Democracy

Author(s): Richard Wollheim

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Apr., 1958), pp. 225-242
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 DEMOCRACY *

BY RICHARD WOLLHEIM

A.

The AncientGreeksare generallyregardedas the foundersof

Democracy.Andrightly so,forit is to themthatwe areindebtedfor
theearliestexamplesofDemocracyin practiceand in theory, and in-
deed fortheworditself.
It needsto be remembered, however, that,ultimately, Antiquity
rejectedDemocracy.'As a formofgovernment it lackedpermanence
even in Athens,and in the realmof speculation,the mostfamous
thinkersbothof Greeceand Rome Plato and Aristotle, Ciceroand
Seneca-wereagainstit. One consequence of thisis thatourknowl-
edgeand understanding ofclassicaldemocratic thought is ofnecessity
partialand limited;and someof its finestexpressions-such as the
FuneralOrationofPericles-havebeeninfluential morethrough suc-
cessivemisinterpretations thanin virtueof whattheyactuallysay.
Both the practiceand the theoryof Democracyappear to be
somewhatolder than the worditself. It is convenientto regard
Cleisthenesas the creatorof Atheniandemocraticgovernment (c.
508 B.C.),butit is mostunlikelythateitherhe or his contemporaries
usd the term 8oqUKpa-ta.2 Equally,it seemsthat manyof the argu-
mentslaterto be usedin favorofDemocracyhad alreadybeenvoiced
in an earliercontroversy: that betweenthe supporters of the un-
fetteredruleof one man and thosewhobelievedin a systemunder
whichall were equal beforethe law (haovoMAta).3 we
This controversy
* This articlewas prepared in cooperationwiththeprojectof a " Dictionary of
Fundamental Termsof Philosophy and PoliticalThought" sponsored by theInter-
nationalCouncilforPhilosophyand HumanisticStudiesand plannedand carried
out withtheassistanceof UNESCO. [Editor'sNote: The plan of the Dictionary
is to inquireintothedivergent meanings oftermsin different
culturaltraditions
and
therefore fiveessaysin fivedifferent languages(French,German,Italian,Spanish,
and English)are plannedto tracethe historyof each conceptfromthe common
classicalbackground to thepeculiardevelopment attachedto the termin the lan-
guageand culturaltradition oftheauthor.The workis directed byan international
editorialcommittee madeup ofProfessors A. J. Ayer(GreatBritain),Hans Barth
(Switzerland), G. Calogero(Italy), R. Klibansky(Canada), A. Koyr6 (France),
E. GarciaMaynez(Mexico),R. McKeon (UnitedStates),and J. Wahl (France).]
1 J. A. 0. Larsen," Judgment of Antiquityon Democracy," ClassicalPhilology,
49 (1954), 1-4.
2 A. Debrunner, FestschriftfiurE. Tieche(Bern,1947), 11-24;
"Af7oKpaTna,"
VictorEhrenberg, "Originsof Democracy,"Historia (1950), 515-48; J. A. 0.
Larsen," Cleisthenes and theDevelopment oftheTheoryofDemocracyat Athens,"
Essaysin PoliticalTheoryPresentedto GeorgeH. Sabine (Ithaca,1948), 1-16.
3 Gregory Vlastos," Isonomia,"American Journal 74 (1953),337-66.
ofPhilology,
225

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226 RICHARD WOLLHEIM

glimpsein the worksof Aeschylus(Pers. 213-4; Pr. Bound 323-4;

Suppliants,passim)and,moreliberally, in thefamousaccountgiven
by Herodotus(Hist. III 80-4) of a debate betweena numberof
Persiannoblesimmediately upon the deathof the Magian usurper
in 522B.C. Theydiscusswhatkindofgovernment shouldbe adopted,
and in thecourseofthedebate-whichthoughclearlyapocryphal as
a pieceof Persianhistory is mostprobablya goodindexof 'progres-
sive' Athenianthoughtof the periodjust afterthe PersianWar
[491-79B.C.]-Otanes,thesupporter oftlovouta, notmerelyputsfor-
wardwhatare to be the main democratic arguments but also lays
downthe termswithinwhichmostfuturediscussionof the subject
is to be contained.These deserveexamination:
In the firstplace,the discussionaboutDemocracyis primarily a
discussionabout formsof government, not one about formsof so-
ciety. Of course,it was a commonplace of Greekpoliticalthinking
thatconstitutional formshavean all-important effecton themanners
or ways (7rpO'ol) of the citizens. So, for instance,Periclesin the
FuneralOration(Thuc. Hist. II. 35-46) claimsthat AthenianDe-
mocracy was an educationforall itsmembers;and Plato,in asserting
a completeparallelismbetweenthe organization of a Polis and the
organization ofthesoulsofthosewholivein it,was onlygeneralizing
popularconceptions.But,forall that,Democracy was notassociated
in the classicalmindwithany clear-cutformof societyin the sense
of specificsocialstructure.To Pericles,forinstance,Democracyis
perfectly compatiblewithdifferences of wealth;whatit is not com-
patiblewithis that these differences shouldcarrywiththemany
politicalinfluence. In Demosthenes' Fourth Philippic(OrationesX.
44) we findthesameconception.Even Aristotle, themostsociologi-
cally mindedof ancientthinkers, who talks of Democracyas the
naturalproductof a particular formof society(Pol. III. 1286b),has
yet nothingseriousto say about it as an active agentin society.
Moreoverit mustbe remembered thatthe advocatesof Democracy
(withtheexception ofa fewradicalsophists, e.g.,Antiphon)regarded
consistent
it as perfectly withtheexclusionof slaves,foreigners, and
womenfrompoliticallife; and even,it wouldseem,withan oppres-
siveregimeoversubjectterritory (cf. Pericles'FuneralOration).
Secondly,Democracyas a formof government is rigorouslycon-
nectedwith,ifnotidentified by,certainspecific politicalinstitutions.
Otanesrefersto the selectionof officials by lot,the scrutinyat the
endofa termofoffice, andthedecisionofpolicybypopularassembly.
In practicedemocrats recognizedthatcertainoffices ofstate,e.g.,the
commandof the army,called forspecialskill and in consequence
werepreparedto allowthatsuchpostsshouldbe removedfromthe
sphereof lottery.But apartfromthisand similarminormodifica-

