Remember: use IRAC!
In the name of Jesus, may you successfully deliver your pleadings, agent!
[cross was here and he believes in you :) so does xander :D]
INTRO
First of all, am I audible?
Greetings, Mr./Madam President, Your Excellencies, and may it please the
Court. I’m the co-agent of the Applicant. My name is Leony Amanda, and it
is an honor for me to appear before this Court to submit the remaining
submissions of the Applicant.
For the next 21 minutes, this agent will be addressing the third and fourth
claims of the Applicant.
Where, third, we submit that the sanctions imposed by the Applicant were
lawful, and thus the Applicant has no obligation to conduct reparation.
And fourth, that the transport of hazardous waste to Etna by the Respondent
violated its Treaty obligation, whereas the conditional cooperation by the
Applicant was in compliance with the Peace Treaty.
As such this agent shall proceed to her first submission.
1. Resources of international law?
= Under Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute, sources of international law
include:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
b. international customs, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law [consistent state practices that hold legal
obligation and thus accepted as law];
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
These sources are hierarchical in nature, but are not 100% definitively in a
hierarchy.
2. Jurisdiction of the ICJ?
= Article 36 of the ICJ Statute. ICJ has no jurisdiction submitted by
individuals, non-governmental corporations or any other private
entities. ICJ only has jurisdiction over State to State disputes.
(International organization disputes: which court? The ICJ in
particular is not competent to handle dispute cases in which one of
the parties is an international organization. No other Court is
competent to adjudicate this kind of dispute. However, ARIO
[Articles on the Responsibility of International Organization]
provides other mechanisms).
3. What constitutes customary international law (customs)?
= 2 elements: state practice (that particular law is being practiced by
many states) and opinio juris (that particular conduct gives a sense
of legal obligation—if violated, there are legal repercussions).
4. Highly qualified publicists?
= Highly qualified publicists are qualified legal scholars who wrote
legal writings. There is no definitive list of qualified legal scholars
(or highly qualified publicists). Instead, these scholars are qualified
through the depth of their writings and their respect within the legal
community. For example, Shabtai Rosenne (int. Law prof and
Israeli Diplomat. His work: book “The Law and Practice of the
International Court”)
5. Difference between general principle and customary international
 law?
= According to the proposed definition of opinio juris, customary
international law includes “principles” as well as “rules.” A
“principle” is less specific and normally establishes a persuasive
obligation to give some value or action great weight in decision
making. A “general principle” is a principle that is broad in scope
and applies across a wide range of subject areas. Examples of
general principles include, inter alia, the good faith principle and
the principle of equity. Examples of customary international law,
inter alia, are reparation and prevention of transboundary harm.
Both are unwritten sources of law.

SUBMISSION-1 Applicant acted in accordance with the Peace Treaty in imposing unilateral
sanctions against Respondent and its nationals, and Applicant has no
obligation to conduct reparation

Y. E., the Respondent has launched not one, but two unlawful attacks based How about the claim of expropriation brought by the Respondent?
on misleading information, namely the attack on Nant Gateway, which was = Y.E., the opposing counsel’s argument on the violation of expropriation,
of crucial importance to the Applicant’s economy (for it is the only mouth of even if established, does not violate any article within the peace treaty. The
Eamont Thruway (Art. 15 Peace Treaty & para. 15 SAF)), and the attack of opposing counsel has argued that it constitutes a violation under Article 2(1)
Compound Ardan. Subsequently, the Applicant imposed economic-based of the peace treaty, however said article only recognizes the provision of the
sanctions to cease the aggression of the Respondent, which would bring this UN Charter and the customary law governing friendly relations. None of
agent to her first submission: Applicant acted in accordance with the Peace those legal frameworks recognize expropriation as custom. Since the prayer
 Treaty in imposing its sanctions, and to this end, this agent submits 3 main of relief strictly asks for violation of treaty obligation, the claim of
arguments. expropriation should not be sustained.
1. First, the sanctions were in accordance with Art. 2(3) of the Peace
Treaty. Why sanctions?
2. And alternatively, the sanctions were lawful countermeasures. = This is our last feasible option for the Applicant to stop the aggression.
3. Thus, the Applicant has no obligation to grant any of the requested The Applicant has tried to stop the aggression by conditioning its
reparation. cooperation subsequent to the attack on Nant Gateway. Yet, the Respondent
[OPPOSING COUNSEL ARGUMENTS] still launched an attack on Compound Ardan. And as such, the Applicant
The opposing counsel on their written submission submitted that your imposed sanctions as the last feasible option.
sanctions violated the right to health under Article 12 ICESCR!
= Y.E., the opposing counsel in addressing how the sanctions violated the Agent, are all unilateral sanctions lawful? Can they be unlawful?
right to health referred to Article 12 ICESCR. However, pursuant to = Y.E., unilateral sanctions, and sanctions in general, are lawful when they
paragraph 41 of General comment No. 14. for Article 12 ICESCR, it was are in compliance with the existing or applicable international law.
elaborated that only measures that are directly restricting medical supplies Sanctions are unlawful when it contradicts said existing law/applicable law.
are prohibited. In the present case, the Applicant’s sanctions are not directly For instance, a sanction is unlawful when it violates the non-intervention
targeting the hospitals in the Respondent state, rendering that the sanctions principle, where such discussion can be found in our written submission.
did not directly restrict their medical supplies. The shortage of medicinal
equipment is collateral, and the ILC1 recognizes that collateral damages are Examples of unilateral sanction!
sometimes naturally unavoidable. Further, the burden of proof on this matter = The United States’ trade embargo against Cuba, which has been in place
relies upon the Respondent, for the Respondent is the one who alleges such since 1960 and prohibits most trade between the two countries; the
claim (para. 162 of the 2010 Pulp Mills case). European Union’s embargo on arms sales to China, imposed in response to

