VLC-PBR2022-BNB-CRIMINAL-LAW-Criminal-Law-I-Prof. Modesto A. Ticman, JR

BAR REVIEW NOTES AND CASES ON
CRIMINAL LAW
(Basic Principles and Criminal Law 1)
By: Prof. MODESTO A. TICMAN, JR.
Part I
Basic Principles
1. Significant Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Enact Penal Laws.
1.1 No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
1.2 Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment inflicted.
1.3 No person shall be imprisoned for debt.
1.4 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
1.4.1 An ex post facto law is one which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for
an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or
makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that
changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming
to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a
right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some
lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the
offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. (People vs.
Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241)
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Basic Principles & Criminal Law I
Prof. Modesto A. Ticman, Jr.
1.4.2 A bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of
a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of
certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or
otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in
the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most
essential. (Misolas vs. Panga, 181 SCRA 648)
2. Characteristics of Philippine Criminal Laws.
2.1 GENERALITY – Philippine penal laws binding upon all persons who live or sojourn within
the Philippine territory.
2.1.1 Exceptions: those exempt from criminal prosecution by virtue of – [a] the universally-
accepted principles of Public International Law, such as sovereigns, heads of states,
ambassadors, charge d’ affaires; [b] treaties and treaty stipulations; and [c] laws of
preferential application.
2.2 TERRITORIALITY – Philippine penal laws undertake to punish crimes committed within the
Philippine territory.
2.2.1 Exceptions: [a] crimes committed on board a Philippine registered vessel or aircraft cruising
on international waters or airspace; [b] crimes involving counterfeiting or forging of coins
or currency notes or introduction thereof into the Philippines; [c] crimes committed by
public officers while in the exercise of their functions; [d] crimes against national security
and the laws of nations under Arts. 114-123 of the RPC; and [e] violations of certain
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (R.A. No. 11479).
2.2.2 Exceptions to the exceptions: Treaties and laws of preferential application.
2.3 PROSPECTIVITY – Philippine penal laws cannot make an act punishable which when
committed are not yet so. They cannot be given retroactive effect.
2.3.1 Exception: Those which establish conditions that are favorable or lenient to the accused.
For as long as a penal law is favorable to the accused, it shall find application regardless of whether
its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if
service of sentence has already begun. The accused shall be entitled to the benefits of the new
law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving
his previous sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of the modified
sentence. (Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 05 December 2018)
Penal laws are laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses and
prescribing penalties for their violation. While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime or
provide a penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its
provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime.
(Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison, et al. vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et al., G.R. No. 212719,
25 June 2019)
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2.3.2 Exceptions to the exceptions: [a] habitual delinquents; or [b] if made expressly inapplicable
to pending actions or existing causes of action.
3. Interpretation of Penal Laws.
3.1 Penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the
accused. If the language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in
favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting
substantial justice. The law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual. It is this philosophy
of caution before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty that animates one of the most
fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights, that every person is presumed innocent until
proven guilty. (People vs. Bon, 506 SCRA 168)
3.2 If the statute admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in
favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. (People vs. Sullano, G.R. No.
228373, 12 March 2018)
4. Mistake of Fact.
4.1 Mistake of fact is the misapprehension of facts on the part of the accused. It is an absolutory
cause. It
Requisites: [1] the act would have been LAWFUL had the facts been as the accused believed
them to be;
[2] the INTENTION of the accused was lawful; and
[3] the mistake was WITHOUT fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.
4.2 Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the
intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof
of only general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not
look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this
defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact;
and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the
mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. (Yapyuco
vs. Sandiganbayan, 674 SCRA 420)
5. Motive vs. Intent.
5.1 Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. It is not an
element of a crime. As such, it need not be proven by the prosecution EXCEPT when – [a] the
identity of accused is in dispute; [b] there is a need in ascertaining the truth between two
antagonistic versions of the killing; [c] the evidence is merely circumstantial.
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5.2 Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect a definite result. It is an element of a
crime, except for culpable felonies, and thus, must be proven by the prosecution.
6. Mala in se vs. mala prohibita.
6.1 Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and
acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala
prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is
done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of
the offender is immaterial. When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered
injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there
may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended.
Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation.
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the
determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or
omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se, - on the contrary, if it is not immoral in
itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala
prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question
of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. (Dungo
vs. People, 761 SCRA 375)
6.2 When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they
are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the
other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. (Mabunot vs. People, 803
SCRA 349)
7. Entrapment vs. Instigation.
7.1 In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators
practically induce the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense and become co-
principals themselves. (People vs. Pacis, 384 SCRA 696)
7.2 There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension
of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the
accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the
origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the
criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law
officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea
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and carries it into execution. (Chang vs. People, 496 SCRA 321) The legal effects of
entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does. (People vs. Sta. Maria,
519 SCRA 621).
8. Alibi as a defense.
8.1 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is
for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the
witnesses. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical
impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. The accused must demonstrate that he
was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. (People vs. Ambatang, G.R. No. 205855,
29 March 2017; People vs. Llobera, G.R. No. 203066, 05 August 2015).
9. Corpus Delicti.
9.1 Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecutions for felonies and offenses. Corpus
delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers
to the fact that a crime has actually been committed. As applied to a particular offense, it
means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. Corpus delicti
refers to the specific injury or loss sustained. It is the fact of the commission of the crime that
may be proved by the testimonies of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not
necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide
with the use of unlicensed firearms, or to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom. (People vs. Obedo, 403 SCRA 431; Rieta vs. People, 436 SCRA 273).
9.2 The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license
or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To
establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists
and that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or
permit to possess or carry the same. (Sayco vs. People, 547 SCRA 368)
9.3 In arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the
fire, e.g., the charred remains of a house burned down and of its having been intentionally
caused. (People vs. Gonzales, 560 SCRA 419)
9.4 In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner,
and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. (Zapanta vs. People, 694 SCRA 25)
9.5 In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous
drug itself. The corpus delicti is established by proof that the identity and integrity of the
prohibited or regulated drug seized or confiscated from the accused has been preserved; hence,
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the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug to
prove its case against the accused. The prosecution can only forestall any doubts on the
identity of the dangerous drug seized from the accused to that which was presented before the
trial court if it establishes an unbroken chain of custody over the seized item. (People vs.
Asjali, G.R. No. 216430, 03 September 2018)
10. Conspiracy.
10.1 Conspiracy to commit a crime is not punishable unless there is a law that specifically provides
a penalty therefor. However, if the crime subject of the conspiracy has actually been
committed, it shall be deemed absorbed in the crime and shall become a manner of incurring
criminal liability. In such case, all persons who may have participated therein shall be held
equally liable regardless of the extent, nature or degree of their participation.
10.2 Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless
abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy,
he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. (People vs. Vasquez, 430 SCRA 52)
10.2 It is not necessary to prove a previous agreement to commit a crime if there is proof
that the malefactors have acted in concert and in pursuance of the common objectives. Direct proof is
not essential to show conspiracy since it is by its nature often planned in utmost secrecy and it can
seldom be proved by direct evidence. (People vs. Yu, 428 SCRA 437)
10.3 There is an implied conspiracy when two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, are in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment. In other words, there must be unity of purpose and unity in
the execution of the unlawful objective. (People vs. Bermudo, G.R. No. 225322, 04 July 2018)
10.4 To hold one as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he

