INTRODUCTION

Although intellectual property rights have existed in China for centuries, they were
not given considerable legal consideration until the mid-1980s. On paper, the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is very similar to the West, with a complex and
comprehensive bureaucracy dedicated to protecting both foreign and domestic
intellectual property. Yet intellectual property crimes are nonetheless common and, in
many respects, normalized in China. One out of every three North American
corporations claims that Chinese-based companies have stolen their intellectual
property in the last decade, and one out of every five claims that it has occurred in the
last year. According to recent estimates from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union Intellectual Property
Office (EUIPO), China accounts for over 90% of all seized counterfeit goods.
As an intangible asset, intellectual property refers to inventions, artistic works,
symbols, designs and other creations of the mind. Similar to any other property right,
these protections allow for creators to benefit from their works. Depending on how it
is expressed, intellectual property is generally divided into one of four categories,
including patents, trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets. Patents protect an
invention and generally last for 20 years, though when that timeline legally begins is
dependent on the country for which the patent is granted. Trademarks protect a brand,
ensuring that a good is produced by the correct manufacturer. Excluding unique
circumstances, trademarks will continue to last for as long as the fees are
paid. Copyrights protect artistic creations, such as music, literature, art, and most
noteworthy, computer code. Finally, trade secrets encompass confidential information
that make one firm more competitive than another. While each country maintains its
own laws and policies regarding intellectual property, the international community
abides by a series of conventions administered by the World Intellectual Property
Organization. These include the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (Paris Convention), the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Berne Convention), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
Intellectual property rights are essential for protecting and promoting innovation.
From an individual perspective, intellectual property rights ensure that creators, or
those that invest in the creation of a good, earn their deserved credit and remuneration.
From a societal perspective, these rights promote innovation and growth. Guaranteed
protection and uniform law provide greater incentive to develop new products, which
in turn contributes to a more advanced economy. Intellectual property is the backbone
of state advancement.
Trademark counterfeiting is another violation of intellectual property, but one with
very different effects. In many circles, counterfeit products bring to mind the notion of
imitation luxury goods, such as purses, shoes and other accessories. As such, a
common misunderstanding is that the only victims in the cases of counterfeit goods
are multinational corporations. However, experts estimate that only 5% to 10% of all
counterfeits are of a luxury good, and only half of all counterfeit goods are of
clothing, accessories or shoes. The remaining counterfeit products include infant
formula, vaccines, prescription drugs, consumer goods, and aftermarket parts for
everything from automobiles to aircraft carriers, to name just a few. The dangers of
such counterfeits are just as varied as the products themselves, with notable examples
being lethal amounts of melamine in infant formula, faulty aftermarket airbags and
even counterfeit N95 masks during the COVID-19 pandemic. Disastrous
consequences are not only present from a public health standpoint, but financially as
well. Additionally, because the trafficking of counterfeit goods is so profitable, with
estimated values higher than $500 billion in worldwide trade, money from counterfeit
goods have been found to finance corrupt governments, organized crime and even
terrorism. Though it is true that brands do suffer from counterfeit goods, more
importantly, the counterfeiting enterprise poses a stark danger to the public welfare.

Chinese IP law regime-

Though modern intellectual property policy is a relatively new concept to China,
developed only in the last half-century, intellectual property in its simplest definition
can trace back thousands of years in China. Trademarks, as discussed, are the brands,
logos and “marks” used to describe the origin of a product, claiming an artist’s
ownership and ensuring its quality and place of origin for authenticity. By this
definition, some of the world’s earliest known trademarks are attributed to Chinese
potters and sculptors. Under British imperialism, the Qing Dynasty faced immense
pressure to develop trademark law to protect British brands, and as a result, in 1904
the Qing Dynasty disseminated a set of provisional regulations, titled “Experimental
Regulations for the Registration of Trademarks.” These regulations marked the first
formal trademark laws in China and were later developed into a stricter code during
the Chinese Republican Period, again under the pressure of British forces.
The Chinese Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China on October
1, 1949. This came after a near 40-year civil war, Japanese occupation during the
Second World War, and what was later known as the “Century of Humiliation,” a 100-
year period where China was ravaged by foreign imperialism and mass opium
addiction.  The powerhouse that China had been for centuries was no more, leaving
Mao Zedong with nothing but an enormous population to rebuild a country. In the 70
years since this declaration, China has built itself into one of the world’s strongest
nations, with a backbone of intellectual property law to sustain its growth.
