Postgraduate Coursework Coversheet

Student Number: 2 7 9 0 0 1 9

Course Title: International Security & Strategic Studies

Essay/Assignment Title: Critical assessment on critical security studies’ necessity to commit

to emancipation

Course Co-ordinator: Ian Paterson

Date of Submission: 13th November 2022

Word Count: 1.975

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Critical must be emancipatory: why critical security studies need a

commitment to transformation
Introduction: from critique to emancipation

This essay will argue that critical approaches to the study of security must entail a commitment
to emancipation. We will trace back the roots of critical studies in social sciences to understand
its essence, leading us to theorize on the reflectivity of such approximations, and the
consequence of this: a rather post-positivist approach that entails a normative commitment of
the academia in the form of emancipation.

In this sense, the essay is divided into five sections: (1) Finding the roots; (2) On critical
reflectivity; (3) Towards post-positivism; (4) The normative imperative; and (5) The leap to the
emancipatory commitment.

Finding the roots

Critical security studies come from critical studies in social sciences, which, in turn, has its
philosophical roots in Marxist authors. In his Thesis on Feuerbach Marx understood that
philosophy had traditionally served to study the world, but it should also be a tool to change it.
Marxist theories are not only theories of how the world works, but they are a way to understand
the world and, from there, propose transformative alternatives to reality (Jones, 1995).

Antonio Gramsci followed on and conceptualized counterhegemony as a previous and

necessary step for change (ibid., 1995). In contemporary terms, critical studies do represent (or
at least can represent) this countering to the hegemonic traditional discourses and worldview
of international relations and security theories. Thus, to change the material reality we must
beforehand change the superstructure, the ideational reality, and this is where the academic
world enters the game.

On critical reflectivity

Marxist tradition studied the constant of history: change. And critical studies accepted change
as part of reality, and it enables them to think beyond the supposed natural laws of traditional
studies. Critical security studies became critical at the time when they challenged the very way
in which the dominant worldview was created; questioning how the world order came about.
These epistemological thoughts can be framed within critical theory, different from what
Robert Cox (1981) labeled as problem-solving theory. The latter claims to study reality from
an outside objective position, but as long as the theorist is inherently entrenched with the reality

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being analyzed, he or she actually helps sustain the current order. In contrast, critical theory is
self-reflective, it wonders about the foundations of our thoughts. They understand that the
object of study, in our case, security, is a derivative concept (Booth, 1991): it is not just out
there, each one’s understanding of security has its origins impregnated with a normative
element. And as McCormack states this paves the way for the possibility of transformation
advocacy (2009).

The study of international relations itself has normative implications. The construction of the
sub-discipline of security studies is the result of a struggle among several actors, consequently,
it is inherently political (Nunes, 2012). Then, if it is political, it cannot be objective. Political
means having a standpoint, a position from where you see the world in a certain way, striving
to analyze it in the most scientific way possible, but knowing its limitations, and from there,
providing a political alternative.

Having a reflective understanding of theory and acknowledging that theory is built from a
perspective, sets one free from the unnecessary constraints of pretending to be conducting a
somewhat pure, scientific analysis of an object from an abstract (and inexistent) outside.
Therefore, the theorist can take a normative stance, in this case, emancipation. This does not
mean, however, that critical scholars have the right to substitute thorough analysis for
ideological work. It is rather the contrary: being transparent about one’s ethical stances and
academic origins and influences enhances the social scientific value of the work because it is
not deceitful. R. Cox, renowned author of critical international relations argued that “theory is
for someone and for some purpose” (1981). In this sense, scholars can undoubtedly be explicit
as to whom and for what they stand for, given a set of analyses of reality.

Towards post-positivism

Accepting that knowledge can never be value-free takes us closer to a rather post-positivist
position. Critical security studies’ pillar is that security is inherently political (Nunes, 2012).
Security being political subsequently means that the work as a security practitioner or scholar
is political too because one is no alien to society as one is part of it. As a consequence, wanting
or not, if engaged in the study of security, one is engaged in politics, hence, you must take a
normative stance: social change, emancipation.

This stance critiques the known-as ivory tower of academia. No passive academic engagement
with reality exists in social sciences. The study of security reality impacts its praxis, having
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real-world implications. Therefore, one is responsible for its work, so he or she must commit
to transformation if part of the critical studies circle (Nunes, 2012).

The normative imperative

For Frankfurt School’s Horkheimer there is no neat division between reality and the study of
it. He stated the following: the “presentation of societal contradictions is not merely an
expression of the concrete historical situation but also a force within it to stimulate change”,
and continues: “then (the critical theorist’s) real function emerges” (Horkheimer, 1937). This
real function is to impact the world and transform it.

Once we understand that study and reality are that intertwined, and that displaying the critiques
to the current system is immanent in critical studies, we must, then, accept that critical studies
must have a normative commitment. R. Cox argued that critical studies were indeed born for
the sake of creating an alternative world (1981, p.128). The theorists of this line of thought
resist accepting reality as it is, as a given. Deeper into this, Hynek and Chandler (2013) stated
that the birth of Critical Security Studies is entrenched with the notion that academics should
also do policy advocacy.

The leap to the emancipatory commitment

In critical social theory, A. Linklater agrees that critical approximations must have
emancipatory aspirations (1990). And so is the case for critical security studies as well. Here,
we will go from security to emancipation to see how this works. But, before, what is security?
And what is emancipation?

