ROBERTO A. FLORES v. FRANKLIN M.

DRILON

GR No. 104732
June 22, 1993

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent
Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is
challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an
administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the
Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the
Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional
provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also
contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to
appoint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional

prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.

RULING:

YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official

shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective
official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as C h a i r m a n
a n d C E O o f S B M A ) . T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n prohibits.
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple
functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them
function without the distraction of other governmental duties. The Congress gives the
President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the condition
that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume
the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the
congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the
President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.

WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". .
. Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this
Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional; consequently, the
appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J.
Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.

However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by respondent
Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be retained by him,
and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in the exercise of his authority as
officer de facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.

SO ORDERED.
 DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 193237

October 9, 2012

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga Del
Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on
6 December 2009 a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny
due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that
Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he
declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.

Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had
already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-
140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos
admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino
countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos' probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987.
Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order dated 5 February
2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos
further stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for
disqualification filed against him on the same grounds.

The COMELEC En Banc narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos' criminal record as

follows:

As backgrounder, [Jalosjos] and three (3) others were accused of the crime of robbery
on January 22, 1969 in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin of the
then Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found him and his co-accused guilty of robbery
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of prision correccional minimum to prision
mayor maximum. [Jalosjos] appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals but his
appeal was dismissed on August 9, 1973. It was only after a lapse of several years or
more specifically on June 17, 1985 that [Jalosjos] filed a Petition for Probation before
the RTC Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by the court. But then, on motion
filed by his Probation Officer, [Jalosjos'] probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City
on March 19, 1987 and the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued.
Surprisingly, on December 19, 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F.
Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already
fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation. This Certification was the one used by
respondent Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of the disqualification case filed against him
by Adasa in 2004, docketed as SPA No. 04-235.

This prompted [Cardino] to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former
Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration, guilty of violating Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting to the
fact that respondent Jalosjos had fully complied with the terms and conditions of his
probation. A portion of the decision of the Sandiganbayan is quoted hereunder:

The Court finds that the above acts of the accused gave probationer Dominador
Jalosjos, [Jr.,] unwarranted benefits and advantage because the subject certification,
which was issued by the accused without adequate or official support, was
subsequently utilized by the said probationer as basis of the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest that he filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, which prompted the said court to issue the Order dated February 5, 2004
in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU, declaring that said probationer has complied
with the order of probation and setting aside its Order of January 16, 2004 recalling the
warrant or [sic] arrest; and that said Certification was also used by the said probationer
and became the basis for the Commission on Elections to deny in its Resolution of
August 2, 2004 the petition or [sic] private complainant James Adasa for the
disqualification of the probationer from running for re-election as Mayor of Dapitan City
in the National and Local Elections of 2004.

The COMELEC's Rulings

On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino's petition and cancelled
Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division concluded that "Jalosjos
has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he
declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in
fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he
has not yet served." The COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos' certificate of
compliance of probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his
sentence. The penalty imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of one
year, eight months and twenty days of prisión correccional as minimum, to four years,
two months and one day of prisión mayor as maximum. The COMELEC First Division
ruled that Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his disqualification as provided for in
Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160."
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos' motion for
reconsideration. The pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:

With the proper revocation of [Jalosjos'] earlier probation and a clear showing that he
has not yet served the terms of his sentence, there is simply no basis for [Jalosjos] to
claim that his civil as well as political rights have been violated. Having been convicted
by final judgment, [Jalosjos] is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public
office. His proclamation as the elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does not
deprive the Commission of its authority to resolve the present petition to its finality, and
to oust him from the office he now wrongfully holds.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied for
utter lack of merit. [Jalosjos] is hereby OUSTED from office and ordered to CEASE and
DESIST from occupying and discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga. Let the provisions of the Local Government Code on
succession apply.

SO ORDERED.

Jalosjos filed his petition on 25 August 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237, while
Cardino filed his petition on 17 September 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193536.

On 22 February 2011, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing G.R. No. 193237.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is

DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution dated August
11, 2010 of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC) are hereby
AFFIRMED.

Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial
notice of its resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this Court resolved to
consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.

Jalosjos then filed a Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated that "he has resigned
from the position of Mayor of the City of Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which
resignation was accepted by the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga Del Norte, Atty.
Rolando E. Yebes." Jalosjos' resignation was made "[i]n deference with the provision of
the Omnibus Election Code in relation to [his] candidacy as Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013."
These cases are not rendered moot by Jalosjos' resignation. In resolving Jalosjos'
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 and Cardino's Petition in G.R. No.
193536, we address not only Jalosjos' eligibility to run for public office and the
consequences of the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, but also COMELEC's
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos' probation was revoked; (2) ruled
that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga
del Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy without making a finding
that Jalosjos committed a deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as
Jalosjos relied in good faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible
for the same position from which he is now being ousted.

