on Leibniz has always interested scholars, and Kulstad advances the hypothesis that Leibniz’s metaphysical views about how finite things follow from God and his at imo Kajamies, and Arto Repo for their in- valuable assistance in the preparation ofthis volume. We also express special thanks to Michael Della Rocea for his help and encouragement. cated otherwise, are from "Abbreviation in the front I SPINOZA’S SUBSTANCE MONISM Michael Della Rocca Cima Seine bse principles enable him, in often surprising ays, to argue validly forthe claim that there is only one substance. [argue this point here primarily by explaining how Spinoza’s denial of conceptual ‘or explanatory relations between different attributes (such as thought and exten- sion) obviates —in ways that have not been adequately appreciated — certain im- portant challenges that face his argument for monism. This conceptual barrier be- tween the attributes is introduced ina claim the import of which is not immediately ‘evident: “Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through it ‘One of my aims is to go some distance toward unpacking the meaning of this proposition, ‘My focus will not, however, be exclusively on ths conceptual separation. To pre- pare the way for my account ofthis divide, I will frst spend some time on a differ- cnt kind of restriction Spinoza places on conceptual or explanatory relations. This is Spinoza’s view that each substance is conceptually prior to its modes (1p). By ex- plaining how the conceptual priority of substance over its modes validates a crucial step in Spinoza’s argument for monism, I will be ina position to reveal one ofthe ‘ways in which the conceptual barrier between the attributes i also importantly at ‘work in that argument? 1. An Overview of Spinoza’s Position begin with a rather brief sketch, and is conceived through itself (1d3). My focus for n 1g conceived through itself, instead of on the notion of bei 10 Spinoza, xis conceived through y ifand only fx is explained by, ot in terms of, y. This is evident from the second halfof ap7s, where Spinoza says that when we perceive effects through their causes, we are explaining the order of nature of the connection of causes. Spinoza sometimes uses perceives and conceives interchangeably; so that, for him, when we conccive ef fects through their causes, we are explaining the order of nature. This suggests that Spinoza regards claims about conceiving one thing through another as claims about the explanation of one thing by another. Further evidence forthe equation of con- ception and explar with one another also cannot be unk ‘one does not involve the concept of the other” Here Spinoza treats as notion of conceiving a thing and the notion of understanding a thing or rendering it used—a conclusion that Spinoza explicily draws in 1p7d. Spinoza, a substance must be conceived under one or more attributes (1p109), cach of which somehow cons extension as examples of attributes an infinity of ateributes. Human beings are aware only of thought and extension. It isimportantto note that the fact that, for Spinoza, a substanceis conceived under an attribute does not imply that it is conceived through something es. Thisis, believe, due to the fact that the attributes are so intimately related tothe substance that they constitute its essence. I should emphasize, hough, that I do not investigate in detail here the difficult problem of precisely what Spinoza means by saying that each at- tribute constitutes the essence (or an essence?) ofthe substance and why he qualifies this by saying, famously, that an attribute is what the intellect perceives ofa sub- substance and about attributes, they do not turn on any particulars problem just raised concerning the relation between a substance and its attributes. “The way in which a substance is conceived through itself and is independent of other things isto be contrasted with the way in which nonsubstances are conceived. through and dependent on something else. Spinoza makes clear that such depend- cent beings depend, ultimately, on an independent being, that ison a substance,’ and. he calls these dependent beings moder ofthe substance (x For Spinoza, the modes ofa substance depend on that substance by depending ‘omits attsibutes. Thus the modes that depend on or are conceived through the at tribute of thought are called modes of thought and similarly for modes that depend ‘on extension, and so forth. My body and its states are examples of modes of exten- son, for Spinoza; my mind and its ideas are examples of modes of thought. Here, also, 'do not take up a number of major particular, do not characterize donot getem- Since Spinoza 1¢ holds that the unique sub- this claim is simply by appl 7, a substance, and since each substance exists necessarily it im of substance monisn: since God has te, for another substance besides God to exis, that substance would ibutes wth God. But sinc, for tributes and since God does exist, Spinoza concludes that no substance except God cass (p19 ‘To begin to understand and evaluate this argument, fous first on two the claim that substances ean cn tp4:“Two or more distinct things are is- bya difference in the atributes ofthe substances ffections!" This entails that any two distinct substances inoza, substances cannot share st- ion of [of the same nature or attribute) (1psd). Spinoza seems to be saying in 1p «things must have some concern the modes or ateri- utes of a substance or substances. Further, Spinoza seems tobe saying at the end