performed an overt act in pursuance of or in furtherance of the conspiracy, although the acts performed
might have been distinct and separate. This overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting a moral ascendance over the other
co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. (People vs, Raguro, G.R.
No. 224301, 30 July 2019)
10.5 Mere presence at the scene of the crime is not, by itself, sufficient to establish
conspiracy. There must evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an
illegal act is required. Knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. (People vs. Escobal, G.R. No.
206292, 11 October 2017)
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Part II
Revised Penal Code – Book 1
11. Praeter intentionem.
11.1 Any person may be held liable for an intentional felony although the wrong done is not
intended by him, if:
1. he has committed an intentional felony;
2. the wrong done or injury caused is the direct, natural or logical consequence of the felony
committed; or
if the intentional felony committed is the proximate cause of the injury or damage incurred by
the victim.
Notes: (a) Although the accused may be held guilty of the offense which he did not intend to commit,
he may however be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of “no intent to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed” under par. 3 of Art. 13 of the RPC. (b) If the accused has performed an act which
does not constitute an intentional felony but which, through his negligence or imprudence, has
resulted to the death of or infliction of physical injuries upon the victim, he may be held liable for
Reckless Imprudence/Negligence resulting to Homicide/Physical Injuries, a culpable felony.
11.2 Proximate cause is the causal connection between the felonious act and the resultant injury,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. “Efficient intervening cause”: [a] deliberate act
of the offended party; or [b] an active force based on an act or fact absolutely foreign from the
criminal act. The following preexisting conditions may not be efficient intervening causes: [i]
pathological condition of the victim; [ii] predisposition of the offended party; [iii] physical
condition of the offended party; [iv] concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the
negligence or fault of the doctors; or [v] the conditions supervening the felonious act such as
tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene. (Quinto vs. Andres, 453 SCRA 511)
12. Impossible crimes.
12.1 In impossible crimes, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. That the
offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be in impossible under this clause, the act
intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must
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be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act
in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is
to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act, (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does
not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor
or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who
puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds the
pocket empty. (Intod vs. CA, 215 SCRA 52)
13. Stages of execution.
13.1 The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident
other than his spontaneous desistance.
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed. (Macapagal-Arroyo vs. Sandiganbayan, 797 SCRA 241)
13.2 The elements of a frustrated felony as the following:
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;

