9 Cruz Civillaw PDF

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PLEDGE/ REM
TORTS
& DAMAGES
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PLEDGE is a contract by virtue of

which the debtor delivers to the
creditor or to a 3rd person (Art. 2093
NCC) a MOVABLE (Art. 2094 NCC) or
documents evidencing incorporeal
rights such as negotiable instruments,
bills of lading, shares of stocks, bonds,
or warehouse receipt (Art. 2095 NCC)
for the purpose of securing the
fulfillment of a principal obligation (Art.
2085 NCC), with the understanding that
when the obligation is fulfilled, the
thing delivered shall be returned with
all its fruits and accessions.
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF PLEDGE

& MORTGAGE (ART. 2085 NCC): THAT
1. they be constituted to secure the
fulfillment of a principal obligation;
2. the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;
3. the persons constituting the pledge or

mortgage have the free disposal of their
property, and in the absence thereof, that
they be legally authorized for the purpose;
4. when the principal obligation becomes
due, the thing given by way of pledge or
mortgage may be alienated for the
payment to the creditor. (Art. 2087 NCC).
PLEDGE MORTGAGE
1. constituted on movables 1. constituted on immovables
(Art. 2094 NCC)) & alienable real rights
imposed upon immovables
(Art. 2124 NCC)
2. property pledged is placed 2. delivery of the property
in the possession of the mortgaged to creditor is
creditor or of a 3rd person NOT necessary.
by common agreement
(Art. 2093 NCC)
3. NOT VALID against 3rd 3. NOT VALID against 3rd

persons unless a persons if not registered in
description of the thing the Registry of Property;
pledged & the date of the VALID & BINDING between
pledge appear in a public the parties even if the
instrument (Art. 2096 instrument is NOT
NCC) recorded in the Registry of
Deeds (Art. 2125 NCC)
PACTUM COMMISORIUM a
stipulation whereby the thing
pledged/mortgaged or under
antichresis shall
AUTOMATICALLY become the
property of the creditor in case
of default in the payment of the
debt w/n the agreed period;
forbidden by law and considered
null and void.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE PLEDGEE:

1. take care of the thing pledged with the
DOAGFOAF; has a right to reimbursement
of expenses for preser vation; liable for its
loss or deterioration (Art. 2099 NCC);
2. cannot deposit the thing pledged w/a 3rd

person (Art. 2100 NCC);
EXCEPTION: stipulation authorizing him
to do so.
EFFECT: pledgee is responsible for acts
of his agents/employees w/respect
to the thing pledged.
3. bring any action w/c pertain to the

owner of the thing pledged in order to
recover it from, or defend it against a
3rd person. (Art. 2103 NCC);
4. cannot use the thing pledged w/o
authority of the owner;
EXCEPTION: preservation of the thing
requires its use, but for
that purpose only.
(Art. 2104 NCC).
¾ use/misuse of the thing by pledgee
owner may ask that it be
judicially or extra-judicially
deposited.
5. bound to advise the pledgor, w/o delay,

of any danger to the thing pledged.
(Art. 2107 NCC);
6. W/O fault of the pledgee and there is
danger of destruction, impairment or
diminution in value of the thing
pledged he may cause the thing
to be sold at a public sale, proceeds of
which shall be the security for the
principal obligation.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE PLEDGOR:

1. pay the principal obligation, including
interests, if any (Art. 2105 NCC);
2. pay the expenses incurred by the

pledgee for the preservation of the
thing (Art. 2105 NCC);
3. pay for damages incurred by the
pledgee for flaws of the thing and its
deterioration for which pledgee has
not been advised of.
REQUISITES FOR THE SALE OF THING

PLEDGED (Art. 2112 NCC):
1. credit has not been satisfied in due time;
2. creditor/pledgee proceeds before a notary
public for the sale in a public auction;
3. debtor is notified of the place, date and
time of the public sale and the amount for
which the sale is to be held;
4. 1st auction, NO Sale 2nd auction sale
with the same formalities as 1st sale;
5. 2nd auction, NO Sale creditor/pledgee
may appropriate the thing pledged and give
debtor an acquittance for his ENTIRE DEBT.
ART. 2113 NCC. At the public auction,

pledgor/owner may bid
has a BETTER RIGHT

if she should offer the
same terms as the
highest bidder
Pledgee may also bid
offer NOT VALID if she

is the ONLY bidder.
ART. 2114 NCC. All bids at the public auction

shall offer to pay the purchase price at
ONCE.
ART. 2115 NCC. Sale of the thing pledged
extinguishes the principal obligation,
whether or not the proceeds of the sale
are EQUAL to the amount of the principal
obligation.
(1). Proceeds of the sale > than the amt.
of obl. debtor NOT entitled to
the excess;
(2). Proceeds of the sale < than the amt.
of obl. creditor NOT entitled to
RECOVER the deficiency.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE PLEDGE:

1. Thing pledged is RETURNED by the
pledgee to the pledgor/owner any
stipulation to the contrary is VOID.
(Art. 2110 NCC);
2. Statement in writing by the pledgee
that he renounces/abandons the pledge
(Art. 2111 NCC);
¾ acceptance by
pledgor/owner
NOT NECESSARY
¾ return of the thing
pledged to pledgor
Pledgee becomes
a depositary
3. Sale of the thing pledged in a

public auction based on Art. 2112
NCC and Art. 2122 NCC;
4. Payment of the principal obl. by
pledgor/owner or 3rd person
before redemption of the thing
pledged. (Art. 2118 NCC).
ART. 2122. A thing under pledge by

operation of law may be SOLD only
after demand of the amount for w/c
the thing is retained. The PUBLIC
AUCTION shall take place w/n ONE
MONTH after such demand. If W/O
just ground, the creditor does NOT
cause the public sale to be held
w/n such period, the debtor may
require the RETURN of the thing.
Sps. Paray, et. al. vs. Rodriquez, et.