of, psd, when he cites rpg, that if two things are distinct, one must beable to conceiveing to those fea- le of the Identity of ‘them as such by appealing to difference between the regard to which they differ A version of the P Since Spinoza sees conceiving a fact as explaining it, we can say that for Spinoza 5 then there is some difference between x and y that explains their That the notion of expl: thus operative in Spinoza's version ofthe Princi- ‘of Indiscernibles shows thathe would defend it, at least in part, by inciple of Sufficient Reason, which he also accepts. According to that cates how facts about nonide ater in this chapter that there may be an- facts must be explainable ‘must be explained." We ‘other point at which Spinoza employs PIL} in the argument for monism. ‘There are two challenges to Spinoza’s argument in rpsd that l explore: first, why, share the same attribute legitimately be distin- ‘guished by their modes? Second, why, for Spinoza, cannot substances that share the same attribute be distinguished by their attributes? Afterall, ifthey share some at- tributes bur differ in others then there would bea way to distinguish them by their attributes, I call the frst problem the different modes problem and the second the different atributes problem, I consider them in turn in the next two sections, before ‘examining the later stages of Spinoza’s argument for monisi. {for Spinoza, cannot substances th 2. The Different Modes Problem Suppose that substance a and substance b share attribute x. Suppose further, for the sake of simplicity, that nether substance has any attribute besides x. Spinoza claims thata and beannotbe distinguished by their modes. His reason appears, if we quote in full the sentence I just cited as evidence that Spinoza accepts an indiscernibility principle: I€[ewo substances are distinguished] by Spinoze's point seems tobe this since a substance is somehow prior tits modes, we are entitled to put the modesto the side when it comes to individuating substances." 1. A substance is not in and is not conceived through its modes. 2. The modes ofa substance are in and ate conceived through that substance. In invoking 1pt in 1p54, is Spinoza concerned, in particular, with one ofthese ewo aspects of his thesis of priority; thats, does Spinoza rej stances are individuated by their modes because such a situation would violate par- ticular one ofthe above pair of claims? Ie is clear, believe, from rps, that Spinoza is more directly concerned with a violation of (1) than with a violation of (2). ‘Tosee that thisis true, return to the erucal passage from 1psd: tation in which sub- If [ovo substances are distinguished] by a difference in their affections then since a substances prior in nature tits affections (by affections are therefore ‘put tone side and (he substance] ix considered in itelf hats (by d3 and a), consid- be many, but only one fof the same nature oat Tf we do oe px by its modes, then we are saying here, be considering itselforin another be considering it in an substance by which we are individuating the substance. Spinoza’s emphasis on the notion of being in tent, therefor, im- plies that if we allow modes to individuate a substance, then we ate treating that substance not asin itself, but rather asin its modes. Such a result would directly vi- ‘late the definition of substance and also (1), the frst component of the priority re- lation. Notice, however, that it would not, by itself violate 2), the other component ‘we would, it seems, the modes of theof that relation. For this reason, psd: he is more concerned through than with what modes are in and conceived through. that (12) would be violated ividuated by their modes? I believe that we can, that there actually rather simple way of showing how (1) would be violated if substances could be individuated by their modes alone. To bring out this reason, itis helpful to ‘of being in and being conceived through are mutually entailing for Spinoza! thes, [need to emphasize an important explication of the meaning of the term formed from the concept of y. jn mind, we return to the scenario in which substances a and b -nario? That's, what conceptsare re- ibstance a? Since, for Spinoza, substances are \gof xis not sufficient for conceiving ides a, chat is b, that has attribute ribute x” would not, by itself ‘ompare the thought, “the senator Since the concept of xs not sufficient for having the concep ofthe concept of 1 must have richer content than simply “the substance with atribute x" In other ‘words, a mustbe conceived through something in addition to attibute x. ne needs concept that, perhaps together withthe concept of x, would sufice for having the concept ofa Since the concept of x by itself could not accomplish that because at- tribute x doesnot differentiate a from b, the required addtional concept must bea concept of something that differentiates from b And in our senario such thing can only be, ofcourse, the modes of those substance. To have the concept ofa, we must, therefore, have the concept notony of tuibute x, butalso of et of modes mi, the et of modes that a has and that differentiates a from b, That i one must, in order to conceive ofa conceive of it as "the substance with attribute x and st of ‘modes m1.” “Thus, in our seenario, the concept of substance a would require the conceptof a modes, Substance a would, therefore, be conceived, at least in part, through its modes. And here we have a violation of (1) and thus a violation ofthe priority ofa substance