RULING:

The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos'
certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any
public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a
candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of
Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc. The dissenting opinions erroneously limit the remedy against Jalosjos to
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and apply the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code.

A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for

public office is a false material representation which is a ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the same Code. Sections 74 and 78 read:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks
to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in
the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that
he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public
office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a
criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate
clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under
Section 78.

A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under

Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under
Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:

Section 40, Local Government Code:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon

the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a

party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.

Revised Penal Code:

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. x x x

Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. The duration of the penalties of prisión
mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve
years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty,
in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.

xxxx

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. The
penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall
produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have
held, even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to
be elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any
of the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in

paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. The
penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession
or calling shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or

during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for
the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the
term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any
popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification.

Art. 42. Prisión mayor its accessory penalties. The penalty of prisión mayor shall carry
with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for
any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand,
under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means
that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification," which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification
and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public
office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

In Lacuna v. Abes, the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the
import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:

On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that

appellee's conviction of a crime penalized with prisión mayor which carried the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section
99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for
public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of
the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the
case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty
deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during
the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for
the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the
term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any
popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be
applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers
to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the
sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the
perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the
provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states that such duration is
"according to the nature of said penalty" which means according to whether the penalty
is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification
"deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually."

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately

once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty
does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict
serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender
shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual
special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is
immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of
his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes
ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he
became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the
time his judgment of conviction became final.

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the

Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means
that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that
Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"
means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As this Court held
in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer to
"qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is
ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special
disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to
run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes
a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this
Court explained in Fermin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is
not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of
the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC
that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to
be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation
in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due
course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since
they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction
mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition
for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis
supplied)

Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to which
perpetual special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a ground for a
petition under Section 68 because robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated in
Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned, Section 68 refers only to election offenses
under the Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes under the Revised Penal Code. For
ready reference, we quote again Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a

party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Emphasis supplied)

There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify including the
crime of robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this Section. All the offenses
enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus Election Code. The
dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes gravely errs when it holds that Jalosjos' conviction
for the crime of robbery under the Revised Penal Code is a ground for "a petition for
disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC and not for cancellation of COC under
Section 78 thereof." This Court has already ruled that offenses punished in laws other
than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a ground for a petition under Section 68.
In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia, the Court declared:

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those

enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are
beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in
nature.
A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four
statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino
citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant
to, a foreign country; (3) a statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks
election; and (4) a statement of the candidate's allegiance to the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines.

We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy when he stated under oath that he was eligible to run for mayor? The
COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all found that Jalosjos was not eligible to run for
public office. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos made a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of
Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification
which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 and not under Section 78. The
dissenting opinion of Justice Brion concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a
disqualification that is not a ground under Section 78 without, however, saying under
what specific provision of law a petition against Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his
certificate of candidacy.

What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a

ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material representation
arises from a crime penalized by prisión mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be
properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12
or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to
adopt belongs to the petitioner.

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of

candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid
votes. Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from
the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or
after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was
never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being
void ab initio. Jalosjos' ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy,
and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus,
Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May
2010 elections Cardino who received the highest number of votes.

Decisions of this Court holding that the second-place cannot be proclaimed winner if the
first-place is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the
certificate of candidacy of the first-place was valid at the time of filing but subsequently
had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment
that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of
candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of
candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-
candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can
never be a first-place in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds
that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab
initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate
should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very
beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of
candidacy for the same position.

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a
legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of
the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the
convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the
Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final
judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to
run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the
Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The disqualification of a convict to run
for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a
competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to
the conduct of elections.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the
anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special
disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will
be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to
the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office
those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED, and the
Petition in G.R. No. 193536 is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11
August 2010 of the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively,
in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Agapito J.
Cardino ran unopposed in the May 2010 elections and thus received the highest
number of votes for Mayor. The COMELEC En Banc is DIRECTED to constitute a
Special City Board of Canvassers to proclaim Agapito J. Cardino as the duly elected
Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga Del Norte.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the Department of Justice
and the Department of Interior and Local Government so they can cause the arrest of,
and enforce the jail sentence on, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. due to his conviction for the
crime of robbery in a final judgment issued by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 18) of
Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU.

SO ORDERED.
 JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 205033

June 18, 2013

FACTS:

On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner by final
judgment. Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued an order commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and
three (3) days.

