CHARLES FRIED: Now there are a few conditions and I'm

sure they will strike you as fair before such promises, which are not bargains,

are enforced in court.

For instance, remember Leonard against Pepsico.

The reliance on the promise has got to be reasonable.

The promise has to be serious, not a joke.

So Leonard's reliance on the Pepsi ad, which

after all was quite significant reliance--

a $700,000 investment, as it turned out, was substantial

but it wasn't reasonable.

No reasonable person should have gone to the trouble and expense in respect

to such a promise as Pepsico had made.

Second, the detriment has to be foreseeable

by the person who elicits it, who causes it,

which is really not so far from the requirement

that the detrimental reliance be reasonable.

In other words, the person who makes the promise, if he's a reasonable person,

has to foresee that by making this promise,

it's going to cause this detrimental reliance.

That's easiest to see in the case of Sister Antillico, which

today would come out very differently.

The brother-in-law could foresee that his sister would

suffer the expense and the trouble that she did when he made the promise.

And Grandpa certainly could foresee that his granddaughter might

quit her job as a result of his promise.

So to summarize this last bit, there are two additional requirements in addition

to the promise.
The reliance on the promise has to be reasonable,

and it has to be foreseeable.