Final Notes - Labor Law 1

THE DEFINITION AND CONCEPT OF ‘INDUSTRY’ UNDER SECTION 2( j) OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES
ACT, 1947
INTRODUCTION
Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, defines “Industry” as “any business, trade, undertaking,
manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial
occupation or avocation of workmen”. The definition of industry has not always been so simple and so clear.
Since its inception in 1947, it has gone over many amendments for inclusion, as well as exclusion, of some
terms. In this paper, we will break down the present definition of industry and see how it evolved over a
period of time, from D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee to Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A.
Rajappa, and the aftermath of Bangalore Water Supply. The time frame that will be covered in this paper is
of 50 years, that is, from 1947 to 1997.
COMPONENTS OF THE INDUSTRY UNDER SECTION 2(j)
The definition of labor is divided into two parts, or perspectives. It is important to call it “perspective”,
because it is actually divided based on the standpoints of the employers, and the employees. The first part is
the employers’ standpoint, that is, “any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers”,
and the second one is that of the employees, that is, “any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or
industrial occupation or avocation of workmen”. The first part can be said to be the one that gives the
definition its statutory meaning, while the second part, which starts with “and includes”, is just inclusive of
all the other things. It is a deliberate action, which refers to several other things that can form part of
“industry” and includes it in the definition.
From the employers’ point of view, the definition comprises of five main components – business, trade,
undertaking, manufacture, and calling. In the Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union v. Gymkhana
Club, ‘business’ was referred to as an enterprise, which is not a trade but an occupation as distinguished
from pleasure, while the definition of ‘trade’ was drawn from the Halsbury’s Law of England and meant “(a)
exchange of goods for goods or goods for money, and (b) any business carried on with a view to profit,
whether manual, or mercantile, as distinguished from the learned arts or learned professions and from
agriculture”. In this sense, the definition of business was given a wider scope than that of trade. However, it
should not be construed that trade has a narrow scope, because it includes all kinds of businesses, ranging
from a small stall-keeper to a big multi-national commercial company, while also including skilled craft.
Therefore, any commercial occupation that involves monetary transaction or transaction of goods can be
called ‘trade’.
‘Undertaking’ is defined, or attempts are made to define it in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee and Ors., as
an entity between a business or a trade, and a manufacture. Therefore, it cannot be called a business or trade,
because if it were the intention of the drafters of the Act, then they would not have written it as a separate
entity. Drawing reference from Webster’s Dictionary, it was held that ‘undertaking’ would mean “‘anything
undertaken’ or ‘any business, work or project which one engages in or attempts, as an enterprise’”.
According to Webster's dictionary, 'undertaking' means 'anything undertaken' or 'any business, work or
project which one engages in or attempts, as an enterprise'. It may be a private individual or individuals’
enterprise as well. It became important to give a clear definition to the word ‘undertaking’ because there was
some ambiguity and there was no well-drawn difference between a business and an undertaking. Hence, the
Madras Gymkhana Club clearly defined it as “any business or any work or project which one engages in or
attempts as an enterprise analogous to business or trade.”
‘Manufacture’ is one of the components of ‘industry’ and “is a kind of productive industry in which the
making of articles or material (often on a large scale) is by physical labor or mechanical power”, while the
last component, ‘calling’, “denotes the following of a profession or trade”, and can also mean one’s usual
occupation, avocation, business or trade, or “the way in which a man passes his life”. Not much has been
discussed about the last two components, but they must not be overlooked or overshadowed by the previous
components.
Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

The definition of ‘industry’ is not limited to only these components. There follows the second perspective,
which is from the point of view of the employees, and comprises of the following components – calling,
service, employment, handicraft and industrial occupation or avocation. The word ‘calling’ has the same
meaning as in the first part of the definition. The only difference between the two is the group of people it
refers to. While in the first part it refers to the employers, in the second part, it refers to the employees’. The
term ‘service’ is a broad term, and can also mean ‘material service’, as indicated in the Madras Gymkhana
case, where it was noted that “before the work engaged it can be described as an industry, it must bear the
definite character of 'trade' or 'business' or 'manufacture' or 'calling' or must be capable of being described
as an undertaking resulting in material goods or material services.” To understand what ‘material services’
are, we need to look at The Management of Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi, where it was
explained as being those services which involve an activity that is “carried on through co-operation between
employers and employees to provide the community with the use of something”. These activities include
water, transportation, electric power, telecommunication, etc., which requires trained and professional men
to be employed. However, what is important here is not just the nature of their work, but the productivity of
a service provided, or “a service organized as an industry and commercially valuable”. In contrast to this,
regular or ordinary services are those, which wholly or largely, depend upon “contribution of professional
knowledge, skill or dexterity for the production of a result”, which are provided by individuals to
individuals. To put it simply, material services are of commercial character, out of which “something”
comes into existence, which is not the same as benefits that the particular individuals might receive, and it is
its production, which is described as “production of material services”.
Material services do not include personal services rendered by domestic help, administrative services
rendered by public officials, service in aid of occupations of professional men, which are exception to the
‘presence of employer-employee relationship’ rule. ‘Employment’ brings in the context of a contractual
agreement, and would not therefore, like material services, include personal services rendered by domestic
help, administrative services rendered by public officials, service in aid of occupations of professional men.
Any manual labor that is “exercised by way of trade or for purposes of gain in or incidental to the making of
an article a part of an article” is termed as ‘handicraft’. The word ‘avocation’ is similar to the definition of
the word ‘calling’ in the first part, in respect that it means the way in which a man passes his life or spends
his time. They are “the things that he devotes his time to, his pursuits or engagements, in general, the affairs
that he has to see.” Lastly, the word ‘occupation’ involves all the activities that do not amount to a vocation.
EVOLUTION AND SCOPE OF INDUSTRY
The history of ‘industry’ in Labor Law in India is divided in to four phases. The first phase was between
1953 and 1962, the second between 1962 and 1978. The third phase is the Bangalore Water Supply Sewage
Board, and the last, fourth phase is the post-Bangalore Water Supply case.
Phase I
The first phase was a period between 1953 and 1962, which included the following landmark cases –
Case: D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee
Banerji v. Mukherjee was the first case that laid down the definition of ‘industry’. It answered the question
whether a municipal corporation’s activities would fall within the ambit of industry with an affirmative. It
noted that capital and profit weren’t an important requirement for an entity to fall within the ambit of
industry, and is completely irrelevant. Also, neither was the fact whether it was a public body or a private
entity. Justice Chandrashekhara Aiyar widened the meaning of ‘industry’ and ruled that though the activities
of a municipal corporation cannot be regarded as being a business or a trade, it would fall within the ambit
of the component ‘undertaking’. While explaining the meaning of the word ‘undertaking’, it explained that
if a corporation’s work or activities were analogous to “the carrying out of a trade or business”, then it
would fall under the ambit of ‘industry’.
Therefore, what was important to take from this case was that an entity that performs the activities
analogous to a business or a trade would fall within the ambit of ‘industry’.

Case: Baroda Borough Municipality v Its Workmen
The Baroda case followed the Banerji case, and reiterated its ruling that an entity that carries on any work
analogous to business or trade would fall within the ambit of ‘industry’.
Case: Corporation of City of Nagpur v Its Employees
In the Nagpur case, the Court drew a distinction between regal and municipal function of the corporation,
and held the latter to be analogous to business or trade. The dispute was not under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, but under Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947, where industries
were defined a little differently. Under that Act, ‘undertaking’ was specifically defined as mining and
manufacturing, and therefore, it would not have been possible include anything else under the ambit of
‘undertaking’. It was noted that if the municipal corporation carried on activities analogous to trade and
business, then it would fall within the ambit of ‘industry’.
While drawing a distinction between regal and welfare functions, it was observed that while regal functions
dealt with police, judiciary, law, etc., welfare functions were those that could be performed by the private
sector. Justice Subba Rao brought the welfare functions of a municipal corporation within the purview of
‘undertaking’ as these activities were determined to be analogous to trade because the activity was organized
that rendered a service. He also dismissed the quid pro quo argument for services, as not being a necessary
condition.
It was also observed that nature and character of the activity should play a determining factor in the
definition of industry. The case also brought in activity-based classification for industry.
The definition of ‘industry’ was in this case observed as being divided in two parts, from the employers’
standpoint, and from the employees’ standpoint. If an activity fell in either of the two parts, then was
considered to be an ‘industry’. Such an activity shall be an organized activity, which pertains to personal or
private employment. The regal functions of the municipal were statutorily delegated, and were necessarily
excluded from the purview of the definition, and were confined to legislative power, administration of law
and judicial power. All the branches of an industry would also be industry for the purposes of the Act, and
its predominant function would be the criterion for determining whether it is an industry.
Case: State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoori Sabha
The Hospital Mazdoori Sabha was an important case because it answered the question whether the activities
of a hospital would fall within the ambit of the definition of the word ‘industry’. To reach the conclusion,
the definition of ‘industry’ was broke down to the effect that the meaning of ‘trade’ was divided into two
parts, such that “exchange of goods for goods or goods for money” became its primary meaning, while “any
business carried on with a view to profit whether manual or mercantile, as distinguished from the liberal arts
or learned professions and from agriculture” became the secondary meaning. ‘Undertaking’ was also
widened and further described as being anything that has been undertaken. It was observed that if the
definition had deliberately used words, which had such wide imports, then it would be necessary to read
them in their wide denotation, and therefore, hospitals would be included in the definition. Even if a hospital
is run by a government body without a profit motive and with public funds, it would still be called an
‘industry’.
Case: Ahmedabad Textile Industry’s Research Association v. State of Bombay
The Ahmedabad Textile Industry’s Research Association followed the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and laid
down that the activity of the association was an ‘industry’ because it provided material services to a part of
the community, was carried on by help from the employees, had organization that was similar in manner to
trade or business, and most importantly, there was cooperation between the employers and employees.
In the first phase of the evolution of ‘industry’, there was a push and pull in the widening and narrowing of
the definition of ‘industry’. There were two tests that were laid down in the first phase. (1) “An activity,
business or trade is ordinarily organized”, and (2) “The activity need not necessarily be preceded by a

procurement of capital in the business sense, and profit need not be a motive”. After these two tests, a fresh
test was introduced in the Ahmedabad Textile Industrycase that “the partnership should only be an
association between the employers and employees, and the employees should have no rights in the results of
their labor or in the nature of the business or trade”. In furtherance to this, another test was added that “the
association of capital and labor must be direct and essential”.
Phase II
The second phase was a period from 1962 to 1978, and included many landmark cases. There was a shift in
the interpretation of the word ‘industry’, where the definition was narrowed down from its previous wider
interpretations. Following were the important landmark cases –
Case: University of Delhi v. Ramnath
The Delhi University case dealt with a very important question – whether the educational activity of the
Delhi University would fall within the definition of ‘industry’ or not. The Court took the view that
educational institutions would not fall within the meaning of an ‘industry’. The reasoning given was that the
aim of the University was education, and as such, teachers are not workmen, and their profession could not
be equated to that of industrial workers. While one would think that the words used in the definition would
have a more definite meaning to them, they were instead made “subservient” to the tests that were earlier
laid down.
Case: Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union v. Gymkhana Club
Of all the landmark cases, Madras Gymkhana is probably the most important one, where the judges
reviewed all the previous cases to determine the meaning of industry. It was laid down that a club is not an
‘industry’, even though the affairs of the club fell under the second part of the section and are organized
similar to a business. Any profit motive was considered to be immaterial. The services rendered in the club
are to the members for their own amusement and pleasure, while the material goods are for their
consumption.
Justice Hidayatullah observed that every employer-employee relationship does not necessarily constitute an
industry. Personal or administrative services rendered fall outside the purview of industry. From the second
part of the definition, it is necessary to note that there must be productive labor, and “the workmen must be
following an employment, calling, or an industry avocation”. Industry was described as being “the nexus
between employers and employees”, which produces a result by bringing two distinct bodies together.
Case: Management of Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi
The Safdarjung Hospital case overturned the very important ruling from the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case,
that “even if a hospital is run by a government body without a profit motive and with public funds, it would
still be called an ‘industry’”. The meaning was narrowed down and revisited, and it was decided that if a
hospital does not embark on an economic activity that could be analogous to business or trade, and is a part
of the Government’s functions, and is run as a Governmental department, it would not be called an industry.
Moreover, if the dominant purpose of the hospital is research and training, and alongside treats the patients,
then it would not be an industry. However, earlier the income or profits were rendered immaterial, but here,
it was noted that if the hospital does charity, and makes income from donations and prohibits distribution of
profits, then it would not be an industry.
Phase III
The third phase mainly constitutes of the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewage Board v. A. Rajappa. It
overruled most of the previous cases covered in Phase II (supra), while also rehabilitating Hospital Mazdoor
Sabha, and based the meaning of ‘industry’ on two tests – (a) a triple test, which is – (1) Systematic activity,
(2) Cooperation between employer and employee, and (3) production of goods and services, and (b) the
dominant nature test.

Justice Krishna Iyer noted that ‘industry’ is very widely defined, where a “(i) systematic activity (ii)
organized by cooperation between an employer and an employee (the direct and substantial element is
chimerical) (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human
wants and wishes”, there is, prima facie, an ‘industry’ within that enterprise. Regardless of whether the
venture is in the public sector or private sector or is a joint sector or any other, the absence of any gainful
objective or the absence of profit motive remains irrelevant. The decisive test for an industry is the nature of
its activity, with focus on its functionality and the employer-employee relations, and welfare or
philanthropic undertaking would not affect the organization if it is a trade or business. It will continue to be
so.
While describing ‘industry’, it was noted that all organized activities that possessed the elements of the
‘triple test’, whether or not they are trade or business, may still be industry, conditional to the “nature of the
activity”, that is, if it is analogous to carrying on business or trade. Also, the organization of the activity may
not be similar with regard to cooperation between the employer and the employees, but it does not matter, as
long as there is an analogy on the terms of employment.
There are a few professions, clubs, educational institutions, cooperatives, research institutes, charitable
projects, and other kindred adventures, that would be ‘industry’ if they fulfill the elements of the triple test.
However, there may be exceptions, where only a minimal number of employees are hired, for minimal
matters. In those cases, such a venture would not be an ‘industry’. Another exception is an institution where
services are rendered free of cost, or at a nominal cost, and the servers do not engage for remuneration, or on
a master – servant relationship, then it is not an industry, even though there might be a few stray manual or
technical servants hired for help. “Such eleemosynary or like undertakings alone are exempt – not other
generosity, compassion, developmental passion or project.”
One of the important aspects of the Bangalore Water Supply case was the dominant nature test –
a. “The predominant nature of the services and the integrated nature of the departments” will be the
true test to identify an industry where there is a complex of activities, and some of them may qualify
for exemption. It would also apply where some of the employees are not ‘workmen’, or some
isolated departments are “not productive of goods and services”.
b. Welfare activities or economic adventures undertaken by the statutory bodies or by the government
would not qualify for exemption. However, sovereign functions alone can.
c. If there are units in departments that discharge sovereign functions, which are industries and are
substantially severable, then they would fall within the definition of ‘industry’.
d. “Constitutional and competently enacted legislative provisions may well remove from the scope of
the Act categories which otherwise may be covered thereby.”
Phase IV
The fourth and the final (for now) phase is the post-Bangalore Water Supply case period, where two
essential developments took place in the legislative and in the judiciary.
Legislative- The first legislative effort was the Industrial Relation Bill, which was introduced in 1978 that
tried to incorporate the findings and the rulings of the Bangalore Water Supply case, but with the dissolution
of the Parliament, the bill lapsed.
The second effort was seen with the ‘Industrial Dispute (Amendment) Act, 1982’, which enacted the
proposed definition with some alterations and additions in the Act.
Judiciary- The Bangalore Water Supply case was questioned on various occasions. In Coir Board
Ernakulam v. Indira Devi, the predominant activity test was upheld, and some doubts were cast about the
correctness of the Bangalore Water Supply test, as it was believed that having an extended definition would
have a damaging effect. On being reviewed by a larger Bench, Bangalore Water Supply was held to be
good.

