima gained control over the maritime routes from the Adriatic
Sea to Constantinople. Venice received one fourth of the capital and the empire as well
as half of the other three quarters. The doge was called “lord of the quarter and half of
the Empire of Romania”84 since he received “quarte partis et dimidie totius Imperii
Romanie”. A further proof for the prominent position of the Venetians is that they had
not given an oath of subordination to the emperor; on the contrary, they hold their veto
right against the selection of an unfriendly towards the Serenissima person. Moreover,
everyone coming from cities and states at war with Venice could not enter the empire.
They had their own podesta—Marino Zeno— and after a treaty in 1205, the Venetians
had an autonomy inside the state. The Venetian fief holders gave an oath of fidelity to
doge and they had military and fiscal obligations only towards the Commune.85
79See van Tricht 2011: 34–36 on the Byzantine imperial elite families which remained in territories
under the Latin rule.
80Shawcross 2012a: 212–213.
81McCormick 2001.
83Kindlimann 1969.
On the other hand, while being part of the Council of the Empire, the Venetians
retained their own administrative apparatus next to the one of the emperor (judges, treas-
urers etc.).86 Imperial authority was often questioned by the Serenissima; on their turn,
the emperors had acted in many instances without consulting the Venetians.87 Finally, in
matters of foreign policy, Venice followed her own interests; she concluded trade treaties
with enemies of the Latin Empire, whereas the emperors avoided any relations to powers
unfriendly to Venice, such as Genoa.88
Despite their initial successes in conquering areas in Asia Minor and in central Greece,
the new lords of Constantinople miscalculated the importance of some neighbor-
ing states and failed paramount in creating strong alliances. The first significant exter-
nal opponents were the Bulgarians. At first, they sought for an alliance with Baldwin I
against the Greek state of Nicaea. Their proposal was rejected. Kalojan, the Bulgarian
ruler, called then the Greeks of Didymoteichon to revolt against them. In the battle of
Adrianople in May 1205, the Bulgarians captured the Latin emperor Baldwin I who died
the next year in captivity whereas prominent crusaders like Louis de Blois died on the
battlefield.89 Henry I, brother of Baldwin I, was crowned emperor in August 1206. He
proved to be an excellent diplomat and military leader. Under his rule started a consoli-
dation phase of the Empire which ended with his death. Henry I followed a policy of
either signing treaties with or military defeating the enemies. Around 1208, he signed a
treaty with the Greeks of Nicaea while he defeated the Greeks of opponent Epirus under
Michael I (1205–1215) as well as the Bulgarians. In 1214 and after a successful expedi-
tion in Asia Minor, a treaty defined the boarders with the Nicaean emperor Theodore I
Laskaris.90
Henry’s successors failed to continue his work. Under Robert of Courtenay91, Asia
Minor fell to the Nicaean troops, while Thessaly, Macedonia and Thessaloniki to the
Epirus state. The decline continued under John of Brienne92 and especially under
Baldwin II. However, after 1230 (battle of Klokotnitsa), the Bulgarians and the Nicaeans
made an alliance against the Latin Empire and sieged Constantinople (1235). The rise of
the Empire of Nicaea to the greatest power in Asia Minor and the Balkans under John III
Vatatzes (1221–1254) continued in the following decades until the recapture of 1261.93
In its final days, the Empire was reduced into a city-state reminding the situation in 1453
when the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans was inevitable.
Apart from failing in creating the necessary military alliances, the Latin emperors
failed as well in creating “a common dynastic framework” as Michael Angold has named
it. Although Henry I has used marriage alliances in order to strengthen the position of
the Empire among its neighbors, his successors were reluctant in engaging in intermar-
riages with the Greek and Bulgarian neighbors, even at the moment when their weakness
became obvious.94 Such entanglements would have established a supportive network in
the Romania without relying strongly on the help of France, Venice or the Papacy. The
lack of dynastic connections on a local level allowed the other powers of the region to
cooperate against the lords of Constantinople. Moreover, it transformed quickly the Latin
Empire from the most important player in 1216 into the weakest link in the power arena
of the Eastern Mediterranean.
One of the most fascinating aspects of the Latin Empire of Constantinople relates to
its ideological framework.95 The imperial ideology of the new emperors was based on
the Byzantine one mixed however with western elements. Their aim was to legitimise
their presence on the former Byzantine territories and to give a sense of continuity to the
Greek inhabitants. The Byzantine influence is attested in ceremonies and rituals, as well
as in documents, coins, seals and in the imperial title.
