-- se eee eae UNCLASSIFIED Richard Montgomery (C) DERAMWSS/WXAICRI7625/1.0 Copy 7 of 8 Cover + iv +9 pages duly 1997 This document is subject to the release conditions printed fon the reverse of this page vias |UNCLASSIFIED dstl iomaton Cerra Bagzr Parton wn Saisury Wis S84 040 er 01980013072 Fox 01980613670 Tobe round by Danxsiss -| 1 4 aa ‘amber ‘ae ma — UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED [This document was produced by DERA for the Coastguard Agency undor Contract Reference 'WSS/S3186 and, unless indicated, may be used and circulated 1n accordance with the conditions of the Order under which it was supplied It may not be used or copied for any non- |Govornmental or commorcial purpose without the ‘written agreement of DERA, © Crown copyright, 1997 Defence Evaluation and Research Agency UK Approval for wider use 01 release must be sought fom: Intollectual Proporty Department, Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, DERA Farnborough Famborough, Hampshire GUt4 OLX ayrtewassiFre? AR RRRAR RRR me meUNCLASSIFIED Record of changes ‘This isa contolled document, Aitional copies should be obtained through the ising suthorty Inthe event of copying locally, each document shall be marked “Uncorteled Copy’ Ariondment shall be by whole document replacement Proposals for change should be forwarded lo the issuing authority. Issue) Date etait of Changes TOP ai fay 197 | alae —— — t i — — ERA WSS WHHCHI7H291 6eae see eke eee eae Eeniemnmery NCLASSIE! i {A review was caried out of the information available at DERA Chorley on the wreck of ‘the Richard Montgomery and the munitions thought to be present. The types of ammunition and their probable location in the wreck is deseribed and an assessment ‘made of their condition following the extended period of immersion. A suinmary is also given on the information available on the effects of « conrived or accidental initiation of the munitions resulting ina mass explosion a yreensss et? :UNCLASSIFIED List of comtents Authorisation Record of changes Executive summary it List of contents iv 1 Introduction 2 Review of available information 2.1 Mitions remaining in the wreck 22. Kiclee Incident 23. Effects of a mass detonation 3 Conclusions 4 References ween ERAS WXECROZGINweet eee UNCLASSIFIED Introduction The Unted States Liberty Ship, SS Richard Montgomery, ran aground on Bast Nore Sands in the Thames estuary in August 1944, The vessel had on board neatly 9000 tonnes (of munitions of which approximately one half wece salvaged atthe time and the rest ace sll i the wreck. ‘The wreck is one and a hatf miles from Sheemess and the Isle of Grain and 600 feet from the Medway Channel Fairway. The masts and derricks are visible a all states ofthe tide and the decks ae always covered even at low tide (1) There have been regular reviews of the situation with the wreck and a number of proposals for salvaging the remainder of the cargo but the decision has always been that 51 was better not to distu:b it (2,3,4}. Following the most recent review, held on 25 November 1996, DERA were requested to provide a short written comment on the probable condition ofthe manitions and explosives and the possible effects onthe arca of ‘mass explosion (5) 1ED nuawssuxtcnnane ——pahGaGStF net23 243d 244 244d 2142 UNCLASSIFIED Review of available information ‘Munitions rem ing in the wreck There are a number of discrepancies between the information inthe sailing draf (6) and hatin the salvage reports [7] butte information at Table 2-1 1s probably a reasonable estinate of the munihers and ‘ypes of mivntions remaining sn the various pars of the wreck ‘The munntions that have Deen the principle cause of concern, and whose presence has probably most mfluenced the decisions not to attempt recovery of the ret of the cargo, are the eluste: fragmentation bombs located “between decks” in hold wo 2, These are believed to be of two types and some of them are understood to be fured. Details of the ‘evo types ae given below. a ster fragmentation bomb, AN MIA 100Ib size (These bombs are packed in a cluster of six 2019 bombs type Mal cach fited with a fuze type AN-MIIA1. This fuze contains an in line M3 detonator which contains both lead azide and a gilding, metal detonator cup. These was intially considerable concem over the possibility of the formation of copper azide on the copper or copper alloy components. This was considered hazardous, as copper azide is morc sensitive than lead aide, and was likely to be formed in potenilly hazardous pars ofthe safety and arming ‘mechanisms. The