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 DEMOCRACY 227

tions,the listof essentialdemocratic institutionsremainsfairlycon-

stantthroughout theclassicalperiod.
Thirdly, thesuperiority or otherwise offormsofgovernment is to
be determined by a criterion
thatis, afterall, essentially practical-
if in the veryhighestsenseof the word; namely,the capacityto
providerationaland harmonious government, bothrationality and
harmony beingconceivedofas empirically verifiable phenomena.As
an applicationof thiscriterion the superiority of Democracyis held
to reston thesurerwisdomofthemany. Thoseto whomDemocracy
givespowermay individually varyin intelligence and goodwill,but
collectivelytheyare boundto be superior.This viewwhichis sug-
gestedby Otanesreappearsin theFuneralOration,thoughits classi-
cal formulation is in Aristotle(Pol. III. 1281b) who,however,re-
countsit moreas a goodand establishedargument thanas one that
he personallyaccepts. Behindthis argumenttherelies the great
issuein Greekpoliticalphilosophy:whether government is an expert
skill,likemedicine andnavigation, ora matterin whichall areequally
competent.This issuefindsits mostphilosophical expressionin the
Republic,wheretheargument is betweengovernment basedon mere
Opinion(8o0'a), whichis thepossession ofthemany,and government
grounded in Truth(aAX7OdEa),
whichis theprerogative ofthefew. Plato
claims to 'prove' the superiority of philosophicalrule, and De-
mocracyis in consequencecondemned.
Neitheroftwofamousmodernarguments forDemocracy-i.e.,the
moralargument thatall menhavetherightto governthemselves, and
thescepticalargument thatsincemencan neverknowwhatis right,
theyshouldbe governedin accordancewiththeirwishes-is much
heardofas faras we knowin antiquity.Aristotle at one pointmen-
tionsone established'democratic'argumentwhichmightseem to
have a scepticalring-i.e.,that 'the diner,not the cook,willbe the
bestjudgeof a feast' (Pol. 1282a). However,Aristotle in thispas-
sageis notmaintaining thatthereis no certainmethodofjudginggood
government, but ratheris suggesting thathitherto thismethodmay
have beenmisconceived.
In classicalthought-andso ultimately in laterthought baseddi-
rectlyupon it-Democracyis seldomconsidered in isolation. Con-
stitutionaldiscussiongenerallytakesthe formof drawingup a list
of all possibleformsof government and thencontrasting, favorably
or unfavorably, themeritsof each witheach. Not onlydo different
thinkers varyin theirestimatesof Democracy, but theytendto dis-
agreeon themeaningthattheyattachto theconceptaccording to the
waytheyhavedrawnup theirinitiallists. Forthelistbeingintended
as exhaustive, each itemin it drawsits meaningnegatively fromthe
otheritems,i.e.,it meanswhattheydon'tmean. In theRepublicthe

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228 RICHARD WOLLHEIM

of states(i.e.,imperfect
classification states)is fourfold-Timocracy,
Oligarchy, Democracy,Tyranny;in Xenophon'sMemorabiliait is
fivefold-Kingship, Tyranny, Aristocracy,
Plutocracy,Democracy;in
the Politicusit is sixfold-Kingship, Aristocracy and Democracyby
consent,and Tyranny, Oligarchyand Democracyby violence;in the
Politicsit is again sixfold-Kingship, Aristocracy and Polity,and
Tyranny,Oligarchyand Democracy. This rathersterilemethodof
discussinggovernmentasthoughall possibleformsof organization
weretimelessly laid open to inspectionand Historyhad nothingto
teach-was unfortunately the featureof classicalspeculationthat
medievalthinkers foundeasiestto assimilate.In consequence it dis-
figuresmuchoftheirspeculation.Significantly, however,therealand
permanentcontribution of the Middle Ages to the historyof De-
mocracywas madein the fieldnot of theorybut of practice:in the
development ofrepresentation. Representationalinstitutions,
though
not unknownin antiquity-as somehistorianshave claimed-were
nearlyeverywhere of farless importancethanthe 'primaryassem-
blies'in whichall thecitizensparticipated.4
B.
The development oftheconceptofDemocracyin Anglo-American
discussionsis hardto trace. In thefirst place,it is extremely
complex.
Secondly,it is intertwined withthehistoryof relatedconceptssuch
as Equality,Liberty, Toleration,etc.; to separatethemout is almost
impossible, to leave theminvolvedis disastrous.And thirdly, there
is no cleardividingline betweenthe historyof Democracyand the
presentconditionof Democracywithall the problemsand contro-
versiesthatsurround it. Accordingly, thebestthatcan be doneis to
isolatethemostimportant singleincidentsin thislonghistory.
1. The Puritans. It was in the courseof theEnglishCivil War,
amongstthemoremilitantPuritansects,thatthemodernnotionof
Democracyoriginated.It was theproductof twodominantideas of
Puritanism.First,the beliefin the separationof churchand state.
The originalCalvinistdoctrineof passiveobediencegave wayunder
theimpactofofficial hostilityand persecution to a vociferous
separa-
tism. Thismadepossibleforthefirst timeinmodernhistory a purely
secularpoliticaltheory.Secondly, therewas thebeliefin 'the priest-
hoodof all believers.'According to thisdoctrine, man shouldbe left
freeto followhisownvocation,and in doingso he stoodin no needof
themediation ofeitherpriestorpresbyter.Transposedintopolitical
termstheidea of freedom meantthatman had no obligationto any
government that soughtto controlhim foranythingbut his own
4J. A. 0. Larsen,Representative
Government
in Greekand Roman History
(Berkeley-LosAngeles,1955).