1
Commentary 5 Art. 49 ARSIWA.
Why don’t you address the violation of non-intervention principle? the Chinese government's crackdown on pro-democracy activists in
= Article 2(1) of the Peace Treaty recognized the application of the UN Tiananmen Square in 1989; the United States’ trade embargo against Iran,
Charter provisions as well as customary law governing friendly relations. In which has been in place since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and aims to
this respect the Applicant has submitted in its written submission (p.25-26) pressure the Iranian government to change its policies on a variety of issues;
that its sanctions did not violate the principle of non-intervention. For the the United States’ trade embargo against Venezuela, which has been
following reasons: imposed since 2019, in response to the country's political crisis and human
a. First, that this Court in its 1986 Military and Paramilitary rights abuses.
judgment [para. 245] clearly rejected the notion that
economic pressure would amount to a violation of the What is aggression?
customary principle of non-intervention. = Aggression under Art. 3 of the UNGA Resolution 3314 (XX), which was
b. Second, that while this Court’s rejection in the past does not recognized in para. 194 of the 1986 Military and Paramilitary as custom,
foreclose a finding of a breach in the future, there exists the use of armed forces in the territory of another state (Art. 3e), amongst
extensive state practice which equally rejects such a notion. others, constituted aggression.
For instance, the UN also allows the imposition of = Aggression under the UN Charter refers to the use of armed force by one
economic sanctions under Article 41 of its charter. state against another state, in a manner that is not in self-defense or
Furthermore, participants of the UNGA have shown an otherwise authorized by the UN Security Council. Article 2(4) of the UN
inconsistent perception regarding the legality of economic Charter specifically prohibits the use of force by one state against another,
sanctions. [i.e from 2017 to early 2021, Saudi Arabia, the stating that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt have all the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
maintained sanctions against Qatar, while simultaneously independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
supporting the Assembly’s resolutions condemning Purposes of the United Nations."
unilateral coercive measures].
And as such Y.E., the more immediate relevance is the violation of free The opposing counsel submitted that your sanctions violated the GATT!
trade enshrined under Article 2(3) of the Peace Treaty. = Y.E., this agent would like to respectfully request the Court to reject such
claim made by the Respondent, for this Court has clearly recognized in para.
[Has the ICJ ever interpreted GATT? Yes, but it does not equate that the ICJ 245 of the 1986 Military and Paramilitary case that matters resulted from
has the jurisdiction to adjudicate claims that arose from GATT, for it was the breaches of international economic instruments, specifically the GATT,
more appropriate under the jurisdiction of WTO: falls outside of this Court’s jurisdiction. In this vein, this agent shall not
The ICJ Advisory Opinion that interpreted the General Agreement on argue further on this matter.
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is the "Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of
the GATT 1994 in the Light of Article XXI" also known as the "DSU
Article 21 Opinion". The Opinion was issued by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) on December 20, 1996; United States - Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (1998) - In this case, the ICJ was
asked to determine the compatibility of a US law that prohibited the import
of shrimp caught using methods that could harm sea turtles with the
provisions of the GATT]

ARGUMENT-1 The sanctions were in accordance with Art. 2(3) of the Peace Treaty

Proceeding to address the first argument, Y.E.
Recalling page 16 of the Respondent’s written submission, they submitted
that the sanctions violated Article 2(3) of the Peace Treaty, which obliges
the promotion of, amongst others, free trade within the Gais Peninsula.
This argument should not be sustained, for Article 2(3) of the Peace Treaty
1. Isn’t Art. 2(3) of the Peace Treaty specifically states that the parties
shall work to promote free trade? Does the term “shall” not give any
specific legal obligation?
= (Article 1 of Treaty of Amity: “There shall be firm and enduring
peace and sincere friendship between the United States of America
and Iran.”)
does not entail any specific legal obligation that could be breached, and the
Respondent has failed to prove otherwise.
Priorly, however, this agent would like to refer to para. 49 of the Preliminary
Objection of the Oil Platforms case, where freedom of trade can be defined
as the freedom to engage in trading activities in general (and not merely
just the immediate act of purchase and sale, but also ancillary activities
integrally related to trading).
[The term “trade” and “commerce” can be used interchangeably, as
recognized by this Court in paragraph 48 of the Preliminary Objection of the
Oil Platforms, in which the Court in that paragraph referred to the concept
of freedom of trade defined in the Oscar Chinn case in defining freedom of
commerce in the subsequent paragraph 49. Further, throughout the
document, the Court repeatedly referred to trade when addressing
commerce, such as in paras. 41, 46 and 51]
Such freedom of trade however, must duly respect a state’s right to
terminate trade relations where it sees fit as recognized by this Court in
paragraph 276 of the 1986 Military and Paramilitary judgement. In light of
this premise, Y.E., the Applicant should not be faulted for exercising its
liberty in selecting its business partners.
= The term “shall” does not in itself automatically entail a specific
legal obligation. Rather, as recognized in para. 52 of Oil Platforms
(preliminary objection), such broadly worded clauses merely
provide context by which other provisions of the treaty should be
interpreted.
2. What is the position of freedom of trade?
= Freedom of trade is a legal concept established by convention/by
a treaty. (What is the difference between convention/treaty/charter?
They’re the same and can be used interchangeably).
3. Has “freedom of trade” ever been interpreted in other case laws?
= Yes, Y.E., “freedom of trade” was interpreted and mentioned in
the Oil Platforms case, although worded as “freedom of
commerce,” pursuant to the Treaty of Amity, the treaty relevant in
that case.
4. Is this Court bound by precedents?
= Respectfully, no, Y.E. However, the Court may use past
jurisprudence to interpret present cases or present disputes.
5. Oscar Chinn is a businessman. So, how is it comparable to our case,
in which it is a State?
= It is comparable because the case is actually between Belgium and
the UK. Oscar Chinn is on behalf of his state. Hence, it is
comparable.
[Just like the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, which is between Republic of
We are aware, however, that such liberty is not limitless and can only be
limited by the existence of a specific legal obligation to this effect.
Nevertheless, not all provisions of a Treaty create a specific legal obligation.
This Court in para. 52 of its Preliminary Objection in the Oil Platforms
case affirmed that some clauses are constructed in a manner that is so broad
that it does not create a specific legal obligation of its own, and instead
merely provides guidance in the interpretation of other provisions within
the treaty. Y.E., referring to the discussion of the assessment of the
broadness in that same case, where the Court deemed that Article 1 of the
1955 Treaty of Amity was too broad, or too general, [Art. 1: “There shall
be firm and enduring peace and sincere friendship between the United States
of America and Iran”], where in para. 27, the Court explained that such a
broad formulation renders the Article cannot be interpreted in isolation from
the object and purpose of the 1955 Treaty in which it was inserted. In para.
31, the Court then deemed that due to its broadness, the Article has no
specific legal obligation of its own, and merely exists to guide the
interpretation of other provisions in said Treaty.
Thus, presently, Article 2(3) of the Peace treaty reflects such broadness for
two reasons.
(1) It refers to, and I quote, ‘all applicable rules of international law’
which significantly broadens the scope of relevant norms for
Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo]
6. What is your threshold on saying that Art. 2(3) has no specific legal
obligation?
= The threshold is that such broadly-worded clauses serve the
purpose of interpreting other provisions of the treaty, for such
clauses are the underlying values of the treaty in question.
7. Doesn’t Article 2(3) fall under the object and purpose of the treaty?
= Y.E., Art. 2(3) and the purpose and object of the treaty are related,
but the Article does not specify a specific manifestation of the
object and purpose of the treaty. Every decision made by the drafter
has a deliberate and effective meaning. In the context of Art. 2(3),
the drafters deliberately decided to put no specific clause on it,
unlike paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 2. Thus, Article 2(3) is too
broad and merely serves as a contextual guide for other provisions
of the Treaty.
8. Agent, what does it mean when a provision creates a blanket
argument?
= Y.E., a provision may lead to a blanket argument or blanket
protection when it covers or refers to all regimes or all areas of
international law, and hence too broad, leading to a blanket
argument or blanket protection that extends beyond the object and
purpose of the treaty.
 consideration unlike article 2(1) and (2)2 which made reference to
specific legal instruments and regimes that are immediately tied
to the object and purpose of the Peace Treaty.
(2) It was drafted under Part I of the peace treaty titled, ‘Basic
Principles’. The mere term ‘principle’ is defined as a rule of law
which guides an action (the WTO in its China IPR panel report
(WT DS362, applicable treaty = TRIPS). This must be seen as a
deliberate decision by the drafters to indicate that Article 2(3)
merely serves to contextually guide the interpretation of other
provisions within the Peace treaty.
As such Y.E, where article 2(3) does not entail any specific legal obligation
but merely guides the interpretation of the Peace Treaty, the Article cannot
be breached. Hence, the sanctions were in accordance with the Peace Treaty.
[LAST RESORT ARGUMENT]
Para. 56 of SAF: President Vortigern was adamant that the economy and
way of life of the Respondent state will survive. Further, he reassured that
the Respondent's foreign partners and business allies are still trading with
them. Hence, in any event, the sanctions imposed by the Applicant have not
discouraged the Respondent’s right to freedom of trade.
2
Para. 273 of the 1986 of Military and Paramilitary.
9. Why do you use WTO not ICJ?
= Because this Court has never specifically interpreted the mere
term “principle”.
10. Doesn’t the Military and Paramilitary case concern different
circumstances, such as that related to aid and not economic trade?
= In the 1986 Military and Paramilitary, there are 2 activities. First,
the cutting of sugar aid. The Court determines this doesn’t violate
the FCN Treaty. Second, there is a general trade embargo. This is
the one that the Court regards as a violation of the FCN Treaty. In
the present case, we are referring to the latter, and we are arguing
the case is incomparable to our case at hand.
11. Applicant urged several of its allies to take similar measures =
impeding freedom of trade?
= In paras. 121 through 123 of the Oil Platforms judgement, it was
explained that the Treaty of Amity established freedom of
commerce only between the high contracting parties, which were
Iran and USA, and any other activities between parties that are not
the high contracting parties do not violate the Treaty of Amity. In
the present case, Art. 2(3) of the Peace Treaty specifically limited
the legal obligation therein in the context of economic relations
between the STATE PARTIES. As such, economic activities outside

