Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262

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Research Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/respol

Hype cycles during socio-technical transitions: The dynamics of collective

expectations about renewable energy in Germany
Michael Kriechbaum a, b, *, Alfred Posch a, Angelika Hauswiesner a
a
University of Graz, Institute of System Sciences, Innovation and Sustainability Research, Merangasse 18, 8010 Graz, Austria
b
Graz University of Technology, STS - Science, Technology and Society Unit, Kopernikusgasse 9, 8010 Graz, Austria

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The literature on socio-technical change describes the widely acknowledged, important roles of collectively
Sociology of expectations shared expectations in shaping the trajectories of novel technologies. However, in previous studies on these
Sustainability transitions technological expectations, researchers have mainly emphasised early innovation stages, paying little attention
Discursive struggles
to technologies that have already begun to challenge and transform the established socio-technical system. In this
Climate policy
Frames and framing
study, we use the example of the German energy transition to address this gap. By conducting a content analysis
of nearly 12,000 newspaper articles, we examined the nature and dynamics of expectations that were circulating
in Germany’s wider public from 1992 to 2017 regarding wind power, solar photovoltaics, and biogas. Our
findings reveal patterns of hype and disillusionment for all three technologies and illustrate the important roles
of frame expectations in shaping these hype cycles. Furthermore, the findings shed new light on processes that
contribute to the emergence and dynamics of widely shared expectations and indicate that the associated hype
patterns are manifestations of unfolding transition dynamics rather than the result of frustrated expectations. In
theoretical terms, we integrated insights from (transition) research on discourse and framing into the sociology of
expectations, initiating a promising dialogue between scholars in these two fields.

1. Introduction
To meet the ambitious targets stated in the Paris climate agreement,
the electricity sector must strongly and rapidly transition towards low-
carbon energy technologies (van Sluisveld et al. 2018). The sector
currently absorbs over 40% of the global primary energy and is strongly
based on coal and gas (IEA, 2019). Experts in this sector expect that
renewable energy sources will play key roles in reducing the sector’s
dependency on these fossil fuels (IEA and IRENA, 2017). Indeed, many
countries are attempting to rapidly increase their shares of renewables
(REN21, 2019). Germany has played a pioneering role in this regard,
initiating its support for the diffusion of renewables in the 1990s. This
triggered a strong growth in the wind power, solar PV, and biogas sec­
tors, leading to an increase in the share of renewable electricity from
virtually zero in 1990 to over one-third in 2017 (BMWi, 2020). How­
ever, the established structures in the German power sector are facing an
increasing number of challenges due to the rapid diffusion (and growing
competitiveness) of these non-hydro renewables: infrastructure re­
quirements, market logics, and actor constellations are changing, while
new business models are emerging (Quitzow et al. 2016; Johnstone and
Kivimaa, 2018). Furthermore, the rising share of renewables has been
accompanied by an increase in local conflicts (Reusswig et al. 2016) and
has stimulated public and political debates on the economic feasibility of
the transition towards renewables (Fischer et al. 2016).
In conceptual terms, Germany’s renewable energy markets can be
regarded niches that are breaking into the socio-technical system of the
fossil-nuclear-based electricity sector (Strunz, 2014; Geels et al., 2016).
A great deal is ‘at stake’ during such transitions (Geels, 2004: 909), and
it is not surprising that Schmid et al. (2016: 272) described the German
Energiewende as a “power struggle between a large variety of actors that
differ as profoundly as with respect to their motives and underlying
worldviews”. Germany’s renewable energy policy history documents
this struggle. This history has been described as fragmented (Renn and
Marshall, 2016; Cherp et al. 2017) and as being shaped by the increasing
numbers of renewable energy advocacy groups (Dewald and Truffer,
2011; Sühlsen and Hisschemöller, 2014; Gründinger, 2017; Strunz et al.
2016), by institutional entrepreneurs, such as the Green Party (Jacobs­
son and Lauber, 2006), and by ‘fightbacks’ from incumbents (Geels et al.
2016; Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016). The level of support for renewables
has also varied both over time and across technologies, resulting in