over its modes. This is, I believe, a very natural and simple way to see (1) asat work in 1ps4, to provide a valid so- Tution to the different modes problem: 3. The Different Attributes Problem ibstance d also has two attributes icks thought Its second atributeis ibstances seem tobe individuated by hought and the other does not. This isa case of attribute shar- needs to rule it out in order for his argument for substance id, But what could be illegitimate about this scenario? attributes problem. ‘Thekind of strategy used to solve the different modes problem can show ushow to olve this one, To solve the different modes problem, I started by asking, Through this question I develop line of thought formal ent modes case. Recall hat chas extension and thought. Substance dhas extension and atebute +. Although conceiving ofthe attribute of thought might be sufficient for conceiv- ing of substance c, conceiving ofthe atribute of extension is nor sufi ceiving of, because there is something else besides: , which has the attribute of extension. Thus forming the concept “The substance wit the attribute of exten- sion” would no, by isl sulice for having the concept of ein particular. To con- ceive of this particular substance, we must conceveit through something in addition toextenson or instead of extension, One needs concept tha, perhaps together with the eonceptof extension, would be sufficient for having the concept of substance c, rather than substance d, Since the concept of extension could not be what we are secking because extension does not dilferentiatec from d, it appears that the re- uired Further concept must bea concept of something that differentiates c from d. And in our scenario sucha thing can only be, of cours, the other atributes of those substances the atributes with regard to which cand ddifer? To conceive ofc, we must therefore have the concep ofthe aeributof thought, that attribute which chas and which differentiates c from d. We can toconetive of eas extended, conceive o tensionand' nother words the concept ofa certain extended substance, that concept of thought. Given Spinozas notion of con- ceiving through it follows that extended substance cis conceived through thought.Would the claim that a given extended substance is conceived through thought violate any of Spinoza's principles, in the way that, as we sa, stance is conceived through its modes violates Spinoza’ answer is, believe, yes. The em tributes, with Spinoza’ claim the attributes precludes any sit ‘one must appeal to thought. |, but the latter not. Since the concep- ch conceiving of an extended substance e- d share the attribute of extension bur differ with regard to thought. This point is ble, and we can conclude that because ofthe conceptual barr ject any case in which two substances share one or mor butes, without having the conception of itself. Thats, the 's attributes (chat is, extension) was not, independently of another pealing to extension alone was not enough; another atribute had tobe invoked. The fact that this conclusion violated the conceptual barrier suggests that an implication ‘of the conceptual barier is the following: () Bach attribute of a substance, independently of sny other attribute ofthat substance is suflicient for conceiving ofthat substance. ific aim to which one must appeal in order to solve the different at- lem in the way I just proposed. G)is the 5 tributes ida). Further, Spinoza also holds that conc ‘onceiving ofthat thing: tothe of ay hing longs tha which bing give the hing i posited and which being taken aviay, the ly taken ayo tht without which the hing ean neither be nor be eneiveds anaich ean nether be nor be conceived without the thing. ad; my emphasis) ‘These laims together indicate that each atribute ofa substance is sufficient for con- ceiving ofthat substance and, in particular, that (3) Each attribute ofa substance, independently of any other attribute of that substance, i sufficient for conceiving ofthat substance (One passage where Spinoza directly argues along the lines of 3) oceurs in Ep 9. Simon de Vries wondered, in Ep 8, how a single substance could have, s Spinoza claims,a plurality of attributes. This sa standard objection to Spinoza, and one that Descartes would surely press2”I will try to shed som¢ ter, But here I am interested in a presupposition that emer sponse. In restating the problem in his own words, Spinoza takes it to be the prob- lem of “how one and the same thing can be designated [insignir] by ewo names” Presumably, these designators enable one to single out or distinguish the object in question. (Tle word Spinoza uses here can mean “to distinguish’ or “to make know”) So the problem Spinoza sees is that of how there can be two different ways same object about names and designators is meant to capture a relate toa substance indicates the following: for Spi- ich name of a given object by itself is sufficient for singling out or distinguishing that object, so toofi sufficient for singling out or ute of a substance, by ibute ofa substance, independently of any other ateibute ofthat sufficient for conceiving ofthat substance. ce suggests that he holds ‘Thus Spinoza’s likening of attributes to designators or ¢ (3) the assertion that is the heart of my so assertion to the conceptual passage in which he introduces from rptos. There, while elucidating 1pto, the propos the conceptual barrier, Spinoza says: nate of a substance] expresses the reality or being ofthe substance. he atsibutes are independent of one anc