[IN THE EVENT THE ASSESSMENT OF BROADNESS IN THE 1986
MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY WAS CHALLENGED]
Y.E., in that case, the Court discusses the assessment of broadness in the
context of a claim in connection with the object and purpose of the FCN
Treaty. The same assessment was referred to in the Oil Platforms case (para.
28), to interpret Article 1 of the Treaty of Amity, where in the judgment it
was deemed that Article 1 of Treaty of Amity did not create a specific legal
obligation.
The existence of the political background of Article 1 of Treaty of Amity (it
is a newly added article) was relevant in the case of the Oil Platforms, but it
does not have any bearing on the assessment of broadness in our case. In our
present case, the fact that we don’t have such political background does not
preclude Art.2(3) peace treaty from being too broad.
the STATE PARTIES CANNOT constitute a violation of the Peace
Treaty.
12. Did the ICJ ever cite WTO Case Law?
= The ICJ has cited WTO case law in some of its decisions,
recognizing the relevance of the jurisprudence developed by the
WTO in certain areas of international law. For example, in the case
of Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia) the ICJ
drew on the jurisprudence of the WTO dispute settlement system to
support its findings on the interpretation of the concept of “like
products” under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). The ICJ and the WTO have different legal regimes and the
ICJ is not bound by the decisions of the WTO but can use them as
guidance.
13. Why should this Court consider dissenting opinions/separate
opinions?
= Y.E., dissenting opinions/separate opinions provide extensions of
insights on matters that weren't caught upon in the main judgement,
or in interpreting a legal term. The part we are citing is not the part
that goes against the main judgement of this Court.
14. If your argument was justified by this Court, would the Court open
a bad precedent to which all States will easily sanction another?
= Respectfully no, Y.E. Article 59 of the ICJ Statute clearly stated
that the decision of this Court is only binding upon the disputing
 Parties of the case, because the facts and circumstances are
different. Even if it does, it falls under the right of a state to
conduct a lawful unilateral sanction. The imposition of a sanction is
only lawful when it complies with all the relevant rules of
international law.
15. Why use Preliminary Objection? Why not use Merits?
= Even the preliminary objection of this Court is recognized as a
subsidiary source under Art. 38 ICJ of the Statute.
16. Parameter/threshold of broadness?
= Extending beyond the object and purpose of a treaty.
17. Isn’t a treaty commitment enough to establish a breach of free trade
promotion?
= Y.E., while we do understand such concern–however, the prayer
before the Court in paragraph 65 requires a violation of a treaty
obligation–not commitment.
Adds:
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 2 referred to specific regimes of
international law, and hence do not create a blanket argument.

ARGUMENT-2 Alternatively, the sanctions are a form of legitimate countermeasure

Proceeding to submit the second argument. We submit that alternatively, the 1. Define countermeasures!
unilateral sanctions were imposed by the Applicant as a legitimate = Pursuant to Article 22 ARSIWA, Y.E., in the event of an
 countermeasure.
As recognized by this Court in paragraphs 83-87 of the 1997
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, in imposing countermeasure, a state shall fulfill:
3
1. First, the procedural prerequisite.
4
2. And second, the substantive prerequisite.
Under international law, the leading authorities on countermeasure are the
1997 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros and the ARSIWA (Arts. 49-53).
internationally wrongful act, an injured state may impose
countermeasure as an inducement to cease the wrongfulness of the
responsible state. Countermeasure is the right of an injured State to
respond to the wrongful act of a responsible State as a means to
induce compliance.
2. What is the position of countermeasure?
= The Court in para. 83 of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros recognizes
countermeasures as custom. This is also parallel to the ILC’s
commentary of the ARSIWA that recognizes countermeasure as a
custom.
3. Why impose these sanctions without the authorization of the
UNSC?
= Respectfully, Y.E., under international law, there are 2 types of
sanctions: there are sanctions proposed by the UNSC, and there are
also unilateral sanctions. In the case at hand, our sanctions are
unilateral sanctions. Just because the sanctions do not come from
the UNSC, and are unilateral, it does not mean that the sanctions are
prima facie unlawful.