2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. (People vs.
Caballero,
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400SCRA 424)
13.3 Stages of execution in Homicide cases.
2. If the intended victim survives, the accused is guilty thereof eitherattempted
in its or
frustratedstage only.
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2.1
Frustrated Homicide. The accused is deemed to have performed all acts of execution
which would have produced the felony of Homicide, etc. if the wound sustained by the
victim is fatal or mortal, which could have caused his instantaneous death where it not
for a cause independent of the offender’s will, say, timely medical intervention.
2.2 Attempted Homicide. The accused has not performed all the acts of execution where the
wound inflicted on the victim is not fatal or mortal, or even if the latter has not
incurred any injury.
3. In attempted and frustrated homicide, there must always be intent to kill. Otherwise, the accused
may be held guilty of physical injuries or other lesser offenses only. However, the accused
may be held liable for Homicide, Infanticide or Parricide, even absent intent to kill, if the death
of the victim resulted under the circumstances referred to in Art. 4, par. 1 of the RPC. In
Murder in whatever stage, intent to kill is essential. (Ticman, The Preweek Reviewer for
Jittery Bar Takers, Vol. III, 2021 ed., pp. 191-192)
13.4 Theft or Robbery has no frustrated stage. They are either attempted or consummated. It is
already produced upon the “taking of personal property of another xxx.” There was no need for
permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or
disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner is enough to constitute the crime in its consummated
stage. (Valenzuela vs. People, 525 SCRA 306)
13.5 There is no frustrated stage in Rape; it is either attempted or consummated. For its
consummation, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male
organ is sufficient. It is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of
execution were performed. (People vs. Orita, 184 SCRA 114)
14. Justifying circumstances.
14.1 Self-defense. The elements of self-defense are: (1) that the victim has committed unlawful
aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming
self-defense; (2) that there be reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming
self-defense be not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression. While all
three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may
be successfully pleaded (People vs. Asis, 634 SCRA 491)
14.2 Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical
injury upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful
aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful
intent to cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, which puts the defendant’s life in real peril. (Manaban vs. CA, 494 SCRA 503)
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14.3 A mere threatening or intimidating attitude or an exchange of insulting words and invectives
between the accused and victim, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as
unlawful aggression, unless coupled with physical assault. (People vs. CA and Tangan, 352
SCRA 599)
14.4 The unlawful aggression must be continuing or must have been existing at the time the defense
is made. Once unlawful aggression ceases, the one making the defense no longer has any right
to injure, much less kill the victim. (People vs. San Juan, 386 SCRA 400; People vs. Dijan,
383 SCRA 15)
14.5 In defense of property rights, unlawful aggression as an element thereof need not be coupled
with an attack upon the person making such defense. (People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389)
14.6 The means employed to repel the unlawful aggression must be reasonable and necessary. It
does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the
law requires is a rational equivalence, considering certain factors, such as: the emergency, the
imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct more than reason,
that moves or impels the defense. The proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the
harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such injury.
(Velasquez vs. People, G.R. No. 195021, 15 March 2017).
14.7 When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential
element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the
wrongful act and should immediately precede the act. This third requisite of self-defense is
present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if
provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it
was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by
the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.
(Urbano vs. People, 576 SCRA 826)
14.8 State of necessity. The infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or
injury may not befall one’s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least
possible prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or
injury to another or, if there is no such other way but the damage to another may be minimized while
avoiding an evil or injury to one’s self, then such course should be taken. (People vs. Punzalan, 687
SCRA 675)
14.9 If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future,
this defense is not applicable. For the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury
feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful
inaction of the actor. (Ty vs. People, 439 SCRA 220)
14.10 Fulfillment of duty. The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
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lawful exercise of a right or office rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his
duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused, or the offense committed
is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right
or office. (Mamangun vs. People, 514 SCRA 44)
14.11 Obedience to order. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following requisites
must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some lawful
purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful. (Ambil vs.
Sandiganbayan, 653 SCRA 576).
14.12 Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its
illegality,
the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.
(Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332)
14. Exempting circumstances.
14.1 Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing
the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because
there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost
consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. Thus, in order to lend credence to a defense of
insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his or her acts. (People vs. Umawid, 725 SCRA 597)
14.2 Age of the offender/child in conflict with the law as a circumstance which may affect
his criminal liability.
Age Extenuating Circumstance

15 years or below (Sec. 6, R.A. 9344) Exempting
Over 15 years but under 18 years, who acted without
discernment. (Sec. 6, R.A. 9344)
Exempting
Over 15 years but under 18 years, who acted with
discernment. (Sec. 6, R.A. 9344)
Privileged Mitigating
Under 18 years (for the crimes of prostitution [Art. Exempting
202, RPC], mendicancy [PD 1563] and sniffing rugby
[PD 1619]), with or without discernment.
(Sec. 58, R.A. 9344)
Over 18 years but under 70 years Full responsibility
Over 70 years (Art. 13 [2], RPC) Generic Mitigating
(Ticman, The Preweek Reviewer for Jittery Bar Takers, Vol. III, 2021 ed., p. 199)
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14.3 The existence of Accident must be proved by the appellant to the satisfaction of the
court. For this to be properly appreciated in appellant’s favor, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is caused by mere
accident; and (3) that there was no fault or intent on his part to cause the injury. The accused must
convincingly prove the presence of these elements in order to benefit from the exempting circumstance
of accident. (People vs. Latosa, 621 SCRA 586)
14.4 Irresistible force and uncontrollable fear. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must
be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in
equal combat. A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future injury, is insufficient. (People
vs. Dequina, 640 SCRA 111; People vs. Licayan, 764 SCRA 227). Additionally, the fear of an injury
is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed.
15. Mitigating circumstances.
15.1 No intent to commit so grave a wrong. In homicide cases, the determination of the real
intention of the offender may be based on the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the
injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. In other cases, the utterances and/or demeanor of
the accused, before, during or after the commission of the crime may be considered. This
circumstance is always appreciated in favor of the accused if he incurs criminal liability for an
offense which he does not intend to commit under par. 1 of Art. 4 of the RPC (praeter
intentionem).
15.2 Threats and provocation. Before the same can be appreciated, the following elements must
concur: (1) That the provocation or threat must be sufficient or proportionate to the crime
committed and adequate to arouse one to its commission; (2) That the provocation or threat
must originate from the offended party; and (3) That the provocation must be immediate to the
commission of the crime by the person provoked.
(People vs. Beltran, 503 SCRA 715).
15.3 The threat must not be offensively and positively strong, i.e., such is not accompanied by an
act manifesting the intention of the victim of making good of his threat. Otherwise, the threat
may constitute unlawful aggression that could give rise to self-defense.
15.4 Vindication of a grave offense. For such to be credited, the following requisites must be
satisfied: (1) that there be a grave offense done to the one committing the felony, his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees; and (2) that the felony is committed in vindication of such
grave offense. (Napone vs. People, G.R. No. 193085, 29 November 2017)
15.5 A lapse of time is allowed between the grave offense and the vindication if the influence
thereof, by reason of its gravity and the circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted until
the moment crime was committed.
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15.6 Passion or obfuscation. For this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown
that (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the
intended victim; (2) that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the
commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused’s mind; and that
(3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of
lawlessness or revenge. To be entitled to this mitigating circumstance, the following elements
must be present: (1) There should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind; (2) the act that produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity. (People vs. Gonzalez, 359 SCRA 220; People vs. Cuasay, 569
SCRA 870)
15.7 Provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances.
Wellsettled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should
be treated together as one mitigating circumstance xxx and not as two separate mitigating
circumstances. (Romera vs. People, 434 SCRA 467)
15.8 Voluntary surrender. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following
elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders
himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary. To be
sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the
intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt
or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in
searching for and capturing them. (People vs. Casta, 565 SCRA 341) If none of these two (2)
reasons impelled the accused to surrender, because his surrender was obviously motivated
more by an intention to insure his safety, his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not
spontaneous. (Belbis vs. People, 685 SCRA 518)
15.9 The filing of information and/or the issuance of warrant will not automatically make the
surrender involuntary. Despite the pendency of an arrest warrant, the accused may still be
entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts
surrounding the very act of giving himself up, such as, if immediately upon learning that a
warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him, he
surrendered to the authorities. (De Vera vs. De Vera, 584 SCRA 506)
15.10 Confession of guilt. To be entitled to such mitigating circumstance, the accused must have
voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution. The following requirements must therefore concur: (1) the accused spontaneously
confessed his guilt; (2) the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before a
competent court trying the case; and (3) the confession of guilt was made prior to the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution. (People vs. Montinola, 360 SCRA 631). To be
voluntary, the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged. People vs. Dawaton, 389 SCRA
277).
15.11 Similar and analogous circumstances. Although restitution is akin to voluntary surrender,
restitution (Malversation, Theft, Robbery and Estafa) should be treated as a separate mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused when the two circumstances are present in a case, which
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is similar to instances where voluntary surrender and plea of guilty are both present even
though the two mitigating circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code. Considering that restitution is also tantamount to an admission of guilt on
the part of the accused, it is proper to consider it as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor
of the accused. (Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, 672 SCRA 270)
16. Aggravating Circumstances.
16.1 Abuse of Public Position. To appreciate this aggravating circumstance, the public officer must
use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him as a means by which he
realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry “Did the accused
abuse his office to commit the crime?” (People vs. Villamor, 373 SCRA 254) If the accused
could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his position, there is no abuse of
public position. (People vs. Amion, 353 SCRA 410)
16.2 In contempt of or with insult to public authorities. The requisites of this