* Corresponding author at: Institute of System Sciences, Innovation and Sustainability Research, Merangasse 18, 8010 Graz, Austria
E-mail address: michael.kriechbaum@uni-graz.at (M. Kriechbaum).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2021.104262
Received 27 October 2019; Received in revised form 4 December 2020; Accepted 3 April 2021
Available online 22 June 2021
0048-7333/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
M. Kriechbaum et al.
significant divergences in the diffusion dynamics (and market shares)
for wind power, solar PV, and biogas (Bruns and Ohlhorst, 2011; Lauber
and Jacobsson, 2016; Markard et al. 2016).
Although scholars now know more about the socio-political processes
that have characterised the previous transition dynamics of the German
Energiewende, no attention has been paid so far to the relationships be­
tween these processes and the expectations that were associated with the
emerging technologies. Previous research findings from innovation
studies show that expectations strongly shape technological trajectories
(Borup et al. 2006; Schot and Geels, 2007; Van Lente et al. 2013). These
findings indicate that expectations allow actors in technological fields to
manage uncertainties and coordinate innovation activities (Van Lente,
2012; Konrad et al. 2012), but they also highlight the fact that expecta­
tions play central roles in creating legitimacy, particularly if these ex­
pectations are shared widely. Based on these findings, scholars have
argued that expectations can both attract attention to the field (Borup
et al. 2006) and challenge the rigid institutional structures of the estab­
lished sociotechnical systems (Smith and Raven, 2012). At the same time,
scholars have noted that widely shared expectations about novel tech­
nologies often change over time and move in so-called hype cycles,
whereby periods of strongly positive expectations are followed by periods
of disillusionment or even pessimism (Fenn and Raskino, 2008; van Lente
et al. 2013, Dedehayir and Steinert, 2016).
In the business literature, hype cycles are usually presented as mirror
images of a technology’s maturation (Fenn and Raskino, 2008). In
contrast, innovation scholars have emphasised the important roles
played by social interactions and policy processes in shaping these cycles
(e.g. Brown and Michael, 2003; Borup et al. 2006; Melton et al. 2016).
Furthermore, it has been highlighted that the emergence of expectations
about technologies is generally characterised by conflict rather than
consent and is subject to strategic framing activities (Rosenbloom et al.
2016; Smith et al. 2014; Berkhout, 2006). In a similar vein, some
scholars suggest that hype cycles are influenced by power struggles that
occur between technology proponents and opponents (Bakker and
Budde, 2012; Geels et al. 2007). Given the competitive and conflicting
nature of technological expectations, hype cycles may play important
roles during unfolding transitions. However, in previous studies on
technological hypes, scholars predominantly focused on early-stage
technologies (Sovacool and Hess, 2017). Hence, little is known about
hype cycles that emerge during phases in which niche technologies have
already begun to compete with and transform established
socio-technical systems.
In this study, we use the examples of wind power, solar PV and
biogas in Germany to address this gap and propose a new framework for
explaining the formation of collective (or widely shared) expectations
about emerging niche technologies. We identified the dynamics of ex­
pectations regarding each of the three analysed technologies from 1992
to 2017 by applying a content analysis of newspaper articles published
by Germany’s largest national newspaper. Subsequently, we took a
process-theoretical approach to reveal how these dynamics interrelated
with the evolution of the country’s renewable energy policy and the
development of the respective markets. To conceptualise technological
hype cycles in the context of socio-technical transitions, we integrated
insights from the growing body of (transition) literature on discourse
and framing (Smith and Raven, 2012; Rosenbloom et al. 2016; Hess,
2019) into the sociology of expectations (Brown and Michael, 2003;
Borup et al. 2006; Van Lente, 2012). Overall, our research findings not
only shed new light on the processes driving the emergence and shaping
of technological hype cycles, but also reveal the crucial roles techno­
logical expectations play in navigating through ongoing transitions.
2. Conceptualising hype cycles in the context of socio-technical
transitions
In this section, we review the sociology of expectations and the
associated concept of technological hypes, contrasting these with more
2
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
Fig. 1. The original notion of the hype cycle (developed by the Gartner con­
sultancy group): Novel technologies tend to be overestimated when introduced,
which leads to a high level of societal attention and inflated expectations
(Hype). Because expectations do not translate into reality, a phase of disillu­
sionment sets in. Over time, this disillusionment is overcome, and the tech­
nology reveals its true value and diffuses widely (Enlightenment).
recent insights into the discursive processes that influence technological
expectations during socio-technical transitions. Subsequently, we
conceptualise the relation between hype cycles and niche-regime
struggles and develop a framework to explain the emergence of widely
shared expectations about niche technologies.
2.1. The sociology of expectations and the notion of hype
Innovation scholars have widely acknowledged the roles of expec­
tations in shaping technological trajectories (Rosenberg, 1982; Nelson
and Winter, 1982; Rip and Kemp, 1998). Scholars studying the sociology
of expectations have provided particularly valuable insights into the
nature of expectations in the context of emerging technologies (for an
overview, see Borup et al. 2006 and Van Lente, 2012). This research
field emphasises the strong effect of expectations on innovation activ­
ities and highlights the roles that expectations play in shaping the early
stages of technology development: they allow innovators to manage the
high uncertainties that are typically associated with these early-stage
technologies, create legitimacy, and coordinate the often loose and
heterogeneous actor networks that are involved in the innovation pro­
cess (Borup et al. 2006; Van Lente, 1993). Another key characteristic of
the sociology of expectations is that a focus is placed on collectively
shared (and publicly communicated) expectations, rather than on pri­
vate expectations (Van Lente, 2012; Berkhout, 2006).
The content of these collective expectations has been analysed by
several scholars. Whereas different definitions of technological expecta­
tions exist (Budde and Konrad, 2019; Sovacool et al. 2019), the most
commonly used definition in the sociology of expectations was developed
by Borup et al. (2006: 286), who referred to expectations as “real-time
representations of future technological capabilities and situations”. By this
definition, expectations can refer to different time horizons (near versus
distant future) and degrees of specificity (vague versus distinct statements),
and may be related to widely diverse aspects of a technology (Alkemade and
Suurs, 2012). With regard to the latter, scholars have distinguished between
three different types (or levels) of expectations: specific, general, and frame
expectations (Ruef and Markard, 2010; Van Lente et al. 2013; Kriechbaum
et al. 2018). Specific expectations refer to expectations about individual
projects, organisations, and products; general expectations refer to de­
velopments of the technological field as a whole, such as market or profit­
ability developments; and frame expectations refer to expectations that
connect the technology to wider societal goals, such as job creation or
environmental protection.
Literature contributions to the sociology of expectations also provide
valuable insights into the dynamics of collective expectations over time.
A generally observed pattern includes the so-called hype cycles; these
are strong and rapid increases and subsequent decreases in both societal
M. Kriechbaum et al.
Table 1
Comparison between the original concept of hype cycles and the interpretation of hype circles by scholars in sociology of expectations field.
Original view of hype cycles
Ontology Realism
Nature of hypes Expectations during hypes are inflated and
deceptive
Determinants of Material conditions (level of maturity)
shape
Suggested dynamics Hype-Disillusionment-Enlightenment
attention to and expectations about a technology (Ruef and Markard,
2010; Van Lente et al. 2013; Dedehayir and Steinert, 2016). Developed
by a consultancy group to specify the right time for investment (Fenn
and Raskino, 2008), the notion of hype cycles originally referred to three
pre-defined phases through which emerging technologies inevitably
pass: hype, disillusionment, and enlightenment (Fig. 1).
Hypes were initially believed to be intrinsically linked to inflated (i.
e. deceptive) expectations, but sociology of expectations scholars have
taken a more constructivist view (Table 1). Specifically, they suggest
that hypes allow innovators to take advantage of the aforementioned
performativity of expectations in order to influence the momentum of
the technology development (potentially leading to ‘self-fulfilling
prophecies’)1. Along these lines, difficulties associated with assessing
the validity of expectations ex-ante are highlighted (Van Lente, 2012).
Moreover, Konrad (2006) pointed out that even ex-post evaluations are
limited, because the actors’ retrospective accounts are characterised by
their interpretive flexibility. Overall, scholars in the sociology of ex­
pectations field are more interested in the real-time implications of
hypes (and disillusionments) than in how accurately the associated ex­
pectations can predict the future (Van Lente et al. 2013).
2.2. Expectations as contested narratives during socio-technical
transitions
The ideas of scholars who study the sociology of expectations also
appear in the literature on socio-technical transitions. A key concept in
this literature is the multi-level perspective (MLP) (Geels, 2004, Geels,
2002). According to this concept, expectations play major roles in sup­
porting the formation and function of so-called socio-technical niches.
Such niches are described as spaces which protect radically new (and
potentially sustainable) innovations by shielding them from the unfav­
ourable selection environments in established (unsustainable)
socio-technical systems (Geels, 2004; Schot and Geels, 2008). Although
these systems are believed to be subject to inertia and stabilised by the
socio-technical regime (i.e. the underlying and relatively rigid set of
shared rules, norms, and beliefs), the MLP suggests that niches may
break into these systems at some point and create new (and more sus­
tainable) socio-technical configurations (Geels, 2002; Geels and Schot,
2007). Positive expectations contribute to the protective functions of
niches, but also to allow actors to nurture the development of the
respective innovations (e.g. by enabling actors to mobilise resources)
(Geels and Raven, 2006; Schot and Geels, 2008).
Several scholars have recently suggested that expectations about
emerging technologies also act as ‘outward-oriented’ narratives that are
associated with niche-regime power struggles. Geels (2010) highlighted
the important roles that expectations may play in the competition be­
tween advocates for emerging niche technologies and incumbent actors,
suggesting that both actor groups create and share (de-)legitimising
expectations about these technologies in order to manipulate legislation,
regulations, and policy programmes in their favour. In a similar vein,
Smith and Raven (2012) argued that actors in specific niches use
1
For a prime example of such self-fulfilling prophecies, see previous work on
Moore’s Law (Van Lente and Rip, 1998; MacKenzie, 1990).
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
The view of hype cycles taken by sociology of expectations scholars
Constructivism
Expectations during hypes influence innovation activities in the present and are not necessarily
inflated
Material conditions and social processes (interpretation and discourse)
Cycles of hype and disillusionment may be repetitive, and ‘enlightenment’ may not always be
reached.
positive ‘narratives’ about the future to actively challenge and desta­
bilise the established socio-technical regime. Furthermore, the authors
suggested that these narratives are “argued and mobilised in a
socio-political sense, rather than only in a socio-technical sense” and
described as “part of a solution to broader social, environmental and
economic challenges” (p. 1032-1033). In several empirical studies,
scholars could substantiate the contested and normative character of
expectations, emphasising the role of expectations in justifying and (de-)
legitimizing niche technologies by correlating the technology and its
socio-technical configuration with broader developments that took
place in the ‘wider social world’ (Geels et al. 2007; Smith et al. 2014;
Rosenbloom et al. 2016).
The fact that technological expectations are being presented as con­
tested future narratives reflects the scholars’ steadily growing interest in
analysing the roles of discourse and framing in socio-technical transitions
(Hoppmann et al. 2020; Kern and Rogge, 2018; Lempiälä et al. 2019). The
concepts of discourse and framing are rooted in policy and organisational
studies (Hajer, 1996; Cornelison and Werner, 2014) and a rising number
of scholars are applying these concepts to shed light on the ‘politics’ of
transitions and on how discursive struggles are associated with the
transformation of established socio-technical systems (Kern, 2012; Kern
and Rogge, 2018; Lee and Hess, 2019). Particularly in the context of
ongoing energy transitions, scholars have studied the underlying
discursive dimensions and analysed how competing actor groups (often
strategically) frame energy issues and associated technologies (Scarse
and Ockwell, 2010; Isoaho and Karhunmaa, 2019; Hess, 2019).
2.3. Hype cycles as manifestations of niche-regime struggles
In this paper, we build on the above-mentioned studies on future nar­
ratives and align (transition) research on discourse and framing more
closely with the sociology of expectations. In so doing, we shed new light on
the nature of technological hype cycles and the roles they play during socio-
technical transitions.2 Specifically, we present technological expectations
as (de-)legitimizing future narratives that interrelate with niche-regime
struggles. Based on this understanding, we describe hypes as periods dur­
ing which advocates of niche technologies are able to successfully challenge
the existing regime. Thus, the actual shape of hype cycles reflects the overall
course of the discursive niche-regime struggles, indicating the extent to
which niche technologies have been able to establish themselves in the
regime. This combined perspective implies that hypes are not limited to
early stage technologies (as typically assumed in the sociology of expecta­
tions). Instead, it suggests that hype cycle dynamics become particularly
prevalent when niche technologies enter the established systems, because
the associated niche-regime struggles are usually fought on public stages
and are the most intense while transition processes are ongoing (Geels and
Verhees, 2011; Geels et al. 2017).
The few existing studies on the dynamics of expectations related to
more mature technologies substantiate this suggestion. Geels et al.
2
In a recent contribution by Hoppmann et al. (2020), research on hype cycles
was explicitly linked to literature on framing. However, in this study, the au­
thors analysed hype cycles in an organisational rather than a wider societal
context.
3
M. Kriechbaum et al.
Fig. 2. Conceptual framework.
(2007) found that psychotropic drugs were associated with hype cycles
throughout the 20th century; these cycles reflected discursive struggles
that were particularly decisive while the usage of these drugs was
increasing or sometimes even after they had become more widely
available. In a similar vein, several scholars have revealed hype patterns
associated with the increasing diffusion of biofuels, emphasising the
crises of legitimacy that were associated with these market uptakes
(Verbong et al. 2008, Berti and Levidow, 2014; Alkemade and Suurs,
2012). Finally, Kriechbaum et al. (2018) identified hype and disap­
pointment cycles for PV technologies in Germany and Spain, showing
that expectations were most actively shared once the technology had
become more visible on the market.
Like Rosenbloom et al. (2016) and Smith et al. (2014), we suggest
that discursive struggles over emerging niche technologies are strongly
associated with expectations that link the niche characteristics (content)
with wider societal problem frames and issues (context). To consider this
in analytical terms, we made the above-mentioned distinction among
specific, general, and frame expectations3, assuming that niche-regime
struggles manifest themselves at the frame level of expectations.
Whereas expectations at the other two levels refer to developments of or
within the respective technological fields, frame expectations link the
technologies to wider societal goals and reflect societal hopes and fears
that are associated with a technology (Kriechbaum et al. 2018; Sovacool
et al. 2019). In other words, frame expectations act as ‘moralizing sys­
tems’ (Berkhout, 2006) and generally contain statements about how
‘good’ or ‘bad’ a technology will be for the society. Thus, they are ex­
pected to play particularly important roles, allowing niche technology
advocates to challenge and compete with the established regime.
2.4. The emergence of widely shared expectations - towards an
explanatory framework
Building on the above, we argue that widely shared expectations
emerge as a result of discursive struggles that take place between
3
The notion of frame is used here to signify how expectations ‘frame’ tech­
nologies around wider societal issues and, thereby, (de-)legitimize these tech­
nologies. Note, however, that in the technology context, scholars typically refer
to frames more broadly as intersubjectively shared schemes of interpretations
by which actors make sense of a technology (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008).
4
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
competing coalitions of actors. Members of these coalitions engage in
narrative work and create and share expectations based on specific
events. At the same time, this narrative work is constrained (or enabled)
by the pre-existing characteristics and the wider institutional settings of
the emerging niche (Fig. 2). Like Geels and Verhees (2011), we support
the arguments of cultural sociology scholars, who describe cultural ac­
tions as social processes carried out by actors to gain legitimacy by
‘performing’ narratives on public stages (Swidler, 1986; Alexander,
2004). Specifically, we suggest that hype cycles are driven by such
performative acts and are characterised by ‘technological dramas’
(Pfaffenberger, 1992) that reflect the competition between optimistic
and pessimistic views on the respective technology.
Specific events set the stages for these dramas (Geels and Verhees,
2011); they open up discursive spaces and allow both technology ad­
vocates and opponents to create and share their expectations. The role of
triggering events has been emphasised in the literature on hypes since
the beginning. Scholars have associated these events mainly with
niche-internal developments, such as technological breakthroughs or
the implementation of niche-specific support policies (Fenn and Ras­
kino, 2008; Melton et al. 2016). We believe that changes that occur in
the wider socio-technical context, such as price developments in
competing technologies or changes in the wider policy setting, also play
important roles (regarding the latter change, see Lee and Hess’s (2019)
work on political opportunity structures). Furthermore, we argue that
hype cycles are not merely associated with a single triggering event, but
are shaped and influenced by a continuous series of events.
Several factors influence how closely expectations can be connected
to specific events and how widely they resonate within the public. The
strength of the underlying actor coalition is a key factor (Hajer, 1996).
Several transition scholars have described powerful actor coalitions that
are typically associated with dominant discourses (Smith and Kern,
2009; Geels, 2014). In addition, insights from research on collective
action frames (Benford and Snow, 2000) indicate that the strength of
such coalitions depends to a large extent on the standing and (perceived)
credibility of the associated actors. We thus argue that the impact of an
actor’s narrative work of creating and sharing expectations is moderated
by the public’s interpretation of how legitimate this actor is. For this
reason, we suggest that this narrative work is typically carried out by a
rather exclusive group of actors, such as experts, policy makers, industry
representatives, or CEOs.
 M. Kriechbaum et al.
5

Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262

Fig. 3. Important events in the history of the German renewable energy policy (based on Hake et al. 2015; Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Bechberger and Reiche, 2004; Bruns and Ohlhorst,
2011; Nordensvärd and Urban, 2015; Dewald and Truffer, 2011; Hoppmann et al. 2014; respective regulations).
M. Kriechbaum et al.
The resonance of expectations also depends on how these align with
the pre-existing characteristics of the emerging technological field. Even
powerful coalitions of ‘trustworthy’ actors cannot share any expecta­
tions they want; they are constrained by the material properties of the
technology (Hoppmann et al. 2020). We suggest that such properties
refer to all tangible or ‘actual’ aspects (Sewell, 1992) of the associated
socio-technical niche. These aspects specifically refer to technological
and economic attributes, as well as regulative conditions, and range
from technology-specific features (e.g. technical performances, cost
developments) to wider characteristics of the technological field (e.g.
diffusion rates, subsidies, or number of jobs created). Material properties
matter, because the credibility of expectations is assessed on the basis of
previous manifestations of the technologies (van Lente, 1993; Bakker
et al. 2012). Hence, expectations that do not align with the material
developments are unlikely to prevail.
However, as previously noted, the assessment of the empirical fit
between expectations and actual material characteristics is subject to
interpretive flexibility (Konrad, 2006). Therefore, these characteristics
constrain or enable the formation of expectations, rather than deter­
mining them. Benford and Snow (2000) echoed this view when they
suggested that the correspondence between a particular frame and the
empirical reality can be interpreted differently, although its credibility
depends on this correspondence. The formation of expectations is also
constrained by previous credibility assessments (Bakker et al. 2011). In
our context, this means that the pre-existing expectations (and the
resulting public sentiment) about the technology influence how suc­
cessfully actor coalitions can use particular events to create expecta­
tions. For instance, during a phase of disappointment (i.e. when the
public widely shares a perception that the technological expectations
have not been fulfilled), technology advocates will find it difficult to
capitalize even on highly favourable events.
Finally, we argue that the success rate of sharing expectations also
depends on the alignment between these expectations and the wider
institutional setting. Like other transitions scholars (e.g. Geels, 2020),
we have adopted Scott’s (2014) typology of institutions and define the
institutional setting as the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive
structures that underlie the socio-technical context of the emerging
niches. Study findings on collective action frames indicate that the
successful diffusion of particular frames strongly depends on how they
resonate with pre-existing cultural structures (Benford and Snow, 2000;
McCammon, 2013). In a similar vein, several transition scholars have
noted the importance of widely shared norms, values, and beliefs in
constraining the narrative work of niche actors (Rosenbloom, 2018;
Kern, 2012; Geels and Verhees, 2011). We suggest that also expectations
need to be connected to such structures to increase their diffusion. This
is especially the case for frame expectations, which, by their very nature,
associate technologies with wider societal goals and problem frames.
While previous scholars have strongly emphasised alignments with
informal, cultural structures, we additionally highlight the importance
of regulative institutional settings (e.g. sector-wide regulations or na­
tional polices) in constraining (or enabling) the diffusion of particular
expectations.
3. Germany’s energy policy and the emergence of renewables
The history of the emergence of wind power, solar PV, and biogas
technologies in Germany is closely entwined with the history of the
country’s energy policy (for an overview of important policy events, see
Fig. 3). After the first efforts were made to support renewables in the
beginning of the 90s, a turbulent co-evolution between policy and
market dynamics followed. This co-evolutionary process can be divided
into five different phases.
6
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
3.1. Initial attempts to promote the diffusion of renewable energy
(1990–1997)
Political efforts to support the deployment of renewable energy tech­
nologies can be traced back to the Electricity Feed-in Act (1990), which was
pushed by a strategic coalition set up by the Green Party and required public
energy utilities to pay producers of renewable electricity a yearly fixed
remuneration (Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016; Hake et al. 2015). The 100 MW
Mass Testing Programme for wind power and the 1000-roofs programme for
solar PV were also implemented at this time (Bechberger and Reiche, 2004).
The wind industry in particular benefited from these early support mea­
sures, growing strongly from 1990 to 1998 (BMWi, 2020). But the industry
was confronted with regulatory uncertainties: in 1996, the large energy
utilities filed a lawsuit against the Feed-in Act in the EU court, and, until the
Building Act of 1998 was enacted, the construction law severely hindered the
approval processes for building permits (Bruns and Ohlhorst, 2011). The
solar industry grew much less strongly; however, given the high costs of the
technology, even a moderate growth was remarkable and strongly linked to
additional bottom-up support from local municipalities (Jacobsson and
Lauber, 2006; Dewald and Truffer, 2011). The biogas industry was still in its
pioneering phase at that time, whereby the users were typically farmers
who constructed the plants themselves (Markard et al. 2016).
3.2. Renewables at the core of energy policy (1998-2003)
In 1998, renewables were prioritised in Germany’s energy policy
(Hake et al. 2015). The new red-green government prepared a nuclear
phase-out, implemented the 100.000 solar roofs programme, and sub­
stantially revised the feed-in law. The latter resulted in the Renewable
Energy Sources Act (EEG) 2000, which offered cost-covering and
technology-specific feed-in tariffs and guaranteed these payments over a
period of 20 years. At the same time, the European Union dismissed the
aforementioned lawsuit filed by German electricity companies, which
further increased the legitimacy of renewables. The favourable political
conditions triggered a veritable boom in wind power installations and
the entrance of incumbent German manufacturers into the wind in­
dustry (Geels et al. 2016). However, the wind industry faced new
challenges related to (i) the increasing public opposition due to land­
scape impacts and (ii) the decreasing availability of profitable sites
(Bruns and Ohlhorst, 2011). With significant tariff increases and the
100.000 roof programme, (roof-mounted) PV systems now took off as
well (Dewald and Truffer, 2011). Finally, the regulatory support also
stimulated the diffusion of biogas technology and initiated the pro­
fessionalisation of the market (Markard et al. 2016).
3.3. The EEG 2004 and increasing climate awareness (2004-2008)
With the EEG 2004, the red-green government defined concrete
expansion targets and again raised the tariffs for photovoltaics, biogas,
and offshore wind technology. Although the Green Party was succeeded
by the Conservatives after the election in 2005, the new government not
only maintained the amended regulations, but even increased the asso­
ciated expansion targets (EEG 2009). This ambitious decision was
strongly related to the government’s commitment to reduce GHG emis­
sions (Hake et al. 2015); this correlated with a remarkable increase in
public awareness about climate change in 2007, not only in Germany
(Fig. 4), but also on a global level (Schmidt et al. 2013). However, the
wind industry was still struggling with the limited availability of suitable
building sites (Bruns and Ohlhorst, 2011). Conversely, the solar market
continued to grow and was now additionally being driven by large-scale,
ground-mounted systems (Dewald and Truffer, 2011). The biogas sector
finally took off as well and became also characterised by ever larger
plants, which now mainly ran on maize silage (Markard et al. 2016).
M. Kriechbaum et al.
Fig. 4. Media attention with regard to climate change in the Süddeutsche Zei­
tung (Numbers of articles per year, search terms: ‘Klimawandel’ and
‘Klimaschutz’).
3.4. The cost-efficiency paradigm and Fukushima (2009–2013)
In 2009, the Conservative Party formed a coalition with the Liberal
Party, which traditionally had been rather critical of the EEG. The new
government agreed to continue to support renewables, but made the
rising costs associated with the feed-in policy a subject of discussion
(Hake et al. 2015). The resulting energy concept placed a clear focus on
wind power, including offshore technology (BMWi and BMU, 2010). In
contrast, the support for PV was considered to be too costly.4 After the
first tariff cuts proved ineffective (in fact, the solar market experienced
an unprecedented growth)5, support for PV declined drastically in 2012
(‘PV-Novelle 2012’); this led to a significant drop in installations and
triggered a severe crisis in the hitherto emerging domestic
manufacturing industry (Geels et al. 2016). To further decrease policy
costs and avoid the creation of extensive maize monocultures6, the
government also strongly reduced the support for biogas (EEG 2012)
(Markard et al. 2016). At the same time, Fukushima and the (renewed)
decision to phase out nuclear power led the government to increase their
support for the wind sector still further. This sector was characterised by
increasing shares of repowering technology and a slowly emerging
offshore sub-sector (Reichardt et al. 2016).
3.5. The EEG 2.0 – from feed-in tariffs to tendering (2014-2017)
The Social Democrats replaced the Liberals in the government as a
result of the 2013 election, but cost efficiency remained on top of the
energy-political agenda. Moreover, by implementing the EEG 2014, the
new coalition laid the foundation for redesigning the feed-in tariff
structure to support a market-based tendering scheme that was intro­
duced three years later (EEG 2017). At the same time, development
corridors were being developed for each technology to ensure a ‘steady
and grid-compatible’ deployment of renewables . While the contracted
biogas market developed along with the associated corridor, which was
small and mainly restricted to the use of manure and waste, the PV
market was far from reaching the specified corridor (BMWi, 2020).
Conversely, the amount of newly installed capacities in wind power
4
Indeed, the difference costs associated with solar PV rose from 266 million
EUR (0.06 euro cent/kWh) in 2004 to 4.5 billion EUR (1.10 euro cent/kWh) in
2010, which was almost half of the total difference in costs paid to renewables
(with a share in the renewable electricity production of not even 12%) (BMWi,
2020; BMWi, 2018).
5
Due to a drop in prices for silicon, overcapacities of solar panels on the
market and cheap production costs in Asian countries (mainly China), PV sys­
tem prices fell more rapidly than the tariffs at this time (Hoppmann et al. 2014;
López Prol, 2018).
6
Although the EEG 2009 linked the use of energy crops to sustainability
criteria, the boom in the biogas sector lead to a substantial increase in maize
acreage, triggering a legitimacy crisis (Markard et al. 2016).
7
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
Table 2
Search query and yields
Technology Search Terms Yield
Wind Windr!d* OR Windkraft* OR Windstrom* OR 5569
Power Windenergie* Articles
Solar PV Photovoltaik* OR Fotovoltaik* OR Sonnenenergie* 5219
OR Sonnenstrom* OR Sonnenkraft* OR Solaranlagen Articles
OR Solarpark* OR Solarstrom*
Biogas Biogas* OR Biomethan* OR Bioerdgas* 1176
Articles
(including rising shares of repowering and offshore plants) soared and
greatly exceeded previous deployment rates as well as the defined
deployment corridor (ibid.).7
4. Methodology
To identify collective (i.e. publicly communicated and widely
shared) expectations that were associated with wind power, solar PV,
and biogas in Germany from 1992 to 2017, the country’s largest national
newspaper, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, was selected as the main data
source.8 We searched through the newspaper’s archive for articles that
were published in this time range (1992–2017) and included mentions
of the respective technologies. Table 2 shows the search terms used for
each of the technologies and the number of articles identified. In total,
the query yielded 11,964 articles. In a first step, the annual number of
articles was plotted over time for each technology. This revealed the
(change in) media coverage and served as an indicator for the amount of
public attention given to the respective technologies during this time
period.
Subsequently, a content analysis was conducted (Krippendorff,
2013) to identify the expectations expressed in the articles. Using the
software MAXQDA, all articles were manually examined and explicit
expectation statements were coded for their specific content as well as
their connotations. The coding structure was developed based on the
three levels of expectations defined by Ruef and Markard (2010), Van
Lente et al. (2013), and Kriechbaum et al. (2018) (see Table 3). To
determine the connotations of the expectations, the identified state­
ments were divided into categories of positive, negative, and neutral
expectations. Positive (negative) expectations referred to statements
that implied optimism (pessimism) with regard to a specific aspect of the
respective technology, and neutral expectations referred to statements
that were either ambivalent or lacked clear connotations.
The content analysis was conducted by two persons. Initially, a pilot
test was carried out: After the coding scheme had been discussed thor­
oughly, 250 randomly selected articles were analysed by both coders.
These test results were compared and discussed, the code definitions
were further refined, and a coding guideline was established. During the
analysis, regular meetings were held by the coders to review difficult
statements and update the coding guideline. To further minimize
analytical bias, all coded statements were cross-checked by the
7
Since the average number of years between initial project planning and
commissioning is about 4–5 years (BWE, 2018), this boom in installation can be
traced back to the previous period rather than to the change in legislation that
occurred in 2014. Furthermore, the flexible cap that was introduced in the EEG
2014 to keep the number of new installations within the deployment corridor
was not supposed to take effect before 2016 (this differed for PV).
8
As we wanted to analyse expectations that were communicated to and
shared with the wider public, national newspapers were chosen as an appro­
priate data source. We selected the largest newspaper for an in-depth analysis
after examining similar trends between national newspapers with regard to the
media attention received. See Fig. A.1 for a comparison of media attention
patterns between the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the second largest newspaper, the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (which is the counterpart of the Süddeutsche
Zeitung in terms of the editorial stance).
M. Kriechbaum et al.
Table 3
Description of the different levels of expectations and the associated coding scheme (developed on the basis of Ruef and Markard, 2010; Van Lente et al. 2013;
Kriechbaum et al. 2018).
Levels Sub-categories/Codes
Specific Projects
Expectations with regard to specific manifestations of a Organisations
technology. Products and
Services
General Diffusion
Expectations about the technological field as a whole.
Profitability
Scope of
Application
Frame Economy
Societal hopes and fears that go along with a technology.
Environment
Society
respective other coder and, if necessary, additionally discussed. In this
way, the whole categorisation process (i.e. determinations of content
and connotations) was carried out and cross-checked by two persons,
which is an ideal method of conducting a content analysis (Krippen­
dorff, 2013). To manually sift through the large number of identified
newspaper articles, the search terms were highlighted in the articles,
and only statements in those paragraphs where the search terms
appeared were considered (the pilot test showed that the error rate
arising from the application of this procedure was insignificant).
The number of expectations was determined by identifying the
number of positive and negative statements made per year; the higher
the number of net positive expectations (number of positive expecta­
tions minus number of negative expectations), the higher the level of the
expectations (or optimism) and vice versa. Consequently, a hype was
regarded as a period during which a strong and rapid increase in the
number of both positive (net) expectations and published articles about
the technology took place. Disillusionment, in turn, was regarded as a
period during which net expectations and media attention declined.
Finally, disappointment was interpreted as a phase during which net
negative expectations predominated. To increase the transparency of the
associated trends, a three-year rolling average of the annual number of
net expectations was calculated. The dynamics were also quantified for
each of the defined codes (and, thereby, for each of the levels).
To study the identified dynamics of expectations and how these
dynamics related to the developments in the respective niches and the
wider socio-technical context, a process-theoretical approach was
applied. Traditional ‘variance approaches’ (Mohr, 1982), such as
cross-sectional and panel analysis, are particularly useful when ana­
lysing change processes that unfold continuously and are driven by
deterministic causation. However, they cannot entirely account for (i)
critical events that suddenly change the course of a given development,
(ii) the historical context in which the development is embedded, and
(iii) the “formative patterns that give overall direction of development,
but do not entirely determine what happens at the micro level” (Poole
et al. 2000:4). The application of process theory enables all these types
of influences to be considered, allowing researchers to open the ‘black
box’ between independent and dependent variables and to evaluate
processes between these variables, rather than the regularities (Van de
Ven and Poole, 2005).
Referring to Poole et al. (2000: 19), a process was defined as “a
coherent sequence of events that describe how things change over time”.
Process theorists highlight the succession of events that underlies
change and suggest using narratives to specify the significance of the
events and the forces that influence them (Van de Ven and Poole, 2005).
Narratives are descriptions of the temporal sequences, timing, and
context of chains of events that lead to certain outcomes (Verbong et al.
2008). Developing narratives allows scholars to accept that entities,
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
Expectations about the implementation or outcome of or several projects.
Expectations raised by or about organisations that are associated with the technology.
Expectations with regard to products or services that are related to the technology.
Expectations about diffusion rates, share in energy supply or market developments more
generally.
Profitability-related expectations such as expectations about price developments, rate of return
or technical progress.
Expectations about new application fields or combinations with other technologies.
Expectations about impacts on the economy (e.g. job creation, national/regional
competitiveness, electricity costs).
Expectations with regard to environmental impacts (e.g. impact on climate or landscape).
Expectations about impacts on the society more generally (e.g. impact on energy security or
standard of living).
attributes, and events may change in meaning over time, to illustrate
critical events, and to study how events are connected with each other
(Poole et al. 2000). Because we wanted to do more than merely measure
the regularity of relationships between independent and dependent
variables, this method was applied to make stronger causal inferences
and identify the actual processes that underlie change (Maxwell, 2012).
To develop process-theoretical accounts in this study, the following
strategy was applied. First, we qualitatively analysed the detailed con­
tent of the identified expectation statements (stored and arranged
chronologically in an Excel file), the actor groups behind the statements,
and the specific circumstances under which the statements were raised.
In this step, we paid particular attention to periods during which the
dynamics of expectations changed significantly (e.g. turning points or
periods showing strong changes in the number of expectations). Second,
we analysed how the critical changes in expectations dynamics related
to the above described co-evolution between Germany’s energy policy
and the renewable energy markets. In this way, we could illuminate
relevant events and infer how the identified expectation dynamics
related to both niche internal processes and developments in the wider
socio-technical context. In the next section, we present the findings of
this analysis and describe them in detail for each technology.
5. The emergence and evolution of expectations
In the case of all three analysed technologies, the expectations
moved in patterns that resemble a hype cycle (Fig. 5). These patterns
varied substantially in their shape, duration, and intensity. The peak in
positive expectations occurred in the second half of the 2000s for all
three technologies, the expectations about wind power were by far the
strongest and longest-lasting. Biogas experienced a relatively short peak
(i.e. only two years in duration), which was followed by a phase in which
expectations were less frequently shared, became increasingly negative,
and eventually almost completely disappeared. Although wind power
and solar PV also went through a phase of falling expectations, the ex­
pectations either stabilised again (wind power) or showed a renewed
increase (solar PV). Another significant difference relates to the pre-
hype period. While the number of expressed expectations was insignif­
icant in the case of biogas, wind power was already associated with
cyclic expectations, and PV, with relatively stable (and predominantly
positive) expectations, throughout the 90s.
As will be demonstrated in this section, the hype patterns did not
merely mirror the interplay between market and policy developments;
instead they emerged as a collective meaning-making process in which
the prospects of the technologies were constantly negotiated in the
context of broader societal goals. During this process, each of the cycles
were strongly shaped by frame expectations (i.e. societal hopes and fears
that went along with the technologies). Whereas the hypes were driven
8
M. Kriechbaum et al. Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262