Following this, in Chief Conservator of Forest v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, suggestion to reconsider the
Bangalore Water Supply case was made before the Supreme Court, which was “discounted without much
ado”. One of the noticeable changes in the Fourth Phase were that cases were being decided based on the
Bangalore Water Supply case, and not only based on the meaning of ‘industry’ under Section 2(j) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
It was observed in the General Manager, Telecom v. Srinivas Rao that the definition of ‘industry’ that was
substituted by the Amending Act of 1982 was not brought into force by the government by issuing a
notification, as is required, and therefore, the law stated in the Bangalore Water Supply would be the
authority for the definition and meaning of ‘industry’.
Conclusion
The definition and concept of the term ‘industry’ is very vast, and it is not possible to explain all of its
facetsin one paper. In this paper, the main focus was on the definition and how the definition and the
concept of ‘industry’ were evolved through case laws. To understand it in simple words, ‘industry’ is
divided in two parts – the employers’ point of view, and the employees’ point of view. While an activity that
falls in either of the category would be considered an ‘industry’ under Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, it is not possible to read one part without the other. To understand the meaning of industry, it is
important to look at the predominant function of the institution in case it has both industrial and non-
industrial functions. The triple test that (1) Systematic activity, (2) Cooperation between employer and
employee, and (3) production of goods and services, is also to be looked at when determining whether an
institution is an industry or not. The definition of ‘industry’ went through a roller coaster ride, such that in
the First Phase, it received a wide interpretation, and then moved on to a narrower interpretation, and finally
to a wide interpretation again in the Bangalore Water Supply case. Till 1997, even though an Amended Act
was passed, the government was negligent in not declaring the change in the definition of ‘industry’ through
a notification, and therefore, the law laid down in the Bangalore Water Supply, by a seven-judge Bench
holds preceding value.
4th Phase: Post Bangalore Water Supply
Legislative
The first legislative effort was the Industrial Relation Bill, which was introduced in 1978 that tried to
incorporate the findings and the rulings of the Bangalore Water Supply case, but with the dissolution of the
Parliament, the bill lapsed. The second effort was seen with the ‘Industrial Dispute (Amendment) Act,
1982’, which enacted the proposed definition with some alterations and additions in the Act.
Judiciary
Case: G.M Telecom Factory v HR Thakur 1998 – (Regal functions)
A single judge of the Bombay HC held that the telecom factory established by the GOI would fall under the
definition of industry.
Case: Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruthi Kondhare-1996- (Regal functions)

The Bench of three judges in the case of has held basing its decision on the Bangalore water supply case that
social forestry is an industry u/s 2(j).
Case: State of Gujarat v. Pratam Singh Nar Singh Parmar-2001 (Regal functions)-
Has taken a contrary view- bench of SC consisting of Pattanaik and Agrawal JJ held that forest department
of a state government would not fall within the definition of industry.
(Direct conflict with above 2 decisions) O.P. Mahlotra says that “with great respect, the decision in PN
Parmar is wholly perverse and is violative of the norms of judicial discipline”.
Case: State of UP v. Jaiveer Singh

Whether the term industry as defined in section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 includes the ‘social
forestry’ department of state, which is welfare scheme undertaken for improvement of environment?

The case has been submitted to a constitutional law bench after the same court in two distinct cases on
relying on the judgment of the Bangalore Water Supply case, have come to different conclusions. The Bench
of three judges in the case of Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruthi Kondhare has held
basing its decision on the Bangalore water supply case that social forestry is an industry u/s 2(j).
Whereas, the division bench in the case of State of Gujarat v. Pratam Singh Nar Singh Parmar has
taken a contrary view.
In this case, the court stated that the definition of industry was a far too ‘policy-oriented decision to be
settled by judicial decisions. The Parliament must step in and legislate in a manner, which will leave no
doubt as to its intention. That alone can afford a satisfactory solution to the question which has agitated and
perplexed the judiciary at all levels.”
Justice Jaswant Singh for himself and Justice Tulzarpur in his dissenting opinion stated that “ we think, it is
high time that the Legislature steps in with a comprehensive bill to clear up the fog and remove the doubts
and set at rest once and for all the controversy which crops up from time to time in relation to the meaning
of the aforesaid term rendering it unnecessary for larger benches of this Court to be constituted which are
driven to the necessity of evolving a working formula to cover cases.”
The court also states that though the legislature had intervened and stepped in to provide the definition of
‘industry’ in the year 1982, yet even after 23 years, the provision still remains unamended, and the lack of
definition continues to confuse the courts and parties.

Case: Coir Board Ernakulam v. Indira Devi
The predominant activity test was upheld, and some doubts were cast about the correctness of the
Bangalore Water Supply test, as it was believed that having an extended definition would have a damaging
effect. Observed that a larger bench should be constituted for reconsidering BWS. On being reviewed by a
larger Bench, Bangalore Water Supply was held to be good.
Landmark cases like Coir Board Ernakulam v. Indira Devi (1998), two-judge bench and pre dominant
activity test was upheld and doubts were casted by the same board about the correctness of the Bangalore
water supply test was being challenged in 1980’s itself. The court held that there is a damaging effect of
such an extended definition. A larger bench reviewed the above-mentioned case and they stated that the
Bangalore water supply judgment holds good. Suggestion to reconsider water supply by CCF judge was also
made.
Case: All India Radio and Door Darshan:

The companies were large employers and had a monopoly at one time. They were held to industry. The
argument of lawyer of all India radio was that it is a sovereign unction but the judge held that a private
company could carry out the function also. Similar institutions were held to be industries in one case and not
industries in another.
Case: Sub Divisional Inspector of Post (1996):

Postal department in not an industry, Critique: If you apply water supply ratio and the basic ratio then the
postal departments would be considered as an industry and the private parties can also be an industry.
Case: Bombay telephone canteen employment (1997):

The telecom department was not to be held industry. Postal Industry and Telecom Industry was the same
department till about 2000. This was overruled by GM telecom case (1997), which bought clarity in the
telecom case. The court held Telecom it to be an industry. This case settled issue relating to telecom.
Labor Law- Industrial Dispute

Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines Industrial Disputes-

“Any dispute or difference between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen connected
with the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labor of any
person”
Can be divided into four parts:
 Factum of Dispute
 Parties of Dispute- employer and employees, employers and workmen, workmen and workmen
 Subject Matter of Dispute- Dispute should be connected with the employment or non-employees,
term of employment, the conditions of labor of any person.
 The dispute should relate to industry.
Factum of Dispute:
The dispute or difference must be something fairly definite and with real substance and not a mere personal
quarrel. The term industrial dispute connotes a real and substantial difference having some element of
persistency connected with the employment or non-employment, with the terms of employment or with
conditions of labor of any person.
Parties of a Dispute:
The requirement of the definition that the dispute must relate to the employment or non employment or the
terms of employment or the conditions of labor of “any person” necessarily therefore imports a limitation in
the sense that a “person” in respect of whom the employer and employee relation never existed or can never
exist cannot be the subject matter of an industrial dispute between the employer and workmen.
Case: N.K.Sen v Labor Appellate Tribunal
The court in this case held that the in the absence of the above conditions no industrial dispute could be
raised in regard of such person.
Case: Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v Dimakuchi Tea Estate
The dispute in the case arose out of the dismissal of a medical officer of a tea estate who was not a workman
under Section 2(s) of the Act. From the context of the definition of Industrial Dispute the court applied
limitations on the construction of ‘any person’, that is a person in respect of whom employer-employee
relation never existed or could not possibly exist cannot be a subject matter of the dispute between
employers and workmen. It therefore held that ‘any person’ meant that a person whose employment, non
employment, terms of employment or conditions of labor, the workmen as a class have a direct or
substantial interest under the scheme of the Act, a community of interest. It is the community of interest of
the class as a whole, which furnishes the clear nexus between parties to a dispute and the dispute.
The dispute must be a real and substantial dispute between the parties so as to be capable of settlement or
adjudication by one party to the dispute by giving necessary relief to the other. The person involved in the
dispute must be one whose employment, non-employment, conditions of labor, the parties to a dispute must
have direct or substantial interest. In the absence of a direct and substantial interest the dispute cannot be
said to be a real or substantial dispute between the parties.
The question is whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman within the meaning of the
Act still falls within the scope of the definition clause in Section 2(k). If we analyze the definition clause it
falls easily and naturally into three parts: first, there must be a dispute or difference; second, the dispute or
difference must be between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen or between
workmen and workmen; third, the dispute or difference must be connected with the employment or non-
employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. The first part
obviously refers to the factum of a real or substantial dispute; the second part to the parties to the dispute;
and the third to the subject matter of that dispute. That subject matter may relate to any of two matters - (i)

employment or non-employment, and (ii) terms of employment or conditions of labour, of any person. On
behalf of the appellants it is contended that the conditions referred to in the first and second parts of the
definition clause are clearly fulfilled in the present case, because there is a dispute or difference over the
termination of service of Dr. K.P. Banerjee and the dispute or difference is between the employer, namely,
the management of the Dimakuchi tea estate on one side, and its workmen on the other, even taking the
expression “workmen” in the restricted sense in which that expression is defined in the Act. The real
difficulty arises when we come to the third part of the definition clause. Learned counsel for the appellants
has submitted that the expression “of any person” occurring in the third part of the definition clause is an
expression of very wide import and there are no reasons why the words “any person” should be equated with
“any workman”, as the tribunals below have done. The argument is that inasmuch as the dispute or
difference between the employer and the workmen is connected with the non-employment of a person called
Dr. K.P. Banerjee (even though he was not a workman), the dispute is an industrial dispute within the
meaning of the definition clause. At first sight, it does appear that there is considerable force in the argument
advanced on behalf of the appellants. It is rightly pointed out that the definition clause does not contain any
words of qualification or restriction in respect of the expression “any person” occurring in the third part, and
if any limitations as to its scope are to be imposed, they must be such as can be reasonably inferred from the
definition clause itself or other provisions of the Act.
A little careful consideration will show, however, that the expression “any person” occurring in the third part
of the definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this wide world. First of all, the subject-
matter of dispute must relate to (i) employment or non- employment or (ii) terms of employment or
conditions of labour of any person; these necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in respect
of whom the employer- employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject-
matter of a dispute between employers and workmen.
Having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act, and its other provisions, the expression “any person” in
Section 2(k) of the Act must be read subject to such limitations and qualifications as arise from the context;
the two crucial limitations are (1) the dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute (as
indicated in the first two parts of the definition clause) so as to be capable of settlement or adjudication by
one party to the dispute giving necessary relief to the other, and (2) the person regarding whom the dispute is
raised must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour
(as the case may be) the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. In the absence of such
interest the dispute cannot be said to be a real dispute between the parties. Where the workmen raise a
dispute as against their employer, the person regarding whose employment, non-employment, terms of
employment or conditions of labour the dispute is raised need not be, strictly speaking, a “workman” within
the meaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or
conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest.
In the case before us Dr. K.P. Banerjee was not a “workman”. He belonged to the medical or technical staff -
a different category altogether from workmen. The appellants had no direct, nor substantial interest in his
employment or non-employment, and even assuming that he was a member of the same Trade Union, it
cannot be said, on the tests laid down by us, that the dispute regarding his termination of service was an
industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails
and is dismissed.
Case: J.H. Jadhav v. Forbes Gokak Ltd
The respondent employed the appellant. He claimed promotion as a clerk. When this was not granted, the
appellant raised an industrial dispute. The State Government referred the question whether the appellant was
djustified in his prayer for promotion with effect from the date that his juniors were promoted to the
Industrial Tribunal. In their written statement before the Tribunal the respondent denied the appellant’s
claim for promotion on merits. In addition, it was contended by the respondent that the individual dispute
raised by the appellant was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, as the workman was neither supported by a substantial number of workmen nor by a
majority union. The appellant claims that his cause was espoused by the Gokak Mills Staff Union.
The Tribunal concluded that the act of the respondent in denying promotion to the appellant amounted to
unfair labour practice. An award was passed in favour of the appellant and the respondent was directed to
promote the appellant as a clerk from the date his juniors were promoted and to give him all consequential
benefits.
The respondent by way of a writ petition challenged the award of the Industrial Tribunal. A Single Judge
dismissed the writ petition. The respondent being aggrieved filed a writ appeal before the appellate court.
The appellate court construed Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and came to the conclusion
that an individual dispute is not an industrial dispute unless it directly and substantially affects the interest of
other workmen. Secondly, it was held that an individual dispute should be taken up by a union, which had
representative character, or by a substantial number of employees, before it would be converted into an
industrial dispute neither of which according to the appellate court, had happened in the present case. It was
held that there was nothing on record to show that the appellant was a member of the Union or that the
dispute had been espoused by the Union by passing any resolution in that regard.
The definition of “industrial dispute” in Section 2(k) of the Act shows that an industrial dispute means any
dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between
workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of the
employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. The definition has been the subject matter of
several decisions of this Court and the law is well settled.
The definition has been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court and the law is well settled. The
locus classicus is the decision in Workmen v. Dharampal Premchand (Saughandhi) [AIR 1966 SC 182]
where it was held that for the purposes of Section 2(k) it must be shown that:
(1) The dispute is connected with the employment or non-employment of a workman.
(2) The dispute between a single workman and his employer was sponsored or espoused by the union of
workmen or by a number of workmen. The phrase “the union” merely indicates the union to which the
employee belongs even though it may be a union of a minority of the workmen.
(3) The establishment had no union of its own and some of the employees had joined the union of another
establishment belonging to the same industry. In such a case it would be open to that union to take up the
cause of the workmen if it is sufficiently representative of those workmen, despite the fact that such union
was not exclusively of the workmen working in the establishment concerned.
Labor Law- Workmen

The ingredients of the definition of workmen may be classified under the following heads:
The definition of workmen falls in three parts under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The first
part denotes a workman with reference to a person employed in an industry to do manual, skilled, unskilled,
technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward. (Contract of employment between
employer and employee)
The second part denotes any person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with an
industrial dispute or whose dismissal or retrenchment has led to an industrial dispute.
The third part denotes that if any person has satisfied the first two conditions but falls short of any of the
categories in the first part will be excluded from the definition of workman.
Once it has been established that there is a relationship of employer and employee the duration will not
matter such that even a temporary or casual employee will be a workman.
Case: Workmen of Food Corporation of India v Food Corporation of India

