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JUSTICE QUARTERLY VOLUME 22 NUMBER 3 (SEPTEMBER 2005)

Turning the Other Cheek:


Reassessing the Impact of
Religion on Punitive Ideology

01 James D. Unnever, Francis T. Cullen, and


Aguilar Jurado
Brandon K. Applegate
20junnever@radford.edu
Department
JamesUnnever
00000June
Justice
10.1080/07418820500089091
RJQY108892.sgm
0741-8825
Original
Taylor
2005
22 and
& of
2005
SociologyRadford
Quarterly
Article
Francis
(print)/1745-9109
FrancisGroup UniversityRadfordVA 24142USA
Ltd Ltd (online)

Religion has long been recognized as an underlying aspect of correctional


policies. Researchers, however, have only recently begun to move beyond consid-
erations of how fundamentalist Christian affiliations might shape preferences for
punitive correctional policies. The present study broadens the extant research
by examining multiple aspects of religious beliefs and how they affect support
for capital punishment and harsher local courts. Analyses of General Social Survey
data show that religion has divergent effects. Beyond a mere fundamentalist or
conservative religious view, those who have a rigid and moralistic approach to
religion and who imagine God as a dispassionate, powerful figure who dispenses
justice are more likely to harbor punitive sentiments toward offenders. In

James D. Unnever is Associate Professor at Mississippi State University. His most recent research
focuses on whether egalitarianism and racial resentment predict support for crime reduction poli-
cies, the racial divide in support for capital punishment, the impact of white racism on support for
the death penalty, and the relationship between victimization and political beliefs. His most recent
publications investigate Colvin’s differential coercion theory, the relationships among ADHD, low
self-control, and bullying and criminal behavior, the cultural, social, and individual sources of bully-
ing among middle school students, victim reporting of bullying behavior, whether aggressive victims
are a distinct group of students, empathy and support for capital punishment, weakly held opinions
about the death penalty, and the relationship between Christian fundamentalism and support for
capital punishment. Francis T. Cullen is Distinguished Research Professor of Criminal Justice and Soci-
ology at the University of Cincinnati. His most recent works include Combating Corporate Crime:
Local Prosecutors at Work, Criminological Theory: Context and Consequences, and Criminological
Theory: Past to Present—Essential Readings. His current research focuses on the impact of social
support on crime, the measurement of sexual victimization, public opinion about crime control, and
rehabilitation as a correctional policy. He is a Past President of both the American Society of Crimi-
nology and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. Brandon K. Applegate is an Associate Professor
of Criminal Justice at the University of Central Florida. He has published more than two dozen arti-
cles on punishment and rehabilitation policy, correctional treatment, juvenile justice, public views
of correctional policies, jail issues, and decision-making among criminal justice professionals. He
also co-edited Offender Rehabilitation: Effective Correctional Intervention. He previously served
as Secretary of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and is currently Second Vice-President of
the Southern Criminal Justice Association. Correspondence to: James D. Unnever, Department of
Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work, Mississippi State University, P.O. Box C, Mississippi State,
MS 39762, USA. E-mail: junnever@soc.msstate.edu

ISSN 0741-8825 print/1745-9109 online/05/030304-36


© 2005 Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences
DOI: 10.1080/07418820500089091
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 305

contrast, those who have a gracious or loving image of God and who are compas-
sionate toward others—that is, those who take seriously the admonition to “turn
the other cheek”—are less supportive of “get tough” policies. In the end, not only
is religion a multi-dimensional phenomenon but also its features likely coalesce
to divide believers into opposite camps—with one set of attributes fostering harsh
sentiments toward offenders and another set of attributes tempering punitive-
ness and justifying interventions aimed at helping the criminally wayward.

Keywords religion; Christian fundamentalism; punitive ideology; capital


punishment; public opinion

Introduction

Compared to other advanced industrial nations, expressions of religious faith


are widespread in the United States and have a prominent role in shaping the
contours of policy debates (Ammerman, 1987; Newport & Saad, 1997; Shorto,
02 1997; Wald, 1992). Religion is thus potentially implicated in understanding not
only the causes of criminal behavior but also how society reacts to behavior it
Aguilar Jurado
defines as illegal (Baier & Wright, 2001; Durkheim, 1964; Regnerus, 2003).
Indeed, as David Garland (1990, p. 203) has stated, “Throughout the history of
penal practice religion has been a major force in shaping the ways in which
offenders are dealt with.” Despite these insights, researchers have only begun
to explore the fullness of religious and spiritual beliefs and their potential influ-
ence on attitudes toward correctional issues such as support for the death
penalty and the harshness of local courts.
Most of the extant research has investigated whether Christian fundamental-
ism fosters punitive correctional policies. This focus is understandable given the
spread of “get tough” correctional policies and the emergence of fundamental-
ism as a socioreligious movement—a movement often accompanied by promi-
nent “right-wing” religious leaders calling for conservative social policies
(Beyerlein & Chaves, 2003; Cullen, 2002; Cullen, Fisher, & Applegate, 2000;
Grasmick, Cochran, Bursik, & Kimpel, 1993; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Hood &
Smith, 2002; Layman, 1997).1 This line of inquiry has been valuable, but it also
has been limited in two ways.
First, the research on fundamentalism and crime policies has tended to
portray fundamentalists as a monolithic group who universally support punitive
correctional policies because they share similar conservative religious beliefs.
Young (1992) and others (Hood & Smith, 2002) argue that such a portrayal

1. According to a Harris poll (Taylor, 2001), the percentage of people who believe in the death
penalty steadily increased from 1970 to 1997 (1970—47 percent, 1973—59 percent, 1976—67
percent, 1983—68 percent, and 1997—75 percent). Since 1997, support for the death penalty has
declined from 75 percent to 67 percent in 2001. Notably, Smith (1991) reports that the number of
individuals who attended a fundamentalist denomination did not change significantly from the late
1960s to the late 1980s (1967—32.2 percent, 1984—33.1 percent, 1985—34.6 percent, 1986—34.5
percent, 1988—35.4 percent). Still, the “new Christian right” emerged in the late 1970s as a unique
social and political force (Ammerman, 1987; Harding, 2000).
306 UNNEVER ET AL.

denies the heterogeneity of religious beliefs found among fundamentalists.


Second, as Applegate, Cullen, Fisher, and Vander Ven (2000) point out, the
concentration on the potential influence of fundamentalism has diverted
attention away from a consideration of how other religious beliefs might
promote public support for less punitive and more progressive criminal justice
policies. In particular, researchers have only begun to explore how more
compassionate or forgiving religious beliefs may be related to perceptions of
correctional policies.2
In this context, the current research analyzes the relationship between
religion and punitiveness, with a special focus on beliefs that might temper
support for harsh correctional policies. Using data from the 1997–1998
03 General Social Survey (hereinafter referred to as the “GSS”), we explore how
support for the death penalty and for harsher courts is shaped by two
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measures of religiousness—forgiveness and an image of God as “gracious”
rather than harsh and hierarchical—and a measure of the related concept of
04 compassion. In addition to controls for other relevant factors, we include
measures of religious activity (e.g., frequency of meditation and frequency
Aguilar Jurado
of prayer), Christian fundamentalist religious beliefs (e.g., support for bibli-
cal literalism), and belonging to a fundamentalist denomination. The results
challenge the stereotype of religion as uniformly fostering support for
punishment, and suggest instead that features of religious belief might
lessen the endorsement of punitive correctional policies. As a prelude to this
analysis, we first review the relevant research and then detail our research
strategy.

Religion as a Source of Punitive Ideology

One important line of inquiry by criminologists has been to explore whether


religion in the United States is a source of public support for punitive crime
control policies. This relationship is reasonable because, compared to other
advanced industrial nations, the United States is both more religious and more
punitive (Ammerman, 1987; Garland, 1990, 2001; Wald, 1992). The possibility
of this relationship has led criminologists to try to uncover what it is about
religion that might be related to public opinion about crime-related issues.
Scholars have taken two approaches to revealing the possible linkages between
religion and punitiveness. One approach focuses on religious variables that
should positively predict punitiveness, and the other examines the relationship

