“Missile Defense System”

Seminar Report

Submitted to

Sant Gadge Baba Amravati University

In partial fulfillment of the Requirement for the award of

Degree of

Bachelor of Engineering

By

Shubham Narendra Maske

Under the guidance of

Dr. V. B. Padole

Department of Electronics and Telecommunication Engineering

P. R. Pote Patil Education & Welfare Trust's Group of Institutions,

College of Engineering & Management.

Amravati – 444605 (M. S.)

2021-2022.
 Department of Electronics and Telecommunication Engineering
P. R. Pote Patil Education & Welfare Trust's Group of Institutions,
College of Engineering & Management.
Amravati – 444605 (M. S.)
2021 – 2022.

CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that the Seminar report entitled

“Missile Defense System”

Submitted by

Shubham Narendra Maske

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Degree of Bachelor of Engineering in
Electronics and Telecommunication Engineering by Sant Gadge Baba Amravati University & is a
bonafied work carried out during the session 2021-2022.

Dr. R. D. Ghongade Dr. V. B. Padole

Head of the Department Guide

i
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is our supreme duty and desire to express acknowledgement to the various

torchbearers, who have rendered valuable guidance during the preparation of our Seminar.

First of all, we extend our deepest gratitude to our revered Principal Dr. A.V. Kale

without whose support; our Seminar could not have been transformed into present form.

We are grateful to Dr. R. D. Ghongade HOD, Electronics and Telecommunication

Engineering Department; and guide Dr. V. B. Padole for providing immense support and

guidance. We are beholden for guiding us at every step in the Seminar. He has most honestly

guided me throughout; never leaving me unanswered for any of our doubts. It was his

constant persuasion, encouragement, inspiration and able guidance that helped me in

completing our Seminar successfully.

Shubham Narendra Maske

Final Year,
EXTC

ii
 Abstract
The role of defense against nuclear missile has been a heated military and political
topic for several decades. However, missile defense is no longer limited to interception of
strategic nuclear weapons. The terms “Missile Defense System” broadly means a system that
provides any defense against any missile type (conventional or nuclear) by any country. Any
mechanism which can detect and then destroy a missile before it can any harm is called a
missile defense system (MSD).

The gradual development and proliferation of missile technology has blurred and line
between the technologies for the interception of tactical missile (usually short to intermediate
range with non-nuclear payloads) and the interception of strategic missile (usually long
ranged with nuclear payloads). Missile defense can be divided into categories based on the
various characteristics: Types/range of missile interception, the trajectory phase where the
intercept occurs, and whether intercepted inside the Earth’s atmosphere). High-performance
tactical ballistic missile carrying non-nuclear payloads now have the ability to affect strategic balance
in conflict zones. Likewise, high-performance tactical missile defense system can now influence force
deployment strategies.

iii
 TABLE OF CONTENT

Chapter No. Contents Page No.

Certificate i

Acknowledgement ii

Abstract iii

Table of content iv

List of figure v

1 Introduction 1

1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 Command And Control 2

1.3 Mechanisms 3

2 System Overview 4

2.1 History 4

2.2 Countermeasures 5

2.3 Features 6

3 Type Of Missile Intercepted 7

3.1 Strategic 7

3.2 Theater 7

3.3 Tactical 8

3.4 Endoatmospheric 8

3.5 Exoatmospheric 9

4 A System Of Elements 11

4.1 Boost phase 11

4.2 Midcourse phase 11

iv
 4.3 Terminal phase 12

5 Working Principal 13

5.1 Working Together 13

5.2 Elements 15

5.3 Advantages 17

5.4 Disadvantages 17

6 Conclusion 19

References 20

v
 LIST OF FIGURE

Figure No. Figure Name Page No.

1 s-400 Antiballistic Missile 7

2 MIM-104 Patriot 8

3 Primary Role Of Three Phases 12

4 Working Of System 14

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 Missile Defense System

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Missile Defense System are a type of missile defense intended to shield a country
against income missiles, such as intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) or other
ballistic missile. The United States, Russia, India, France, Israel, Italy, United
Kingdom and China have all developed missile defense system.