The word employed means the relationship of employer and employee via a contract of service, which is
express or implied and the employer agrees to pay the employees in cash or kind. There should be a
relationship of employer and employee or master and servant. The relationship of command and obedience
or master and servant must exist for a person to be a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act.
Case: Dharangadhara Chemical Works v State of Saurasthra
The court held that the test of ‘supervision and control’ might be taken as the prima facie test to determine
the relationship of employment. The test is the existence of right in the master to supervise and control the
work done by the servant. The nature and amount of control vary from industry to industry thus the greater
the amount of direct control the stronger the ground for contract of service.
The test, which is thus applied, is the existence of right of control in the manner in which the work is done.
The Industrial Tribunal in the case at hand came to the conclusion that the appellants from manufacturing to
the end process exercised supervision and control and control was direct in nature.
The appellants contended that the workers were independent contractors in as much as the workers do piece
work and the appellant content that the agarias engage other people to do work and pay them and are thus
beyond the control of the management and thus are independent contractors and not workmen within the
meaning of the Act. The court holds that the distinction between workmen and independent contractors is
that the former do the work by them whereas the latter get others to do the work.
Supervision and control depends and has to be looked at based on the nature of work, circumstances and
place where he is to do the work, skill, technique or method which he has used to do the work.
Case: Hussaibhai v AFT Union
A number of workmen were engaged to make ropes from within the factory, but these workmen, according
to the petitioner, were hired by contractors who had executed agreements with the petitioner to get such
work done, therefore, the petitioner contended that the workmen were not his workmen but the contractors’
workmen.
Where a worker or group of workers labors to produce goods or services and these goods or services are for
the business of another, that other is, in fact, the employer. He has economic control over the workers’
subsistence, skill and continued employment. If he, for any reason, chokes off, the worker is, virtually, laid
off. The presence of intermediate contractors with whom alone the workers have immediate or direct
relationship ex contractu is of no consequence when, on lifting the veil or looking at the conspectus of
factors governing employment, we discern the naked truth, though draped in different perfect paper
arrangement, that the real employer is the Management, not the immediate contractor. Myriad devices, half-
hidden in fold after fold of legal form depending on the degree of concealment needed, the type of industry,
the local conditions and the like may be resorted to when labour legislation casts welfare obligations on the
real employer, based on Articles 38, 39, 42, 43 and 43-A of the Constitution.
Case: Indian Bank Association v Workmen of Syndicate Bank
On behalf of the appellants it has been submitted that the Deposit Collectors could not be treated, as
workmen since their engagement were purely a matter of contract between the parties. It was submitted that
the agreements were, in all cases, for a specific period. It was submitted that the Deposit Collectors did their
work without any control or supervision of the banks. It was submitted that the Deposit Collectors could also
do other works and take on other employment. It was submitted that the Deposit Collectors had no fixed
time or period to devote to their work as Deposit Collectors or for their attendance in the Bank. It was
submitted that these Deposit Collectors could come to the Bank at any time and make the deposits. It was
further submitted that there was no qualification or age-limit for a person to be engaged as a Deposit
Collector and that, in fact, many of the Deposit Collectors were well- advanced in age. It was submitted that
no disciplinary action could be taken against the Deposit Collectors. It was submitted that all the
abovementioned facts showed that there was no relationship of master and servant and that, therefore, these
Deposit Collectors were not workmen.
It was submitted that Section 10(1)(b) clearly lays down that a banking company cannot employ any person
whose remuneration or part of whose remuneration takes the form of commission or of a share in the profits
of the company. It was submitted that it was an admitted position that commission was paid to Deposit
Collectors.
On the other hand, Mr. Sharma, on behalf of the respondents submitted that the Deposit Collectors had to
regularly visit the small depositors, i.e. small traders, housewives, students, etc. He submitted that they
would have to go to these depositors at times, which were convenient to those persons or at times when they
would be in a position to give the deposit. He submitted that the Deposit Collectors may also have to make
more than one visit to small depositors. He submitted that the Deposit Collectors would have to collect
deposits from all these persons and then take the collections to the banks and make the deposits after making
the relevant entries and filling up the relevant forms. He submitted that the work of Deposit Collectors was
manual inasmuch as they had to make the collections by going from place to place and from depositor to
depositor and that it was also clerical inasmuch as they had to fill up various forms, accounts registers and
passbooks every day. He submitted that over and above this work many of the Deposit Collectors were also
made to do other sundry works of a clerical nature in the banks. He submitted that amount received by the
Deposit Collectors by way of commission was wage linked to productivity. He submitted that it was
incorrect to state that the banks had no control over the Deposit Collectors. He submitted that the banks
exercised control over the Deposit Collectors and laid down various stipulations, which were to be followed
by these Deposit Collectors. He submitted that merely because the nature of the control was different did not
mean that there was no control.
Respondents relied on Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments
[(1974) 3 SCC 498]- held that while control was an important factor it was wrong to say that in every case it
would be a decisive factor. It held that the degree of control and supervision would be different in different
types of business and that what was essential was an element of authority over the workers in the
performance of the work, so that the employee was subject to the directions of the employer.
Respondents relied on Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurasthra [AIR 1957 SC 264]-
This Court held that the prima facie test of master and servant relationship between employer and employee
was the existence of the right in the employer not merely to direct what work was to be done but also to
control the manner in which it was to be done, the nature or extent of such control varying in different
industries and being by its nature incapable of being precisely defined.
We also cannot accept the submission that the banks have no control over the Deposit Collectors.
Undoubtedly, the Deposit Collectors are free to regulate their own hours of work, but that is because of the
nature of the work itself. It would be impossible to fix working hours for such Deposit Collectors because
they have to go to various depositors. This would have to be done at the convenience of the depositors and at
such times as required by the depositors. If this is so, then no time can be fixed for such work. However,
there is control inasmuch as the Deposit Collectors have to bring the collections and deposit the same in the
banks by the very next day. They have then to fill in various forms, accounts registers, and passbooks. They
also have to do such other clerical work as the Bank may direct. They are, therefore, accountable to the Bank
and under the control of the Bank.
We also see no force in the contention that Section 10 of the Banking Regulation Act prevents employment
of persons on commission basis. The proviso to Section 10 makes it clear that commission can be paid to
persons who are not in regular employment. Undoubtedly, the Deposit Collectors are not regular employees
of the Bank. But they, nevertheless, are workers within the meaning of the term as defined in the Industrial
Disputes Act. There is clearly a relationship of master and servant between the Deposit Collectors and the
Bank concerned.
Write a note on the nature of work?

Under Section 2(s)- Seven types of employment:
 Manual work
 Unskilled work
 Skilled work
 Technical work
 Operational work
 Clerical work
 Supervisory work
Case: A. Sundarambal v Government of Goa, Daman and Diu
The short question which arises for consideration in this case is whether a teacher employed in a school falls
within the definition of the expression ‘workman’ as defined in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(the Act’).
Two questions arise for consideration in this case: (1) whether the school, in which the appellant was
working, was an industry, and (2) whether the appellant was a ‘workman’ employed in that industry. It is,
however, not disputed that if the applicant was not a ‘workman’ no reference under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act
could be sought.
In University of Delhi v. Ram Nath [AIR 1963 SC 1873] a bench consisting of three learned Judges of this
Court held that the University of Delhi which was an educational institution and Miranda House, a college
affiliated to the said University, also being an educational institution would not come within the definition of
the expression ‘industry’ as defined in S. 2(j) of the Act. Section 2(j) of the Act states that ‘industry’ means
any business, trade, undertaking manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service,
employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then
was) who decided the said case, held that the educational institutions which were predominantly engaged in
teaching could not be considered as industries within the meaning of the said expression in S. 2(j) of the Act
and, therefore, a driver who was employed by the Miranda House could not be considered as a workman
employed in an industry. The above decision came up for consideration in Bangalore Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa [AIR 1978 SC 548] before a larger bench of this Court. In that case the
decision in University of Delhi was overruled.
Thus it is seen that even though an educational institution has to be treated as an industry in view of the
decision in the Bangalore Water Supply, the question whether teachers in an educational institution can be
considered as workmen still remains to be decided.
In order to be a workman, a person should be one who satisfies the following conditions: (i) he should be a
person employed in an industry for hire or reward; (ii) he should be engaged in skilled or unskilled manual,
supervisory, technical or clerical work; and (iii) he should not be a person falling under any of the four
clauses, i.e. (i) to (iv) mentioned in the definition of ‘workman’ in section 2(s) of the Act. The definition
also provides that a workman employed in an industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory,
technical or clerical work for hire or reward includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or
retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, an industrial dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or
retrenchment has led to that dispute.
We are concerned in this case primarily with the meaning of the words ‘skilled or unskilled manual,
supervisory, technical or clerical work.’ If an employee in an industry is not a person engaged in doing work
falling in any of these categories, he would not be a workman at all even though he is employed in an
industry. The question for consideration before us is whether a teacher in a school falls under any of the four
categories, namely, a person doing any skilled or unskilled manual work, supervisory work, technical work
or clerical work.
We are of the view that the teachers employed by educational institutions whether the said institutions are
imparting primary, secondary, graduate or post-graduate education cannot be called as ‘workman’ within the
meaning of section 2(s) of the Act. Imparting of education, which is the main function of teachers cannot be
considered as skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work.
Imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. A teacher educates children; he
moulds their character, builds up their personality and makes them fit to become responsible citizens.
Children grow under the care of teachers. The clerical work, if any they may do, is only incidental to their
principal work of teaching. We agree with the reasons given by the High Court for taking the view that
teachers cannot be treated as ‘workmen’ as defined under the Act. It is not possible to accept the suggestion
that having regard to the object of the Act, all employees in an industry except those falling under the four
exceptions (i) to (iv) in section 2(s) of the Act should be treated as workmen. The acceptance of this
argument will render the words ‘to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical
work’ meaningless.
Case: May and Baker (India) Ltd v Their Workmen
In that case this Court had to consider the question whether a person employed by a pharmaceutical firm as a
representative (for canvassing orders) whose duties consisted mainly of canvassing orders and any clerical
or manual work that he had to do was only incidental to his main work of canvassing could be considered as
a workman as defined in the Act.
A ‘workman’ was then defined as any person employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled
manual or clerical work for hire or reward. Therefore, doing manual or clerical work was necessary before a
person could be called a workman. This definition came for consideration before industrial tribunals and it
was consistently held that the designation of the employee was not of great moment and what was of
importance was the nature of his duties. If the nature of the duties is manual or clerical, then the person must
be held to be a workman. On the other hand if manual or clerical work is only a small part of the duties of
the person concerned and incidental to his main work which is not manual or clerical, then such a person
would not be a workman. It has, therefore, to be seen in each case from the nature of the duties whether a
person employed is a workman or not, under the definition of that word as it existed before the amendment
of 1956.
The Court held that the employee Mukerjee involved in that case was not a workman under section 2(s) of
the Act because he was not mainly employed to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire
or reward, which were the only two classes of employees who qualified for being treated as ‘workman’
under the definition of the expression ‘workman’ in the Act, as it stood then.
Case: H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd.
The question that falls for consideration in these matters is whether the ‘medical representatives’ as they are
commonly known, are workmen according to the definition of ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the ‘ID Act’).
The change brought about by this Amendment was that the persons employed to do ‘supervisory’ and
‘technical’ work were also included in the definition for the first time by this amendment, although those
who were employed in a supervisory capacity were so included in the definition provided their monthly
wage did not exceed Rs. 500.
The first change brought about by this amendment was that whereas earlier only those who were doing
unskilled or skilled manual work were included in the said definition, now those who did any unskilled or
skilled work, whether manual or not, came to be included in it. The second and the most important change
that was brought about was that those persons who were employed to do ‘operational’ work were also
brought within the fold of the said definition.
Case: Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen

The dispute there was whether the workmen employed by the sales-office of the company were entitled to
production bonus as were those employed in the factory and the factory-office. The incidental question
which arose in this case was whether the sales-office was entirely independent of the factory or was a
department of the one and the same unit of production, and whether inspectors, salesmen, and retail
salesmen of the sales-office were workmen within the meaning of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
However, the argument advanced before the Court was not on the basis of the supervisory or technical
nature of the work done by the employees concerned, viz., inspectors, salesmen and retail salesmen. The
argument instead, both before the Industrial Tribunal and this Court was based on the clerical work put in by
them, which were found to be 75 per cent of their work. This Court confirmed the finding of the Tribunal
that the employees concerned were workmen because 75 per cent of their time was devoted to the writing
work. The incidental question was whether the sales-office and the factory and the factory-office formed
part of one and the same industrial establishment or were independent of each other. The Court observed
that it would be unreasonable to say that those who were producing matches were workmen and those who
sold them were not. In other words, the Court did not hold that the work of selling matches was as much as
operational part of the industrial establishment as was that of manufacturing.
Case: Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distribution v Burmah Shell Management Staff Association
The dispute, among others, was whether the Sales Engineering Representatives and District Sales
Representatives employed in the company were workmen within the meaning of the ID Act. The dispute had
arisen prior to 28.10.1967. The argument on behalf of the workmen was that the definition of the ‘workmen’
(which at the relevant time also included persons doing supervisory and technical work) was all
comprehensive and contemplated that all persons employed in an industry must necessarily fall in one or the
other of the four classes mentioned in the main body of the definition, viz., those doing skilled or unskilled
manual work, supervisory work, technical work or clerical work, and consequently the court should proceed
on the assumption that every person is a workman unless he fell under one of the four exceptions to the
definition. The Court rejected this contention.
The Court referred to its earlier decision in May & Baker case and pointed out that the Court had held that
since duties of the employee there were not mainly manual or clerical the employee was not a workman.
Referring in this connection to the May & Baker case, the Court pointed out that in that case, it was noticed
that the employee’s duties were mainly neither clerical nor manual although his duties did involve some
clerical and manual work and hence he was held not to be a workman. The Court then referred to the nature
of the duties of Sales Engineering Representatives and the District Sales Representatives with whom, among
others, the Court was concerned there. With regard to the Sales Engineering Representatives, the Court
approved of the finding of the Tribunal that he was not employed on a supervisory work, but found fault
with the Tribunal for not proceeding further to examine whether he was employed on any other work of such
a type that he could be brought within the definition of workman. The Court then itself examined the said
question. Since there was no suggestion at all that he was employed on clerical or manual work, and all that
was canvassed was that he was doing technical work, the Court found that the amount of technical work that
he did was of ancillary nature to his chief duty of promoting sales and giving advice. The mere fact that he
was required to have technical knowledge, for such a purpose, did not make his work technical. According
to the Court the work of advising and removing complaints so as to promote sales remains outside the scope
of technical work. Consequently, the Tribunal’s finding that the Sales Engineering Representative was a
workman was set aside. Referring to the District Sales Representatives, the Court held that they were not
doing clerical work, and that they were principally employed for the purpose of promoting sales of the
company. Their main work was canvassing and obtaining orders. In that connection, of course, they had to
carry on some correspondence, but that correspondence was incidental to the main work of pushing sales of
the company. In connection with promotion of sales, they had to make recommendations for selection of
agents and dealers; extension or curtailment of credit facilities to agents, dealers and customers; investments
of capital and revenue in the shape of facilities at agent’s premises or retail outlets; and selection of suitable
sites for retail outlets to maximize sales and negotiations for terms of new sites. On these facts, the Court
held that the work that they were doing was neither manual nor clerical nor technical nor supervisory, and
further added that the work of canvassing and promoting sales could not be included in any of the said four
classifications and the decision given by the Tribunal that they were not workmen was valid.
Case: S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra
The dispute was whether Development Officers of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) were
workmen. The dispute arose on account of the dismissal of the appellant-Development Officer w.e.f.
8.2.1969. The court noticed that the change in the definition of workman brought about by the Amending
Act 36 of 1956 which, as stated above, added to the originally enacted definition, two more categories of
employees, viz., those doing ‘supervisory’ and ‘technical’ work. The three-Judge Bench of this Court did
not refer to the earlier decisions in May & Baker, WIMCO and Burmah Shell cases. The Bench only
referred to the decision of this Court in Workmen v. Indian Standards Institution [(1975) 2 SCC 847] where
while considering whether ISI was an ‘industry’ or not, it was held that since the ID Act was a legislation
intended to bring about peace and harmony between management and labour in an ‘industry,’ the test must
be so applied as to give the widest possible connotation to the term ‘industry’ and, therefore, a broad and
liberal and not a rigid and doctrinaire approach should be adopted to determine whether a particular concern
was an industry or not. The Court, therefore, held that to decide the question whether the Development
Officers in the LIC were workmen or not, it should adopt pragmatic and not a pedantic approach and
consider the broad question as to on which side of the line the workman fell, viz., labour or management,
and then to consider whether there were any good reasons for moving them on from one side to the other.
The Court then noticed that the LIC Staff Regulations classified the staff into four categories, viz., (i)
Officers, (ii) Development Officers, (iii) Supervisors and Clerical Staff, and (iv) Subordinate Staff. The
Court pointed out that Development Officers were classified separately both from Officers on the one hand
and Supervisors and Clerical Staff on the other and that they as well as Class III and Class IV staff other
than Superintendents were placed on par inasmuch as their appointing and disciplinary authority was the
Divisional Manager whereas that of Officers was Zonal Manager. The Court also referred to their scales of
pay and pointed out that the appellation '‘Development Officer'’ was no more than a glorified designation.
The Court then referred to the nature of duties of the Development Officers and pointed out that a
Development Officer was to be a whole-time employee and that his operations were to be restricted to a
defined area and that he was liable to be transferred. He had no authority whatsoever to bind the Company in
any way. His principal duty appeared to be to organize and develop the business of the Corporation in the
area allotted to him, and for that purpose, to recruit active and reliable agents, to train them, to canvass new
business and to render post-sale services to policyholders. He was expected to assist and inspire the agents.
Even so, he had not the authority either to appoint them or to take disciplinary action against them. He did
not even supervise the work of the agents though he was required to train them and assist them. He was to be
a friend, philosopher and guide of the agents working within his jurisdiction and no more. He was expected
to “stimulate and excite” the agents to work while exercising no administrative control over them. The
agents were not his subordinates. He had no subordinate staff working under him. The Court, therefore, held
that it was clear that the Development Officer could not by any stretch of imagination be said to be engaged
in any administrative or managerial work and, therefore, he was a workman within the meaning of the ID
Act. Accordingly, the order of the Industrial Tribunal and the judgment of the High Court holding that he
was not a workman were set aside. As has been pointed out above, this decision did not refer to the earlier
three decisions in May & Baker, WIMCO and Burmah Shell cases, and obviously proceeded on the basis
that if an employee did not come within the four exceptions to the definition, he should be held to be a
workman.
Case Analysis: May & Baker, WIMCO, Burmah Shell
The decision in May & Baker case was delivered when the definition did not include either ‘technical’ or
‘supervisory’ or ‘operational’ categories of workmen. That is why the contention on behalf of the workmen
had to be based on the manual and clerical nature of the work done by the sales representatives in that case.
The Court had also, therefore, to decide the category of the sales representatives with reference to whether
the work done by him was of a clerical or manual nature. The Court’s finding was that the canvassing for
sale was neither clerical nor manual, and the clerical work done by him formed a small fraction of his work.
Hence, the sales representative was not a workman.
In WIMCO case, the dispute had arisen on 18.8.1961 under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and at the
relevant time the definition of the workman in that Act was the same as under the Central Act, i.e. the ID
Act which had by virtue of the Amending Act 36 of 1956 added to the categories of workmen, those doing
supervisory and technical work. However, the argument advanced before the Court was not on the basis of
the supervisory or technical nature of the work done by the employees concerned, viz., inspectors, salesmen
and retail salesmen. The argument instead, both before the Industrial Tribunal and this Court was based on
the clerical work put in by them, which were found to be 75 per cent of their work. This Court confirmed the
finding of the Tribunal that the employees concerned were workmen because 75 per cent of their time was
devoted to the writing work. The incidental question was whether the sales-office and the factory and the
factory-office formed part of one and the same industrial establishment or were independent of each other.
The Court observed that it would be unreasonable to say that those who were producing matches were
workmen and those who sold them were not. In other words, the Court did not hold that the work of selling
matches was as much as operational part of the industrial establishment as was that of manufacturing.
In Burmah Shell case, the workmen involved were Sales Engineering Representatives and District Sales
Representatives. The dispute had arisen on 28.10.1967 when the categories of workmen doing supervisory
and technical work stood included in the definition of workman. The Court found that the work done by the
Sales Engineering Representatives as well as District Sales Representatives was neither clerical nor
supervisory nor technical. An effort was made on behalf of the workmen to contend that the work of Sales
Engineering Representatives was technical. The Court repelled that contention by pointing out that the
amount of technical work that they did was ancillary to the chief work of promoting sales and the mere fact
that they possessed technical knowledge for such purpose, did not make their work technical. The Court also
found that advising and removing complaints so as to promote sales remained outside the scope of the
technical work. As regards the District Sales Representatives, the argument was that their work was mainly
of clerical nature, which was negatived by the Court by pointing out that the clerical work involved was
incidental to their main work of promoting sales. What is necessary further to remember in this case is that
the Court relied upon its earlier decision in May & Baker and pointed out that in order to qualify to be a
workman under the ID Act, a person concerned had to satisfy that he fell in any of the four categories of
manual, clerical, supervisory or technical workman.
We thus have three three-Judge Bench decisions which have taken the view that a person to be qualified to
be a workman must be doing the work which falls in any of the four categories, viz., manual, clerical,
supervisory or technical and two two-Judge Bench decisions which have by referring to one or the other of
the said three decisions have reiterated the said law. As against this, we have three three-Judge Bench
decisions which have without reference to the decisions in May & Baker, WIMCO and Burmah Shell cases
have taken the other view which was expressly negatived, viz., if a person does not fall within the four
exceptions to the said definition he is a workman within the meaning of the ID Act. These decisions are also
based on the facts found in those cases. They have, therefore, to be confined to those facts. Hence the
position in law as it obtains today is that a person to be a workman under the ID Act must be employed to do
the work of any of the categories, viz., manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or
supervisory. It is not enough that he is not covered by either of the four exceptions to the definition. We
reiterate the said interpretation.
We have already pointed out as to why the word ‘skilled’ would not include the kind of work done by the
sale promotion employees. For the very same reason, the word ‘operational’ would also not include the said
work. To hold that everyone who is connected with any operation of manufacturing or sales is a workman
would render the categorization of the different types of work mentioned in the main part of the definition
meaningless and redundant. The interpretation suggested would in effect mean that all employees of the
establishment other than those expressly excepted in the definition are workmen within the meaning of the
said definition. The interpretation was specifically rejected by this Court in May & Baker, WIMCO and
Burmah Shell and A. Sundarambal cases, although such an interpretation was given in S.K. Verma, Delton
Cables and Ciba Geigy cases the legislature impliedly did not accept the said interpretation as is evident
from the fact that instead of amending the definition of ‘workman’ on the lines interpreted in the said latter
cases, the legislature added three specific categories, viz., unskilled, skilled and operational. The ‘unskilled,’
‘skilled’ were divorced from ‘manual’ and were made independent categories. If the interpretation suggested
was accepted by the legislature, nothing would have been easier than to amend the definition of ‘workman’
by stating that any person employed in connection with any operation of the establishment other than those
specifically expected is a workman. It must further be recommended that the independent categories of
‘unskilled’, ‘skilled’ and ‘operational’ were added to the main part of the definition after the SPE Act was
placed on the statute book.
Labor Law- Strikes and Lock Outs

Strikes
As defined by Section 2(q) “Strike means a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any
industry acting in combination, or concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding, of any
number of persons who are or have been, so employed to continue to work or to accept employment.” The
definition of strike in this clause remains the same as it was in s 2(l) of the repealed Trade Disputes Act,
1929.
The following are the ingredients of strikes:
 There must be a cessation of work

 The cessation of work should be by a body of persons employed in any industry
 The person striking must have been acting in combination
 The person taking part in strike must be working in any establishment which can be called an
industry
 There must be a concerted refusal
 Refusal under a common understanding of any number of persons who are or have so employed to
continue to work or accept employment
 The object of the strike should be related to employment, non-employment or the terms of
employment or with conditions of labour of the workmen.
Case: Syndicate Bank v. K Umesh Nayak
The case has aptly stated the law in the following words: “The strike, as a weapon, was evolved by the
workers as a form of direct action, during their long struggle with the employers. It is essentially a weapon
of last resort, being an abnormal aspect of employer- employee relationship and involves a withdrawal of
labour, disrupting production, services and the running of the enterprise. It is a use by the labour of their
economic power, to bring the employer to see and meet their viewpoint, over the dispute between them. The
cessation or stoppage of work, whether by their employees or by the employer, is detrimental to the
production and economy to the well being of the society as a whole. It is for this reason that industrial
legislation, while not denying the right of workmen to strike, has tried to regulate it along with the right of
the employer to lockout and has also provided a machinery for peaceful investigation, settlement, arbitration
and adjudication of the disputes between them.. The strike or lockout is not be resorted to, because the
concerned party has a superior bargaining power or the requisite economic muscle to compel the other party
to accept in demand, such indiscriminate use of power is nothing but an assertion of the rule of ‘Might is
right’. Its consequences are lawlessness, anarchy and chaos in the economic activities, which are most vital
and fundamental to the survival of the society. The strike or lockout has to be used sparingly, for the
redressal or urgent and pressing grievances, when no means are available or when available, means have
failed to resolve it. It is for this reason that industrial legislation, such as the Act, places additional
restrictions on strikes and lockouts in public utility services”.
Kinds of Strikes
Strikes are of various kinds, some of them very controversial as well. Go Slow Strikes and Pen Down
Strikes are two examples of strikes. This form of strikes mostly occurs in railways, banks and telegraphs and
workmen employ a method of strike that uses time consuming techniques so as to slow down the work. A

go-slow strike is not a strike in the strict sense of the term but since it causes serious financial injury to the
employer it is considered to be grave misconduct.
Case: Bharat Sugar Mills v Jain Singh
The court held that a go-slow strike is a picturesque description of deliberate delaying of production by
workmen pretending to be working in a factory. A go-slow strike may be much worse than an ordinary
strike because the factory and machines are still functional but the output is negligible and that reduces
efficiency and delays output as well, which in effect harms machine parts.
Case: Punjab National Bank v Employees
The bank dismissed 150 employees for taking part in a pen down strike. The question then arose whether
pen down strike is a form of strike within Section 2(q) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Looked at simply and
in the basic grammatical perspective a pen downs strike is a cessation of work by a group of individuals
acting with a common understanding. The court held the strike to be illegal because the workers who were
striking entered the premises and refused to work, which also led to violence and an illegal seizure of
buildings.
The 2nd National Commission on Labor has recommended that the existing definition of strike may stand the
way it is but “go-slow” and “work to rule” are both serious kinds of misconducts that need to be taken into
account.
Case: Management of Chandramalai Tea Estate v Workmen:
Union workers submitted a list of 15 demands to the management but their demands remained unsettled.
One of the key issues was whether the workers were entitled to wages for the period of the strike? The
workmen pleaded that the strike was justified whereas the employers i.e. the management proclaimed that
the strike was illegal and unjustified. The tribunal after a very interesting analysis came to the conclusion
that the strike though not fully justified was half justified and half unjustified. The tribunal thus awarded the
workmen 50% of the wages due to them for the strike period.
Case: The Statesmen Limited v Workmen
Post the case of Chandramalai Tea Estate the tribunal took a very similar view in the case of The Statesmen
Limited v Workmen. In this case the workmen went on an illegal and disorderly strike over a bonus dispute,
which was responded to by the management, by a lockout, which they refused to lift even after the workmen
ended the strike and started to work peacefully. The tribunal ended the strike as well as the lockout and held
that the blame had to be apportioned and thus 50% of the wages for the lockout period were granted to the
workmen. However the tribunal clarified and laid down that, “ where the strike unjustified and the lockout is
justified the workmen would not be entitled to any wages at all and similarly where the strike is justified and
the lockout is unjustified the workmen will be entitled to full wages for the period of strike and lockout”
Case: India General Navigation and Railway Co. Ltd. v. Workmen
This Court while dealing with the issues raised there, observed as follows:
In the first place, it is a little difficult to understand how a strike in respect of a public utility service, which
is clearly, illegal, could at the same time be characterized as ‘perfectly justified’. These two conclusions
cannot in law coexist. The law has made a distinction between a strike, which is illegal, and one, which is
not, but it has not made any distinction between an illegal strike, which may be said to be justifiable and
one, which is not justifiable. This distinction is not warranted by the Act, and is wholly misconceived,
especially in the case of employees in a public utility service. Every one participating in an illegal strike is
liable to be dealt with departmentally, of course, subject to the action of the Department being questioned
before an Industrial Tribunal, but it is not permissible to characterize an illegal strike as justifiable. The only
question of practical importance, which may arise in the case of an illegal strike, would be the kind or
quantum of punishment, and that, of course, has to be modulated in accordance with the facts and

circumstances of each case. Therefore, the tendency to condone what has been declared to be illegal by
statute, must be deprecated, and it must be clearly understood by those who take part in an illegal strike that
thereby they make themselves liable to be dealt with by their employers. There may be reasons for
distinguishing the case of those who may have acted as mere dumb driven cattle from those who have taken
an active part in fomenting the trouble and instigating workmen to join such a strike, or have taken recourse
to violence.
Legality and Justification of Strikes

The legality and justifiability of strikes are two different things all together. Strikes both legal and illegal
have are of two types, unjustified and justified. A dismissal of illegal strikers has been disapproved on the
ground that though illegal the strike was justified. Similarly a claim of legal strikers has sometimes been
dismissed on the grounds that a strike while legal was unjustified. However it has been settled that an illegal
strike can never be justified. Justification of a strike is a question of fact and has to be determined for each
case. Justification means “whether the reason for which the strike was called was serious enough or had
enough potential to significantly affect the conditions of labor or terms of employment or employer
employee relationships”. However, use of coercion or violence during a strike negates whatever justification
a strike may have.
The question in the below cases is whether workmen who proceeded to strike whether illegal or legal are
entitled to wages for the period of Strike?
Case: Churakulam Tea Estate v Workmen
In Churakulam Tea Estate which is a decision of three learned Judges, the facts were that the appellant-Tea
Estate which was a member of the Planter’s Association of Kerala (South India), from time to time since
1946, used to enter into agreements with the representatives of the workmen, for payment of bonus. In
respect of the years 1957, 1958 and 1959, there was a settlement dated 25-1-1960 between the Managements
of the various plantations and their workers relating to payment of bonus.
The workmen started agitation-claiming bonus. The conciliation proceedings in that regard failed. All 27
workers in the appellant’s factory struck work on the afternoon of 30-11-1961. The Management declined to
pay wages for the day of the strike to the said factory workers.
The Tribunal took the view that the strike was both legal and justified and hence directed the appellant to
pay wages. This Court noted that there were no conciliation proceedings pending on 30-11-1961 when the
factory workers resorted to strike and hence the strike was not hit by the aforesaid provision. The Court
further observed that if the strike were hit by Section 23(a), it would be illegal under Section 24(1)(i) of the
Act. Since, however, it was not so hit, it followed that the strike in this case could not be considered to be
illegal.
Case: Crompton Greaves v Workmen