2. For the purposes of this paper, “other religious beliefs” are referred to as religious and spiritual
beliefs. This more inclusive categorization allows for an examination of a variety of beliefs that may
be considered as either religious or spiritual (Zinnbauer, Pargament, & Scott, 1999). In the broadest
sense, spirituality refers to the inner experience of religious feelings and awareness (Underwood &
Teresi, 2002). Using these two terms to create a general category, religious and spiritual beliefs, is
consistent with the research by Marler and Hadaway (2002). They report that most people who
consider themselves as “being religious” also consider themselves as “being spiritual.”
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 307

between the more forgiving and loving aspects of religion and how they may
be related to support for national crime-related policies (see, e.g., Applegate
et al., 2000).
The approach that investigates how religion may foster greater punitiveness
has primarily focused on Christian fundamentalism. However, scholars recog-
nize that Christian fundamentalism is a complex concept that is difficult to
measure precisely. Therefore, most of the extant research has included
multiple measures of Christian fundamentalism and assessed whether they
positively predict punitive ideology. Typically, the prior research has included
a measure that assesses whether people belong to a fundamentalist denomina-
tion. Nearly always, the extant research has used Smith’s (1990) classification
of denominations as their measure of whether individuals belong to a funda-
mentalist denomination (see, e.g., Barkan & Cohn, 1994; Borg, 1997; Britt,
1998; Grasmick, Davenport, Chamlin, & Bursik, 1992; Stack, 2003; Young,
2000).3
The extant research has included additional measures of Christian funda-
mentalism that go beyond the simple dichotomy of whether individuals
belong to a fundamentalist denomination. These additional measures assess
whether individuals express religious beliefs that have been identified with
Christian fundamentalism. There is no agreed upon single belief or set of
beliefs that definitely defines a person as a fundamentalist. However,
researchers argue that a common belief among most fundamentalists is that
the Bible should be interpreted literally (e.g., Britt, 1998; Grasmick & McGill,
1994; Young, 1992). The extant research has also argued that Christian funda-
mentalists tend to encourage people to believe in Jesus Christ or to accept
Jesus Christ as their savior (see, e.g., Young, 1992). Other measures include
whether individuals have had a “born again” experience (Young, 1992) and
scales such as the “conservative theology” index (Britt, 1998) that incorpo-
rate multiple measures of conservative religious beliefs (see also, Curry,
1996).
Table 1 presents a summary of the research that has investigated the rela-
tionship between punitiveness and Christian fundamentalism. We present the
author(s) of the study, date of publication, measures used to assess Christian
fundamentalism, and the results from the analyses. Below, we review the major
findings of the research summarized in Table 1.
In general, the research investigating whether fundamentalism positively
predicts punitiveness has generated mixed results. Grasmick, Bursik, and
Blackwell’s (1993) analysis of data collected from Oklahoma City residents
found that being a member of an evangelical or fundamentalist denomination
was significantly related to support for the death penalty, harsher courts, and

3. For a list of the denominations included in the classification scheme, see Smith (1990). Of
note, the Christian fundamentalist denomination that had the largest percentage of respondents
in our sample was the Southern Baptist Convention (32 percent). Another 27 percent of the
respondents identified themselves as members of “Other Baptist Churches” or “ Baptist, Don’t
know which.”
308

Table 1 Review of literature on religion and support for punitive correctional policies

Corrupt
Measure of Fundamentalist Self-identified Biblical Punitive Religious Religious Born Conservative human Religious
Author(s) punitiveness denomination fundamentalist literalism God Evangelism activity salience again theology nature forgiveness

Applegate et al. Death penalty ns ns ns −


(2000) support
Harsher courts ns ns ns ns
UNNEVER ET AL.

Punitiveness ns + ns −
index
Barkan and Death penalty ns ns
Cohn (1994)a support
Baumer Death penalty ns −
et al. (2003) support
Britt (1998) Death penalty +a, −b ns − ns ns
support
Borg (1997)a Death penalty +c, nsd ns
support
Evans and Age appropriate ns ns +
Adams (2003) for death penalty
Juvenile waiver ns ns ns
to adult court
Punitiveness + ns ns
index
Grasmick, Death penalty + + ns ns ns
Bursik, and support
Blackwell (juvenile)
(1993)
Death penalty + ns ns ns +
support (adult)
Table 1 (Continued)

Corrupt
Measure of Fundamentalist Self-identified Biblical Punitive Religious Religious Born Conservative human Religious
Author(s) punitiveness denomination fundamentalist literalism God Evangelism activity salience again theology nature forgiveness

Grasmick, Death penalty + + ns


Cochran, support
Bursik, and (juvenile)
Kimpel (1993)
Death penalty + + ns
support
(adult)
Harsher courts + + ns
Stiffer + ns ns
penalties
Police use of ns ns ns
deadly force
Grasmick and Punitiveness + −
McGill (1994)a index
(juvenile)
Moon et al. Death penalty ns
(2000) support
Sandys and Death penalty ns ns ns
McGarrell support
(1997)
Soss Death penalty ns
et al. (2003)a support
Stack (2003) Death penalty + ns
support
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK
309
Table 1 (Continued)

Corrupt
310

Measure of Fundamentalist Self-identified Biblical Punitive Religious Religious Born Conservative human Religious
Author(s) punitiveness denomination fundamentalist literalism God Evangelism activity salience again theology nature forgiveness

Vogel and Death penalty ns ns


Vogel support
(2003) (juvenile)
Death penalty + ns
support
(adult)
UNNEVER ET AL.

Young Death penalty +a, nsb + − − ns


(1992) support
Young Death penalty ns
(2000) support
Young and Death penalty nsa, −b nsa, +b +a, −b −b
Thompson support
(1995)
Gun ownership ns ns nsa, +b ns

Notes. Results summarized here are based on the most rigorous multivariate tests reported by the author(s) of each study. +: significant positive relationship; −: significant negative relationship; ns:
relationship not significant.
aWhite respondents.
bBlack respondents.
cNative Southern respondents.
dNon-native Southern respondents.
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 311

stiffer laws.4 Using GSS data, Young (1992) investigated whether affiliation with
a fundamentalist denomination and two indicators of conservative religious
beliefs (biblical literalism and whether the individual reported a born-again
experience) were related to support for the death penalty. In general, Young
(1992) found that white fundamentalists were more likely to support the death
penalty. He reasoned that white fundamentalists were more likely to attribute
the cause of crime to individual free will and sinful behavior. In contrast to
white fundamentalists, Young (1992) suggested that African American funda-
mentalists were less supportive of the death penalty because they attributed
the cause of crime to situational characteristics, which, in turn, diminished
their desire to fully punish criminals. Young (1992) concluded that white funda-
mentalists have a moral absolutism that eliminates much of their uncertainty
about the death penalty. Curry’s (1996) finding that fundamentalist religious
beliefs predict diminished variation in the perceived wrongfulness of different
crimes reinforces Young’s conclusion.
Borg’s (1997) analysis of the relationship between fundamentalism and the
southern culture of violence suggests that the influence of fundamentalism on
support for punitive correctional policies may be more pronounced not only
among whites (Young, 1992) but also among white native southerns. Borg (1997)
reports that white southern fundamentalists are nearly three times more likely
to support the death penalty than are white non-southerners.
Grasmick and McGill (1994) conducted a path analysis of data collected from
Oklahoma City residents, which included attributional style as an intervening
variable between fundamentalist religious beliefs and perceptions of correc-
tional policies. They found that biblical literalists were more likely to attribute
the cause of crime to a dispositional attributional style, which in turn was
related to supporting the death penalty (Grasmick & McGill, 1994). Most
recently, Vogel and Vogel (2003) analyzed survey data collected in Orange
County, California and found that individuals who characterized themselves as
fundamentalists were more likely to support the death penalty for adults but
not for juveniles.
However, there is research that indicates that fundamentalists are not more
likely to support capital punishment. Soss, Langbein, and Metelko’s (2003) anal-
ysis of 1992 National Election Studies (NES) data found that a self-reported
measure of being a Christian fundamentalist had no direct effect on support for
the death penalty for white men when core conservative values were included

4. Grasmick, Bursik, and Blackwell (1993) used the classification scheme created by Smith (1990)
(see footnote 3), which groups evangelists and fundamentalists into one category. Grasmick, Bursik,
and Blackwell (1993) readily acknowledged that their classification scheme did not capture the
heterogeneity of religious beliefs found among fundamentalists (see Young, 1992). Therefore, they
substituted a measure of adherence to a literal interpretation of the Bible as an alternative to the
fundamentalist affiliation category. Grasmick, Bursik, and Blackwell (1993) reported that their
results somewhat differed depending on how they operationalized fundamentalism but that strong
similarities were also found. They concluded that research on support for the death penalty should
include different dimensions of religious beliefs, including having a born-again experience and being
a self-identified fundamentalist.
312 UNNEVER ET AL.

such as authoritarianism and individuality. Young and Thompson (1995) discov-


ered that whites were not more likely to support capital punishment if they
belonged to a fundamentalist denomination, interpreted the Bible literally, and
attempted to save souls. Young and Thompson’s (1995) analysis for African
Americans, however, revealed that belonging to a fundamentalist denomina-
tion, perceiving God as punitive, and evangelism actually decreased the likeli-
hood of support for the death penalty. Applegate et al. (2000) also reported
that biblical literalists were not more likely to support capital punishment and
harsher local courts. In addition, Sandys and McGarrell’s (1997) survey of
Indiana residents found that none of their religious belief measures (biblical
literalness, religious salience, and belonging to a fundamentalist denomination)
had a significant direct effect on general support for the death penalty. Sandys
and McGarrell (1997) concluded that researchers should be cautious in
interpreting the influence religion has on attitudes toward capital punishment
especially in states beyond the Bible belt.
In sum, there is evidence that suggests that fundamentalists may be more
likely to support punitive crime-related policies. However, the evidence is not
overwhelming for four reasons. First, there are numerous studies that have
found a null relationship between Christian fundamentalism and measures of
punitiveness regardless of how Christian fundamentalism was measured (e.g.,
belonging to a Christian fundamentalist denomination, biblical literalism, self-
report of being a fundamentalist). Second, the research suggests that the asso-
ciation between fundamentalism and punitiveness varies across race and region.
Indeed, the extant research indicates that African American Christian funda-
mentalists tend to oppose capital punishment more so than members of other
denominations. Third, the extant research suggests that one of the beliefs iden-
tified with Christian fundamentalism, evangelism, tends to predict opposition to
harsh correctional policies and the death penalty. Lastly, when a positive
association has been reported, it is marginally significant, and the magnitude of
the association has been small. Thus, at this point, it is not clear whether
Christian fundamentalists are more likely to support punitive crime-related
policies.