al., G.R. 132287, January 24, 2006
Under the Civil Code, the foreclosure of a pledge

occurs extrajudicially, without intervention by the courts.
All the creditor needs to do, if the credit has not
been satisfied in due time, is to proceed before a
notary public for the sale of the thing pledged.
Pledged property, necessarily personal in

character, may NOT be redeemed by the debtor
after being sold in public auction. No law or
jurisprudence establishes such right. No such
right exists.
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
- conttact whereby the debtor se ecurres the

fulfillment of a principal obl., specia ally
subjecting to such security an IMMOVABL LE
ver immovable prop. in
property or real rights ov
case the principal obl. is NOT complied with
ulated;
at the time stipu
- must appear in a publiic instrument duly y
recorded in the Registry of Properr ty to bind
3rd parties
s;
- even if NOT recorde
ed in the RD BINDING
between thhe parties.
ART. 2130 NCC. A stipulation forbidding

g the
owner from alienating th he immovable e
property mortgaged shall be VOID.
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE:
¾ remedy available to mo ortgagee by
y w/c
he subjects the mortgaged property to
the satisfaction of the obligation
secured to w/c the mortgage was given;
¾ denotes the procedurre adopted by the
mortgagee to terminate the rights of the
mortgagor on the e property mortgaged
and includes the public sale itself.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION right

of the MORTGAGOR to REDEEM
the mortgaged property AFTER his
DEFAULT in the performance of the
conditions of the mortgage but
BEFORE THE SALE of the
mortgaged property OR BEFORE
CONFIRMATION OF THE SALE.
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION right of

the MORTGAGOR to REDEEM the
mortgaged property within a
certain period AFTER it was SOLD
for the satisfaction of the mortgage
debt.
¾ to be exercised w/n 1 year from
REGISTRATION of the SALE.
REQUISITES for a VALID REDEMPTION:

1. Redemption within 12 months from
registration of the sale;
2. Payment of purchase price of the
prop. + 1% interest/mo. computed from
the date of registration of the sale;
3. Written notice of the redemption served
on the officer who made the sale
(sheriff) and a duplicate
filed w/ the proper Registry of
Deeds.
ANTICHRESIS CREDITOR acquirres

the right to receive the FRUIT TS of an
IMMOVABLE of his debtor, w/ th he
obligation to apply them to the
payment of the interest, if owing,
and thereaftterr to the principal of his
s
credit. (Art. 2132 NCC)..
Art. 2134
4. The amoun nt of th
he priincipal
and of the interes st shall be spec cifiied
in WRITING, otherwise con ntract
of antichresiis is VOID.
Art. 2134. The CREDITOR, unless there is a

stipulation to the contrary, is OBLIGED to:
¾ PAY the taxes and charges upon the estate;
¾ BEAR the expenses necessary for its
preservation and repair.
*Sums spent for these purposes shall be

deducted from the FRUITS.
to be exempt from these obligations, MAY, always

compel the DEBTOR to enter again upon the
enjoyment of the property, except when there is a
stipulation to the contrary (Art. 2136 NCC).
CANNOT reacquire the enjoyment of the

immovable W/O first having TOTALLY PAID what he
owes the creditor.
Art. 2137 NCC. The creditor does NOT

acquire the ownership of the real
estate for non-payment of the debt
within the period agreed upon.
Every stipulation to the contrary
shall be VOID. But the creditor may
petition the court for the payment of
the debt or sale of the real property
Rules of Court on foreclosure of
mortgage shall apply.
ANTECHRESIS PLEDGE
1. object real 1. object personal
property; property;
2. perfected by mere 2. perfected by

consent; delivery of the
object pledged;
3. consensual 3. real contract.

contract.
REAL ESTATE
ANTICHRESIS
MORTGAGE
1. real property delivered to 1. debtor retains possession
the creditor; of real property;
2. creditor does NOT have

2. creditor acquires only the the right to receive the
right to receive the fruits fruits of the property but
of the real property REM creates a REAL
does NOT produce
RIGHT over the property
a REAL RIGHT;
enforceable
against the whole world;
3. creditor has obl. to apply
the fruits to the payment 3. NO such obligation on the
part of mortgagee;
of interest, if owing and to
the principal of the credit;
4. creditor is obliged to pay 4. creditor has NO such

the taxes and charges obligation.
upon the estate.
Subject matter is REAL property
CHATTEL MORTGAGE
contract by virtue of which
personal property is recorded in
the Chattel Mortgage Register
as a security for the
performance of an obligation.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE PLEDGE

1. delivery of personal prop. 1. delivery to pledgee of
to the mortgagee NOT personal property is
necessary; REQUIRED;
2. registration in the Chattel 2. registration in the
Mortgage Register is Registry of Property NOT
necessary for its necessary;
VALIDITY;
3. procedure for the sale of 3. procedure for the sale of
the thing given as security the thing pledged found in
found in Sec. 14 of Act. Article 2112 of the Civil
No. 1508, as amended; Code;
4. If the property is 4. If the property pledged is sold
foreclosed excess and there is a deficiency
over the amount due goes creditor NOT entitled to
RECOVER the deficiency NOT
to DEBTOR; if there is WITHSTANDING any stipulation
a deficiency CREDITOR to the contrary; if there is an
is entitled to RECOVER excess debtor NOT
deficiency from DEBTOR. entitled to the excess, unless it
EXCEPTION: RECTO LAW is otherwise agreed.
Subject matter is PERSONAL property
TORTS
and
DAMAGES
QUASI-DELICT
¾ whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is NO pre-existing
contractual relation between the
parties, is called a QUASI-DELICT.
ELEMENTS:
(1) Act or omission;
(2) Damage to another;
(3) Existence of fault or negligence;
(4) No pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties.
NEGLIGENCE the omission to do