Any mechanism which can detect and then destroy a missile before it can cause any
harm is called a missile defense system (MDS). The role of defense against nuclear
missiles has been a heated military and political topic for several decades. However,
missile defense is no longer limited to interception of strategic nuclear weapons. The
gradual development and proliferation of missile technology has blurred the line
between the technologies for the interception of tactical missile (usually short to
intermediate range with non-nuclear payload) and the interception of strategic
missiles (Usually long ranged with nuclear payloads). High-performance tactical
ballistic missile carrying non-nuclear payloads now have the ability to affect strategic
balance in conflict zones. Likewise, high-performance tactical missile defense system
can now influence force deployment strategies. Missile defense can be divided into
categories based on various characteristics: type/range of missile intercepted, the
trajectory phase where the intercept occurs, and whether intercepted inside or outside
the Earth's atmosphere. These types/ranges include strategic, theater and tactical. Each
entails unique requirements for intercept, and a defensive system capable of
intercepting one missile type frequently cannot intercept others. However, there is
sometimes overlap in capability.

Given the immense variety by which a defense system can operate (targeting nuclear-
armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), tactical, and theater missiles), there
are some unarguably effective atmospheric (outside the Earth's atmosphere)
countermeasures an attacking party can use to deter or completely defend against
certain types of defense systems, ranges of ACBM's, and intercept locations. Many of

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 Missile Defense System

defenses to these countermeasures have been implemented and taken into account
when constructing missile defense systems, however, it does not guarantee their
effectiveness or success. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has received scrutiny in
regards to their lack of foresight of these countermeasures, causing many scientists to
perform various studies and data analysis as to the true effectiveness of these
countermeasures.

Defending against cruise missiles is similar to defending against hostile, low-flying

manned aircraft. As with aircraft defense, countermeasures such as chaff, flares, and
low altitude can complicate targeting and missile interception. High-flying radar
aircraft such as AWACS can often identify low flying threats by using doppler radar.
Another possible method is using specialized satellites to track these targets. By
coupling a target's kinetic inputs with infrared and radar signatures it may be possible
to overcome the countermeasures.

1.2 COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control, battle management, and communications (C2BMC) systems

are hardware and software interfaces that integrate a multitude of sensory information
at a centralized center for the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). The command
center allows for human management in accordance to the incorporated sensory
information- BMDS status, system coverage, and ballistic missile attacks. The
interface system helps build an image of the battle scenario or situation which enables
the user to select the optimal firing solutions.

The function of ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) systems is to provide

combatants the ability to seek and destroy intermediate- and long-range ballistic
missiles en route to the US homeland. Data are transmitted from the defense satellite
communication system, and compiles an image using the coordinated information.
The system is able to relay real-time data once missiles have been launched. The
GMD can also work to receive information from the C2BMC, which allows Aegis
SPY-1, and TPY-2 to contribute to the defense system.

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 Missile Defense System

The integrated air- and missile-defense battle command system (ICBS) is seen as the
future for command and control systems for U.S. Army defense systems. It is
designed to integrate data relay between weapon launchers, radars, and the operators,
which allows air-defense units to fire interceptors with information being relayed
among radars. The advantage of such a system is it can increase the area an air unit
can defend. More importantly, it can reduce interceptor waste by reducing the
probability that more than one air defense unit would launch unnecessary interceptors
towards the same target. The IBCS is intended to replace other command and control
systems already in use. The IBCS is also capable of being comparable with that of
foreign military. There are some intentions for the use of IBCS on a global level with
the global C2BMC system.

1.3 MECHANISMS

Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System is "ALTBMD" for short. As
of early 2010, the Alliance has an interim capability to protect troops in a specific area
against short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles (up to 3,000 kilometers). The
end system consist of a multi-layered system of systems, comprising low- and high-
altitude defenses (also called lower- and upper-layer defenses), including Battle
Management Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (BMC3I), early
warning sensors, radar, and various interceptors. NATO member countries provide
the sensors and weapon systems, while NATO has developed the BMC3I segment
and facilitate the integration of all these elements.

