FA manupatra
MANU/SC/0002/1984
Equivalent citation: AIR1984SC1072, 1985(3)ARBLR2(SC), (1984)2CompLIL(SC), (1984)2CompL:
984(1)SCALEA, (198
(usesjascri18
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 3023 of 1980
Decided On: 06.03.1984
Appellants: Tarapore and Company
Vs.
Respondent: Cochin Shipyard Ltd., Cochin and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
D.A, Desai and 0. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Fali Sam Nariman, Anand Narain Haksar, T. Raghav,
R.F. Nariman and V.A. Bobde, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: G.B. Paj P. Kumar, A.K. Sharma, Ashok Mathur and
Parveen Kumar, Advs.
Case Note:
Arbitration - award - appeal against Order setting aside award - where
specific question is referred to arbitrator for his decision award cannot be set
aside on ground of error apparent on face of award because question of law
wrongly decided - claim of compensation made by arbitrator which led to
dispute covered by arbitration clause - quantum of compensation awarded by
arbitrator never disputed nor questioned - Order passed by High Court liable
to be set aside - appeal allowed.
JUDGMENT
D.A. Desai, J
1. In this appeal by special leave a very interesting question in the field of law of
arbitration which ‘honest man dread more than the dreaded law suits' arises for our
consideration.
2. First respondent Cochin Shipyard Limited (‘respondent' for short) invited tenders for
construction of Building Dock at Cochin, As there was only one tender that of Tarapore
& Company, the appellant, the respondent called fresh tenders somewhere in July,
1971. In December, 1971, the respondent invited tenders for construction of a Repair
Dock also at Cochin. There were two tenders for Building Dock, namely, one of the
appellant and one by M/s. National Building Construction Corporation, a Government of
India undertaking, the value of the tender of the latter being double that of the
appellant. For the construction of the Repair Dock, the only tender was of the appellant.
In view of the limited number of tenders received, the appellant was invited to negotiate
the terms of tender. The value of the works to be executed was over Rs. 24 crores. In
view of the huge investment in the project, the tenders were examined by a committee
called the Tender Committee constituted in accordance with the approval of the MinistryA manupotra
of Shipping and Transport for examining and evaluating the tenders received for the
Building Dock and the Repair Dock. The Tender Committee taking note of the poor
response to the invitation to tender and costly affair decided to accept the tender of the
appellant inter alia for the reasons (i) that works of such complexity and magnitude
have not been undertaken before by any Indian contractor, (ji) that the plant and
equipment required for the work are not available indigenously, (iii) that if the
contractor is to procure the specialised equipment required for this work, there is hardly
any assurance that after these works are over, he would find any substantial use for the
same, (iv) that excavation and subsequent construction involve dewatering which
introduces considerable amount of uncertainty and that during the discussions, the
apprehension of the tenders of this kind was voiced and noticed by the Committee, and
(v) that RCC Piling also requires highly skilled and complex technical operations and it
involves a large element of risk and uncertainty in the work. Both the tenders of the
appellant were accepted, and contracts were entered into between the parties. Both the
parties while entering into contracts were aware and conscious of the fact that
equipment and technical know-how would have to be imported involving a huge outlay
of foreign exchange. Appellant-contractor quoted rates on two alternative basis
depending-upon whether it had to import equipment and know-how at its cost involving
Rs, 2 crores in foreign exchange or the equipment and know-how were to be imported
by the respondent at its cost and made available for use of the appellant in which case
the appellant would be liable to pay hire charges for the pile driving plant at the rate of
Rs. 23/- per metre of 600 mm dia. RCC cast-in-situ pipe and Rs. 16/- per metre of 500
mm dia. RCC cast-in-situ pipe and at the rate of 300 per tonne of steel sheet piles
driven to be recovered from the running bills payable to the appellant-contractor, The
appellant was given to understand by a note in the invitation to tender that foreign
exchange in yen credit to the tune of Rs. 38 lacs is earmarked for the purchase of
construction equipment, accessories etc. from Japan for works of Building Dock, Repair
Dock, the three Quays etc. On January 24, 1973, work order for Building Dock and
Repair Dock was issued by the respondent in favour of appellant and in this work order
as recommended by the Tender Committee, the respondent adopted the alternative B as
set out in the tender, namely, that the contractor was to procure the equipment and
know-how at a cost of about Rs. 2 crores in foreign exchange. In order to make this
aspect specific, additional condition No, 31 was incorporated in the works order in order
to provide for the expense to be incurred and the amount of foreign exchange needed
for importing equipment and technical know-how, relevant portion of which reads as
under:
Requisite foreign exchange, for importing piling plant and machinery, spares,
technical know-how and hiring of experts necessary for both the Dock Works
vide Work Order No. 13019/1/71-W-II dated January 24, 1973 for Building
Dock etc. and Work Order No 13012/15/71-W-II dated January 24, 1973 for
Repair Dock etc., amounting to about Rs. 2.00 crores in all will be made
available to the contractor from the 11th Yen Credit subject to his getting
indigenous clearance and providing detailed justification. The details of such
procurement shall be furnished by the Contractor as soon as they are finalised
3. In view of the huge investment, it was agreed that the respondent would make an
advance payment of 75% of the value of old machinery and 90% of the value of new
machinery brought to site by the Contractor and in order to secure this advance
payment, equipment would be hypothecated by the Contractor to the respondent and
the advance payment were to carry interest at 9.1/2% p.a. on the outstanding balance
of advance. The mode of recovery was also specified. The formal contract was signed
on January 29, 1973 which included an arbitration clause to which we would turn a littleJ manupotra’"
later.
4, It so happened that the required pile driving equipment including the technical know-
how against 11th Japanese Yen credit were not available. The respondent also made
inquires in this behalf but without success. Ultimately, International Foundation Group,
Holland agreed to provide the rate of equipment conforming more or less to the same
specification for which clearance was sought and received from the Government of
India. After the respondent certified that the equipment and know-how offered by
International Foundation Group. Holland conform to the earlier clearance and that the
same equipment being not indigenously available or against 11th Japanese Yen Credit,
the respondent requested the Government of India to give necessary clearance to the
appellant to import the equipment. This approval was received on September 1, 1973
and the foreign exchange to the extent of Rs. 211.80 lakhs equal to 9,442.700. Dutch
Florins was released in favour of the appellant. The entire imported equipment was
received in four consignments between March/July 1974, During the intervening period,
there were variations in the rate of exchange and therefore the foreign exchange cost of
equipment alone in terms of rupees worked out at Rs. 177.50 lakhs and of the technical
know-how fees payable in 11 installments worked out at Rs. 105 lakhs. The custom
duty went up by Rs. 21 lakhs as a consequence of the increase in rupee value of the
imported equipment in terms of Dutch Florin.
