UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Nika Lesjak, Laila Burkardt and Chloé Lallemand

Mentor: doc. dr. Danijel Crnčec and doc. dr. Faris Kočan

NATO's form of involvement in the Eastern

Mediterranean Region through Regional Security
Complex Theory

Research paper

Ljubljana, 18. 12. 2022

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Contents
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................3
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).............................................................................................5
RESEARCH QUESTION & STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER..............................................................6
LITTERATURE REVIEW....................................................................................................................7
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A REGIONAL SECURITY
COMPLEX............................................................................................................................................9
THREE FORMS OF INVOLVMENT................................................................................................11
What is NATO’s form of involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean region?.........................12
What NATO did............................................................................................................................13
What NATO should do according to researchers.......................................................................14
CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................................15
BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................................................................................................16

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INTRODUCTION
Before attaining independence from the UK in 1960, interethnic conflict afflicted Cyprus.
Around 77% of island residents were Greek, while 18% were Turks. As a result, a power-
sharing arrangement was included in the 1960 pact between the leaders of the Cypriot
community and Turkey, Greece, the UK, which later became the country's three guarantor
states. However, Greece and Turkey had their own regional struggle and fuelled local
nationalist ambitions. Turkish community stopped participating in the government in 1963.
The 1960 agreement failed after a bout of ethnic violence 1963. In 1974 a military coup in
Cyprus supported by the Greek military junta raised fears of a Greek annexation of the whole
island. This led to Turkish troops occupying the northern part of the island. Finally, in 1974,
Turkey invaded Cyprus, claiming a right to protect the Turkish minority following a
coup carried out by ethnic Greeks and backed by the Greek government, which had
sought to unite the island with Greece (Mihalache, 2017). Since then, the island has been
de facto partitioned. Northern Cyprus, almost 40% of the island, has been controlled by
the Turkish community while the rest of the island has remained Greek. The UN has
condemned the invasion. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established in 1983
(TRNC). The TRNC is not recognised internationally, other than by Turkey. The rest of the
world holds “Greek” Cyprus as the legitimate entity. The Turkish occupied part of
Cyprus is separated from the Republic of Cyprus by a UN buffer zone, overseen by a UN
force of around 750 troops. The UK contributes around 250 troops. Under the Treaty of
Guarantee, the UK also retains sovereignty over two military bases in Cyprus (known as
the Sovereign Base Areas) (Fella and Curtis, 2022). To date, there is a large Turkish
military presence on the island, around 30,000 troops (Mihalache, 2017).

A vote on the island's reunification was held in both communities in 2004 as a result of
then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's peace plan, which called for a federation of
two constituent republics bound together by a federal government. The peace process
was basically ended when the idea was rejected by the Greek community but approved
by the Turkish community. Referenda and the peace process both took place in the
framework of Cyprus's ambitions to join the EU. The EU attempted to resolve the
problem using a stick-and-carrot strategy during the accession negotiations. The EU
nonetheless accepted Cyprus into the union in 2004, suspending EU law in the North
until the conflict could be resolved despite the Annan Plan's failure (Mihalache, 2017).

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Cyprus' government is led by an elected president. Nicos Anastasiades, a member of the
conservative Democratic Rally (DISY), has served as president since 2013. He agreed
with the 2004 strategy of a federation. The TRNC is a semi-presidential republic. Ersin
Tatar, formerly Prime Minister at the head of the right-wing nationalist National Unity
Party (UBP), was elected President in 2020. Tatar rejects the UN model of a federal
Cyprus and advocates a "two-state solution," which formally recognizes the island's
current partition. Tatar is supported by Turkish President Erdo ğan (Fella and Curtis,
2022)

Since 2004, efforts have been made to restart the peace negotiations. Those included the
2017-launched UN-sponsored discussions. These negotiations broke down when the
Turkish government insisted on its right to intervene unilaterally in Cyprus and the
Greek foreign ministry stated that it was impossible for Greece to support the idea of a
federated Cyprus with occupying forces there (Fella and Curtis, 2022).