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 Missile Defense System

Chapter 2

SYSTEM OVERVIEW

2.1 HISTORY

The problem was first studied during the last year of the Second World War. The
only countermeasure against the V-2 missile that could be devised was a massive
barrage of anti-aircraft guns. Even if the missile's trajectory were accurately
calculated, the guns would still have a small probability of destroying it before impact
with the ground. Also, the shells fired by the guns would have caused more damage
than the actual missile when they fell back to the ground. Plans for an operational test
began anyway, but the idea was rendered moot when the V-2 launching sites in the
Netherlands were captured.
In the 1950s and 1960s, missile defense meant defense against strategic (usually
nuclear-armed) missiles. The technology mostly centered around detecting offensive
launch events and tracking inbound ballistic missiles, but with limited ability to
actually defend against the missile. The Soviet Union achieved the first nonnuclear
intercept of a ballistic missile warhead by a missile at the Sary Shagan antiballistic
missile defense test range on 4 March 1961. Nicknamed the “Griffon” missile system,
it would be installed around Leningrad as a test. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the
United States Project Nike air defense program focused initially on targeting hostile
bombers before shifting focus to targeting ballistic missiles. In the 1950s, the first
United States anti-ballistic missile system was the Nike Hercules, which had the
ability to intercept incoming short-range ballistic missiles, but not intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) or ICBMs.
This was followed by the Nike Zeus, which was capable of intercepting ICBMs by
using a nuclear warhead, upgraded radar systems, faster computers, and control
systems that were more effective in the upper atmosphere. However it was feared the
missile's electronics may be vulnerable to x-rays from a nuclear detonation in space.
A program was started to devise methods of hardening weapons from radiation
damage.[18] By the early 1960s the Nike Zeus was the first anti-ballistic missile to
achieve hit-to-kill (physically colliding with the incoming warhead).

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 Missile Defense System

2.2 COUNTERMEASURES

A common countermeasure that attacking parties use to disrupt the efficacy of Missile
Defense Systems are the simultaneous launching of decoys from the primary launch
site or from the exterior of the main attacking missile itself. These decoys are usually
small, lightweight dud rockets that take advantage of the interceptor sensors tracking
and fool it by making many different targets available in an instant. This is
accomplished via the releasing of decoys in certain phases of flight. Because objects
of differing weights follow the same trajectory when in space, decoys released during
the midcourse phase can prevent interceptor missiles from accurately identifying the
warhead. This could force the defense system to attempt to destroy all incoming
projectiles, which masks the true attacking missile and lets it slip by the defense
system.
This categorization of decoy is the most similar to the standard understanding of what
a missile decoy is. These types of decoys attempt to mask the attacking ICBM via the
release of many similar missiles. This type of decoy confuses the missile defense
system by the sudden replication the sheer amount of similar targets there are.
Knowing that no defense system is 100% reliable, this confusion within the targeting
of the defense system would cause the system to target each decoy with equal priority
and as if it was the actual warhead, allowing the real warheads chance of passing
through the system and striking the target to increase drastically.
Similar to replica decoys, these types of decoys also take advantage of the limitations
in number within the missile defense systems targeting. However, rather than using
missiles of similar build and trace to the attacking warhead, these types of decoys all
have slightly different appearances from both each other and the warhead itself. This
creates a different kind of confusion within the system; rather than creating a situation
where each decoy (and the warhead itself) appears the same and is therefore targeted
and treated exactly like the "real" warhead, the targeting system simply does not know
what is the real threat and what is a decoy due to the mass amount of differing
information. This creates a similar situation as the result of the replica decoy,
increasing the chance that the real warhead passes through the system and strikes the
target.

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 Missile Defense System

2.3 FEATURES
Protecting people, places and the principle of sovereignty itself takes vision. It takes
precision. It takes technologically advanced sensors, command-and-control
systems, satellites and interceptors, working in layers to defeat all types of threats,
from short-range missiles to hypersonic warheads hurtling through space.
They mean command-and-control systems can process data faster. And they mean
operators can employ interceptors to engage their targets with even greater
precision. The missile has the capability to shoot down targets moving at 10 km per
second in orbits as high as 1,200 km. Sensors that track and target warheads aboard
the kinetic kill vehicle may have trouble distinguishing the "real" warhead from the
decoys, but several tests that have included decoys were successful.

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 Missile Defense System

Chapter 3

TYPES OF MISSILE INTERCEPTED

3.1 STRATEGIC

Targets long-range ICBMs, which travel at about 7 km/s (15,700 mph). Examples of
currently active systems: Russian A-135 system which defends Moscow, and the
U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system that defends the United States from
missiles launched from Asia. Geographic range of strategic defense can be regional
(Russian system) or national (U.S. system).

3.2 THEATER

Targets medium-range missiles, which travel at about 3 km/s (6,700 mph) or less. In
this context, the term "theater" means the entire localized region for military
operations, typically a radius of several hundred kilometers. Defense range of theater
defensive systems is usually on this order. Examples of deployed theater missile
defenses: Israeli Arrow missile, American THAAD, and Russian S-400.