something w/c a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations w/c
ordinarily regulates the conduct of
human affairs, would do; doing
something w/c a prudent &
reasonable man would NOT DO.
¾ Failure to observe for the protection
of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution and
vigilance w/c the circumstance justly
demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
is that cause which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient and intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which
the result would not have occurred.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably
later than that of the other, the one who
has the last reasonable opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and fails to
do so, is chargeable with the
consequences of the loss without
reference to the prior negligence of the
other party. (Picart vs. Smith).
ART. 2184 NCC. Motor vehicle misha

ap
OWNER is SOLIDARILY LIABLE
with his driver IF the
e former
(1) was in the vehicle;
(2) could have, by use of due
ence, prevented the
dilige
misfortune.
*Driver disputably presumed

negligent if found guiilty of
reckless driving OR violating traffic
regulations at least TWICE within
the next preceding 2 MONTHS.
ART. 2185 NCC. Driver of motor vehicle

presumed negligent if at the time
of mishap, he was VIOLATING ANY
TRAFFIC REGULATION.
ART. 2188 NCC. Prima facie presumption
of negligence of defendant IF
death or injury results from:
a) his possession of dangerous
weapons; OR
b) possession of dangerous
substance (poison) EXCEPT:
When the possession or use
thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR the thing or

transaction speaks for itself.
Defendant is presumed negligent
WHEN:
(1) the accident was of a kind w/c does
not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent;
(2) instrumentality or agency w/c caused
the injury was under exclusive control
of the person charged w/ negligence;
(3) injury suffered not due to any
voluntary action on the part of the
person injured;
(4) absence of explanation by the
defendant.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
(Art. 2179 NCC)
GENERAL RULE: When plaintiff’s OWN
NEGLIGENCE was the immediate &
proximate cause of his injury, he
CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES.
EXCEPTION: If his negligence was only
CONTRIBUTORY, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant’s lack of due care, the
plaintiff MAY recover damages, but
the COURTS SHALL MITIGATE THE
DAMAGES TO BE AWARDED.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK a plaintiff

who voluntarily assumes a risk of
harm arising from the negligent or
reckless conduct of the defendant
CANNOT RECOVER from such harm.
“VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA” one
is not legally injured if he has
consented to the act complained of
or was willing that it should occur.
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA damage
W/O injury; although there was
physical damage, there was NO legal
injury as there was NO violation of
legal right.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs.

ROBERTO REYES, GR 154259,
FEB. 28,2005
Reyes AKA
Nikko Hotel “Amay
Mla. Garden Bisaya”
Mr. Tsuruoka’s
birthday party
Ms. Ruby
Lim
The doctrine of volenti non fit

injuria (“to which a person
assents is not esteemed in law as
injury”) refers to self-inflicted
injury or to the consent to injury
– which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who
knowingly and voluntarily
exposed himself to danger, even
if he is not negligent in doing so.
EMERGENCY/SUDDEN PERIL DOCTRINE

Applicable only IF:
1) emergency situation is sudden and
unexpected;
2) such as to deprive the actor of all
opportunity for deliberation.
ACTION BASED ON QUASI-DELICT

must be instituted within 4 YEARS
from the occurrence of the cause.
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE one

who did NOT commit the act or
omission causing damage to
another can still be civilly liable,
directly or subsidiarily.
Art. 2180. VICARIOUS LIABILITY

liability for acts or omission of
persons for whom one is responsible.
1. FATHER, in case of death or incapacity,
the MOTHER
• damage caused by minor children;
• living in their company.
2. GUARDIAN
• for minors or incapacitated persons;
• under their authority;
• living in their company.
3. OWNER & MANAGER of establishments
• for employees;
• in the service of their branches;
• on the occasion of their functions.
4. EMPLOYERS
• employees and household helpers;
• acting w/in the scope of their
assigned tasks;
• even if employers are NOT engaged in
any business or industry.
5. STTATE
• acts of SPECIAL AGENTS ONLY.
6. TEACHERS OR HEADS of
establishments of Arts and Trades
• for pupils, students or apprentices;
• while in their custody;
• applies to academic institutions also
liability attaches to teacher-in-
charge.
DEFENSE: observance of all the DOAGFOAF

to prevent the damage.
ART. 2190 NCC. Proprietor of a building or
structure liable for damages resulting
from its total or partial collapse due to
LACK OF NECESSARY REPAIRS.
ART. 2191 NCC. Proprietors are liable for
DAMAGES caused by:
1) explosion of machinery and inflammation of
explosive substances;
2) excessive smoke harmful to persons;
3) falling of trees situated near highways, not
caused by force majeure;
4) emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or
deposits of infectious matter, constructed
w/o precautions suitable to the place.
ART. 2193. Head of family living in a building

liable for damages caused by things
thrown or falling from the same.
DAMAGES
is the sum of money which the law
awards or imposes as pecuniary
compensation, recompense or
satisfaction for an injury done or a
wrong sustained as a consequence
either of a breach of a contractual
obligation or a tortious act; pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes
for the breach of some duty or the
violation of some right.
DAMAGE DAMAGES
The loss, injury or Compensation in

deterioration caused money for the loss
by negligence, design or damage.
or accident of one
person to another in
respect of another’s
property.
DAMAGE is the occasion of the DAMAGES
DAMAGES
1. ACTUAL/COMPENSATORY
adequate compensation for such
pecuniary loss suffered by a person
as he has duly proved.
¾ shall comprehend not only the
value of the loss suffered but also
that of the profits w/c the obligee
failed to obtain. (Art. 2200 NCC)
ART. 2205. Damages may be recovered:

(1) for loss or impairment of earning
capacity in cases of temporary or
permanent personal injury;
(2) for injury to plaintiff’s business
standing or commercial credit.
DAMAGES FOR DEATH:

(1) death indemnity;
(2) loss of earning capacity;
(3) support, for a period not exceeding 5 years,
the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(4) moral damages for mental anguish for the
death of the decedent.
2. MORAL include physical suffering,

mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury.
(Art. 2217 NCC)
3. NOMINAL are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, w/c
has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered by him. (Art. 2221 NCC)
4. TEMPERATE more than nominal

but less than compensatory damages;
may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proved with
certainty. (Art. 2224 NCC)
¾ must be reasonable under the
circumstances (Art. 2224 NCC)
5. LIQUIDATED those agreed upon by

the parties to a contract to be paid in
case of breach thereof. (Art. 2226 NCC)
6. EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE
imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good in
addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory
damages. (Art. 2229 NCC).
¾ in CRIMINAL OFFENSES crime

was committed with 1 or more
aggravating circumstances
(Art. 2230 NCC).
CONTRACTS & QUASI-CONTRACTS

defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner (Art. 2232 NCC).
** Exemplary damages CANNOT be

recovered as a MATTER OF RIGHT
but DISCRETIONARY on the COURT
(Art. 2233 NCC).
*** Stipulation renouncing exemplary

damages in advance NULL and
VOID.
DR. FILOTEO ALANO vs. ZENAIDA LOGMAO,

G.R. 175540, APRIL 7, 2014
Dr. Alano Arnelito Zenaida
Q : Is the doctor who authorized removal of

specific organs from a brain-dead person for
transplantation purposes liable for damages?
A: NO. Petitioner instructed his subordinates to “make certain”

that “all reasonable efforts” are exerted to locate the patient's
next of kin, even enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices
of the death of the patient would reach said relatives. It also
clearly stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and
remove the internal organs of the deceased was being given
ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable law had been
complied with. Such instructions reveal that petitioner acted
prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all reasonable
means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He even
specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted IF
the Department of Surgery has complied with all the requirements
of the law. Petitioner could not have been faulted for having
full confidence in the ability of the doctors in the Department
of Surgery to comprehend the instructions, obeying all his
directives, and acting only in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP. vs. CUEVAS,

GR 174161, June 15, 2015
Mina’s Transport
(Actual owner)
Jessie Rillera
(driver)
Ju
unnel Cuevas
10/14/94 – Mina’s Transit bus Metro Mla. Transport
driven by Rillera hit & damaged
the Honda motorcycle owned by Corp. (MMTC)
Reynaldo & driven by Junnel;
the latter’s leg was severely (sold several bus units to
fractured & despite several Mina’s Transit but retained
operations, he was still unable ownership over the buses
to walk without crutches; the until certain conditions were
motorcycle was extensively met; Mina’s Transit operated
damaged. the buses in Metro Mla. )
Q: Who is liable for the accident?

A: The registered owner is liable. MMTC could

not escape liability for the personal injuries and
property damage suffered by the Cuevases. This is
because of the registered-owner rule, whereby the
registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in a
vehicular accident could be held liable for the
consequences. The registered-owner rule has
remained good law in this jurisdiction considering
its impeccable and timeless rationale, as
enunciated in the 1957 ruling in Erezo, et al. v.
Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, 108-109 (1975).
PNR vs. BRUNTY, GR No. 169891, Nov. 2, 2006

NEGLIGENCE is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would
NOT DO; It is want of care required by the
circumstances.
Rhonda Brunty, an American citizen, came for a

visit to the Phil. Together with her Filipino host Juan
Manuel M. Garcia, she traveled to Baguio City on
board a Mercedes Benz sedan driven by Rodolfo L.
Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25,
1980. PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes,
was on its way to Tutuban, Manila. Mercelita, by 2am,
driving at 70km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of
the railroad track up ahead and that they were about
to collide with the PNR Train. Mercelita was instantly
killed & the two other passengers suffered serious
physical injuries. Brunty was brought to a hospital
in Tarlac but was pronounced dead after 10 minutes
from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered severe head
injuries was brought to the same hospital but later
transferred to the MDH & to the Makati Medical
Center for further treatment.
x x x An examination of the photographs of the

railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented
as evidence by PNR itself would yield the
following: (1.) absence of flagbars or safety
railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the
installed warning signals; and (3.) lack of
proper lighting within the area. Thus, even
if there was a flagman stationed at the site as
claimed by PNR (petitioner), it would still be
impossible to know or see that there is a
railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is
an approaching train from the Moncada side of
the road since one's view would be blocked by
a cockpit arena.
The SC HELD: XXX railroad companies owe to

the public a duty of exercising a reasonable
degree of care to avoid injury to persons and
property at railroad crossings, which duties
pertain both in the operation of trains and in
the maintenance of the crossings. Every
corporation constructing or operating a railway shall
make and construct at all points where such railway
crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe
crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient
elevation from such road as to admit a free passage
of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and
distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the
proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the
necessity of looking out for trains. It is imperative
on the part of the PNR to provide adequate
safety equipment in the area.
The SC has previously determined the liability of

the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross
bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or
semaphores. Such failure is evidence of
negligence and disregard of the safety of the
public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it
because public safety demands that said device or
equipment be installed.
As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear

chance is applicable, the SC ruled in the negative.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the loss. The proximate cause of
the injury was petitioner’s negligence, hence the
above doctrine is not applicable in this case.
MERCURY DRUG CORP., et. al. vs. SPS.