Turning the Other Cheek: The Differential Effects of Religion

The focus of scholars on the potential of religion to increase punitiveness has


provided valuable insights. However, the limits of that research reflect the
tendency among criminologists to conceptualize religion in a one-dimensional
fashion. Clearly, religion has its harsh, judgmental, moralistic side. However,
the other side of religion—its focus on love and forgiveness, its focus on turning
the other cheek when offended—might well prompt religiously oriented people
to be less punitive. That is, religion might be a multi-faceted factor that must
be “unpackaged” into its component parts. Because it offers the seemingly
contradictory messages of harshness and love, it might well have differential
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 313

effects on punitiveness, depending on which component of religion people most


embrace.
In this paper, we emphasize three religious beliefs—forgiveness, compassion,
and having a gracious image of God—that should foster less punitive attitudes.
We also include conservative religious beliefs such as biblical literalism that
should predict a more punitive approach toward crime. In sum, our intent is to
expand the focus of the prior research by investigating how the complexities
embedded within religious beliefs can manifest themselves within the dual and,
at times, contradictory purposes of our criminal justice policies—that is, to
punish but at the same time rehabilitate criminal offenders.

Forgiveness

Forgiveness can be defined as overcoming the “negative affect and judgment


toward the offender, not by denying ourselves the right to such affect and
judgment, but by endeavoring to view the offender with compassion, benevo-
lence, and love while recognizing that he or she has abandoned the right to
harm them” (Enright, Gassin, & Wu, 1992, p. 101). Forgiveness is a core reli-
gious belief promoted by virtually every major religion, including Christianity,
Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam (Rye et al., 2000). For example, the
emphasis on a forgiving God is revealed in Psalm 86:15: “For You, Lord, are
good, and ready to forgive, And abundant in lovingkindness to all who call upon
You.” In addition, and of particular importance to the issue of capital punish-
ment, the Bible repeatedly states that the path to salvation is forgiving others
who have sinned. The following scriptures illustrate the biblical mandate that
Christians should be forgiving of others and that forgiveness is a path to God.

Matthew 6:12: And forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors.

Matthew 6:14: For if you forgive others for their transgressions, your heavenly
Father will also forgive you.

Matthew 6:15: But if you [Matthew 18: 35] do not forgive others, then your
Father will not forgive your transgressions.

In general, researchers have found that religiously centered individuals are


more likely to believe in forgiveness at a general abstract level than practice
forgiveness in specific, real-life circumstances (McCullough & Worthington,
1999). The inability of people to act on religiously centered beliefs about forgive-
ness is related to whether people blame the offender’s behavior on dispositional
factors, whether offenders accept responsibility for their offense and perform an
act of contrition, and the harm caused by the transgression (McCullough &
Worthington, 1999). Krause and Ellison (2003) add that older people who believe
God forgives them are substantially more likely to unconditionally forgive trans-
gressors—that is, not to require an offender to perform an act of contrition.
314 UNNEVER ET AL.

Clearly, more is known about the relationship between forgiveness and inter-
personal transgressions than the relationship between forgiveness and support
for crime-control policies. To our knowledge, there is only one study that has
examined the relationship between forgiveness and support for correctional
policies. Applegate et al. (2000) administered a single-state survey and
collected data on 542 respondents. Their survey included a scale measuring
forgiveness (forgiveness is required, forgiveness is limitless as long as the
offender repents, and we should “hate the sin” but “love the sinner”),
measures of Christian fundamentalist beliefs (biblical literalness and the extent
to which people believe in the punitiveness of God), measures of religious
salience, attitudes toward punitive correctional policies, and numerous control
variables.
Applegate et al. (2000) found that forgiveness was significantly related to
measures of punitiveness. They report that those who believed in forgiveness
were less likely to support the death penalty, were less likely to support harsher
local courts, and were less punitive in general (Applegate et al., 2000). Notably,
they also found that forgiveness had a larger effect than their measures of
fundamentalism in all but one of their models. They concluded that researchers
should broaden their conceptualization of the relationship between crime-
control preferences and religion beyond establishing the linkages among
Christian fundamentalist beliefs, “get tough on crime” attitudes, and repressive
crime-control policies.

Compassion

Compassion involves the empathetic understanding of the suffering of others


facilitated by an awareness of one’s own suffering. Compassion and forgiveness
are analytically distinct concepts. Hieronymi (2001) defines compassion as the
“readiness to forgive” but argues that one can forgive a transgressor without
empathetically understanding their motives, pain, or remorse. For Hieronymi
(2001), forgiveness can occur in the absence of compassion since forgiveness is
likely when the offended person no longer perceives the transgressor as a
threat.
All of the major world religions preach universal compassion (Batson, Eidel-
man, Higley, & Russell, 2001). For example, compassion is a central organizing
concept of Buddhism, which defines compassion as the aspiration that beings be
free from suffering and which considers compassion as the antidote to cruelty
(Alarid & Wang, 2001). The following quote from the Buddha elucidates the
Buddhist perspective on compassion: “If a person foolishly does me wrong, I will
return to him the protection of my boundless love. The more evil that comes
from him, the more good will go from me. I will always give off only the
fragrance of goodness” (Dhammananda, 1987, p. 173).
Compassion is also a central organizing concept for Christian religions (Bailey,
2003). Christian religions emphasize the importance of loving one’s neighbors
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 315

and being concerned for the well-being of everyone regardless of whether they
are foe or friend (Batson et al., 2001). Biblical scriptures encourage Christians
to care for the welfare of others.

Ephesians 4: 32: Be kind and compassionate to one another, forgiving each


other, just as in Christ God forgave you.

Psalm 103: 8: The Lord is compassionate and gracious, slow to anger, abounding
in love.

Mark 1: 40–42: And a leper came to Jesus, beseeching Him and falling on his
knees before Him, and saying, “If You are willing, You can make me clean.”
Moved with compassion, Jesus stretched out His hand and touched him, and said
to him, “I am willing; be cleansed.” Immediately the leprosy left him and he
was cleansed.

1 Peter 3: 8: Finally, all of you, live in harmony with one another; be sympa-
thetic, love as brothers, be compassionate and humble.

However, Young (1992) argues that the salience of compassion varies across
Christian religions. Young (1992) focuses on the role that compassion has in
demarcating a clear conceptual distinction between members of Christian
fundamentalist denominations and members of evangelical denominations.
Young (1992) notes that members of Christian fundamentalist denominations
tend to deny the possibility of moral relativism. Thus, members of Christian
fundamentalist denominations believe that humans have the inherent potential
for immorality and that the actions of individuals should not be compassionately
judged in their social context. In contrast to members of Christian fundamental-
ist denominations, Young (1992) argues that the evangelistic desire to convert
can be interpreted as an expression of compassion and concern for the soul of
others.5 He further argues that because of their more compassionate orienta-
tion, evangelists should be less supportive than members of Christian fundamen-
talist denominations of punitive correctional policies such as the death penalty.
Young (1992) analyzed the 1988 GSS and reported that evangelism was the
measure most related to correctional attitudes in relation to the other religious
variables included in his analysis (belonging to a fundamentalist denomination,
biblical literalism, reborn experience, and religious salience). Evangelists—those
who indicated they had tried to persuade someone to accept Jesus Christ as his
or her savior—were significantly less likely, and biblical literalists were signifi-
cantly more likely, to support the death penalty. Young (1992) concluded that
his research supported an interpretation of evangelism as a manifestation of
compassion and concern for the fate of others.

5. Young (1992) also offers an alternative argument that the evangelistic desire to convert is based
not on compassion for the suffering of others but rather on a selfish need to ensure one’s own salva-
tion through conformity to biblical and clerical directives.
316 UNNEVER ET AL.

Clearly, Young’s (1992) analysis indicates that the correct specification of the
relationship between religious beliefs and support for justice policies must
include compassionate beliefs. It is noteworthy, however, that Young (1992) did
not directly measure compassion. The current research investigates whether
individuals who report that they feel a deep sense of responsibility for reducing
the pain and suffering in the world are less likely to support punitive correc-
tional policies. Note that we consider compassion to be both a secular and reli-
gious belief. For example, we regard the use of compassion in the phrase
“compassionate conservative” as more of a secular than a religious use of the
term (Wang, 1999).