On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However,
because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City
Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition
for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Zamboanga City. Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoCon October 5, 2012,
seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled
on May 13, 2013. In his CoC, petitioner stated,inter alia,that he is eligible for the said
office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.

On October 18, 2012, the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his
perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in
any election. Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in its Order which,
pursuant to Section 138 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known
as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and executory.

The COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January 15,
2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and
Local Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to
comply with the voter registration requirement.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc act beyond its jurisdiction when it issued
motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner's right to due
process?
(2) Whether or not, petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective
office already been removed by Section 40 (a) of the LGC?
RULING:

1. No, the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it
issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending
petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it
merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling
petitioner's CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of
which had already been established by his final conviction. In this regard, the
COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with
the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial
proceedings.
The denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally
necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced
through a petition based on either Sections 12 or 78of the OEC, or Section 40 of
the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on account of final
and executory judgments as when a candidate's disqualification to run for public
office is based on a final conviction.

There is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En

Banc would be acting in a purely administrative manner. Administrative power is
concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public
office had already been settled in a previous case and now stands beyond
dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc to cancel his CoC as a
matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

2. No, petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office has
not been removed by Section 40 (a) of the LGC.
The petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried
with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn,
pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As
discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective
office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the
said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a
penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the
convict to run for elective office. Article 41 in this case directly and specifically
prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of
two (2) years from petitioner's service of his commuted prison term, he remains
bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which
consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
It is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned
accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not
depend on the length of the prison term, which is imposed as its principal
penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court's ruling in Lacuna v. Abes, where the
Court explained the meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to the penalty of
disqualification to run for public office.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualified the

convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only
during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised
Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This
accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or
hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special
disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence.
The Court holds that Section 40(a) of the LGC has not removed the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification which petitioner continues to suffer. Thereby,
he remains disqualified to run for any elective office pursuant to Article 30 of the
RPC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
 EFREN RACEL ARATEA vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 195229

October 9, 2012

FACTS:

Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections.
Lonzanida Hied his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. On 8 December 2009,
Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida's
certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the
term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that
he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local
elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms
for the same position. The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution on 18
February 2010 cancelling Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida's motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010
elections, Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of
voles and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge
Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010. On the same date,
Aratea wrote the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and requested
for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office
of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida's disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S.
2010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal
conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida's disqualification, the Office of the Mayor
was deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor
in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC's resolution of Lonzanida's
motion for reconsideration.
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Bane Issued a Resolution disqualifying
Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc's
resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served
as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second,
Lonzanida had been, convicted by final judgment often (10) counts of falsification under
the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
(2) Whether or not Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales.

RULING:

1. No, Lonzanida was not disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus

Election Code.
Lonzanida’s disqualification falls under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code are specifically enumerated:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is
a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (e) spent
in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95,
96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs
d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status
as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the
Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely
nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the
three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under
the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section
68.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses
are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not:
administrative in nature.
Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction
by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does
not constitute a ground for a petition under Section 68.

However, In the case of Lonzanida, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to

run for, any elective public office front the time the judgment of conviction against
him became final. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009
and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy on 1 December 2009.

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the

Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which
means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of
candidacy.

If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is

false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate.

Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone
suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a
final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to
the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public
office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the
court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government
agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy - A cancelled certificate of candidacy

void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.

The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the

contrary, ii was emphasized in our En Banc resolution that Lonzanida's
disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the three-
term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to have been
convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code.
2. Yes, Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales.

As a consequence of Lonzanida's disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was

deemed permanently vacant. In other words, on election day, respondent
Lonzanida's disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since
respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San
Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should he considered stray votes.
Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for
the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not

qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or
after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he
was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being
void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010
elections Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and
the Order dated 12 January 2011 of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No, 09-1 58 (DC)
are AFFIRMED. The COMELEC En Banc is DIRECTED to constitute a Special
Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren Racel Afatea is ORDERED to cease and
desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales.
 JAPZON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 180088
January 19, 2009

FACTS:

Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty

(Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the
COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground of material misrepresentation.
Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, in what
was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Easter Samar). Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA)
and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years.
When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy, he falsely represented therein that he was a
resident of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and
was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
Even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty
continued to make trips to the USA. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an
American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his
foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws. Hence, Japzon
prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running
for public office and the cancellation of the latter’s Certificate of Candidacy.
In his Answer to Japzon’s Petition, Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino
who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen.
Ty argued that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his
American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections.
Pending the submission by the parties of their respective Position Papers in SPA
No. 07-568, the 14 May 2007 elections were already held. Ty acquired the highest number
of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar.