HUANG & STEPHEN HUANG, GR No. 172122,
June 22, 2007
The liability of the employer under

Article 2180 NCC is direct or immediate. It
is NOT conditioned on a prior recourse
against the negligent employee, or a prior
showing of insolvency of such employee. It
is also joint and solidary w/ the employee.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is

demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment

or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
To be relieved of liability, petitioner

Mercury Drug should show that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family,
both in the selection of the employee and in
the supervision of the performance of his
duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective
employees, the employer is required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience, and
service records. With respect to the supervision
of its employees, the employer should formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for their breach. To establish
compliance with these requirements, employers
must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, Mercury Drug’s

Recruitment and Training Manager, applicants are
required to take theoretical and actual driving tests, and
psychological examination. Mrs. Caamic admitted that
Del Rosario took the driving tests and psychological
examination when he applied as Delivery Man, but not
when he applied as Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted
that Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle,
instead of a truck during the driving tests. No tests
were conducted on the motor skills development,
perceptual speed, visual attention, depth
visualization, eye and hand coordination and
steadiness of Del Rosario. No NBI and police
clearances were also presented. Del Rosario
attended only three driving seminars – on June 30,
2001, February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the
only seminar he attended before the accident which
occurred in 1996 was held 12 years ago in 1984.
Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up

driver for long trips. At the time of the accident, Del
Rosario has been out on the road for more than
thirteen hours, without any alternate. Mrs. Caamic
testified that she does not know of any company policy
requiring back-up drivers for long trips.
Mercury Drug failed to show that it exercised

due diligence on the supervision and discipline over
its employees. On the day of the accident, Del Rosario
was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for
reckless driving. He testified that he reported the
incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He
was not suspended or reprimanded. No disciplinary action
whatsoever was taken against Del Rosario. We affirm
the finding that Mercury Drug has failed to
discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee, Del Rosario.
Stephen was only seventeen years old, nearly six

feet tall and weighed 175 pounds. He was in fourth
year high school, and a member of the school varsity
basketball team. He was also class president and
editor-in-chief of the school annual. He had shown
very good leadership qualities. He was looking forward
to his college life, having just passed the entrance
examinations of the University of the Philippines, De
La Salle University, and the University of Asia and the
Pacific. UST even offered him an athletic scholarship,
but the accident prevented him from attending the
basketball try-outs. He was an exceptional student.
He excelled both in his academics and extracurricular
undertakings; intelligent, motivated, a go-getter. Had
the accident not happened, he had a rosy future
ahead of him.
Stephen’s car was a total wreck.

Stephen sustained massive injuries to
his spinal cord, head, face & lungs.
Despite a series of operations,
Stephen is paralyzed for life from his
chest down and requires continuous
medical and rehabilitation
treatments.
With regard to actual damages, Art. 2199 of

the Civil Code provides that "[E]xcept as provided
by law or by stipulation one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved x x x." In the
instant case, the SC upheld the finding that the
actual damages claimed by respondents were
supported by receipts. The amount of
P2,973,000.00 represented cost of hospital
expenses, medicines, medical services and
supplies, and nursing care services provided
respondent Stephen from December 20, 1996, the
day of the accident, until December 1998.
Petitioners are liable for all damages which are the

natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. The doctors who attended to respondent
Stephen are one in their prognosis that his chances of
walking again and performing basic body functions are nil.
For the rest of his life, he will need continuous rehabilitation
and therapy to prevent further complications such as
pneumonia, bladder and rectum infection, renal failure,
sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis and fractures,
and other spinal cord injury-related conditions. He will be
completely dependent on the care and support of his family.
SC thus affirm the award of P23,461,062.00 for the life
care cost of respondent Stephen based on his average
monthly expense and the actuarial computation of the
remaining years that he is expected to live; and the
conservative amount of P10,000,000.00, for the loss or
impairment of his earning capacity, considering his age,
probable life expectancy, the state of his health, and his
mental and physical condition before the accident.
The SC also upheld the award of P4M as

moral damages, P2M as exemplary damages
and P1M as attorney’s fees and litigation
expense. "The award of moral damages is aimed
at a restoration, within the limits of the possible,
of the spiritual status quo ante."Moral damages
are designed to compensate and alleviate in
some way the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
caused a person. Although incapable of
pecuniary computation, they must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The
amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever
with the wealth or means of the offender.
As to exemplary damages, Art. 2231 NCC

provides that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted
with gross negligence. The records show that at the
time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving
without a license because he was previously ticketed for
reckless driving. The evidence also shows that he failed
to step on his brakes immediately after the impact. Had
petitioner Del Rosario done so, the injuries which
respondent Stephen sustained could have been greatly
reduced. Wanton acts such as that committed by
petitioner Del Rosario need be suppressed; and
employers like petitioner Mercury Drug should be more
circumspect in the observance of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. The
award of exemplary damages in favor of the
respondents is therefore justified.
With the award of exemplary damages,

the SC likewise affirmed the grant of
attorney's fees of P1M to respondents.
In addition, attorney's fees may be granted
when a party is compelled to litigate or
incur expenses to protect his interest
by reason of an unjustified act of the
other party.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. (PSI) vs

NATIVIDAD & ENRIQUE AGANA, GR 126297,
JAN. 31, 2007; FEB. 2, 2010
“Hospitals, having undertaken one of
mankind’s most important & delicate endeavors,
must assume the grave responsibility of pursuing
it with appropriate care. The care and services
dispensed thru this high trust, however technical,
complex and esoteric its character may be, must
meet standards of responsibility commensurate
with the undertaking to preserve and protect the
health and the very lives of those placed in the
hospital’s keeping.”
Issue: whether a hospital may be held liable

for the negligence of physicians-consultants
allowed to practice in its premises.
PSI, together with Dr. Miguel Ampil (Dr. Ampil)

and Dr. Juan Fuentes (Dr. Fuentes), was
impleaded by Enrique Agana and Natividad Agana
(later substituted by her heirs), in a complaint for
damages filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 96, for the injuries suffered
by Natividad when Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
neglected to remove from her body two
gauzes which were used in the surgery they
performed on her on April 11, 1984 at the
Medical City General Hospital. PSI was impleaded
as owner, operator and manager of the hospital.
The SC premised the direct liability of PSI to the