Gracious Image of God

Greeley (1995) presents a middle-range theory in Religion as Poetry that


assumes that religion is the story individuals tell themselves and others in order
to give meaning to human life. These stories include religious symbols that
Greeley (1995) argues are the overarching images that become master
templates for a person’s life. A central aspect of an individual’s religious story is
their image of God.
Greeley suggests that individuals form their image of God largely by interact-
ing with their parents and by witnessing their parents’ interactions. These
patterns of interaction produce an individual’s religious story that includes an
image of God. Greeley argues that an individual’s image of God can be thought
of as a continuum that at one end defines God in loving, intimate, and nurturing
terms and at the other end defines God as distant, harsh, and judgmental. He
labels this continuum as the “gracious image of God scale.”
Greeley (1995) argues that individuals will vary as to how they perceive the
world and their relationships with other human beings depending on their loca-
tion on the gracious image of God scale. He specifies that individuals who have
a gracious image of God—that is, as loving and nurturing—should be more grace-
ful in their relationships with their fellow human beings. Accordingly, Greeley
(1995) argues that empirical indicators of religious stories will allow researchers
to access an individual’s “culture system,” thus enabling meaningful predictions
about the way the individual will respond to the issues of human life (Greeley,
1995, p. 179). He further argues that an individual’s image of God should be a
stronger predictor of attitudes and behaviors than other religious measures such
as religious affiliation and church attendance.
Greeley (1993, 1995) used GSS data to test his theory. He operationalized his
key concept of individuals having a gracious image of God by creating a “grace
scale.” Greeley developed the grace scale by combining the responses to four
items that force choices on a 7-point scale of how individuals picture God:
father/mother, master/spouse, judge/lover, and king/friend. He recoded the
items so that high scores on the scale showed an inclination to the mother–
spouse–lover–friend end of the scale. Greeley (1995) considered individuals who
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 317

have a mother–spouse–lover–friend image of God as having a gracious image of


God, and his theory predicts that these individuals should be less punitive. Gree-
ley (1993, 1995) also suggested that individuals whose image of God reflected a
father–master–judge–king orientation should have a harsher religious imagery.
Individuals who have a harsh hierarchical image of God should be more punitive
since they perceive human society as “God-forsaken,” unnatural, and oppressive.
Using the GSS and the grace scale, Greeley (1993, 1995) found support for his
theory. He reports that individuals who had a gracious image of God (i.e.,
perceived God as a mother–spouse–lover–friend) were more likely to support
civil liberties, to vote against Ronald Reagan, to advocate government support
for African Americans, to be pro-environment, to support feminist attitudes on
women’s labor force and political participation, and to oppose the death
penalty (Greeley, 1993, 1995). Greeley (1995, p. 188) concluded that:

The way one pictures God does affect attitudes and voting patterns indepen-
dently of political and religious orientations and independently of sex, age,
education, and region of the country. . . . People’s “stories of God” do relate
to their stories of political and social life. Such stories ought not to be ignored
by a responsible social scientist.

In the current research, we reproduce Greeley’s (1993, 1995) gracious image of


God scale and investigate whether it is negatively related to support for the death
penalty and for harsher local courts while including variables ignored by Greeley.
Our inclusion of Greeley’s (1995) concept of a gracious image of God is also
based on the extant research on punitiveness. Prior researchers have not, to our
knowledge, employed a scale that directly measures Greeley’s concept, but they
have included scales that assess whether people believe in a punitive God—that
is, scales that should positively correlate with the father, master, judge, and
king end of the gracious image of God scale. Indeed, Grasmick, Bursik, and
Blackwell (1993) created a two-dimensional punitive God image scale (punitive
on one end and nurturing on the other) and reported that it was positively corre-
lated with literalism and belonging to a fundamentalist denomination. They also
found that it positively predicted support for the death penalty for juveniles but
not for adults. Applegate et al. (2000) also measured perceptions of God as puni-
tive. Three items asked respondents whether they feared God’s punishment,
believed that evil people go to Hell, and believed that God knows everything a
person does wrong. Applegate et al.’s (2000) punitive God index was significantly
related to general crime punitiveness but not with other correctional attitudes.
Additionally, Evans and Adams (2003) created a punitive God scale and found
that it positively predicted a general measure of punitiveness.

Religious Rigidity

Greeley (1993) identified another concept—having a rigid and moralistic


approach to religion—that should predict people’s views on social issues including
318 UNNEVER ET AL.

crime control policies. He operationalized religious rigidity by using four


measures included in the 1988 GSS (e.g., how important is it to you to believe in
God without question or doubt). He included the religious rigidity scale in a
regression equation predicting whether enough money was being spent on
protecting the environment. The analysis showed that respondents who had a
rigid and moralistic approach to religion were less likely to support additional
spending to protect the environment. Greeley (1993, p. 27) concluded that the
Bible “is not the cause of lower support for environmental spending; it is rather
the pretext of those whose rigid ‘style’ inclines them both to resist environmental
concern and insist on religious certainty.” The current research includes a
measure of whether the individual had a rigid and moralistic approach to religion,
and we expect that it should positively predict support for punitive correctional
policies.

Research Strategy

The intent of this project is to assess whether “neglected variables”—variables


that fall under the more loving or “turn the other cheek” side of religion—are
related to measures of punitiveness while controlling for alternative explana-
tions. Accordingly, although the research has generated mixed results, we
control for standard measures of Christian fundamentalism for two reasons.
First, as noted, some research suggests that Christian fundamentalism positively
predicts punitiveness; and, second, it is possible that our “neglected vari-
ables”—compassion, forgiveness, and a gracious image of God—may covary with
measures of Christian fundamentalism. Consistent with the extant literature,
we thus include multiple measures of Christian fundamentalism. Our first
measure, the one most consistently found in the prior research, assesses
whether respondents belonged to a fundamentalist denomination. Also consis-
tent with the extant research, we use Smith’s (1990) classification scheme to
assess whether individuals belonged to a fundamentalist denomination. We also
include two variables that measure whether respondents expressed religious
beliefs that have been identified with Christian fundamentalism. We include
whether respondents were biblical literalists and a measure of evangelism, with
the recognition that this measure, though used previously as an assessment of
Christian fundamentalism, may not positively predict punitiveness (see, e.g.,
Young & Thompson, 1995).
We further recognize that there are other possible correlates that could
confound the relationship between our neglected variables and punitiveness.
Thus, we also control for variables commonly found in previous studies including
other religiously related measures, demographic characteristics, and political
orientation.
In sum, after taking into account the factors the extant research on religion
has linked to punitiveness, we explore whether variables that fall under the
more loving or “turn the other cheek” side of religion are related to support for
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 319

the death penalty and support for harsher courts. We include three measures.
Based on our review of past studies, we expect religious beliefs to be diver-
gently related to support for crime control policies, with particular beliefs
supporting punitive correctional policies and others relating to their opposition.
More specifically, we expect three of our religious/secular beliefs to be nega-
tively related to support for punitive correctional policies. We predict that
more forgiving individuals will be more likely to oppose capital punishment and
harsher local courts. We also expect more compassionate individuals and those
who have a gracious image of God to express more opposition to capital punish-
ment and be in less favor of harsher courts. However, we expect individuals who
have a moralistic and rigid approach to religion to be more likely to support
capital punishment and harsher local courts. In addition, based primarily on the
research by Grasmick and his colleagues (Grasmick, Bursik, & Blackwell, 1993;
Grasmick, Cochran, Bursik, & Kimpel, 1993), we expect Christian fundamental-
ists to be more likely to support the death penalty and harsher local courts.

Methods

Data

We include an Appendix that describes the variables included in our analyses.


Variable names are in the first column, the coding categories/range are in the
second column, and descriptive statistics are in the last two columns.
We analyzed data from the 1998 General Social Survey, conducted by the
National Opinion Research Center. The GSS is a replicated cross-sectional survey
that is based on a representative sample of adults residing within the United
States. The GSS sampled approximately 1500 respondents each year from 1972
to 1993, except for 1979, 1981, and 1992, when no survey was conducted.
Beginning in 1994, the GSS has surveyed larger samples (approximately 3000
respondents) in even-numbered years only. In addition to the general advan-
tages offered by the GSS (i.e., a large, nationally representative sample, with
items on various attitudinal and sociodemographic topics), the 1998 GSS
contains an extensive array of items tapping aspects of religion and spirituality.
These items include regular “core” items (e.g., denomination, religious atten-
dance and belief), as well as numerous additional questions from two separate
modules that focused on religious beliefs and practices.
Analyzing the 1998 GSS, with its expanded measures of religiousness provides
an opportunity to examine more fully the relationship between religious and
secular beliefs and support for punitive crime control policies. A large number of
studies have analyzed data generated from single-state surveys (e.g., Applegate
et al., 2000; Grasmick, Bursik, and Blackwell, 1993; Grasmick, Cochran, Bursik,
and Kimpel, 1993; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Vogel & Vogel, 2003). However,
these studies have limited generalizability due to their inability to control for
regional differences in support for punitive correctional policies (see Borg, 1997).
320 UNNEVER ET AL.

The 1998 GSS is also racially and economically more diverse than other stud-
ies (e.g., Applegate et al., 2000) and has a larger sample than other research
(e.g., Applegate et al., 2000; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Vogel & Vogel, 2003).
Furthermore, the 1998 GSS allows for an analysis of a number of religious and
secular beliefs that either have not been previously investigated (e.g., compas-
sion and a gracious image of God) or have been assumed to be identical
constructs. For example, Applegate et al. (2000) conflate forgiveness with
compassion when research indicates that they are distinct analytical concepts
(Hieronymi, 2001). Accordingly, the 1998 GSS presents the opportunity to assess
the relationship between previously ignored religious and secular beliefs and
attitudes toward crime control policies among a large, regionally, economically,
and socially diverse sample. Thus, the 1998 GSS offers a valuable opportunity to
investigate the hypotheses advanced in this paper.6

Dependent Variables

Attitudes toward punitive correctional policies were measured in two ways:


support for the death penalty and support for harsher local courts. These vari-
ables have been consistently included in the GSS, and both have long traditions
of being used as indicators of the extent of public punitiveness (see, e.g.,
Stinchcombe et al., 1980; Warr, 1995).