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 DEMOCRACY 229
and theidea of self-sufficiency
benefit, meantthatmanhad no need
of any government thatsoughtto controlhimforhis ownbenefit-
he could do that forhimself.These views,whichare particularly
associatedwiththeLevellers(JohnLilburne, JohnWildman, Overton
and Walwyn)crystallized in thecourseofthelongdiscussions on the
typeof constitution thatEnglandwas to have afterthe Civil War,
and theyreceivedtheirmostspecific formulation in theAgreement of
the People presented at the PutneyDebates (Nov.-Dec. 1647).5
The centralthesisof PuritanDemocracyis thatthe basis of all
legitimate government is consent.But thisnotionofconsentsuffers
gradualdilutionthe closerthe argument comesto practicalpolitics.
At its mostextremeit meansthateveryoneshouldconsentto every
singlelaw thatcommands hisobligation-aviewwhichleadsto what
mightbe calledthe 'market' viewof Democracyas a permanently
functioning mechanism forregistering thepopularwill: moremoder-
atelythe notionmeansthat everyoneshouldconsentto thosewho
makelawsforhim,whileat its weakestit is heldto involveno more
thanthateveryoneshould'have a voicein electing.'
2. The Revolutionof 1688. The nextstagein thehistory ofDe-
mocracy is recordedin JohnLocke'sSecondTreatiseof CivilGovern-
ment(1689), a document whichhas alwaysbeenregardedas a justi-
ficationof the GloriousRevolutionof 1688thoughit was probably
writtenand its leadingideas certainly laid downsomeyearsbefore.
Here the politicaltheoryof the Puritansis takenup but withits
revolutionary implicationsneutralized.The 'birthright'of every
Englishcitizen,on whichtheLevellershad insisted, is exchanged for
a fixedlistof 'naturalrights.'Significantly, theserightsdo notin-
cludeanyspecifically politicalrights,i.e.,rightsto exerciseor control
politicalpower. Naturalrightsgiveman onlywhatmightbe called
an indirect in government,
interest in thatthegovernment is respon-
sibleforsafeguarding thesenaturalrights.This responsibility is ex-
pressedin Locke'sTreatiseby meansof theold metaphorof a social
contract to whichthepeopleand thegovernment arethetwoparties;
the peoplepledgetheirobligationto the government, and in return
the government undertakesto protectthe people'srights. If the
government failsto keep its side of the contract, the people auto-
maticallycan revoketheirs. In otherwords,the rightof everyone
to a sharein the government on whichthe Puritanshad laid such
stresshas nowbeenwhittleddownto no morethanthe rightto re-
volt againstthe government if thingsgo too far.
3. TheAmerican Revolution.The prevailing theory oftheAmeri-
can Revolutionis Lockean. Both Jefferson and Madisonexplicitly
declaredthemselves to be democrats-though at thisperiodthe 'de-
-5A. S. P. Woodhouse,
Puritanism
and Liberty(London,1948).

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230 RICHARD WOLLHEIM

mocraticformof government ' and the 'republicanformof govern-

ment' seemto have been used as synonyms.Democracy, however,
is to be contrastednot so muchwithotherand specifictypesof
government, as withany kindof arbitrary or tyrannical rule. To
Madisonthereal dangeris 'the spiritof faction,'i.e.,the spiritthat
leads one partof the community to tryand rulethe restin its own
sectionalinterests,and he welcomedrepresentation in someformor
anotheras a goodmethodofcurbingthisspirit. However,it was not
the onlymethod,norevena particularly sacrosanct method. For it
had in thefirstplaceto be supplemented by a seriesof constitutional
checksand balances;and secondly, it introduced dangersofitsown-
in Madisonwehearforthefirst timeofthe'tyrannyofthemajority.'
Amongstthe Americanrevolutionaries therewas also a more
radicaldemocratic theory.6This findsclassicalexpression in Tom
Paine's CommonSense (1776). Paine believedthatall government
was an evil,butthatit couldbe a justified evil. To be justifiedit had
to concurwiththe willof the majority, and Paine supportedrepre-
sentationas themethodofassuring thatit didso. Paine'ssignificance
in thehistory ofdemocratic thoughtis twofold.In thefirstplace-
as he himselfsaid oftheFrenchRevolution-he'graftedrepresenta-
tionupondemocracy.'Priorto Paine therehad beena tendency on
the partof moreradicalthinkers to regardrepresentation withsus-
picionas maskingthe trueexpression of popularconsent,whereasit
wasthemoreconservatively mindedthinkers whowelcomed it,at any
ratein a modifiedform, as oneofthevariouselements '
in a balanced'
constitution.Secondly,in Paine we see the growing awarenessthat
Democracy involvesa greatdeal in thewayofsocialreform and eco-
nomicredistribution.
Despitethe supportthatthe moreradicaldemocrats receivedin,
forexample,Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, theywereunsuccessful
in theirprogram, and eventheirpoliticalobjectiveswereunrealized.
4. The Utilitarians.The Utilitariandemocratictheoryis the
productoftwogeneralprinciples-onepsychological, theothermoral
-both of whichderivedirectlyfromthe thoughtof the Enlighten-
ment. The firstprinciple is thatall menpursuetheirownhappiness.
The secondis thatthe onlyjustification of any actionis that,com-
pared with alternatives, it producesthe greatesthappinessof the
greatestnumber.Fromthefirst principleit followsthatsomegovern-
mentis necessary;froma combination ofthetwoprinciples it follows
that Democracyis the best formof government.For if everyone
pursueshis own happinessand government oughtto pursuethe
happinessof the greatestnumber,thengovernment mustbe in the
6 ElishaP. Douglass,Rebelsand Democrats(ChapelHill,1955).

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 DEMOCRACY 231
handsof thegreatestnumber.Democracyis no longerclaimedas a
right-Benthamdismissed thedoctrineofNaturalRightsas ' a pom-
posityon stilts '-but is advocatedas the onlypossiblemeansto a
self-evidentlydesirableend.
detachedscientific
It is indicativeof the Utilitarians' attitudeto
formsof government that the earlyUtilitariansavoidedthe demo-
craticconclusion fromtheirpremises, eitherbecausetheybelievedin
thenaturalharmony ofinterests(a beliefpopularizedby thepolitical
economists oftheday),orbecausetheybelievedthatproperly trained
intellectualsmightby theirsuperiorintelligence transcend the ordi-
naryegotisticconditionof humanity and act as altruistic
legislators.
It seemsthatit was JamesMill who convertedBenthamto demo-
craticbeliefs,7 and certainlythe best statementof the positionof
democratic Utilitarianism orPhilosophicalRadicalismis hisEssay on
Government(1820). Even he, however,advocatesnot universal
suffrage but onlya suffrage wideenoughto securetherepresentation
ofall interestsand to makethepredominance ofsinisterinterestsim-
possible.
5. The StruggleforMajority Rule. In America the strugglefor
Democracy-inthefullestsenseofunqualified rulebythemajority-
wasresumed in theearlypartofthenineteenth century.The debates
in theMassachusetts Convention of 1820,theNew YorkConvention
of 1821,and theVirginiaConvention of 1829-30,theprolonged con-
troversy in South Carolina,and the bitterstrugglein Rhode Island
culminating in the 'Dorr War' of 1842,markthe variousphasesin
the struggle of limitedv. universalsuffrage.The arguments of the
conservatives vary:sometimes theyappealto a viewofgovernment as
a balanceofinterests, sometimes to therightsofproperty, sometimes
to fearsof majoritytyranny, sometimes to the absurdity of general
politicalprinciplesand rights,sometimes to local circumstances.By
comparison thereformers areofonevoice. To themit seemedabsurd
to concedesuffrage to a certainextentand thenstop; anygoodreason
one had forgoingso far,was a reasonforgoingfurther, forwherever
one drewthelinemustbe arbitrary.Graduallythelogicofthispo-
sitiontriumphed.
In GreatBritainthepositionwas different. The constitutionnot
beingin thefirstplace an artefact, thecreatureofdebateand choice,
therewas no originalratiodecidendito whichappeal couldbe made.
In consequence eachtimethesuffrage wasextended-in1832,in 1867,
and in 1884 the liberalstendedto stressthe practicalnecessityof
themeasure, whiletheconservatives emphasized itspracticaldangers.
On neitherside do we findmuchtheoretical discussionapart from
7 Elie Halevy,The GrowthofPhilosophical
Radicalism(London,1928).