Fig. 5. Dynamics of expectations and media attention as extracted from articles published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, as well as the developments in the respective markets
(data on installation rates from BMWi, 2020).(For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

Table 4
Positive and negative frames that were associated with the technologies. To assess the strength of the frame categories, a four-stage scale was used (very optimistic
(++), optimistic (+), pessimistic (− ), very pessimistic (− − )), whereby the assessment was based on both the intensity (number of statements) and persistence.
Technology Phase Frame Strength Example

Wind Power Hype Economy (+) “Many of the automotive suppliers, which are now in a crisis, could start to produce wind mills.” 2009-11-19
Environment (++) “Due to the threat of dramatic climate change, we have no time to discuss the aesthetics of wind mills.” 2007-11-15
Society (++) “Wind parks will soon be the main pillar of the energy supply.” 2010-04-30
Disillusionment Economy (− ) “Operators of offshore parks might be protected from financial risks in the future – at the expense of consumers.” 2012-12-05
Environment (− ) “Extensive deployment of wind mills will destroy our landscape.” 2012-08-31
Solar PV Hype Economy (+) “The industry associations expect 100 000 jobs by 2012.” 2008-07-19
Environment (++) “Climate change is challenging, and we as cities need to set a good example with solar parks.” 2008-06-03
Society (+) “Solar power will decrease energy imports” 2008-02-04
Disillusionment Economy (− − ) “Now, the solar industry fears for many jobs.” 2010-05-07
Because of the rapid deployment, high consumer costs are feared.” 2011-12-10
Biogas Hype Economy (+) “Particularly the boom of bioenergy is providing future opportunities for farmers.” 2007-01-10
Environment (++) “With biogas, the carbon emissions can be reduced substantially.” 2007-10-25
Society (+) “With a rapid deployment of biogas, we will get more independent from energy imports.” 2006-12-11
Disillusionment Economy (− ) “The costs for renewables such as biogas is likely to strongly increase in 2013.” 2012-09-08
Environment (− − ) “Environmentalists fear that the intensive maize cultivation will lead to over-fertilisation of the soil.” 2011-04-21
Society (− ) “(…) [the increasing demand for maize due to biogas] will lead in times of food shortage to famines.” 2011-05-31

by positive frame expectations (e.g. hopes for climate change mitigation,
job creation, or energy security), disillusionments were characterised by
‘framing struggles’ in which negative frame expectations, such as fears
of high policy costs, were contrasted with and challenged these hopes
(Table 4).
5.1. Wind power
The expectation dynamics with regard to wind power showed a long
pre-hype period with a steady increase in media attention and rather
unsteady expectations (1992–2006), a hype phase with an unprecedented
increase in both media attention and expectations that lasted for about
half a decade (2006–2011), a phase of disillusionment (2012–2014), and
a phase of ‘recovery’ (2015–2017). The results show that frame expec­
tations played key roles in shaping both hype and disillusionment. Hopes
for climate change mitigation and energy security strongly characterised
the hype phase, whereas these hopes were counteracted by economic
fears during the disillusionment phase. Frame expectations were also
rather ambivalent during the surrounding periods and accounted for the
bulk of the identified negative expectations (Fig. 6).
During the pre-hype period, expectations were particularly unstable
at the specific level, which mainly mirrored dynamics within the in­
dustry. For instance, the increase and subsequent drop in specific ex­
pectations around 2000 reflected the strong growth in the wind market.
These were mainly positive expectations about planned or already
implemented power plants and optimistic statements related to newly
formed wind companies. The market growth was triggered by the
favourable Building Act of 1998 and slowed down due to increasing
space limitations. General expectations were more stable during this
period, particularly after 2000; although the increasing space limita­
tions led to pessimistic outlooks on the domestic wind market, this
pessimism was outweighed by positive expectations about the mid- and
long-term developments of the wind industry. Many of these expecta­
tions were related to the announcement made by the red green-
government to set specific expansion targets.
At the frame level, conflicting expectations characterised the entire