Support for the death penalty

Respondents were asked whether they favor or oppose the death penalty for
persons convicted of murder. The response categories included “favor,”
“oppose,” and “don’t know.” A dichotomous measure, Death Penalty (1 = favor,
0 = other), was constructed, and 72 percent of the respondents reported that
they favor the use of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.
Research indicates that support for the death penalty for both adults and
juveniles is substantially reduced when respondents are offered the alternative
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole (Moon, Wright,
Cullen, & Pealer, 2000). Moon et al. (2000) report that 76 percent of surveyed
Tennessee residents generally favored the death penalty for adults. Yet, when
they were offered the alternative of life without the possibility of parole, 45

6. Although a total of 2,832 individuals were interviewed in the 1998 GSS, our sample size is
substantially smaller than this. Since 1987, the GSS has employed a split ballot interview design, in
which a subset of “core” items are asked of all respondents, but all other items are asked of a
randomly selected subsample of respondents. In 1998, for instance, this split ballot design signifi-
cantly reduced the number of respondents who answered many of the attitudinal items (e.g.,
support for capital punishment), as well as those who responded to the various topical modules
(e.g., the 1998 religion modules, which included the items on compassion and forgiveness). The
assignment of the various interview schedules (“ballots”) is randomized, eliminating the potential
for significant bias, which otherwise could undermine the representativeness of the sample.
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 321

percent preferred this option to the death penalty. More recently, Vogel and
Vogel (2003) found that 57.6 percent of their respondents in California reported
that they either strongly or somewhat favored the use of the death penalty for
adults. They also found that of the individuals who favored the use of the death
penalty for adults, 42.5 percent favored the use of life without parole when it
was offered as an alternative sentence.
Thus, the extant research indicates that how the death penalty question is
worded affects estimates of how many people support its use. However, Moon
et al. (2000) argue that a single-item broadly worded question can measure a
“global” belief in capital punishment. In addition, other researchers question
whether the wording of the death penalty item affects its relationship with
other variables including religious and secular beliefs (Soss et al., 2003). Recent
research addresses this issue. Unnever and Cullen (2005b) created a binary
dependent variable that included two choices: support for the death penalty or
support for life in prison without the possibility of parole. Their research
showed that variables that have been consistently found to influence the binary
question of whether or not Americans support the death penalty (yes–no), such
as political ideology, also significantly influenced the choice between support-
ing capital punishment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
This research analyzes a dichotomous measure of support for the death
penalty with caution, acknowledging that it may overestimate overall support. It
is noteworthy that other studies have used a binary measure of support for the
death penalty, including Applegate et al. (2000), Borg (1997), Halim and Stiles
(2001), Stack (2000, 2003), Young (1992), and Young and Thompson (1995).

Support for harsher local courts

The respondent’s attitudes toward punitive correctional policies were also


analyzed by including a measure of their attitudes toward their local court,
Harsher Courts. This measure was based on the following question. “In general,
do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with
criminals?” The response categories included “too harshly,” “not harshly
enough,” and “about right.” These were coded so that larger values indicate
that respondents reported that the courts were not harsh enough. Among the
respondents, 78 percent reported that the courts were not harsh enough.7, 8

7. The distribution of Harsh Courts was skewed with more than three-fourths of the respondents
reporting that their local courts were not harsh enough. Consequently, we also used an ordinal
regression model to analyze Harsh Courts and the results were substantively the same as those
presented in Table 2 using the cumulative logit model.
8. We selected the respondents’ attitudes toward the death penality and the harshness of their local
courts as measures of attitudes toward crime control policies (Cohn, Barkan, & Halteman, 1991). We
did not analyze gun ownership as a dependent variable because we did not consider it to be a valid
measure of the respondent’s attitudes toward crime control policies. Respondents can own guns for
a multitude of reasons including the need for protection and the desire to hunt (Young & Thompson,
1995).
322 UNNEVER ET AL.

This level of punitiveness is typical; data generated from the GSS have indicated
that since the mid-1970s, approximately four out of five respondents believe
that the courts are too lenient (Applegate, 1997).

“Turning the Other Cheek” Variables

The following describes the three variables that are the central focus of this
research: forgiveness, compassion, and a gracious image of God. Elsewhere, we
have discussed these measures as “neglected variables.” However, throughout
the remainder of this article, we refer to these measures as “turning the other
cheek” variables.

Forgiveness

We constructed a scale to assess whether the respondents were forgiving. Our


forgiveness scale, Forgiveness, was constructed by summing across responses to
three items that were included in the 1998 GSS. Respondents were asked how
often their religious or spiritual beliefs have led them: (a) to forgive themselves
for things they have done wrong; (b) to forgive others who hurt them; and (c) to
know that God forgives them. Responses were reverse-coded (1 = “never” to 4 =
“always or almost always”) so that higher scores on Forgiveness indicated that
respondents were more forgiving. The alpha coefficient for Forgiveness was .65.
This reliability is consistent with prior research (Idler, 1999). A factor analysis of
the three forgiveness items generated a single factor.

Compassion

Our measure of Compassion is based on the extent of the respondents’ agree-


ment with the following statement: “I feel a deep sense of responsibility for
reducing pain and suffering in the world.” Responses were recoded so that they
ranged from (1) “strongly disagree” to (4) “strongly agree.”

Gracious image of God

We reproduced Greeley’s (1993, 1995) “grace scale” by summing across the


responses to a set of four semantic differential items in the GSS. The respon-
dents were shown a card with sets of contrasting images and asked to place
their image of God between the two images on a scale of 1–7. The relevant sets
of images were mother vs. father, master vs. spouse, judge vs. lover, and king
vs. friend. We recoded the mother vs. father semantic differential item so that
high scores reflected a more gracious image of God. The alpha coefficient for
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 323

our Gracious God Scale is .61. This reliability is consistent with prior research
(Boyd, 1999). A factor analysis of the four semantic differential items generated
a single factor.

Measures of Religion

We include these measures in our analysis because some research has found
that they predict greater punitiveness, and they may be related to our “turning
the other cheek” variables. Therefore, we include these measures to control for
their possible confounding effects.

Christian fundamentalism

We constructed three binary measures to indicate whether respondents were


Christian fundamentalists. We used the classification scheme developed by
Smith (1990) to construct our first measure, Fundamentalist Church. It denotes
whether respondents belonged to a fundamentalist denomination (1 = funda-
mentalist denomination, 0 = other). Thirty percent of the respondents reported
that they belonged to a fundamentalist denomination. Our second measure,
Evangelist (1 = evangelist, 0 = other), was based on the SAVESOUL question
included in the GSS: “Have you ever tried to encourage someone to believe in
Jesus Christ or to accept Jesus Christ as his or her savior?” Forty-three percent
of the respondents reported that they have tried to encourage someone to
accept Jesus Christ as their savior. Our last measure is whether the respondents
were biblical literalists; the binary variable Literalism is coded as 1 = literalist
and 0 = other. The GSS asked the respondents to choose from a set of state-
ments describing their feelings on the Bible. Those who chose “the Bible is the
actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, word for word,” were consid-
ered literalists and coded 1.9 Thirty-one percent of the respondents reported
that they interpret the Bible literally.

Religious activity

Our measure of Religious Activity is a scale that was constructed by summing


across the responses to three items: “About how often do you pray?” (responses

9. The correlations among our measures of Christian fundamentalism were Fundamentalist denomi-
nation with Evangelist (.37, p = 000), Fundamentalist denomination with Literalism (.35, p = .000),
and Evangelist with Literalism (.34, p = .000). The correlations between these measures and Reli-
gious Rigidity were Fundamentalist denomination with Religious Rigidity (.25, p = .000), Evangelist
with Religious Rigidity (.33, p = .000), and Literalism and Religious Rigidity (.34, p = .000). Belonging
to a fundamentalist denomination was also correlated with Forgiveness (.18, p = .000), Compassion
(.06, p = .02), and a Gracious God Imagery (−.19, p = .000).
324 UNNEVER ET AL.

were reverse-coded and range from (1) “never” to (7) “several times a day”),
“Within your religious or spiritual tradition, how often do you meditate?”
(responses were reverse-coded and range from (1) “never” to (7) “more than
once a day”), and “How often do you pray privately in places other than at
church or synagogue?” (responses were reverse-coded and range from (1)
“never” to (7) “more than once a day”). Higher scores on the scale indicated
that respondents often engaged in religious practices. The alpha coefficient for
the religiosity scale was .80. A factor analysis of these three religious activity
indicators generated a single factor.

Religious rigidity

We use a single item previously analyzed by Greeley (1993) to measure whether


the respondent had a rigid and moralistic approach to religion.10 The respon-
dents were asked how important it was to believe in God without question or
doubt in order to be a good Christian or Jew. Responses were recoded so that
they ranged from (1) not very important to (5) very important.

