Eleonora Montuschi

12. What is Wrong with Talking of Metaphors in

Science?

Models and Theoretical Terms are "Like Metaphors":

the Received View in the Realist Domain

Philosophers of science of the post-positivist tradition have

been concerned with a critique of the logico-positivist pattern
of empirical meaning and, at the same time, with an analysis of
the procedures by which new terminology, especially explana-
tory terminology, is introduced into the vocabulary of science.
In pursuing either interest, metaphor became a useful and in-
structive domain of inquiry. The relevant ground was prepared
by M. Black, who first drew attention to the similarities be-
tween the use of "interactive" metaphors in common and liter-
ary discourse, and the use of models in scientific language1.
This analogy was taken up by post-positivist philosophers,
especially of the realist school, and developed in two main ar-
eas: the constructive function of models in theoretical explana-
tions; and the introduction of meaningful expressions in scien-
tific vocabulary by means of procedures which are neither nec-
essarily nor primarily observational, or empirical. Mary Hesse
has emphasised the relation between metaphor and model;
whereas Richard Boyd has more specifically discussed the re-
lation between metaphor and theoretical terms. Both views are
well known among "metaphorologists", and have been widely
debated in the past years. I will briefly recall some of the main
features of each view, in order to be able to point out an aspect

1 Black, M., Models and Metaphors, Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press,

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310 Eleonora Montuschi

which is common to both: namely, the fact that metaphor is

called into question as a descriptive criterion to be used
paradigmatically, and to some extent metalinguistically. In
other words, metaphor is primarily used as a model for mod-
els, as well as a model for theoretical terms.
In Hesse2 the structure of an interactive metaphor is used to
"write out" the structure of a scientific theory: the principal
subject (or primary system) of the metaphor is related to the
domain of the explanandum, and expressed in observational
terms; the secondary subject (or system) is related to the ex-
planans, and it is expressed either in observational terms or in
the language of a familiar theory. The model "takes off" from
the latter system: by virtue of a principle of "assimilation", the
two systems interact in such a way that features of the sec-
ondary system are "transferred" (selectively) to the primary,
to such an extent that the latter becomes describable through
the "frame" provided by the former. Examples of the relation
between the two systems are of the following kind: "Sound
(primary system) propagates via ondulatory motion (sec-
ondary system); "gases are collections of particles with random
movement"', etc.
In Boyd3, the mechanism of interactive metaphors is said to
display a strong "parallelism" to the procedure by means of
which theoretical terms are introduced and used in scientific
discourse. This parallelism is prompted by the fact that both
metaphors and theoretical terms provide "epistemic access" to
the identification of possible, or purported referents. This pro-
cedure amounts to acknowledging the role a certain term
(metaphorical or theoretical) plays in a social set-up (a conver-
sation, a poem, a scientific research). Without having to be
"definite descriptions", theoretical terms, like metaphors, still

2 Hesse, M., Models and Analogies in Science, Notre Dame: University of

Notre Dame Press, 1965; and also, by the same author, "A new Look at
Scientific Explanation", Review of Metaphysics, 17 (1963- 64).
3 Boyd, R., "Metaphor and Theory Change: What is "Metaphor" a Meta-
phor for?", in: A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979.
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 12. What is Wrong with Talking of Metaphors in Science? 311