9
M. Kriechbaum et al.
pre-hype period. Environmental frame expectations were especially
ambivalent. On the one hand, wind power was linked to positive envi­
ronmental impacts and, in particular, with the reduction of carbon
emissions. On the other hand, the technology was associated with
negative impacts on the landscape. The strong growth in installed wind
power plants around 2000 intensified these ‘framing struggles’, which
were not limited solely to the environmental dimension. After the red-
green government turned the nuclear phase-out into a law in 2002, a
discussion began regarding the role and capabilities of wind power:
Hopes for a renewable-based energy future, job creation, and national
competitiveness were contrasted with fears of decreasing energy secu­
rity, increasing electricity costs, and the belief that wind power would
never be able to substitute for conventional energy sources. Many of these
fears were driven by large energy utilities, but also by members of the
government. The Minister of Economic Affairs at the time (Conservative
Party), for instance, stated that it could be economically more meaningful
to modernise coal-fired powerplants than further deploy wind power.
The hype phase set in suddenly in 2007. While the wind industry was
still struggling with space limitations and declining domestic in­
stallations at this point in time, positive frame expectations or – more
specifically – hopes with regard to climate change, abruptly gained the
upper hand and played a key role in triggering and maintaining an un­
precedented phase of optimism. Against the background of the rapidly
rising climate awareness, both at the policy level and in the public sphere,
the hopes that wind power would become a key technology in the miti­
gation of climate change began to dominate the discourse. While these
hopes were directly visible at the frame level (frame environment), they
also manifested themselves on two other levels. On the specific level,
many of the positive expectations were now raised by incumbents who
announced plans to invest in wind power and often explicitly linked these
Fig. 6. Dynamics of expectations and media attention as extracted from articles published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, as well as the development of the respective markets
(data on installation rates from BMWi, 2020). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
10
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
plans to the necessity to act against climate change. On the general level,
much of the optimism was related to the ambitious climate targets set by
the government and the ‘inevitable’ growth of the wind market that
would accompany attempts to reach these targets.
In addition to the environmental hopes, wind power was framed with
increasing frequency as a technology that would play a key role in
providing energy security (frame society). This frame was closely linked
to Fukushima and the withdrawal of the initial decision of the
conservative-liberal government to extend the lifetime of nuclear power
plants. Expectations that wind power would become an important pillar
of the energy system in the medium- to long-term prevailed even before
Fukushima (frame society) and mirrored the initial energy concept
introduced by the conservative-liberal government. However, the gov­
ernment’s turnaround with regard to nuclear power spread further
increased optimism and triggered a significant increase in expectations
with regard to the ability (or rather necessity) of wind power to provide
energy security once nuclear power was removed from the grid (i.e.
within one or two decades). This starkly contrasted with expectations
that developed in the early 2000s, when the plan to phase-out nuclear
energy led to framing struggles over the ability of wind power to sub­
stitute for nuclear energy (counter frames still existed but were clearly
outweighed by the optimistic ‘energy security’ frame).
Finally, wind power was associated with increasing frequency with
economic hopes and, in particular, with job creation. To some extent,
these hopes were embedded in a wave of general optimism about the
economic potential of renewable energy markets. Several studies
emerged that predicted that about half a million jobs would be created in
the renewable energy sector in 2020, and renewable industries were
increasingly referred to as job-creators that could become the new
leading industries of the 21st century. But these hopes for job creation
M. Kriechbaum et al.
were also specifically linked to the wind industry. Particularly during
the global economic crisis, the creation of wind turbines was seen as an
opportunity for the struggling automotive suppliers. Furthermore, the
emerging offshore technology raised hopes in the coastal regions
regarding the establishment of a completely new industry, counteracting
rising unemployment.
Offshore wind power generally played an important role in shaping
the hype phase. Whereas the idea to install wind power plants in the sea
has existed for many years (Reichardt et al. 2016), it was now being
significantly pushed by climate mitigation and energy security framing.
For instance, on the general level, much of the optimism was related to
the possibility of and high potential for using wind power in the open
sea; this optimism often directly referred to climate change and energy
security. A representative of Friends of the Earth Germany stated in
2007 “The deployment of offshore wind power is a is a crucial prerequisite
for the nuclear phase-out and the achievement of the climate targets”
(2007-06-04). Many of the project-related expectation statements (spe­
cific level) also referred to plans to install offshore wind parks. With
tariff increases in the EEG 2009 and an emphasis on offshore technology
(including specific deployment targets) in the Integrated Energy and
Climate Program of 2007 and the Energy Concept of 2010, the gov­
ernment also directly contributed to the diffusion of optimism about
offshore wind.
As observed for the hype phase, the phase of disillusionment, which
began in 2012, was significantly shaped by frame expectations. Sud­
denly, economic fears emerged and began to outweigh the economic
hopes that had characterised the hype phase. Delays in the offshore
industry and related problems with grid connection (which also explain
the negative expectations on the specific and general levels) not only
triggered fears about job losses and decreasing investments, but also
Fig. 7. Dynamics of expectations and media attention as extracted from articles published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, as well as the development in the respective markets
(data on installation rates from BMWi, 2020). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
11
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
concerns about increasing costs for the electricity consumer. These cost
concerns were related to the need to build new inland transmission lines,
but were also embedded in the broader policy debate over the intro­
duction of a cost-break. This cost-break was proposed to control the
ever-increasing renumeration payments for renewables. As economic
fears emerged, the climate change and energy security frames became
less prevalent and were (again) challenged by negative frame expecta­
tions, such as fears of grid overloads, blackouts, and concerns about
negative landscape impacts (not only from windmills but also from
planned transmission lines).
A significant number of negative expectations about wind power
were still being expressed in 2014, and especially at the specific level,
which was dominated by the bankruptcy of Prokon, Germany’s biggest
wind energy cooperative. However, the level of pessimism fell off
markedly from 2015 and onwards. The industry successfully commis­
sioned an increasing number of offshore wind parks, which helped them
to overcome their previous disappointments experienced at the specific
and general levels. Furthermore, concerns about negative environ­
mental impacts decreased, even though an unprecedented growth in
onshore installations occurred. The definition of deployment corridors
(EEG 2014) seems to have allayed not only fears about overly high
policy costs but also concerns about negative impacts on the landscape.
At the same time, the deployment corridors – although associated with
mixed expectations about the impacts on the future wind market – did
not severely lower general expectations.
5.2. Solar PV
In the case of solar PV (Fig. 7), the expectation dynamics showed a
long pre-hype period with predominantly positive expectations
M. Kriechbaum et al.
(1992–2004), a hype phase that built up rather gradually (2005–2009),
a phase of disappointment, which was (as in the case of wind power)
dominated by economic fears (2010–2013), and a phase with a renewed
increase in positive expectations (2014–2017).
The pre-hype period was associated with a strong increase in media
attention from 1992 and onwards and continually positive expectations.
Throughout this period, solar PV was depicted as a ‘green alternative’
(frame environment) that would allow humans to enter the ‘solar age’
and utilize the abundant energy of the sun (frame society). In addition,
in many statements, the technology was described as a ‘seminal tech­
nology’ that would inevitably prevail in the future. This ‘futurity’ frame
often served as a justification for efforts to support the development of
the immature technology. For instance, in one statement cited in the
early 1990s, a speaker of a citizen solar initiative justified financial
supports for solar PV by arguing that the arising costs are acceptable
because these were “after all, investments in a technology with a promising
future” (1995-02-07). Hence, a self-fulfilling prophecy was created,
where a belief in the technology’s promising future mobilised resources
that made it possible to develop the technology in the first place and
bring it closer to its ‘inevitable’ future.
Expectations about the price development (general level) even
explicitly drew upon the notion of self-fulfilling prophecies. During the
1000 solar roofs program (1990–1995), which showed that the demand
created by the program itself already triggered a fall in (at that time,
relatively high) system prices, the following narrative began to domi­
nate the discourse: The demand for solar PV needs to be stimulated,
because the more systems are produced, the cheaper they will become. A
study by Greenpeace, which showed that investing in a 5-MW solar
factory would already lead to a 40% reduction of the price of solar
systems, attracted particular attention in this regard. Hence, the logic of
self-fulfilling prophecies was deliberately projected towards the devel­
opment of solar PV in order to legitimize support and mobilize re­
sources. This logic was applied to justify the cost-covering remuneration
payments that were initially implemented by only a few municipalities
but later became the role model for the nation-wide feed-in tariffs.
After the 1000 solar roofs program ended, expectations about
creating a larger market were less frequently shared (general level). Still,
expectations about the technology’s environmental benefits and the
forthcoming solar age remained unchanged. Because the aforemen­
tioned local support policies allowed for the implementation of further
systems (mostly on schools and other public buildings), specific projects
also continued to attract a strong amount of attention and trigger posi­
tive expectations (specific level). Eventually, the 100 000 solar roofs
program and the cost-covering remuneration payments (feed-in tariffs)
of the EEG 2000 also led to a renewed increase in market expectations.
In fact, the resulting demand for solar systems was now so strong that
the entrance of solar PV into the mass market was expected in the
foreseeable future. This optimism was underpinned by goal set by the
red-green government to push renewable energy and was shared across
different actor groups, including market analysts, researchers, and, not
surprisingly, the emerging industry itself. One journalist stated in an
article published in 2001 “The solar age has long since begun” (2001-06-
22). Given the fact that the share of solar PV in the electricity production
was 0.01% at this point in time, this statement was quite remarkable.
Positive prospects for the PV industry played also a key role in the
formation of the hype, which began to build up in 2005. Whereas the
approaching end of the red-green coalition due to the early elections in
2005 created uncertainty in the young industry (despite continued
market growth and increased profitability levels, the industry was still
heavily dependent on political support), the commitment of the new
coalition (Conservative Party and Social Democrats) to further support
solar PV marked the beginning of an unprecedented rise in expectations.
The emergence of economic hopes (frame economy) became an impor­
tant factor in this development. The strong degree of market uptake and
the successful developments in domestic solar companies (e.g. Solar