5. The appellant made a tentative claim in the amount of Rs. 61.27 lakhs from the
respondent on account of increase in cost of pile driving equipment and technical know-
how fees on the ground that the contractor was entitled to be compensated by the
respondent for the same. In the letter dated May 28,1975, the appellant has stated that
the ‘tendered rates were based on certain total cost of machines which has since gone
up considerably rendering the rates no longer workable. The appellant had provided for
a cost of 150 lakhs of rupees for the equipment and the life of the equipment was taken
as 12,000 hours and its probable period of engagement on this job was taken as 8,000
hours. On this basis two-thirds of the cost of the equipment will be written off by way
of depreciation on this job.' It was also stated that there is an increase in the fees for
the technical know-how, The letter concluded by saying that the loss sustained by the
appellant upto May 15,1975 on account of variation in the rate of foreign exchange was
Rs. 61,27,317 and requested the respondent to compensate the loss atleast upto the
tune of Rs. 45 lakhs which is approximately 75% of the loss suffered by the contractor
in this behalf, The respondent responded to this letter as per its letter dated July 2,1975
saying that the letter dated July 14,1972 of the appellant which forms part of the
contract documents clearly recites that the total foreign exchange required by the
contractor for the equipment, spares, technical know-how and hiring of experts, was
expected to be about Rs. 2 crores and that the expenditure incurred by the contractor in
this behalf so far has been less than Rs. 2 crores and in the circumstance s it was found
difficult to accept the position that the tender was based on the assumptions indicated
in the letter under reply and that the rates for the pile driving should for the future be
revised. There ensued further correspondence between the parties. Ultimately, the
appellant by its letter dated March 1, 1976 informed the respondent that its claim for
compensation for increase in the cost of Imported pile driving equipment and technical
know-how fees has not been entertained for over a year. It was further stated that
‘inasmuch as the dispute has thus arisen between us regarding the above claim, we are
invoking the provisions for arbitration in our contracts and referring this dispute to
arbitration." On March 17, 1976 Chief Engineer of the respondent replied saying that the
matter as set out in the letter dated March 1,1976 invoking arbitration clause is
receiving their immediate attention and the appellant will hear shortly in this behalf. On
March 29,1976, the respondent wrote to the appellant denying the claim forF manupoatra
compensation of the appellant. Simultaneously the respondent framed three points
covering the dispute so raised for reference to and decision by the arbitrator. The letter
also sets out as required by Clause 40 a panel of three names from which anyone can
be chosen by the appellant as the sole arbitrator. The appellant by its letter dated April
19,1976 while refuting the contention of the respondent that the dispute would not be
covered by Clause 40 i.e. arbitration clause in the contract, stated that the proper
course would be to refer the dispute that has arisen between the parties to the decision
of the arbitrator and not any particular issue or issues. Ultimately from amongst the
three names indicated by the respondent the appellant selected Shri C, Srinivasa Rao,
Chief Bridge Engineer, Southern Railway, Madras to be the Sole Arbitrator to decide the
dispute. On receipt of this letter the respondent referred the dispute to Shri C. Srinivasa
Rao as Sole Arbitrator. While referring the dispute to the sole arbitration of Shri C.
Srinivasa Rao; the respondent retained the three points of reference set out in the letter
dated March 29,1976 but added one more. The Arbitrator entered upon the reference on
June 2,1976. On being called upon by the Arbitrator, the appellant filed its statement of
claim on June 19,1976. The appellant claimed Rs. 2,03,47, 266 as per the Schedule to
the Statement of Claim on account of increase in the cost of equipment and technical
know-how fees. The respondent filed its reply to the Statement of Claim on July 19,
1976.
6. The points/disputes referred by the parties to the sole arbitrator read as under:
1. Does the claim of Messrs. Tarapore & Co. on Cochin Shipyard Ltd., for
compensation for increase in the cost of imported pile driving equipment and
technical know-how fees referred to in Clauses (2) and (3) hereunder fall within
the purview of the first paragraph of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of
Contract entered into between the two parties ?
2. If the answer to (1) above is in the affirmative, in terms of the provisions of
the contract are Messrs. Tarapore & Co. entitled to compensation for increase in
the cost of imported pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees to be
paid to them by Cochin Shipyard Ltd.? If so, what Is the amount ?
3. The dispute that has arisen between Messrs. Tarapore & Co., and Cochin
Shipyard Ltd. regarding the claim of M/s. Tarapore & Co., for compensation for
increase in the cost of the imported pile driving equipment and the technical
know-how fees.
4. Costs
7 . Parties appeared before the Arbitrator through their respective counsel. The
Arbitrator gave its Award on July 6,1-977. On Point No. 1, the Arbitrator held as under:
The claim of Messrs. Tarapore and Company on Cochin Shipyard Limited for
compensation for increase in the cost of imported pile driving equipment and
technical know-how fees falls within the purview of the first paragraph of
Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract entered into between the
parties.
8. On Point No. 2, the Arbitrator held that the appellant ‘Messrs. Tarapore and Company
are entitled to compensation by the Cochin Shipyard Limited for the increase in the cost
of imported pile driving equipment and the technical know-how fees by a sum of Rs. 99
lakhs only which amount shall be payable with interest at 9.1/2% per annum from this
date till date of payment or decree, whichever is earlier’. On Point No. 3, the decisionFA manupoatra
recorded was ‘that it is covered by the decision on Points (1) and (2)'. On Point No. 4,
on the question of costs, the Arbitrator having determined his fees and incidental
expenses directed both the parties to bear the same equally. The Award was typed on a
stamp paper of the value of Rs. 150/- at Madras. By his letter dated Ni! July, 1977, the
Sole Arbitrator forwarded the award to both the parties.
9. The appellant moved a petition under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act in the
Court of the Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam for filing the award and for making it a rule
of the court. On October 7,1977 the respondent moved 0.P. 81 of 1977 being a
combined petition under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act before the
Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam praying for setting aside the award. The prayer for
setting aside the award was founded on two grounds; (1) that the award is
insufficiently stamped and (2) that the Arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction by
misconstruing Clause 40.of the General Conditions of Contract (Arbitration clause for
short).