In Crompton Greaves Ltd. the facts were that on 27-12-1967, the appellant- Management intimated the
workers’ Union its decision to reduce the strength of the workmen in its branch at Calcutta on the ground of
severe recession in business. The workmen resorted to strike.
It is well settled that in order to entitle the workmen to wages for the period of strike, the strike should be
legal as well as justified. A strike is legal if it does not violate any provision of the statute. Again, a strike
cannot be said to be unjustified unless the reasons for it are entirely perverse or unreasonable. Whether a
particular strike was justified or not is a question of fact, which has to be judged in the light of the facts and
circumstances of each case. It is also well settled that the use of force or violence or acts of sabotage
resorted to by the workmen during a strike disentitles them to wages for the strike period.
After observing thus, the Court formulated the following two questions, viz., (1) whether the strike in
question was illegal or unjustified? and (2) whether the workmen resorted to force or violence during the
said period, that is, 11-1-1968 to 29-2-1968. While answering the first question, the Court pointed out that
no specific provision of law has been brought to its notice, which rendered the strike illegal during the
period under consideration. The strike could also not be said to be unjustified as before the conclusion of the
talks for conciliation which were going on through the instrumentality of the Assistant Labour
Commissioner, the Company had retrenched as many as 93 of its workmen without even intimating the
Labour Commissioner that it was carrying out its proposed plan of effecting retrenchment of the workmen.
Hence, the Court answered the first question in the negative. In other words, the Court held that the strike
was neither illegal nor unjustified. On the second question also, the Court held that there was no cogent and
disinterested evidence to substantiate the charge that the striking workmen had resorted to force or violence.
That was also the finding of the Tribunal and hence the Court held that the wages for the strike period could
not be denied to the workmen on that ground as well. It will thus be apparent from this decision that on the
facts, it was established that there was neither a violation of a provision of any statute to render the strike
illegal nor in the circumstances it could be held that the strike was unjustified. On the other hand, it was the
Management, by taking a precipitatory action while the conciliation proceedings were still pending, which
had given a cause to the workmen to go on strike.
Case: Bank of India v T.S.Kelava (Compare to other cases)

The apparent conflict of opinions expressed in three decisions of this Court - a three-Judge Bench decision
in Churakulam Tea Estate (P) Ltd. v. Workmen [AIR 1969 SC 998] and a two-Judge Bench decision in
Crompton Greaves Ltd. v. Workmen [(1978) 3 SCC 155] on the one hand, and a two-Judge Bench decision
in Bank of India v. T.S. Kelawala [(1990) 4 SCC 744] on the other. The question is whether workmen, who
proceed on strike, whether legal or illegal, are entitled to wages for the period of strike?
In the first two cases, viz., Churakulam Tea Estate and Crompton Greaves, the view taken is that the strike
must be both legal and justified to entitle the workmen to the wages for the period of strike whereas the
latter decision in T.S. Kelawala has taken the view that whether the strike is legal or illegal, the employees
are not entitled to wages for the period of strike.
It is, however, apparent from the earlier two decisions, viz., Churakulam Tea Estate and Crompton Greaves
that the view taken there is not that the employees are entitled to wages for the strike period merely because
the strike is legal. The view is that for such entitlement the strike has both to be legal and justified. In other
words, if the strike is illegal but justified or if the strike is legal but unjustified, the employees would not be
entitled to the wages for the strike period.
Fundamental Right to Strike

Law on the subject is well settled that there is no fundamental right to resort to strike. In the case of
Kameshwar Prasad v State of Bihar the court held that the rule, which prohibited strikes, was valid since
there existed no fundamental right to resort to strike. The court in a later case Radhey Shyam Sharma v Post
Master General Central Circle held that a perusal of Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution shows that
there is no fundamental right to strike and the strike thus called was illegal. To come to this conclusion the
court relied on the case of All India Bank Employees Association v National Industrial Tribunal wherein the
court held that even on a very liberal interpretation of sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 19 can lead to
the conclusion that trade and labor unions have the fundamental right to collective bargaining and to strike.
Even lawyers cannot go on strike, not even a token strike.
There is also no statutory provision that allows and empowers employees to go on strike. There is also no
moral or equitable justification to go on strike since many believe that it is a weapon, which is mostly
misused and results in total chaos and maladministration particularly when a large number of employees go
on strike and bring the entire administration and functioning of the industry or workplace to a grinding halt.
Though right to form union and right to freedom of speech and expression are guaranteed under the
Constitution via Articles 19(1) (c) and 19(1) (a) respectively, the right to strike is not derived out of it.
However peaceful demonstrations are allowed.
Case: All India Bank Employees Association v. National Industrial Tribunal
The first case for a consideration that whether the right guaranteed to form a union, provided in Article 19(1)
(c) of the constitution carries within it a concomitant right that the achievement of the object for which the
union if formed. In the said case the employees argued that when Article 19(1)(c) guarantees the right to
form associations, a guarantee is also implied that the fulfillment of every object of an association so formed
is also a protected right. This would translate into a constitutional guarantee that every association shall
effectively achieve the purpose for which it was formed, without interference of law except on the grounds
relevant to the preservation of public order or morality set out in the exception to Article 19(1)(c) in Article
19 (4). In the case mentioned above the court through Justice N. Rajgopala Ayyangar rejected the above-
mentioned argument. The court opined that the unions guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) do not carry with it a
fundamental right in the union so formed to achieve every object for which the union was formed. This
could not be read into the provisions of Article 19 even if the Article were to be given a rather liberal
interpretation. The argument that a trade union was formed for the purpose of collective bargaining which
was possible only through the means of a strike failed due to the fact that the achievement of the objectives
of the union so formed are not guaranteed by the Constitution. The right to strike or to declare a lock out
may be controlled or restricted through appropriate industrial legislation. Such legislation would thereafter
not be tested for validity under Article 19(4) of the Constitution.
Case: Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar
This case was filed against Rule 4A of the Bihar Government Service Conduct Rules 1956, which prohibits
any form of demonstration or strike. The court in the said case held that “Rule 4A in so far as it prohibited
any form of demonstration, be it however innocent or however incapable of causing a breach of public
tranquility, was violative of Arts. 19 (1) (a) and 19 (1)(b) of the Constitution of India, and since on the
language of the rule as it stood it was not possible to so read it as to separate the legal from the
unconstitutional portion of the provision, the entire rule relating to participation in any demonstration must
be declared as ultra vires.” The court thereafter reasoned that since any form of demonstration is the
manifestation of the feelings of an individual or a group, it is thus a communication of ideas to others. This
would thus amount to speech or expression. To support this, the court pointed out that the signs made by a
dumb person are also considered speech, and thus a demonstration would in effect be categorized as speech.
Rule 4A in as much as it prohibited “any form of demonstration” would violate Article 19 (1)(a) and Article
19(1)(b) and would thus be ultra vires. But the court clarified that R 4A prohibiting the right to strike will
not be held unconstitutional, since the right to strike is not a fundamental right. In saying so, the court
followed the reasoning given by the All India Bank Employees case.
Case: In Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India and Anr
It was opined that lawyers have no right to strike or give a call for boycott and they are prohibited from a
token strike too. The Supreme Court has specifically observed that for just or unjust causes, strikes cannot
be justified in the present-day situation. It is very clear that the weapon does more harm than any justice.
The society and the public at large suffer in the process.
Case: T. K. Rangarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu
The case is of considerable importance in the development of the right to strike in India, and thus requires
critical scrutiny. The facts of the case revolve around the unprecedented action of the State of Tamil Nadu,
which terminated the services of all government servants who resorted to strike for the fulfillment of their
demands. The employees challenged the action of the Government in the Madras High Court. They
petitioned the court under Art.226/227 of the Constitution. The court directed the government through an
interim order to allow all these employees to resume work and to wait for further directions. The court took
into consideration factors like termination of services without any enquiry etc. But the division bench of the
High Court reversed this order and dismissed the petition on grounds that the petition was not maintainable,
as other remedies that lay in the Administrative tribunal were not exhausted. The employees had challenged
the validity of the Tamil Nadu Maintenance of Essential Services Act, 2002 and the Tamil Nadu Ordinance
No.3 of 2003, both of which allowed the government to terminate the services of 2 lac employees.

The apex court declared that government servants had neither a fundamental nor a statutory nor a moral
right to go on strikes. The court emphasized on the fact that the apex court had continuously declared that
the right to strike was not a fundamental right. Further no statute allows for such a right, rather the Tamil
Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1973 prohibit strikes and incitements to strikes or similar
activities. The reasoning resorted to by the court was threefold – firstly there is no fundamental right to
strike as was held in many preceding judgments. Secondly, there is no legal or statutory right to strike, as no
statute provides for the same, in fact it is prohibited, and thirdly, there is no moral right to strike since
government employees do not have the right to “hold society to ransom”
Lockouts
A lockout is an employer’s instrument of economic coercion used by him to refuse to employees work if
they do not sign a pledge to belong to a trade union. Employers can also use a lockout in response to a strike
as a measure of retaliation in order to force the workers to give up their demands and work peacefully.
Section 2(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines lockout. It lays down the ambit of the definition of lock
out as closing of a place of employment or suspension of work or refusal by an employer to continue to
employ any number of persons. A lockout in most occasions could be in response to a strike and is often
referred to as an antithesis of strike however the use of both the weapons is regulated by various sections of
the Industrial Disputes Act.
Case: Management of Express Newspapers
Justice Gajendragadkar explains the difference between closure and lockout. A closure includes shutting
down the business all together whereas a lockout the place of employment and work is shut down as a
measure to get the union to accede to their demands. Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Acts states that a
lockout cannot be declared in a public utility service with immediate effect but only after a notice is given
and date is fixed which must not be within 14 days of giving the notice. Section 22 and Section 23 prohibit
lockout of workers if conciliation proceedings are pending. Section 24(3) absolves a lock out of illegality if
it a consequence of an illegal strike. In case of an illegal lock out full wages have to be forked out by the
employers as a means to promote social justice and fairness.
Case: Statesman Limited v Their Workmen
The court made it clear that in case where a strike is unjustified and lockout is justified workmen would not
be entitled to any wages at all whereas where strike is justified and lock out is not they would be entitled to
entire wages for the period of strike and lockout.
Case: Karibetta Estate v Rajamanikam
Just as a strike is a weapon available to the employees for enforcing their industrial demands, a lockout is a
weapon available to the employer to persuade by a coercive process the employees to see his point of view
and to accept his demands. In the struggle between capital and labour, the weapon of strike is available to
labour and is often used by it, so is the weapon of lockout available to the employer and can be used by him.
The use of both the weapons by the respective parties must, however, be subject to the relevant provisions of
the Act. Chapter V, which deals with strikes and lockouts, clearly brings out the antithesis between the two
weapons and the limitations subject to which both of them must be exercised.
Labor Law- Trade Unions Act

What is the concept of a trade union?
Beatrice Webb: “A Trade Union, as we understand the term, is a continuous association of wage-earners for
the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their working lives”

Clyde E Dankert: “ A Trade Union is a continuing organisation of employees established for the purpose of
protecting or improving, through collective action, the economic and social status of its members”
Trade Unions have rom individuality to collective measures and concept of collective bargaining and the
issue of trade union to the emergence of trade union-
 Atrocities of one class over the other

 Attitude of the State- Laissez-Faire (freedom of contract)-free persons, free to choose their
employers and economic liberation and disregarding the condition of the workers
In India:
The 1921 Buckingham & Carnatic Mills case the Madras Union lead by BP Wadia was indicted – criminal
conspiracy and damages against the Union. Post the case a demand was made for trade union legislation and
their activities. In 1926 the (Indian) Trade Union Act was passed.
What are the objectives of the Trade Union Act? What are the methods for implementing it?
To bring about changes:
 Life and living conditions of the workers

 Income and future security
 Greater say in policy making decisions that affect the conditions of the workmen
Mutual Insurance, Collective Bargaining and Political Action

Mutual Insurance:
Income generated used towards the welfare of the members- money constraint. Reducing role owning to the
social security measures undertaken by the State. Mutual Insurance balances the problems associated with
collective bargaining-illegal combination.
Collective Bargaining:
Importance increased after the members received immunity from criminal prosecution and civil liability.
Participation in the decision making process. Collective bargaining and therefore collective agreements at
various levels- national and domestic level
Pros and Cons of Collective Bargaining:
Pros
 Can lead to high-performance workplace where labor and management jointly engage in problem
solving, addressing issues on an equal standing.
 Provides legally based bilateral relationship.
 Management’s rights are clearly spelled out.
 Employers’ and employees’ rights protected by binding collective bargaining agreement.
 Multi-year contracts may provide budgetary predictability on salary and other compensation issues.
 Unions may become strong allies in protecting higher education from the effects of an economic
slowdown.
 Promotes fairness and consistency in employment policies and personnel decisions within and across
institutions.
 Employees may choose whether they want union representation.
 A strong labor management partnership may enable the workforce development needed for engaging
the technology revolution.

Cons
 Management’s authority and freedom are much more restricted by negotiated rules.
 Creates significant potential for polarization between employees and managers.
 Disproportionate effect of relatively few active employees on the many in the bargaining unit. This is
particularly the case when collective bargaining involves a system-wide structure of elections.
 Increases bureaucratization and requires longer time needed for decision-making.
 Increases participation by external entities (e.g., arbitrators, State Labor Relations Board) in higher
education’s decision making.
 Higher management costs associated with negotiating and administering the agreements.
 Eliminates ability of management to make unilateral changes in wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.
 Restricts management’s ability to deal directly with individual employees.
 Increased dependence on the private sector for certain services, particularly those requiring
technological competence, may be compromised.
 Contract administration is a very difficult process to manage and significantly changes the skill set
required of managers and supervisors.
Collective agreement- enforceability:
 Limited degree in India- must be registered with the appropriate government- it forms a settlement
 Failure in collective bargaining may lead to strike
Political Action:
 Developing allegiance to a particular political party to push the issues

 It helps the workmen in general
Write a note on immunity from criminal and civil conspiracy?

Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act deals with criminal conspiracy in trade disputes and provides that no
member of a trade union shall be liable to punishment under Section 120B of the IPC in respect of
agreement between the members for the furtherance of the object of the Union whereas Section 15 sets out
the object for which the general funds may be spent.
Section 18 provides for immunity from civil action, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be maintainable
in any civil court against any registered Trade Union or any other officer in respect of any act done in
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.
Case: Rohtas Industries Limited v Rohtas Industries Staff Union
A dispute arose between the management and unions over the payment of enhanced wages and bonus. This
resulted in a strike. The strike was terminated and the dispute was sent into arbitration. They had to decide-
a) the claim for wages during the period of strike and b) the claim of the management for compensation for
the losses suffered.
The arbitrators held that the workers strike was illegal and they were to pay compensation to the
management. The High Court reversed. The case went up to the Supreme Court via appeal from the
management.
The question asked was could workman pay compensation to the employers do to losses resulting from the
trade unions furtherance of s. 15. It was held that even if it is a illegal strike, the workers cannot give
compensation to the employees. The ID dispute act, the award cannot go beyond the act itself. Nowhere in
the ID will include payment of compensation to the employer.