circumstance are: (1) the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2) he is not the
person against whom the crime is committed. (People vs. De Mesa, 354 SCRA 397)
16.3 Disregard of Age or Sex. Anent the circumstance of age, there must be a showing that the
malefactor deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. Neither could
disregard of respect due to sex be appreciated if the offender did not manifest any intention to
offend or disregard the sex of the victim. In other words, killing a woman is not attended by
the aggravating circumstance if the offender did not manifest any specific insult or disrespect
towards the offended party’s sex. (People vs. Taboga, 376 SCRA 500)
16.4 Dwelling. It Includes every dependency of the house that forms an integral part thereof,
including the staircase of the house and its terrace. (People vs. Rios, 333 SCRA 823). It may
also mean temporary dwelling; it may be aggravating even if the victim was not the owner of
the house where the crime was committed, be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bedspacer, as what
the law seeks to protect is the sanctity of the home. (People vs. Dela Torre, 373 SCRA 104)
16.5 It is not aggravating if the offended party has given provocation, which must be sufficient, and
have immediately preceded the commission of the crime (People vs. Rios, 333 SCRA 823); if
the building where the crime was committed was NOT solely, entirely and exclusively used for
dwelling purposes (People vs. Taño, 331 SCRA 448); when both offender and offended party
reside in the same house; and In Robbery with use of force upon things and Trespass to
dwelling, because it is inherent in both crimes.
16.6 Abuse of confidence. For this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the
confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the
accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. The confidence
must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the
offended party’s belief that the former would not abuse said confidence. (People vs. Arrojado,
350 SCRA 679)
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16.7 Nighttime, Band, or Uninhabited Place. By and of itself, nighttime (band or uninhabited place)
is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially
sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the
commission of the crime by ensuring the offender’s immunity from capture. (People vs. Silva,
387 SCRA 77). In default of any showing that the peculiar advantage of nighttime was
purposely and deliberately sought by the accused, the fact that the offense was committed at
night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad. To be aggravating, this circumstance must concur
with the intent or design of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded by the
darkness of night. (People vs. Balais, 565 SCRA 555).
16.8 “Aid of armed men”. In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices only. They must not
be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused,
otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. (People vs. Enojas, 718
SCRA 313)
16.9 Distinctions among the forms of repetition.
Habituality (Reiteracion)
Recidivism Quasi- Habitual
Recidivism Delinquency
Accused was previously convicted by final judgment of (a)
crime/s and is convicted anew of another.
Offense
Offense Offense/s which the of which
Offenses
which the accused was previously the
which the
accused punished for and of which accused
accused
was he is convicted anew need was
not be embraced under the was
previousl previousl
same Title of the RPC; previously
y y
both offenses however convicted
convicted convicted
must be punished under of (which
of and of the RPC. and for
should be
which he which he
robbery,
is is serving
theft,
convicted sentence
serious/les
anew is
s serious
must be punished
PI, estafa
embraced under the
or
under the RPC or
falsificatio
same SPL,
n) and of
Title of while the
which he
the RPC. offense
is
that he
convicted
commits
anew
while
must be
serving
punished
sentence
under the
therefor
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must be RPC.
punished
under the
RPC.
Previous Service of sentence is required. Previous Previous
convictio conviction conviction
n by final by final by final
judgment judgment judgment is
is is enough. enough.
enough.
Within 10
No period No period between previous and last convictions. No period years
between between from
previous previous release or
and last and last last
convictio convictio conviction
ns. ns. for
robbery,
xxx,
accused
was found
guilty
thereof, a
third time
or oftener.
Generic Generic Agg. Circ. Special Extra-
Agg. Circ. Agg. Circ. ordinary
Agg. Circ.
Can be Can be offset by Mit. C. Not offset Not offset
offset by by Mit. C. by Mit. C.
Mit. C.
If not If not offset by MC, serves to increase penalty to Serves to
offset by maximum period. increase Additional
MC, penalty to
serves to maximum penalty
increase period. is
penalty to imposed.
maximum
period.
Additional
Always an Not always an Agg. Circ. Always an
penalty
Agg. Circ. Agg. Circ.
is
always
imposed.
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(Ticman, The Preweek Reviewer for Jittery Bar Takers, Vol. III, 2021 ed., pp. 210-211)
16.10 Price, reward or promise. The accused had used money or other valuable consideration for the
purpose of inducing another to perform a criminal act. It is not aggravating if the person
supposedly induced had other personal reasons to commit the crime or if he would have
nonetheless committed the crime with or without such price, reward, or of its offer or promise.
16.11 By means of fire, poison, inundation, explosion, and other artifice involving great waste or
ruin. If the offender, with intent to kill, kills another by means of fire or explosion, he is guilty
of Murder. But if the offender, absent intent to kill, destroys a property by means of fire or
explosion and as a result, a person dies or is killed, he is guilty of Arson with Homicide (a
special complex crime) or Destruction with Homicide (ordinary complex crime), as the case
may be.
16.11 Evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites
must be shown: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse
of time between such a determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to
reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of the will if he desired to hearken to its warning. (People vs. Dimacuha, G.R. No.
191060, 02 February 2015; People vs. Cirbeto, G.R. No. 231359, 08 February 2018).
16.12 Evident premeditation may not be appreciated if the attack was the result of rising tempers or
made in the heat of anger (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 224498, 11 January 2018) as well as if
the victim is different from that intended unless if it is shown that the accused was determined
to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance.
(People vs. Ventura, 433 SCRA 389)
16.13 Abuse of superior strength/Means to weaken defense. They may be taken as

