Case Study - Kelompok 5

CASE 2.
Jack Greenberg, Inc.
Auditors commonly find themselves facing situations in which they must persuade cli-
ent executives to do something they absolutely and resolutely do not want to do. When
all else fails, auditors may be forced to use a tactic that clinical psychologists, mar-
riage counselors, parents of toddlers, and other interpersonal experts typically frown
upon; namely, the old-fashioned “if you don’t cooperate, I will punish you” threat. In
the mid-1990s, an exasperated team of Grant Thornton auditors resorted to threaten-
ing a stubborn client executive to goad him into turning over key documents that had
significant audit implications. The executive eventually capitulated and turned over
the documents—which resulted in even more problems for the auditors.
The Brothers Greenberg

For decades, Jack Greenberg oversaw a successful wholesale meat company, a com-
pany that he eventually incorporated and named after himself.1 Jack Greenberg, Inc.,
marketed a variety of meat, cheese, and other food products along the Eastern Seaboard
of the United States from its Philadelphia headquarters. Jack Greenberg’s failing health in
the early 1980s prompted him to place his two sons in charge of the company’s day-to-
day operations. After their father’s death, the two brothers, Emanuel and Fred, became
equal partners in the business. Emanuel assumed the title of company president, while
Fred became the company’s vice president. The two brothers and their mother made up
the company’s three-person board of directors. Several other members of the Greenberg
family also worked in the business.
Similar to many family-owned and -operated businesses, Jack Greenberg, Inc.
(JGI), did not place a heavy emphasis on internal control. Like their father, the two
Greenberg brothers relied primarily upon their own intuition and the competence
and integrity of their key subordinates to manage and control their company’s opera-
tions. By the mid-1980s, when the privately owned business had annual sales mea-
sured in the tens of millions of dollars, Emanuel realized that JGI needed to develop
a more formal accounting and control system. That realization convinced him to
begin searching for a new company controller who had the expertise necessary to
revamp JGI’s outdated accounting function and to develop an appropriate network
of internal controls for the growing company. In 1987, Emanuel hired Steve Cohn, a
CPA and former auditor with Coopers & Lybrand, as JGI’s controller. Cohn, who had
extensive experience working with a variety of different inventory systems, immedi-
ately tackled the challenging assignment of creating a modern accounting and con-
trol system for JGI.
Among other changes, Cohn implemented new policies and procedures that pro-
vided for segregation of key responsibilities within JGI’s transaction cycles. Cohn
also integrated computer processing throughout most of JGI’s operations, including
the payroll, receivables, and payables modules of the company’s accounting func-
tion. One of the more important changes that Cohn implemented was developing an
internal reporting system that produced monthly financial statements the Greenbergs
1. The facts of this case and the quotations included in it were taken from the following court opinion:
Larry Waslow, Trustee for Jack Greenberg, Inc., v. Grant Thornton LLP; United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 240 B.R. 486; 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1308.
191
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203
192 SECTION TWO Audits of High -R isk Accounts
could use to make more timely and informed decisions for their business. Cohn’s new
financial reporting system also allowed JGI to file more timely financial statements
with the three banks that provided the bulk of the company’s external financing. By
the early 1990s, JGI typically had a minimum of $10 million in outstanding loans from
those banks.
One area of JGI’s operations that Cohn failed to modernize was the company’s
accounting and control procedures for prepaid inventory. Since the company’s early
days, imported meat products had accounted for a significant portion of JGI’s annual
sales. Because foreign suppliers required JGI to prepay for frozen meat items, the
company maintained two inventory accounts: Prepaid Inventory and Merchandise
Inventory. Prepayments for imported meat products were debited to the Prepaid
Inventory account, while all other merchandise acquired by the company for resale
was debited to the Merchandise Inventory account. Prepaid inventory typically
accounted for 60 percent of JGI’s total inventory and 40 percent of the company’s
total assets.
Long before Cohn became JGI’s controller, Jack Greenberg had given his son Fred
complete responsibility for the purchasing, accounting, control, and other decisions
affecting the company’s prepaid inventory. Following their father’s death, the two
brothers agreed that Fred would continue overseeing JGI’s prepaid inventory. When
Cohn attempted to restructure and computerize the accounting and control proce-
dures for prepaid inventory, Fred refused to cooperate. Despite frequent and ada-
mant pleas from Cohn over a period of several years, Emanuel refused to order his
younger brother to cooperate with Cohn’s modernization plan for JGI’s accounting
system.
Accounting for Prepaid Inventory