World, Coenergy, Q-Cells) triggered hopes that the solar industry would
12
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
become an important job motor for the country. Particularly in Eastern
Germany, the emerging solar industry was increasingly viewed as a role
model that would provide cues regarding how to respond to ongoing
structural changes.
With the favourable conditions of the EEG 2009, which were already
agreed upon in 2008, a sheer unlimited wave of optimism began to
spread. Together with the upward trend of the market, the amended
feed-in law produced a strong level of confidence in the future growth of
the industry. The ever-growing solar companies, most of which emerged
from start-up companies that were founded not even a decade ago, were
associated with highly positive growth prospects. Established companies
such as Siemens, Bosch, and Schott entered the industry and made bold
predictions about the future PV market. Against this background, the
potential role of the industry (which still covered less than 1% of the
country’s electricity production) was even compared with that of the
chemical or automotive industry. In addition to the job-creation frame
(frame economy), the strong increase in the oil prices encouraged hopes
that solar PV would allow for a decrease in the energy dependency
(frame society). Finally, and already in 2007, the strong rise in public and
political climate awareness triggered strong hopes for climate mitigation
as well (even though the impact of the climate mitigation frame was
much weaker than that of wind power).
In 2010, however, the public discourse changed abruptly. Ironically,
the unprecedented growth of the industry, which even exceeded previ­
ous expectations, played a key role in this regard. On the one hand, this
growth reinforced expectations about establishing a strong job-creating
industry (several statements, for instance, referred to a study according
to which already 40 000 people were employed in production and
equipment manufacturing alone). On the other hand, however, fears
began to circulate that the policy costs that were associated with rising
installation rates (and passed on to end consumers) would become un­
acceptably high. The fact that the public discourse changed precisely in
2010 is certainly related to the particularly strong increase in in­
stallations that occurred that year. However, the new conservative-
liberal government played also a key role in shaping the new discourse.
By placing a particular emphasis on cost efficiency and deciding to
cut the tariffs for PV, the government fuelled a strong public debate. A
broad range of actor groups, including consumer associations, energy
incumbents, but also ‘pro-renewable’ researchers, shared the govern­
ment’s concerns about overly high policy costs and even demanded
more cutbacks. Still, these concerns were countered by the argument
that the costs were exaggerated, since the economic benefits through job
creation and price drops at the electricity exchange had not been
considered. In addition, fears spread that the future of the industry and
its associated jobs were at risk. Specifically, actors expressed fears that
the reductions in tariffs would benefit primarily Chinese companies,
which were able to produce solar panels more cheaply, and would push
German companies out of the market. Unsurprisingly, these fears were
mainly expressed by representatives of the industry, but federal states
with a strong solar industry, and members of the Green Party also voiced
their concerns over the cutback.
In the subsequent years, these framing struggles intensified. Further
cutbacks by the government and the fact that German solar companies
were indeed struggling to survive or went bankrupt reinforced the fears
of the industry. The CEO of one of the biggest domestic companies, Solar
World, stated “I’m afraid the consequences are catastrophic. The subsidy is
further reduced by 30 to 50 percent. We can’t cut costs that much further.
Now almost two decades of industrial policy in Germany are at stake - sub­
sidies and many thousands of jobs” (2012-04-14). Despite continuous
cutbacks, however, the number of solar installations skyrocketed,
further fuelling concerns over rising policy costs. The head of the eco­
nomic research institute and think tank RWI Essen stated “If we do not
fundamentally change course now, the energy transition is in danger of
failing” (2012-09-12).
The debate about the economic impact of photovoltaics only ended
when the number of new installations in 2014 (after further cuts and the
M. Kriechbaum et al.
Fig. 8. Dynamics of expectations and media attention as extracted from articles published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, as well as the development in the respective
markets (data on installation rates from BMWi, 2020). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
this article.)
introduction of a deployment corridor through the EEG 2014) fell
significantly, and most domestic solar companies disappeared from the
market. While expectations were generally shared less frequently in the
subsequent years, the number of positive expectations later increased
again, and especially in 2017. This renewed optimism was mainly driven
by the continuing fall in PV system prices, the removal of legal barriers
for utilizing solar plants on buildings with multiple owners, and high
expectations about cost-efficient possibilities to combine solar panels
with battery systems. In parallel, hopes about climate change mitigation,
energy independence, and the replacement of fossil fuels (re)-emerged.
In the words of the head of the German solar industry association, “The
solar eclipse has ended” (2017-02-28).
5.3. Biogas
In the case of biogas technology, media attention was almost insig­
nificant during the 1990s and early 2000s. It was only in 2006–2007 that
both media attention and expectations showed a noteworthy increase
(particularly driven by hopes for climate mitigation, energy security,
and new income possibilities for farmers). Already in 2008, however,
the expectations and attention levels were falling again, and, in 2012,
negative frame expectations (about costs, environmental impacts and
ethical implications) triggered a phase of disillusionment. Subsequently,
media attention decreased again significantly and expectation state­
ments almost completely disappeared (Fig. 8).
For more than a decade, biogas technology was only rarely perceived
by the public. During the 90s, the few expectations that circulated were
mainly associated with demonstration projects (specific level) or envi­
ronmental benefits (frame environment). Expectations that referred to
13
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
the latter were mostly unspecific and appeared in articles that dealt
more generally with renewable energy technologies. Even when the
number of installed biogas plants began to increase by the end of the 90s
(in 2000, for instance, twice as much electricity was produced by biogas
plants than by solar PV systems (BMWi, 2020)), the technology
continued to receive little attention.
The first notable increase in expectations occurred in the context of
the EEG 2004. While media attention remained unchanged, the new law
raised positive market expectations (general level). This optimism also
raised hopes that biogas production would allow farmers to create a
second mainstay or even completely transform into ‘Energiewirte’ (frame
economy). The Federal Minister of Agriculture at the time boldly stated
“The farmers of today are the oil sheikhs of tomorrow” (2004-12-10). The
market grew strongly in subsequent years (e.g. from 2004 to 2008, a six-
fold increase occurred in installed capacities (BMWi, 2020)), resulting in
a further increase in expectations (and also in media attention).
Particularly from 2006–2007, the hopes for new income opportunities
for farmers began to circulate more frequently. The fact that the agri­
cultural sector was dealing with farm closures and falling farmers’ in­
comes reinforced these expectations, as the following statement
illustrates “A growing number of farmers recognise they cannot live anymore
from growing cereals or raising pigs - but will have a future with producing
energy” (2006-03-18).
The increasing optimism seen in 2006–2007 was additionally driven
by hopes that biogas would contribute to energy security (frame society)
and climate change mitigation (frame environment). The energy security
frame was based on two aspects: First, biogas was expected to allow
Germany to decrease its dependency on oil and gas (the prices of which
strongly increased during this period); second, biogas was expected to
M. Kriechbaum et al.
balance fluctuations from wind and solar PV. As with the other two
technologies, hopes for climate mitigation became particularly preva­
lent as climate awareness increased strongly from 2007 and on. How­
ever, already in 2007, these hopes were contrasted with environmental
fears. Experts and environmentalists (including the members of the
Federal Environmental Agency) raised the concern that a boom in the
biogas industry could lead to biodiversity loss and soil degradation due
to the intensified cultivation of maize (the most profitable and
frequently used crop for biogas production).
The increase in expectations in 2006–2007 was also caused by opti­
mistic market expectations (general level) and optimistic outlooks for and
from biogas companies (specific level). The optimism about the market
growth potential was driven by the strong market take-off and the
favourable conditions of the EEG 2004; this optimism was encouraged by
the ministries, chambers of agriculture, and the industry itself. In addi­
tion, this optimism was reinforced by successful efforts to feed biogas into
the gas grid. The ability to produce biogas which can directly substitute
for natural gas not only triggered expectations about entering new mar­
kets, but also encouraged incumbent utilities such as EON to enter the
biogas industry. Together with the optimistic outlooks of newly founded
biogas companies, the plans of incumbents to invest in biogas technology
influenced the strong increase in expectations seen at the specific level.
Although the biogas industry continued to grow strongly after 2007
(in 2012, the share of biogas in the electricity supply was already 4%
(BMWi, 2020)), media attention dropped, and expectations were less
frequently shared. Towards the end of the 2000s, those expectations that
were shared were still predominantly positive, but in 2011, renewed
concerns arose about the environmental impacts of the ever-growing
maize cultivation, marking a turning point. While environmental
hopes (climate mitigation) and fears balanced each other out in 2011,
the fears became predominant in 2012 and were even reinforced by an
emerging debate about the indirect emissions that were generated by the
increasing use of maize (and biomass in general). In addition, increasing
global food prices and looming famines triggered an ethical debate
about the use of maize in biogas plants, which counteracted the energy
security frame that had been developed as a result of the government’s
decision to phase out nuclear power in 2011 (frame society). Finally, the
general cost debate with regard to the feed-in tariff also affected biogas
(frame economy); by 2012, biogas was already the second-largest cost
driver in terms of difference costs (BMWi, 2018).
After strong cutbacks were included in the EEG 2012, some optimistic
statements still appeared in the media. This optimism was supported in
part by efforts to search for alternatives to maize (general expectations),
but also by shared expectations about the important role of biogas in
stabilizing the electricity grid. After the EEG 2014 was issued, however,
biogas disappeared almost completely from the public discourse. Already
anticipating this, one journalist stated early in 2014 “In April, the federal
government plans to introduce the bill for the new green electricity subsidies,
and then the biogas era will probably be over almost as quickly as it
began”(2014-03-18).
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Most prior research on hype cycles (and on technological expectations
more generally) placed a focus on early-stage technologies to study how
expectations dynamics shape technology development and contribute to
the formation of associated niche spaces. In this study, however, we ana­
lysed expectation dynamics in the context of technologies that had already
begun to break into the market. We reconstructed the expectation dynamics
that were associated with the three most rapidly growing renewable energy
technologies in Germany and conceptualised hype cycles as manifestations
of the discursive struggles that are associated with periods in which niche
technologies challenge and compete with the existing socio-technical sys­
tems. Thereby, we were able to gain insight into the important roles that
technological hype cycles play during ongoing socio-technical transitions.
Moreover, we could show that expectations actively shape transition