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232 RICHARD WOLLHEIM

JohnStuartMill's Representative Government (1861) whichcom-

binedUtilitarianism witha profound senseofminority rights.
The peculiarcontribution of GreatBritainto the spreadof De-
mocracyconsisted notso muchin anytheoretical justificationof the
extension ofthesuffrage as in practicalmeasuresformakingthisex-
tensioneffective.The historyof thisconsistsof two distinctproc-
esses. The firstprocesswas the growing dependenceof government
upontherepresentative assembly.This meanton theone handthat
no government couldsurvivewithouta majorityin, or at any rate
the confidence of,the House of Commons,and secondlythatit was
notenoughforthegovernment to presentanddefenditspolicybefore
the House of Lords.8 The secondprocesswas the gradualdevelop-
mentof partyorganization.In its modernformthisdatesfromthe
1830s,but thevitaleventis theformation oftheBirmingham 'Cau-
'
cus after1867.9 For all its possibledrawbacks, thedevelopment of
politicalpartieshas had a threefold significance forDemocracy:in
in thefirstplace,theyserveto formulate clearlythepoliciesthatare
presented to theelectorate;secondly, theyarousetheinterestof the
electorate in thesepolicies;and thirdly theyensurethatthevictori-
ous policyis in factbindingon theensuinggovernment.This second
processculminates in thetheoryof 'the mandate.'
It has beenobservedby politicalwriters thatthe secondprocess
whencompletehas succeededto someextentin undoingor reversing
thefirstprocess. For thoughthelifeof thegovernment continues to
dependuponthewilloftheCommons, duringitslifethegovernment
nowmanagesto enforce its willupontheCommons;and it manages
to do so becauseit is in effecttheorganofpartyleadership.
6. The Fears of Democracy. The constantfeaturethat runs
throughnineteenth-century thought,both conservative and liberal,
is the fearof Democracy.For themostpartthisis of an entirely a
priorikind. All arguments, forinstance,about Democracyas the
causeoflowerculturalstandards(Carlyle,Lecky,HenryAdams)are
necessarily ofthiskindsincethen,as now,therewas notevena rudi-
mentary sociology ofart. Someofthearguments, however, aremore
empirical in character.In themiddleofthecentury thegreatsource-
bookforthosewhowererationally frightened of democratic excesses
was Alexisde Tocqueville'sDe la democratie en l'Amerique(1835).
Tocquevillehas,however, beenmuchmisunderstood. He was notan
enemyof Democracy:he was, rather,so convincedof its coming
victorythat he passedoverits advantagesand concentrated on its
defectsand dangers. Towardstheend ofthecentury and at thebe-
8Sir Ivor Jennings,
CabinetGovernment
(Cambridge,
England,1937).
9 M. Ostrogorski,
Democracyand theOrganization
ofPoliticalParties(London,
1902).

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 DEMOCRACY 233
ginningof the twentiethcentury,most anxietyabout Demnocracy
findsfreshsustenance in thefinding ofthenewscienceofpsychology.
Originallythesefindings werethepreserve ofthosewhowereopenly
and activelyhostileto Democracy, but graduallytheyweretakenup
by a considerable bodyof thinkers who werebasicallyfavorableto
Democracyand wantedto finda wayofreconciling theirbeliefswith
the newscience. Theserangefromoptimistic thinkers like Graham
Wallas to morepessimistic thinkerslikeWalterLippmann.
7. Democracyand Economics. To eighteenth- and earlynine-
teenth-century democrats the naturalcorollary of theirpoliticalbe-
liefsseemedto be theeconomic doctrineoflaissez-faire.A fewradical
voiceswereraisedin protestagainstthisprevailing orthodoxy, butto
no greateffect.However,fromthemiddleofthenineteenth century
onwardsthetraditional viewof the correcteconomicimplications of
democratic beliefwas increasingly called in doubt. It becameap-
parentthatDemocracyimpliedlaissez-faire onlyon certainfurther
assumptions, largelyof a psychological and economiccharacter, that
werenot themselves justified.The main psychological assumption
was a thoroughgoing egoisminherited fromeighteenth-century me-
chanistictheory,but whichfoundlittlesupportin empiricalpsy-
chology. The most significant economicassumptionwas that the
theoreticalrequirements of perfectcompetition werein factsatisfied
underordinaryconditions;increasingly did it becomeapparentto
orthodox economists thatin practicemonopolistic and semi-monopo-
listicconditions
areinevitable.10
C.
Contemporary discussionsof Democracymay be broughtunder
fourroughheadings:the meaningof Democracy,the conditions of
Democracy, the justification
of Democracy,and the relationof De-
mocracyto otherpoliticalconceptsand principles.
1. The problemof the meaningof Democracyarisesas soon as
one considerswithany degreeof literalnessthe worditself:demo-
cracy,the 'rule of the people.' For contrastthiswithothersimilar
words,suchas pluto-cracy, 'rule oftherich,'and theo-cracy,
the'rule
of the priests.'" Immediately twoquestionsassertthemselves.In
thefirstplace,howcan thepeoplerulein the wayin whichtherich
or the priestsclearlycan? For surelythereare too manyof them
forit to be a practicalpossibility.And secondly, if thepeoplerule,
whois thereleftto be ruled? (It is to be observedthatin theclassi-
cal worldneither ofthesetwoquestionsarosewiththeforcethatthey
10 J. M. Keynes,The End of
Laissez-Faire(London,1927).
ll G. A. Paul, " Democracy,"
Chambers Encyclopaedia,4 (1944),430-1.