cee akan ubstance as equi ing that each expresses the substance itself. Spinoza often uses claims about the being, of xand claims about x itself interchangeably.» Thus (5) is equivalent to (6!) Bach attribute ofa substance, independently of any other attribute ofthat ses that substance. “To show that (5!) and, thus, (5) are equivalent to (3), we need to show that for Spinoza (6) xexpresss y if and only ifxis sufficient for conceiving of y thing, we can see that he is here saying thatthe modes ate conerved though tosaying that conceiving of the modes requires conceiv is therefore making the point here that ifone conceives ofthe modes then one is also conceiving ofthe attribute; thats, that conceiving ofthe modes is sufficient for con- ceiving ofthe attribute. For Spinoza, because a mode expresses a cert conceiving of that mode is sufficient for conceiving ofthat attribute. (Fora si passage, se aprd,) ‘The passage from apsd provides evidence that Spinoza holds the! of the equivalence in (6), thats, the claim tha conceiving of'y. That Spinoza accepts the fll equivalence is evident from 2procd. ‘There Spinoza treats the claim that the essence of man expresses God's nature in a the elaim thatthe essence of man can- not be conceived without God. Now to say thatthe essence of man cannot be con- inoza, to say that the essence of man is conceived through God. To say thisis, as we have seen, to say that conceiving ofthe essence of ‘man requires conceiving of God, and thus itis to say that conceiving ofthe essence ‘of man is sufficient for conceiving of God. So, for Spinoza, the elaim thatthe essence cof man expresses God's nature is equivalent to the claim that conceiving of the general pri Since Spinoza accepts (6), we can see the claim in spro to the effect chat bute ofthat ach atribute of a substance, independently of any other substance, expresses that substance, as tantamount to the claim that drives my proposed solution to the different atri- bates problem, that is, the claim that (G) Each ateribute of a substance, independently of any other substance, is sufficient for conceiving ofthat substance. ‘The fact that Spinoza makes an assertion such a (3) in Ep o and pros shows that he seeks to rule out situations in which an attribute by itself fils to enable us to con- ‘eive of orto express.a substance. He is asserting that there are no cases in which an attribute is sufficient for conceiving of a substance only with the help of other atti- bute. xe but differ with regard ‘wothers, such a the case of substances cand d,s precisely such a case. In fat itis the ‘only casein which an atribute would require the help of other attributes in order to provide a way of conceiving of the substance that has those two sub stances shareall their attributes, then no attribute ofthe substance can provide away of conceiving of that substance, even with assistance from other attributes ofthat sub- stance, (In such a case, one would have to appeal to the modes in order to conceive of the substance. We have already seen how Spinoza’s priority thesis precludes such an if substance shares no attributes with other substances, that tes is unique to that substance, then each attribute ofthat substance‘would, by itself, be sufficient for conceiving ofthat substance. case in which an aterbute of a substance would be insufficient for conceiving of the substance without the help of other attributes would be precisely a casein which two substances share some attributes but differ with regard to others. ‘Thus, even though he does not explicitly mention a casein which two substances share some but not all their attributes, we © precisely this kind of ease, Further, xp1os, in particular, shows that he wants to rule ‘out this kind of ease by invoking the conceptual barrier between the attributes. For these reasons, I conclude not only that Spinoza is sensitive to the different atributes problem, but that he also endeavors to solve it by the kind of strategy that I have de- veloped here, ~ Let us step back a bit and consider, in the light of one another, Spinoza’ re- sponses to the different modes problem and to the different attributes problem. roblem by considering whats re- see that Spinoza seeks to eli tended substance, for example, would be conceived through thought. This, how- ‘ever, would violate the conceptual barrier between the attributes. substances cannot share at- tributes. Further, my interpretation suggests that a key aspect of Spinoza’ view of tributes is the claim that each attribute by itself i suficent for conceiving of the substance that has that attribute. The “by itself” here means sufficient for conceiving of the substance independently of the other attributes ofthe substance and independently ofthe modes ofthe substance. of Substances with Fewer Than All the Attributes roblem, Spinoza’s conceptual barrier ‘what this entails for Spinoza, is that any possible substance nec cvident from the fact that, on the basis of 1p7, Spinoza argues in, ibutes) and since a sub- ly exists. In 1p14 Spinoza con- so substances can share at- God is defined asa substance (the substance of infin Js there anything in Spinoza wing way? that precludes an opponent from arguing inthe f i) Bach possible substance necessarily exists is no sharing ofatributes, God is impossible Spinoza’s monism. He needs to show that his argument forthe conclusion of existence and t's nonexistence does not commit him tothe soundness ofa par ‘exists and God does not. In other words, Spinoza ur- gitimate to