10. The learned Subordinate Judge noted the fact that the award was originally
engrossed on a stamp paper of Rs. 150/- but before filing the award in the court on
August 4, 1977, the Arbitrator on August 1,1977 affixed additional stamp of Rs.
14,722.50. p. which would be the requisite stamp under Article 12 read with Article 14
of the Kerala Stamp Act. The learned Subordinate Judge accordingly negatived the
contention of the respondent that the award was insufficiently stamped. On the second
point, the learned Judge held that the respondent having submitted the question
whether the dispute raised by the appellant was covered by the arbitration clause
cannot be permitted to controvert the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to decide this dispute
and accordingly, negatived the contention of the respondent. The learned Judge after
modifying the award of the Arbitrator in the matter of interest from 9.1/2% as awarded
by the Arbitrator to 6% granted the application of the applicant and made the award a
rule of the court.
11. The respondent preferred M.F.A. 409 of 1979 in the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam. A Division Bench of the High Court agreed with the learned Subordinate
Judge on the question of insufficiency of stamp. The Division Bench however, after
expressing its displeasure about not making a reasoned award by the Arbitrator
proceeded to examine the contention whether the arbitration clause covers the dispute.
The court held that the question whether the dispute is arbitrable or not cannot be
finally decided by the arbitrator because it is a matter relating to his jurisdiction. It was
further held that the arbitrator cannot by an erroneous interpretation or construction of
the clause confer jurisdiction on himself and the court can go into the question whether
the matter in dispute between the parties is covered by the arbitration clause. The
specific contention on behalf of the appellant that once a specific question of law is
referred to the arbitrator, the parties are bound by the decision of the arbitrator was
negatived by the High Court and it was held that as the respondent has joined
arbitration under protest, it was not estopped from contesting the question and the
award is not binding on it if it can be shown that the arbitration agreement did not
cover the dispute raised by the appellant. The court finally held that even though the
arbitration clause was very wide, the dispute as to the compensation for increase in the
cost of imported pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees would not be
covered by the arbitration clause inter alia on the ground that by C1. 26 of the General
Conditions of Contract every plant, machinery and equipment had to be provided by the
contractor and any rise or escalation in the price of such equipment or machinery
cannot be the subject matter of compensation by the respondent. Accordingly, the
appeal of the respondent was allowed and the judgment and order of the trial courtrAd | manupatra
making the award rule of the court was set aside. The court directed that the award be
returned to the parties. Hence this appeal by the contractor by special leave.
12. Before we advert to the rival contentions, it would be advantageous to refer to the
arbitration clause being Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Tender subject to which
the contract was entered into, the relevant portion of which reads as under:
Clause 40. Except where otherwise provided in the contract, all questions and
disputes relating to the meaning of the Specifications, Instructions, designs
Drawings hereinbefore mentioned and as to the quality or workmanship or
materials used on the work or as to any other questions, claim, right, matter or
thing whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to the Contract, Designs,
Drawings, Specifications, Estimates, Instructions, Orders or these conditions or
otherwise concerning the works or the execution or failure to execute the same,
whether arising during the progress of the work or after completion or
abandonment thereof shall, after written notice by either party to the contract,
to the either of them, be referred to the Sole Arbitration of a person appointed
by the Chief Project Officer of the Cochin Shipyard Project or the Administrative
Head of the Cochin Shipyard Project at the time of such appointment by
whatever designation known, from a panel of names given in Annexure II.
13. Over and above the extracted portion, the clause provides for the manner and
method of appointing the sole arbitrator, the continuance of the work during progress of
arbitration proceedings, the time and place of holding the arbitration proceedings, the
power to enlarge the period for making the award and finality to be attached to the
award of the Arbitrator.
14. When the arbitration clause was invoked by the appellant, the respondent did
contend that the dispute raised by the appellant was not covered by the arbitration
clause. After specifying its demur, the respondent formulated the points in dispute on
which the arbitration was invited to give his award. Undoubtedly, the respondent
proceeded to formulate the points in dispute between the parties on which the Arbitrator
was to be invited to give his award without prejudice to its right to contend that the
dispute is not covered by the arbitration clause and that the appellant is not entitled to
any compensation in respect of the increase in the cost of imported pile deriving
equipment and technical know-how fees. What is the effect of referring the specific
question of law to arbitration without prejudice to one's right to contend to the contrary
will be presently examined. The fact remains that on the dispute arising out of a claim
for compensation on account of the increase in the cost of imported pile driving
equipment and technical know-how fees, the respondent agreed to refer the dispute
under two specific heads to the Arbitrator. The dispute so raised have already been
extracted. Briefly stated they are : (1) whether the claim for compensation would fall
within the purview of the first para of the arbitration clause and (2) if it does the
quantum of compensation, if any, to which the appellant would be entitled. Analysing
the disputes, let it be made distinctly clear that the appellant asserted that its claim for
compensation would be governed by the arbitration clause and the same was
specifically denied by the respondent saying that the claim would be beyond the
purview of the arbitration clause. On these rival positions, the specific issue was framed
whether the claim for compensation would fall within the purview of the first part of the
arbitration clause. This was the specific dispute referred to the arbitrator inviting him
specifically to decide this dispute. If this issue specifically raises a question as to
jurisdiction of the arbitrator to arbitrate upon the dispute set out in Point No. 2, it
appears to have been specifically referred to the Arbitrator for his decision. Parties,FA manupoatra‘
therefore, agreed to submit the specific question even with regard to the scope, ambit,
width and the construction of the arbitration clause so as to define its parameters and
contours with a view to ascertaining whether the claim advanced by the appellant and
disputed by the respondent would be covered by the arbitration clause. Whether upon
its true construction the arbitration clause would include within its compass the dispute
thus raised between the parties was specifically put in issue because parties were at
variance about it. Appellant asserted that its claim to compensation would form the
subject matter] of arbitration under Clause 40 and the respondent contending to the
contrary. While deciding this dispute, as to the scope, width and ambit of arbitration
clause vis-a-vis the dispute raised, it is not necessary to decide whether the claim was
tenable justified or had any substance in it. That would fall within the second point of
reference to the arbitrator which opens with a specific clause that it needs only to be
decided if the answer to the first point of reference, namely jurisdiction of the arbitrator
under Clause 40 is in the affirmative meaning thereby that the dispute so raised and
subsisting between the parties would be covered by the arbitration agreement. In other
words, if the dispute is covered by the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator was further
required to decide whether there was any substance in the claim made, and if he found
some substance in the disputed claim, to ascertain what amount the appellant would be
entitled to recover as and by way of compensation from the respondent. The arbitrator
was thus required and called upon first to decide whether the dispute is arbitrable as
falling within the width and ambit of the arbitration agreement. If the answer is in the
affirmative, then alone the second point need be examined. If the answer to the first
point of reference is in the negative in that if the arbitrator were of the opinion that the
dispute is not arbitrable as it would not fall within the scope, width and ambit of the
arbitration agreement, it would not be necessary for him to determine whether the
appellant was entitled to recover anything by way of compensation. This aspect is being
analysed in depth to point out that the parties specifically referred the question of
construction of arbitration agreement, its width, ambit and parameters vis-a-vis the
dispute raised so as to decide whether the dispute would fall within the purview of the
arbitration agreement, in other words the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
15. Correspondence placed on record would unmistakably show that a specific question
as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was specifically referred by the parties to the
arbitrator. Appellant contractor by his letter dated March 1, 1976 to the Chief Engineer
of the respondent invited his attention to the claim for compensation for increase in cost
of pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees raised about a year ago and
further invited his attention to the letter dated 6th October, 1975 of the respondent
informing the appellant that the claim cannot be entertained. The appellant proceeded
further to state as under:
Inasmuch as a dispute has thus arisen between us regarding the above claim,
we are invoking the provisions for arbitration in our contracts and referring this
dispute to arbitration.
