Sanchez vs.

People

G.R. No. 179090, June 5, 2009

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information dated August
29, 2001 which reads:

The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias
Nilo of Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV],[7] a
sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and which acts are
prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during the trial.

The appellant argues that the injuries inflicted by him were minor in nature that it is not prejudicial to
the child-victim’s development and therefore P.D. No. 603 is not applicable and he should be charged
under the Revised Penal Code for slight physical injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. 603 as amended is applicable to the case at hand.

HELD:

In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial
to the Child's Development. —

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse,
(b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to
the child’s development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly
and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three
acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child’s development.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under
Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts
therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and
child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to
the development of the child is different from the former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word “or” is a disjunctive term
signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of
“or” in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase “be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development” supposes that there are four punishable
acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation;
and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The
fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying
condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the
questioned provision does not warrant such construal.

Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but
merely as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a
child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the
Constitution. As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child,
whether the same is habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this
definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and
3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.
AMANQUITON, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 186080 August 14, 2009 CORONA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Julius Amanquiton was a purok leader of Barangay Western Bicutan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. At 10:45 p.m. on October 30, 2001, petitioner heard an explosion. He,
together with two auxiliary tanod, Dominador Amante and Cabisudo, proceeded to
Sambong Street where the explosion took place.
They saw complainant Leoselie John Bañaga being chased by Gil Gepulane. Upon
learning that Bañaga was the one who threw the pillbox that caused the explosion,
petitioner and his companions also went after him.
On reaching Bañaga’s house, petitioner, Cabisudo and Amante knocked on the door.
When no one answered, they decided to hide some distance away. After five minutes,
Bañaga came out of the and petitioner and his companions immediately apprehended
him. Bañaga's aunt, Marilyn Alimpuyo, followed them to the barangay hall.
Bañaga was later brought to the police station. On the way to the police station, Gepulane
suddenly appeared from nowhere and boxed Bañaga in the face. This caused petitioner
to order Gepulane’s apprehension along with Bañaga. An incident report was made.
During the investigation, petitioner learned Bañaga had been previously mauled by a
group made up of a certain Raul, Boyet and Cris but failed to identify two others. The
mauling was the result of gang trouble in a certain residental compound in Taguig City.
Bañaga’s mauling was recorded in a barangay blotter.
Thereafter, an Information for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI, RA 7160 in relation to
Section 5 (j) of R.A. 8369 was filed against petitioner, Amante and Gepulane.
On arraignment, petitioner and Amante both pleaded not guilty. Gepulane remains at-
large. On May 10, 2005, the RTC found petitioner and Amante guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. Amanquiton's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was given due course. On August 28, 2008, the
CA rendered a decision which affirmed the conviction but increased the penalty.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the facts of the case as established constitute a violation of Section 10 (a),
Article VI of RA 7160.
HELD:
NO. The Constitution itself provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. An accused is entitled to an acquittal
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. It is the primordial duty of the
prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the
only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty.
The RTC and CA hinged their finding of petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt (of the
crime of child abuse) solely on the supposed positive identification by the complainant
and his witness (Alimpuyo) of petitioner and his co-accused as the perpetrators of the
crime. We note Bañaga’s statement that, when he was apprehended by petitioner and
Amante, there were many people around. Yet, the prosecution presented only Bañaga
and his aunt, Alimpuyo, as witnesses to the mauling incident itself. Where were the other
people who could have testified, in an unbiased manner, on the alleged mauling of
Bañaga by petitioner and Amante, as supposedly witnessed by Alimpuyo? The
testimonies of the two other prosecution witnesses, Dr. Paulito Cruz and Rachelle
Bañaga, did not fortify Bañaga’s claim that petitioner mauled him, for the following
reasons: Dr. Cruz merely attended to Bañaga’s injuries, while Rachelle testified that she
saw Bañaga only after the injuries have been inflicted on him.
We note furthermore that, Bañaga failed to controvert the validity of the barangay blotter
he signed regarding the mauling incident which happened prior to his apprehension by
petitioner. Neither did he ever deny the allegation that he figured in a prior battery by gang
members.
All this raises serious doubt on whether Bañaga’s injuries were really inflicted by
petitioner, et al., to the exclusion of other people. In fact, petitioner testified clearly that
Gepulane, who had been harboring a grudge against Bañaga, came out of nowhere and
punched Bañaga while the latter was being brought to the police station. Gepulane, not
petitioner, could very well have caused Bañaga's injuries.
Alimpuyo admitted that she did not see who actually caused the bloodied condition of
Bañaga’s face because she had to first put down the baby she was then carrying when
the melee started. More importantly, Alimpuyo stated that she was told by Bañaga that,
while he was allegedly being held by the neck by petitioner, others were hitting him.
Alimpuyo was obviously testifying not on what she personally saw but on what Bañaga
told her.
We apply the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule in this case. Where the evidence on
an issue of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the evidence weighs, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.
G.R. No. 182941 July 3, 2009

ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, Petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:

TOPIC: EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES – CONCEPT

FACTS:
The victim, thirteen-year-old AAA was playing with her friend BBB in the second floor of her family’s
house when
petitioner arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. Thereafter,
the petitioner undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her and he did the same to AAA. AAA
subsequently disclosed the incident and underwent physical examination which revealed findings
consistent with sexual abuse. On the basis of the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner
was charged with rape. The RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape. The petitioner appealed to
the CA by attacking AAA’s credibility and invoked paragraph 1, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) to wit:

“SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.”

The CA affirmed the RTC decision and ruled that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner is exempt from criminal liability in the charge of qualified rape. (YES)

RULING:
An exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the
accused is freed from criminal liability; in other words, the accused committed a crime, but he cannot
be held criminally liable therefor because of an exemption granted by law. In the case at bar, the age
of the petitioner is critical for purposes of his entitlement to exemption from criminal liability under
paragraph 1, Sec. 6 of RA 9344 which modified paragraph 2, Article 12 of the RPC.

The Court finds the petitioner to be not more than fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime and thus exempt from criminal liability. This finding hinged on previous
jurisprudences accepting testimonial evidence to prove the minority and age of the accused in the
absence of any document or other satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth. Further, paragraph
1, Sec. 7 of RA 9344 states that “xxx. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of
the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved
in his/her favor.”

From the foregoing, the CA Decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The criminal case for rape
filed against petitioner was DISMISSED and the same was REFERRED to the appropriate local
social welfare and development officer who shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of R.A.
No. 9344.

Michael Padua vs People of the Philippines GR 168546 (July 23, 2008)

Facts:
Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal drugs. Initially in his arraignment
he pleaded not guilty but re-entered his plea of guilty to avail the benefits of first time offenders.
Subsequently, he applied for probation but was denied. In his petition for certiorari, the court said that
probation and suspension of sentence are different and provisions in PD 603 or RA 9344 cannot be
invoked to avail probation. It is specifically stated that in drug trafficking, application for probation
should be denied. As aside issue, the court discussed the availment of suspension of sentence under
RA 9344.

ISSUE
Whether suspension of sentence under RA9344 can still be invoked given the fact that the accused is
now 21 years old.
HELD
NO. The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer
Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of
the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child
in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however,
provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether
to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period
or until the child reaches the maximumage of 21 years
. Petitioner has already reached 21years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a
child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears
moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.
PEOPLE v. MILAN ROXAS Y AGUILUZ, GR No. 200793, 2014-06-04