Security is broadly agreed (and vaguely defined) as the mere absence of threats to a referent
object. On the other hand, the most vocal international relations trend on emancipation, the
Aberystwyth School, defines emancipation as the “freeing of people from those physical and
human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do” (Booth,
1991, p.319), from both structural and contingent oppressions. As the definition of security is
not complete nor operational, the Welsh School has expanded its notion to the point that
security is understood as emancipation, and even, some claim, including the most prominent
scholar, Ken Booth, that security is emancipation. We can argue that this conceptualization is
very problematic: we should not have two concepts that are defined differently eventually being
the same one. Moreover, the circular definition of security as emancipation can be criticized to

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lead to the struggle for emancipation as the struggle for security, then “depriv(ing)
emancipation of its true potential and put(ting) it outside a vision of freedom, instead
developing emancipatory conduct around a particular notion of order” (Kaltofen, 2013, p.40).
This is, however, accepting the given notion that security is a militarized and order-centered
concept per se. Rather, critical security studies should aim to deconstruct this traditional notion,
as emancipatory security shows, and build a positive security concept. We could, instead, have
a notion of emancipation as a path toward security. The struggle for freeing ourselves from
constraints eventually, and gradually, leads us to a mutual and reciprocal security.

Some scholars as Aradau (2004) criticize this notion and highlight the fact that security is
necessarily prioritizing ones over the others, that securing one referent object means the other
is insecure. However, this is not in line with what critical studies are about. It accepts the zero-
sum game of the hegemonic discourse. If an object of security is supposedly secure, and that
leads to the other being insecure, the former does not live within security, because the other’s
stress is socially transmitted, and the insecure group will do anything to achieve security.

Let’s see an example: a big flow of refugees gets into a small country, and many conservatives
and/or racists will sincerely feel insecure, no matter the statistics or other political
considerations. Finding refuge brings security, people are away from threats. But locals feel
insecurity, as they believe the foreigners spoil national culture and are more prone to crime.
This would look like security is a zero-sum game. Furthermore, we could not argue that afraid
locals are not really insecure, because critical studies accept security as a social construction
and thus, as subjective. We cannot argue either that objectively, looking at statistics and
scientific research, locals are secure. If they feel insecure, they are insecure. Nevertheless, from
a critical security studies perspective, we can flip this reasoning: the insecurity of locals will
transform into insecurity for the refugees. Refugees are theoretically secure, outside a war-torn
country, but they are not in a security situation, they lack the acceptance of locals, so they feel
unwelcomed and insecure: xenophobia, racism, etc. All in all, there is no zero-sum game,
security for ones is not insecurity for others.

And there is yet another critique: emancipation can be used to justify the so-called
emancipation of nations, giving free rein for the secession of many peoples leading to a sort of
anarchical disorder. However, the right to self-determination of a human collective is a
universal right of humanity. It is not exercised against anybody, not even the state from which
one is seceding. It is a positive right that enables nations to have sovereignty, a sort of collective
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emancipation. Because having uncomfortable groups of people within a state creates insecurity
because as we have said, a (national) group is not secure if the other is not secure.

Booth argues true security is mutual, non-exclusionary. Emancipation integrates the idea of the
reciprocity of rights: “I am not truly free until everyone is free”, “my freedom depends on your
freedom” (Booth 1991, p.322). Thus, if true security encompasses not depriving others of it, it
necessarily means that all human groups should emancipate themselves to be free from
constraints. Hence, we arrive at emancipation. Rather than security being emancipation, we
could affirm that security should and must be emancipatory.

Conclusion: critical security must be emancipatory

Many critical security authors argue that emancipation is at the heart of critical security studies
(Hynek & Chandler, 2013). Even, some authors as Hynek and Chandler propose to stop
labeling most critical security studies as critical, because they do not offer emancipatory
alternatives (2013).

In this brief essay, we have argued that Marxist roots of critical studies set the basis for a
philosophical questioning of the current order and the necessity to contribute to changing it.
Reflectivity helps deconstruct the traditional views and helps theorize the inseparability of
political reality from academic analysis, nearer to post-positivist stances. Eventually, we get to
the acknowledgement that no author can set himself apart from the normative consequences of
their work. Thus, an ethical normative commitment is a necessary step that will eventually lead
to an emancipatory notion of security.

Even, making the case backwards, not having an emancipatory imperative means you adhere
to the mainstream logic of understanding security as the survival of the fittest. Accepting reality
as it is, or rather, as it is presented, erases the possibility of a normative commitment. You step
back to the fictional positivist separation between reality and the study of it. Without
questioning one’s apriorisms, without deconstructing the dominant view through reflectivity,
a so-called critical security theorist may end up serving the interests of the status quo, which
may be legitimate, but is not critical. Emancipation without critique is blind; critique without
emancipation is futile.

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 References

- Aradau, C. (2004). Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and

emancipation. Journal of International Relations and Development, 7(4), pp.388–413.
doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800030.

- Booth, K. (1991). Security and emancipation. Review of International Studies, 17(4),

pp.313–326. doi:10.1017/s0260210500112033.

- Cox, R.W. (1981). Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International
Relations Theory. Millennium, 10(2), pp.126–155.

- Horkheimer, M. (1937). Postscript. In Critical Theory: Selected Essays, Continuum:

New York City, pp. 24-252

- Hynek, N. and Chandler, D. (2013). No emancipatory alternative, no critical security

studies. Critical Studies on Security, 1(1), pp.46–63.
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- Kaltofen, C. (2013). Engaging Adorno: Critical security studies after emancipation.

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- Linklater, A. (1990). Power, Order and Emancipation in International Theory. In:

Beyond Realism and Marxism. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
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- McCormack, T. (2009). Critique, security and power: The political limits to

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