one and the same aggravating circumstance. Employment of means to weaken the defense is, at the
very least, subsumed under the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. In determining
whether the qualifying circumstance of employing means to weaken the defense is present, the Court is
guided by the same standard in determining the presence of abuse of superior strength, i.e., notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous
to the aggressor's and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the
crime. (People vs. Maron, G.R. No. 232339, 20 November 2019)
16.14 Abuse of superior strength is appreciated whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and his aggressors, and the latter took advantage of such inequality to
facilitate the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength means to
purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. Unlike in treachery, where the victim was not given the opportunity to defend
himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the
victim was completely defenseless. It is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural
strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the
employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. (People vs.
Pagapulaan, G.R. No. 216936, 29 July 2019).
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16.15 An attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in
the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. (People vs.
Enojo, G.R. No. 240231, 27 November 2019)
16.16 Treachery. It is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make In turn, its elements are: (1) employment of means, method or manner of
execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on
the part of the victim; and (2) deliberate adoption of such means, method or manner of
execution. In other words, the means of attack, consciously adopted by the assailant, rendered
the victim defenseless. (People vs, Bermudo, G.R. No. 225322, 04 July 2018). It is not
enough that the attack was "sudden," "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation."
(People vs. Bagabay, G.R. No. 236297, 17 October 2018)
16.17 There can be no treachery when the victim was "forewarned of the danger he was in," "put on
guard," or otherwise "could anticipate aggression from the assailant" as when "the assault is
preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the
victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former." (People vs. Jaurigue, G.R.
No. 232380, 04 September 2019)
16.18 Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his
person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate. The essence of treachery lies on the deliberate, swift, and
unexpected attack on the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim, leaving the latter no
chance to resist or escape. (People vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 224289, 14 August 2019)
16.19 Cruelty. For cruelty to exist, there must be proof showing that the accused delighted in
making their victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and moral
pain in the consummation of the criminal act. (People vs. Catian, 374 SCRA 514). The crime is
not aggravated by cruelty simply because the victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of which
were fatal. For cruelty to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof
that, in inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the perpetrator intended to exacerbate the
pain and suffering of the victim. The number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not proof of
cruelty. (Simangan vs. People, 434 SCRA 38).
17. Alternative Circumstances.
They are those which must be taken into consideration as (generic) aggravating or (generic) mitigating
according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission.
They are: (1) Relationship, (2) Intoxication, and (3) Degree of instruction and education.
17.1 Intoxication. It is the consumption of such quantity of any alcoholic beverage as to blur one’s
reason and deprive him of certain degree of control.
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17.2 It is mitigating if it is not habitual and not intentional, i.e., not subsequent to the plan to
commit a crime; it is aggravating if it is habitual or intentional, i.e., subsequent to the plan to
commit a crime.
18. Persons Criminally Liable.
18.1 As to the Degree of Participation.
PRINCIPALS ACCOMPLICES ACCESSORIES