PREREQUISITE-1 Procedural prerequisite

Turning to address the procedural prerequisite which consists of 2 1. Why are the countermeasures urgent? = All of the sanctions are

3
Para. 84 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros.
4
Para. 83-87 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros.
 requirements: calling upon the responsible state and a prior notification of
the measures to be taken. The Applicant fulfilled the former requirement, as
mentioned in paragraph 32 of the SAF, where Queen Clarine implored
President Vortigern one year prior to the imposition of the countermeasure.
For the latter requirement of notification, Y.E., it is subject to exemption if
the countermeasure is classified as urgent. Y.E., urgent countermeasure is
described when its notification might frustrate its own purpose by
opening an opportunity for immunization. The ILC has recognized in its
commentary to the ARSIWA that freezing assets, temporary stay orders, and
other similar measures5 are direct forms of an urgent countermeasure, in
which the Applicant's countermeasure consists of these forms. The
Applicant is thus exempted from conducting the latter requirement of
notification.
[URGENT COUNTERMEASURES UNDER 53(D) OF SAF]
= Y.E., the determination of whether a countermeasure is immunizable or
not depends on the expected time to adapt.
= Immunizable countermeasures constitute urgency, hence creating
exemption of the duty of notification. As evident in paragraph 32, the
Applicant has called upon the Respondent 1 year prior to the imposition of
5
Commentary 6 of Article 52 ARSIWA.
immunizable.
2. How are they immunizable?
= ILC in commentary (6) of Article 52 of ARSIWA clearly stated
temporary freezing of assets, temporary travel bans, and similar
measures as such, are urgent countermeasure, meaning that they are
immunizable <3
3. How about paragraph 52 SAF?
= Even if the Applicant notifies in such a short time, which is
during their second calling upon as evident in paragraph 52 of the
SAF, the Respondent would still be able to immunize themselves
from the three sanctions, established in 53 (a)-(c). Yet, all of the
sanctions, including that in 53(d) of the SAF are imposed
cumulatively, so the notification would still frustrate the imposition
of the sanctions immunizable during a short period of time.
4. Why not separate notice?
= Y.E., this would create a phenomenon where the Respondent
anticipates the other upcoming sanctions, including those that are
immunizable. Therefore, conclusively, in all events, the Applicant
should be exempted from the duty of notification.
5. Isn’t countermeasure supposed to not involve third parties? Why did
Applicant urge its allies?
the countermeasure. For sanction 53(d), in the expanse of 1 year, the
Respondent for sure will be able to immunize themselves from
consequences of the Applicant prohibiting its citizens and companies from
creating new contracts with the Respondent. Hence, all of the
countermeasures are immunizable, and Applicant shall be exempted from
the duty of notification in the present case.
PREREQUISITE-2
Turning to address on how the Applicant fulfilled the substantive Potential questions:
prerequisite of a lawful countermeasure, which consists of 4 requirements:
(i) firstly, it must be the response to a previous international wrongful act;
(ii) secondly, the effects of must be proportionate , (iii) thirdly, it must be
reversible, and ultimately (iv) it shall not affect the protection of the
fundamental human rights.
Y.E., the attacks on Nant Gateway and Compound Ardan were illegitimate,
as previously elaborated by my co-counsel, rendering Respondent has
= Y.E., even if Applicant urges its allies, it does not automatically
mean that they comply with it, and does not mean those allies take
the same measures. Hence, this is not something to be concerned
about.
[Sanctions, unlike countermeasures, can be imposed collectively.
For example: sanctions against Russia imposed by the European
Union countries].
Remember!
The procedural obligations have no specific timespan, but what ILC focuses
on is that the obligation should be conducted prior to the countermeasure.
Substantive prerequisite
1. Why are the attacks = wrongful act? The 2 cumulative elements of
internationally wrongful acts?
= Y.E., based on Art. 2 ARSIWA, the 2 cumulative elements to
establish that a State has conducted an internationally wrongful act
are attributability & the existence of the breach.
2. Are the acts of Vortigern (launch of OSS) attributable to the
Respondent state?
constituted an internationally wrongful act, and the countermeasure is a
response to this wrongful act.
In the vein of the proportionality of a countermeasure, the ILC in its
commentary of the ARSIWA (commentary 6 Article 51) takes into account
the assessment of qualitative and quantitative factors. [However, it was
never mentioned that these two factors are cumulative, and hence the
failure to address one of them does not entail the failure of the other, and
does not change the outcome of the assessment of proportionality]. The
ILC mentioned that all relevant factors should be addressed. In the
present case, the qualitative factor bears more relevance than the other. We
recall paragraph 158 of the 1978 Air Services, where the Arbitration
mentioned that proportionality is more likely to be met when the initial and
the counter measure are being “necessarily and reasonably connected,”
in which the Applicant’s countermeasure fulfills this standard, for the
countermeasure, and the initial measure (of the Respondent), were under
the same concern, which was the aggression in the Belt that resulted in the
destruction of Nant Gateway, the mouth of Eamont Thruway. Due to the
time-sensitive nature and the impossibility to obtain a precise number, the
quantitative aspect can at best be achieved through approximation
(recognized in para. 83 of the Arbitration), where we recall paragraphs 4,
5, and 41 of the SAF and Article 15 of the Peace Treaty, where it was stated
that the Respondent and Applicant’s bilateral commerce represented 32%
= Yes, Y.E. The acts of President Vortigern are attributable to the
Respondent state. Pursuant to Article 4 of the ARSIWA, the conduct
of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law, and that an organ includes any person or entity
which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the
State. In the case at hand, Vortigern is the President of the
Respondent state, and therefore he is a person which has a status in
accordance with the internal law of the Respondent state, rendering
his acts attributable to the Respondent state.
3. Who has the discretion to determine whether one conduct is
wrongful?
= It is the Court, Y.E. (Then why are you the one making the
assessment? The agent of the Applicant has the right to alleged
wrongful conducts that have direct injuries or damages to the
Applicant state. Hence, we submit that the Respondent has
conducted an internationally wrongful act, and the first requirement
of the substantive prerequisite of a countermeasure).
4. What if we deem the attacks as lawful?
= Y.E., then in such unfortunate circumstances, our countermeasure
argument shall fall. However, our main argument on the lawfulness
of the sanction still stands.
5. Then, in the event the attacks were deemed lawful, should your state
be held liable?
 and 24% of their respective economies, and that the Eamont Thruway is
vital to the economy of the Applicant. Thus, the economic-based
countermeasure was proportionate.
The countermeasure was further reversible. The Court in paragraph 83 of
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros mentioned that countermeasures seek to induce
compliance and thus must be reversible. Applicant's countermeasure fits
this description. The countermeasure imposed was to induce the compliance
of the Respondent to cease the aggression (SAF para. 52). [The Applicant
further periodically reviewed the measure to ensure adjustments were
made when necessary (paragraph 9 of the clarifications)]. Furthermore, the
measures imposed, such as travel bans, freezing banks and assets, as well as
prohibition of contracts are all reversible in nature (as the assets frozen can