start out, as his opponent does, with the jinoza attempts to resolve itby asserting that God has more (or any other substance with fewer attributes than God)" In pris Spinoza sys: [The more reality belfor this claim, let us investigate its meaning and the way in which it would obviate for Spinoza, is enailed by saying that God has more power we grant that ts exists, we must also grant that God ex ists This is true forthe following reason. For Spinoza, {y) Something with lesser power to exist cannot exist if something with greater power to exist does not ()is for Spinoza trivial seater power, does afer al, x has greater power thing cannot have greater power to exist than an a exists, then God exist ‘existence of God as well. Since God and ts share an attribute, we can sce thatthe ex- {stence of 1 would require that there be a case of attribute sharing. Since Spinoza le2* This conclusion would obviate the opponent's argument from the claim that tt is posible tothe conclusion that sr exists but God does not. We can therefore see how, by invoking the claim that God has more power to exist than does ts1, Spinoza would block an important challenge to his argument tributes and power provides, therefor, the ground Spinoza’s argument for monism. the question, How does Spinoza argue that at- ed in this way? We ean discern in Spinoza the fol lowing line of thought. With focus again on tst and God, let us show win, for Spi- ‘noza, God's having more attributes is correlated with Godt’ having more power to exist than does ts, Spinoza holds that ciently, it has the power to do so only because ofthe fact tothe number ofits attributes. So Spinoza pr its own sufficiency only asa result ofits attributes, With the help of (), we ean reach the claim that: that being can exstby -suflicient existence; but self-sufficient existence (10) God has whatever would give sr power for ‘God hat further features that also give God power (10) follows, in part, from (9)88 I now show: () claims thats having thought would ‘each ofthe other infinitely er power. Thus we can lows from (to) that God has sce why (ro) is true for Spi more power to exist than does tst. This is how Spinoza seems, in Ep 35, to support hisassertion that God has more attributes than ts and therefore has more power to showing that God exists an opponent’ charge that does not. y showing this, Spinoza would rebut an ‘exists and God does not. In the course of arguing that opponent can be ‘The opponent does God. In doing this, the opponent is taking seriously the possibility that some ‘than God, and thus ‘the reason why st has 4s, in effec, claiming that a feature besides thought is (part of) what gives s1 power xis. But this is precisely the denial of (9). So we see that, in taking his position, the opponent was, in effect, denying (all along. Thus Spinoza is, of course, not en- titled to assume it, as he apparently does.ives tet more power to exist than God. Although tst and God both have thought, they differ in that God has: besides thought, and tsr does snot. This difference, a Cartesian would say, is clearly to the detriment of God (as Spinoza defines God) since the notion ofa substance having more than one is simply incohe perfectly legitimate. Thus, the Cartesian would say, God would be precluded from existing by God's very concept, but ts would not be precluded by tsi’secincept. In this way, we can see the Cartesian objector as holding th that tsz has the attribute of thought that would give sr s rather, the objector would say, ‘would be due to that together with the fact that ts has no other attributes. Thus this Cartesian objection illustrates how an. power to exist than tsr can be seen ‘shaving thought is all chats rel- levant would be some further difference 1e concerning whether oF not the sub- ‘opponent of Spinoza’ view that Ge as denying ()all along, thats, as lar would undermine Spi stance monism. Thus there is good reason to look for a more successful Spinozistic, argument for the claim that ris impossible. “My strategy for the rest ofthis section follows: Assuming the no-shared-atribute er Spinozi ly the conceptual barrier between the attributes I offer an argument for Spinoza’s monism, which thesis and several fense of Spinoze’s view that the more attributes a substance possesses the more power ithas to exist, my argument here will uncover a strong reason forthe similar Spinozistic claim that there is some difficulty fewer than all the atributes and that this diffi substance has. After this more successful Spinozistic argument for monism and the view that tt is impossible, I will explore the extent to which this argument can ac- tually be found in Spinoza see why E a ception of substances entails that each possible substance necessarily exists (1 is, in effect, the assertion of Spinoza’s substance monism, and we a led to that yet. I want to show now how we can get from my weaker im of monism, From Spinoza’s view that no two substances share atributes, together with the weak assertion that each atribute exists, we can draw the conclusion thatif xis an chen xis possessed by one substance and by no other. Thus we ean speak ly, of the thinking substance and she extended sub- ak of the thinking substance and the extended substance, [simply mean to refer tothe unique substance that possesses thought and the unique substance that possesses extens ‘The question I want to focus on If x+y, then there is some difference between x and y that expl ronidentiy. In the light of this principle, consider the