Aganas on the following facts and law:
First, there existed between PSI and Dr. Ampil

an employer-employee relationship as
contemplated in the December 29, 1999 decision in
Ramos v. Court of Appeals that "for purposes of
allocating responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee relationship exists
between hospitals and their consultants.“
Although the Court in Ramos later issued a Resolution
dated April 11, 2002 reversing its earlier finding on the
existence of an employment relationship between
hospital and doctor, a similar reversal was not
warranted in the present case because the defense
raised by PSI consisted of a mere general denial
of control or responsibility over the actions of Dr.
Ampil.
Second, by accrediting Dr. Ampil and advertising his

qualifications, PSI created the public impression that
he was its agent. Enrique testified that it was on
account of Dr. Ampil's accreditation with PSI that he
conferred with said doctor about his wife's
(Natividad's) condition. After his meeting with Dr.
Ampil, Enrique asked Natividad to personally consult
Dr. Ampil. In effect, when Enrigue and Natividad
engaged the services of Dr. Ampil, at the back of
their minds was that the latter was a staff member of
a prestigious hospital. Thus, under the doctrine of
apparent authority applied in Nogales, et al. v.
Capitol Medical Center, et al.,PSI was liable for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil.
Finally, as owner and operator of Medical City

General Hospital, PSI was bound by its duty to
provide comprehensive medical services to
Natividad Agana, to exercise reasonable care to
protect her from harm, to oversee or supervise all
persons who practiced medicine within its walls,
and to take active steps in fixing any form of
negligence committed within its premises. PSI
committed a serious breach of its corporate duty
when it failed to conduct an immediate
investigation into the reported missing gauzes.
Dr. Ampil is liable for negligence & malpractice:

Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during Natividad’s
operation. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only
to perform hysterectomy when he found that the
malignancy in Natividad’s sigmoid area had spread to her
left ovary.
Under the “Captain of the Ship” rule, the operating
surgeon is the person in complete charge of the
surgery room and all persons connected w/ the
operation. It was his act of ordering the closure of the
incision notwithstanding that 2 pieces of gauze
remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to
Natividad’s body.
DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE vs. SPS. JOHN DAVID

& NORA GO, GR 160889, APRIL 27, 2007
T he Hippocratic Oath mandates

physicians to give primordial consideration
to the well-being of their patients. If a
doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is
accountable for his acts. Intent is
immaterial in negligence cases because
where negligence exists and is proven, it
automatically gives the injured a right to
reparation for the damage caused.
In medical negligence cases, the doctrine of res

ipsa loquitur allows the existence of an injury to
justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instruments causing the
injury, provided the ff. requisites concur:
1. The accident is of a kind w/c ordinarily does not

occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality w/n the
exclusive control of the defendant;
3. The possibility of contributing conduct w/c
would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
As to the 1st requirement, the gaping wound on Nora's

arm is certainly not an ordinary occurrence in the act of
delivering a baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs
involved in the process of giving birth. Such injury could not
have happened unless negligence had set in
somewhere.
2nd, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by

the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are
deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge
under the "captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine
holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the
negligence of his assistants during the time when those
assistants are under the surgeon's control. It can be logically
inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in charge
during the delivery of Nora's baby, exercised control
over the assistants assigned to both the use of the
droplight and the taking of Nora's blood pressure.
Hence, the use of the droplight and the blood pressure
cuff is also within petitioner's exclusive control.
Third, the gaping wound on Nora's

left arm, by its very nature and
considering her condition, could only be
caused by something external to her and
outside her control as she was
unconscious while in hypovolemic shock.
Hence, Nora could not, by any stretch
of the imagination, have contributed
to her own injury.
SOLIDBANK CORP. vs. SPS. TEODULfO &

CARMEN ARRIETA, GR 152720,
FEB. 17, 2005
A bank’s gross negligence in dishonoring
a well funded check, aggravated by its
unreassonable delay in repairing the error,
calls for an award of moral and exemplary
damages. The resulting injury to the check
writer’s reputation and peace of mind needs
to be recognized and compensated.
Treating Carmen’s account as closed,

merely because the ledger could not be found
was a reckless act that could not simply be
brushed off as an honest mistake. The SC has
repeatedly emphasized that the banking
industry is impressed with public
interest. Consequently, the highest degree of
diligence is expected, and high standards of
integrity and performance are even required of
it. By the nature of its functions, a bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts of
its depositors with meticulous care and
always to have in mind the fiduciary
nature of its relationship with them.
PRUDENTIAL BANK vs CA and LETICIA

TUPASI-VALENZUELA, GR 125536,
MAR. 16, 2000
As a business affected with public interest &
because of the nature of its functions, the bank
is under obligation to treat the account of its
depositors with meticulous care, always having
in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
While petitioner’s negligence may not be
attended w/ malice and BF, it caused serious
anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation, hence,
the offended party was entitled to reasonable
moral damages.
JARCO MARKETING CORP. et. al. vs CONRADO &

CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, GR 129792, DEC. 21, 1999
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in
which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant.
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection
of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution & vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Accident and negligence are intrinsically

contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident
occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary
care, which is not caused by fault of any person & which
could not have been prevented by any means suggested
by common prudence.
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and

her daughter, ZHIENETH, 6 years old, were at the
2nd floor of Syvel’s Dept. Store, Makati City.
CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the
payment and verification counter when she felt a
sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She
looked behind her and saw ZHIENETH on the floor,
her body pinned by the bulk of the store’s gift-
wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying
and screaming for help.
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati
Medical Center where she was operated on. The next
day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter
communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic
slate. She died fourteen (14) days after the
accident on the hospital bed.
The cause of her death was attributed to the

injuries she sustained. The provisional medical
certificate issued by ZHIENETH’s attending doctor
described the extent of her injuries:
Diagnoses:
1. Shock, severe, sec. to intra-abdominal injuries due to

blunt injury
2. Hemorrhage, massive, intraperitoneal sec. to laceration,
(L) lobe liver
3. Rupture, stomach, anterior & posterior walls
4. Complete transection, 4th position, duodenum
5. Hematoma, extensive, retroperitoneal
6. Contusion, lungs, severe
Petitioners denied any liability for the injuries

and consequent death of ZHIENETH. They claimed
that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising
care and diligence over her daughter by
allowing her to freely roam around in a store
filled with glassware and appliances.
ZHIENETH too, was guilty of contributory
negligence since she climbed the counter,
triggering its eventual collapse on her.
Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was
made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it
never fell nor collapsed for the past 15 years since
its construction. Petitioners maintained that it
observed the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection, supervision and control of its
employees. The RTC agreed w/ the Petitioners.
Private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should

be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child
below 9 years is incapable of contributory negligence.
And even if ZHIENETH, at 6 years old, was already
capable of contributory negligence, still it was
physically impossible for her to have propped herself on
the counter. She had a small frame (four feet high and
seventy pounds) and the counter was much higher and
heavier than she was. Also, the testimony of one of the
store’s former employees, Gerardo Gonzales, who
accompanied ZHIENETH when she was brought to the
emergency room of the Makati Medical Center belied
petitioners’ theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter.
Gonzales claimed that when ZHIENETH was asked by
the doctor what she did, ZHIENETH replied,
"[N]othing, I did not come near the counter and
the counter just fell on me."
The CA decided in favor of private respondents and

reversed the appealed judgment. It found that
petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally
dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an
inverted "L" with a top wider than the base. It was top
heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither
evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow base.
The counter was defective, unstable and
dangerous; a downward pressure on the
overhanging portion or a push from the front could
cause the counter to fall. Two former employees of
petitioners had already previously brought to the
attention of the management the danger the counter
could cause. But the latter ignored their concern. The
CA faulted the petitioners for this omission, and
concluded that the incident that befell ZHIENETH
could have been avoided had petitioners repaired
the defective counter.
The Court of Appeals declared that ZHIENETH,

who was below 7 years old at the time of the
incident, was absolutely incapable of negligence or
other tort. It reasoned that since a child under nine
years could not be held liable even for an intentional
wrong, then the six-year old ZHIENETH could not be
made to account for a mere mischief or reckless act.
It also absolved CRISELDA of any negligence, finding
nothing wrong or out of the ordinary in momentarily
allowing ZHIENETH to walk while she signed the
document at the nearby counter.
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA and

ruled that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH
was no accident and that ZHIENETH’s death
could only be attributed to negligence.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS,

GR 143363, February 6, 2002
The proximate cause of an injury

is that cause which, in natural &
continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury & w/o which the
result would not have occurred. The
negligence of the minor driver, (James
Daniel II), or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep owned
by Villanueva, was the proximate cause
of the accident, hence, petitioner may
not be held liable for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.
From the records it appears that St. Mary’s

Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment
drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. As
a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos
was part of the campaigning group. On the fateful
day, Sherwin, along with other high school students
were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep
was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and
a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter
drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result
the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a
result of the injuries he sustained from the accident
Under Article 218 FC, the following shall have

special parental authority over a minor child while
under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child
care. This special parental authority and responsibility
applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility
applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the
pupils and students outside the school premises
whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 FC, if the person under custody is a
minor, those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by
the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
Liability for the accident, whether caused by the

negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The
negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was
only a remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Considering that the negligence of the minor

driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent
Villanueva was an event over which St. Mary’s
Academy had no control, and which was the
proximate cause of the accident, St. Mary’s
Academy may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident.
ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE et. al. vs.

MIRANDA, GR 182353, 7/29/2010
During a science experiment about

fusion of sulphur powder & iron fillings with
Rosalinda Tabugo as subject teacher &
employee of SJC, Jayson looked into the
test tube with a magnifying glass. The
compound in the test tube spurted out
hitting Jayson’s eyes and the different parts
of the bodies of his groupmates. Jayson had
to undergo surgery & had to spend for his
medication.
Were petitioners negligent, hence,
liable for damages to Jayson?
A: YES. The proximate cause of

Jayson’s injury was the concurrent
failure of petitioners to prevent the
foreseeable mishap that occurred during
the science experiment. Petitioners
were negligent by failing to exercise the
higher degree of care, caution, and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators & teachers.
However, Jayson is partly

responsible for his own injury, hence, he
should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence.
QUASI-CONTRACTS
NEGOTIORUM GESTIO
SOLUTIO INDEBITI
NEGOTIORUM GESTIO
¾ Whoever VOLUNTARILY TAKES
CHARGE of the agency or mgt. of the
business or prop. of another, W/O any
power from the latter, is obliged to
CONTINUE the same until the
TERMINATION of the affair and its
incidents, or to require the person
concer ned to SUBSTITUTE him, if
the OWNER is in a position to do so.
(Art. 2144 NCC).
*This juridical relation DOES NOT

ARISE WHEN: (Art. 2144 NCC)
1. the property or business is NOT

neglected or abandoned
UNAUTHORIZED CONTRACT
2. in fact, the manager has been tacitly

authorized by the owner AGENCY
* ratification of the mgt. by the owner
of the busines EXPRESS
AGENCY, even if business may not
have been successful (Ar t. 2149 NCC)
OBLIGATIONS OF THE
OFFICIOUS MANAGER:
1. Perform his duties with the DOAGFOAF;
2. Pay the damages w/c thru his fault or
negligence may be suffered by the owner
of the property or business under mgt.;
* court increase or moderate
indemnity acc. to the circumstances.
3. CANNOT delegate his duties to another
person, OTHERWISE,
he shall be liable for the acts of the
delegate, W/O prejudice to the direct
obligation of the delegate to the owner
of the business.
** Responsibility of 2 or more officious

managers SOLIDARY, UNLESS the mgt.
was assumed to save the thing or business
from imminent danger. (Art. 2146 NCC).
4. Officious manager is LIABLE for

FORTUITOUS EVENT IF he: (Art. 2147 NCC)
(1). undertakes risky operations w/c the owner

was not accustomed to embark upon;
(2). preferred his interest to that of the owner;
(3). fails to return the property or business

after demand by the owner;
(4) . assumed the management in BF.