be unfrozen and prohibition or bans can be revoked once the Respondent
has complied with their obligations).
Ultimately, the countermeasure did not violate fundamental human rights,
which was elaborated by the ILC to be those human rights that are
non-derogable even in times of war, such as those enumerated under
Articles 4 ICCPR, 15 ECHR and 27 ACHR.6 [Limited to only those 3
articles? It is not definitively limited to these 3 articles, however, the ILC
6
Commentary 6 Article 50 ARSIWA + footnote 761: “See article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights; article 27 of the American
Convention on Human Rights.”
= Y.E., in its commentary to the ARSIWA, the ILC recognizes the
right of a state to conduct countermeasures while running a risk of
false assessment (Doesn’t this mean all states can conduct
countermeasures and justify it under false assessment? Y.E., we
have to understand that this is the nature of countermeasures. In
practice, to prevent the abuse of such measures, states are bound by
good faith, where if a state is found to have conducted bad faith
conduct, they will be deemed to have conducted an internationally
wrongful act. This prevents states from abusing such measures).
6. What are the disastrous outrageous and how are the obligations
reasonably connected?
= The disastrous outrages are the destruction of Nant Gateway and
Compound Ardan. The “reasonably connected” obligations is
implied through how the destruction of Nant Gateway (the mouth of
Eamont Thruway) disregarded the vitality of Eamont Thruway
towards Applicant’s economy (Article 15 Peace Treaty).
7. What are those non-derogable rights?
Under Article 4(2) ICCPR: Rights under Articles 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16
and 18 ICCPR, such as right to life, right to not be tortured or
treated/punished cruelly and inhumanely, right to not be enslaved,
right to not be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to
 did only identify these 3 articles in interpreting the most fundamental human
rights].
[THE EFFECTS OF YOUR MEASURE ARE IRREVERSIBLE! YOU
HOLD THE MONEY OF ORDINARY PEOPLE, AND YOUR
SANCTIONS CAUSED RESPONDENT TO HAVE MEDICAL NEEDS
SHORTAGE]
= Medical needs shortage: Y.E., we understand such concerns. However,
under the circumstance where there is no other option to induce compliance,
the ILC in its commentary to the ARSIWA recognizes that there will be
inevitable and unavoidable collateral or peripheral damages.7 The
Applicant’s intention was not to deprive the Respondent from having
medical equipment, but to induce their compliance, and hence these
circumstances are justifiable for they are collateral or peripheral in nature.
= Holding the money or ordinary people: Y.E., we understand such
concerns. However, in the present instance, such circumstances will
constitute an inevitable collateral damage, in which the ILC has recognized
that such collateral damage is simply unavoidable in some circumstances.8
The Applicant has never intended to injure the ordinary people, for the
purpose of our sanctions is to cease the aggression in the Belt. The Proportionality of Countermeasure
Applicant has tried to do many other measures to achieve so, such as
7
Commentary 5 Art. 49 ARSIWA.
8
Ibid.
fulfill a contractual obligation, and right to a fair trial. These are
also the rights that are non-derogable under Arts. 15 ECHR and 27
ACHR. None of these are violated by the countermeasure.
8. Why bring ECHR/ACHR if none of the parties are party to the
ECHR/ACHR?
= It falls as a guidance for the ILC in interpreting protection of
fundamental human rights. Such articles of the conventions
essentially govern the same thing as Article 4 of ICCPR, to which
both Applicant and Respondent are State Parties.
9. How is the “necessarily and reasonably connected” countermeasure
in Air Services?
= (France v. USA. France banned the flight of Pan-American
Airlines for flights from London to Paris. Subsequently, the US
imposed sanctions to flights from Paris).
= Proportionality: alleged breach of France is limitation of flight,
and hence, USA’s countermeasure is also on limitation of flight. The
measure is interrelated and reasonably connected.
= The losses were also approximated.
conditioning its cooperation and repeatedly warning the Respondent. We are a. Are the 2 assessments of the proportionality of countermeasure,
forced to resort to such sanctions to cease the aggression, and these which are quantitative and qualitative factors, cumulative?
sanctions inevitably and unavoidably lead to some collateral or peripheral = Y.E., the ILC did not specify the nature of such assessment (the nature of
damages. cumulative or not). However, in determining the proportionality of a
countermeasure, the ILC elaborated that all relevant elements should be
[IN THE QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PROPORTIONALITY, addressed. And as such, both factors should actually be addressed.
SHOULDN’T THERE BE A NUMBER?] b. If one of the factors is not assessed, is it okay? Will it automatically
= The ILC did not establish that both factors, the qualitative and fail the assessment of the other factor?
quantitative, are cumulative. However, the ILC did explain that all relevant = As this agent has mentioned, the ILC did not clarify the nature of such
factors should be addressed. In the case at hand, we’ve addressed both the assessment. Thus, the failure to assess one of these factors cannot
qualitative and quantitative aspects. However, even if the Court is not fully automatically entail the failure of the other.
convinced that the quantitative aspect has been fulfilled, the qualitative 10. Does this Court ever cite Arbitration?
assessment is more relevant than the quantitative one. Even if we do not = Yes, Y.E. It is precisely the case of the 1978 Air Services, where
ascribe a significant weight on the quantitative assessment, for it is almost the Court in paragraph 83 of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros cited it in
impossible to establish it in an issue of time sensitive nature, and impossible interpreting the lawfulness of countermeasure.
to obtain a precise number, it does not automatically entail that the 11. Why are the fundamental human rights meant = those
qualitative assessment is not relevant and should be disregarded. Further, it non-derogable in times of war?
does not change the outcome of the assessment of proportionality. The = It is as explained by the ILC in its commentary to the ARSIWA,
Respondent has been misled twice in both attacks on Nant Gateway and Y.E. [Commentary 6 of Article 50]
Compound Ardan, and hence the Applicant had to impose the sanctions as 12. Agent, I find that some of the effects of your measures are
countermeasure. irreversible, such as the inability of the Respondent hospitals to
obtain some medical necessities. How do you respond to this?
= Even in the event that these measures were found to be
 irreversible, such obligations were not absolute in the first place, as
the ILC recognized “it may not be possible in all cases to reverse all
of the effects of countermeasures after the occasion for taking them
has ceased”.9
13. How about rights to the highest attainable standards of health? Isn’t
that correlated to the right life?
= Yes, it is related. However, even if the right to health is a
component of the right to life, yet, a breach of right to health is not
enough to sustain a breach of right to life. This is because Article 14
ICCPR, Article 15 ECHR and Article 27 ACHR only mention the
inherent right to life as non-derogable. This means that the drafters,
and the ILC that cites these articles, are in the view that only their
right to health does not equate to the right to life. Further, in the
present case, no losses of life were mentioned due to the cut access
to insulin and other medical things. Thus, this agent shall no longer
continue to argue on this.
(Extra info: right to health is not the right to be healthy. Right to
health concerns the right to access health. Everyone can access
health facilities).
14. Policy rationale on the reversibility of your countermeasure?
= Policy rationale of irreversible effects of the economic-based