Byzantine influence demonstrated already the first imperial actions of the new inhab-
itants of Bukoleon palace in Constantinople. Robert de Clari described in detail the
coronation ceremony of Baldwin I on May 16 1204. He focused on the sequence of
events but also on gestures, robes and insignia.96 Modern scholars cannot identify the
exact Byzantine model since we lack a book like the De Cerimoniis for the 12th cen-
tury. But as Theresa Shawross correctly argued, the Crusaders had a specific model in
mind, perhaps the coronation of Alexios IV Angelos, which they personally had seen and
experienced.97
In the ideological framework of the Latin Empire were incorporated not only the
ritual aspects of Byzantine ideology. Also, the objects of communication with foreign
93Longnon 1949; Lock 1995: 51–66; Balard 2006: 220; Balard 2001: 242–243; Morrisson 2011a:
powers and their citizens (documents, seals and coins) offered the necessary legitima-
tion of the new emperors. In relation to the chancery, the strategy followed was to imitate
Byzantine practices for imperial charters foremost the usage of menologema for dating
the documents.98 The emperors signed by their own hand the charters with the excep-
tion of Baldwin I who was illiterate. However, the charters do not lose their Flemish ele-
ments, especially those addressed to western powers. Perhaps two separate departments
may have existed in the imperial chancery (a Byzantine and a Western one) with a work
division based on the type, aim and recipient of the documents.99
The documents are important testimonies of the imperial ideology of the new state
on the Bosporus. The imperium Constantinopolitanum, as the Latin Empire was called
in its earliest testimonies, was perceived as the continuation of Byzantium staying in no
opposition to the Holy Roman Empire.100 Baldwin I bore the title “Balduinus Dei gra-
tia fidelissimus in Christo imperator a Deo coronatu, Romanorum moderator et semper
augustus, Flandrie et Hayn[onie] Comes”.101 Baldwin’s seals follow partially French
models. On the obverse, the legend reads in Greek: ΒΑΛΔΟVΙΝΟΣ ΔΕΣΠΟΤΗΣ
(despot Balduin) and on the reverse in Latin: „Balduinus die gratiae imperator
Romanorum Flandrie Hainonie“. The ruler is represented according to western models.
In the following years, the title remained in its core elements unchanged.
Also Henry I followed a bilingual system with a mixture of Greek and Latin.
Three types of seals have been identified. The first two have in the obverse ΕΡΡΙΚΟΣ
ΔΕΣΠΟΤΗΣ (Henry despot) and on reverse: Henricus Die gratia imperator Romaniae
or Romanorum. The third type had a Latin obverse (Henricus die gratia Imperatoris
Constantinopolitani) and a Greek reverse which declares Henry autokrator and despot of
Constantinople.102
The seals of both Baldwin I and Henry I are interesting also for the use of Romani(a)
e and Romanorum in relation to “imperator” since the first combination adheres to the
ideological aspirations upon the land whereas the second combination complies with the
Byzantine traditional claims.
The last emperor, Baldwin II, was born in Constantinople in 1217 in the Porphyra
chamber, the room where traditionally the children of the Byzantine emperor were born;
he was, therefore, Porphyrogennetos (= born in the purple). He added this to his seals.
The known examples represent Baldwin on the obverse on horseback and on the reverse
seated and wearing a crown, divitision and loros, holding a scepter and globus cruciger.
The legend on the obverse is in Greek: “Βαλδουΐνος δεσπότης Πορϕυρογέννητος ο
Next to the new political power in Constantinople, also a new ecclesiastic order
was established. If Pope Innocent III finally accepted the plunder of a Christian city
was due to his hope of the submission of the Orthodox Church to the papal author-
ity. Shortly after the election of Baldwin I, also a Latin Patriarch was chosen. The first
Latin Patriarch in the Queen of Cities was a Venetian, Thomas Morosini, following the
arrangements of the Partitio Romaniae. The establishment of a Latin Patriarchate in
Constantinople did not, however, solved the problems with the Orthodox nor with Rome.
Innocent III was for months unaware of this fact and when he finally heard about dis-
liked the decision. Finally, he accepted the situation and even tried to legitimise the exist-
ence of a Latin Patriarch in Constantinople with the hope once more of a Union of the
Churches.