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234 RICHARD WOLLHEIM

do forus. For in thefirstplace,the CityState was generally small

enoughto permitthe peopleto participatedirectlyin government.
Secondly,to most classicalthinkersthe word 'demos' meant the
peoplein the senseof 'the commonpeople' or 'the ordinary man,'
or,moresimply,'the poor,'notin themodernsenseof'the peopleas
a whole,'or ' everymemberofsociety': in consequence if thedemos
ruled,thislefttherichand thenobleto be ruledover.)
Two traditions ofdemocratic thought canbe identified bytheway
in whichtheytreatthisproblem.Onetradition, stemming ultimately
fromRousseau,insistson takingthisproblemveryliterallyand pro-
posingto it a radicaland peculiarsolution. To beginwith,all the
members ofsocietyare said to possesstwowillsor selves:a 'true' or
'real ' self,and an ' arbitrary' or ' fitful
' self. All thetrueselvesin
any community are harmonious in theirdemands,whereasit is a
markofthearbitrary selvesthattheyarediscordant.In termsofthis
para-psychological assumption the twoquestionsoutlinedabove-or
the 'paradoxofself-government,' as a thinker ofthisschool,Bernard
Bosanquetcalled it-are readilysolved. For to the firstquestion,
how can the peoplerule,beingso manyand so diverse?,the reply
comesthatit is theirbetterselvesthatrule,and theseselves,though
naturally diverse,are necessarilyharmonious.Secondly,to theques-
tion,whoremainsto be ruledif everyone rules?,the answeris given
thatthoughin a Democracytheruledarecertainly differentfromthe
rulersas muchas theyare in a plutocracy or in a theocracy,theyare
howeverdifferent, notin beingdifferent people,butin beingdifferent
partsofthesamepeople thatis,theruledare thearbitrary orfitful
selvesofthosewhoserealortrueselvesaretherulers.'2
This tradition ofthought, forall itsmetaphysical neatness,would
appearto raiseas manyproblems as it solves;and thesefurther prob-
lemsto be debarredof solution. For no empiricalmethodis sug-
gestedwhereby we can recognize or pickout thedictatesof thetrue
or real selvesas opposedto thoseof the arbitrary selves. Indeed,
when,as usuallyhappensin thistradition ofthought, thetrueselfis
further identified
withthemoralself,it is clearthatno suchmethod
couldbe providedwithoutfallingintothe errorsof ethicalNatural-
ism. Fromall thisone mightwellassumethatthis'idealist' tradi-
tionofdemocratic thought wouldlead to a totalandbarrenscepticism
aboutdemocratic practice. In facttheresulthas beenratherdiffer-
ent. Idealistthinkers have been led to supportthe notionof a su-
premelegislator or leaderwhowouldbe able to penetrate thesurface
ofconflicting individualdesiresandintuittheunderlying rationaland
harmonious willofthecommunity. Sucha conception has beencalled
12 Berard Bosanquet,The Philosophical
Theoryof theState (London,1899).

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 DEMOCRACY 235
'TotalitarianDemocracy.' 13 If in Anglo-American politicalthought,
littleorno attention has everbeenpaid by 'idealist' thinkers to this
verydifficult problemof the practicalinterpretation of theirtheory,
suchself-denial, thoughsayingsomething fortheirpoliticalwisdom,
scarcely redoundsto theirintellectual credit.
A different answerto this problemis providedby a schoolof
thought, moreempiricist in outlook,whichseeksto removethe so-
calledparadoxat an earlierstage. On thisview,thoughin a De-
mocracythe peoplerule,theydo not rulein the sensein whichthe
richmightrulein a plutocracy orthepriestsin a theocracy; thatis to
say,theydo notrulein thesenseofholdingin theirownhandsand
wieldingdirectly thesupremelegislative and executivepowers. They
rulein a modified sensein thattheyexercisesomecontroloverthe
use of thesepowers. Andin thissenseofruling,the argument con-
tinues,therecan be no difficulty in seeinghow the people,manyof
themthoughtheremaybe, can rule. Equally,on thisview,thereis
no difficultyin seeinghowthepeoplecan at onceruleand be ruled.
For the supremelegislativeand executivepowers,likeany otherex-
ternalforceorinstrument, can be controlled bya groupofpeopleand
yet also exercisedoverthat group. This empiricist solutiondiffers
fromtheidealistsolutionabovein thattheparadoxthatis supposed
to arisefromthefactthattherulersandtheruledarein a Democracy
identical,is disposedof,not by any dialecticallegerdemain leading
to a radicalreinterpretation ofpoliticalexperience,butby an analysis
whichseeksto understand theconceptof 'rule' or 'government'as
it appearsin thecontextofdemocratic thought, withoutin any way
alteringit.
However,it wouldbe a mistaketo assumethat this empiricist
viewdoesnotalso giveriseto further problems.For thoughit may
answerthedifficulties connected withthesizeorvastnessoftheruling
groupin a Democracy, it stillleaves unsettledthosewhichariseor
are allegedto ariseout of its diversities and disharmonies.If the
peopledo not agreeuponhowthesupremelegislativeand executive
powersofthecommunity areto be used-as theymostlikelywillnot
-how can theycontrolthe use of thesepowers? Such difficulties
certainly exist. It is, however, errorto regardtheseas metaphysical
orlogical,ratherthanpractical, difficulties.For thereis no absurdity
orinconsistency or self-contradiction in supposing thepeopleto exert
control overpolicyevenwhenthepolicypursuedis notto thetasteof
all. The onlyissue is whetherthe methodemployedforselecting
policyby aggregating tastesis 'reasonable' or 'fair,'and thisissue
is practical.
13 J. L. Talmon,The Originsof Totalitarian
Democracy(London,1952).