9
ARSIWA Commentary, Art. 49, ¶9.
 countermeasure (Commentary 9 of Art. 49 ARSIWA):
= Threshold: no other option to induce compliance.
= We are in part imposing the countermeasure of an economic
breach, and hence, we have no other option other than to impose
economic-based sanctions in order to impose proportional sanctions
that are commensurate.
= Y.E., The countermeasure, imposed as economic-based sanctions,
was originally designed in a way to commensurate and reflect the
injury we suffered through the attacks of Nant Gateway. Even if the
consequences of such sanctions may be irreversible we submit such
losses were only collateral which was affirmed by the ILC to be
unavoidable in some circumstances. [Art. 49 ARSIWA Commentary
(5)].
15. Agent, under its commentary to ARSIWA (commentary 7 Article 50
ARSIWA), the ILC explained that it is essential to distinguish
between the basic objective of applying political and economic
pressure upon the governing elite of a country to persuade them to
conform to international law, and the collateral infliction of
suffering upon the most vulnerable groups within the targeted
country. In the present case, didn’t your countermeasure affect the
citizens of the Respondent state, which are considered as the
vulnerable group?
 = Y.E., this agent is aware of such a statement by the ILC. In that
instance, the ILC does not refer to all vulnerable groups, but only to
the MOST vulnerable groups, such as those who are
poverty-stricken or sick. In the present case, the countermeasure
specifically targeted the governing elite, such as Vortigern and his
cabinets. The only citizen that is affected is Kay Ector, who is a
major donor to the RPP, and further has many connections abroad,
which makes him one of the elites in the Respondent state, and
hence not vulnerable.

ARGUMENT-3 Applicant has no obligation to grant any of the requested reparation.

Proceeding to submit our last argument on the first submission, Y.E. Compensation = monetary remedy covering any financial assessable
damage including losses of profits insofar as it is established.
Y. E., we submit that the Applicant has no obligation to grant any of the
requested reparation. To this end, we submit that due to the lawfulness of Restitution = the re-establishment of the situation which existed before the
the sanctions enacted, the Applicant has not conducted any wrongful act, breach.
and thus the Applicant is not under an obligation to conduct reparation. Satisfaction = in the event that both restitution and compensation are
impossible to be carried out, satisfaction takes place. Satisfaction may
[WHAT ABOUT WITHDRAWING?] consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a
= Y.E., countermeasures shall be terminated as soon as the wrongful act of formal apology or another appropriate modality.
the responsible State has ceased.10 However, Y.E., as evident in paragraph