Fred Greenberg processed the purchase orders for meat products that JGI bought
from foreign vendors. The items purchased were inspected by the appropriate
authority in the given country and then loaded into refrigerated lockers to be trans-
ported by boat to the United States. When a vendor provided documentation to JGI
that a shipment was in transit, Fred Greenberg approved payment of the vendor’s
invoice. Again, these payments were debited to JGI’s Prepaid Inventory account.
Fred Greenberg maintained a handwritten accounting record known as the prepaid
inventory log to keep track of the items included in the Prepaid Inventory account at
any point in time.
When a shipment of imported meat products arrived at a U.S. port, a customs bro-
ker retained by JGI arranged for the individual items to be inspected and approved
for entry into the United States by customs officials. After a shipment had cleared
customs, the customs broker sent a notification form to that effect to Fred Greenberg.
When the product arrived by truck at JGI’s warehouse, a U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) official opened and inspected the items included in the order.
The USDA official completed a document known as Form 9540-1 to indicate that the
items had passed inspection. Each Form 9540-1 also indicated the date that the given
products had arrived at JGI’s warehouse.
Upon completion of the USDA inspection process, the prepaid inventory items
were turned over to the manager of JGI’s warehouse. The warehouse manager
stamped the items to indicate that they had passed the USDA inspection and then
completed a document known as a delivery receipt that listed the date of arrival, the
vendor, the type of product, and the quantity of the product. The warehouse man-
ager sent the delivery receipt form to Fred Greenberg, who matched the form with
the appropriate vendor invoice. Fred then deleted the given inventory items from the
CASE 2.1 Jack Greenberg, Inc. 193
prepaid inventory log and forwarded the matched invoice and delivery receipt to
Steve Cohn, who processed an accounting entry that transferred the product from
the Prepaid Inventory account to the Merchandise Inventory account. At the end of
each year, JGI took a physical inventory of the company’s warehouse and adjusted
the balance of the Merchandise Inventory account to agree with the results of the
physical inventory.
Because of the accounting procedures used for JGI’s two inventory accounts, there
was some risk that certain inventory items would be “double-counted” at year-end.
That is, certain inventory items might be included in both the Prepaid Inventory and
Merchandise Inventory accounts if there was any delay in processing the delivery
receipt forms. For example, suppose that a shipment of imported meat products
arrived at JGI’s warehouse on December 29, two days before the close of the com-
pany’s fiscal year. If Fred Greenberg failed to delete the items in the shipment from
the prepaid inventory log and failed to forward the delivery receipt and invoice for
the shipment to Steve Cohn on a timely basis, the items in the shipment would be
included in both inventory accounts at the end of the year.2 To reduce the risk of such
errors, Cohn reconciled the prepaid inventory log maintained by Fred to the year-end bal-
ance of the Prepaid Inventory account. Cohn also asked Fred to allow him to review any
delivery receipts that arrived during the last few days of the fiscal year.
Fred’s Fraud
Steve Cohn realized that the accounting procedures for prepaid inventory increased
the risk that JGI’s year-end inventory would be misstated. In early 1992, Cohn, who
by this time had been given the title of chief financial officer, designed a computer-
ized accounting system for JGI’s prepaid inventory. Cohn then called a meeting with
the two Greenberg brothers to illustrate the system and demonstrate the important
information and control advantages that it would provide over the “sloppy” manual
system that Fred had used for years to account for prepaid inventory. Several years