can ensure some kind of continuity in the use of a certain ex-

pression in "approximating" towards a certain, not yet identi-
fied referent. The expression can be taken as a non-definitional
strategy of "reference fixing", by means of which w e accom-
modate our language to the world. So, for example, "gene",
before being or becoming a real entity (gene) is a linguistic,
tentative and provisional (relative to our degree of cognitive
awareness) identification of whatever the real entity will turn
out to be.
The relation between metaphor and scientific models/theo-
retical terms also displays significant differences. It is here that
a sort of "divorce" takes place, such that the price to be paid in
order to maintain the parallelism is to make metaphors "re-
semble" models and theoretical terms, instead of vice versa. So
we are told by Hesse that "metaphorical" models should be
based on some kind of pre-existing similarity, or analogy:
whatever may be the case for poetic uses 4 , "the suggestion that
any scientific model can be imposed apriori on any explanan-
dum and function fruitfully in its explanation must be resisted.
Such a view would imply that theoretical models are irrefutab-
le" 5 . In order to work at an intersubjective level, interactive
models are not meant to shock, or to surprise, by being unex-
pected, striking, or unrepeatable. As a matter of fact, they
should ideally aim at becoming "perfect metaphors", that is
constructs which might eventually or virtually, become literal
interpretations 6 . That is to say, in order to become fully cogni-
tive they should, eventually or virtually, sentence their meta-
phorical nature to death: a constitutive trait of literary meta-
phors is that they are often intentionally imperfect.
Interactive metaphors as models for theoretical models also
face a specific problem of reference. At first sight, we would be

4 So in Black: in some cases "it would be more illuminating [...] to say that
the metaphor creates the similarity than to say it formulates some similarity
antecedently existing", to the extent that even "absurd" conjuctions of
words become intelligible in a metaphor. See, Black, op.cit., p. 37.
5 Hesse, op.tit., p. 161.
6 Hesse, ibid., p. 170.
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312 Eleonora Montuschi

inclined to say that the referent is to be the primary system,

described metaphorically. However, even granting that an in-
teractive metaphor makes us "see" the primary system differ-
ently, we are not justified in claiming that what we see is dif-
ferent: man does not change because we think he is a wolf; and
obviously, even more so in the case of the referents of physical
theories. Here a further distinction between poetic and scien-
tific metaphors is called in, and it concerns the question of
"metaphoric truth": contradiction is inextricable from interac-
tion in poetic metaphors, in a sense which is inapplicable to
scientific metaphors 7. The latter are not "peculiarly subject to
formal contradictoriness", and "their truth criteria, although
not rigourously formalizable, are at least much clearer than in
the case of poetic metaphor" 8 .
As to the relation between metaphors and theoretical terms,
we learn from Boyd that the latter are like catachretical meta-
phors. These, nonetheless, in order to function as theory-con-
stitutive must, first of all, "trade" their "open texture", which
is suggestive of new connotations and of perspective inten-
sional increments, for the acceptance of some criteria of preci-
sion for their use, for instance, some identifiable strategy of
clarification as far as their analogical sources are concerned. So
we read in Boyd that these "theoretical" metaphors can be
clarified in terms of the degrees of explanatory success played
by them in the domain of a theory - where "degrees of ex-
planatory success" becomes the measure, as well as the proof,
of their "open texture". This trade of features is interpreted by
Boyd as a sign of the existence of two different sorts of "open-
endedness": the one pertaining to theory-constitutive meta-
phors can be called "inductive", which is to be distinguished
from the "conceptual" one, pertaining to literary metaphors.
The function of the latter, to say it concisely, "is not typically
to send the reader out on a research programme" - which is
precisely the function of inductive open-endedness.

7 Hesse, ibid., p. 169.

8 Hesse, ibid.
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Besides, theory-constitutive metaphors differ from literary

interaction metaphors in other respects. They do not lose their
insightfulness through overuse: in fact, unlike the latter, the
more they are exploited, the more insight they offer. More-
over, the same group of people who produce them is also in
charge of their explication: in the scientific community, there
is no distinction which resembles that between a poet and his
literary critics, or commentators 9 . It is then on the basis of this
readjustment of features that we are entitled to claim, follow-
ing Boyd's lines, that theory-constitutive metaphors - though
"highly atypical" - are in a sense indistinguishable from other
"typical" uses of scientific language, namely theoretical terms.
We might, at this point, ask ourselves whether, once
"adopted" by science, this is the only way metaphor can be
profitably used in scientific discourse. We introduce metaphor
in order to picture aspects of something else, but then, given
the different nature of this "something else", we force upon
metaphor (in its scientific use) features, or interpretations of
features, which better qualify the "something else" rather than
metaphor. Thus it might seem that the only room left for
"genuine" metaphors in science is that for exegetic, pedagogi-
cal, illustrative, or "cosmetic" ones: that is, classes of meta-
phors which are useful but not essential to scientific discourse.
A different strategy can, I believe, be tried out - that is, differ-
ent from employing metaphor as a remedy for the misfunc-
tionings of logico-positivist notions. By sampling actual cases
of scientific discourse, we might find some of the suggestions
needed in order to build up, and make sense of, a specific ap-
preciation of the role of metaphors qua metaphors in science.