Following Mao’ success in the Chinese Civil War, the Communist Party recognized
the need for science and technology in rebuilding a country. This recognition,
however, also came with several contradictions. Mao’s constituency was a large,
generally uneducated peasant class—one that had grown in opposition to the college-
educated urban elites. Further, the idea of protecting technological innovation as
private property ran opposite to the very ideals of socialism. As such, the Mao
government developed a model of scientific and technological development in which
innovation belonged to the public.
In this time, the Communist Party did develop foundational intellectual property right
laws. Within a few short months of establishing themselves as a country, the
Communist Party of China passed the “Provisional Regulations on the Protection of
Patent Rights.” This policy, however, was riddled with contradictions and loopholes.
For example, patent rights could only be granted if the inventor was part of a larger,
often state sponsored, organization, such as a research institute, factory or minefield.
Additionally, Article 14 stated that should the state deem it necessary, all patent rights
would be appropriated from the individual to the state. Further, while Article 7
described a penalty for misuse of a patent without the patentholder’s consent, there
was no process for calculating compensation, nor was any government body
designated with enforcement measures. These provisions, in essence, lived only on
paper and failed to reach any point of practicality.
By 1953, however, the Community Party under Mao initiated its “great socialist
transformation,” assuming control over all private industry in the state by 1956. In
accordance to Mao’s first five-year plan, China assumed control over private
enterprises to channel scarce resources into key industries, rapidly industrializing the
nation. As state-owned businesses now only had to produce goods to meet
government quotas, rather than consumer demand, the need for trademarks quickly
collapsed. When supplies ran short, which was often, typical consumers could not
choose between brands of commodities, taking what they could to support themselves
and their families. Internal efforts for stronger intellectual property rights took a
backseat to economic and industrial development, and as a result, the intellectual
property right policies lost what little traction they once held.
Then, in the greatest blow to intellectual property rights, China underwent the
infamous Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. This socio-political movement
vilified intellectuals, elites and government officials as capitalist cronies. The 50,000
registered trademarks in China at the time were criticized as “representing capitalist
values,” and fell into disuse. Tens of thousands of leading scientists and technical
professionals were lumped into a generalized “bourgeoisie,” sentenced to labor camps
to pay for the social and financial capital that they had earned from their work.
Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, and the concurrent end to the Cultural
Revolution, Chairman Deng Xiaoping chose to alter the path of China’s growth. In the
waning years of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party had begun to
recognize the importance of structured intellectual property right laws. In 1973, a
Chinese delegation was sent to attend a WIPO conference in Geneva, where Ren
Jianxin, Director of Legal Affairs in the China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade, reported the importance of reestablishing China’s failed
intellectual property rights system to then-Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. The “Reform
and Opening-Up” strategy, led by Deng, not only shifted a new importance towards
foreign trade, but revitalized interest in intellectual property rights. In 1979, WIPO’s
General Secretary, Arpad Bogsch, visited China, where he discussed how to
implement a possible patent system, and the following year. In 1980, the People’s
Republic of China joined WIPO and committed to a stronger intellectual property
rights system by sending delegations across the world to learn about patent systems in
other countries, including Germany, Brazil, and the United States.
Coming out of the Cultural Revolution, the international community recognized the
potential market growth of China and desired a system that would protect their
intellectual property.
In 1984 the Chinese government passed the 1984 Patent Law. Unlike its predecessors,
the 1984 Patent Law was in-depth and exhaustive, making up 69 articles detailing
everything from application procedures and review processes to enforcement
measures. Though far stronger than existing regulations, the new patent law still
contained several deficiencies when compared to international standards. Unlike those
of developed countries, patents could only be granted in China for fifteen years,
compared to twenty in most other countries. Additionally, scientific discovery,
pharmaceuticals, foods, beverages, disease treatments and anything derived from
chemical processes could not be patented. China joined the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Intellectual Property in 1985 and the Madrid Agreement for the
International Registration of Trademarks in 1989. Though slow to start, the
Communist Party of China was falling in line with the international intellectual
property standards.