16. The respondent by his letter dated March 17, 1976 informed the appellant that the
matter raised in the letter dated March 1,1976 in the matter of compensation is
receiving their immediate attention and the appellant will shortly hear from them in this
connection. Thereafter the respondent by his letter dated March 29,1976 informed the
appellant as under;
We have dealt with the merits of your claims in the previous correspondence on
the subject and we reiterate that no amounts whatever are due to you in respect
of these claims. It is also our view that such claim does not fall within theJA manupatra‘
purview of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract and hence does not
qualify for arbitration.
However, in view of your insistence and without prejudice to our position, we
propose that, the following be the issues to be referred to arbitration:
1. Does the claim of M/s. Tarapore & Co., on Cochin Shipyard Ltd., for
compensation for increase in the cost of imported pile driving
equipment and technical know-how fees fall within the purview of the
first para of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract entered
into between the two parties?
2. If the answer to 1 is in the affirmative in terms of the provisions of
the concerned contract, are Messrs. Tarapore & Co. entitled to
compensation for increase in the cost of imported pile driving
equipment and technical know-how fees to be paid to them by Cochin
Shipyard Ltd.? If so, what is the amount?
3. Costs.
17. The respondent proceeded to notify the panel of names and invited the appellant to
choose the arbitrator as agreed to between the parties and set out in clause 40. The
appellant by his letter dated April 19, 1976 while reasserting that the claim made by it
would be covered by Clause 40 further stated that the proper course would be to refer
the dispute that has arisen between the parties on the matter of compensation to the
decision of the arbitrator and not any particular issue or issues. It was also suggested
that framing of the issues will be the function of the arbitrator after he enters upon the
reference and after he has the pleadings of both the parties before him. The appellant
also suggested what dispute should be referred to the arbitrator and set it out as under:
The decision of the dispute that has arisen between M/s. Tarapore & Co., and
the Cochin Shipyard Limited, regarding the claim of M/s. Tarapore & Co., for
compensation for the increase in the cost of the imported pile driving
equipment and of the technical know-how fees.
18. The appellant proceeded to suggest that Shri C. Srinivasa Rao from amongst the
panel be appointed as the Sole Arbitrator. The respondent by his letter dated April
27/28, 1976 annexing three earlier letters dated March 1, 1976, March 29, 1976 and
April 19, 1976 referred the four points herein before set out for the decision of the
arbitrator.
19. This correspondence would unmistakably show that while the appellant wanted a
general reference about its claim, it was the respondent who now contests that no
specific question of law was specifically referred to the arbitrator for his decision was
specific about the points to be referred for the decision of the Arbitrator. The first point
extracted hereinabove would clearly show that the specific question about the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator to arbitrate upon the dispute set out in points Nos. 2, 3 and
4 was specifically referred to the arbitrator. On the first point, the arbitrator had to
decide whether the claim made by the appellant and disputed by the respondent would
be covered by Clause 40 i.e. the arbitration clause. In other words, the specific question
referred to the Arbitrator was about his jurisdiction to arbitrate upon the disputes
covered by points Nos. 2, 3 and 4, if and only if, upon a true construction of the
arbitration clause that is-first paragraph of Clause 40, would cover the disputed claim
for compensation he can enter into the merits of the dispute and decide it. It is uponA manupatra'
the decision on point No. 1 that the arbitrator would have jurisdiction to decide the
dispute involved in points Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The, first point of reference is clearly a
specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and this was
framed and referred to by none other than, despite the initial objection of the petitioner,
the respondent. therefore, the respondent invited the arbitrator by the specific point of
reference which involves a specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator to decide the same. This becomes further clear from the fact that both the
learned Counsel appearing before the arbitrator submitted agreed draft issues for the
decision of the arbitrator. The first issue amongst the agreed draft issues reads as
under:
Does the claim of the claimant fall within the purview of the purview of the first
para of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract entered into between
the two parties?
20. This point was not to be incidentally decided while deciding the dispute referred to
the arbitrator his jurisdiction to entertain the dispute is questioned. In fact, hereby the
reference of the specific point of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator the
parties invited the arbitrator to decide this specific question. It was he who was asked
by the submission or terms of reference to decide his jurisdiction first and then proceed
to decide the dispute on merits. We referred to Issue No. 1 in the agreed draft issues
only to buttress the conclusion that it was at the instance of the respondent that the
arbitrator was called upon to decide the question of the scope, ambit and width of
arbitration clause the decision on which would confer jurisdiction upon him to decide
the dispute as to compensation. In this context it would be advantageous to refer to
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the counter statement filed by the respondent before the
arbitrator which reads as under:
11. It is submitted that the claim in question relating to the increase in the cost
of machinery and equipment as also technical know-how fees payable by the
contractors/claimants is fully outside the purview of the contract. There is no
liability on the part of the respondent to procure the machinery and equipment
or technical know-how required by the contractor nor was there any liability to
pay any part of the cost, whether it be the original assumed cost or the
increased cost. The claim thus is completely outside the purview of the contract
and it is submitted, therefore, that the same does not fall within the purview of
the first paragraph of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract and thus
not arbitrable.