later, Cohn would recount how the Greenberg brothers reacted to his proposal.
I told Fred how this was a great idea and how I believed that this would be a big step
forward in being able to monitor the [prepaid] inventory and determine what was
open. . . . And I showed it to Fred, looked at it and said, “Isn’t this great? We can do
this.” And I said, “Don’t you want to do this?” And he looked at me and said, “No.”
I was flabbergasted. I looked over to Manny [Emanuel]. He just sat there. And I was
furious. I didn’t talk to Fred for weeks. I was—I was having a hard time dealing with
it. I couldn’t imagine why he wouldn’t want me to do this. It was such a good thing for
the company. And he didn’t want to do it.
Later in 1992, the persistent Cohn decided to personally collect the information
needed to maintain a computerized accounting system for JGI’s prepaid inventory.
Cohn would watch for delivery trucks arriving at JGI’s warehouse, which was adja-
cent to the company’s administrative offices. When a truck arrived, either he or a
subordinate would go to the shipping dock and make copies of the delivery receipt
and other documents for each shipment of imported meat products. “We used to run
back and forth trying to get these receivings [delivery receipts] that [the warehouse
manager] was preparing and it became a game. I became a laughingstock because it
was a joke that I was trying to get this information.” After several weeks, an exasper-
ated Cohn gave up his futile effort.
2. Because such items would be present during the year-end physical inventory of JGI’s warehouse, the
book-to-physical inventory adjustment would cause them to be included in the December 31 balance of
the Merchandise Inventory account.
Fred Greenberg had reason not to cooperate with Cohn’s repeated attempts to
overhaul the accounting and control procedures for JGI’s prepaid inventory. Since
the mid-1980s, Fred had been intentionally overstating the company’s prepaid inven-
tory. Those overstatements had materially understated JGI’s annual cost of goods
sold as well as overstated the company’s gross profit and net income each year. In
subsequent court testimony, Fred reported that his father’s failing health had com-
pelled him to begin manipulating JGI’s reported operating results. “To avoid aggra-
vating his illness, I started the practice [inflating prepaid inventory] so he would feel
better about his business.”
Fred also testified that following his father’s death “significant changes occurring
in the market which adversely affected us” caused him to continue his fraudulent
scheme. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Fred and his brother found it increas-
ingly difficult to compete with larger wholesalers that were encroaching on their com-
pany’s market. To compete with these larger companies, JGI was forced to reduce
the gross margins on the products that it sold. To mitigate the impact of this competi-
tive pressure on JGI’s operating results, Fred routinely overstated prepaid inventory to
produce gross margins that approximated those historically realized by the company.
Fred manipulated the dates upon which the prepaid inventory was received in order
to make it appear that the company’s operations generated the same general financial
performance from period to period. He did this by determining how much inventory
needed to be prepaid inventory so that the percentages of gross profit and net income
would remain consistent.
To overstate prepaid inventory, Fred destroyed delivery receipts forwarded to him
by JGI’s warehouse manager and neglected to update the prepaid inventory log for
the given shipments. Weeks or even months later, he would prepare new delivery
receipts for those shipments, delete the items in the shipments from the prepaid
inventory log, and then forward the receipts along with the corresponding vendor
invoices to Cohn. This practice resulted in inventory items being included in the
Prepaid Inventory account well after they had arrived at JGI’s warehouse.
Auditing Prepaid Inventory