Facts:
Five informations were filed against accused-appellant Roxas, charging him as follows:
On 16 September 1997, [AAA], who was then 9 years of age, was at her grandmother [CCC]'s house
located on [XXX], Quezon City.  In the morning of said date, she was at the dirty kitchen with her aunt
[ZZZ] who was then washing clothes.  Her aunt asked... her if she had already taken a bath, she
replied in the negative.
Her uncle, accused-appellant, overheard their conversation so he volunteered to give [AAA] a bath. 
Subsequently, he brought her upstairs to the bathroom.
While inside the bathroom, accused-appellant told [AAA] to turn around.  After she complied with his
directive, he blindfolded her.  [AAA] started to wonder what the accused-appellant was doing so she
told him that he was supposed to give her a bath. 
Accused-appellant told her that they would play first for a while.
He turned her around three (3) times and then, removed her shorts and underwear.  After that, he sat
on a chair, which was inside the bathroom, and raised both of her legs.
Thereafter, she felt him on top of her.  She also felt accused-appellant's penis enter her vagina which
she found painful.
She cried and shouted the name of her aunt, but accused-appellant got angry and poked a sharp
instrument on her neck.  [AAA] did not report the incident because accused-appellant threatened to
cut her tongue and to kill her and her mother.
[AAA] was raped again on 20 March 1998 while she was at the same house of her paternal
grandparents.
Another incident of rape took place on 11 May 1998 while [AAA] was again at her paternal
grandparents' house.  On the said date, she was alone in the living room on the second floor of the
house when accused-appellant called her.  She did not accede to his... bidding because she was
scared of him.
[AAA]'s ordeal did not stop there.  She was raped for the fourth time on 28 July 1998 at her paternal
grandparents' house.  She and the accused were incidentally alone in the living room on the second
floor of the house.  He asked her to go with him inside... the bedroom of her grandparents, but she
did not get up from her seat.  So accused-appellant pulled her toward the bedroom.  She tried to free
herself, but he poked a pointed instrument at her.
The fifth and last incident of rape happened on 09 August 1998.  At that time, [AAA] was at the
terrace on the second floor of her paternal grandparents' house; and accused-appellant also
happened to be there.
The RTC of Quezon City rendered its Judgment on December 11, 2007, finding accused-appellant
Roxas guilty as charged in each of the five Informations filed against him.
The RTC held that accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal responsibility on the ground
that he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or insane person, since Dr. Aglipay merely
testified that he was an eighteen-year old with a mental development comparable to... that of children
between nine to ten years old.  The RTC found the testimony of AAA credible, and found the
testimonies of the defense witnesses to be "flimsy."

Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S TESTIMONY

Ruling:
Accused-appellant Roxas claims that the testimony of AAA is replete with inconsistencies and
narrations that are contrary to common experience, human nature and the natural course of things.
[16]  Accused-appellant Roxas likewise points out that under
Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, minors fifteen (15) years old
and below are exempt from criminal responsibility.  Accused-appellant Roxas claims that since he
has a mental age of nine years old, he should also be "exempt from criminal... liability although his
chronological age at the time of the commission of the crime was already eighteen years old."
In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the age
as determined by the anniversary of one's birth date, and not the mental age as argued by accused-
appellant Roxas.  When the law is clear and free from any doubt or... ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation.  Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court
interpret or construe its true intent.
On the matter of the credibility of AAA, we carefully examined AAA's testimony and found ourselves
in agreement with the assessment of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.   As observed by the
appellate court:
We note that she recounted her ordeal in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner,
without any artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the veracity of her testimony.  She recalled
the tragic experience and positively identified... accused-appellant as the one who ravished her on
five occasions.  Her testimony was unshaken by a grueling cross-examination and there is no
impression whatsoever that the same is a mere fabrication.  For her to come out in the open and
publicly describe her harrowing... experience at a trial can only be taken as a badge of her sincerity
and the truth of her claims.
Principles:
In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344[18] is explicit in
providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time
of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her
birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate... proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008 JOEMAR ORTEGA vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: At the time of commission of rape, the accused was only 13 years old, while the victim AAA
was 6, both minors. It was alleged that petitioner raped her three times on three different occasions in
1996. The lower courts convicted him of rape with criminal and civil liability imposed. The case was
pending when Republic Act 9344 (R.A. No. 9344) or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
was enacted amending the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. Said
law took effect on May 20, 2006. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already
reached the age of majority. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claimed that petitioner is not
exempt from criminal liability because he is not anymore a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344. The
OSG further claimed that the retroactive effect of said law is applicable only if the child-accused is still
below 18 years old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is exempt in the crime alleged by reason of minority

HELD: Yes, the petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. For one who acts by virtue of any of the
exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the
conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. Hence,
while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.
By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of
the commission of the alleged rape. The first paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly
provides that, a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. The Court gives retroactive application insofar as it favors
the persons guilty of a felony. While the law exempts the petitioner from criminal liability, however, he
is not exempt from civil liability. For this reason, petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA
civil indemnity.