10
Article 53 ARSIWA.
60 of SAF, the wrongful act, which is the aggression, still has not ceased,
and therefore, Applicant has no obligation to withdraw the sanctions.
SUBMISSION-2
Proceeding to submit the second submission, Y.E. Recalling pages 27-29 of
the Respondent’s written submission, they submitted that their transport of
waste to Etna was in compliance with Article 28 of the Peace Treaty.
However, this argument should not be sustained, for the Respondent has
failed in addressing how such action is the best practicable means, and does
not provide any legal basis subsequent to that certain submission. Thus, in
this vein, this agent submits 2 arguments:
- First, that Respondent has violated its customary obligation to
Agent, what are the elements of reparation?
= Y.E., in order to establish obligation of reparation, Art. 31 ARSIWA
obliges the existence of an internationally wrongful act, attribution and
direct link between the wrongful act and the injury suffered. The Applicant
submits that the Applicant has not conducted any internationally wrongful
act and thus the Applicant has no obligation to conduct reparation.
The 3 forms of reparation!
= Based on Art. 34 ARSIWA, reparation may take form in restitution,
compensation and satisfaction.
Respondent violated its Treaty obligations in transporting hazardous plastic
waste to Etna
1. Should this Court question the credibility of the ILSA Report?
= Respectfully, no, Y.E. Despite being the single source of
information therein, neither the Respondent or Etna has proven that
such report is false.
[Etna did reject the report, however, it was merely a political
statement and no scientific evidence was further attached to that
statement. Therefore, the credibility of the ILSA report should be
sustained].
 minimize the risk of significant transboundary harm.11
AND
- Second, that Applicant had complied with the treaty in conditioning
its cooperation.
Turning to the first argument, we recall that the Respondent is under a
customary obligation of due diligence to minimize the risk of significant
transboundary harm, as recognized by this Court in para. 101 of the 2010
12
Pulp Mills case. This obligation obliges states, to the best extent of their
capacity, to pursue the mitigation of such harm or the risks associated with
it.
The term ‘minimize’ requires states to reduce the risk of such harm to the
lowest possible degree.13 We do understand that such an obligation is not
one of results where all the harm must be completely avoided, however, we
submit that the Respondent’s measure had not achieved the ‘lowest
possible degree of risk’ in light of the present circumstances.
To this end, this agent respectfully directs the Court’s attention to paragraph
11
Pulp Mills (2010) para. 101.
12
Also stated in ILC, ‘Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities’, Art. 2(1).
13
Commentary para. (3) of Article (3) of the ILC, ‘Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities.’
14
Pulp Mills (2010) para. 205.
2. In the span of 2 days (22 Feb-24 Feb), what can the Respondent do?
= Y.E., under the understanding that the obligation of due diligence
continues throughout the lifespan of the project.14 In the existence of
new evidence, which in this case is the ILSA report, the Respondent
should have taken the time to consider and take into account the
new evidence, and further assess the risk. In the present case, the
Respondent did not take into account the new evidence by ILSA
and did not accommodate the risk. The Respondent thus did not try
to minimize the harm to the lowest possible degree.
3. How about paragraph 46 of SAF where Respondent’s
Environmental Minister stated keeping the waste is more dangerous
than transporting it to Etna?
= Y.E., we are aware of such a statement. However, sending it to
Etna will result in a future environmental catastrophe, because it has
already posed a risk of STBH and Etna will inevitably engage in
harmful practices. Therefore, the Respondent is supposed to assess
the current risk further and find the best alternative to minimize the
risk to the lowest possible degree instead of continuing the waste
transportation without further assessment and justifying it through
45 of the SAF where the report produced by ILSA clearly indicated Etna’s
inability to properly manage the hazardous wastes, which would lead Etna
to inevitably engage in environmentally-harmful practices. This report was
made on 22 February 2022 whereas the Respondent’s transfer of the
hazardous wastes ended on 24 February 2022 [SAF p. 44, 46]. (The
Respondent could have halted the final stages of its waste transportation to
assess the existence of other alternatives to the risks associated with its
continued transfer). To this end, this agent would like to highlight para. 205
of the 2010 Pulp Mills case where, it was clearly ruled the obligation of due
diligence extends throughout the lifespan of the measure. As such, where
the Respondent failed to consider information obtained regarding a risk of
inevitable transboundary harm, the Respondent had not fulfilled its
obligation of due diligence.
ARGUMENT-2
such a statement.
4. Are you saying the attack by UAC was lawful? Are you justifying
UAC?
= No, Y.E. This agent is not defending the interests of the UAC, nor
is this agent trying to justify the actions of UAC.
5. What about the procedural prerequisite of environmental impact
assessment? Do you agree the Respondent has conducted the EIA,
or at least they have no obligation to conduct EIA?
= This Court in para. 271 of the 2010 Pulp Mills case recognized
that in the context of environment, the procedural obligation is
independent from the substantive obligation. The fulfillment of
procedural obligation (EIA) does not automatically entail the
fulfillment of the substantive obligation. Even if the Court is
convinced that the Respondent has fulfilled their procedural
obligation, it doesn’t automatically entail that they lawfully fulfilled
the substantive obligation of due diligence. Further, the facts are
particularly silent on this issue, rendering it an absence of fact that
this agent cannot address, and thus this agent focuses on addressing
how the Respondent violated its substantive obligation of due
diligence.
Applicant complied with the Treaty in conditioning cooperation regarding
treatment of the waste on the termination of Respondent’s aggression
Proceeding to address our last argument on the second submission, Y.E.,
where we submit that the Applicant complied with the Treaty in
conditioning cooperation regarding treatment of the waste.
Y.E., Art. 28 of Peace Treaty obliges the Parties to to take whatever steps
are necessary, or are reasonably requested by the other Parties to this Treaty,
to cooperate in good faith in reducing the risk of significant environmental
harm, and the Applicant’s conditional cooperation complies with such
obligation.
Y.E., the Applicant’s request for the termination of aggression under its
conditional cooperation is a necessary step, and is a form of reasonable
request, for it is the last feasible option in Applicant’s attempt to halt the
aggression, and it aims to realize the purpose of the Peace Treaty and Art.
28 of the Treaty. It is crucial to highlight that effects of the aggression
initiated the environmental concerns at hand, in which the war between the
Respondent and UAC caused the main waste treatment plant of The Plastics
Conglomerate to collapse (para. 37 SAF), and if the war continued, it would
pose larger environmental and public health problems (para. 38 SAF). The
indispensable need to terminate the aggression in order to prevent further
environmental catastrophe renders the conditional cooperation a necessary
step. And as the Peace Treaty seeks to maintain peace within The Peninsula,
and as Art. 28 seeks to promote environmental development and protection,
1. How is it the last feasible option? Why did the Applicant not deploy
military troops instead?
= Peacekeeping is limited only to keep the peace within the
Peninsula. Applicant has provided the peacekeeping troops. But, the
war escalated. Many casualties, many destructions. The war became
too much. Applicant retracted their peacekeeping troops. Applicant
did not further deploy military troops because it was limited under
Art. 6 Peace Treaty and evident in para. 28 of SAF. Furthermore,
any support from Applicant may prolong the conflict which is the
primary trigger to the environmental catastrophe threatening the
entirety of the Belt. And ultimately, international law has never
obliged a state to help another state that is in a conflict.
= Further, in the event that the Applicant wanted to deploy any help
or military troops, it was impossible, because the only mouth of
Eamont Thruway, which was the Nant Gateway, was destroyed by
the Respondent.
2. Threshold of “necessary”?
= In the 2010 Pulp Mills case, the Court interpreted the term
“necessary measures” in Article 36 of the 1975 Statute as taking all
positive steps to achieve the object and purpose of the article in the
treaty, which is to avoid changes in the ecological balance.
3. Don’t you think the sanctions are enough? Why do you still
condition your cooperation even after you sanctioned them?
and where the military activities in the Belt was the initial cause of the
environmental concerns, Applicant’s request in its conditional cooperation is
a reasonable request.
[RAGNELL IS ATTACKED BY UAC! THE WASTES ARE
ACCUMULATING IN THE GAIS PENINSULA AND YOU ARE THE
ONLY OTHER STATE THAT IS CAPABLE TO MANAGE THE WASTE!
WHY DO YOU STILL CONDITION YOUR COOPERATION?]
= Y.E., this agent recognizes that the Applicant is the only other State in the
Peninsula with the adequate facility to manage the waste. However, the
Applicant conditioned its cooperation in order to prevent further and future
environmental catastrophe, for as mentioned in para. 38 of the SAF, the
ongoing fight would trigger future environmental calamity.
= Further, Y.E., while we sympathize with the circumstances of the
Respondent, we find it necessary to recall that the dispute between the
Respondent and UAC stemmed from the GREED of the Respondent in
maintaining control over the Belt after the expiration of the agreed upon
65-years term lease. That is our position in this circumstance, Y.E.
[WHAT IS YOUR LOSS IF YOU ACCEPT THE WASTE FROM THE
RESPONDENT WITHOUT CONDITIONING YOUR COOPERATION?]
= By the time we conditioned our cooperation, the sanctions have
not been enacted. Y.E., yet after the conditional cooperation, the
Respondent still attacked Compound Ardan. Subsequently, the
Applicant sanctioned the Respondent.
4. In which paragraph of the SAF did it mention that the Respondent
said that they would not return the territory (the Clarent Belt) to
Balan?
= Y.E., we concede that there is an absence of explicit statements in
the SAF to this regard. However, we can make inferences of facts
from paragraphs 21, 24 and 58 that the Respondent is under the
agenda of circumventing their obligation to return the Belt to Balan.
Such inference of facts has been admitted and practiced by this
Court in page 18 of the 1949 Corfu Channel.
[21: President Vortigern, during his time as a presidential candidate
of the Respondent state, made an ambiguous and controversial
promise regarding the scheduled withdrawal of the Respondent state
from the Belt]
[24: President Vortigern in his presidential campaign questioned the
Peace Treaty for the interests of the Respondent state]
[58: President Vortigern, in the time he has already run as the
President of the Respondent state, did not comply with Article 18(1)
of the Peace Treaty, in which he did not initiate any negotiation to
start the transition of the Belt back to Balani control even after 2
= The Applicant will lose its opportunity to terminate the Respondent’s
aggression which contradicts the Peace Treaty, and which will create further
environmental concerns in the future (para.38 SAF).
months has passed from the required time under the Article]
5. Do you submit that there is a significant transboundary harm in the
present case? There is no harm? Will risk pose a violation?
= Y.E., there is no harm yet at the current moment. The
transportation poses a risk of significant transboundary harm, that in
the future, would inevitably result in a significant transboundary
harm.
= The risk itself does not pose a violation, Y.E.. However, what
constitutes the violation is the Respondent’s failure to prevent or
minimize this risk by not acting diligently. This failure constitutes
the violation of the customary obligation of due diligence to prevent
customary transboundary harm.
6. What is good faith? Where does this Court ever cite good faith?
= This Court in para. 142 of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros has defined the
principle of good faith. The Court determines that the principle of
good faith obliges the Parties to apply that principle in a reasonable
way and in such a manner that the purpose of a Treaty can be
realized.
= This Court has also ever cited the good faith principle in
paragraph 46 of the 1974 Nuclear Tests case (what happens in that
case? Australia and New Zealand each instituted proceedings
against France concerning tests of nuclear weapons which France
 proposed to carry out in the atmosphere in the South Pacific region,
Y.E.)