While the 1980’s reform was led by domestic pressure, where internal actors
motivated stronger intellectual property policy, China in the 1990’s faced an influx of
external forces. Deng Xiaoping had set the stage for explosive growth in China,
helping the rest of the world realize the country’s profitable market. Foreign direct
investment into China in the mid-1980’s stood around $4 billion, but had skyrocketed
to approximately $35 billion by 1995, an increase of nearly ten-fold. As more
transnational corporations shifted focus to the newly emerged open economy,
governments followed suit with a renewed push for stronger intellectual property
laws.
 In this time, individuals reportedly felt it was unfair that the United States had forced
China to develop strong intellectual property laws that, in many ways, inhibited
domestic economic growth. As one official argued, the United States “copied
Europeans for more than one century; why can’t [China] copy the Americans for
twenty years? […] Did they follow these standards when they were at our stage of
economic development? The US practices double standards.” The developed countries
had, only decades earlier, subjected China to a century of imperialization, and the
resulting sentiment still molded the perspectives of many Chinese. As a result of
voices like these, the political pendulum swung away from protecting foreign
companies, appeasing domestic constituents and allowing for the increased
infringements on foreign intellectual property. With accusations of violations growing
exponentially, the United States in 2018 resumed its presence in the Chinese
intellectual property realm through the US-China Trade War, leading to another series
of revisions.
After a period of investigation, the central government concluded that although the
new patent and trademark policies benefited Chinese business owners, many believed
these benefits were only a byproduct of bowing to foreign powers. The real winners,
they argued, were foreign companies that now had safeguarded access to Chinese
markets. This belief led to a decade in which intellectual property policy focused on
domestic constituents. In December of 2008, the central government passed a revised
Chinese patent law, which among several changes, allowed for the compulsory
licensing of monopolized patents when deemed necessary. As a result, foreign
enterprises had no voice on licensing terms should the Chinese government deem their
product critical, illustrating that the pendulum had swung away from foreign influence
to appease and appeal to domestic constituents.

China’s failure to implement the provisions-

Trademark counterfeiting is the unauthorized, intentional use of another brand’s
trademark to sell a similar, but often low-quality, product. Though most often thought
of as an issue only for companies, counterfeit products can negatively affect
everything from local economies to a consumer’s health, even going as far as to fund
other transnational criminal organizations and other crimes.
Around 90% of all counterfeit products originate from China. Provinces containing
Special Economic Zones (SEZs, similar in policy to Free Trade Zones) had far more
instances of counterfeiting than provinces without this designation, indicating that a
decreased presence of regulations, combined with an increased opportunity for trade,
amounted in greater opportunity for counterfeit goods. Not only does the Chinese
judicial system know the regions in which counterfeiting takes place, but law
enforcement also has the capability to identify exactly where these businesses are
located. For Chinese-facing third party e-commerce marketplaces, such as Taobao or
JD.com, independent sellers are required to upload business licenses, including the
registrant’s name, the business name and its address. Oftentimes, this information is
available publicly, allowing for anyone to investigate the business. In an age where
the Chinese government requires more information from its citizens than ever before,
the process of identifying a business, its owners, and the operating location is
genuinely simple.
When businesses identify that their goods have fallen victim to counterfeiting in
China, several barriers exist in reporting. Chinese law enforcement seldom
investigates intellectual property rights claims seriously. While it is true that the
promotion of intellectual property rights generally improves and strengthens a
growing economy, the People’s Republic of China has become a massive exporter of
counterfeit goods, whose manufacturing and distribution sustains a large part of the
Chinese GDP. 
China needs to maintain a high GDP growth rate, generally between 6% and 6.5%, in
order to ensure employment for its population. By utilizing a balance of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and market mechanisms to target this range each quarter, the
government can plan its economy, keeping people employed and ensuring regime
approval. When this number faulters, fears arise that a slowed economy will decrease
citizen approval for the government, creating the potential for instability. As a result,
economic growth is key to the Communist Party.