5. EXCEPT when the mgt. was assumed to

SAVE the prop. or business from IMMINENT
DANGER, officious manager shall be
LIABLE for a FORTUITOUS EVENT IF:
(1) he is MANIFESTLY UNFIT to carry on the mgt.
(2) by his intervention, he PREVENTED a more
COMPETENT person from taking up the mgt.
6. Personally LIABLE for contracts w/c he has
entered into with 3rd persons, EVEN
THOUGH he acted in the name of the
owner; NO RIGHT of action between
owner and 3rd persons; These provisions
shall NOT APPLY IF: (Art. 1252 NCC)
(1) owner expressly or tacitly ratified the mgt.;
(2) contract refers to things owned by owner of
the business.
OBLLIGATIONS OF THE
OWNER
(Art. 2150 NCC)
1. liable for obligations incurred in
his interest;
2. reimbursement of the officious
mgr. for the necessary and
useful expenses and for the
damages suffered by the latter
in the performance of his duties.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF
MANAGEMENT
(Art. 2153 NCC)
1. Owner repudiates it or puts an end
thereto;
2. Officious mgr. withdraws from the
management;
3. Death, civil interdiction, insanity or
insolvency of owner OR officious
manager.
SOLUTIO INDEBITI (Art. 2154 NCC)

¾ If something is RECEIVED when there is
NO RIGHT to DEMAND it, and it was
unduly delivered thru MISTAKE, the
obligation to RETURN it arises.
¾ Payment by reason of a MISTAKE in the

construction or application of a doubtful
or difficult question of law.
¾ Payer was in DOUBT whether debt was

DUE, he may recover if he proves that it
was not due.
ART. 2157. Responsibility of 2 or

more payees of payment NOT DUE
SOLIDARY
ART. 2159. He who in BF accepts an
UNDUE PAYMENT SHALL:
(1) pay legal interest if money is involved;
(2) liable for fr uits received/should have
been received if thing produces fruits;
(3) answerable for loss/impairment of the
thing from any cause;
(4) liable for damages to the person who
delivered the thing, until it is recovered.
ART. 2171. FINDER OF LOST PERSONAL

PROPERTY Arts. 719 & 720.
finder of movable return to previous possessor
deposit with mayor

unknown
thing is perishable publication for

2 consecutive
sale at public auction weeks
8 days after publication
thing /value
6 months from publication
awarded to finder
(a) owner did NOT appear
1/10 of the price
(b) owner appeared of thing to finder
(c) finder/owner obliged to reimburse
the expenses
That’s all
Folks!!!
Thank you for listening…


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ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

PLEDGE is a contract by virtue of

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF PLEDGE

3. the persons constituting the pledge or

3. NOT VALID against 3rd 3. NOT VALID against 3rd

OBLIGATIONS OF THE PLEDGEE:

2. cannot deposit the thing pledged w/a 3rd

3. bring any action w/c pertain to the

5. bound to advise the pledgor, w/o delay,

OBLIGATIONS OF THE PLEDGOR:

2. pay the expenses incurred by the

REQUISITES FOR THE SALE OF THING

ART. 2113 NCC. At the public auction,

has a BETTER RIGHT

Pledgee may also bid

offer NOT VALID if she

ART. 2114 NCC. All bids at the public auction

EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE PLEDGE:

3. Sale of the thing pledged in a

ART. 2122. A thing under pledge by

Sps. Paray, et. al. vs. Rodriquez, et.

Under the Civil Code, the foreclosure of a pledge

Pledged property, necessarily personal in

REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE

- conttact whereby the debtor se ecurres the

ART. 2130 NCC. A stipulation forbidding

EQUITY OF REDEMPTION right

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION right of

REQUISITES for a VALID REDEMPTION:

ANTICHRESIS CREDITOR acquirres

Art. 2134. The CREDITOR, unless there is a

*Sums spent for these purposes shall be

to be exempt from these obligations, MAY, always

CANNOT reacquire the enjoyment of the

Art. 2137 NCC. The creditor does NOT

2. perfected by mere 2. perfected by

3. consensual 3. real contract.

2. creditor does NOT have

4. creditor is obliged to pay 4. creditor has NO such

CHATTEL MORTGAGE PLEDGE

NEGLIGENCE the omission to do

LAST CLEAR CHANCE

ART. 2184 NCC. Motor vehicle misha

*Driver disputably presumed

ART. 2185 NCC. Driver of motor vehicle

RES IPSA LOQUITUR the thing or

ASSUMPTION OF RISK a plaintiff

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs.

The doctrine of volenti non fit

EMERGENCY/SUDDEN PERIL DOCTRINE

ACTION BASED ON QUASI-DELICT

IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE one

Art. 2180. VICARIOUS LIABILITY

DEFENSE: observance of all the DOAGFOAF

ART. 2193. Head of family living in a building

The loss, injury or Compensation in

ART. 2205. Damages may be recovered:

DAMAGES FOR DEATH:

2. MORAL include physical suffering,

4. TEMPERATE more than nominal

5. LIQUIDATED those agreed upon by

¾ in CRIMINAL OFFENSES crime