In April 2021 after a three-day summit, attended by Greece, Turkey, UK and the Greek
and Turkish Cypriots, aiming to end a four-year impasse in peace discussions, the United
Nations claimed there was not enough common ground to begin negotiations on war-
divided Cyprus. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said, that despite their efforts,
the concerning parties have not yet found common ground to allow the resumption of
formal negotiations in relation to the settlement of the Cyprus problem. Ersin Tatar
commented that as long as his state is not recognized, there is no point in holding formal
talks on the matter of Cyprus. To what Nicos Anastasiades replied, that the Turkish two-
state proposal is in clear violation of UN resolutions over the island and would never be
accepted (Al Jazeera, 2021).

President Tatar stated in January 2022 that he had informed UN Secretary General
Guterres that new Cyprus peace talks could not be initiated but that he was willing to
engage in an informal discussion. He claimed that he had requested that President
Anastasiades and himself travel to London for new discussions about a variety of topics
in a different setting with Stephen Lillie, the UK High Commissioner for Cyprus (Fella
and Curtis, 2022).

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The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

The geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean have changed in the last decade with the
discovery of natural gas fields. Among others, these include the Aphrodite gas field in
the southern exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Cyprus, discovered in 2011 (Fella and
Curtis, 2022) Beginning in the early 2000s, the dispute between Turkey, Greece, and
Cyprus over EEZs grew more heated with the discovery of natural gas deposits in the
early 2010s. But Ankara's strategy has only recently started to shift from diplomatic
protests at the UN to the use of military force. The exclusion of Turkey from the
EastMed Gas Forum (EMGF) and the alignment of both Turkey's competitors (such as
the UAE and Egypt) and Western allies with Greece and Cyprus are seen by Turkish
decision-makers as supporting the pressing necessity for independence. The ideological
background of Turkeys action in the region is the “Blue Homeland” (mavi vatan)
doctrine, which holds that naval superiority is required to prevent attempts by Greece
and Cyprus to control the seas surrounding Turkey with the support of the transatlantic
alliance. The status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as well as Turkey's
ownership of hydrocarbon resources are all at risk. The ideology reflects Turkey's
extreme energy dependence while expressing Ankara's long-standing security concerns
over Northern Cyprus. It also places a strong focus on resource access (Adar and Toygür,
2020). Turkeys exclusion from the EastMed Gas Forum means, that it will not be or is
not a part of the EastMed Pipeline project. This is a 6 billion € project that was meant to
ship gas from deposits in the Leviathan gas field in Israel, through the Aphrodite gas
field in Cyprus to Crete in Greece and further to Europe. But in January 2022, the United
States withdrew their support of the project. The problem with the project was, that it
would exclude Turkey, and it contradicted with the EU’s plans to become climate neutral
by 2050. Turkey was very welcoming of the pipeline retreat. “The demise of the EastMed
pipeline will remove a major cause for tensions in the region, as there will be one less area
where Turkey feels boxed in by regional developments,” said Emre Peker, a Turkey and EU
expert at risk analysis firm Eurasia Group (Stamouli, 2022).

Regarding conflicting claims by Turkey and Greece about maritime boundaries and the
Exclusive Economic Zones, Ankara and Athens hold opposing views, with the former
adopting a more constrictive stance on the functions and dimensions of the islands in
establishing the EEZ. Regarding the latter, Turkey takes issue with the Republic of Cyprus

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(or, to be more precise, the Greek Cypriots) being the only party in charge of conducting
energy exploration activities in the eastern Mediterranean. Ankara maintains that the Turkish
administration in TRNC has the right to carry out energy exploration activities and issue
permits since it insists on the political equality of Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Dalay, 2021).