Conspirators NOT conspirators NOT conspirators
Participate before, during or Participate before or during the Participate after the
after the commission of the commission of the crime. commission of the crime.
crime.
May be liable for May be liable for May be liable for
consummated, frustrated and consummated, frustrated and consummated and frustrated
attempted felonies. attempted felonies. felonies only.
May be liable for Grave, Less May be liable for Grave, Less May be liable for Grave and
Grave and Light Grave and Light Felonies. Less Grave Felonies only.
Felonies.
Penalty: that prescribed by law Penalty: one (1) degree lower Penalty: two (2) degrees
for the offense. than that prescribed by law for lower than that prescribed by
principals. law for principals.
18.2 Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered principals by
direct participation if the following requisites are present: [a] they participated in the criminal
resolution and [b] they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts
which directly tended to the same end. (People vs. Dacillo, 427 SCRA 528)
18.3 Even if there is no conspiracy, one is criminally liable as principal by direct participation if he
performs overt acts which produce the crime. It is sufficient if said acts contributed to the
accomplishment of the crime and thus is liable therefor by reason of his individual and
separate overt criminal acts. (People vs. Cabareño, 349 SCRA 297)
18.4 The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires [a] that the inducement be
made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and [b] that such
inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor. Inducement
may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or agreement for consideration. The
words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct
participation. (Ambagan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, 14 October 2015; People vs.
Batin, 539 SCRA 272)
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18.5 To be regarded as an accomplice, it must be shown that (i) he knew the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, and concurred with the latter in his purpose; (ii) he cooperated
in the execution by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or
moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (iii) his acts bore a direct
relation with the acts done by the principal. (Gurro vs. People, G.R. Nos. 224562 and 237216,
September 18, 2018). An accomplice needs to have had both knowledge of and participation in
the criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in
conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were
united in their criminal design. (People vs. Tolentino, 380 SCRA 171).
18.6 Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct
participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then
does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether
the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct
participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. However, where one cooperates in the
commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution,
he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice. (People vs. Pilola, 405
SCRA 134).
18.7 Conspirators vs. Accomplices. Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they
know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention
because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know
about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate
in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime;
accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of
the offense. (People vs. Salvador, 695 SCRA 660)
18.8 Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an accessory as one who had knowledge of the
commission of the crime and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice,
yet took part subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting oneself or
assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the
body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and
(3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory, the following
elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the crime and (2) subsequent
participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes. (People vs. Tolentino, 380 SCRA
171).
19. Multiple Offenses.
19.1 Complex crimes under Art. 48 of the RPC, as distinguished from special complex crimes and
continuous crimes.
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Ordinary Complex Crimes Special Complex Crimes or Continued or Continuous

Composite Crimes Crimes
Two or more crimes are actually committed, yet, in the eyes of the law, they constitute only one
crime. Thus, only one penalty is imposed.
They result from (1) a single
act constituting 2 or more grave They result from different acts They result from different acts
or less grave felonies or that one offense may not be or a series of acts but all arising
[compound crimes]; or (2) the necessary for the commission from one criminal resolution.
commission of an offense as a of another crime.
necessary means of committing
another crime [complex crime
proper].
The combination of the
offenses is not specified but The composition of which is
generalized, i.e., grave and/or not specified by law; 2 or more
The composition of the offenses
less grave, or one offense being violations of the same penal
is fixed by law.
the necessary means to commit provision.
the other.
The penalty is that
corresponding
to the more/most serious The penalty is specific, i.e., that The penalty is specific, i.e., that
offense, to be imposed in the which is prescribed by law. which is prescribed by law for
maximum period. the offense.
Light felonies are treated as a
separate offense, except in Light felonies are absorbed. N/A
quasidelicts.
Applicable to crimes under the Applicable to crimes under the Applicable to crimes under the
RPC. RPC and SPL. RPC and SPL.
Examples: RPC – Theft of 2 or
Examples: Multiple murder, Examples: RPC – Robbery more personal properties from
Direct Assault w/Homicide, w/Homicide, Rape w/ the same place and at the same
Forcible Abduction w/Rape, Homicide, Kidnapping w/Rape; period; SPL – viol. of Sec. 3
Theft thru Falsification of SPL – Carnapping w/ (e),
Homicide (R.A. R.A. 3019 [Santiago vs.
Commercial Document.
10883) Garchitorena: favoring 32
unqualified aliens with the
benefits of the Alien
Legalization Program]
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19.2 Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done
in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to
a single complex offense. (People vs. Sanidad, 402 SCRA 381)
19.3 In forcible abduction with rape, forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus,
the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible
abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the
forcible abduction. (People vs. Garcia, 378 SCRA 266)
19.4 There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, because the
immediate effect of falsification of private document is the same as that of estafa. The
falsification of a private document cannot be said to be a means to commit estafa, because the
fraudulent gain obtained through deceit in estafa, in the commission of which a private
document was falsified, is nothing more nor less than the very damage caused by the
falsification of such document. (L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code-Criminal Law, Book II,
2021 ed., p. 292). If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit
estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without
the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. (Batulanon vs.
People, 502 SCRA 35)
19.5 In Quasi-delicts, light felonies are not treated and punished as offenses separate from grave
and less grave felonies. (Ivler vs. San Pedro, 635 SCRA 191)
20. Preventive imprisonment (Art. 29, RPC)
20.1 It is detention of the accused while being prosecuted for a crime, either because he is charged
of a non-bailable offense or if bailable, he cannot put up the required bail.
20.2 The period during which the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment may be deducted
from the penalty to which he is sentenced, as follows: [a] FULL TIME of preventive
imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, unless - (a) he is a recidivist, or has been convicted
previously twice or more times of any crime, and (b) when, upon being summoned for the
execution of his sentence, he has failed to surrender voluntarily, OR [b] 4/5 of the period of
preventive imprisonment, if he does not agree in writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
21. Penalties.
21.1 Although reclusion perpetua has a definite duration, it remains to be an indivisible penalty and,
when it is the prescribed penalty, should be imposed in its entirety without a fixed period for
its duration, regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended
the commission of the crime. In prescribing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, its duration in
years need not be specified. (People vs. Zacarias, 375 SCRA 278)
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21.2 Order of payment of pecuniary liabilities: [1] Reparation of the damage caused, [2]
Indemnification of consequential damages, [3] FINE, [4] Cost of the proceedings.
21.3 Subsidiary imprisonment. In case failure to pay FINE, the convict shall be subjected to
subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for each amount equivalent to the highest
minimum wage rate in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by
the trial court.
21.4 Limitations: [1] if the penalty is prision correccional, arresto mayor or arresto menor and
FINE, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed 1/3 of the sentence and in no case shall it
continue for more than one year; [2] if the penalty is FINE only: not more than 6 months for
grave or less grave felony; [3] no subsidiary imprisonment if the penalty is prison mayor or
higher; and [4] if the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case
of failure to pay the penalty of fine. (People vs. Alapan, G.R. No. 199527, 10 January 2018)
21.5 Indeterminate Sentence Law (IS Law); Disqualified offenders: {1} those convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life imprisonment (and reclusion perpetua, as it is equated as
synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of the IS Law. [People vs. Enriquez, 465 SCRA
407]) {2} if the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year; {3} those
convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; {4} those convicted of
misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; {5} those convicted of piracy; {6}
those who are habitual delinquents; {7} those have escaped from confinement or evaded
sentence; and {8} those who have violated the terms of conditional pardon granted to them.
21.6 Rules on the application of the IS Law.
21.6.1 RPC - Maximum term: the appropriate period of the prescribed