Control Variables

As controls, we included measures and standard demographic variables that


researchers have found to be related to support for punitive crime control poli-
cies and, therefore, could influence our results.
Conservative political views have been linked to punitive correctional prefer-
ences (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Payne, Gainey, Triplett, & Danner, 2004;
Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Unnever, Roberts, & Cullen, 2005). Including a
measure of the respondent’s political orientation allows us to estimate the
independent effects of “turning the other cheek” variables while assessing the
direct effect of political orientation on crime-related attitudes (Applegate
etal., 2000). We use a single item, which has been extensively used in prior
death-penalty research (see, e.g., Applegate et al., 2000; Barkan & Cohn, 1994;
Borg, 1997, 1998; Stack, 2003; Vogel & Vogel, 2003; Young, 1992), to measure
political ideology, Politically Conservative (scale of 1–7, with the maximum
category denoting “extremely conservative” respondents). Our measure was
based on the following question. “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals
and conservatives. I’m going to show you a 7-point scale on which the political
views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to
extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?”
Prior studies (e.g., Young, 1992) have found that African Americans are
less likely to support capital punishment. We included a measure of race,

10. The other three items that Greeley (1993) used to measure whether the respondents had a rigid
or moralistic approach to religion were not included in the 1998 GSS.
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 325

African American (1 = African American, 0 = other). Past studies (e.g., Borg,


1997) have reported regional differences, with white southerner fundamen-
talists expressing higher levels of support for the death penalty. We created
a variable, Southerner (1 = southerner, 0 = others), that assessed whether
respondents resided in the South when they were 16 years old and were
living in the south when the interview was conducted. We also controlled for
gender (Gender, 1 = male, 0 = female), since the prior research has indi-
cated that males are more likely to support punitive crime control policies
(Applegate et al., 2000; Soss et al., 2003; Stack, 2000). It is noteworthy that
Stack (2000) tested for gender interactions and found no evidence that men
and women differed significantly in their reasons for supporting the death
penalty.
In addition, we controlled for the respondent’s level of education, Education
(years completed). Past studies have found that higher education levels tend to
dampen support for punitive attitudes including the death penalty (Payne
etal., 2004; Soss et al., 2003; Stack, 2003). Furthermore, we control for the
respondent’s family income, Family Income (summary scale ranging from 1–23,
where the minimum category denotes an income of “under $1K” and the maxi-
mum category denotes “$110K or over”). Some researchers have argued that
family income should be negatively related to support for the death penalty
because low-income people have greater direct and indirect contact with the
costs of punitive sentences, and high-income people more often reap the bene-
fits (Soss et al., 2003). Finally, we included Age (measured in years), since it
has been hypothesized to positively predict support for capital punishment
(Stack 2000), and for exploratory purposes, we include Foreigner (1 = not born
in US, 0 = born in US), indicating whether respondents were born outside the
United States.11

Analytical Strategy

Binary logistic regression was used to analyze the dichotomous dependent vari-
able, support for the death penalty, and a cumulative logit model was used to
analyze support for harsher local courts, since it had three categories. Listwise
deletion of missing data was used for all variables except Family Income, where
missing values were replaced with its mean. The death penalty analysis included
1,010 respondents, and the harsher courts analysis included 1,018 respondents.

11. Other researchers investigating support for the death penalty have included fear of victimiza-
tion (FEAR) (Applegate et al., 2000; Stack, 2003; Young & Thompson, 1995). However, not all the
respondents in 1998 were asked this question, and including it would result in losing over a third of
our sample (359 respondents). We also considered including measures of martial status (1 = married,
0 = other) and size of residence (1 = urban, 0 = other), but neither was a significant predictor of
support for capital punishment. In addition, we susbtituded the square of education for our measure
of education, and it also did not significantly predict support for death penalty.
326 UNNEVER ET AL.

Results

Table 2 presents our two full regression equations. Model 1 of Table 2 shows the
results from regressing support for the death penalty, and Model 2 presents the
results from regressing support for harsher local courts on our independent and
control variables.

Support for the Death Penalty

As shown in Model 1, two of our “turn the other cheek” variables significantly
05 predicted support for the death penalty. Respondents who were more compas-
sionate and who had a more gracious image of God were less likely to support
Aguilar Jurado
the death penalty. More specifically, a one-unit increase in the 4-point compas-
sion index decreased the predicted odds of supporting capital punishment by 28
percent, and a one-unit increase in our 24-point gracious image of God scale
decreased the predicted odds of supporting the death penalty by approximately
5 percent.12 Also, a one-tailed significance test (p = .04) showed that respon-
dents who expressed forgiving beliefs were significantly less likely to support
capital punishment. A one-unit increase in the 10-point forgiveness scale
decreased the predicted odds of supporting the death penalty by approximately
8 percent.
06 The results from Model 1 additionally indicate that two of our religion
measures significantly predicted support for the death penalty, religious activ-
Aguilar Jurado
ity and having rigid religious beliefs. More specifically, each one-unit increase in
our 20-point index of religious activity decreased the predicted odds of support-
ing the death penalty by approximately 6 percent. In addition, a one-unit
increase in the 5-point index of having a rigid and moralistic approach to reli-
gion increased the predicted odds of supporting capital punishment by 27
percent.
A number of our demographic controls significantly affected whether the
respondent supported the use of the death penalty. The predicted odds of an
African American supporting the death penalty were less than one-third the
odds of other racial groups. In addition, foreigners were significantly less
likely to support capital punishment—the predicted odds of a foreigner
supporting the use of the death penalty were 41 percent of the odds of
respondents born in the United States. As expected, males were significantly
more likely to support capital punishment. The predicted odds of a male
supporting the death penalty were over a third larger than the predicted odds
of a female. Based on past research, we expected native southerners to
support capital punishment, and a one-tailed significance test (p = .04)
showed that native southerners were significantly more likely to support the
death penalty than respondents raised in other regions. Model 1 of Table 2

12. For an analysis of the factors that predict compassion, see Unnever and Cullen (2005a).
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 327

Table 2 Regression analyses of support for the death penalty and for harsher local
courtsa

Variables Model 1: Death penalty Model 2: Harsher courts

07 Turn the other cheek variables

Aguilar Jurado Forgiveness .92 1.04


(−.08) (.04)
Compassion .72*** .76**
(−.15) (−.12)
Gracious God imagery .95** .97*
(−.14) (−.09)

Religion variables
Fundamentalist church 1.11 .64*
(.03) (−.11)
08 Literalism .77 1.44*
(−.07) (.09)
Aguilar Jurado
Evangelist 1.01 .96
(.00) (−.01)
Religious activity .94*** 1.02
(−.20) (.07)
Religious rigidity 1.28*** 1.03
(.16) (.02)

Control variables
Age 1.00 .99
(.04) (−.08)
African American .31*** .55**
(−.22) (−.11)
Income 1.02 1.05**
(.05) (.13)
Gender (male = 1) 1.36* .81
(.08) (−.06)
Education 1.01 .95
(.01) (−.08)
Southerner 1.39 1.02
(.08) (.00)
Politically conservative 1.18** 1.08
(.12) (.06)
Foreigner .42*** .51**
(−.13) (−.10)

Model Chi-square 147.94*** 47.94***


Max rescaled R2 .20 .06

aOdd ratios are reported with standardized logistic regression coefficients in parentheses.
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.
328 UNNEVER ET AL.

further indicates that being politically conservative positively predicted


support for capital punishment. A one-unit increase in the 7-point politically
conservative index increased the predicted odds of supporting capital punish-
ment by 17 percent.

Harsher Local Courts

Model 2 of Table 2 presents the cumulative logit model for whether respondents
wanted harsher local courts. Similar to the death penalty analysis, we found
09 that individuals who were more compassionate and who had a gracious image of
God were less likely to favor harsher local courts. A one-unit increase in the 4-
Aguilar Jurado
point compassion index decreased the predicted odds of being in a higher cate-
gory of support for harsher courts by 24 percent. In addition, a one-unit
increase in our 24-point gracious image of God scale decreased the predicted
odds of being in a higher category of support for harsher courts by 3 percent.
10 We found mixed support for the hypothesis that Christian fundamentalists
were more likely to be punitive in their attitudes toward criminal offenders. As
Aguilar Jurado
shown in Model 2, respondents who belonged to a fundamentalist denomination
were significantly less likely, and those who were biblical literalists (one-tailed
significance test, p = .03) were more likely, to favor increased harshness by
their local courts. Being a member of a fundamentalist denomination decreased
the predicted odds of a more punitive response by 36 percent. In contrast,
interpreting the Bible literally was associated with a 43 percent increase in the
odds of support for harsher courts.
Model 2 indicates that African Americans and foreigners were significantly
less likely to want harsher local courts. The predicted odds of African Americans
being in a higher category of support for harsher local courts were nearly half
the odds of other racial groups, and the predicted odds of foreigners being in a
higher category of support for harsher local courts were half the odds of respon-
dents born in the United States. Model 2 shows a positive relationship between
the respondents’ income and support for harsher courts; an increase of one unit
on the income scale was associated with a 4.7 percent increment in the odds of
preferring harsher courts.