 Illicit goods contribute significantly to the country’s trade economy. This creates an
apparent contradiction when working with foreign entities that want stricter laws, such
as the United States. Though the US pressures China into stronger intellectual
property enforcement, the Chinese government cannot allow for its economy to suffer,
especially to appease outside actors. The trade of counterfeit goods is massive in
scope, value and size, yet the effort needed to dismantle it is often minimal. When
businesses identify that their goods have fallen victim to counterfeiting in China,
several barriers exist in reporting. Chinese law enforcement seldom investigates
intellectual property rights claims seriously, meaning that in many cases, successful
businesses will initiate their own private investigations by employing Chinese partners
to gather evidence. Then as they gather sufficient evidences, the businesses will
present it to local law enforcement. Even with enough evidence gathered, however,
these cases often will not receive the attention they deserve . In one instance, Alibaba
reported that of the 1,910 cases of suspected counterfeiting that it had referred on to
police, only 129 people were found guilty, highlighting the dire need for effective law
enforcement.

The Chinese Actors: Politicians, Public Servants and the People:

The Communist Party of China faces a conundrum that few, if any, other states
encounter in their economic decision-making process. While it is true that the
promotion of intellectual property rights generally improves and strengthens a
growing economy, the People’s Republic of China has become a massive exporter of
counterfeit goods, whose manufacturing and distribution sustains a large part of the
Chinese GDP. Party members face the unique challenge of balancing long-term and
short-term economic strength, for in the case intellectual property laws in China, one
must come at the expense of the other.
Before diving into the complexities of enforcing intellectual property rights, this paper
will first outline the primary goals of the Communist Party of China. In 2008, Chinese
State Councilor Dai Bingguo stated that the three primary concerns of the People’s
Republic of China are maintaining regime stability, maintaining territorial sovereignty,
and continued economic growth.[112] China needs to maintain a high GDP growth rate,
generally between 6% and 6.5%, in order to ensure employment for its population. By
utilizing a balance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and market mechanisms to target
this range each quarter, the government can plan its economy, keeping people
employed and ensuring regime approval. When this number faulters, fears arise that a
slowed economy will decrease citizen approval for the government, creating the
potential for instability. As a result, economic growth is key to the Communist Party.
Though intellectual property right laws protect and promote innovation, they also halt
the counterfeit manufacturing industry. If China exports counterfeit goods valued at
approximately $400 billion, and China has a total export value of $2.4 trillion, one can
see that illicit goods contribute significantly to the country’s trade economy. The
Communist Party, when determining intellectual property rights law, has to balance
the potential for long-term growth promoted by intellectual property rights with the
reality of short-term losses that strict enforcement would instigate. This creates an
apparent contradiction when working with foreign entities that want stricter laws, such
as the United States. Though the US pressures China into stronger intellectual
property enforcement, the Chinese government cannot allow for its economy to suffer,
especially to appease outside actors.
It is important to note, however, that this does not mean that the Chinese government
has not taken any steps to enforce intellectual property rights. Pioneered in 2014, the
National People’s Congress identified a growing need for judiciary bodies focused
specifically on intellectual property rights cases. A mountain of claims highlighted
how local and regional judicial systems had little training in intellectual property, and
therefore, would often disregard such cases. As a result, the government created
specialized intellectual property courts in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing. This
system gained national attention for its incredible work and has since grown to over
20 specialized courts and tribunals, including even an appellate IP court. The judges of
these courts are generally considered to be some of the best in China, with at least a
decade of experience in intellectual property right law. This has played a significant
role in the annual number of court cases relating to violations of intellectual property
in China, as highlighted by Figure 4. Both 2018 and 2019 experienced similar
numbers, though this is largely due to claims that the specialized IP courts had reached
their capacity for legal cases.
Though the Chinese government follows central ideologies that guide its growth and
development, how these policies are interpreted and implemented from a local level
sometimes differs from that of their national counterparts. Intellectual property rights
law is one example of this. While the national government has to balance long-term
and short-term economic growth, provincial and municipal governments are
constantly pressed to outperform not only each other, but their previous numbers. This
section of the paper will focus on how the interests of certain local governments
oppose the intended goals of intellectual property enforcement.
Before discussing intellectual property rights, one must understand how the Chinese
government and its levels of political meritocracy work. The Communist Party of
China does not operate in a democratic fashion that the United States is accustomed
too. Instead, it utilizes a hierarchical electoral system, where local officials are directly
elected. Then, as they achieve success and better their community, they are given the
opportunity to rise into higher positions with more responsibility. This process of
political meritocracy combines personal aspirations with benevolent altruism to
motivate officials to success. At the same time, however, it creates ample opportunity
for corruption and faked economic figures.