penalty, after appreciating mitigating and/or aggravating
circumstance/s, if any;
Minimum term: within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty.
21.6.2 SPL - Maximum term: not to exceed the prescribed penalty;

Minimum term: not less than the prescribed penalty.
21.7 In both cases, it is mandatory that the minimum and maximum terms be specified. “The need
for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent
the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness
of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon
his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record.” (Luy vs. People, 805 SCRA 710)
21.8 When an offense is defined in a special law, but the penalty therefor is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the RPC, the legal effects under the system of penalties relative to the Code
would necessarily apply to the special law. (People vs. Padlan, G.R. No. 214880, 06
September 2017).
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22. Service of Sentence.
22.1 In case the offender is sentenced to suffer multiple penalties, they may be served
SIMULTANEOUSLY, if the nature of the penalty permits it, such as perpetual and temporary
disqualifications, suspension, destierro, public censure, fine, and bond to keep the peace, civil
interdiction, and confiscation and payment of costs. Otherwise, they are to be served
SUCCESSIVELY, in the order of the penalties’ severity, with the most severe penalty to be
served first.
22.2 Limitation: the maximum duration shall not be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed, which shall not exceed 40 years.
22.3 Probation Law; Disqualified offenders: {1} those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than 6 years; {2} those convicted of any crime against the national
security; {3} those previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of more than 6 months and 1 day and/or a fine of more than ₱1,000.00; and {4}
those who are once on probation
22.4 The application for probation must be [i] in writing and filed with the [ii] court which rendered
judgment [iii] within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal (15 days).
22.5 Probation may be granted whether the sentence is imprisonment or fine (for subsidiary
imprisonment).
22.6 The filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of right to appeal. Reasons: (1)
Appeal and Probation are mutually exclusive remedies as they rest on diametrically opposed
legal positions. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused
for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction [Almero vs. People, 718 SCRA 698]; (2)
Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for probation. This is totally in
accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976, as amended),
which in part provides that the filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal. Thus, there was no more opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to
appeal, the judgment having become final by the filing of an application for probation. [Vicoy
vs. People, 383 SCRA 707]
22.7 Gen. Rule: No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the accused has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Exception: When a judgment imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed, and