Following the submission of the Position Papers of both parties, the COMELEC
First Division rendered its Resolution in favor of Ty.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Ty can comply with the requirements set forth in Republic Act No. 9225
Japzon argues that when Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his
domicile of origin. Ty did not establish his residence in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, just because he reacquired his Philippine
citizenship. The burden falls upon Ty to prove that he established a new domicile of choice
in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, a burden which he failed to discharge. Ty did not
become a resident of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by merely executing the Oath
of Allegiance under Republic Act No. 9225.

HELD:
The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to
work in the USA and eventually became an American citizen. Ty reacquired his Philippine
citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance. At this point, Ty still held dual citizenship, i.e.,
American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his American
citizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.
Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This
is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country
of which he is also a citizen.
Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino
with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.

Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who
reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for
public office, he must:
1) Meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and
2) Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March
2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary
public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already
effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.
The other requirement of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 pertains to the
qualifications required by the Constitution and existing laws.
Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution left it to Congress to enact a local
government code which shall provide, among other things, for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant to the foregoing mandate, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, the
Local Government Code of 1991, Section 39 of which lays down the following
qualifications for local elective officials:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines;
a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect.

xxxx
(C) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities,
component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on
Election Day.
The challenge against Ty’s qualification to run as a candidate for the Office of
Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, centers on his purported
failure to meet the one-year residency requirement in the said municipality.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is,
"the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi)."
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition
of new domicile (domicile of choice).
As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Ty’s reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or
effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did
not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his
new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the
time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.
As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with the one-year residency
requirement for running for public office is a question of fact. Its determination requires
the Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties before the COMELEC.
The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence
presently before this Court, found that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, and one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. It is
axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which
have acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court.

Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine
passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini
St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, and Eastern Samar. For the years 2006
and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from
the said municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a
voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, and
Eastern Samar.
In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, since his arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably, just a little over
a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. Japzon maintains that Ty’s trips abroad
during said period, i.e., to Bangkok, Thailand (from 14 to 18 July 2006), and to the USA
(from 31 October 2006 to 19 January 2007), indicate that Ty had no intention to
permanently reside in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
The COMELEC First Division and en banc, as well as this Court, however, view these
trips differently. The fact that Ty did come back to the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, after said trips, is a further manifestation of his animus
manendi and animus revertendi.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the
14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the
contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected, does not constitute loss of residence. The Court also notes, that even with his
trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007
local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of
the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty’s
avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
 TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 198742
August 10, 2012

Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of

Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for
and thus hold any elective public office.

FACTS:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents,
she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.
She filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra. The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
The petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen.
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the elections.
She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections
this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and
was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Soon thereafter, private respondents filed separate petitions for quo warranto
questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual
citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27,
2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with
Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear
abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

The trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner
herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not
under oath. Comelec agreed in toto.
ISSUES:
Posed for resolution are the following issue:
For purposes of determining the petitioner’s eligibility to run for public office, whether the
"sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-
forma requirement.

RULING:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectively of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject
to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and
the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office: Provided, that they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country
where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) Are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) Are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis ours)
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-
acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
A year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of
Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not
under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v.
COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any
dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she
personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy.
The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal, when we held that Filipinos
re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines,
thus:
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to
administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained
their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to
additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single,
definite, and sensible meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship
must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath.
The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal
requirement only with respect to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a natural-born
Filipino so as to override the effect of the principle that natural-born citizens need not
perform any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to
that, as the petitioner wants this Court to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino
citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the option of executing an unsworn
affidavit of renunciation.
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously
declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is
already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged
superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for
the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
The fact that petitioner won the elections cannot cure the defect of her candidacy.
Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified
candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire
their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections.The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino
citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not.
It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office.

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to

Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the
operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner's failure to
comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18,
2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she
executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and
hold any elective office in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC
(AE) No. A-44-2010 is AFFIRMED in toto.
 GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176947
February 19, 2009

Facts:

Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in the following items:
Tambunting's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections and Tambunting's
Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections No. 6 - I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
No. 9 - No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001. 36 in the Philippines and 25 in
the Constituency where I seek to be elected; No. 12 - I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek
to be elected.
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American Tambunting presented a copy of
his birth certificate which showed that he was born of... a Filipino mother and an American
father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen.
Tambunting's possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not
a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance pursuant to R.A. No. 9225
To refute Cordora's claim that the number of years of residency is false because
Tambunting lost his residency because of his naturalization as an American citizen,
Tambunting contended that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship.
COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora's complaint.
COMELEC En Banc affirmed was convinced that Cordora failed to support his
accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.