Case: Vidhyasagar Institute of Mental Health v Vidhyasagar Hospital Employees Union
The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a) declaration that the strike threatened by the defendants employees union
was illegal and b) a restraining order against the union and their members from holding any demonstration.
All efforts to resolve the dispute amicably failed. The court relied on a bunch of principles and held that the
strike/demonstration is illegal.
 Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain suit of this nature

 Immunity given under Section 18 does not extend to conduct those acts, which may amount to an
offence.
 Peaceful demonstration is a fundamental right.
 It is a legitimate right to make legitimate demands. Trade Union ahs the right to make demands in a
peaceful manner.
 No right to hold demonstrations at the residence of the employer.
 Demonstrations cannot be violent or intimidating in nature.
Case: Indian Oxygen v Workmen

Certain disputes arose between the company and its workmen over the payment of overtime and the unions
right to attend various meetings and conventions during working hours. The Industrial Tribunal held in favor
of the workmen of all establishments of the company. The company appealed to the SC.
Questions- a) Whether the Union can change its constitution and extend membership? b) Whether the
workmen were entitled to overtime payment and had the right to attend various meetings?
The SC held that the first contention of the company valid and said that the workmen in the Jamshedpur
factory only would be entitled and not everyone. The court held that Industrial adjudication cannot and
should not ignore the claims of social justice and socio-economic equality. The court held that it is not fair
for the tribunal to ask the company to grant special leave. The overtime rate was allowed but the other
awards of the tribunal were set aside.
Case: Food Corporation of India Staff Union v Food Corporation of India
The FCI and the representatives of the Union agreed to follow the “secret ballot method” for determining the
representative character of the Union. They approached the SC in an appeal and writ to lay down as to how
the method must work to yield the correct result.
“When in an establishment, be it an industry or an undertaking, there are more than one registered trade
unions, the question as to with whom the employer should negotiate or enter into bargaining assumes
importance, because if the trade union claiming this right be one which has as its members minority of the
workmen/employees, the settlement, even if any arrived between the employers and such a unions, may not
be acceptable to the majority and may not result in industrial peace. In such a situation with whom the
employers should bargain, or to put it differently who should be the sole bargaining agent, has been a matter
of discussion and some dispute. The 'check off system' which once prevailed in this domain has lost its
appeals; and so, efforts are on to find out which other system can foot the bill. The method of secret ballot is
being gradually accepted. All concerned would, however, like to see that this method is so adapted and
adjusted that it reflects the correct position as regards membership of the different trade unions operating in
one and the same industry, establishment or undertaking”
Write a note on the registration of trade unions?
Appointment of Registrars (Section 3)
 Appropriate government appoints a person to be a Registrar of Trade Unions for each State
 In addition to the Registrar, the deputy and additional registrar may be appointed
Mode of Registration (Section 4):
 Seven of more members of a Trade Union required
Application for registration (Section 5):

Accompanied by a copy of the rules and statement of the following:
 The names, occupations and addresses of the members making the application
 Name and address of the Trade Union
 Name, title ages, address and occupations of the office bearers of the Trade Union
Section 6:
 Name of the trade union

 Objects of the trade union
 Purposes of General Fund
 Maintenance of a list of the members of the Trade Union and providing the opportunity of inspection
by the office bearer or any other member
Case: Rangaswami v Register of Trade Unions
This is a petition under S. 11 of the Trade Unions Act seeking to set aside the order of the Registrar of Trade
Unions, Madras refusing to register the union of employees of the Madras Raj Bhavan as a trade union
under the Trade Unions Act
The term ‘workman’ under the Act would include one employed in an industry. Although there is no
definition of the term industry in the Act itself, the definition of the term given in the Industrial Disputes Act
should be adopted for ascertaining its meaning as both the enactments related to the same subject, viz., the
betterment of the conditions of labour in the country. If that were done, the term “industry” which is defined
to include an undertaking would be comprehensive enough to cover the case of employees like these
engaged in services at the Raj Bhavan who systematically do material service for the benefit of not merely
the members of the Governor’s household but also to visitors and guests as well. Therefore, the employees
in the present case should be held to be employed in an undertaking by the employer within the meaning of
that term.
The question whether Government servants who form an association amongst themselves would have their
union registered under the Trade Unions Act.
Under Sec. 4 of the Trade Unions Act, a trade union could apply for and obtain registration therefor. That
provision states: Any seven or more members of a trade union may by subscribing their names to the rules
of the trade union and by otherwise complying with the provisions of this Act with respect to registration
apply for registration of the trade union under this Act.
It is therefore necessary to consider what would be a trade union. Section 2(h) defines a trade union thus:
“Trade union means any combination whether temporary or permanent, formed primarily for the purpose of
regulating the relations between workmen and employers or between workmen or workmen or between
employers and employers or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, and
includes any federation of two or more Trade Unions”
The term “workmen” has not been independently defined in the Act. But in the definition of the term “trade
dispute” (which defines such dispute as one between employers and workmen etc.), the definition of the
term “workmen” is found. That runs: ‘workman’ means all persons employed in trade or industry whether or
not in the employment of the employer with whom the trade dispute arises.
To sum up, even apart from the circumstance that a large section of employees at Raj Bhavan are
Government servants who could not form themselves into a trade union, it cannot be stated that the workers
are employed in a trade or business carried on by the employer. The services rendered by them are purely of
a personal nature. The union of such workers would not come within the scope of the Act so as to entitle it
to registration thereunder.
The order of the Registrar of Trade Unions rejecting the application of the petitioners is, therefore, correct.
This petition is dismissed with costs.
Case: Registrar of Trade Unions v. Government Press Employees Union
The Employees of the Pondicherry Government Press constituted themselves into the Government Press
Employees Union and under Section 5 of the Trade Unions Act, applied to the Registrar of Trade Unions,
Pondicherry for registration of the trade union. The Commissioner of Labour, Pondicherry, who happens to
be also the Registrar of Trade Unions, sent a communication to the Secretary of the Government Press
Employees Union on 1.7.1971 regarding his inability to register the trade union under the Trade Unions Act,
1926. The ground given by the Registrar for refusing to register the application was “the present functions of
the Government Press Pondicherry do not come within the meaning of trade or business.”
The learned District Judge, upon a consideration of the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, came to the
conclusion, having regard to the nature of the activities of the Government Press, that it partook of the
character of business and industry and that the workers employed in this industry were entitled to have their
union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926.
The question arises whether the workmen represented by the Government Press Employees Union,
Pondicherry, are persons employed in trade or “industry.” If they are so employed, there can be no difficulty
in holding that their trade union shall be entitled to registration under the Trade Unions Act, 1926.
It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the Government Press, Pondicherry cannot be legitimately
regarded as indulging in trade because it is being conducted without any profit motive. It is true that when
the Government Press prints budget papers and papers for the various departments of the Government, it
does so without any profit motive. But, in view of the admission that the Government Press has also been
printing challans, gazettes and calendars and has been selling the same to the public for a price, it is difficult
to eliminate altogether the profit motive from this enterprise of the Government. Even assuming that the
Government Press is not a trading venture, the more important question that would arise is whether it is not
an ‘industry’ within the meaning of clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant
would, however, contend that the workmen in the employ of the Government Press, Pondicherry, being
Government servants, their trade union is disentitled to registration under the Trade Unions Act.
Learned counsel for the respondents placed strong reliance upon a Division Bench ruling of the Calcutta
High Court in Registrar of Trade Unions, West Bengal v. Mihir Kumar Gooha [AIR 1963 Cal. 56]. That was
a case where the employees of the State Insurance Corporation resolved to form a trade union of their own
and the Registrar of Trade Unions rejected their application for registration under the Indian Trade Unions
Act, 1926. The matter came up before the Calcutta High Court and the Division Bench held that the
Employees’ State Insurance Corporation carried on a ‘trade’ or ‘industry’ and the employees thereof were
‘workmen’ as defined in clause (g) of Sec. 2 of the said Act.
The workmen employed in an Industrial undertaking like the Government Press, Pondicherry, are
‘workmen’ entitled to the benefits of Trade Unions Act of 1926. Consequently, I confirm the judgment of
the Court below and dismiss this petition with costs
Case: Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam v. Commissioner of Labour
The facts in this appeal are that the employees working in Power and Water Works Wings of the appellant-
Devasthanam had applied for registration of their association under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (the “Act”)
which application was allowed. However, the appellant-Devasthanam thereafter made an application under
Section 10 of the Act for cancellation of the registration of the said Union. The Registrar rejected the
application. In appeal, the High Court went into the question as to whether the two wings, viz., the Water
and Power Wings of the appellant-Devasthanam were an ‘industry’ and came to the conclusion that they
were an ‘industry’, and therefore, held that the certificate granted to the Union was not liable to be
cancelled. Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the appellant has come in appeal before us.
The High Court in the present case has upheld the reference of the industrial dispute made by the State
Government on the ground that it had held the said two wings to be an industry in the said earlier writ
petitions. Admittedly, the finding in question was given by the High Court for the purposes of upholding the
validity of the registration of the Union under the Trade Unions Act. We have pointed out; while dismissing
the appeals against the decision in the said writ petitions that the question did not arise even for the limited
purpose under that Act.
We, therefore, set aside the decision both of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High
Court and remand the matter to the learned Single Judge for deciding the question as to whether the two
wings in question are an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for the purposes of
examining the validity of the reference made. The appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
Case: R.S.Ruikar v Emperor (Immunity)

This is an application in revision by R.S. Ruikar who has been convicted of the abetment of the offence of
molestation defined in S. 7, Criminal Law Administration Act (23 of 1932). He was sentenced to six
months’ rigorous imprisonment, and the sentence was upheld on appeal.
The principal contention on behalf of the applicant is that on the facts found against him in trial and in
appeal no offence has been committed as S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act (23 of 1932) can have no
application to purely industrial disputes.
It is next contended that a perusal of the Act as a whole without any reference to the Statement of Objects
and Reasons would indicate that S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act is to be utilized only on occasions of
combating undertakings, which are subversive to the Government.
It is urged that at the time the Criminal Law Amendment Act was passed by the Central Legislature,
assurances were given that S. 7 would not be employed in the case of industrial disputes. In interpreting the
section this Court is precluded from considering any statements made in the Legislative Assembly or
elsewhere on behalf of Government. It is no duty of the Courts of law to examine, criticize or interpret
anything that may be said on behalf of Government in debate or elsewhere, and it is beyond the competence
of this Court to examine the correctness of the applicant’s assertions. The duty of the Court is to interpret the
law as enacted. Had it been the intention of the legislature to exclude the application of S. 7 from cases
arising out of industrial disputes, it would have said so in explicit terms, more particularly in view of the
nature of the majority of the other sections of the Act, which have their origin in other ordinances.
The next contention is that there is a definite conflict between S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act and the
Trade Unions Act of 1926. It is contended that the valuable right given to Trade Unions to declare a strike
and their immunity from liability for criminal conspiracy or to civil suits in connection with the furtherance
of a strike is taken away if S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act, is held to be applicable to trade disputes. I
am unable to see any conflict. Trade Unions have the right to declare strike and to do certain acts in
furtherance of trade disputes. They are not liable civilly for such acts or criminally for conspiracy in the
furtherance of such acts as Trade Unions Act permits, but there is nothing in that Act which apart from
immunity from criminal conspiracy allows immunity from any criminal offences. Indeed any agreement to
commit an offence would, under S. 17, Trade Unions Act, make them liable for criminal conspiracy. S. 7,
Criminal Law Amendment Act, is part of the Criminal law of the land and an offence committed as defined
in that section is an offence to which the concluding sentence of S.17, Trade Unions Act, applies as much as
it would do to an agreement to commit murder.
In abetting the commission of this offence, an offence, which was undoubtedly committed, the applicant has
been correctly convicted.
Case: The Tamil Nadu Non-Gazetted Government Officers’ Union, Madras v. The Registrar of Trade
Unions
The Tamil Nadu Non-Gazetted Government Officers’ Union is a Services Association which has been
recognised by Government, and the membership of which is open, according to Rule 7 of its constitution, to
all Non-Gazetted Government Officers employed under the Government of Madras except the Executive
Officers of the Police and Prisons Departments and the last grade Government servants. The objects of this
Association are set forth in Rule 4 of the Constitution, and it is seen that they are beneficent and
ameliorative in character, designed along the lines of promoting the welfare of the members in multiple
directions. The Association represented by ten of its members applied on 23-12-1957 to the Registrar of
Trade Unions, Madras, for registration as a Trade Union, under section 5 of the Indian Trade Unions Act
(Act XVI of 1926). In a brief order, the Registrar rejected this application, in which, after a reference to
Secs. 2 (g) and 2 (h) of the Act, he held that such an Association of ministerial employees of the
Administrative Departments of offices of the Government of Madras could not claim to be a Trade Union at
all and was not eligible for registration under the Act. Admittedly, against such an order declining
registration an appeal is provided for under section 11 of the Act and this was duly preferred. The learned
Judge who dealt with the proceeding (Rama Chandra Iyer, J., as he them was) delivered a judgment in which
he had occasion to trade, in some detail, the history of the Trade Union movement in the United Kingdom,
in order to elucidate certain fundamental principles. This appeal is before us as preferred by the Union and
its secretary, from the order of the learned Judge.
After referring to the definition of “Trade Union” in section 2 (h) of the Trade Unions Act, the learned Judge
pointed out that a vital consideration would be the content or significance of the word “workmen” as
occurring in section 2 (h) and he was of the view that this word primarily signify only manual laborers or
workers of that class. This was one ground upon which the learned Judge ultimately concluded that civil
servants of the present Association could not be considered as workmen at all. Next the learned Judge
pointed out that the concept of “collective bargaining”, which is the rationale behind the Trade Union
movement and the existence of the Trade Unions was wholly inappropriate when applied to Government
servants.
The Indian Trade Unions Act contemplated not merely collective bargaining, but also the permeation of the
Trade Union by outside influences to a certain extent (Secs. 21 and 22) and definite participation in politics
(Sec. 16). These were elements that had to be totally eschewed, in the public interest itself, with regard to
the civil services. A strike, the acknowledged weapon of Labour organizations, must be considered
inconceivable as a normal feature of the relationship between the State and its civil servants, at least with
regard to essential state functions. This was another vital ground on which the learned Judge considered that
this Services Association was not a trade union and could not be registered as such. Finally, the learned
Judge referred to the Memorandum of Association and the objects as specified in Rule 4, to which we have
made earlier reference. He stressed that those objects were benevolent and ameliorative and that they could
not sustain the interpretation that the association existed for “regulating the relations between workmen and
employers (State)” or, in brief, for “collective bargaining” with the State. Upon all these grounds, the
petition was dismissed.
As we have stated earlier, section 5 of the Act entitles a Trade Union to apply for registration, and provides
that the application shall be accompanied by a copy of the rules of the Trade Union, and statement of
specified particulars. Under section 5 (2), where a Trade Union has been in existence for more than one year
before the making of the application for its registration, a further general statement of assets and liabilities is
required to be submitted. Under section 7 (1) of the Act the Registrar may call for further information, for
the purpose of satisfying himself that an application complied with the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of the
Act and that the Trade Union is entitled to registration. The Registrar may refuse to register a Trade Union
until such information is supplied. Section 8 relates to registration proper, and section 11 provides for an
appeal by a person aggrieved by any refusal of the Registrar to register a Trade Union. This may be the
convenient context for nothing an argument of the learned counsel for the appellant Union (Sri A.
Ramachandran). The learned counsel argues that where as in this case the Registrar did not call for any
further information under section 7. He has really no jurisdiction to decline registration. This argument is
obviously unsustainable.
The very terms of Section 8 are that the Registrar has to register the Union “on being satisfied that the Trade
Union has complied with all the requirements of this Act”; this shows that where the definitions under
sections 2 (g) and 2 (h) are themselves inapplicable to the so- called Union, the Registrar has every power to
decline the registration. It is for the specified purpose of granting redress against the erroneous exercise of
such power that the appeal is provided for under section 11. Section 16 of the Act, as noted by us earlier,
enables the Union to constitute a separate fund for political purposes and objects and to pursue those
purposes, enumerated in section 16 (2). Sections 17 and 18 refer to the immunity of the members of a
registered Trade Union from criminal prosecution in certain respects, and similarly from civil suits in certain
cases. Under sections 21 and 22, there is room for the introduction of outsiders as office bearers into the
executive of a registered Trade Union, or of outsiders as members, after registration.
In the event of the employee of those branches of Government, which do partake of the character of
“industry” organizing themselves into an Association of this kind, they would be eligible for registration as a
trade Union, or otherwise.
We are therefore of the view, on a careful consideration of the grounds urged before us, that the order of the
learned Judge (Ramachandran Iyer, J.,) was correct, and that this appeal has to fail. We accordingly direct
that it be dismissed but, under the circumstances, without costs.
Labor Law- Minimum Wages Act
Wages means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of
contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his
employment or of work done in such employment. It includes house rent allowance but does not include the
value of any house accommodation, supply or light, water, medical attendance or other amenity or service
excluded by general or special order of appropriate Government; contribution paid by the employer to
Pension/ Provident Fund or under scheme of social insurance; traveling allowance or value of traveling
concession; sum paid to the person employed to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his
employment; or any gratuity payable on discharge.
In unorganized sector, where labour is vulnerable to exploitation, due to illiteracy and having no effective
bargaining power, minimum rates of wages are fixed/ revised both by Central and State Governments in the
scheduled employments falling under their respective jurisdictions under the provisions of the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948. The problem: Low wages in industries where predominantly children and women worked
Objective of fixing just and fair wages:
 Reduces friction between employer and employees