such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty.
Exception to the exception: Where there are several accused where some have taken
further appeal (and obtained a modified judgment, i.e., from nonprobationable to
probationable penalty), the other accused (who did not appeal) may, upon application,
be granted probation.
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23. Total Extinction of Criminal Liability.
23.1 Effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities:
“1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in sensa strictiore."
“2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability 'may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a. Law
b.Contracts
c. Quasi-contracts
d.xxx
e. Quasi-delicts
“3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.
“4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.” (People vs. Monroyo,
G.R. No. 223708, 09 October 2019)
23.2 Prescription of crimes. The period of prescription starts to run from the date of the discovery
of the crime by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. It is interrupted by the filing
of the – {a} complaint (with the prosecutor’s office for purposes of inquest or preliminary
investigation), or {b} information (only in those cases governed by the Rules of Summary
Procedure or those where direct filing is allowed [Jadewell Parking Systems vs. Lidua, 706
SCRA 724]). Unless the offender is absent from the Philippines, it commences to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted or is
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him and for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
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23.3 Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall “commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, xxx.” In People v. Reyes, this Court has declared that registration in public registry is
a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of
what it contains. (Recebido vs. People, 346 SCRA 881)
23.4 Prescription of penalties. The period of prescription begins to run only when the convict
evades the service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. It is interrupted if
the convict, before the expiration of the period – (a) surrenders, (b) is captured, (c) goes to
foreign country with which the Philippines has no extradition treaty, or (d) commits another
crime (other than Evasion of Service of Sentence under Art. 157, RPC).
23.5 Prescription of penalties applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are
serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of
penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term
of his sentence. One who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom. (Pangan vs. Gatbalite, 449 SCRA 144; Del Castillo vs. Torrecampo and People,
394 SCRA 221)
23.6 Marriage of the offended woman under Art. 344. Felonies wherein valid marriage between the
offended woman and offender extinguishes the criminal liability are: (a) Acts of lasciviousness
[Art. 336], (b) Consented Acts of lasciviousness [Art. 339], (c) Qualified Seduction [Art. 337],
(d) Simple Seduction [Art. 338], (e) Forcible Abduction [Art. 342], and (f) Consented
Abduction [Art. 343] and (g) Rape [Arts. 266-A and 266-B, in relation to Art, 266C]. Except
in Rape, the extinction of criminal action and liability by virtue of marriage extends to the co-
principals, accomplices, and accessories.
23.7 Absolute Pardon vs. Amnesty. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take
no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence
of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted
to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who
may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender
from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or
forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ‘not work the restoration of the rights to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon,’ and it ‘in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence’ (Article 36, RPC). While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense. (People vs. Patriarca, 341 SCRA 464)
24. Partial extinction of criminal liability.
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24.1 Conditional pardon. It is akin to absolute pardon, except that it: (a) has conditions that need to
be complied with; (b) must be accepted by grantee; and (c) is revocable. Violation of
conditions of such pardon is dealt with under Art. 159, RPC.
24.2 Commutation of sentence. An act of Chief Executive of reducing the degree of the penalty
inflicted upon the convict, by decreasing the length of imprisonment or the amount of fine.
24.3 Good conduct time allowances (GCTA). These are deductions from the term of the sentence
for good behavior and for study, teaching or mentoring service rendered, while undergoing
preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.
24.4 Special Time Allowance for Loyalty (STAL). This entitles a convict to a 2/5 or 1/5 deduction,
as the case may be, from his original sentence, if he stays in the penal facility on the occasion
of disorder, or after having left the facility on such occasion, returns thereto within 48 hours
following proclamation of the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe. (Art. 98, as amended by R.A. No. 10592). If the convict does not return within
the time allowed, he shall suffer an increase of 1/5 of the remaining term of sentence, not to
exceed 6 months. (Art. 158, RPC).
24.5 Parole. It relates to the suspension of the sentence and release of a convict after serving the
minimum penalty, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence shall be suspended, as
authorized by the Board of Pardons and Parole. (Sec. 5, Act No. 4103).
25. Subsidiary Civil Liability.
25.1 Proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons criminally liable, proprietors of

establishments are civilly liable for: (a) crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall
have been committed by their employees; and/or (b) restitution of goods taken through robbery
or theft from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have: [i] notified in advance the establishment, of the deposit of such goods
therein; and [ii] followed the directions which it may have given the guests with respect to the
care and vigilance over such goods. However, proprietors incur no civil liability in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
establishment's employees.
25.1 Employers. The subsidiary civil liability of employer is enforceable in the same criminal
proceeding where the award is made. However, before execution against an employer ensues, there
must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of [1] the existence of an employer-employee
relationship; [2] that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; [3] that the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and [4] that said
employee is insolvent. (Basilio vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 341). The determination of these
conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal and
civil, has been pronounced xxx, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the
execution of the judgment. (Calang and Philtranco vs. People, 626 SCRA 679)
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25.1.1 Employers are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed
in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent
of supplying the latter’s lawyers, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf,
but can only defend the accused. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. People, 427 SCRA 526)
25.1.2 Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense on the
part of the employer and may not free the latter from subsidiary liability for the employee’s
civil liability in a criminal action. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary
liability – Articles 102 and 103 – are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which
they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not
expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer (Pangonorom and MMTC vs.
People, 455 SCRA 211), as it is deemed written therein.
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#updated080122/villasis
Page 28 of 28

VLC-PBR2022-BNB-CRIMINAL-LAW-Criminal-Law-I-Prof. Modesto A. Ticman, JR

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BAR REVIEW NOTES AND CASES ON

By: Prof. MODESTO A. TICMAN, JR.

1. Significant Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Enact Penal Laws.

1.3 No person shall be imprisoned for debt.

1.4 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

2. Characteristics of Philippine Criminal Laws.

2.2.2 Exceptions to the exceptions: Treaties and laws of preferential application.

3. Interpretation of Penal Laws.

5. Motive vs. Intent.

6. Mala in se vs. mala prohibita.

7. Entrapment vs. Instigation.

10.4 To hold one as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he

Revised Penal Code – Book 1

11. Praeter intentionem.

1. he has committed an intentional felony;

12. Impossible crimes.

13. Stages of execution.

13.1 The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

13.2 The elements of a frustrated felony as the following:

1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;

14. Justifying circumstances.

14. Exempting circumstances.

Age Extenuating Circumstance

15. Mitigating circumstances.

16. Aggravating Circumstances.

16.2 In contempt of or with insult to public authorities. The requisites of this

16.13 Abuse of superior strength/Means to weaken defense. They may be taken as

17. Alternative Circumstances.

18. Persons Criminally Liable.

18.1 As to the Degree of Participation.

PRINCIPALS ACCOMPLICES ACCESSORIES

19. Multiple Offenses.

Ordinary Complex Crimes Special Complex Crimes or Continued or Continuous

20. Preventive imprisonment (Art. 29, RPC)

21.6 Rules on the application of the IS Law.

21.6.1 RPC - Maximum term: the appropriate period of the prescribed

21.6.2 SPL - Maximum term: not to exceed the prescribed penalty;

Exception: When a judgment imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed, and

23.1 Effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities:

24. Partial extinction of criminal liability.

25. Subsidiary Civil Liability.

25.1 Proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons criminally liable, proprietors of

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