9 For a discussion of the differences between the two types of metaphors, see
Boyd, op.citpp. 361-63.
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314 Eleonora Montuschi

Where to Look for Metaphors in Science:

Non-Paradigmatic Cases

In criticizing Boyd's notion of epistemic access as a metaphor-

like procedure of reference fixing, Kuhn brings forward an in-
teresting notion. He argues against Boyd's distinction between
"genuine" metaphors (theoretical metaphors = theoretical
terms) and illustrative metaphors (illustrative of theoretical
terms, or of theoretically adequate, non-metaphorical termi-
nology) by looking at the "metaphorical mechanisms" under-
lying both classes. For example, the metaphor "atoms are little
solar systems" is, according to Boyd, simply illustrative since,
at the very time when it was suggested, the similarities be-
tween the two "subjects" of the metaphor were known. It is
not that metaphors of this kind lack any theoretical insight,
but the insight does not depend on the "aptness" of the meta-
phor, nor from its "open-endedness": one could "say exactly
in what respects Bohr thought atoms were like solar systems
without employing any metaphorical device"10.
According to Kuhn, the dismissal of the actual metaphor in
favour of a non-metaphorical picture11 does not imply the con-
comitant dismissal of the metaphorical mechanism for identi-
fying, representing, or exploring the theoretical entities in
question. Even the replacing literal model of atoms is not, after
all, so "literal": it was developed, and exploited by following
strategies and procedures similar to those adopted by the re-
placed model. The original metaphor "fixed" a series of traits
and relations which still worked as criteria for meaning con-
struction in non-metaphorical linguistic descriptions.
Kuhn's point can be further extended. In those cases where
the original metaphor has not been abandoned, this is obvi-
ously apparent. In an expression like "light wave" both the
metaphorical expression and the metaphorical mechanism are

10 Boyd, op.cit., p. 359.

11 "Electrons are little interactive charges governed by the laws of mechanics
and electromagnetic theory".
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 12. What is Wrong with Talking of Metaphors in Science? 315

retained in the meaning construction for that expression.

"Light wave" is not, simply, or simplistically, a dead meta-
phor. More complex is the situation where the original meta-
phor is abandoned because it proves to be inadequate (and not
simply inessential), but we nonetheless try to claim that the
circumstances of, and the reasons for abandonment act as in-
structive, and restrictive conditions for the replacing terminol-
ogy. Darwin's metaphor of the cosmic breeder is a pertinent
illustration.
In the Essay of 1842, the comparison between the state of
nature and the domestic state first led to the suggestion of the
figure of a "cosmic" breeder:
But if every plant or animal was to vary, and if a being infinitely more saga-
cious than man (not an omniscient creator) during thousands and thousands of
years were to select all the variations which tended towards certain ends, etc.' 2

The idea of a "cosmic" breeder allows for a series of interesting

theoretical moves. Firstly, the image appears useful in making
consistent two levels of agency in the natural process of evolu-
tion. On the one level, nature would appear as the product of a
determinate will, which reveals itself in a state of perfection,
that is in some natural order. On the other level, this state of
perfection is said to attain via actual processes and agents in
nature (which, in Darwin's theory, correspond to concepts
such as mortality, struggle for life, etc.). Secondly, the image
also contains a means of "self-control" over the possible in-
consistencies, which could arise as a result of the interaction of
the two levels of natural agency just listed. On the one side,
making the "determinate will", which governs natural plans,
subject to an actual performance of natural forces and mecha-
nisms prevents us from thinking of natural order as a sort of
finalistic state of optimality (a picture that Darwin strongly
resisted). On the other side, the fact that natural forces and
mechanisms all relate to some "will" avoids the risk of convey-
ing the impression that nature acts blindly, or capriciously,