12. It is submitted that the question of arbitrability of the dispute should be
decided as a preliminary point before proceeding with the other issues.
21. The formulation of the specific question of law by the respondent along with its
suggestion to decide it as a preliminary issue and becoming a party to the agreed draft
issue No. 1 would conclusively establish that the specific question of law touching upon
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was referred to the arbitrator for his decision. therefore,
the ‘conclusion is inescapable that a specific question of law touching upon the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator which is indisputably a question construction of clause 40
and therefore a question of law was specifically referred by the parties, to the arbitrator
for his decision and by the terms of Clause 40 agreed to abide by his decision as final
and binding.
22. Mr. F.S. Nariman, learned Counsel for the appellant urged that Section 16(1)(c)A manupeotra
may permit the court to remit or set aside the award on the ground that there is an
error of law apparent on the face of it, yet where a specific question of law has been
referred to the arbitrator for decision, the fact that the decision is erroneous does not
make the award bad on its face so as to permit its being set aside. Expanding the
submission, it was urged that a decision on a question of law by an arbitrator may be
given in two different and distinct situations; firstly where while deciding a dispute
referred to him incidentally a question of law may arise which an arbitrator may decide
in order to dispose of the reference and if in such a situation any error of law appears
on the face of the award, the court can interfere with the award. But there is an
altogether an independent and a distinct situation in which a question of {aw might arise
such as where the parties to the dispute may frame the specific question of law and
refer it to the Arbitrator for his decision. In the later situation, it was urged that the
decision of the Arbitrator even if erroneous would not permit the court to interfere with
the award. Proceeding along it was urged that in this case a specific question of law
touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was specifically referred to the Arbitrator
for his decision and therefore, the decision of the Arbitrator is binding on the parties
and the court cannot proceed to inquire whether upon a true construction of the
arbitration clause, the dispute referred to the Arbitrator for arbitration would be covered
by the arbitration clause so as to clothe the arbitrator with the jurisdiction to arbitrate
upon the dispute,
23. Mr. Pai, learned Counsel for the respondent countered by saying that jurisdiction of
the arbitrator cannot be left to the decision of the arbitrator so as to be binding on the
parties and it is always for the court to decide whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction to
decide the dispute. Alternatively, it was submitted that the arbitrator cannot by a
misconstruction of the arbitration agreement clothe himself with or confer upon himself
the jurisdiction to decide the dispute. The court it was said has always retains to itself
the jurisdiction to look at the arbitration agreement to determine its scope and ambit
and if it is found that the dispute referred to the arbitrator does not fall within the
arbitration agreement, the court must interfere on the ground that the award disclosed
an error of law apparent on the face of it.
24. The contention may be examined both on principle and on the precedents.
25. Complexity of rights and obligations in national and international trade and
commerce would certainly generate disputes between the parties and treated as a
normal incident of commercial life and till commercial arbitration came to be recognised
as a civilised way of resolving such disputes, prolix and time-consuming litigation was
the only method of resolving such disputes. As an alternative to court proceedings,
arbitration as a method of resolving disputes by domestic tribunal constituted by the
choice of parties became acceptable. The basic difference between the court
proceedings and the arbitration is the choice of the tribunal. Ordinarily, all matters in
which relief can be claimed from the court may become subject matter of arbitration.
Now if in a law court incidental questions of law arise in the course of proceeding, the
court has an obligation to decide those questions of law. But when it came to a tribunal
not endowed, with the judicial power" of the State but by conferment by "the parties to
the dispute or which acquires jurisdiction by a submission of the parties to the dispute
to invite the decision by the forum of their choice and to be bound by it a question
arose whether a pure question of law if at all can be referred to an arbitrator for his
decision and even if he decides, can the decision be questioned on the ground that
there is an error apparent on the face of the award in deciding the question. Now as
stated a short while ago, a question of law may figure before an arbitrator in two ways.
It may arise as an incidental point while deciding the main dispute referred to therd | manupoatra
arbitrator or in a given case parties may refer a specific question of law to the arbitrator
for his decision. There is no more gainsaying the fact that a pure question of law may
and can be referred to an arbitrator for his decision. Russel on the Law of Arbitration
Twentieth Edition at page 22 states as under;
A pure question of law may be referred to an arbitrator; and where such a
question is specifically referred his award will not be set aside merely upon the
ground that his decision is wrong
26. In Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 2 Para 623 4th Edition the statement of law
reads as under:
If a specific question of law is submitted to the arbitrator for his decision and
he decide it, the fact that the decision is erroneous does not make the award
bad on its face so as to permit its being set aside; and where the question
referred for arbitration is a question of construction, which is, generally
speaking, a question of law, the arbitrator's decision cannot be set aside only
because the court would itself have come to a different conclusion
27. With the ever widenings expansion of international trade and commerce, complex
question of private International Law, effect of local laws on contracts between parties
belonging to different nations are certainly bound to crop up. Arbitration has been
considered a civilised way of resolving such disputes avoiding court proceedings. There
is no reason why the parties should be precluded from referring a specific question of
law to an arbitrator for his decision and agree to be bound by the same. This approach
manifests faith of parties in the capacity of the tribunal of their choice to decide even
pure a question of law. If they do so, with eyes wide open, and there is nothing to
preclude the parties from doing so, then there is no reason why the court should try to
impose its view of law superseding the view of the Tribunal whose decision the parties
agreed to abide by. therefore, on principle it appears distinctly clear that when a
specific question of law is referred to an arbitrator for his decision including the one
touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, the decision of the arbitrator would be
binding on both the parties and it would not be open to any of the two parties to
wriggle out of it by contending that the arbitrator cannot clutch at or confer jurisdiction
upon himself by mis-construing the arbitration agreement.
28. This conclusion is borne out by a long line of decisions both Indian and foreign to
which we would now turn.
29. The earliest case to which we would refer is the decision of the House of Lords in
Kelanten Government v. Duff Development Co. Ltd. [1923] All E.R. 349 in which Lord
Trevethin in his speech said as under:
If your Lordships should be of opinion that the award is bad in Jaw upon its
face, it should be set aside, for this is not in my view, a submission to
arbitration of such a nature that, although the law is bad upon the face of the
award, the decision cannot be questioned. That happens only when the
submission is of a specific question of law and is such that it can be fairly
construct to show that the parties intended to give up their rights to resort to
the King's courts and in lieu thereof to submit that question to the decision of a
tribunal of their own.