fuze is a vane armed, direct action, ienpact design and the detonator and striker are inline. The sequence of events required to accidentally actuate the detonator are considered extremely unlikely to occur, panicularly afler an extended period of submersion Cluster fragmentation bomb AN M&A1 These bombs ate packed in a cluster of 3 type M40, 231b TNT, unfuced fragmentation bombs. Three fuzes type AN-M120 Al, each ina sealed metal cas, are also packed in the case. The fuze is a mechanical, delay anning impact fuze, In the unarmed state the MI9AZ detonator is out of line with the striker and booster charge. Even if the detonator was to function, with this design of fuze, the explosion would not propagate to the poimer. There was considerable correspondence between the UK snd USA authorities regarding the risk of accidental functioning of these fuzes and the probable effects of their prolonged submersion. A teappraisal of the hnzatds was canied out by PERME, Waltham Abbey in 1980 (8). The conclusions were that the fuzes would have become flooded within a short time after the sinking and are now cither completely non funcional or no more seasitve than in the normal state greens? —UNCLASSIFIED Review of available information Weigwer Biplasie weons | (tonnes) | et iis TT 5 Ta cones sgais “| Sypyroechresy ‘es (whe shoephnarus) 1423 cases wp TOO émo%e boris [Ferware aa arte boosters ooks ‘ ~TaT RDO Bombs TT AN WERT] 987 E TO 00 ms TAT AN WS “208 =agaE "1560 250% Bombe TAT AN WT ia Wo? sane ‘ower noes 1066 iWodib SAP Gombe TNT AW. 1] ‘374 BOO SAP barbs AN WSO a 268 200016 GP THT AME 4 ‘30 1000 ANAS "S21 SAO F260 Io fragmentation bombs AN 81 TERT ea ol ogres bomb Cua | 9 ANA ex za area — iis ANTART RRS wry "Rewwaon cece r andi ANB BEBO 7 le ee) 1 | Cowaraecmetieen 1°" Tira SaP Toon bom] aces | | Table 2.1; remaining munitions See eRe RRRRREDUEEEEEE Eee eee DERAANSSAN XE CRY! U NCCASSIFL ED age +214s 2144 2453 UNCLASSIFIED Review of available information Kraay be of interest 10 note that an investigation earsied eut around 1973 by DF Cotgrove of Southend Chamber of Trae concluded that all of the fuzed bombs had been cleared away during the ongina salvage operation and that all the remaining bombs were ‘unfuzed [8] The conesions were based on a study of the recoids of the Weights ofthe individval cases and interviews with the salvage crew. His view was given limited suppott by Major Theodore C Char, (10° who is an expert on American munitions andl the author ofa bak on the subject ‘The overai conclusion fern the repons avaiable is that any fuees present in the wreck will heve deteriorated to the extent tat they are no longer functional and would not constitute 4 hazatd to handing the murstions by normal EOD handling providing an aqueous environment is maintained. Other munitions present ‘The remainder ofthe cargo consists of unfored high explosive bombs, pyrotechaic stores and 100lb smoke bounis, ‘The main high explosive.filling forthe bombs is understood to be TNT or RDX. These ‘materials are chemically very slable and would be expected to remain in good condition ‘within the bomb cases. The TNT would be relatively unaffected by leakage of water into the bomb case but explosives containing RDX oF ammonium nitrate would be affected as they are partially or completely soluble in water. Unless there has been significant leaking of the soluble components of the explosive there is likely to be litle or no changes in the sensitivity or explosive power of the explosives asa result of the extended submersion, ‘The records show that 2 quantity of 10016 white phosphors smoke bombs are Stored sit the aft deep tank below no 1 hatch The bombs are in individual wooden boxes and do not contain fuze or booster charges. White phosphorus is quite stable when stored under water but can ignite spontaneously in ai. CBDE Porton Dawn has extensive experience ‘of this material and can advise on the special hazards that would be involved in a reenvery operation or explosion involving sores of this type. Kielce Incident One of the factors which probably influenced the decision to leave the wreck untouched ‘was the incident with the Kielce in 1967 [11] ‘The Kielce was a Polish vessel which sank in deep water 3 miles off Folkston with @ cargo of bombs similar to those on the Richard Montgomery, An attempt was made to Feeover the bombs and a small explosive charge was placed adjacctt to a bulkhead to free the bombs. The explosion propagated to the rest of the cargo and the blast caused considerable damage over a wide