12 Darwin, C., The Essay (1842), in: Darwin., F., The Foundations of the Ori-
gin of Species (1909), p. 6.
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316 Eleonora Montuschi

without any intelligible - not necessarily pre-established -

cosmic plan.
It would seem that the metaphor of the cosmic breeder plays
a perfectly suitable, theoretical role. The problem is, however,
that it looks too overtly fictitious, too explicitly rhetorical: al-
most an allegory. It also appears to be excessively loaded: it
forces upon the reader continuous shifts from images to inter-
preted roles, from roles to empirical referents, and from refer-
ents to conjectures about referents. In the Essay, Darwin starts
by acquainting his reader with the expression "natural means
of selection", without, however, letting this take on a theoreti-
cally leading role: the metaphor of the cosmic breeder, and its
related imagery, is central, active and essential in the context of
the Essay. Finally, in the Origin, Darwin will make consistent
use of the expression "natural selection". Here, though, it can
be argued that the analogy introduced and prompted by the
newly replaced metaphor is still, so to speak, guiding the game.
The two terms, which define the new concept, reveal, by
means of a more satisfactory formulation (at least, given the
stage Darwin's theory was at), what the image of the cosmic
breeder implicitely tried to convey: a rule of organization for
the natural process ("selection") and the nature of the means
for its accomplishment ("natural"). Darwin himself would ac-
knowledge this interpretation. In fact, he is aware of the literal
falsity of the expression, when he writes:

In the literal sense of the word, no doubt natural selection is a false term."

Darwin qualifies his claim by generalizing the recourse in sci-

ence to what he himself defines as "metaphorical expressions":
these actually constitute a necessary move, especially in the
process of theory construction.
On the basis of the examples discussed above, it seems that
to questions like "are there metaphors in science?", or "what is
a metaphor in science?", instead of circularly referring back to
models and theoretical terms, we should try to describe what a

13 Darwin, C., Origin of Species, (1982), p. 81.

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 12. What is Wrong with Talking of Metaphors in Science? 317

metaphorical mechanism is, and how, typically, it works in sci-

entific language. This is not to deny that metaphor also might
perform, and sometimes successfully so, a paradigmatic func-
tion in science. It is just to point out that this is not the only or
the best way to assess its scientific role and value.

In Search of a Model for Scientific Metaphor:

a Two-Level Picture

A metaphorical mechanism can be described, and analysed, at

two levels. At a manifest, macroscopic level, it appears to func-
tion as a procedure of conceptual displacement14. Displace-
ment can be described according to a schema articulated in
four different stages: transposition, interpretation, correction
and spelling out.
The first stage consists of the shift of a concept15 into a new
contextual situation, while establishing a relation of compara-
bility between old and new contexts. Transposition is insepa-
rable from the second phase, that is interpretation. This con-
sists of the assignment of a concept from the old cluster to a
specific aspect of the new situation. Transposition and inter-
pretation are, however, subject to a pre-existing structure of
acceptance for the concept in question. The result of the resis-
tance on the part of the structure is an adjustment in the pro-
cess of displacement, called correction. Correction implies
mutual adaptation, and this can take a variety of forms, ac-
cording to the contexts. Finally, when the concept shows itself
to be perfectly "adapted" to the new context, we will say that
it has been spelled out. The spelling out is rarely, or only virtu-