14
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
processes, instead of merely reflecting them.
Most importantly, however, we were able to further elucidate the
processes that contribute to the emergence and shape of hype cycles.
Although other scholars have claimed that the emergence and shape of
hype cycles can be contributed to the level of maturity of a technology
(e.g. Fenn and Raskino, 2008), to policy conditions (e.g. Melton et al.
2016), or to power struggles (Geels et al. 2007), we present a more
comprehensive explanatory framework. Specifically, we argue that
widely shared expectations emerge from a collective meaning-making
process that is fuelled by specific events (within or outside of the
niche), shaped by competing actor coalitions, and constrained by both
pre-existing niche characteristics and wider institutional structures. In
the next section, the three cases that were analysed in this paper are
compared in terms of the specific interplay among these factors. Sub­
sequently, the theoretical contributions of our study will be described in
more detail, and promising avenues for future research will be proposed.
6.1. Cross-case analysis
Our study shows that all three analysed technologies were associated
with patterns of hype and disillusionment. However, the hype cycles
differed in terms of their shape, magnitude, and duration (for instance,
the hype about wind power was by far the strongest- and longest-
lasting). Moreover, different events could be correlated with the rele­
vant ‘turning points’. For instance, the hypes about solar PV and biogas
were mainly induced by niche-internal developments (favourable feed-
in tariffs and market growth), while the hype about wind power
emerged during a market downturn and was primarily triggered (and
maintained) by external factors (i.e. the strong and rapid increase in
public climate awareness in 2007 and the decision to phase out nuclear
power in 2011). In all cases, however, the respective events were suc­
cessfully ‘translated’ into societal hopes (i.e. positive frame expecta­
tions), such as hopes about climate change mitigation and energy
security (wind power), hopes for jobs (solar PV), and hopes for addi­
tional income possibilities for farmers (biogas).
A key question that arose when we compared the three analysed cases
is why wind power benefited much more from the increasing climate
awareness and the nuclear phase-out (in terms of the formation of positive
expectations) than solar PV and biogas. We believe that struggles over
competing frame expectations and the underlying interplay among actor
coalitions, technological characteristics, and wider societal norms and
logics played key roles. The increase in climate awareness triggered pos­
itive (frame) expectations about all three technologies, but the resonance
of these expectations was much weaker for solar PV and biogas than for
wind power. On the one hand, this was due to the powerful actor coalition
that supported the optimistic discourse on wind power. Energy in­
cumbents, who previously had been quite hostile towards all kinds of
renewable energy, were placed under increasing pressure to act against
climate change and joined the wind power coalition. Thereafter, they
actively shared positive expectations about the technology and strongly
influenced the discourse. On the other hand, another important factor
relates to the niche-internal characteristics, namely, to the prospect of
offshore technology (the idea to install offshore wind parks had already
existed for years) and the general perception that wind power could be
upscaled comparatively easily.
When the conservative-liberal government decided to phase out
nuclear power after Fukushima, the (perceived) upscaling capabilities
became even more important. In addition, the fact that the government
now put the most emphasis on wind power strengthened the coalition to
support the technology still further. At the same time, solar PV and
biogas had entered (or were about to enter) a legitimacy crisis. The
increasing policy costs that were associated with the skyrocketing
growth of the PV market did not align with logic of cost efficiency, which
increasingly prevailed in the discourse on renewable energy. While fears
of overly high policy costs were initially spread mainly by the liberal
party members, these fears (and the underlying logic of cost efficiency)
M. Kriechbaum et al.
resonated well in the wider society. Eventually a strong coalition con­
sisting of the government, energy incumbents, consumer associations, as
well as ‘pro-renewable’ researchers pushed back the optimistic discourse
on solar PV, making it impossible for the remaining PV advocates (solar
industry, some federal states, and members of the Green Party) to take
advantage of the government’s decision to phase out nuclear power.
In the case of biogas, legitimacy problems emerged on multiple levels.
Because costs were falling much more slowly than expected (and depen­
ded to a large extent on variable commodity prices), the cost efficiency
logic also undermined the positive discourse on biogas – albeit to a lesser
extent than in the case of solar PV. At the same time, the technology faced
a credibility problem with regard to its sustainability performance. The
growing use of energy crops were increasingly associated with environ­
mental fears of overfertilization and soil erosion as well as with ethical
concerns (i.e. the global food crisis in 2011). In other words, the
(perceived) characteristics of biogas were not in line with broader envi­
ronmental and societal values. Against this background, even the rela­
tively powerful actor coalition behind biogas (agricultural ministries and
chambers as well as several energy incumbents strongly supported the
technology) had difficulties successfully sharing positive expectations and
framing the technology as a sustainable alternative to nuclear power.
6.2. Theoretical contributions
As indicated above, our study findings make several theoretical
contributions. First, they reveal the important roles held by widely
shared expectations about emerging niche technologies (and associated
hype cycles) as socio-technical transitions unfold. We observed that,
once the technologies had broken into the established socio-technical
system, these expectations acted as crucial reference points not only
for companies, but also for policy makers and the wider public. Frame
expectations were often used as guides through the ‘era of ferment’
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986) that characterised the transition pro­
cess. For instance, the strong hopes for climate change mitigation and
energy security associated with wind power and the fears about overly
high policy costs associated with PV technology significantly influenced
pathbreaking policy decisions and provoked important turning points in
Germany’s energy transition pathway. While the idea that technological
expectations have pivotal, guiding functions is not new (e.g. Borup et al.
2006; Van Lente, 2012; Lempiälä et al. 2019), these functions had
received little previous attention in the context of ongoing transitions.
Acknowledging the crucial roles of expectations during transitions
has important implications for the sociology of expectations. Scholars in
this field have primarily emphasised early-stage technologies, but our
findings show that the significance of expectations depends on the po­
sition of the technologies along the transition pathway, rather than on a
particular phase of the innovation process. The identified hype cycles
arose when the technologies began to challenge the existing socio-
technical system; this happened at different maturity levels and, in the
case of offshore technology, even at a very early stage of development.9
When interpreting these findings, it is important to note that we have
analysed expectations that were shared in the wider public, but hype
cycles may also emerge in distinct discursive spheres within specific
communities (Kirkels, 2016; Budde, 2015). In these spheres, expecta­
tions are likely to show distinct dynamics (and appear on different
platforms) than more widely shared expectations (Alvial-Palavicino and
Konrad, 2019; Kirkels, 2016). We suggest the early stages of the inno­
vation process are shaped by expectations that are shared within tech­
nological communities, rather than by expectations shared in the wider
public. In future research, we hope to gain further insight into exactly
how dynamics of community-specific expectations differ from and
9
While ongoing transitions are generally driven by the emergence of already
more mature niche innovations (Geels at al. 2017), this is not necessarily the
case (Geels and Schot, 2007).
15
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262
interact with widely shared expectations.
Furthermore, we have acknowledged that the formation of expec­
tations intertwines strongly with the discursive struggles that charac­
terize unfolding transitions. In doing so, we have established space for a
promising dialogue and exchange of ideas between researchers in the
field of the sociology of expectations and those in discourse and framing
fields. On the one hand, the sociology of expectations scholars reminds
transition scholars who deal with discourse and framing that material
aspects matter (a point which was also emphasised in a recent study by
Hoppmann et al. 2020). Our findings clearly illustrate the roles of the
pre-existing material characteristics of the technologies in constraining
(or enabling) the formation of expectations. For instance, while the
future economic impact of the policy costs associated with solar PV
could have been (and was) interpreted differently, the narrative work of
PV advocates (opponents) was constrained (enabled) by the fact that
solar PV was indeed the ‘costliest’ technology in terms of policy support
and contributed most to the rising policy costs that were associated with
the feed-in tariff system.
On the other hand, (transition) scholars contributing to the discourse
and framing literature prompt scholars who analyse expectation dy­
namics to pay more attention to the framing struggles and discursive
coalitions that underlie these dynamics (Rosenbloom et al. 2016; Smith
and Kern, 2009; Geels and Verhees, 2011). Although researchers in the
sociology of expectations field certainly acknowledge the discursive
processes that are associated with the formation of expectations
(Berkhout, 2006; Bakker et al. 2012; Konrad et al. 2012), few have
provided insights into how exactly these processes unfold. A notable
exception is the concept of ‘arenas of expectations’ developed by Bakker
et al. (2011). But while Bakker and colleagues nicely outlined how in­
novators in emerging technological fields share expectations about
‘their’ technology to impress potential ‘selectors’, we focussed on the
public competition occurring between supporting and opposing co­
alitions and asked why and how expectations gain traction in the wider
public (or not). Incorporating insights from the discourse and framing
literature helped us to answer precisely these questions.
The literature on discourse and framing also highlights the con­
straining (or enabling) role of the cultural context (Kern, 2012; Lee and
Hess, 2019; Geels and Verhees, 2011). In our study, this role was
well-illustrated by the growing public discourse on climate change,
which acted as an emerging ‘discursive opportunity structure’
(McCammon, 2013) that supported the diffusion of climate-related
frame expectations. In a subtler way, our study findings also hint at
the important roles played by more latent societal norms and values,
such as a prevailing logic of cost-efficiency, hopes for jobs, or
taken-for-granted ideas about energy security. We uncovered these
deeply institutionalised structures only ‘indirectly’, but they were
crucial in moderating the resonance of frame expectations. Finally, our
findings indicate the important roles of industry-specific logics. For
example, it is highly plausible that energy utilities contributed strongly
to the optimistic discourse about wind power, simply because the
technology resonated strongest with the incumbent’s engineering logic
of providing ‘large-scale’ solutions.
These findings suggest to examine in future research in more detail
how wider institutional structures interrelate with technological ex­
pectations. In particular, it would be interesting to more closely analyse
the relationship between expectations about emerging technologies and
the deeper, institutionalised expectations associated with the socio-
technical context. Kester et al. (2020), for instance, pointed out the
roles ‘undesirable futures’ that circulate in the wider society play in
providing the wider environment in which promises about novel tech­
nologies are made.10 Budde and Konrad (2019), in turn, introduced the
notion of the ‘web of expectations’, arguing that expectations about
10
Note that a similar point has already been made by van Lente (1993) with
his notion of macro expectations.
M. Kriechbaum et al. Research Policy 50 (2021) 104262