CONCLUSION

If there are no further inquiries, this concludes the Applicant’s submission,

and we request that this Court will rule in favor of the Applicant. Thank you
and may it please the Court.

To Remember

- Arts. 2, 4, 8, 30, 31, 49 ARSIWA = customs

- The 4 elements of substantive countermeasure Not customary, but important to deliver. The Court never
- The works of the ILC such as the ARSIWA, the draft articles of prevention of transboundary harm, the commentaries, and other works, are
recognized as subsidiary sources of IL in assisting the Court in interpreting the primary sources. The primary source in the present is the customary
obligation of prevention of transboundary harm/customary obligation of due diligence. Such articles are thus persuasive. [All of the works of ILC =
subsidiary sources, unless made into custom]
- Primary sources of international law: treaties, customary rules, unilateral acts, general principles
- Secondary sources of international law: binding decisions of international organizations, judicial decisions based on principle of equity
- Subsidiary sources: other judicial decisions, doctrine.
- Remember! There is no formal hierarchy within international law as a whole, there are some hierarchical elements.
- Remember! Treaties and custom are equal, subsequent treaty can displace previous custom; subsequent custom can change treaty. Exceptions: jus
cogens (non-derogable).
 - Jus cogens (from Latin: compelling law; from English: peremptory norm) refers to certain fundamental, overriding principles of international law.
Examples: Prohibition of aggression, slavery, genocide, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity, torture, the right to self-determination, basic
rules of international humanitarian law, prohibition of piracy.

Additional questions
Agent, please explain your submissions briefly!
= Succinctly, we argue that the sanctions imposed by the Applicant were in accordance with the Peace Treaty, and alternatively, constituted lawful
countermeasure, and thus Applicant has no obligation to conduct reparation. Further, the Respondent’s waste transportation violated the Treaty, whereas the
Applicant’s conditional cooperation complied with the Treaty.

What are the internal affairs of a State?

= Y.E., pursuant to para. 205 of the 1986 Military and Paramilitary, the internal affairs of a State cover amongst others, but not limited to, its economic,
politics, and foreign-policy making (Military strategy wasn’t mentioned but it’s also included as a State’s internal affairs)

How is counterclaim procedure/requirements in this Court?

= Y.E., counterclaim is regulated under Article 80 of the Rules of the Court, where paragraph 1 of said Article stated that “the Court may entertain a
counter-claim only if it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court and is directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the other party.” In the
present instance, all of the elements are fulfilled pursuant to the Article, where both parties agreed on the existence of such counterclaim (refer to Order of the
SAF).

Why don’t you just forgive the Respondent?

= Y.E., we forgive the Respondent. However, it does not dismiss our obligation to maintain peace within the Gais Peninsula. Hence, we enact the sanctions/we
condition our cooperation to induce the Respondent’s compliance to stop the aggression.
The strongest argument that the Respondent has brought/could have brought was on how…:

1. Their transport of the waste to Etna was made under the Basel Convention, in which Etna was a state party to the Convention, but not the Respondent.
And yet, Article 11 of the Basel Convention permits the transport of waste between a party and a non-party. However, this argument could not be
sustained, because Article 11 further stipulated that such transport shall not be conducted in a less environmentally-sound manner in comparison to
the Convention’s standards. In Article 4(2)(d) of the Convention, it requires a duty of safe disposal, which means the state of import shall be capable
of managing such wastes. In the present case, Respondent transferred the waste to Etna, who is incapable of ensuring the duty of ensuring safe
disposal, and as such, the transport of hazardous waste falls short within the Convention’s standard and violated Article 11 Basel Convention.
2. The sanctions enacted by the Applicant violated Art. 2(3) through the discouragement of the Respondent’s freedom of trade. However, this argument
should not be sustained, for Art. 2(3) does not create a specific legal obligation of its own, for it is too broad and may lead to a blanket
claim/protection. Further, in para. 56 of the SAF, President Vortigern was adamant that the economy and way of life of the Respondent state will
survive. Further, he reassured that the Respondent's foreign partners and business allies are still trading with them. Hence, in any event, the sanctions
imposed by the Applicant have not discouraged the Respondent’s right to freedom of trade.

Timeline

OSS
Perang
Waste treatment hancur
Minta tolong
Negotiate gagal
Attack on Nant Gateway
Conditional cooperation
Transferring waste to Etna
Attack on Compound Ardan
Sanctions

Additional stuffs
- It’s not only the ICJ that cites WTO case law in its decisions, other international tribunals also do the same, such as the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) among others.
- The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are two separate international organizations with distinct mandates
and procedures. While the ICJ is the principal judicial body of the United Nations, with jurisdiction over disputes between states, the WTO is an
organization that oversees the rules of international trade and provides a forum for resolving disputes between its member states.
- Para. 162 of the 2010 Pulp Mills case = the state who alleges should bear the burden of proof.
- ICESCR is territorial in character (does not apply extraterritorially).15 The Respondent has not explained how the ICESCR can be applied
extraterritorially.
- ILC = highly qualified publicists. Their works are thus included as subsidiary sources mentioned in Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute.

Phrases
- Due to the interest of time…
- To satisfy your concern…
- In the vein of your concern…

15
Legal basis: principle of state sovereignty, enshrined in Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter. The principle provides that states have the rights to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over their territory, including the control and
regulation of economic, social and cultural rights within the borders. As such, where the ICESCR governs matters on economic, social and cultural rights, the Convention shall not be applied extraterritorially and is
territorial in nature.