14 I borrow the expression from D. Schon, Displacement of Concepts, Lon-

don: Tavistock Publications, 1965.
15 Schon uses the word "concept" in a very broad way, to include "a child's
first notion of his mother, our notion of the cold war, my daughter's idea
of thing-game, Ralph Ellison's idea of the negro as an invisible man, the
Newtonian theory of light, and the idea of a new mechanical fastener"
(Schon, op cit., p. 4).
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318 Eleonora Montuschi

ally, a completed process. Concepts, in fact, keep on being

moved across contexts.
In order to analyse displacement as a mechanism, rather
than, simply, as a descriptive procedure, we need to take a
closer look at its underlying structure, and try to discover - at
a second, microscopic level of analysis - some generative rule,
inscribed in language, which might be regarded as responsible
for the displacing procedure. J. F. Ross put forward an inter-
esting hypothesis concerning the role of analogy in language,
which he called "meaning-differentiation-in-use" 16 . This hy-
pothesis proves rather useful in order to substantiate the idea
of there being a structure underlying displacement.
In the available corpus of utterances, belonging to a spoken
language, there are sets of same-term occurrences which carry
an internal multiplicity of meanings. This multiplicity carries a
certain regularity, which in its turn governs meaning differen-
tiation. Meaning-difFerentiation-in-use is a generic linguistic
phenomenon, which points out the fact that words, in suitably
contrasting contexts, "differentiate".
Difference in meaning is, comparatively speaking, relative to
the contextual occurrences of a word. A test for this difference
is how closely a word "fits" the context of occurrence. An
appeal to a contextual fit, though, is not sufficient as an ex-
planatory criterion, and observable differences need to be re-
ferred to a more general net of "contrasting adjustments" in
order to be able to point at some principle of relevant diversity
of meaning (or rule of differentiation).
The procedure of displacement can then be reformulated,
using Ross's terminology, as a structure of relations between
sameness as referred to words and differentiation as referred to
meanings. On the basis of this structure, the same word can
activate different meanings if shifted from one context to an-
other. The advantage of this reformulation of displacement
consists in the possibility of identifying the regularity which

16 Ross, J. F., Portraying Analogy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1981.
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 12. What is Wrong with Talking of Metaphors in Science? 319

governs linguistic displacements, by specifying the analogical

procedures underlying the latter.
When the regularities exhibited by the meaning-differentiation-in-use within
sets of same-term occurrences are expressed in law-like or rule-like generaliza-
tions, having "initial conditions" and "derivation conditions" to be satisfied
by a pair of same-term occurrences, we call the resulting rules analogy rules
and say that meaning-differentiation-in-use for sets of same-term occurrences
in English, considered synchronically, occurs on the whole in accordance with
analogy rules. 17

Analogy, however, is also the result - or one of the results -

of the various adaptations of a word to contexts of possible or
actual occurrence. Because of this, we can talk of "analogy-of-
meaning", thus emphasizing the contrasts among discernible
overlaps of context-occurrences of the same term 18 .
At a general level, Ross intends to focus upon the fact that
there is no such a thing as "the meaning" of a word. A word
has no "signification" outside a context, nor any definite deno-
tation. Signification consists of the wide range of possible uses,
delimited by the circumstances of occurrence. A word means
something by contrast to the possible meaning adaptations of
this word to different contexts.
This would explain why analogy can be taken both as a con-
dition or rule for the production of meaning, and as a result of
the process of signification itself. According to the latter,
meanings appear to be analogical schemes of signification in-
duced by context adaptation. As to the former, because of
meaning adaptation, analogy is explanatory of meaning occur-
rences since, according to Ross, it operates somehow causally.
If the sentence frame were written out twice: (iii) " H e dropped his (N.P.)" and
(iv) " H e dropped his (N.P.)", and if (iii) were completed with "friend" and (iv)
with "book", "dropped" in each would have a determinate and different
meaning that could be altered simply by erasing the completion words in the
two cases and interchanging them. The interchange of completion words

17 Ross, J . F., "Analogy and the Resolution of Some Cognitivity Problems",

Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970): 731.
18 Ross, J. F., Portraying Analogy, p. 96.
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320 Eleonora Montuschi

causes "dropped" in (iii) and (iv) to change meaning and displays that semantic
dominance is explanatory."