Historically, China is not unaccustomed to faked economic data. From 1959 to 1961,
China underwent the Great Leap Forward, in which the country’s grain output fell
dramatically as the country aimed to mass industrialize. Under the impression that
collectivization would increase productivity, the central government set unreasonable
grain production goals for each locality, arguing that an increase in efficiency would
allow for a shift to industry. Knowing that their political futures relied on meeting
certain targets, local officials distorted and exaggerated their statistics of grain
production, over-reporting their numbers to appear successful. As a result, the country
plunged into a famine that killed tens of millions of people. Since then, critics have
continued to accuse China of falsifying numbers relating to everything from economic
data  to COVID-19 deaths, all with varying degrees of accuracy.
In the present, Chinese officials still feel an immense pressure to perform well. Not
only do their political futures rely on this through a system of political meritocracy,
but their personal finances do as well. The civil service pay for Chinese officials is
largely determined by the success of the province they are managing. As localities
perform better, the officials are essentially awarded through a system of state profit-
sharing. Together, these two factors create an environment hospitable for continued
counterfeiting practices.  If a province’s wealth is strongly connected to its
manufacturing industry, and that industry partakes heavily in counterfeit goods, then
there is a direct disincentive to enforce intellectual property right laws. Not only
would it affect their regional indicators for success, such as employment or GDP per
capita, but it could have a direct affect on their personal salaries. However, many
foreign companies have found success in rewarding Chinese local officials for
arresting counterfeiters. By attaching some level of social significance and public
recognition to anti-counterfeiting measures, they outweigh the motivations for
allowing violations of intellectual property to continue.  
Intellectual property laws serve two purposes, protecting creativity and innovation
while also promoting it. Though the enforcement aspect of intellectual property
protections runs against the personal motivations of local officials, the promotion of
innovation is highly beneficial to a region’s success. Local officials would benefit
from promoting intellectual property through registrations and applications rather than
enforcement. This is largely evidenced by the fact that China process the most
applications for intellectual property in the world, yet does not even rank in the top ten
for most innovative countries. They only need to register numbers, so that they can
outperform and outcompete other regions. Local officials push for quantity over
quality in order to boost their numbers, protecting their image while preserving their
state economies.
Overall, local officials face a very different decision-making process from their
national counterparts. While both value the economic and creative development of the
regions they’re responsible for, each group faces different motivations and external
pressures. As such, it is important to identify these relationships and driving forces
when responding to the issue of intellectual property rights in China. Policy exists, yet
the enforcement measures have yet to take a real effect.
The People: Those Who Counterfeit, and Those Who Don’t
The final major domestic actor in intellectual property in China is the people,
including those that violate intellectual property and those that do not. It is important
to state that at its core, counterfeiting and other violations of intellectual property
rights are crimes pursued for monetary gain. The counterfeiting enterprise has been
viewed as more profitable than the drug trade, and even more enticing, it is a low-risk
crime to perform. Not only can the products be challenging to identify, but the
enforcement is low. Should an individual be caught and tried, the punitive damages
are often dwarfed by the profits earned from the crime. These profits can be realized
anywhere in the world, though, as they are not tied down by a specific location. Yet,
nearly all counterfeit manufacturing happens in China. The purpose of this section is
to discuss some of the cultural characteristics of China that make it hospitable for
violations of intellectual property rights. Further, it is to highlight how culture,
ideology, and state history can affect the implicit perceptions of intellectual property
rights, not necessarily providing a scapegoat for why counterfeiters counterfeit, but
illustrating the higher degree of tolerance that Chinese society has for it.