Fig 3.1 s-400 Antiballistic missile

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 Missile Defense System

3.3 TACTICAL

Targets short-range tactical ballistic missiles, which usually travel at less than
1.5 km/s (3,400 mph). Tactical anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) have short ranges,
typically 20–80 km (12–50 miles). Examples of currently-deployed tactical ABMs:
American MIM-104 Patriot and Russian S-300V.

Fig 3.2 MIM-104 Patriot

3.4 ENDOATMOSPHERIC

Endoatmospheric anti-ballistic missile are usually shorter ranged. (e.g.,

American MIM-104 Patriot, Indian Advanced Air Defense).

Advantages:

• Physically smaller and lighter.

• Easier to move and deploy.
• Endoatmospheric intercept means balloon-type decoys won't work.

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 Missile Defense System

Disadvantages:

• Limited range and defended area.

• Limited decision and tracking time for the incoming warhead.

3.5 EXOATMOSPHERIC

Exoatmospheric anti-ballistic missiles are usually longer-ranged. (e.g., American

GMD, Ground-Based Midcourse Defense)

Advantages:

• More decision and tracking time.

• Fewer missiles required for defense of a larger area.

Disadvantages:

• Larger/heavier missiles required.

• More difficult to transport and place compared to smaller missiles.
• Must handle decoys.

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is used to combat
missile threats in the terminal phase. The THAAD system consists of a RADAR,
interceptors, launchers, and fire control system that is truck deployable. The
THAAD system is designed to combat short and medium range ballistic
missiles. The THAAD is the newest BMD system in the United States arsenal
and currently has a 100% success rate during flight testing.

The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system is the final BMD system in
the United States arsenal. The PAC-3 is used to combat missile threats in the
terminal phase. You may be familiar with the original Patriot missile system used
during the first Persian Gulf War. The Patriot system is the most mature BMD
system in the arsenal. The PAC-3 system is designed to combat short and

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 Missile Defense System

medium range ballistic missiles and. The PAC-3 can intercept missiles at lower
altitudes than the THAAD systems.

The most reliable defense against ballistic missile attack is the United States
Aegis Ballistic Defense. The Aegis RADAR is manufactured by Lockheed
Martin and integrated with the broader Command and Control and weapon
systems aboard Aegis Class destroyers. The Aegis system is also available in
land based systems. The Aegis system is designed to combat short and medium
range ballistic missiles throught use or RADAR tracking and interceptor
launch. The Aegis system has an approximately 80% intercept success rate.

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 Missile Defense System

Chapter 4

A SYSTEM OF ELEMENTS

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense is a complex system of elements and supporting

efforts. The integration of these many elements will enable a robust, layered defense
to defend against a hostile missile in all phases of flight.

Ballistic missile trajectories are commonly divided into three phases of flight: boost,
midcourse, and terminal. Each element will play an important role in a robust system
intended to defend against hostile missiles in any phase of flight.

4.1 BOOST PHASE

The boost phase defenses can defeat ballistic missiles of all ranges including
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), but it is the most difficult phase in which
to engage a missile. The intercept "window" is only from one to five minutes.
Although the missile is easiest to detect and track in the boost phase because its
exhaust is bright and hot, missile defense interceptors and sensors must be in close
proximity to the missile launch. Early detection in the boost phase allows for a rapid
response and intercept early in its flight, possibly before any countermeasures can be
deployed.

4.2 MIDCOURSE PHASE

The midcourse phase begins when the enemy missile's booster burns out and it begins
coasting in space towards its target. This phase can last as long as 20 minutes,
allowing several opportunities to destroy the incoming ballistic missile outside the
earth's atmosphere. Any debris remaining after the intercept will burn up as it enters
the atmosphere. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense element is now deployed in
Alaska and California to defend the U.S. homeland against a limited attack from
rogue nations. This system can only defend against intermediate and long-range
ballistic missiles.

A network of advanced sensors, radars and command, control, battle management,

and communication components provide target detection, tracking and discrimination
of countermeasures to assist the interceptor missile in placing itself in the path of the

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 Missile Defense System

hostile missile, destroying with hit-to-kill technology. These sensors and radars
include transportable X-band radars, as well as advanced radars aboard Aegis cruisers
and destroyers capable of operating in the world's oceans.