30. Same distinction was also brought out by Lord Parmoor when he said that 'the
principle applicable where a specific question of law has been submitted to the decisionA manupeatra
of arbitration is well expressed by Channell, J., in Re King and Duveen [1913] 2 K.B. 32
in which it was said that where a specific question of law is referred to an arbitrator for
his decision, the award cannot be set aside on the ground of an error apparent on the
face of the award because the question of law was wrongly decided.’ At a later stage, it
was observed that if the court before which it is sought to impeach the award, comes to
the conclusion that the alleged error in law even if it can be maintained arises in the
decision of a question of law directly submitted to the arbitrator for his decision, then
the principle stated by Channel J., in Re. King and Duveen applies, is attracted and the
parties having chosen their tribunal, and not having applied successfully to the court
under either Section 4 or Section 19 of the Arbitration Act, 1889 are not it a position to
question the award or to maintain a claim to set it aside.’ This decision is an authority
of the proposition that where a question of construction is the very point referred for
arbitration then the decision of the arbitrator upon that point cannot be set aside by the
court only because the court would itself have come to a different conclusion.
31. In F.R, Absalom Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society Ltd{1933]
All E.R. 616 the contention was that the award was bad by reason of an error in law
appearing on the face of it. The submission was not before the court and a reference to
the pleadings had to be made for the purpose of ascertaining whether any specific
question of law was in dispute, and was referred to the arbitrator for his decision. The
pleadings disclosed that the whole dispute between parties was as to the amount due to
the contractor in respect of the value of the work done and of the materials on the site
upto and including a certain date. In the background of this fact, Lord Warrington in his
speech said that no specific question of construction arose. In order to decide whether
the award was bad by reason of an error of law on the face of it, Lord Russel in his
speech pointed out at page 621 that it is essential to keep the case where disputes are
referred to an arbitrator in the decision of which a question of law becomes material
distinct from the case in which a specific question of law has been referred to him for
decision. Thereafter he proceeded to state:
The authorities make a clear distinction between these two cases and as they
appear to me, they decide that in the former case the court can interfere if and
when any error of law appears on the face of the award, but that in the latter
case no such interference is possible upon the ground that it so appears that
the decision upon the question of law is an erroneous one.
32.In reaching this conclusion, the decision in Kelantan Government v. Duff
Development Co. Ltd. was affirmed. On the facts, it was found that no specific question
of law was referred to the arbitrator for his decision.
33.In Durga Prasad Chamria and Anr. v. Sewkishendas Bhattar and Ors.
MANU/PR/0028/1949; the award was sought to be set aside inter alia on the ground
that the award was bad on account of an error of law apparent on the face of it. The
errors of law relied upon were; (a) the arbitrator had admitted as evidence the family
settlement and the partnership arrangement of 1916, neither of which, though each
related (it was said) to Immovable property, had been registered as required by the
Indian Registration Act, and (b) the arbitrator ought to have held that Anardeyi's suit
was in any event barred by limitation. The Privy Council first noticed the issues settled
by Panckridge. J.; amongst them were the two following:
1(b) Is the agreement dated 16th November, 1916, relating to the alleged
family settlement valid or admissible in evidence?FA manupotra®
(9) Is the plaintiff's claim or any portion thereof barred by limitation?,
34, After these issues had been settled, the parties agreed to refer to arbitration "the
outstanding matters in the suit." In a motion for setting aside the award it was urged
that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the award both with regard as to
the admissibility of the alleged family settlement and about the suit of Anardeyi being
barred by limitation. Rejecting the motion, the Privy Council observed as under,
However, that may be, their Lordships are satisfied that the two points of law
as to which it is said the arbitrators error vitiates the award were specifically
referred to him to decide and if this is so, it would be contrary to well-
established principles such as are laid down in re King and Duveen and F.R.
Absalom Ltd. v. Great West (London) Garden Village Society Ltd., for a Court of
law to interfere with the award even if the Court itself would have taken a
different view of either of the points of law had they been before it.
35. Turning to the decisions of our Court, reference may first be made to Seth
Thawardas Pherumal v. The Union of India MANU/SC/0070/1955 : [1955]2SCR48 . Ir
that case, the question was whether the award was bad on account of error of law
apparent on the face of it, as provided in Section 16(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act.
Examining this contention, this Court observed as under:
This covers cases in which in error of law appears on the face of the award. But
in determining what such an error is, a distinction must be drawn between
cases in which a question of law is specifically referred and those in which a
decision on a question of law is incidentally material (however necessary) in
order to decide the question actually referred. If a question of law is specifically
referred and it is evident that the parties desire to have a decision from the
arbitrator about that rather then one from the Courts, then the Courts will not
interfere, though even there, there is authority for the view that the courts will
interfere if it is apparent that the arbitrator has acted illegally in reaching his
decision, that is to say, if he has decided on inadmissible evidence or on
principles of construction that the law does not co-tenance or something of that
nature. See the speech of Viscount Cave in Kelantan Government v. Duff
Development Co. at page 409. But that is not a matter which arises in this case.
The law about this is, in our opinion the same in England as here and the
principles that govern this class of case have been reviewed at length and set
out with clarity by the House of Lords in F.R. Absalom Ltd. v. Great Western
(London) Garden Village Society and in Kelantan Government v. Duff
Development Co. In Durga Prasad v. Sewkis-hendas the Privy Council applied
the law expounded in Absalom's case to India ; see also Champsey Bhara & Co.
v, Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. and Saleh Mahomed Umer Dossal v.
Nathoomal Kessamal. The wider language used by Lord Macnaghten in Ghulam
Jilani v. Muhammad Hassan had reference to the revisional powers of the High
Court under the civil Procedure Code and must be confined to the facts of that
case where the question of law involved there, namely, limitation, was
specifically referred. An arbitrator is not a conciliator and cannot ignore the law
or misapply it in order to do what he thinks is just and reasonable. He is a
tribunal selected by the parties to decide their disputes according to law and so
is bound to follow, and apply the law, and if he does not he can be set right by
the Courts provided his error appears on the fact of the award. The single
exception to this is when the parties choose specifically to refer a question ofA manupotra
law as a separate and distinct matter.