 Prevents exploitation
 Balances earning with the requirement

Section 3:
 Different scheduled employments

 Different classes of work in the same scheduled employment
 Adults, Adolescents, children and apprentices
 Different localities
 By the hour, By the day, By the month
 By such other larger wage period as may be prescribed
Section 4:
What are the essential components to be considered?
 “ A basic rate of wages and a special allowance at a rate to be adjusted, at such intervals and in such
manner as the appropriate Government may direct, to accord as nearly as practicable with the
variation in the cost of living index number applicable
 A basic rate of wages with or without the cost of living allowance, and the cash value of the
concessions in respect of supplies of essential commodities at concessional rates, where so
authorized
 An all-inclusive rate allowing for the basic rate, the cost of living allowance and the cash value of the
concessions
Case: Hydro (Engineers) P. Ltd v Workmen-

“The policy of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, was to prevent employment of sweated labour in the general
interest and so the minimum wages must ensure not merely the physical needs of the worker but must
ensure, in addition to his sustenance and that of his family, the preservation of his efficiency as 'a workman
by providing for some measure of education, medical requirements and amenities.”
“The concept of minimum wage does take in the factor of the prevailing cost of essential commodities
whenever such minimum wage is to be fixed. The idea of fixing such wage in the light of cost of living at a
particular juncture of time and of neutralising the rising prices of essential commodities by linking up scales
of minimum wages with the cost of living index cannot, therefore, be said to be alien to the concept of a
minimum wage. Furthermore, in the light of spiralling of prices in recent years, if the wage scales are to be,
realistic, it may become necessary to fix them so as to neutralise at least partly the price rise in essential
commodities”
Case: Crown Aluminium Works v Their Workmen

The capacity of the employers is immaterial and the State assumes that the employers should be liable to pay
the minimum wages.
“Although there can be no rigid and inexorable convention that a wage structure once fixed can never be
changed to the prejudice of the workmen, there are well-recognised principles on which such revision must
be founded, one important principle, to which there can be no exception, is that the wages of workmen
cannot be allowed to fall below the bare subsistence level. It follows, therefore, that no industry can have the
right to exist if it cannot be maintained except by bringing the wages below that level.”
Case: Kamani Metals and Alloys v Their Workmen

Three wage structure: Minimum wage, fair wage and living wage
“Fixation of a wage-structure is always a delicate task because a balance has to be struck between the
demands of social justice which requires that the workmen should receive their proper share of the national
income which they help to produce with a view to improving their standard of living, and the depletion
which every increase in wages makes in the profits as this tends to divert capital from industry into other
channels thought to be more profitable. The task is not rendered any the easier because conditions vary from
region to region, industry-to-industry and establishment-to-establishment. To cope with these differences
this Court has stated certain principles on which wages are fixed from time to time.
Broadly speaking the first principle is that there is a minimum wage which, in any event, must be paid,
irrespective of the tent of profits, the financial condition of the establishment or the availability of workmen
on lower wages., This minimum wage is independent of the kind of industry and applies to all alike big or
small. It sets the lowest limit below which wages cannot be allowed to sink in all humanity.
The second principle is that wages must be fair, that is to say, sufficiently high to provide a standard family
with food, shelter, clothing, medical care and education of children appropriate to the workman but not at a
rate exceeding his wage earning capacity in the class of establishment to which he belongs. A fair wage is
thus related to the earning capacity and the workload. It' must, however, be realised that 'fair wage' is not
'living wage' by which is meant a wage which is sufficient to provide not only the essentials above-
mentioned but a fair measure of frugal comfort with an ability to provide for old age and evil days. Fair
wage lies between the minimum wage, which must be paid in any event, and the living wage, which is the
goal. “
Case: Greaves Cotton v Workmen
These nine appeals by special leave arise out of the awards of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay and will be
dealt with together. The main dispute, which gave rise to the references was with respect to wages, dearness
allowance and gratuity.
There were nine awards, though the main award dealing with the main dispute relating to wages and
dearness allowance was common.
The main attack of the appellants is on the award as regards wages and dearness allowance. It is urged that
the industry-cum-region formula, which is the basis for fixation of wages and the Tribunal has not properly
applied dearness allowance and it had been carried away by the recommendations of the tripartite
conference, which suggested need-based minimum wages. It is also urged that whatever comparison was
made was with concerns which were not comparable and the wages awarded were even higher than those
prevalent in any comparable concern. It is also urged that the Tribunal did not consider the total effect of the
increase it was granting in basic wage and dearness allowance together as it should have done, for the
purpose of finding out whether the total pay packet in the appellants’ concerns can bear comparison with the
total pay packet of the concerns with which the tribunal had compared the appellants’ concerns. In this
connection it is urged that in fixing scales of wages the Tribunal increased the maximum and the minimum
and the annual rate of increment and decreased the span of years in which the maximum would be reached.
The first question therefore which falls for decision is whether the Tribunal went wrong in not following the
industry-cum-region principle and in leaning on the recommendations of the tripartite conference. It is true
that the Tribunal begins its award with a reference to the recommendations of the tripartite conference
wherein the need-based minimum wage was evolved. It is urged that this disposed the Tribunal to pitch
wage scales too high. It is however clear from the award that though the Tribunal discussed the
recommendations of the tripartite conference at some length, when it actually came to make the award it did
not follow those recommendations. The reason why it referred to those recommendations was that the
respondents-workmen based their claim on them and wanted that the Tribunal should fix wage scales
accordingly. But the tribunal’s conclusion was that it was not feasible to do so, though looking at the
financial stability of the appellants, emoluments needed upgrading. It then went on to consider the wages
prevalent in comparable concerns and finally fixed wages for the appellants on the basis of wages prevalent
in such concerns.
The first question therefore which falls for decision is whether the Tribunal went wrong in not following the
industry-cum-region principle and in leaning on the recommendations of the tripartite conference. It is true
that the Tribunal begins its award with a reference to the recommendations of the tripartite conference
wherein the need-based minimum wage was evolved. It is urged that this disposed the Tribunal to pitch
wage scales too high. It is however clear from the award that though the Tribunal discussed the
recommendations of the tripartite conference at some length, when it actually came to make the award it did
not follow those recommendations. The reason why it referred to those recommendations was that the
respondents-workmen based their claim on them and wanted that the Tribunal should fix wage scales
accordingly. But the tribunal’s conclusion was that it was not feasible to do so, though looking at the
financial stability of the appellants, emoluments needed upgrading. It then went on to consider the wages
prevalent in comparable concerns and finally fixed wages for the appellants on the basis of wages prevalent
in such concerns.
We therefore dismiss the appeals so far as retrospective effect and adjustments as also fixation of wages and
dearness allowance with respect to clerical and subordinate staff are concerned. We allow the appeal with
respect to factory-workmen and send the cases back to the Tribunal for fixing the wage structure including
basic wage and dearness allowance and for granting adjustments in the light of the observations made by us.
The new award pursuant to this remand will also come into force from the same date, namely, April 1,1959.
The appeals with respect to gratuity are dismissed. In the circumstances we order parties to bear their own
costs. Two months from today is allowed to pay up the arrear.
Case: Workmen v. Reptakos Brett & Co. Ltd
The Reptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. (the ‘Company’) is engaged in the manufacture of pharmaceutical and
dietetic specialty products and is having three units, two at Bombay and one at Madras. The Madras factory,
with which we are concerned, was set up in the year 1959. The Company on its own provided slab system of
dearness allowance (DA), which means the DA, paid to the workmen was linked to cost of living index as
well as the basic wage. The said double-linked DA scheme was included in various settlements between the
Company and the workman and remained operative for about thirty years. The question for our
consideration is whether the Company is entitled to restructure the DA scheme by abolishing the slab system
and substituting the same by the scheme - prejudicial to the workmen - on the ground that the slab system
has resulted in over-neutralization thereby landing the workmen in the high-wage island.
The workmen raised several demands in the year 1983 which were referred for adjudication to the Industrial
Tribunal, Madras. The Company in turn made counter demands, which were also referred to the said
Tribunal. One of the issues before the Tribunal was as under:
“Whether the demand of the management for restructuring of the dearness allowance scheme is justified, if
so, to frame a scheme?”
The Tribunal decided the above issue in favour of the Company and by its award dated October 14, 1987
abolished the existing slab system of DA and directed that in future dearness allowance in the Company, be
linked only to the cost of living index at 33 paise per point over 100 points of the Madras City Cost of
Living Index 1936 base. The Tribunal disposed of the two references by a common award. The Company as
well as the workmen filed separate writ petitions before the Madras High Court challenging the award of the
Tribunal. While the two writ petitions were pending the parties filed a joint memorandum dated June 13,
1988, before the High Court in the following terms:
“In view of the settlement dated May 13, 1988 entered into between the parties, a copy of which is enclosed,
both the parties are not pressing their respective writ petitions except with regard to the issue relating to
restructuring of dearness allowance.”
The learned Single Judge of the High Court upheld the findings of the Tribunal on the sole surviving issue
and dismissed the writ petition of the workmen. The writ appeal filed by the workmen was also dismissed by
the High Court by its judgment dated September 14, 1989. The present appeal by special leave is against the
award of the Tribunal as upheld by the High Court.
The Fair Wages Committee, in its report published by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, in
1949, defined the “living wage” as under:
“The living wage should enable the male earner to provide for himself and his family not merely the bare
essentials of food, clothing and shelter but a measure of frugal comfort including education for the children,
protection against ill-health, requirements of essential social needs, and a measure of insurance against the
more important misfortunes including old age.”
The Committee’s view regarding “minimum wage” was as under:
“The minimum wage must provide not merely for the bare sustenance of life but for the preservation of the
efficiency of the worker. For this purpose the minimum wage must also provide for some measure of
education, medical requirements and amenities.”
The concept of ‘minimum wage’ is no longer the same as it was in 1936. Even 1957 is way behind. A
worker’s wage is no longer a contract between an employer and an employee. It has the force of collective
bargaining under the labour laws. Each category of the wage structure has to be tested at the anvil of social
justice, which is the live-fiber of our society today. Keeping in view the socio-economic aspect of the wage
structure, we are of the view that it is necessary to add the following additional component as a guide for
fixing the minimum wage in the industry:
“Children’s education, medical requirement minimum recreation including festivals/ceremonies and

provision for old age marriages etc. should further constitute 25 per cent of the total minimum wage.”
The wage structure, which approximately answers the above six components is nothing more than a
minimum wage at subsistence level. The employees are entitled to the minimum wage at all times and under
all circumstances. An employer who cannot pay the minimum wage has no right to engage labour and no
justification to run the industry.
A living wage has been promised to the workers under the Constitution. A ‘socialist’ framework to enable
the working people a decent standard of life has further been promised by the 42nd Amendment. The
workers are hopefully looking forward to achieve the said ideal. The promises are piling up but the day of
fulfillment is nowhere in sight. Industrial wage - looked at as a whole - has not yet risen higher than the level
of minimum wage.
Labor Law- Equal Remuneration Act
As per the ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951

Article 1- For the purpose of this Convention--
(a) The term remuneration includes the ordinary, basic or minimum wage or salary and any additional
emoluments whatsoever payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by the employer to the
worker and arising out of the worker's employment;
(b) The term equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value refers to rates of
remuneration established without discrimination based on sex.”
Constitutional Provision-
Article 39(d)- “Policy of the State should be directed towards equal pay for both men and women”
Article 14 (Equality before law) and Article 16 (Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment)
“The principle implies that where all things are equal, that is, where all relevant considerations are the same,
persons holding identical posts may not be treated differently in the matter of their pay merely because they
belong to different departments”
What does Equal Pay for Equal Work mean?
The principle of equal work to men and women worker has been gaining increasing acceptance all over the
world. In many countries, law has been passed prohibiting discrimination between men and women in
matters relating to payment of wages for similar work. The State Policy article 39 of the Constitution
envisages that the State shall direct its policy, among other things, towards securing that there is equal pay
for equal work for both men and women.
The question is whether all the staff members must be paid equally without considering their seniority, the
source of their recruitment, qualifications and service related incidents.
Section 2(h) “Same work or work of a similar nature” means work in respect of which the skill, effort and
responsibility required are the same, when performed under similar working conditions, by a man or a
woman and the differences, if any, between the skill, effort and responsibility required of a man and those
required of a woman are not of practical importance in relation to the terms and conditions of employment.
Prohibition of discrimination in recruitment or other condition of service (Section 5) This Act, no employer
shall while making recruitment for the same work or work of a similar nature, or in any condition of service
subsequent to recruitment such as promotions, training or transfer, make any discrimination against women
except where the employment of women in such work is prohibited or restricted by or under any law for the
time being in force: Provided that the provisions of this section shall not affect any priority or reservation for
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, ex-servicemen, retrenched employees or any other class or category
of persons in the matter of recruitment to the posts in an establishment or employment.
Higher pay to a junior- is the situation ex-facie arbitrary- but there may be justifiable grounds- State of A.P.
and others v. G. Sreenivasa Rao & others (1989)
Instances when a junior may draw more
 Better qualification
 Going through internal test /assessment
State of A.P. and others v. G. Sreenivasa Rao & others (1989)
State of West Bengal v Hari Narayan Bhowal