At a more particular level, Ross points out yet another inter-

esting aspect concerning the relation between interchange (of
words) and change (of meaning). The fact that the same word
can fit different contexts is not evidence for meaning invari-
ance. On the contrary, the interchangeability of words, be-
cause of the analogical factor, provides a criterion for novelty
(meaning variance) which, at the macro-level, can be met —
using Schon's terminology - by the identified status of a dis-
placed concept.
We can now try to understand how a "familiar" concept can
be "carried over as a projective model for a new situation" 20 .
Any concept we use is, so to speak, theory-laden. In Schon"s
words:
It can be spelled out in an almost indefinite series of expectations to the effect
that this would happen, if that is the thing it is thought to be, and such-and-
such were done. 21

The old theory, or a familiar concept, might function as sets of

condensed expectations projected onto a new situation. The
aim is that of "naming" aspects of the new situation, for which
we do not have a pre-existing terminology. The fulfilment of
expectations is the result of a step-by-step appraisal of how
appropriate, and applicable, the old context is to a puzzling
new situation.
Is the idea of a metaphorical mechanism, on the basis of the
features described so far, satisfactorily pictured so as to cap-
ture the movements of non-paradigmatic, "genuine" meta-
phors in scientific discourse? A test would be to attempt to
rethink the examples, discussed in the previous section, in the
light of the newly acquired, tentative descriptive picture. The
relation between modelling and sampling, as a sub-case of the
more general relation between theory and evidence, always

19 Ibid., p. 49.
20 Schon, D. A., op.at., p. 68.
21 Ibid., p. 59.
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 12. What is Wrong with Talking of Metaphors in Science? 321

hides a "contriving" aspect. I do not intend my "test" as a con-

firmation of the model just put forward, but rather as an at-
tempt to discover whether the model might work, at least in
some cases, as a descriptive illustration.

Can we Talk of Metaphors in Science in

Non-Paradigmatic Terms?

I will first summarize the structure outlined for metaphorical

mechanisms by means of the scheme below:

Macro level

transposition

interpretation displaced
Displacement
correction concept

spelling out

Micro level

analogical rules

Meaning- causal adaptation meaning

differentia- change
semantic dominance
tion in-use
diversity of meaning

In the case of Darwin's metaphors, "cosmic breeder" and

"natural selection" are examples of displaced concepts. The
terms "breeder" and "selection" are transposed into new con-
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322 Eleonora Montuschi

texts ("cosmos"; "nature"), and interpreted, within the new

domains, by emphasizing certain features of their original
meanings. This interpretation implies a correction of the con-
cepts transposed, to make them adaptable to the new contexts.
The concepts are spelled out when their adjustement has achie-
ved an acceptable degree of meaningfulness (the degree of ac-
ceptability is a contextual function). What makes meaning
change possible? The adaptation to the new context is
"caused" by the existence in language of analogical rules,
which are responsible for effects of "differentiation" of mean-
ings across contexts. Like in the case quoted above, where
dropping a book is different from dropping a friend, a cosmic
breeder is different from a domestic breeder. The interchange
of completion words, as we read above, "causes" drop
{breeder) to "change" meaning, making diversity dependent
on semantic dominance. By relating macro-displacements to
micro-differentiations, we achieve also another goal, namely
that of stressing the role of "contrasts" of meaning vis-a-vis
similarities. What ordinary cases of the kind of "dropping a
book- dropping a friend" show is that, once meaning differen-
tiation is inscribed among the possible rules of functioning of a
language, then change can be envisaged in different degrees,
including that of metaphorical juxtaposition, or even of con-
tradiction.
Metaphor is actually a half-way house between ordinary in-
terchange and plain incoherence. It does not simply amount to
the generic fact that any word might change meaning accord-
ing to the context of its use. Yet, it is not a case of logical in-
compatibility, such as in expressions like "a happy sadness" or
"a sincere lie". An expression like "cosmic breeder" makes out
a different "contrast": the two terms "in interaction" are not
contradictory to each other, but heterogeneous. By being jux-
tapposed within a particular context, they convey a possible
state of affairs via an apparently impossible (or not-yet-
thought-of) one. Here is where diversity of meaning matches
with metaphorical meaning: they jointly work towards ex-
hibiting a pre-figured, unusual solidarity between "distant
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 12. What is W r o n g with T a l k i n g of M e t a p h o r s in Science? 323

worlds". The realm of metaphor is not one of "true-or- false",

but one of "may-be": precisely the realm where cognitive in-
crements become explorable.
In the case of metaphors like "light wave", or "atoms are
little solar systems", the role of diversity, and of meaning dif-
ferences, not only appears rather explicit, but it also explicitly
displays its essential role. If we reconstruct the development of
the concept of light wave according to the structure of dis-
placement, a scheme like the following obtains: 22