Grant Thornton served as JGI’s independent audit firm from 1986 through 1994.
Because prepaid inventory was JGI’s largest asset and because it posed significant
audit risks, the engagement audit team allocated a disproportionate amount of
audit resources to that item. Several weeks before the end of each fiscal year, Grant
Thornton provided Steve Cohn with an “Engagement Compliance Checklist” that iden-
tified the documents and other information needed by the audit engagement team to
complete the audit. Many of these requested items involved JGI’s prepaid inventory,
including “government forms, bills of lading, insurance information, and the delivery
receipts prepared by the warehouse personnel evidencing the date upon which the
[prepaid] inventory was received at the warehouse.” Each year, Grant Thornton also
requested a copy of Fred Greenberg’s prepaid inventory log and Cohn’s reconcilia-
tion of the information in that record to JGI’s general ledger controlling account for
prepaid inventory.
One key item that Grant Thornton did not request from Cohn was the Form 9540-1
prepared for each shipment of imported meat products delivered to JGI’s ware-
house. Grant Thornton auditors later testified that they became aware in 1988 that
a Form 9540-1 was prepared for each prepaid inventory shipment received by JGI.
However, the audit team did not learn until 1993 that the USDA official who com-
pleted the 9540-1 gave a copy of that document to a JGI warehouse clerk.
Each year, Cohn diligently collected the information requested by Grant Thornton
and gave it to the accounting firm well before the date the audit was to begin, with
one exception. Because Fred Greenberg failed to give the prepaid inventory log,
delivery receipts, and other information he maintained for JGI’s prepaid inventory to
Cohn on a timely basis, Grant Thornton received that information well after the audit
had begun each year.
Grant Thornton audited all of JGI’s prepaid inventory transactions each year. “Grant
Thornton tested 100 percent of the prepaid inventory transactions which meant that
Grant Thornton examined every invoice for prepaid inventory and reviewed the
delivery receipts to confirm if and when a delivery had been made.” By examining
the invoices and delivery receipts, the auditors could determine which prepaid inven-
tory purchases were apparently “still open” at year-end, that is, the prepaid inventory
shipments that were properly included in JGI’s year-end Prepaid Inventory account.
Because Fred Greenberg had destroyed many of the delivery receipts prepared by
the warehouse manager, the Grant Thornton auditors failed to discover that much
of JGI’s year-end prepaid inventory was “double-counted.” A critical issue in subse-
quent litigation stemming from this case was whether Grant Thornton was justified
in relying on the delivery receipts to audit JGI’s year-end prepaid inventory. Members
of the audit engagement team maintained that because JGI’s warehouse manager
prepared the delivery receipts independently of the company’s accounting function
for prepaid inventory, those documents provided sufficient competent evidence to
corroborate prepaid inventory. “Grant Thornton believed it was acceptable to rely
on the Delivery Receipt to verify the date of delivery because JGI’s internal control
procedures for inventory were based on a system of ‘segregation of duties.’” A Grant
Thornton representative provided the following explanation of exactly what was
implied by the phrase “segregation of duties.”
Question: You speak of segregation of duties. What do you mean by that?
Answer: Somebody is separate—you know, the purchasing function is separate
from the receiving function and the approval function is different from the
person who executes the transactions.
Question: Does that mean that there are separate people that do these different
functions?
Answer: Yes. Separate people or departments.
1993 and 1994 JGI Audits