Interactions

Previous studies have reported that the influence of religious and secular beliefs
on support for punitive correctional policies may vary across race and region.
More specifically, research suggests that the effect of religious and secular
beliefs, particularly those held by Christian fundamentalists, may be more
pronounced among whites and those who were native southerners (Borg, 1997;
Britt, 1998; Sandys & McGarrell, 1997; Young, 1992). We tested for these possi-
bilities by creating two sets of interaction terms.
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 329

We created a race interaction term for each of the eight religious/secular


beliefs included in the models (e.g., African American × Fundamentalist denom-
ination, African American × Literalism). We also created a native southerner
interaction term for each of the eight religious/secular beliefs (e.g., Southerner
× Fundamentalist denomination, Southerner × Literalism, etc.). We entered the
set of interaction terms separately into the full regression equations presented
in Models 1 and 2 of Table 2. We subtracted the likelihood-ratio Chi-square
generated from the models with the interaction terms from the likelihood-ratio
Chi-squares reported in Models 1 and 2 in Table 2. We then assessed whether
the Chi-square statistic was significant for eight degrees of freedom (i.e., the
number of interaction terms included in the second model) to determine if the
effect of the religious/secular beliefs varied across race and whether the
respondent was a native southerner.
The set of African American interaction terms was not significant for support
for capital punishment (χ2 = 7.30 for eight degrees of freedom, p > .50)—none of
the individual interaction terms was significant at the .05 level. The set of
African American interaction terms for harsher local courts was also not signifi-
cant (χ2 = 15.29 for eight degrees of freedom, p > .05)—none of the interaction
terms was significant at the .05 level.
The set of native southerner interaction terms was not significant for support
for the death penalty (χ2 = 7.63 for eight degrees of freedom, p > .30).
However, one of the interaction terms was significant, Southerner × Fundamen-
talist denomination (p = .01). The set of native southerner interaction terms for
harsher local courts was also not significant (χ2 = 14.05 for eight degrees of
freedom, p > .05), although one of the interaction terms was significant,
Southerner × Compassion (p = .05).
These analyses suggest that, in general, the effect of our religious and secu-
lar measures on support for the death penalty and on harsher local courts did
not vary significantly across race or whether the respondent was a native south-
erner. However, two individual interaction terms were significant, Southerner ×
Fundamentalist denomination and Southerner × Compassion. Subsequent analy-
ses revealed that Christian fundamentalists who were native southerners were
more likely to support the death penalty than Christian fundamentalists who
were not native southerners. We also found that compassionate respondents
who were not native southerners were more likely to oppose harsher local
courts than compassionate respondents who were native southerners.

Discussion

Why do Americans favor stringent sanctions for convicted offenders or,


conversely, what might help to temper their punitiveness? The research reported
here joins an emerging line of inquiry that suggests that views on correctional
policies are potentially shaped not only by structural or geographical location but
also by the content of people’s religious beliefs (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld,
330 UNNEVER ET AL.

2003; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Murphy, 2003; Soss et al., 2003). This perspec-
tive draws on the reality that despite the movement toward modernity and secu-
larism, religion remains a salient feature in the United States (Ammerman, 1987;
Wald, 1992). Thus, research reveals that 96 percent of Americans profess a belief
in God, more than two-thirds report being a member of a church or synagogue,
and in excess of three-fifths state that religion is a “very important” part of their
lives (Newport & Saad, 1997; Shorto, 1997).
As we have noted, early research exploring the connection of religion and puni-
tiveness probed whether a fundamentalist or conservative religious worldview
prompted individuals to embrace harsh sentiments toward offenders. Although
valuable, this approach was limited because it did not seek to capture the
complexity of religion (Applegate et al., 2000). In this context, the 1998 GSS
offered a unique opportunity to explore how various dimensions of religion—from
Christian fundamentalism to images of God—influence support for two core
measures of punitiveness (capital punishment and harsher courts). The analysis
might have been improved by a wider range of outcomes (e.g., support for reha-
bilitation), the use of measures that were all multiple-item scales, and inclusion
of measures of personality orientations such as authoritarianism (Soss et al., 2003;
Stack, 2000, 2003).13 Still, beyond the availability of diverse measures of religion,
the 1998 GSS allows for national-level data, the introduction of controls for
region, and the inclusion of a variety of controls for other religious variables.
Among our demographic controls, several significant relationships of note
emerged—findings largely consistent with those reported in previous research
(for a review of research, see Applegate, 1997). Thus, the affluent were more
likely to favor harsher courts, whereas it appears that minority status tempers
punitiveness. African Americans and those who were foreign born were less
punitive across both dependent variables.14 Notably, we did not find that South-
erners were more punitive—a finding that suggests that residing in the South has
no significant individual effects once a more fully specified model is introduced.
Although political conservatives were more likely to support capital punish-
ment, we found little support that religious conservatism was a strong and
consistent predictor of punitiveness. Thus, none of our measures of Christian
fundamentalism significantly influenced support for capital punishment, and we
found that support for harsher local courts, though positively related to biblical

13. The 1998 GSS does not include measures of authoritarianism (see Stack, 2003). Future research
may want to explore whether more compassionate, forgiving individuals who have a gracious image
of God are less authoritarian and whether authoritarianism mediates the influence of these vari-
ables on measures of punitive ideology.
14. Future researchers may wish to explore further the relationship between being foreign born and
being less punitive. A reviewer of this article noted that the percentage of foreign-born residents has
been increasing and now accounts for approximately 14 percent of the US population. Given the
potential that the foreign born percentage of the US population may continue to increase, future
researchers might want to investigate why foreign-born residents are less punitive than those born
within the United States, and explore whether they may have an impact on crime-related national
policies.
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 331

literalism, was negatively related to belonging to a fundamentalist denomina-


tion.15, 16, 17
A possible reason why we did not find a strong and consistent relationship
between Christian fundamentalist beliefs and support for punitive crime

15. At the bivariate level, none of our measures of Christian fundamentalism was positively and
significantly correlated with either support for capital punishment or harsher courts. The zero-
order correlations between belonging to a fundamentalist denomination and support for capital
punishment and harsher courts were .014 (p = .60) and .023 (p = .40), respectively. Literally
interpreting the Bible was also not significantly correlated with support for the death penalty
(−.033, p = .22) or with harsher courts (.052, p = .06). Notably, evangelism was significantly
correlated with support for capital punishment (−.081, p = .003), but its relationship was nega-
tive. The correlation between evangelism and harsher courts was .005 (p = .84). The lack of a
significant positive zero-order correlation between our Christian fundamentalism measures and
support for the death penalty or harsher courts suggests that other covariates, such as politi-
cal ideology, have not mediated their effect on support for capital punishment or harsher
courts. In other words, the lack of a significant positive zero-order correlation between our
Christian fundamentalism measures and support for the death penalty or harsher courts suggests
that Christian fundamentalism did not indirectly, positively affect punitiveness. Additionally, the
analysis presented in Table 2 indicated that our measures of Christian fundamentalism did not
directly predict punitiveness. According to Alwin and Hauser (1975), the decomposition of path
effects into direct and indirect effects is predicated on a significant correlation between the
exogenous and dependent variable. In our case, the exogenous variables were the three
measures of Christian fundamentalism, and the dependent variables were support for the death
penalty and harsher local courts. None of our measures of Christian fundamentalism was posi-
tively and significantly associated with our measures of punitiveness. Thus, it is reasonable to
conclude that, for these data, Christian fundamentalism was not indirectly or directly associ-
ated with being more punitive. However, future research may wish to illuminate the pathways
that mediate the significant negative zero-order correlation between evangelism and support for
capital punishment (Young & Thompson, 1995).
16. We also explored the possibility that a more rigorous definition of fundamentalism would posi-
tively predict support for the death penalty and harsher courts. In this regard, we constructed
measures that combined belonging to a Christian fundamentalist denomination with our measures of
religious beliefs usually associated with fundamentalism. Thus, these measures defined respondents
as Christian fundamentalists if they belonged to a Christian fundamentalist denomination and held
religious beliefs identified with fundamentalism. We regressed support for the death penalty and
harsher local courts on whether individuals belonged to a Christian fundamentalist denomination
and were biblical literalists and whether individuals belonged to a Christian fundamentalist denomi-
nation and were evangelicals. We deleted our measures of whether individuals belonged to a Chris-
tian fundamentalist denomination and were biblical literalists from the equation (see Table 2) that
included the combination of these two measures. We also deleted the measures of whether individ-
uals belonged to a Christian fundamentalist denomination and were evangelicals from the equation
(see Table 2) that included the combination of these two measures. The fundamentalist-literalist
measure did not significantly predict either support for the death penalty or local harsher courts. It
is instructive that the fundamentalist-evangelical measure did not significantly predict support for
the death penalty. However, it was significantly related to wanting harsher local courts, but the sign
was negative; fundamentalists who expressed evangelical beliefs were significantly less likely to
desire harsher local courts.
17. We recognize that the GSS does not contain exhaustive measures of fundamentalism. As a result,
it would be premature to completely dismiss the possibility that fundamentalism, if measured in all
of its diverse components, might not affect crime-related attitudes. Even so, within the confines of
the 1998 GSS (and with its advantages of being a national-level sample), we are persuaded that we
have responsibly controlled for any possible effects the measures of fundamentalism might have. In
so doing, we lend credence to the study’s main findings that, even when other components of reli-
gion identified by previous researchers are controlled, “turn the other cheek” dimensions of religion
have effects on punitiveness that future research must consider.
332 UNNEVER ET AL.