The recent gas discoveries in the region have increased Turkeys hopes to solve its chronic
economic problems. Turkey has signed many oil and gas pipeline agreements with
Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, and Russia in an effort to position itself as Europe's energy hub and
corridor.  Its aims, however, have mostly remained unmet. In a same way, Turkey demanded
that any pipeline project from the eastern Mediterranean to Europe pass through its territory.
Given Ankara's tense relations with virtually every other nation bordering the eastern
Mediterranean, this option is wildly improbable (Dalay, 2021).

RESEARCH QUESTION & STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER

Now that we have described the aspect of the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis we want to focus
on, conflict on Cyprus, we can form our main research question: “How does external
involvement of NATO influence the regional security dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean
based on the Regional Security Complex Theory?”

In our paper we have already described the case study we want to base our research on.
Below we will briefly describe the literature that we used in the literature review. We shall
explain what the Regional Security Complex Theory is and operationalize the Mediterranean
Area as a regional security complex. In that part we will look at the parameters of
conceptualizing the Eastern Mediterranean as a region. We will further look at the three
forms of involvement, with that meaning external involvement into the regional security
complex. We chose to analyse the NATO as an external factor. So we continue to describe
what NATO already did in the region and what other researchers think NATO should do in
the future. In the conclusion we summarize our findings about the case study.

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LITTERATURE REVIEW
For the understanding of the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis and the conflict on Cyprus, we had
to analyse the historic concept of the region. But seeing as the conflict has been going on for
centuries, we focused on the 20th century developments and peace talks and advancements in
the recent years. One of the main sources for explaining the situation in the region were a
research briefing written by Stefano Fella and John Curtis for the House of Commons of the
United Kingdom on recent developments in Cyprus and peace talks. They explained the
history from Cyprus’ independence from the UK up until the RoC joined the EU in 2004. In
that it also explains the current political system and the UK presence on the island. They go
on to explain the recent political developments and UN sponsored peace talks that took place
in 2017 and new talks in 2021. They also highlight the most prominent areas of conflict. In
the last part they talk about the recent tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, most notably the
Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus.

We also used a research paper written by Iulian Mihalache titled Solving the Cyprus conflict
Difficult achievement but far-reaching benefits ahead, for the Centre for Geopolitics &
Security in Realism Studies in the United Kingdom. It also explains the modern history of the
island and looks more into the 2017 peace talks as it was written in that year. The author talks
about the implications for the EU in the region.

For the recent developments in peace talks we used multiple news articles, most notably from
Al Jazeera, the first English-language news channel in the Middle East, owned by the
monarchy government in Qatar.

On the matter of Exclusive Economic Zone in Cyprus and its relation to Turkey, we analysed
the comment from Sinem Adar and Ilke Toygür, about Turkey, the EU and the Eastern
Mediterranean Crisis: Militarization of Foreign Policy and Power Rivalry. It mostly looks at
the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis from the Turkish perspective and nicely explains Turkish
foreign policy in the region also in relation to other countries, not just Greece and Cyprus.

For the theoretical framework it makes sense to rely mostly on the original work, in which
the whole theory of Regional Security Complexes was shaped and put into words at the first
place. Therefore, we want to especially work and focus on it in order to find the criteria
necessary for the further research on the Mediterranean Area and the NATO. In their book
“Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security” Buzan and Wæver analysed

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foreign behaviour in so-called Regional Security Complexes. Seen from the perspective of
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) according to Buzan and Wæver, the globe is
spanned by four superimposed levels, which form different actor. Each of them has its own
dynamics and characteristics. The top level is the global level, below that is the interregional
level, followed by the regional level as well as the domestic level. They are all closely
intertwined and form specific power relations and dynamics. The theory primarily focuses on
a middle level between state and global system, which is composed of geographically
clustered sets of units (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 27). It is based on the assumption that
security issues mainly take place between neighbouring states, instead of security threats
travelling over far distances. Which makes – historically proven – capabilities and intentions
of neighbouring states to the main concerns of a nation in terms of security environment
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 41).