36. The Court further proceeded to examine whether in the facts of that case, the
arbitrator was specifically. asked to construe Clause 6 of the contract or any part of the
contract or whether any question of law was specifically referred. The Court emphasised
the word ‘specifically’ by pointing out that, parties who made a reference to arbitration
have the right to insist that the Tribunal of their choice shall decide their dispute
according to law, so before the right can be denied to them in any particular matter, the
court must be very sure that both sides wanted the decision of the arbitrator on a point
of law rather than that of the Courts and that they wanted his decision on that point to
be final. The Court then proceeded to examine the various clauses of the contract and
held that this is not the kind of specific reference on a point of law that the law of
arbitration requires. The Court held that when a question of law is the point at issue,
unless both sides specifically agree to refer it and agree to be bound by the arbitrator's
decision, the jurisdiction of the Courts to set an arbitration right when the error is
apparent on the face of the award is not ousted. The mere fact that both parties submit
incidental arguments about a point of law in the course of the proceedings is not
enough. This decision is an authority for the proposition that where the parties
specifically agree to refer a specific question of law for the decision of the arbitrator,
and agree to be bound by it, the Court cannot set aside the award on the ground of an
error of law apparent on the face of it even though the decision of the arbitrator may
not accord with the law as understood by the Court. If on the other hand, the question
of law is incidentally decided by the arbitrator, it is not enough to oust the jurisdiction
of the Court to set aside the award on the ground that there is an error apparent on the
face of the award.
37. In M/s. Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. The Union of India MANU/SC/0057/1960 :
[1960]2SCR793 the Court reiterated the observation in Seth Thawardas's case and
observed that if a specific question is submitted to the arbitrator and he answers it, the
fact that the answer involves an erroneous decision in point of law, does not make the
award bad on its face so as to permit of its being set aside, In the facts of the case, this
Court agreeing with the High Court held that there is no foundation for the view that a
specific reference, submitting a question of law for the adjudication of the arbitrators,
was made. It may be stated in passing that a brief reference to the claim put forward
before the arbitrator on behalf of the appellants in that case, set out at page 798 of the
report, would clearly show that no specific question of law was referred by the parties
for the decision of the arbitrator. Mr. Pai learned Counsel for the respondent pointed out
that the Court has also observed following the decision of the Privy Council in
Champsey Bhara and Company v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd Law
Report 50 1.A. 324., that 'the extent of the jurisdiction of the court to set aside an award
on the ground of an error in making the award is well-defined. The award of an
arbitrator may be set aside on the ground of an error on the face thereof only when in
the award or in any document incorporated with it, as for instance, a note appended by
the arbitrators, stating the reasons for his decision, there is found some legal
proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous. This observation
does not help in deciding the point under discussion and just after this statement, there
follows the observation about the effect of referring a specific question of law for the
decision of the arbitrator and the jurisdiction of the Court to set aside the award on the
ground that there is an error of law apparent on the face of it.
38. In Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram MANU/SC/0003/1963 : [1964]3SCR164 this
Court after referring to the decision in Champsey Bhara and Company reaffirmed that,
the rule in that decision does not apply where questions of law are specifically referredF manupatra
to the arbitrator for his decision; the award of the arbitrator on those questions is
binding upon the parties, for by referring specific questions the parties desire to have a
decision from the arbitrator on those questions rather than from the Court and the Court
will not, unless it is satisfied that the arbitrator had proceeded illegally interfere with
the decision. After referring to the decision hereinabove examined by us, the Court
came to the conclusion that no specific question of law were referred to the arbitrator's
the decision whereof is binding upon the parties.
39. In M/s. Kapoor Nilokheri Co-op. Dairy Farm Society Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.
MANU/SC/0002/1973 : AIR1973SC1338 the Court agreed with the submission on behali
of the respondent Government of India that the appellants having specifically stated that
their claims are based on the agreement and on nothing else and all that the arbitrator
had to decide was as to the effect of the agreement, the arbitrator had really to decide a
question of law, i.e. of interpreting the document, the agreement dated May 6, 1953
and therefore the decision is not open to challenge. In fact, this decision is hardly of
any assistance and we leave it at that.
0.In N Chellappan v. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr.
MANU/SC/0002/1974 : [1975]2SCR811 by a consent order, the umpire was appointed
as the sole arbitrator, and the respondent-Board without a demur participated in the
proceedings before the umpire and took the chance of an award in its favour, this Court
said that it cannot turn round and say that the umpire had no inherent jurisdiction and
therefore its participation in the proceedings before the umpire is of no avail. This
decision is not of much assistance on the point under discussion. Mr. Pai on the other
hand urged that the jurisdiction of the arbitrator could not be determined by him nor
can he arrogate jurisdiction to himself by misconstruction of the contract and thereby
clutch at jurisdiction and in such a situation, the court always retains to itself to set at
naught the award on the ground of an error of law apparent on the face of the award. In
terms, he stated that the issue about the jurisdiction of the arbitrator has never been
parted with by the Court-Generally speaking, common law courts were very reluctant to
part with its jurisdiction to set at naught an award on the ground that the arbitrator had
no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the dispute. The Court went so far as to say that
the arbitrator cannot confer jurisdiction upon himself by deciding in its own favour
some preliminary points upon which its jurisdiction rests. In fact, that is a non-issues.
It cannot be disputed that even the question of jurisdiction of an arbitrator can be the
subject matter of a specific reference. If the parties agree to refer the specific question
whether the dispute raised is covered by the arbitration agreement, it becomes a
specific question of law even if it involves the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and if it is
so, a decision of the arbitrator on specific question referred to him for decision even if
it appears to be erroneous to the Court is binding on the parties. The decisions relied
upon by Mr, Pai do not derogate from, this legal position. We may briefly refer to those
decision.