During the 1992 JGI audit, members of the Grant Thornton audit team told Steve
Cohn and Emanuel Greenberg they were concerned by the large increase in pre-
paid inventory over the previous three years. 3 The auditors also expressed concern
regarding the haphazard accounting procedures applied to prepaid inventory. These con-
cerns caused the auditors to include the following comments in a report entitled “Internal
Control Structure Reportable Conditions and Advisory Comments” that was submitted to
Emanuel Greenberg at the conclusion of the 1992 audit. “Prepaid inventory should be set
up on a personal computer and updated daily from purchases. This would identify a prob-
lem much sooner and reduce the risk of loss should such a problem occur.” Cohn later
testified that he had encouraged Grant Thornton to include this recommendation in the
3. The dollar value of JGI’s prepaid inventory increased by 303 percent from the end of 1989 to the
end of 1992.
report filed with Emanuel Greenberg. Despite this recommendation, Emanuel would not
pressure his brother to cooperate with Cohn’s effort to strengthen the accounting proce-
dures for prepaid inventory.
Grant Thornton auditors had access to the notification forms JGI’s customs broker
sent to Fred Greenberg when a prepaid inventory shipment arrived in a U.S. port.
During the 1993 audit, a Grant Thornton auditor noticed that for several prepaid
inventory shipments an abnormally long period of time had elapsed between the
date the customs broker inspected the merchandise and the date that merchandise
arrived at JGI’s warehouse. When asked about this issue, Fred Greenberg explained
that “floods in the Midwest” had slowed down many shipments en route to the East
Coast from ports on the West Coast. A Grant Thornton auditor contacted JGI’s cus-
toms broker regarding Fred’s explanation. The customs broker told the auditor that
Fred’s explanation was valid.
Near the end of the 1993 audit, a Grant Thornton auditor stumbled across a large
stack of Form 9540-1 documents in the receiving office of JGI’s warehouse. Following
this discovery, the Grant Thornton audit team attempted to match individual delivery
receipts with the corresponding Form 9540-1 documents to verify the dates reported
on the delivery receipts. Because the 9540-1 documents were in no particular alpha-
betical, chronological, or numerical order, the “task proved insurmountable and was
abandoned.” In explaining why the auditors did not insist on JGI providing those
forms in a usable condition, a Grant Thornton representative noted that the 1993
audit program did not require the delivery receipts to be matched with the Form
9540-1 documents. “However, Grant Thornton decided that since JGI had access to
the forms, it wanted them produced for the 1994 audit so that it could use them to
verify the date recorded on the delivery receipts.”
Following the completion of the 1993 audit, Grant Thornton once again submit-
ted a report entitled “Internal Control Structure Reportable Conditions and Advisory
Comments” to Emanuel Goldberg. In this report, Grant Thornton included several
specific recommendations regarding improvements needed in the accounting proce-
dures applied to prepaid inventory. One of these recommendations was to maintain
an orderly file of the Form 9540-1 documents that could be used for internal con-
trol purposes and during the annual independent audit. A second recommendation
called for JGI to begin using a specific set of computer-based accounting and inter-
nal control procedures and documents for prepaid inventory. These latter items were
the same procedures and documents that Steve Cohn had developed and presented
to the Greenberg brothers in 1992.
Throughout 1994, Fred Greenberg continued to refuse to adopt Grant Thornton’s
recommendations for improving the accounting for, and control over, prepaid inven-
tory. In the fall of 1994, Cohn contacted Grant Thornton and told members of the
audit engagement team that Fred had not complied with their recommendations.
A Grant Thornton representative then met with Fred and told him that, at a mini-
mum, JGI would have to provide the Form 9540-1 documents to Grant Thornton if the
accounting firm was to complete the 1994 audit. Still, Fred refused to comply.
Shortly after Grant Thornton began the 1994 audit, a senior member of the audit
engagement team advised Fred that unless the Form 9540-1 documents were pro-
vided, the accounting firm would likely resign as JGI’s independent auditor. Within
a few days, Fred turned over the documents to Grant Thornton. “However, before he
did so, he altered the dates on them. Apparently, the alterations were so obvious that
after reviewing the forms for only 10 seconds, Grant Thornton knew there was a prob-
lem. Grant Thornton informed Emanuel and Cohn that the dates were falsified and
terminated the audit.” When Emanuel confronted his brother regarding the altered
documents, the suddenly remorseful Fred “admitted everything.”
Following Fred’s confession, JGI retained Grant Thornton to determine the impact
of the fraudulent scheme on the company’s prior financial statements and to develop
a set of current financial statements that were reliable. The Greenbergs provided this
information to their company’s three banks. Within six months, JGI filed for bank-
ruptcy and ceased operations.
EPILOGUE
JGI’s sudden collapse sparked a spate of law- compelling evidence that Emanuel Greenberg
suits. In February 1997, JGI’s court-appointed had suspected his brother was misrepresenting
bankruptcy trustee filed a civil action that JGI’s prepaid inventory. “Accordingly, Emanuel
contained eight specific charges against Grant had no reason to check or verify his brother’s
Thornton. These charges included, among oth- work in matching up the deliver y receipts
ers, breach of contract, negligence, and fraud. with the other prepaid inventory documenta-
A primary defense Grant Thornton used in tion.” The judge went even further in absolving
attempting to rebut those allegations was con- Emanuel of responsibility for his brother’s mis-
tributory negligence on the part of JGI and its conduct by suggesting that independent audi-