Displacement Wave Theory

1. Transposition: Shift of a concept Propagation of sound in the air

into a new context 'transposed' into the light
propagation context in the air

2. Interpretation: assignment of a O n e specific aspect of the familiar

concept from the old cluster to a concept 'sound' (= wave) assigned
specific aspect of the new situation to the unfamiliar concept 'light'

3. Correction: adjustment of the Sound wave and light wave are

concept to the new situation and similar but with some differences;
mutual adaptations to the two for ex., the medium of propagation
concepts (an 'ether' in the case of light)

4. Spelling out', the concept proves The elementary-wave theory is

its 'fit' to the new context, and its finally displayed. The concept of
capability of solving puzzling light wave is spelled out on the
occurances ground of the additional
postulation of an 'ether'

From the description above, it appears that analogical regu-

larity is informatively active both on the side of working out
similarities between the two domains involved in the displac-
ing process, and in accommodating differences between them.
It is arguably on the basis of the latter that the new domain
acquires a specific identity. It cannot be denied that "wave"
represents a property ascribed especially on the basis of pur-
ported similarities between the two phenomena compared, but

22 T h e reference is here to Huygen's version of the hypothesis (bases on an

analogy between sound and light) as in Treatise on Light (1912).
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324 Eleonora Montuschi

the presupposition is that "wave" does not refer to the same

wave in both cases - in the same way that both "sound wave"
and "light wave" are not "sea waves". The necessity of intro-
ducing an "ether" precisely emphasizes this kind of difference,
or "contrast". Moreover, if we look at the historical develop-
ment of the notion of ether, we will find even more interesting
material to support the picture just suggested.
The construction of mechanical models of the ether became
a central feature of physical theorizing in the nineteenth cen-
tury. However, in some cases - in the light of new empirical
findings — substantial modifications in the way ether had been
originally characterized were required. H o w these modifica-
tions were carried out is interesting vis-a-vis my view about
metaphorical mechanisms.
F o r instance, in the context of Fresnel's optical theory, the
concept of ether was that of a wave-propagating medium,
whose vibrations were responsible for the transmission of
light. This concept was developed on the basis of the usual
analogy between sound and light "waves". The discovery of
the polarization of reflected light, by Malus and Biot, consti-
tuted a serious threat to Fresnel's view. In fact, the newly dis-
covered phenomenon was explained in terms of "asymmetric
properties" of light. However, Fresnel's concept of ether, built
upon longitudinal, wave-like vibrations could not accommo-
date the possibility of "transversal" vibrations. Fresnel realized
that the concept of ether, originated from the "wave-analogy"
between sound and light, could not hold any longer. Should
then the analogy be discarded, as being simply inadequate?
Fresnel's counter-move is rather interesting for us. Instead of
rejecting the wave-analogy, he claimed that the concept of
ether should be further explored, to see whether it could be
capable of accomodating the consequences of polarization. As
a result of further investigation, a new mechanical model of the
ether, apt to propagate "transverse waves", was proposed by
Fresnel in 1821.
This episode is instructive in at least two respects. O n the
one side, the formulation of "transversal waves" (as opposed
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 12. What is Wrong with Talking of Metaphors in Science? 325