To this cause, the Latin Church was reinforced through the presence of various monas-
tic orders. In Latin Constantinople as in other former byzantine areas, the Cistercians
and the Benedictines were present early on. Later also Franciscans and Dominicans
were added and received churches and monasteries in Constantinople. They were early
on involved in the discussions between Latin and Orthodox Church and participated in
missions to the Empire of Nicaea. Very early were established in the Romania the mili-
tary orders -the Knights Templar, the Knights Hospitaller and the Teutonic Knights- which
possessed properties also in the Kingdom of Thessaloniki and in Central Greece. They
played though a less significant role than it would be expected.107
Yet, all the efforts for a Union of the Churches failed due to the feelings of the
Greeks, but also due to the persons involved. Moreover, the existence of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate in the Greek State of Nicaea gave negotiation power to the Orthodox. The
Latin dogma did not reach the lower strata of society despite the new organisation of
the metropolitan sees and the tolerance of the Papacy towards the orthodox bishops who
stayed on their seats but refused obedience to the Latin Patriarch. There were internal
fights since the Popes wanted to reduce the power of the Venetians as factors of the
Patriarchate. On the other hand, the emperors of Constantinople considered the Pope and
not the Latin Patriarch as discussion partner on religious matters.
Equally important were quarrels related to the church finances. The one fifteenth of
the land properties outside Constantinople had to be given to the Latin Church for its
support. The laity except for the Greeks had to pay tithes. However, later agreements
were needed to solve the problem of the Church property since the Venetians were origi-
nally exempted.108
“We are in need of money,…, and without money, nothing can be done that ought to be
done” (Demosthenes, Olynthiakos I)
A significant systemic weakness is related to the economic power of the Empire; it was
soon proved to be one of the major defective elements of this hybrid state. The first
financial resource was the booty of the pillage of Constantinople.109 Its value was about
400,000 silver marks. A part of it (50,000) was used to pay the debt to the Venetians
while the rest was distributed among the crusaders (35,000) and the Venetians (17,000
107Tsougarakis 2012; Koumanoude 2012; Violante 1999; Lock 1995: 222–239; Mitsiou 2015.
108Wolff 1954; Wolff 1948; Richard 1989: 45–62; Van Tricht 2011: 307–339; Coureas 2015:
145–184.
109Perry 2015.
118 E. Mitsiou
silver marks). However, in the following months, the city was deprived of statues, works
of art and architectural parts which were transferred to the West or were used for minting
coins. Apart from this booty, knights and Venetians, monks and priests participated in an
enormous trade of relics which continued throughout the following years.110
The later economic history of the Latin Empire is difficult to reconstruct due to the
lack of sources. The major source of income were the imperial domains and the fiscal
revenues from these areas. Yet, the extensive military expenditure on wars on various
fronts meant important revenue losses. An image of need and deprivation appears in the
sources especially after the territorial losses in Asia Minor and Thrace. An income of
about 500,000 hyperpyra was reduced to the half or even more than the half,111 whereas
the provisioning of the capital became more difficult. The deprivation is vividly pre-
sented by the case of the thorn-wreath. In 1238, it was pawned to the Venetians for circa
13,000 hyperpyra. King Louis IX the Saint recovered the precious relic and brought it
together with other ones to Paris.
This is being represented also on the urban space of Constantinople where areas
under the imperial authority gave a desolate impression.112 The picture is different for
the Venetians in Constantinople. They had their own district as before 1204, where the
economic activity of the town actually was concentrated. They financed the restoration of
the sea walls and kept their district in the highest level of urban structural competence.113
Trade was the main interest for the Venetians. Merchants and bankers such as
Zaccaria Stagnario, Giovanni Martinaccio, Giberto Querini spent long periods of time in
Constantinople engaging in international trade.114 Constantinople remained a transit zone
for most of the trade between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Yet, the Venetian
penetration to the Black Sea was strengthened especially after 1240 and the Mongol
conquest of the region.115 Despite the positive effects of the Venetian trade and credit
activities, it became evident that Constantinople was marginalised inside the world trade
systems.