4.3 TERMINAL PHASE

The terminal phase is very short and begins once the missile reenters the atmosphere.
It is the last opportunity to make an intercept before the warhead reaches its target.
Intercepting a warhead during this phase is difficult and the least desirable of the
phases because there is little margin for error and the intercept will occur close to the
intended target. Terminal phase interceptor elements include the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) now being delivered to the U.S. Army, the Aegis
BMD near-term Sea-Based Terminal Defense capability using the SM-2 Block IV
missile, and the U.S. Army's PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) now
deployed worldwide. These mobile systems defend against short- to medium-range
missiles.

Fig 4.1 Primary Roles Of Three Phases

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 Missile Defense System

Chapter 5
WORKING PRINCIPAL

5.1 WORKING TOGETHER

The information from the sensors and interceptors routed through command and
control work together similar to the image below, laid out by the Union of Concerned
Scientists in order to demonstrate the workings of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system. The system struggles to reliably destroy target missiles during test
runs, and is not equipped to manage countermeasures. These issues stem from
fundamental problems with how the system is managed, and with how missile defense
technology works.
Ground Based Missile Defense include two parts:

• Payload Vehicle (PLV) - Flight tests have been conducted with a PLV
designed by Lockheed Martin. It consists of the second and third stages of
retired Minuteman II boosters. The Minuteman II PLV will later be replaced
with a more advanced model for one-site coverage of the entire United States.
In addition to the two booster stages on the PLV, there is also a payload
shroud attached to the top. The payload shroud contains the EKV.

• Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) - The kill vehicle is the bullet of NMD's
weapon system. This device is intended to impact the targeted missile at a
velocity of 15,000 mph (24,140 kph). The force of the collision should destroy
any ballistic missile, according to defense officials. The process of
pinpointing, aiming an interceptor at and then killing the target with an EKV is
very complex. There are many components that have to be coordinated in real
time, and the entire procedure is completed less than 30 minutes after the
enemy missile takes off.

The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system can be utilized during the
midcourse phase of flight. The GMD system tracks initial and projected
trajectory of the missile with radar data and then launches interceptor missiles
from locations in Alaska or California. These interceptor missiles reach space
and collide with the warhead. The system has approximately a 50% success rate
during operational testing.
Together, space-based satellites and ground- or sea-based radars create a monitoring
system that contribute to offensive missile detection (detecting a missile after it has

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 Missile Defense System

been launched), discrimination (what is a threat versus a decoy or other

countermeasures), and tracking (keeping the missile “in sight” so that an interceptor
can find it and eliminate the threat).
Interceptors are the missiles used once a threat has been detected. Missiles carry “kill
vehicles,” which detach from the missile (also called the boosters or rockets) and then
go to try to eliminate the threat. Today’s kill vehicles are “hit-to-kill,” meaning that
they aim to eliminate the threat by actually running into it, or “kinetically” (also
called a “kinetic kill”). Due to the speed at which the incoming rival missile and
interceptors and kill vehicles are traveling, this has metaphorically been compared to
“a bullet hitting another bullet.”

Fig. 5.1 Working Of System

Each system has a combination of the below mentioned sensors, radars, interceptors,
kill vehicles, and largely use the networked command and control. The above systems
rely on the below equipment and components:

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 Missile Defense System

5.2 ELEMENTS

Radars:

• X-Band Radars
o Sea-based X-Band Radar
o Army Navy (AN) Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY 2), the
Transportable X-band Radar
• COBRA DANE Radar
• Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR)
• Army Navy (AN) SPY-1 Radar (part of the initial missile defense capability—
used aboard Aegis cruisers/destroyers)
• (Under Development) Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), also known as
the Army Navy (AN) SPY-6 Radar
• (Under Development) Long Range Discrimination Radar

Radar (Radio Detection and Ranging) is a detection system that uses radio waves to
determine the distance (range), angle, or velocity of objects. It can be used to
detect aircraft, ships, spacecraft, guided missiles, motor vehicles, weather formations,
and terrain. A radar system consists of a transmitter producing electromagnetic
waves in the radio or microwaves domain, a transmitting antenna, a receiving antenna
(often the same antenna is used for transmitting and receiving) and
a receiver and processor to determine properties of the object(s).