relation between the thinking substance and the extended substance inthe scenario just described. Ifthey are to be noniden- tical, there must be a difference between them that explains their nonidentity. What could such a difference be? Notice that we can say right away that there are a number of properties that the thinking substance and the extended substance share. For example, each has the property of being asubstance. They therefore also share all the properties entailed by this property including the properties of being self-caused, being infinite and eter- might be called at- ince to say that something has one of these properties snything about which particular attribute or attributes it has or does not have. Indeed, it scems thatthe thinking substance and the extended substance shareall their neutral properties and that any difference between them must consist in non- fac, that they have different attributes. things are dist lifference in the attributes ofthe substances or by a difference in themodes alone ifthe thinking substance and the extended substance are tobe distinct, they must be distinguished by one or more attributes. Let us consider whether we can appeal to the atribute of extension in order to sh the thinking substance and the extended substance. The extended sub- of course, but one might suppose that the bute and that we could inthis way explain stance has the attribute of extensi thinking substance does not have thi pinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason demands an answer here. Twant to show that there can be no explanation ofthis purported faet. in my int, the conceptual barrier between the attributes figures promi- ‘A second attempt might proceed thus: the thinking substance lacks ext tribute of thought precludes it from having the atribute of ex- jew, Because ithas thought, ion might appear to be good: ne cause its having the tension. On this ‘Again, this expla gitimate in Spinozistc ter ibutes. For Spinoza, the proposi (apto) entails the following important lim: "The fact chat a substance fails 0 havea certs dent that although ‘one may be conceived fee from that that they const sion, which is also conceived through itself, we cannot conclude that these sub- E stances ate not identical One can sce why this claim would be [fa substance is prevented from having the attribute of ext has the atebure of thought, then a fact involving extension — that is the fact certain substance docs not have that attribute —would be duc toand ths conceived through, fet involving thought. This would be w allow more ofa conceptual or explanatory connection between thought and extension than Spinoza would eoun- Return now tothe attempted explanation of the thinking substance’ have extension by appealing tots having thought as precludiog its having extension, Since Spinoza accept (12) he would reject such an explanation. So we ares ‘outa way of explaining why the thinking substance acks extension, if indee lack extension. For similar reasons, the following explanation would also fil: “The thinking substance lacks extension because it has some other attribute x which precludes its having extension” This explanation ineffective because, just as the conceptual bar- fier showed that ought cannot preclude a substances having exenso also show thatatiibwe x cannot preclude a substance’s having ex 1 want to consider one farther potential exp failure wo be extended, bu in order todo 0,1 need ce thought and extension rom being extended. Spinoza le another in this way. Thus we can sce Spinoza as le fora substance tohave more than one attribute, and that this posable precielybeeus ofthe concep sepa ong theatres “The conceptual barier ultimately provides an answer to de Veies and tothe Carte- sian objection to Spinoza’s account ‘With this point in mind, lt us considera final attempt to explain the failure of the thinking substance to have extension. One way to explain why 2 thing orlacksa certain property is to appeal tothe fact that itis part ofthe thing's nature or essence to possess or lack that property. Pechaps, then, iis part ofthe nature or essence of the thinking substance that it lacks extension, This would be the eas if forcxample it were part the natareof the thinking substance to have thought and no other atribute (This might be seen asthe nature ofthe substance If thsi the case, then we could appeal tothe fact chat the nature ofthe d substance is estrtive inthis way inorder to explain why it lacks extension, ‘We can readily se that this explanation is unsuccessful, We ave already granted exist and that only one substance as it, Acord- sed (uniquely) by a substance whose nature it i to have thought as well as\cluding extension, If this possibility were realized, then, ofcourse, the one thinking substance would not lack extension. Thhus if one were to explain, the thinking substance’ failure to have extension by appealing to its nature as a substance that has only thought, we would need to explain why thought is not pos- sessed instead by a substance whose nature allows and requires it to have both thought and extension, In other words, the problem now isto explain why the one substance that possesses thought has the les inclusive, rather than the more inclu- sive, nature However, no explanation seems to be available. Given that, for Spinoza, because acceptance of the the would also reject this explanation of the thinking substance’s extension. ‘All ofthe potential explanations of the thinking substance’ lack of ‘we have