Moreover, merchants and producers focused less on the supply of the state’s center
and more on their own profit by selling the surpluses to the West, where the demand
was becoming higher.116 Through this and due to the territorial losses in Asia Minor,
Thrace, and Macedonia the “urban metabolism” failed for the capital. After the first suc-
cessful years, Constantinople was cut by land from the vassal states of the South such
as the Principality of Achaia depending strongly on the sea routes dominated by the
Venetians. On the other hand, the emperors were unable to fulfill what has been called
imperial ecology” (= the management of particular flows of resources and population by
the imperial center).117 According to D. Jacoby: “After 1204 it was merely the capital
of a reduced territorial entity. There was no flow of cash and goods to Constantinople,
whether in the form of fiscal revenue or self-supply of elite households from their pro-
vincial estates. The Latin emperors of Constantinople were chronically impoverished”.118
9 Human Resources
After 1204 many Westerners from different regions and their retinue (foremost France
and Italy) arrived in continental Greece and in the Aegean islands in search of landed
fiefs or trade activities. On the other hand, settlers who had abandoned the city prior to
its capture returned to Constantinople. However, already in its first years, the Empire
faced a shortage of human resources (settlers and soldiers). Already in 1205, 7000
knights left the Latin Empire; one year later also 50 more. As an answer to this prob-
lem, the quick movement of the knights from one region to another one which needed
urgently help was chosen as a typical pattern of military response.119 Henry I addressed
the reasons for the shortage of military man power in a letter to the West: many soldiers
were killed in battles, others returned to their homelands and the remaining ones fought
on various fronts.120 Another reason was the engagement of Latin mercenaries in the
armies of Nicaea and Epirus. Very often the emperors asked for reinforcements in order
to keep the conquered regions;121 rarely did they reach Constantinople. The Latin Empire
became actually an unattractive workplace for mercenaries and other settlers. Since fiefs
went lost, not enough land was available for distribution to them; and the trade was in
the hands of the Venetians, who were the only Westerners still interested in the salvation
of the state. The lack of actual support from the West had many reasons. The Western
powers and the Papacy were preoccupied with political problems in Europe but also with
the situation in the Holy Land. It should not be forgotten that the diversion of the Fourth
Crusade to Constantinople and the foundation of the Latin Empire derived the Crusader
States of knights and means. In the second decade of the 13th century, a new Crusade
was organised but the Latin Empire was unable to contribute substantially to the expedi-
tion despite its promises.122
Finally, a population drain marked the entire period. At first were the Greeks or their
children who abandoned the city and found a new home in the Greek successor states.
From circa 225,000 inhabitants in 1204, Latin Constantinople had in 1261 only 3000,
mostly Venetians.123 The Empire was slowly decapitated.
10 Conclusions
The Latin Empire of Constantinople was the result of conquest and military effort of
Western elites on a culturally different area. According to Wolff “…its eventual collapse
was probably inevitable; founded on alien soil, amid hostile Greeks who soon had lead-
ers around whom they might rally, dependent on a flow of money and men from the west
which might be cut off at any time, the Latin empire could have survived, if at all, only
through statesmanship so far sighted and astute that one would be unrealistic in demand-
ing it of flesh-and-blood crusaders and Venetians”.124
Yet, the sustainability of a system depends on coherence. The Partitio’s plan to
divide and distribute the conquered lands among the emperor and the barons proved the
Achilles’ heel of the Latin Empire. It created a chain of clusters in this new network
of power. The later developments proved that the subgroups of the network could sup-
port the center only if they remained entangled in a direct way. However, the loss of the
Kingdom of Thessaloniki broke the land connections of the Constantinople cluster to the
ones in Central Greece and Peloponessus destabilising the robustness of the system.
Moreover, the existence of parallel centres in decision making procedures and the dif-
ferent policies followed by the various parts (Emperor, Venetians, barons, fief holders)
strengthened centrifugal tendencies. On the other hand, the significant territorial losses
after the two first decades of its existence did not allow for a social and political stabili-
sation. The consequent reduce of the state income contributed further to the crisis since
no investments could be made for the army, the civil administration or the infrastructure.
The Latin emperors notoriously failed to develop any mechanisms of stabilisation by
attracting new settlers and by developing a network of support in the Romania. Finally,
although they were successful in their ideological claims and the imitation of ritual prac-
tices of their Byzantine predecessors, they were unable to consolidate the power they
gained through military means. It would be therefore not incorrect to say that the Latin
Empire of Constantinople was short-lived and died on what Davies called “the political
counterpart of infant mortality”.125
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