In order to understand NATO’s behaviour in the region, we will analyse it through the
Regional Security Complex Theory of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, and particularly the 3
forms of involvement it pointed out. We will also look for precise criteria of these 3 forms of
involvements (through the example of the Western Balkan region) described by Filip Ejdus
and Marko Kovačević, the third one (the governmentality) coined later by Michel Foucault.

To focus on NATO’s behaviour we will base our research on Muhittin Ataman’s article
“NATO in the Turkish-Greek conflict” from 2022 but also on Robin Emmott’s article on
“Reuters”, Heather A. Conley and Rachel Ellehuus’ commentary  produced by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Rainer Meyer Zum Felde’s report “The Eastern Mediterranean Military Environment From a
NATO Perspective” will help us to understand why NATO has not a real form of
involvement, as well as considering the cooperation between NATO and the EU as a possible
form of involvement. This cooperation is also mentioned by Constantinos
Saragkas and Georgios Manassis in their article “Navigating a sea of challenges: a new
approach for NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean”.

Muhittin Ataman's article also discusses the possibility of reforming NATO, the fact that the
article is dated 2022 being particularly interesting as it takes into account the invasion in
Ukraine.

Finally, Damon Wilson’s article “NATO membership for Cyprus. Yes, Cyprus.” raised the
interesting solution of adding Cyprus as a member state of NATO.

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OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS
A REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX
In order to make use of the theory, which explains security dynamics between states in the
same regional security complex, there is the need to operationalise the Mediterranean area as
a Regional Security Complex (RSC). These Complexes are defined “by durable patterns of
amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of security
interdependence” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 45). They form in accordance with anarchic
structures and consequently the balance-of-power structures as well as dependent on
geographical proximity with its resulting effect on security. As, like mentioned earlier,
security threats tend to travel more easily over short distances which makes geographical
proximity a great impact on security interaction (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 45).

These facts lead us to the first factor which allows one to define a certain area as a Regional
Security Complex. These complexes are by nature geographical. They consist of
neighbouring actors and are heavily regional in character. The impacts arising from
geographical proximity become visible in the military, political, societal and environmental
sectors of the countries involved. This makes the geographical proximity of countries one
essential factor which defines a Regional Security Complex. Being neighbouring countries
therefore is – not sufficient, yet – essential, also in the Mediterranean Area. Factor one thus is
countries form a group which consists of states which are physically close to one another
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 47).

A definition of RSCs was was formulated as followed: “a set of units whose major processes
of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems
cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan & Wæver 1998,
p. 201). It emphasises the main properties of the concept. The underlying idea is still that
significant portions of the securitization and desecuritization processes in the global system
will exhibit themselves in so called regional clusters. These clusters are resistant to and
separate from processes of (de)securitization occurring on a global scale (Buzan & Wæver,
2003, p. 44).

Security interdependence is more intense between states located inside one complex than
between states which are inside the complex and those outside of it. This forms another factor
which makes a Regional Security Complex a Regional Security Complex instead of only a
group of neighbouring states. The security of states which belong to one of these areas

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interact with the security of the other states within this RSC. As mentioned earlier, most
security threats do not travel over far distances and therefore threats within an actor’s
immediate neighbourhood tend to be felt the strongest. A state’s security concerns must
primarily be generated within their immediate neighbourhood, within the RSC, which they
belong to. There must be a reasonable distinction. If a group of states wants to qualify as an
RSC, there must be an interdependence concerning security issues which is sufficient both
“to establish them as a linked set” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 47), which makes them a
recognisable entity. But also, the interdependence needs to be strong enough for a visible
distinction to “differentiate them from surrounding security regions (Buzan & Wæver, 2003,
p. 48).