considered have failed. And the ultimate reason for their ceptual barrier between the isbarrier tha giv (21) —the claim that substance’ lack ofa certain ati sessing a certain other attribute—and thus also gives rise to Spinoza’ jute. These particular results of the concep- tual barrier demonstrate, as I have outlined, thatthe purported explanations do not succeed. Further, can think of no other potential explanation ofthe thinking substance’s lack of extension that does not also fall prey i similar ways to (12) and the concep- jn our scenario, the thinking substance fils to have th the extended substance, then, given the con- substance can have more than one: ceptual barrier between the attributes, there is no difference berween the thinking substance and the extended substance that would enable us to explain their non- identity, ‘From the claim that there is no difference that explains this non-identity,to- that there isa single substance that has al the atributes; that is, we reach Spinoza’s claim of substance monism. In presenting this argument for Spinoza’ substance monism, I have found a jon for the assertion which is crucial to his monism and for which he argues question-beggingly in Ep 35. This isthe assertion that the substance that has thought and no other at substance cannot exist, ecause its very many brute fact: the fact that ts with the exception of thought itself). Re- out at some point violating the concep holds. Thus there ean be no ex- for Spinoas, there can be no garding each ofthese Fat Icis important to note be simply the fact that God exists. Since, as we have seen, t ‘equally prevent God from existing, to explain why tst does note toGod's -guing that some other substance ‘we can now pinpoint the fault .nd would thus involve many more power it has to brute facts, one for each lacks. The existence ofa substance whose only attributes are thought and extension would also involve very many brute facts of this type, but since it has one attribute that tr lacks, the like the case of the substance with thought and extension, we are faced with the question, Why does it lack the attribute of extension? As we consider substances ‘with more and more! brute facts concerning atributes-— brute fact er substances. When Se reach the substance ofall attributes, God, we reach a substance whose existence Voids all such brute facts. Thus, unlike all the other substances, no brute fact con- ‘erning atributes precludes God's existence. ‘The assertion that the more attributes a substance has, the more existence-pre- cluding brute facts it avoids is clearly similar to Spinoza’s crucial view thatthe more attributes a substance has, the greater its power to exist. Each claim asserts thatthe ‘question whether or nota substance exists depends, But am not confident that these claims amount to the same thing, since confident that of avoiding more brute facts and of having ‘more power to exist are equivalent for Spinoza. I do not here explore this k, Is the Spinozistic argument I have be admitted that Spinoza does nor exlusive, such a st, by invoking the te the way that Thave just described. possibility of substances that are less than ‘conceptual barrier between the attributes in Instead, tothe extent that Spinoza explicitly takes up the question ofthe impossibil- ity ofts1, he appears to offer the question-begging argument that I found in Ep 35 Nevertheless, there is atleast some indication that Spinoza appreciates the way in 1,as in the above argument, reliance on the conceptual barrier can help to gen- crate identity claims, including claims of substance identity. ‘The first and most important point to consider is cexplicily arbecause of tence of sptos. important to compare the argument Ihave presented with Spinoza’s argument for made identity, forthe identity of modes of one attribute with modes of another attribute. Thave discussed this in detail elsewhere, s0 I will be brief here.” For Spinoza, ideas are modes of thought. Each idea is identical with, is one and the "hus, for example, the idea ofa mode of of extension, the idea of my idea of my body is my mind (ap13) fact that a mode is a mode of thought cannot. from being iden a mode can fail to be ‘with a mode of extension, because ‘thought, Bue this is to rest a fact involving the attribute of extension on a fact in- volving the acribute of thought, which would violate the conceptual or explanatory between the attributes, thesis of parallelism according to which “[tJhe order and connection of ideas isthe same as the order and connection of Spinoza, this entails that an idea and its object share a wide range of ateribute-neu- wal properties, including temporal properties, properties specifying the numbers of causes and effects of a mode, and the property of having a certain degree of com- 1ere would be no legitimate explanation for the non- indeed they were not identical. Given Spinoza’s version lows that the mind is identical ‘The fact that Spinoza sees parallelism as generating the identity of modes of, thought and modes of extension and sees tunable to indi- viduate modes of thoughtand modes of ext he following pas- wage in 2p7s, where he teats the claim for mode identity as equivalent to the claim for parallelism: [Whether we conceive nature under se modes? I conclude that Spinoza does indeed see the identity of modes as generated inthe way Ijust indicated. ‘This argument for mode monism has, of course, the same general structure as the argument for substance monism that T outlined. In the