In this case the Volunteer Force in West Bengal was involved in helping the Police Force to maintain law
and order. On other occasions the Volunteer Force helped in case of other emergencies. They were paid less
in this case.
Claim-
 Nature of work similar

 Denying same pay violation of equal pay and equal work
Respondent-
Nature of work may be similar but justified pay scale
 The recruitment process different

 Required qualifications differed
 Physical ability differed
The High Court held that the nature of work of the respondents was more or less that of the constables of the
police force, especially, when they are called upon to maintain law and order, held that there was no
justification to deny the same scale of pay, to the respondents on the principle of "equal pay for equal work”.
The whole concept of the National Volunteer Force is different from that of the police force. In respect of
the volunteers, it can be said that it is a standby force, not only for law and order, but for different
emergencies, to aid and help the regular police force or members of the other services. In public services,
nature of work in two services or in the same service, the nature of the work of the two groups may be more
or less same. But merely on that ground they are not entitled to the same scale of pay.
Specialized knowledge of experts- Pay Commission
 Not only nature of work

 Educational qualifications, responsibilities of the posts and experience
 Equal pay for equal work" can be enforced only after the persons claiming satisfy the court that not
only the nature of work is identical but in all other respects they belong to the same class and there is
no apparent reason to treat equals as unequal’s.
The standard is that they must-
 Discharge of similar duties

 Functions
 Responsibilities
Checking Discrimination
M/s Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd v. Andrey D’Costa and another-
Claim: Paid less than male stenographers-performing similar work
Respondent: Duty as Confidential Stenographer- attached to the Senior Executives- hence not similar work
as male Stenographers.
In deciding whether the work is the same or broadly similar-

The Authority should take an equally broad approach, for, the very concept of similar work implies
differences in details, but these should not defeat a claim for equality on trivial grounds. It should look at the
duties actually and generally performed not those theoretically possible by men and women. Where,
however, both men and women work at inconvenient times, there is no requirement that all those who work
e.g. at night shall be paid the same basic rate as all those who work normal day shifts. Thus a woman who
works days cannot claim equality with a man on higher basic rate for working nights if in fact there are
women working nights on that rate too, and the applicant herself would be entitled to that rate if she changed
shifts.
The fact that the management was not employing any male as a Confidential Stenographer attached to the
senior Executives in the establishment and that there was no transfer of Confidential Lady Stenographer to
the general pool of Stenographers where males were working ought not to make any difference for purposes
of the application of the Act. Once It is established that the lady Stenographers were doing practically the
same kind of work which the male Stenographers were discharging the employer is hound to pay the same
remuneration to both of them irrespective of the place where they were working unless it is shown that the
women are not fit to do the work of the male Stenographer.
There is no custom or rule that only ladies can be Confidential Stenographers. If only women are working as
Confidential Stenographers it is because the management wants them there. Women are neither specially
qualified to be Confidential Stenographers nor disqualified on account of sex to do the work assigned to the
male Stenographers”
The petitioner contends that the enforcement of the Act will be highly prejudicial to the management, since
its financial position is not satisfactory and the management is not able to pay equal remuneration to both
male Stenographers and female Stenographers. The Act does not permit the management to pay to a section
of its employees doing the same work or a work of similar nature lesser pay contrary to section 4(1) of the
Act only because it is not able to pay equal remuneration to all. The applicability of the Act does not depend
upon the financial ability of the management to pay equal remuneration as provided by it.
Case: Randhir Singh v Union of India
The principle of “equal pay for equal work” has not been expressly declared by our constitution as a
fundamental right but it is definitely a constitutional goal. Some courts have pointed out that directive
principles must be read into fundamental rights in this situation. Article 14 enjoins the state not to
discriminate and deny any person equality before law or equal protection of laws.
Case: Associate Bank Officers v State Bank and Others
Equal pay for equal work is one of the directive principles laid down under Article 39(d) and even though it
is non justiciable it must be borne in mind by the legislature while making laws. In this case unions of
employees of various banks, which are subsidiaries of the State Bank of India claimed higher terminal
benefits, better medical benefits and extra increments in pay. It is the contention of the employees that the
subsidiary banks are entitled to the same benefits of the State Bank.
The court held that the employees of the subsidiary banks are not employees of the state bank, which has its
own capital structure, and thus they were not entitled to the same benefits.
Case: State of Haryana v Jasmer Singh / State of Haryana v Piara Singh / Chief Conservator of Forests v
Maruti Kondhare
The court in these cases held that a daily wage employee who is performing similar duties similar to regular
employees is entitled to the same pay. The court held that similarity in the designation or quantum of work
are not determinative of equality in the matter of pay scales and that before entertaining and accepting the
claim based on the principle of equal pay for equal work, the court must consider the factors such as source
and mode of recruitment, appointment, qualifications, value of judgment responsibilities, reliability,
experience, confidentiality and functional need.
Case: State of Punjab v Surjit Singh

The applicability of doctrine of equal pay for equal work was discussed. The respondents were appointed in
different capacities in public health department of State of Punjab. The SC observed that in our
constitutional scheme “equal pay for equal work” has a definite place and Article 39(d) read with Article 14
explains this clearly. The court held that equal pay for equal work must satisfy the tests of identical and
work and they are discharging equal work and same duties, the equality clause should be invoked only when
the parties are similarly situated and where orders passed are legal.
Case: Haryana State Electricity Board v Gulshan Lal
The appellant is constituted and registered under the Electricity Supply Act. There were discrepancies in the
pay scale of technicians and senior technicians. A suit was filed the basis of which was equal pay for equal
work. The court said that it was not the similar nature of work in itself that was enough for the employee to
invoke the doctrine, other factors such as qualifications and experience were important as well.

No discrimination should be made between men and women workers while recruiting
Case: Air India Cabin Crew v Yeshaswini Merchant and Air India Officers Association v Air India Limited
Appeals were filed against the division bench of the Bombay High Court. The court held that the age of
retirement from flying duties of air hostesses at the age of 50 and then accepting ground duty till age of 58 is
discrimination against them based on sex, which is violative of Article 14, 15 and 16 of the constitution. The
courts relied on Air India v Nargesh Meerza as various constitutional principles were highlighted in this case
regarding service conditions and lower age of retirement.
Section 4 of the Equal Remuneration Act prohibits the employer from paying unequal remuneration to male
and female workers for work of a similar nature whereas Section 5 requires the employer not to discriminate
men and women with respect to recruitment conditions of service for same work or work of similar nature.
The expression “same work and of similar nature” has been defined in Section 2(h) of the Equal
Remuneration Act.
(Page 838-840 of the reading on ER)
Retrenchment: Barsi Light Railway Company & all cases afterwards like Sundramoney, Hindustan
Steel, Delhi Cloth Mills, etc. (Refer to OP Malhotra material mailed to you)
Retrenchment definition – Section 2(oo) of the ID Act- Very wide definition, in 2 parts- Termination of
employee, for any ‘reason whatsoever’ apart from disciplinary action. The second part excludes four kinds
of removal:
Voluntary retirement/ Retirement of superannuation/ Termination on non-renewal of COE/Termination on

ill health
Eranallor Service Coop Bank Ltd. v. Labour Court (Kerala HC)-The appointment of any employee
without the authority of law was void ab initio and therefore the removal will not count as retrenchment.
Mithilesh Kumar v. State of Bihar-Termination of service on account of initial appointment being illegal
will amount to retrenchment. The idea of an illegal and invalid appointment is ‘quite foreign’ to the Act.
Srirangan Coop Urban Bank v. Labour Court- The appointment of a temporary clerk in defiance of the
bank’s rules and regulations was not grounds to make his termination legal. Retrenchment was wide enough
to apply to his case since he had put in over 2 years of service which was more than the continuous one year
required by Section 25(f).
Rajesh Kumar v. M.P.- Termination of the employment of a probationer on an invalidly appointed worker
will not be retrenchment since it is not one of the exceptions given in the Act.
Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union- In ordinary parlance, retrenchment
means discharge of the labour staff when the business is being continued. If there is discharge due to
closure, it is not retrenchment.
Barsi Light Railway case- This analysed the definition of retrenchment in 2(oo) and said it only means the
discharge of surplus labour for any reason. Analysing the discharge bit, it said that the discharge could only
happen when the industry was fully functioning. This was the definition of ‘any reason whatsoever’ – can
only happen when the company is running.
Anakappala Coop Agriculture & Industrial Society case- Retrenchment merely means discharge of
surplus workers. Note: before this case, there was an amendment which incorporated Section 25(fff), which
paid wages and entailed notice before retrenching employees.
Municipal Corp of Greater Bombay case-Discharge of workmen for reason of surplus.
National Garage, Nagpur v. J. Gonsalves- Retrenchment depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case – this case held that it could only constitute retrenchment if the discharge was due to reasons of surplus.
Any other reason would not amount to retrenchment. This was where things changed.
Digwadih Colliery case- This case said that the termination of a service of a workman who had worked for
more than 240 days was retrenchment.
Management of Wilcox Buckwell -Even the retrenchment of a temporary worker on grounds of surplus
was retrenchment.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. Case-The striking-off of the name of the workman off the list of
employees constitutes retrenchment. This was followed in the case of H.D. Singh v. RBI and subsequently
by a number of High Court decisions. Under a standing order, the employee’s name was struck off the rolls
because he was absent for more than 8 days. This was contented to be a case of wrongful termination rather
than retrenchment. However, the court found that it was retrenchment because even though it was done
under a standing order, it was done by the employer.
State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jalandhar- This said that termination for any reason except
superannuation was retrenchment – most importantly, it is immaterial that the termination is
occasioned by the need to discharge surplus labour. This completely changed the situation.
Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa- Termination of service in terms of a contract is also retrenchment
and there is no difference between termination by reason of expiry of contract and termination under the
living contract. This applies to contract of service. It was also said that the termination was automatic, as per
the contract i.e. scheduled to expire on a particular day. Such termination would still be retrenchment, in
spite of the existence of this contract.
SBI v. N. Sunderamoney- The termination of service of a temporary workman employee only for a certain
number of days under the COE would constitute retrenchment. It bases its decision on ‘any reasons
whatsoever’ in the definition. It appears to have been swayed by the unfair conduct of the employer.
Santosh Gupta v. SBI- Retrenchment cannot be defined as per the meaning in the Act. The court observed
that the expression retrenchment must include every act of termination of the service of a workman by the
employer unhampered by precedent. Every termination due to surplus or otherwise would be retrenchment.
Robert D’Souza case- Here, it was held that retrenchment would have to be done by the employer and not
by an act of an employee.
Haryana v. Om Prakash - Reiterated what was said in the above case – namely, that retrenchment had to
be an act of the employer and not the employee, which puts an end to the service.
Punjab Land Rev. Corp case- This case stated that retrenchment means termination for any reason
whatsoever except the reasons mentioned in the Act. This case went against Barsi Light Railway and the
Pipraich case. Note: so basically, Barsi Light Railway narrowed the scope of retrenchment. Then Punjab v.
Labour Court, Jalandhar widened the scope along with Hindustan Steel and then Sundramoney. Then the
Punjab Land Revenue Corp. also went along with Sundramoney, and kept the scope for retrenchment wide,
contradicting Barsi Light Railway, Pipraich and Hariprasad.

Anand Bihari v. Rajasthan State Transport Corporation- Here the driver had bad eyesight and was
terminated – this was held to be within the category of ill health, and therefore did not qualify as
retrenchment.
Hindustan Lever Ltd. Case- Voluntary retirement was found to be retrenchment when the employers
induced the employees to opt for the retirement scheme. This was not found to be ‘voluntary’, since it was
induced. At the same time, New Haven Steel Ball Corporation Ltd. said that voluntary resignation was not
retrenchment, since offering a voluntary retirement scheme was within managerial rights.
Narendra Singh Solanki v. Raw and Finishing Production- An employee abandons employment
voluntarily and did not report for duty for nearly 4 years, it was termination and not retrenchment.
LIC v. Raghavendra Kulkarni- As per the appointment letter, the termination of probationer is not
retrenchment. Note: The situation of a probationer is distinct from a temporary worker.
Morinda Coop Sugar Mills v. Ram Kishan-The termination of service of a casual workman as per the
contract would not amount to retrenchment.
MP Karamchari Sangh v. Syndicate Bank- The provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) talk about the termination
under non-renewal of contract – this should be construed benevolently in favour of the workmen. If the
workman continues in service, the non-renewal can be deemed malafide.

Final Notes - Labor Law 1

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Final Notes - Labor Law 1

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THE DEFINITION AND CONCEPT OF ‘INDUSTRY’ UNDER SECTION 2( j) OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Case: Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruthi Kondhare-1996- (Regal functions)

Case: State of UP v. Jaiveer Singh

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Case: All India Radio and Door Darshan:

Case: Sub Divisional Inspector of Post (1996):

Case: Bombay telephone canteen employment (1997):

Labor Law- Industrial Dispute

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Case: J.H. Jadhav v. Forbes Gokak Ltd

(1) The dispute is connected with the employment or non-employment of a workman.

Labor Law- Workmen

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Case: Indian Bank Association v Workmen of Syndicate Bank

Write a note on the nature of work?

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Case: A. Sundarambal v Government of Goa, Daman and Diu

Case: May and Baker (India) Ltd v Their Workmen

Case: H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd.

Case: Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen

Case: S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra

Case Analysis: May & Baker, WIMCO, Burmah Shell

Labor Law- Strikes and Lock Outs

 There must be a cessation of work

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Legality and Justification of Strikes

Case: Crompton Greaves v Workmen

Case: Bank of India v T.S.Kelava (Compare to other cases)

Fundamental Right to Strike

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Case: Statesman Limited v Their Workmen

Case: Karibetta Estate v Rajamanikam

Labor Law- Trade Unions Act

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

 Atrocities of one class over the other

 Life and living conditions of the workers

Mutual Insurance, Collective Bargaining and Political Action

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

Collective agreement- enforceability:

 Developing allegiance to a particular political party to push the issues

Write a note on immunity from criminal and civil conspiracy?

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB

 Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain suit of this nature

Case: Indian Oxygen v Workmen

Mode of Registration (Section 4):

 Seven of more members of a Trade Union required

Application for registration (Section 5):

 Name of the trade union

Case: Rangaswami v Register of Trade Unions

Case: Registrar of Trade Unions v. Government Press Employees Union

Case: Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam v. Commissioner of Labour

Case: R.S.Ruikar v Emperor (Immunity)

Labor Law- Minimum Wages Act

Objective of fixing just and fair wages:

 Reduces friction between employer and employees

Arman Sood 4th Year BA.LLB