First, China is a collectivist culture in a socialist country built on a foundation of
Confucianism and Taoism, and as such, the very notion of intellectual property rights
runs contrary to implicit beliefs. Collectivist cultures generally value the needs of a
group over the needs of an individual, and in the realm of intellectual property, that is
most often reflected by the perception of a creative work’s purpose. Intellectual
property rights are an inherently individualized concept, highlighting the need for an
individual’s ownership of an idea over the possibility that the group could build upon,
improve and altogether benefit from, the work. Going further, China was built on the
ideals of Confucianism and Taoism. Confucianism emphasizes the role of the public
domain, building on previous works to not only meet an individual’s needs, but to
share with others to improve the general welfare. As Confucius declares in
the Analects, “He who by reanimating the Old can gain knowledge of the New is fit to
be a teacher.” By this logic, creative works belong to the public, who has the
responsibility to interpret and re-interpret it as they see fit. This notion of public
ownership translates into more recent history through the piece Kong Yi Ji, a famous
work published in 1919 by Chinese author Lu Xun. It is Lu Xun that coined the
phrase, “To steal a book is an elegant offense,” highlighting the notion that literature,
and subsequently innovation, should be free for all peoples. It is not a crime to be
looked down upon. From another perspective, Taoism preaches the principles of
simplicity and letting go. By removing one’s self from personal possessions and
material desires, the barriers to happiness and good health fall away too. Removing
the desire for personal property, again, runs opposite to the notion of intellectual
property rights. Just as many American tout how Christianity has shaped and
influenced the United States, the argument stands that Confucian and Taoist values,
the foundation for Chinese society, can shape the implicit views of intellectual
property rights in China.
Finally, there exists a paradigm that the United States must be aware of as it pushes
China to adapt to international intellectual property right laws. Though the country has
grown rapidly, it is still young, and by many metrics, the People’s Republic of China
still considers itself a developing country. Recognizing this, many Chinese citizens
point out that when the United States was at this point in its development, American
businesses were rampantly violating Britain’s intellectual property rights. A prime
example includes Charles Dickens, who in 1842 visited the United States only to find
his works pirated and shared throughout the country. Other developed countries also
shared in a history of intellectual property theft, including Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan. Combined with the fairly recent “Century of Humiliation” that still haunts
many in China, the idea of a Western country enforcing hypocritical laws on China
has shaped how many view the global intellectual property system. No matter that the
scope of the problem is larger than ever before, the perception exists that the United
States is unfairly persecuting China for violations when it had, at one point, used these
very same tactics to develop their own businesses.
China is founded on a culture different than that of the West, and as such, there are
certain things that are viewed differently. Intellectual property rights, and the
ownership of intangible goods, is one example. Though monetary gain is the primary
motive for counterfeiting products, Confucian and Taoist principles have likely
influenced how the Chinese society views this industry. Furthermore, shanzhai-
ism and the unique role that the West has had with China augments that perception,
providing even more of negative perception towards the western intellectual property
standards. As Dr. Gregory Mandel, Dean of the Tsinghua University of Law in
Beijing, once highlighted, the role of public perception towards intellectual property
rights affects how it is enforced and understood. Misperceptions around it limit its
legitimacy and function, meaning that if there is to be a functionally successful system
of intellectual property rights, it needs to include the education of the public

Conclusion-
The People’s Republic of China, in less than half a century, has created an intellectual
property system allowing it to maintain global operations. China has demonstrated a
continued interest in its intellectual property system, revising policies at least once a
decade, their enforcement falls short of international expectations China has become
the global hub for counterfeit products, and numerous allegations exist of Chinese
companies stealing technology from US firms. While frustrating for US policymakers
and brand owners, understanding the problem from a perspective of actor analysis can
provide greater insight into what motivates effective enforcement. While national
officials need to balance long-term and short-term economic stability, local officials
seek consistent economic success and measured development—facets of a region that
intellectual property enforcement could hamper. Finally, the perspective of the
Chinese population provides greater insight into the general tolerance for counterfeit
products.
Intellectual property rights focus on intangible assets, providing worth to creativity
and innovation. Though China has taken measured steps to develop its policies, it is
far from a perfect system. By continuing to utilize international institutions and
economic statecraft, however, the international community can continue to hold China
accountable for protecting intellectual property. These tactics, however, need to be
supplemented by relationship building, public education and mutual understanding.
Only with these key aspects will China’s perspective on intellectual property change,
moving to one where companies both foreign and domestic can operate without the
fear of theft or imitation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY-
 www.dailypioneer.com/2022/columnists/china---s-ip-theft--boon-or-bane
 www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-ally-stealing-western-ip-united-states
 www.aei.org/articles/the-rising-risk-of-chinas-intellectual-property-theft