The typical pattern of an RSC is one of rivalry, balance-of-power, and alliance patterns
among the major powers in the area (to this pattern, penetrating external forces' influence can
then be added). In most cases the pattern of conflict stems from factors which are indigenous
to the region. Therefore, like in South Asia or the Middle East, foreign powers cannot define,
desecuritize, or reorganize the region despite them being partly heavily involved (Buzan &
Weaver, 2003, p. 47). This can be seen very much in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Greek
and Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus live in rivalry and both are indigenous to the island. UK is in
this case the foreign power that cannot desecuritize or reorganize the region, despite having
had a big historical impact on the island and has to this day its sovereign bases there. This is
another factor which marks a Regional Security Complex, the fact that the security issues are
often times a heritage, which was already “born” in this specific area.

The fundamental structure and personality of RSCs are determined by two types of relations:
power relations and patterns of amity and enmity (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 49).

So first of all, in Regional Security Complexes power relations can be recognized, which
leads to a regional balance of power. Therefore, within these networks of relations, the RSCs
can be analysed in terms of polarity.

Furthermore, there are patterns of amity and enmity. Patterns of enmity, relationships
between actors are founded on mistrust and dread, whereas patterns of amity vary from
friendship to protection and support. In order to define a security complex, patterns of amity
and enmity are crucial. If patterns of amity predominate in a regional security complex,
"positive dependency" is used to set relatively intense security interdependence.  If hostile
patterns are prevalent, "negative dependency" will set the relative degree of security

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interdependence and lead to conflict development. According to the theory, historical
circumstances like long-standing enmities help establish patterns of amity and enmity, for
instance between Greeks and Turks, but also Arabs and Persians (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, pp.
489-491).

Apart from defining the Mediterranean Area as a Regional Security Complex, it is essential
for this analysis to operationalize the NATO as a great power. Security dynamics on the
regional level are mostly important for the states within it. Yet, also global powers have an
interest in regional security issues, as it shapes options and consequences of influence of the
specific global power within the global system. Therefore, global powers do have interests on
the regional level, despite their system level character. What distinguishes regional from
global powers is that the ladder “are responded to by others on the basis of system level
calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power”. The influence of the
great power makes it a relevant actor for others. It is therefore considered by other powers as
they see a clear economic, military and political potential of (future) intervention of this
power. They are also defined by the fact that they are usually capable of operating in more
than one region with the perspective of exercising global military and political reach (Buzan
& Weaver, 2003, p. 35).

THREE FORMS OF INVOLVMENT

In the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), researchers categorize 3 forms of external
involvement in a regional security complex (RSC). This involvement can be seen as a
penetration, as an overlay, or as a governmentality; and each of them use a certain form of
power to be involved in the region. A penetration “takes place when external powers align
with certain units within RSC thus changing the regional balance of power” (Ejdus and
Kovačević, 2019). The penetration form of involvement usually uses sovereignty power to
assess its authority in the region, which is exercised by diplomacy or war. We can illustrate
this category of involvement with the example of U.S. intervention in the Middle Eastern
RSC. An overlay is defined as “a military presence of external power so overwhelming that
autonomous intra-regional dynamics loses its relevance.” In other terms, Filip Ejdus and
Marko Kovačević also explains it as “a long term military presence and a political clout of
such gravity that any independent local security dynamics ceases to operate”. This form of
external involvement uses disciplinary power and can be illustrated with the European
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imperial overlay over Africa in the nineteenth century. Finally, the governmentality form of
external penetration is more recent, and coined by Michel Foucault. It “aims to
governmentalize a region by including it into a wider grid of security governance in order to
govern it at a distance.” This form relies on productive power, which unlike sovereignty and
discipline powers, is exercised indirectly. Defined by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall
as “the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of
knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope”, Foucault also
explains that it “denotes an ensemble of liberal discourses and practices aimed to govern at a
distance, beyond the immediate reach of the state.”

However, governmentality, sovereignty and discipline “are not mutually exclusive but rather
represents a ‘triangle’ of different forms of powers.” (Foucault, 2007). Indeed, Ejdus and
Kovačević add that “governmentality can and usually does operate concomitantly with the
presence of disciplinary forms of external involvement that rely on direct influence, coercion
and compulsion”.