substance argume reasoned that since the thinking substance and the extended substance share neutral properties, such as being a substance, being self- caused, and so on, and since the con ceptual barrier gu other, non-neutal properties, such asthe attribute of extension, do not enable uso distinguish the substances, it follows thatthe thinking substance i 1 with the extended substance. The fact that Spinoza relies on this kind of argumer barrier between the attributes can be used to argue for identity claims. ays in apps that the character of mode monism de- ine of argument that emerges in Ep 35. of Spinoza’s notion of attribute provide him with the means to defend his argument for sub- at certain fe ‘The general point that emerges from my inquiry ex. These features inlude (1) independently ofthe modes of the substance and independent ofthe other ateibutes sufficient for conceiv- ingof the substance, and also (2) the fae tha, for Spinoza, because ofthe conceptual independence ofthe attributes, no attribute ofa substance can prevent that substance from having any other ateibut. However, that Spinoza has a powerful defense ofindependence that Spinoza accords o attributes? In the light of my inquiry, Ibelieve that this isthe question most worth exploring to gain further insight into the basis of ‘Spinoza’s monism and to arrive at a final assessment of it Notes ‘An carlice version of this chapter was part of a symposium on Spinoza at the March 4995 mecting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association and drafis, ‘ical with modes of extension, such as bodies. See Della Rocca (1993 and 1996, chapters 7 dicate, my defense of subscance moaism which motivate much of my present discus rectly relevant to mode monism. + Ini Ida a ri im hapa Ro, some ofthe waysin which Spinoza cmploys 1g: “The knowi- ‘edge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause” See in particular 96951988), Carriero (1995). ‘The restriction to posible substances mustbe admitted here. Spinoza would not, of explained bythe sharing of all features a difference what 1p5d suggests From Spinoza’ Latin that iis because ofthe priority chat we can put the ‘modes aside. This is the significance ofthe ergo in the passage quoted. Curley does not ‘translate this word and I have modified his translation accordingly. 16, Gatsett (29908) offers a sophisticated response tothe different modes problem that ly concerned with violations of 2) and not with vilatons of (1). ‘think that, forthe reasons given above, xp5d clearly cuts against his interpretation. 4 psa, here Spinoza speaks ofa substance as “whatisin itself and is con- that, that the knowledge of which doesnot require the knowledge Kripkean proper names chat is thats postion could plasty reasons why Spinoza would rejectit would take us too far afield here. take up chi issue in chapter 5 of Della Roca (96). Garett (:990, 97) imply rejects such aKripkean une 1 of being in and of being conceive rd situation, substance a would als ‘ve can say that inthis (Spinezsically a in pare in its modes. 1. Doney (1990) offers similar solution tothe diferent modes problem. Carriero (1995, perspienous and thorough treatment in Garrett (19906, 83-101). Unfortunately, I cannot haere take up Garret’ solution to this problem or his criticisms of ether proposed solutions. solution to the diffe lem isone that Spinoza would accept, but relies. Here also, asin his solution to the dif lation goes astray by focusing on chat through which through which a substances conceived he previous ection, we cannot appeal to the modes ofthe to Charles Huenemann, inoe' being in 3p7 and apr8d) and preserving one’s being (in 4p18, p20, nd 4p25) to talking about preserving onslf Gin 4p22, d 4p264, 4p35). All of che passages cited from pot 4ae derived from 1 exacly what Spinoza woul tence will become clear lter. 133. See Garret (1979, 209-10). Koistinen (2991) and Kulstad (1996) also consider this problem. asthe explanation of t's nonexit-134. Actually, Spinozas claim is that God has more power to exist ofnelf ase) or by ts kind specified by that atsbue, is noc absolutely infiite (1d2), Only a substance with all at- tributes can be absolutely infinite 136. See, for example, Ep 35: "if being which i endowed with less power exists by is ‘oven sufficiency how much more does another exist which is endowed with greater powes” s,4 priori all the conditions for a ley infinite! power of existence” ce scenavio described in the previous section, each aci- If be sufficient for conceiving of tha substance. haere, Does the thinking substance have che atribute of some but mote properly Spinozstic tems, be expressed the attribute of extension? ‘more cumbersome question were substituted throughout for consider 46. Spinoza makes similar use ofthe conceptual bartier when he says (in xpr1da) that simpler question T actualy substances of different narures can neither give one another existence nor take it away. CE -4papdi “Our power of ating... however cis conceived, can be determined, and hence by the power of ant ‘mon with us, and not by che power ofa thing whose nat For similar points, see Deleuze (1992, 79-82), Charlton (198,526), Donagan (1988, Spinoes'system. Ihave documented such intensonlity in Della Rocca (196, chaptr 7 St “Te thinking sbstance and the extended substance ae one and the same sub- 1c, which snow comprehended under this atibute, now under tht Soalz ie etiam) a mode of extension and the idea ofthat mode ace one and the sme thing, but expressed inewo ways" ap.