area, The blast occurred at about te time that proposals. to recover the munitions from the Montgomery were being considered UNGEASSIFIEP srcsssasecaiossAnwwus 4 ae eee eee 2a 235 UNCLASSIFIED Review of available information Effects of @ mass detonation Thete have been a number of studies ofthe likely effects of a mass detonation af the munitions remaining in the wreck (equivalent to 1500 tonnes of TNT) either as the consequence of an accident or as the result of a planned disposal operation [12, 13] Whilst there 1s nota lot of data available that ear be directly related to the particular situation with the Richard Montgomery, it has always been accepted that a mast explosion would put property and the local population at risk Damage could aise fom a number of effeets of the explosion but the principle cause would be from the resulin air blast. The extent of damage would be very dependent on the weather and tidal conditions at the time but could cause damage to windows al & distance of 18,000 feet and extensive damage to houses at 1650 feet, Because of the location of the wreck there would probably be lite question of dizec injury to people by ar blast ut there could be injury by secondary effects, maily from flying glaes, For a planned explosion, evacuation would be necessary for & distance of 10,000 feet from the wreck. ‘The damage from selsmic shock could occur to a maximum of 14,000 fet but only minor ‘damage would be expected a distances greater than 5,500 feet Structural damage could ‘occur in well maintained properties at distances les than 3,800 feet. I is considered ‘unlikely that wave action would be significant ouside the immediate azea of the water course unless the event occured a the top of a high tide ‘The distance at which ships would be affected would be very dependent on the design of the individual ship but the area would probably need to be cleared 1 a distance of at least 1000 feet in the event of a planned explosion. Misile effects could be produced up to bout 13,000 feet and ata distance of $000 (ee: an intensity of the onder of 1 missile to {every 250,000 square feet could he anticipated (1 massile for every 30 houses), he figures are not claimed as accurate but probably give some idea ofthe megnitude ané effects of a mass explosion of the wieck mecrmvcrane tg SHFLED es31 a aS 16 vane UNCLASSIFIED inclusions ‘The bulk of munitions are high explosive bornbs, The main filings are probably stil in serviceable condition and, with suitable iitiation, capable of a mass high order detonation, Any fuzes present ate likely to have been completely Hooded for some time and are either non functional oF no more sensitive than in their normal stale ‘The white phosphorus smoke bomibs would present 2 special hazard in the event of » secovery operation or explosion The condition of the explosives would probably permit handling by normal EOD procedures providing a aqueous environment was maintained [8] would be extremely dangerous to use explosives in the vieinity ofthe wreck, The reports winch estimated the effects of mass explosion ofthe remaining cargo were both written ome time ago. As there have been significant developments in computer programms capable of modelling evens of this type, it may now be possible to obtain a better assessment of the effecté of amass explosion under a variety of different wind and tidal conditions than was previously available, The Explosives Effects Sub Committee of the Explosive Storage and Transport Committee may be prepared to carry ott this gorse v Dna ss We O78 0| wou ee ~ UNCLASSIFIED References HSB, Board of Trade, Histor of the wreck ofthe $$ Richard Montgomery MNNA‘13/8/037 Pare 2, May 1970 DEVEREUX, R A, $5 Richard Monipomery, Head of DSS, DINT. 63/3, 7 Janwary 981 Minutes of meeting ofthe Working Pary onthe Wreck ofthe Richard Monigomery, 7 March 1979, ‘Coastguard Headquarters, The wreck of the SS Richard Montgomery, a summary report DIDNLPS&MO(NY259/62, 28 August 1996 MURRAY, Il, SALVO, Richard Montpomer Presentation DIDNLPS&MO2S916/2, 2 December 1996, Soiling draft of SS Richard Montgomery (SS PH 241) Hetil HAWKINS, § J, Reappraval ofthe sate of hazardous ordnance nthe wreck ofthe S88 Richard Montgomery 10 December 1980, WHITBREAD, £ G, $8 Rickard Montgomery, 28 Mauch 1973 CHART, TC, 28 March 1973, Press cutting ofthe Thames Time Borab, 27 August 1978, LADE & CT, Bffect of detonation nthe wreck SS Richard Montgomery, WABII2106, 15 May 1970 TATE, F EG, The Richard Montgomery problem, XB 243/1/3. 4 December 1975 . anagge? bmanowncenrasis yy oe