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236 RICHARD WOLLHEIM

In Anglo-Saxon countries theusualmethodemployed forensuring

popularcontrolis thatofrepresentative institutionswitha composi-
tiondetermined by specificelectoralprocedures, and thesemethods
have overtheyearsbeenfoundto satisfythenaturalor intuitivede-
mandsof 'reasonableness'and 'fairness.' However,it needsto be
emphasizedthatall thesedevicesare no morethanwell-tried means
ofsecuring democratic control:noneofthemlogicallyguarantees such
control.
Thoughmuchof the criticism levelledat representative institu-
tionsis grosslyexaggerated in thatit assimilates theabusesofthesys-
temto its necessary concomitants, it doesprovidecertainhealthyre-
mindersof how the systemcan go wrong. These may be brought
underfourheadings:
(i) The societymaybe so sunkin apathyor sweptawayby hys-
teriathatthemajorityvoteis untypicalof theconsidered ideas and
desiresof themajorityof thesociety. To guardagainstapathycer-
tain democratic countries have introduced compulsory voting(Aus-
tralia,Belgium, Switzerland, etc.). In spiteofthearguments thatcan
be putforward in favorofthismeasure-mostofwhichwereraisedin
thedebatesin theAustralian Parliament onitsintroduction in 1924
it has generally '
been regardedas 'undemocraticin itself. Against
mass hysteriano plausibleconstitutional safeguardhas yet been
proposed.
(ii) The societymay be entirely reasonableand balancedin its
votinghabits,and yet,through sometechnicalaspectoftheelectoral
procedure, it maybe impossible to arriveat a decisionthatcan prop-
erlybe saidtorepresent thewishesofthemajority.The limiting case
whicharisesforanyelectoralprocedure is whereeach ofthealterna-
tivesvoteduponattractsan equal numberofvoters,forthenno de-
cisionwhatsoever is forthcoming. A moredifficult case is wherea
decisionis forthcoming, butthisclearlydoesnottallywithwhatordi-
narilyorintuitively wouldbe thought to be themajority will. It can
be demonstrated thatforeveryknown'reasonable'methodofvoting
ifthealternatives are threeor morethereis a situationin whichthis
is boundto happen.'4 The onlyabsolutelyfoolproof systemis where
everyelectorvotesin turnon everypair of alternatives-ascarcely
practicalmethod.15(Proportional representation, oftenat thisstage
recommended as a panacea,merelytransfers thesedifficultiesfromthe
electoralstageto thelegislative stage.)
(iii) The societymayknowitsownmind,expressit unequivocally
14 E. J. Nanson,"Methods of Election,"Transactionsand Proceedingsof the
RoyalSocietyof Victoria,19 (1883), 197-240;KennethArrow,Social Choicesand
IndividualValues(New York,1951).
15 RobertA.
Dahl, A Prefaceto DemocraticTheory(Chicago,1956).

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 DEMOCRACY 237
through theelectoralprocedure, and thenthemajorityso established
mayenforce itspolicywitha completedisregard forthedesires, inter-
estsorrightsoftheminority.Fearsofthe'tyrannyofthemajority '
werea constantthemein the nineteenth century,the greatage of
democratic thought.In thetwentieth century, thegreatageofdemo-
craticpractice,thesefearshave not on the wholebeen realized-
though, significantly, wheretheyhavebeen,therealityhas beenon a
scalefarexceeding theworstenvisaged.It wouldseemthattheprob-
lemhereis sociological ratherthanpolitical,in thatsocialcondition-
ingis morelikelyto be an effective remedythana systemof consti-
tutionalchecksandbalances.
(iv) The majority mayknowitsownmind,expressit through the
electoralmechanism, and the majorityso constituted so far from
tyrannizing overtheminority, mayfailevento exertruleoverit. For
powercan fall into the hands of a minoritywithinthe majority.
Somethinkers have indeedclaimedthatany machinery of majority
ruleis boundto put effective controlintothe handsof a minority.
But thiswouldseemto be exaggeration.Since the end of the last
century, increasing attentionhas,however, beenpaid to theoligarchic
tendencies implicit indemocratic machinery: inparticular, thoserelat-
ingto partyorganization and program construction.
Perhapsthemostimportant singlelessonto be learntfromthese
objections is that Democracycannotbe self-guaranteeing. It is ex-
posedto risks,in thefirstplace,fromthemechanism thatis devised
to implement it,and secondly, fromtheotherelements in society.It
has beencalledjustifiably, a 'calculatedrisk.'16
2. The questionof the conditions of Democracy, i.e., whatmust
existforDemocracyto exist,is one of thegreatproblemsof theage.
Unfortunately, a greatdeal of contemporary discussionof it is be-
devilledbyan essentialambiguity in thenatureofthequestion. It is
oftenunclearwhetherthe questionis logical, i.e., what conditions
mustbe satisfiedforus to say correctly that Democracyexists,or
empirical,i.e., what conditionsmustexistelsewherein societyfor
Democracyto comeintoexistence and to survive.17Such ambiguity
is commonin theoretical arguments, butin thiscontexttherearetwo
additionalfactors to accountforitspersistence.Oneis theabsenceof
anydevelopedsociology ofpolitics;and theotheris theextreme pres-
tigeattachedto the word'Democracy,'so thatwriters tendto take
overanyconcomitant ofDemocracythattheylikeand writeaboutit
as ifit werepartofDemocracy.
16RobertA. Dahl and CharlesLindblom,Politics,Economicsand Welfare(New
York,1953).
17Joseph A. Schumpeter,Capitalism,Socialismand Democracy(New York,
1947).