What is NATO’s form of involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean

region?

After identifying the Eastern Mediterranean region as a regional security complex, following
the logic of RSCT we can ask ourselves: what is NATO’s form of involvement in the Eastern
Mediterranean region? Especially towards the conflict between Greece and Turkey, which
are both NATO member states. To answer this question, we will base our argumentation on
different criteria’s form of involvement. About penetration’s form of involvement, the
external power usually applies military operations and control in the region, makes security
alignments with states within the RSC, and could also uses diplomacy. On the other hand, we
can observe an overlay form of involvement when the external power applies what we call a
“military overlay” which is performed by a permanent military presence, troops stationing, a
disarmament process, a deterrence presence… When the external power uses an overlay kind
of involvement, it can also choose to work with and/or support civilian authorities of the
region, and could also uses diplomacy, the goal of these actions would be a security
reassurance for the population. Finally, the goal of the governmentality form of involvement
being to govern a region at distance, the external power could need for that to construct a
region as a delineated terrain of governance first. The possible characteristics of this form of

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involvement are an economic integration of the RSC by the external power, the integration in
a security community, and the military presence can still help the external power to govern
the region at distance.

However, what NATO did and how it behaved toward this crisis can’t actually fit in one of
the three form of involvement that we just described. This is why we will first focus on what
NATO did, explaining why it didn’t have a real form of involvement in the region, and
finally focus on some solutions found by scholars about what NATO should do and we will
see if these actions can be interpreted as a form of external involvement or not.

What NATO did

NATO had a role of mediation between Greece and Turkey, “calling them not to escalate the
tension” (Ataman, 2022) and it actually led to talks at NATO headquarters between the two
countries, which permitted a de-escalation process of the conflict, as well as a hotline to
“avoid accidents in the sea and air” (Emmott, 2020) established by the two countries. The
Turkish Ministry stated shortly after that they reached a mutual understanding on “general
principles”. And NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg welcomed “the establishment of
a military de-confliction mechanism, achieved through the constructive engagement of
Greece and Turkey”. We can note that it was Greece and Turkey who were the main actors of
this de-escalation establishment, NATO being only a mediator and the place where the talks
happened.

Indeed, NATO still lacks “an independent, effective mechanism to prevent an inter-ally
conflict” (Ataman, 2022). We can also add that when Ankara sent ships into Cypriot waters,
the EU denounced “illegal actions” and “EU foreign affairs ministers convened on July 13,
asking Ankara to provide “clarifications” on its actions”. NATO on the other hand did no
such thing, and Turkey actually “has met little resistance from either the European Union,
NATO, or the United States in response to its actions, with the exception of harsh words and
limited sanctions.” (Conley and Ellehuus, 2020) NATO’s behaviour in the conflict can
therefore not be considered as any real form of involvement.

This lack of involvement is however explainable. Indeed, Greece and Turkey being both
NATO members, the alliance “has no authority to intervene.” “Any resolution whether

13
through bilateral or multilateral negotiations must be achieved in a framework outside of
NATO. Even in the case of a military escalation, NATO would not be able to act without the
consensus of all its members, including both Greece and Turkey” (Zum Felde, 2020). From
this point of view, NATO can’t be considered as an external power and therefore can’t have a
behaviour fitting one of the three forms of involvement. However, we will see that
researchers have found other solutions that might be considered as an involvement in the
region.

What NATO should do according to researchers

They are several other ways NATO could face the Eastern Mediterranean crisis, most of
scholars agreeing on the fact that an intra-alliance conflict could only weaken the alliance and
profit countries or powers outside of NATO, leading to solutions perhaps to more efficient
actions and solution toward this crisis.