Issues:

Whether Cordora's petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of

Tambunting's failure to meet citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is the
present petition an action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The
present petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful
statements in his certificates of candidacy.
Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

Tambunting possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth. The
rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance
both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is
involuntary andarises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship
who seeks public... office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the
individual's active participation in the naturalization process.
Under R.A. No. 9225,
A Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain
his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a
naturalized citizen's foreign citizenship.
5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino
citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the... time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath"
The twin requirements of... swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship... involve natural-born Filipinos who later became
naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the
Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not
subsequently... become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Cordora's reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized American.
Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin... elements of the
fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently and is not
dependent upon citizenship. Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully
made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. Tambunting is eligible for the office
which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements
prescribed by law.
 MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 201716

January 8, 2013

FACTS:

For four successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010
national and local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the
position of municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding
terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers
initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the
functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation.
Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest,
paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-
2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then
came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this
electoral contest, Torres sought the formers disqualification to run.
The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in
the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its Resolution,
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC,
which affirmed by COMELEC en banc.

Issue:

Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.

HELD:

The petition is partly meritorious.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Involuntary Interruption of Service
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term
when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy,
an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the
rightful choice of the electorate.
Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s
office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. During the pendency of the election
protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority. Consequently, the period
during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or
break in his service because prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos
opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid
proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
 BENJAMIN U. BORJA vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133495
September 3, 1998

Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for
a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation
of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and
served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed
a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner
Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s
disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3
consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another
term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but
the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for
mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of

law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that
office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next
election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply
found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because
he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-
mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of
chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the
application of any term limit.
 ALDOVINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 184836

December 23, 2009

FACTS:

Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three
consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. But in Sept 2005, during his
3rd term, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation to a
criminal case. The Court lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension order, so he resumed his
office

In 2007 election, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the same position. His
disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected
and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional
limit.

COMELEC 2nd Division ruled in Asilo’s favor, because they said Asilo failed to
render complete service for 2004-2007 term because of the 90-day suspension order.

COMELEC En banc refused to reconsider, so the question was raised to the

Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON preventive suspension of an elected local official constituted an interruption

that allowed him to run for a 4th term.

RULING:

YES. Interruption of office happens when the term is broken because the office
holder lost the right to hold on to his office and cannot be equated with failure to render
service.

Court first discussed the 3-term limit rule. Sec 8, Art X of the Constitution and Sec
43(b) of RA 7160 is almost the same thing except for some minor differences in the
wording. The first branch of this provision fixes the term of a local elective official and
limits their stay to no more than 3 terms. “Term” here is a period of time during which an
official has the title and can serve. It is a fixed and definite period. The second branch of
the provision relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any circumvention of
the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with public office – though it doesn’t
textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only interruption of service that doesn’t
affect continuity of service for a full term. ‘Renunciation’ also connotes abandonment, not
something that is acted on the official.

Preventive suspension is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of

an official who has been charged administratively/criminally, where the evidence
preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability. No position
is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended, which is what happened to
Asilo. Preventive suspension, being a temporary incapacity to render service during an
unbroken term, is different from interruption of service, which occurs in the context of term
limitation after there has been a break in the term.

Because the term was not vacated, the term was unbroken. So Asilo cannot run
for a fourth term because the preventive suspension is not considered an interruption of
an elective official’s term.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly

NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is
declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a
prohibited fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo.
 ADORMEO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147927

February 4, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14 2001 elections. Private
respondent was then the incumbent mayor.

Private respondent Talaga Jr. was elected mayor in may 1992. He served the full
term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In election of 1998, he lost to Bernard
Tagarao.

In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term
of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. on the ground
that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three consecutive terms as
follows:

1. May 1992 election, served full term;

2. May 1995 election, served again full term;
3. Recall election of May 2000, served only the unexpired term of Tagorao after
having lost to Tagorao in 1998 election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already
served two full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.

RULING:

NO. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is
not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the
recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as
contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was
defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a
continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby barring
him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the “voluntary
renunciation” contemplated by the law.
 SOCRATES vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 154512

November 12, 2002

FACTS:

COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of
the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.

On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor in the recall
election.

Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated

seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the
cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that the latter is disqualified
from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as
mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998
immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.

COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of

merit. And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.

ISSUE:
Whether or not one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms
is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.

RULING:

Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution, which states:
“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.”

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code, which provides:

“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected.”

The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than
three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation
of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent
is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of
service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-
election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for
the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election,
like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption
in the continuity of service.

Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution

prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth
term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive
term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-
election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What
the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24,
2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June
30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking
referred to the regular elections in 2001.