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238 RICHARD WOLLHEIM

In contemporary discussions oftheconditions ofDemocracy, three

issueshavebeensingledout forparticular attention:
(i) The connectionbetweenDemocracyand Socialism. Those
who assertthatthereis a real connection betweenthe two may be
dividedintothreegroups:
First,therearetheMarxists.Thesearesometimes takento assert
thatDemocracyis incomplete withoutsocialism.This,however, is a
misunderstanding oftheirtrueposition. For whattheywishto do is
not so muchto extendthe conceptof Democracyas to transposeit
completely.Believingin what has been called the 'impotenceof
18 theyare indifferent
politics,' to constitutionaland politicalorgani-
zation,but at the sametimewantto securethe fullprestigeof this
conceptfortheirownpreference in whattheyconsider to be thetruly
important field-thatofeconomicorganization.It is significant that
the use of the word'Democracy' as a wordof praisein Marxist
thoughtdatesfromthe timewhenit becamea universally honorific
word.
Secondly, therearetheDemocraticSocialists. OfthesetheGuild
Socialistsusedto arguethata societycouldnottrulybe called'demo-
cratic' unlessall the institutions in it werethemselves democratic.
Amongsttheseinstitutions wereto be numbered factoriesand other
industrial plants,and thedemocratization of suchinstitutions neces-
sarilyinvolvesworkers'control,i.e., Socialism.'9 Nowdays,most
Socialistswouldpreferto use less a prioriarguments.Some would
use a pragmaticargument, namelythatpoliticalDemocracycannot
be trulysafewithout economic reorganization: andagainotherswould
prefer a moralargument to theeffectthatthereis an inconsistency in
applyingtheprinciple ofequalityin thefieldofpoliticsand denying
it in thefieldofeconomics.
Thirdly, thereare theconservatives whoarguethatDemocracyis
in its natureincompatible withSocialism. Thereare a numberof
arguments raisedin current discussionto thiseffect:theyare differ-
entiatedaccording to the featureof Democracythattheyholdto be
the groundof thisincompatibility. Somehave heldthisto be com-
petition,otherstolerance, otherstheexistenceofproperty.A recent
argument thathas attractedattentionis thatwhichmaintainsthat
Democracyrequiresfreedom, freedom requirestheRule of Law, and
Socialismin its advocacyof bureaucratic planninghas to dispense
withthe Rule of Law.20 Againstthisit has been urgedin the first
place,that the Rule of Law guaranteessecurity, not freedom;and
18Karl R. Popper,The OpenSocietyand Its Enemies(London,1945).
19G. D. H. Cole,GuildSocialismRe-Stated(London,1920).
20F. A. vonHayek,The Road to Serfdom(London,1944).

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 DEMOCRACY 239
secondly,that even if economicplanningdoes contractfreedomin
somedirections, it extendsit in othersand theoveralleffect maywell
be an increaseratherthana diminution.21
(ii) The connection betweenDemocracyand the beliefin De-
mocracy.Since JohnStuartMill who claimed(ironicallyenough)
thatDemocracywas not suitablefor'Malays and Bedouins,'it has
been generallyconcededby even the most ferventdemocratsthat
thereare someconditions thata populationmustsatisfyforit to be
fitforDemocracy. However,despitethe practicalurgencyof this
problemwiththebreak-upoftheold colonialempires, ourknowledge
of whattheseconditions are has not increased.On one condition-
whichto someappearsto have a certainintuitiveobviousness-con-
troversy has been bitter:viz., the beliefin, or acceptanceof,De-
mocracy.Now if thiscondition is takenas applyingto societyas a
wholeit is obviously true,perhapslogicallyso. But it doesnotfollow
fromthisthatit is therefore trueofeverysinglememberofa society.
Societyto be democratic mustbelievein Democracy;but howmany
membersit can successfully containwho do not themselves believe
in Democracy, is a questionincapableof anya priorianswer. It de-
pendson therestraints thatthesedissidents arepreparedto putupon
theirown behavior,on the moralor spiritualauthoritythat they
wieldoverothers,and on the extentto whichtheirbehaviorcan be
neutralized by otherfactorsin society(freespeech,the press,edu-
cation,etc.).
(iii) The connection betweenDemocracyand Constitutionalism.
It wouldbe commongroundto nearlyall supporters of Democracy
thatthereare certainlawsor regulations thatoughtnotto be passed
evenifthegreater partorindeedthewholeofthepeoplefavorthem.
To someit has seemeddesirableto inscribethese'morallimitations'
of Democracyin a charteror Constitution.Some Englishthinkers
have gloriedin thefactthatlibertiesenjoyedin GreatBritainare to
be foundnotin any Constitution but in the accumulated precedents
of commonlaw.22 It wouldseem,however,that thoughthismay
wellbe something to be gratefulfor,it is nota matterforpride,and
it is perfectly naturalthat other,and in particularyounger,De-
mocracies shouldprefer to expresstheiridealsin a moresystematic if
necessarily more'artificial'fashion.
However,the issue somewhatchangeswhenthe Constitution is
regardednotmerelyas a systematic statement of thelibertiesrecog-
nizedin societybutas a methodofguaranteeing them. In suchcases
21 Hans Kelsen," Democracy and Socialism,"Conference
on Jurisprudenceand
Politics(Chicago,1954),63-87.
22 A. V. Dicey,Introduction
to theStudyof theLaw of the Constitution
(Lon-
don,1885).

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240 RICHARD WOLLHEIM

the Constitution is accompaniedby somemechanism forenforcing

provisions likethatof judicialreview. To certainthinkers thishas
seemedtheobviousrequirement ofDemocracy;byothersit has been
regardedas inequitable,incompetent, and unnecessary.It is in-
equitablebecauseit triesto limitthepowerofthelivingmajorityby
meansofthe 'the dead hand' of thepast: it is incompetent because
the onlycases whereit is likelyto arise are just,thosewherethe
Constitution itselfwillrequire'interpretation'; and it is unnecessary
becausea societythatis likelyto acceptthefindings ofsucha mech-
anismis unlikelyseriouslyto offendagainstthe spiritof its Con-
stitution.These strictures are sometimes supportedby a historical
examination of the recordof actualmechanisms, e.g.,the historyof
judicialreview'in the U. S. as an instrument of Democracy.-`
3. Thereare in circulation in Anglo-Saxon thoughta numberof
arguments, all purporting to justifyDemocracy. These arguments
varygreatlyin acceptability according to thenumberand validityof
theprinciples theyinvoke,thetruthofthefactualassumptions they
makeuse of,and therelevanceof the kindof Democracyforwhich
theyargueto thekindthatwe experience.
(i) To exerciseruleor to enjoyanyformof politicalauthority is
a kindof moraleducation. On egalitariangroundsthe opportunity
forsuchself-improvement shouldbe extendedto as manyas possible.
In Democracyit is extendedto all: therefore Democracyis thebest
ofall formsofgovernment.This argument, whichis originally to be
foundin Aristotle(Pot. III. 1277b),mayhave had someapplication
withintheconfines of the Polis,but appliedto the conditions of the
modernworldit seemshopelesslyunrealistic.Significantly enough,
it is the characteristic argument of a kindof Liberalismwhichis or
waspeculiarly associatedwitha classicaleducation.
(ii) The secondargumentis that trueopinionon politicaland
moralmattersis the privilegeof the commonman. Accordingly,
powerin a community shouldresidewithhim: and thisit does only
in a Democracy.Hencethesuperiority of Democracy.As we have
seen,thisargument is centralto theGreekconception ofDemocracy.
In modernthought it has receivedreinforcement froma certainsenti-
mentaltheoryof the goodnessof human natureuncorrupted by
wealth,luxuryand education. In contrastto this,Democracyhas
comein formuchcriticism basedon theso-calleddiscovery ofman's
'irrationality ' by modernpsychology.Muchofthiscriticism is con-
fused,and,ifit provesanything, provesnotso muchtheweaknessof
Democracyas the weaknessof thisparticularargument forit.
23 HenryS. Commager,
MajorityRule and MinorityRights(New York-Lon-
don,1943).