The threat Russia now represents with the recent war in Ukraine might for example push
NATO “to develop a military or a political mechanism to resolve intra-alliance conflicts. In
other words, the escalation of the Turkish-Greek conflict may force NATO to make some
reforms to prevent crises within the alliance” (Ataman, 2022). This possible new reform
might change completely NATO’s behaviour towards the region and could be assimilated to
overlay or penetration form of involvement, depending on the type of military operation or
political mechanism that are led in the region.

Several researchers pointed out a solution that would not implies a reform of the
organization: adding Cyprus as a NATO member. It “could transform Cyprus into an anchor
of stability in an eastern Mediterranean region embroiled in crises” and “could help both
sides commit to forge one state together” (Wilson, 2019). This would very probably be a
penetration form of involvement in the region, NATO including Cyprus as one of its
members matching perfectly with the criteria “making security alignments with states within
the RSC”.

Finally, a form of cooperation between NATO and the EU is often pointed out, as the
solution of NATO inability to act because both organizations have the same values: “values
committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of

14
law”. Indeed, “threats and future challenges should be managed with a combination of
NATO’s hard power and the EU’s soft power. (…) in the Mediterranean—to become a joint
maritime operation since they serve the same principles.” (Saragkas and Manassis, 2021) The
fact that both organizations have different instruments of powers might only be beneficial for
the two organizations: “In this manner, NATO can serve the interests of all its member states
and secure Europe's continued prosperity in the new global geopolitical environment” (Zum
Felde, 2020). This possible cooperation with the EU might be seen as an overlay form of
involvement in the region, if the cooperation leads to military control in the region, the
presence of the EU and NATO being so overwhelming that the current dynamics of the
region cease to become relevant.

It is obviously hard to tell what NATO will decide in the next few months concerning the
Eastern Mediterranean crisis, and what kind of involvement the organization will decide to
make, if it decides to adopt one. It is however possible that NATO will change its behaviour
toward this crisis because of the threat Russia now represents since the invasion in Ukraine.

CONCLUSION
The occupation with the Regional Security Complex Theory has in the beginning revealed to
us the properties of the Mediterranean Area. After looking deeper into the theory, which was
established and revised by Buzan and Wæver in 2003, it became clear that a Regional
Security Complex can be identified by its geographical proximity. Yet, the physical aspect is
not the only which defines a Regional Security Complex. Rather, states within one RSC are
furthermore closely interdependent in terms of security, which is strong enough to establish
them as a linked set - a recognisable entity, which can be differentiated from surrounding
security regions. Another defining aspect of a RSC is the origin of the security issue. Mostly
security issues arise from the specific area and are of an inherited character. Furthermore, we
found that RSCs are characterized by patterns of amity and enmity as well as internal power
relations.

Greece and Turkey are, not only close in a physical sense but have been connected culturally
throughout history. In our paper we focused more on recent history and developments in the
20th and 21st centuries. In the international arena, they are recognized as an entity of the
Eastern Mediterranean, along with Cyprus, all very important actors in the region. They have

15
security dynamics, which we described in this paper and that makes them closely
interdependent and a good example of rivalry in the context of the Regional Security
Complex Theory. Greeks and Turks can also be characterized by patterns of amity and
enmity as mentioned in the paper.

Also of relevance was to define the NATO as a global power. This was possible by realizing
that global powers are defined by their global influence and their economic, military and
political (potential) capabilities.

We then tried to find if NATO’s behaviour toward the Eastern Mediterranean region
corresponded to one of the three forms of involvement (penetration, overlay, or
governmentality). But after focusing on what NATO did, our research went deeper and we
realized that the alliance could not be fully involved in the crisis, as both Greece and Turkey
are members of NATO. However, in the light of recent events, NATO could change its
behaviour, so it seemed relevant to us to look in more detail at the various suggested
solutions (provided by researchers) to this crisis. In the end, it appeared that most of these
solutions could correspond to a form of involvement, but it’s still impossible to predict what
kind of involvement NATO will have in the Eastern Mediterranean region since it only had
the role of mediation between the two countries.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
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