control policies is that we analyzed a nationally representative sample, the


1998 GSS. Baier and Wright (2001) completed a meta-analysis of 60 studies
and reported that the negative effect of religion on crime increases when the
unit of analysis is “a moral community”—local congregational level—and is
weaker at the regional or national level. The moral community thesis argues
for the existence of a religious contextual influence on individual behavior
such that living with or near a considerable number of religious people will
affect a person’s behavior, regardless of that person’s religious preference or
commitment (Regnerus, 2003). An extension of this thesis suggests that the
effect of Christian fundamentalist beliefs on support for punitive crime
control policies may vary depending on the aggregate concentration of indi-
viduals who hold Christian fundamentalist beliefs.18 This may also explain why
Grasmick and his colleagues (Grasmick, Bursik, and Blackwell, 1993; Gras-
mick, Cochran, Bursik, and Kimpel, 1993; Grasmick & McGill, 1994) have
found significant relationships between fundamentalism and punitiveness in
Oklahoma City, whereas Sandys and McGarrell (1997) failed to find such asso-
ciations in Indiana. Future research may wish to explore whether the effect
of Christian fundamentalist beliefs on support for punitive crime control poli-
cies is greater in geographical areas with a highly concentrated population of
Christian fundamentalists.
Regarding the focus of our research, we found that our “turning the other
cheek” variables were associated with being less punitive. We found that those
with a gracious, non-hierarchical, and more nurturing image of God and those
who were more compassionate were less likely to support either capital punish-
ment or harsher courts. Our results also support the argument that more forgiv-
ing individuals were less punitive. In addition, we found that other dimensions
of religion were related to public support for crime-related issues. Rigid reli-
gious beliefs (equating morality to belief in God without doubt) increased the
likelihood that capital punishment would be endorsed, and in contrast, religious
activity (praying and meditating often) was a significant predictor of decreased
support for the death penalty.
Taken together, these findings suggest that religion has divergent effects.
Beyond a mere fundamentalist or conservative religious view, those who have a
rigid and moralistic approach to religion and who imagine God as a dispassion-
ate, powerful figure who dispenses justice are more likely to harbor punitive
sentiments toward offenders. In contrast, those who have a gracious or loving
image of God and who are compassionate toward others—that is, those who take
seriously the admonition to “turn the other cheek”—are less supportive of “get

18. Notably, Regnerus (2003) found that moral communities are not defined by simple aggregate
religiosity. However, his results suggest that aggregate concentrations of Christian fundamentalists
construct moral communities that maintain a significant level of cohesiveness and social control,
which extends to nonmembers. Regnerus (2003) concludes that Christian fundamentalist moral
communities tend to restrain adolescent delinquency.
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 333

tough” policies.19 In the end, religion can be a source of punitive or more


progressive views toward crime and its control. This is perhaps why religious
people can be prominent advocates both of harsh correctional policies and of
attempts to humanize prisons and to save offenders from a life in crime. Thus,
on the one hand, Ronald Godwin, former vice president of the Moral Majority
calls for longer prison terms and a federal death penalty, but on the other hand,
groups such as Prison Fellowship International embrace mercy and restoration
for “prisoners, ex-prisoners, victims and their families” as their spiritual mission
(Prison Fellowship International, 2003, p. 24; Thornton, 1981). Restorative
justice, in particular, is a potentially progressive policy agenda advocated by
religious groups (Van Ness & Strong, 1997). Faith-based correctional initiatives,
which seek to support offender reform yet are embraced by political conserva-
tives, also illustrate the complex relationship between religion and correctional
policy.
Given the pluralistic influence of religion, our findings hold two chief implica-
tions for future research. First, there is increasing evidence that studies of
correctional attitudes are likely to be misspecified if they fail to include
measures of religion in the analysis. Second and relatedly, scholars would bene-
fit by forfeiting stereotypical conceptions of religion as uniformly promoting
anti-progressive correctional policies. Not only is religion a multi-dimensional
phenomenon, but also its features likely coalesce to divide believers into oppo-
site camps—with one set of attributes fostering harsh sentiments toward offend-
ers and another set of attributes tempering punitiveness and justifying
interventions aimed at helping the criminally wayward (see also Applegate et
al., 2000). The challenge for researchers is thus to capture the richness of what
it means to be religious in American society and to probe more deeply into how
distinctive religious worldviews nourish harsh or humane correctional policies.
Finally, from a theoretical standpoint, future research might also profit from
an attempt to unpackage further the relationship between religious belief and
support for punitive criminal justice policies. We suggest that research is
needed that more fully articulates the inculcation of religious beliefs and the
processes that intervene between religious beliefs and sentiments toward
crime-control policies.
Generally, it is assumed that religious beliefs are firmly rooted in exposure to
religious teachings (Young, 1992). However, Greeley (1995) argues that images

19. Other related research supports our conclusion that individuals with a humanistic orientation
are less likely to support punitive national policies. In a related study, Feldman and Steenbergen
(2001) found that “humanitarianism,” a prosocial orientation, which they found to be significantly
correlated with empathy, predicted support for national policy programs such as welfare. They
concluded that: “Humanitarianism does not lead to opposition to capitalist values, but rather trig-
gers sympathy for those who fall by the wayside in capitalist society” (Feldman & Steenbergen,
2001, p. 674). Thus, a reasonable supposition is that individuals with a humanistic orientation—those
that are empathetic and forgiving—may not only tend to oppose punitive crime-control policies but
also support alternative approaches to crime control such as rehabilitation or policies that address
the social problems associated with crime (e.g., bad schools and joblessness) (Applegate et al.,
2000).
334 UNNEVER ET AL.

of God can emanate from extra-religious sources such as parent–child interac-


tions and exposure to parental conflict. In addition, Straus’s (1991) cultural
spillover theory postulates a positive correlation between individuals who
support physically punishing children and their attitudes towards punitive
crime-control policies—the death penalty being the definitive punitive policy.
Thus, we suggest that future researchers may wish to more fully articulate the
relationships among exposure to different kinds of parenting, religious beliefs,
and public support for capital punishment. More specifically, future research
may wish to test whether individuals exposed to authoritarian parenting are less
likely to develop compassionate, forgiving beliefs infused with a loving image of
God, which in turn diminishes their desire to “redeem” the offender (Unnever &
Cullen, 2005a).
A full conceptual model of public support for crime-control policies should
also involve a specification of the pathways through which religious faith and
experiences exert their influence. Three mediating variables are likely to be
worth considering.
First, previous studies have suggested that attributions of why individuals
break the law can affect levels of punitiveness (Cullen, Clark, Cullen, &
Mathers, 1985; Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Payne et al., 2004; Stinchcombe et
al., 1980). Religious beliefs that portray offenders as freely choosing sinful
behavior might increase punitive sentiments, whereas the portrayal of offend-
ers as sinful but redeemable might decrease the willingness to inflict punish-
ment. Second, religion contains normative prescriptions for how to respond to
the less fortunate, including those who sin through harmful criminal acts.
Increased punitiveness is likely to occur when individuals give salience to rigid
moral standards and the imposition of just consequences by a hierarchical
God; more progressive policies are likely to be favored by those who take
from their understanding of God the obligation to turn the other cheek and
save all those who have fallen outside God’s love. Curry’s (1996) research
showed that Christian fundamentalism positively relates to perceptions of the
moral wrongfulness of crimes and negatively relates to variation in those
perceptions. Although he did not examine religious rigidity directly, his find-
ings suggest that certain religious beliefs may foster inflexible norms. Third,
religion might well be a source of emotional identification with offenders. To
the extent that religion creates the capacity to “love” and have compassion
for all of God’s creatures—including wayward souls—it may foster feelings that
limit the desire to inflict excessive pain on offenders (see, e.g., Prejean,
1993).
In closing, we reiterate the hope that this project adds to the relatively
small, but growing literature showing the importance of including religion in any
attempt to explain public views toward the punishment of crime—including the
salient issue of the death penalty. Religion continues to be an integral feature
of American society and thus is likely to shape how people understand their
world (Stansell, 2004). Our paper has attempted to illuminate, however, that
religion is a multifaceted social phenomenon that can exert diverse, rather than
TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 335

uniform, effects. Again, we suggest that in the time ahead, religion remains an
area that offers rich possibilities for further theoretical and empirical investiga-
tion.

Acknowledgments

We thank Christopher Ellison and John Wooldredge for their insights on an


earlier draft of this paper.

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TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK 339

Appendix. Coding of Variables

Variable names Coding/range M SD

Support for the death 1 = favor, 0 = other .72 .44


penalty
Support for harsher courts 1–3 with higher values indicating 2.70 .60
wanting harsher local courts
Forgiveness 3–12 with higher values 10.09 1.90
indicating more forgiveness
Compassion 1–4 with higher values indicating 2.72 .82
more compassion
Gracious image of God 4–28 with higher values 11.90 5.02
indicating a more gracious image
of God
Fundamentalist church 1 = fundamentalist .30 .46
denomination, 0 = other
Biblical literalist 1 = literalist, 0 = other .31 .46
Evangelist 1 = evangelist, 0 = other .43 .49
Religious activity 3–21 with higher values 13.15 5.65
indicating more activity
Religious rigidity 1–5 with higher scores indicating 4.12 1.28
being more rigid religiously
Age In years (18–89) 45.63 17.05
African American 1 = African American, 0 = other .13 .34
Income Scores ranging from 1–23 (23 = 14.94 5.04
$110K or over)
Gender 1 = male, 0 = female .45 .49
Education Years completed 13.23 2.94
Southerner 1 = southerner, 0 = others .33 .47
Political conservative Scores from 1–7 (7 = extremely 4.07 1.40
conservative)
Foreigner 1 = foreign born, 0 = born in US .09 .28
Annotations

Turning the Other Cheek : Reassessing the Impact of Religion


on Punitive Ideology
Unnever, James; Cullen, Francis; Applegate, Brandon

01 Juan Antonio Aguilar Jurado Page 1


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02 Juan Antonio Aguilar Jurado Page 2


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03 Juan Antonio Aguilar Jurado Page 3


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04 Juan Antonio Aguilar Jurado Page 3


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05 Juan Antonio Aguilar Jurado Page 23


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06 Juan Antonio Aguilar Jurado Page 23


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07 Juan Antonio Aguilar Jurado Page 24


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