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 DEMOCRACY 241

(iii) A more materialistic versionof the precedingargument

makesthe ordinary man the bestjudgenot of whatis rightforthe
community but of his owninterests.In consequence, if the people
areallowedto control thegovernment, thentheinterests ofthepeople
willbe dominant.Democracyis identified withpopularcontrol, and
therefore vindicated.This argumentis the argument of the Utili-
tarians,supportedin theircase by a thoroughgoing psychological
It
egoism. also has been subjected to a great deal of empirical criti-
cism. Recentsociologyhas,forinstance,cast doubton the classical
notionsof classby bringing out whathas beencalled (perhapsmis-
leadingly)the 'subjective' elementin class determination. Never-
thelessthe argument has considerable weight.
(iv) A further retreatfromthe positionsmaintainedin the two
previousarguments leads to the completely scepticalargumentfor
Democracy.According to this argument, it is impossible foranyone
to discoverwhatis the rightcourseof actionforthe community, or
wherethetrueinterests ofitsinhabitants reside. Fromthisit follows
that everyonein the community shouldbe allowedto do whathe
wantsto do as faras is sociallypossible. The onlysocietyin which
thiscan happenis theone in whicheveryone has somecontrolin the
government: therefore Democracyis favored. As a variantof this
argument, it maybe maintained thatevenifone can discoverwhatis
ideallytherightcourseof actionto pursue,it wouldbe wrongto in-
siston it unlesseveryone in the community recognized its rightness.
Accordingly in practiceone mustadopta scepticalattitudetowards
government and allowpeopleto have thelaws,institutions, etc.,that
theywant: henceDemocracy.
It seemsto be certainly thecase thatscepticism doesinvolveDe-
mocracy-even if the link is not as rigorous or as formalas some
wouldbelieve. It doesnotfollowfromthis,though-ascertaincritics
of Democracywould have us believe that Democracyinvolves
scepticism.
(v) At theoppositeend of thescale it is maintainedthatevery-
one has a naturalrightto controlgovernment and thatthisrightis
recognized onlyin Democracy:therefore Democracyis thebestform
of government.This argument has been subjectedto two linesof
criticism, both of whichare misguided.The firstis that the con-
ceptionof 'a naturalright'is metaphysical.Now naturalrightsare
capableof,and oftenreceive,a metaphysical interpretation,but this
is notnecessary.To saythatsomething is a naturalrightmaymerely
be a wayofsayingthatit is an ultimatevalue. Secondly, it has been
ujrged thatit is absurdto allowthateveryone has a naturalrightto
exercisecontrolovergovernment whenin factnot everyonecan do
so. But thisargument assumesthatthe rightin questionis, in the

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242 RICHARD WOLLHEIM

of jurisprudence,
terminology 'a rightproper' (i.e., correlativeto
duty)whereasit seemsmorenaturalto assumethatit is a libertyor
privilege.24
(vi) Finally,it maybe maintainedthatit is irrelevant whether
Democracydoes in factmaximizewelfare,safeguardrights,accord
withnaturallaw,etc.,forthefactis thatundermodernconditions it
is the onlyworking possibility.No memberof an emancipated in-
dustrialsocietywill put up withpoliticaltutelage. He insistson
havinga fairchanceofinfluencing thegovernment in accordancewith
his owndesiresand ideas; and by a ' fair' chancehe meansa chance
' as good as the nextman's.' This argumentwas succinctly sum-
marizedin the nineteenth centuryby the conservative JamesFitz-
JamesStephenwhosaid thatin Democracywe countheadsto avoid
breakingthem;and it remainsto-dayone of the bestarguments in
favorof Democracyon accountof its extremeeconomy.
4. The relationoftheconceptofDemocracyto othernotionssuch
as Equality,Liberty, etc.,fallsoutsidethescopeofthisarticle.
ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

W. R. Agard,What DemocracyMeant to the Greeks (Chapel Hill,

1942); E. Barker,GreekPoliticalTheory:Plato andHis Predecessors (Lon-
don,1918); C. L. Becker,ModernDemocracy(New Haven, 1941); R. J.
Bonner,AspectsofAthenianDemocracy(Berkeley,1933); J. Bryce,Mod-
em Democracy(London,1921); W. S. Carpenter,The Developmentof
American PoliticalThought(Princeton, 1930); F. W. Coker,"SomePresent-
Day Criticsof Liberalism," AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,47 (1953),
1-27;J.Frank,TheLevellers(Cambridge, Mass.,1955); J.W. Gough,John
Locke'sPoliticalPhilosophy(London,1950); W. Jaeger,Paideia (Berlin-
Leipzig,1934; Oxford,1939); A. H. M. Jones,"The EconomicBasis of
Athenian Democracy," Past andPresent,1 (1952), 13-31;W. Kendall,John
Lockeand theDoctrineofMajorityRule (Urbana,1941); H. D. Lasswell,
D. Lerner,andIthielda Sola Pool,SymbolsofDemocracy(Stanford, 1952);
Lord Lindsayof Birker,The ModernDemocraticState,Vol. I (London,
1943); R. R. Palmer," Noteson the Use oftheWord'Democracy,'1789-
99,"PoliticalScienceQuarterly, 68 (1953),203-26;J.Plamenatz,The Eng-
lishUtilitarians(Oxford,1949); G. H. Sabine," The Two DemocraticTra-
ditions,"PhilosophicalReview,61 (1952),451; T. A. Sinclair,A Historyof
GreekPoliticalThought(London,1952); H. E. Stier,Die klassische Demok-
ratie. Arbeits-gemeinschaft fur Forschungdes Landes Nordrhein-West-
falen:Geisteswissenschaften,3 (Cologne-Opladen, 1954).
University
College,London.
24 RichardWoliheimand Isaiah Berlin," Equality,"Proceedings
of the Aristo-
telianSociety,30 (1956), 281-326.

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