41. In Produce Brokers Co. Ltd. v. Olympia Oil and Cake Co. Ltd.[1914] All E.R. 133it
was held that “if the question which the arbitrator takes upon himself to decide is not in
fact within the submission the award is a nullity. The arbitrator cannot make his award
binding by holding contrary to the true facts when the question which he affects to
determine is within the submission.” Let us emphasise the ratio of the decision that the
arbitrator takes upon himself to decide a question not within the submission. This
would mean that the question of law was not specifically referred to the arbitrator for
his decision but it was incidentally raised. In fact, nowhere it was contended that any
specific question of law was referred to the arbitrator and if so what would be its effect
on the binding character of the decision was ever raised in that case. In that case afterFZ manupatra’®
an answer was returned to the Special Case submitted for the opinion of the court, the
Committee of Appeal unreservedly accepted the said answers upon the construction of
the contract as a matter of law apart from the custom of the trade, but proceeded
further to hold that there was a long established and well-recognised custom of the
trade in cases of re-sales that buyers under the form of contract in question impliedly
agreed with their sellers that they would accept the original shipper's appropriation if
passed on without delay. On a motion by the buyers to have the award set aside, of
which notice was given, the Divisional Court held that the arbitrators had no jurisdiction
to find conclusively the existence of a trade custom, and the Court of Appeal on the
authority of precedents but against their own opinion, affirmed the decision. The
appellant-seller's company appealed to the House of Lords. Lord Loreburn in his speech
observed that ‘these men of business made contracts and therein agreed to arbitrate
upon all disputes arising out of their contracts. Yet there have already been seven
distinct stages of argument and decision, four of them in courts of law, upon a dispute
arising on those contracts, and the end is not yet. I do not know how many more stages
there will be. Parties have a right to prefer what some may consider the imperfect
though expeditious wisdom of arbitrators to the slower and more costly justice of His
Majesty's courts. It is to be regretted when they have to encounter the inconveniences
of both methods with the advantage of neither." Approaching the matter from this
angle, the appeal was allowed and the decision of the Committee of Appeal, taking note
of the custom of the trade, allowed the award to stand, This decision can in no way help
the respondent.
42. In Attorney General For Manitoba v. Kelly and Ors. [1922] All. E.R. 69 it was
observed that "Whenever there is a difference of opinion between the parties as to the
authority conferred on an umpire or arbitrator under an agreed submission the decision
rests ultimately with the court and not with the umpire or arbitrator." This is predicated
upon a proposition that common law courts were reluctant to part with their jurisdiction
to set at naught an award if the arbitrator confers jurisdiction upon himself by deciding
in his own favour some preliminary point upon which his jurisdiction rests
43. Mr, Rai also referred to the decisions of the Privy Council in Champsey Bhara & Co.
and Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd.[1926] All. E.R. 51 Both these
decisions are of no assistance on the question about the reference of a specific question
of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator for his decision and its effect. In
fact, the decision in Champsey Bhara's case clearly turns upon as to what constitutes an
error of law apparent on the face of the award.
44. The next case referred to was Heyman and Anrs. v. Danvins Ltd. [1942] (1) All E.R.
337 It reasserts that as a rule the arbitrator cannot clothe himself with jurisdiction.
45. Turning to the decisions of this Court, reference was first made to Jivarajbhai
Ujamshi Sheth and Ors. v. Chintamanrao Balaji. and Anr. MANU/SC/0239/1963 :
[1964]5SCR480 Shah, J. speaking for himself and Justice Sarkar at page 499 observed
that 'this is not a case in which the arbitrator has committed a mere error of fact or law
in reaching his conclusion on the disputed question submitted for his adjudication. It is
a case of assumption of jurisdiction not possessed by him, and that renders the award,
to the extent to which it is beyond the arbitrator's jurisdiction, invalid". It may be
pointed out that these observations are in the context of the facts of that case and there
was no contention before the court that any specific question of law touching upon the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator was referred to for his decision by the parties.
46. The last decision in this context referred to was Dr. S.B. Dutt v. University of Delhi.A manupatra’
MANU/SC/0131/1958 : [1959]1SCR1236 In that case the arbitrator gave by his award a
direction to enforce the contract of personal service. This was stated as an error of law
apparent on the face of the award and the award was set aside. Again it may be pointed
out that the reference to the point set out in the letter of reference extracted at page
1240 clearly spells out that no specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of
the arbitrator was referred to the arbitrator for his decision.
47. On a conspectus of these decisions, it clearly transpires that if a question of law is
specifically referred and it becomes evident that the parties desired to have a decision
on the specific question from the arbitrator about that rather than one from court, then
the court will not interfere with the award of the arbitrator on the ground that there is
an error of law apparent on the face of the award even if the view of law taken by the
arbitrator does not accord with the view of the court. This view of law taken in England
was stated by this Court to be the same in this country and since the decision in Seth
Thawardas's case which follows earlier decisions in England and India, it has not been
departed from. The view canvassed for by Mr. Pai that common law courts were very
reluctant to part with its jurisdiction has hardly any relevance where a specific question
of law including the one touching the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is referred to the
arbitrator for his decision. Even if the decision of the arbitrator does not accord with the
view of the court, the award cannot be set aside on the sole ground that there is an
error of law apparent on the face of it.
48. Before we conclude on this point we must take note of a contention of Mr. Pai that
the respondent cannot be estopped from contending that the arbitrator had no
jurisdiction to entertain the dispute as the respondent agreed to the submission without
prejudice to its rights to contend to the contrary. It is undoubtedly true that in the letter
dated March 29,1976 by which the respondent agreed to refer the dispute to the
arbitrator, it was in terms stated that the reference is being made without prejudice to
the position of the respondent as adopted in the letter meaning thereby without
prejudice to its rights to contend that the claim of the appellant is not covered by the
arbitration clause. In the context in which the expression ‘without prejudice’ is used, it
would only mean that the respondent reserved the right to contend before the arbitrator
that the dispute is not covered by the arbitration clause." It does not appear that what
was reserved was a contention that no specific question of law was specifically referred
to the arbitrator. It is difficult to spell out such a contention from the letter. And the
respondent did raise the contention before the arbitrator that he had no jurisdiction to
entertain the dispute as it would not be covered by the arbitration clause. Apart from
the technical meaning which the expression ‘without prejudice’ carries depending upon
the context in which it is used, in the present case on a proper reading of the
correspondence and in the setting in which the term is used, it only means that the
respondent reserved to itself the right to contend before the arbitrator that a dispute
raised or the claim made by the contractor was not covered by the arbitration clause. No
other meaning can be assigned to it. An action taken without prejudice to one's right
cannot necessarily mean that the entire action can be ignored by the party taking the
same. In this case, the respondent referred the specific question of law to the arbitrator.
This was according to the respondent without prejudice to its right to contend that the
claim or the dispute is not covered by the arbitration clause. The contention was to be
before the arbitrator. If the respondent wanted to assert that it had reserved to itself the
right to contend that no specific question of law was referred to the arbitrator, in the
first instance, it should not have made the reference in the terms in which it is made but
should have agreed to the proposal of the appellant to make a general reference. If the
appellant insisted on the reference of a specific question which error High Court appears
to have committed, it could have declined to make the reference of a specific question