management. tors are the parties primarily responsible for
Grant Thornton argued that JGI had a respon- discovering such schemes.
sibility to implement internal controls that Given Fred’s equal ownership in the com-
would have been effective in uncovering Fred pany and his apparent control, not only is
Greenberg’s fraudulent scheme. In particu- there no evidence that Emanuel was “slip-
lar, Grant Thornton contended that Emanuel shod,” there is no evidence that he could have
Greenberg should have required his brother prevented Fred’s wrongful acts. Rather, in the
to adopt the computer-based accounting and unique circumstances where a corporation is
control procedures initially proposed by Steve owned and operated by family members, the
Cohn in 1992. The accounting firm also main- goal of deterring wrongdoing is best served
tained that Emanuel Greenberg had been neg- by subjecting the auditors to potential liabil-
ity, thereby encouraging greater diligence by
ligent in failing to discover Fred’s subterfuge
them in such situations in the future.
since he had never taken any steps to check or
verify his brother’s work for the all-important After responding to Grant Thornton’s argu-
Prepaid Inventory account. ments, the federal judge criticized several
The federal judge who presided over the aspects of the firm’s JGI audits. Although
lawsuit filed against Grant Thornton by JGI’s Grant Thornton identified the large increase
bankruptcy trustee responded to the firm’s con- in prepaid inventory during the late 1980s and
tributory negligence defense by first suggesting early 1990s as an audit risk factor, the judge
that the accounting firm, rather than JGI’s man- suggested that the accounting firm did not
agement, had more “leverage” to force Fred thoroughly investigate the underlying cause
Greenberg to adopt Cohn’s recommendations. of that dramatic increase. Likewise, the judge
“Cohn could not insist that Fred implement maintained that during the 1993 audit Grant
tighter controls over the prepaid inventory, but Thornton did not adequately investigate the
Grant Thornton, as JGI’s auditor, could. Indeed, abnormally long time lag between the date
that is how the fraud was finally discovered that certain imported meat shipments arrived
in 1994.” Additionally, the judge pointed out at a U.S. port and the date they were delivered
that Grant Thornton had failed to present any to JGI’s warehouse.4 The judge also referred to
4. Recall that JGI’s customs broker had confirmed Fred Greenberg’s assertion that floods in the Midwestern
states during 1993 were responsible for this time lag. Apparently, that assertion was not valid.
criticism of Grant Thornton that was included According to Grant Thornton, although it
in a report prepared by an expert witness now knew that third-party verification of the
retained by JGI’s bankruptcy trustee. Among delivery dates existed, it considered it unnec-
other is sues, this repor t criticized Grant essary to have the USDA forms for the 1993
Thornton for not discovering until 1993 that audit because of its reliance on JGI’s segre-
gation of duties. Yet, Grant Thornton refused
JGI had copies of the Form 9540-1 documents.
to rely upon JGI’s segregation of duties for its
According to the expert witness, if the auditors 1994 audit. Rather, it demanded that JGI pro-
had performed a routine “walk-through” audit duce the USDA forms for the 1994 audit. . . . If
procedure to document their understanding Grant would not issue an unqualified opinion
of JGI’s important accounting and control pro- in 1994 relying solely upon JGI’s segregation
cedures, they would have immediately discov- of duties, then why did it do so in 1993?
ered that “third-party documentation [Form
9540-1] existed to verify the arrival dates of the In October 1999, the federal judge issued
inventory.” a 36-page opinion weighing the merits of the
The federal judge was most critical of Grant allegations filed by JGI’s trustee against Grant
Thornton’s decision near the end of the 1993 Thornton and the validity of the accounting firm’s
audit to continue relying on the internally gen- rebuttals of those allegations. After striking down
erated delivery receipts when the firm had one of the charges filed against Grant Thornton,
access to externally generated documenta- the judge ruled that the other charges would be
tion to vouch the prepaid inventory transac- addressed in a subsequent trial. Since no fur-
tions and year-end balance. In the judge’s ther mention of this case can be found in public
opinion, that decision could be construed as records, Grant Thornton and JGI’s bankruptcy
“reckless.” trustee apparently settled the case privately.
Questions
1. Identify important audit risk factors common to family-owned businesses. How
should auditors address these risk factors?
2. In your opinion, what primary audit objectives should Grant Thornton have
established for JGI’s (a) Prepaid Inventory account and (b) Merchandise
Inventory account?
3. Assess Grant Thornton’s decision to rely heavily on JGI’s delivery receipts when
auditing the company’s prepaid inventory. More generally, compare and contrast
the validity of audit evidence yielded by internally prepared versus externally
prepared client documents.
4. Describe the general nature and purpose of a “walk-through” audit procedure.
Are such tests required by professional auditing standards?
5. Identify audit procedures, other than a walk-through test, that might have
resulted in Grant Thornton discovering that Fred Greenberg was tampering with
JGI’s delivery receipts.
6. Once an audit firm has informed client management of important internal
control weaknesses, what further responsibility, if any, does the audit firm have
regarding those items? For example, does the audit firm have a responsibility to
insist that client management correct the deficiencies or address them in some
other way?

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CASE 2.

Jack Greenberg, Inc.

The Brothers Greenberg

Accounting for Prepaid Inventory

Auditing Prepaid Inventory

1993 and 1994 JGI Audits

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