niche technologies are strongly intertwined with expectations and vi­ CRediT authorship contribution statement
sions at the regime and landscape levels. However, Budde and Konrad
(2019) analysed expectations that are shared about the socio-technical Michael Kriechbaum: Conceptualization, Methodology, Investiga­
context, rather than the institutionalised expectations that tacitly un­ tion, Data curation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing,
derlie this context. As we did in our study, the authors analysed expec­ Visualization. Alfred Posch: Supervision, Funding acquisition, Writing
tations that were publicly communicated via language. Such – original draft. Angelika Hauswiesner: Investigation, Data curation.
expectations may change rapidly and actors who share them may not
necessarily believe them, but rather use them as reference points (van
Lente, 2012; Konrad et al. 2012).11 Declaration of Competing Interest
An emerging body of literature that addresses the ‘deep’ expectations
that underlie the socio-technical context is the literature on socio- The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
technical imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim, 2015). These are considered interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
to be ‘collectively held and performed visions of desirable futures’ that the work reported in this paper.
are the outcome and medium of advances in science and technology. As
such, they are closely intertwined with ‘shared understandings of forms Acknowledgements
of social life and social order’ (Jasanoff 2015: 19). These imaginaries
provide us with an interesting complementary view of expectations. We would like to thank the editor and three anonymous reviewers for
Aligning research on hype cycles with research on socio-technical their comments, which have been of great help in improving the paper.
imaginaries offers a promising route for future research and would We also want to express our appreciation for the valuable feedback
help scholars elucidate the interplay between publicly communicated received by Rick Bosman, Kasper Ampe and Arijit Paul. Finally, we are
images of the future and the latent, institutionalised expectations upon grateful for the helpful comments to earlier versions of the paper given
which established socio-technical settings are based. by participants of the IST Conference 2018 in Manchester and the NEST
Our analysis findings also highlight the fact that expectation dy­ Conference 2018 in Utrecht.
namics are not only driven by niche-specific regulations, but also by the
regulative structures that are associated with the socio-technical Appendix
context. Policy targets were identified as playing key roles in this re­
gard. For instance, the national emission targets that preceded the
renewed decision to phase out nuclear power explain (as least in part)
why this decision triggered much more optimism about wind power
than the first phase-out decision made in the early 2000s (which trig­
gered a debate between renewable energy and coal power advocates).
The targets set by policy makers in terms of the renewable energy share
in the electricity sector are another example. While these targets were
not related to specific technologies, they were frequently used by tech­
nology advocates to support positive expectations about the growth of
the respective technological field and counteract pessimistic expecta­
tions about short-term prospects.
The insight into the important roles of wider policy targets might be
valuable regarding the current efforts to push carbon-intensive tech­
nologies out of the market. In our case, such targets played key roles in
legitimizing positive expectations about emerging technologies. How­
ever, they also can crucially affect the processes of delegitimizing
established fossil-fuel based technologies and constraining the narrative
work of the discursive coalitions that support these technologies. From a
transition management perspective, our study findings also suggest that
a deeper analysis is needed to identify conditions under which actors in
specific niches can independently shape expectation dynamics in the
wider public. The findings indicate that actors have difficulties suc­
cessfully competing in the discursive struggles over expectations unless
they form strategic alliances with other, more powerful actor groups.
However, because powerful actor groups are often deeply engrained in
the socio-technical regime, such alliances are likely to require the niches
to conform to the regime, reducing the potential to use the resulting Fig. A.1. Comparison between media attention in the two largest national
expectations to bring about ‘deep transitions’ (Schot and Kanger, 2018). newspapers. Search query based on search terms shown in Table 2.

Funding
This work was funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under
research grant number W 1256-G15 (Doctoral Programme Climate
Change – Uncertainties, Thresholds and Coping Strategies).
11
Note that this definition of expectations corresponds well with Schmidt’s
(2008) discursive institutionalism approach.
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