to "longitudinal waves") furthers the process of displacement

by focusing, this time, on a specific, alleged property of the
general concept. The modification, though, poses a problem of
identity for the original concept of ether. The problem can be
solved, contextually, by assuming that contrastive qualifica-
tions, within the background of meaning-differentiation-in-
use, might "cause" - even if tentatively, in this case - a mean-
ing change in the original concept. So, the term "ether" can be
retained in the shift prompted by the new displacement (T-
waves vs. L-waves); but also the term "wave" is not to be dis-
carded just because its meaning (or part of its meaning) has
changed across contexts. On the other side, although it is pos-
sible to say exactly in what way ether is not a wave-propagat-
ing medium (polarization), a metaphorical mechanism is still at
work in trying to identify, explore, and represent the replac-
ing, "literal" concept. Besides, and as said before in the case of
atoms and the solar sytem, even the new, literal concept is not,
after all, so "literal": the original metaphor is all but dead.
From the discussion of a few examples it cannot be conclu-
sively argued that metaphorical mechanisms, in the form re-
constructed above, are effectively at work in scientific dis-
course, and that they account for the identity of typical, "gen-
uine" metaphors in that discourse. What these examples sug-
gest, nonetheless, is that there might be ways of identifying
metaphors in science which do not necessarily treat them as
paradigmatic devices, in the sense presented at the beginning
of this essay.
In order to argue in favour of the suggested analytic shift, a
series of moves have proved to be required. First of all, instead
of using metaphor as a model for whatever feature or aspect of
scientific discourse metaphor is meant to identify, or typify,
we need to find a model for metaphor itself, in order to ac-
knowledge its specific presence in that discourse. Secondly, if a
description of this presence is to be at all possible, then it can-
not be confined, as we saw, only to what has been called the
"macro-level" of linguistic interactions. The idea of a genera-
tive mechanism, underlying the visible structure of displace-
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326 Eleonora Montuschi

merit, was introduced to provide some kind of "grounding"

for the cross-contextual movements of meaning. A metaphor
does not simply amount to the fact that words, in suitably
contrasting contexts, activate different meanings. However,
the linguistic performance of metaphor is possible because of a
mechanism of meaning-differentiation-in-use, namely because
of some kind of analogical regularity. This is causally responsi-
ble for differentiation, and indirectly for interaction of mean-
ings-
It might be objected that this way of describing metaphor
has hardly any trait which specifically, and uniquely, applies to
science. Why should we call this metaphor "scientific", other
than because we found instances of its presence in samples of
scientific discourse? Two replies can be tried out in this re-
spect. On one side, what I intended to convey is the idea that
metaphors in science - at least, some of them - are metaphors,
or primarily metaphors, and not models of something else.
Therefore, their description should to some extent conform to
some general picture of metaphor. On the other side, specific
aspects of the general description, or even contrary to the gen-
eral description, might emerge contextually, and in such a way
we are entitled to believe that they are aspects proper to the
metaphors in question, and not features induced by the com-
parison with other constituents of scientific discourse (models,
theoretical terms).
Thirdly, and finally, to argue for a non-paradigmatic use of
metaphor in scientific discourse does not amount to denying
other uses (there included the paradigmatic one). It certainly
means, however, that the relation between scientific metaphors
and theoretical models/theoretical terms needs rethinking. It
could be claimed that metaphors are among the constructive
devices of the language of a model; or that metaphors are
among other non-definitional and non-ostensive strategies of
reference fixing, such as theoretical terms. These distinctions
are not just meant to be in principle. By taking them as opera-
tive in actual cases of scientific discourse, we will not be, for
example, forced to say that any theoretical term is a metaphor
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 12. What is Wrong with Talking of Metaphors in Science? 327

(a claim which is simply untrue). Neither will be obliged to

accept that only models whose source (secondary subject) is
different from their target (primary subject) are "genuinely"
irreplaceable in the process of shaping the latter (there are, in
fact, models in science which are not built upon, or introduced
by, any sort of analogy, either explicit or otherwise, between
two distinct domains). By attending to non-paradigmatic uses,
we will find ourselves in the privileged position of being able
to capture the eclectic resources of scientific discourse - cer-
tainly, resources more eclectic than the options envisaged by
the received view, either as accepted or improved upon. Also,
and once again, we will be pleasantly surprised by the never
ending virtues of metaphor itself.

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