Air- and Space-Based Sensors Used:

• Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) and Space Tracking and
Surveillance System-Demonstrators (STSS-D) constellation operated by the
Missile Defense Agency
• Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) hosted on commercial satellites
• Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) technology project, operated by the
Missile Defense Agency
• Defense Support Program (DSP), constellation of satellites operated by the
U.S. Air Force Space Command
• (Under Development) Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS), constellation of
integrated satellites operated by the U.S. Air Force Space Command
o SBIRS-LEO (Low Earth Orbit), incorporated into the STSS program in
2001 with the Missile Defense Agency
o (Under Development) SBIRS-GEO (Geosynchronous orbit), intended
to replace Defense Support Program (DSP)
o (Under Development) SBIRS-HEO (High Elliptical orbit), intended to
replace DSP

Interceptors:

• Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI), for the GMD System

• SM-2
• SM-3 (RIM-161 Standard Missile-3)
o 3 variations: Block IA, Block IB, Block IIA

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 Missile Defense System

• SM-6 (RIM 174 Standard Missile-6)

• (Under Development) Boost Phase Laser Defenses
• Evolved Seasparrow Missile (ESSM), NATO Interceptor
• Space-Based Intercept (SBI) Layer

Kill Vehicle:

• Exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV)

• (Terminated August 2019) Redesigned kill vehicle (RKV)
• (Under Development) Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV)

The Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) is the Raytheon-manufactured interceptor

component with subcontractor Aerojet of the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense (GMD), part of the larger National Missile Defense system. The EKV is
boosted to an intercept trajectory by a boost vehicle (missile), where it separates from
the boost vehicle and autonomously collides with an incoming warhead.

Command and Control Centers:

• Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC).

• GMD Fire Control and Communication, only for the GMD System.
• (Under Development) Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command
System (IBCS).

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 Missile Defense System

5.3 ADVANTAGES

The Department of Defense requires a capability to both negate and deter the use of
theater ballistic missiles in future conflicts. To meet this need, the United States Air
Force is developing a revolutionary new weapon system call the Airborne Laser and
employing one aspect of information warfare; the near real time transfer and use of
theater ballistic missile launch point data. The Air Force theater missile defense
program seeks to bring the battle to the enemy by engaging the launched threat as
early as possible in its flight path. Additionally, it denies the enemy the use of their
theater ballistic missile infrastructure through destruction and deterrence. Due to their
inherent inaccuracy, however, many countries are increasing their lethality by
developing warheads equipped with these warheads of mass destruction.
The most often cited rationale given for defense against theater missiles is that they
are capable of employing nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons.
• It is essential to defend against theater missiles is that they threaten our
capability to effectively wage war.
• The main missile threats that missile defense systems have aimed to defend
against have been ballistic missiles, but more recently, greater emphasis has
been placed on defending against other types of missiles as well.
• It create a monitoring system that contribute to offensive missile detection
(detecting a missile after it has been launched), discrimination (what is a threat
versus a decoy or other countermeasures), and tracking (keeping the missile
“in sight” so that an interceptor can find it and eliminate the threat).
• Because they are designed to defeat incoming missile attacks, missile defense
systems can save lives and protect civilian infrastructure from damage or
destruction. More important, missile defense plays a critical role in strategic
deterrence.

5.4 DISADVANTAGES

Nuclear weapons differ from chemical, biological, or conventional warheads, The

principal difference is the size, shape, and inertial properties of the
warhead, Nuclear weapons have a different distribution of weight within the

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 Missile Defense System

volume they occupy, fissile material, the core of a Ballistic Missile weighs more
per unit of volume than most other materials.

• They have a lot of tech in them, so if one fails to explode, then you
potentially have just granted access to your tech to the enemy.
• They cost tons of money for kg explosives delivered.
• The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons,
combined with missile capability, is the greatest threat that people
will face in the coming years, The weapons of mass destruction can
be delivered by aircraft and also on the ground by terrorists, most of
whom will find it easier to use conventional firearms and explosives.

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Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

With missile defense, having a system in place could prevent an enemy attack from
ever reaching many places. It’s peace of mind worth investing in. Missile defense is a
critical component of the national security architecture that enables every country
military efforts and can protect national critical infrastructure, from population and
industrial centers to politically and historically important sites. It can strengthen
diplomatic and deterrence efforts and provide both time and options to senior
decision-makers amid crises involving missiles flying on both ballistic and non-
ballistic trajectories (e.g., cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons). Because they are
designed to defeat incoming missile attacks, missile defense systems can save lives
and protect civilian infrastructure from damage or destruction. More important,
missile defense plays a critical role in strategic deterrence. The ability to deter an
enemy from attacking depends on convincing him that his attack will fail, that the cost
of carrying out a successful attack is prohibitively high, or that the consequences of an
attack will be so painful that they will outweigh the perceived benefit of attacking.

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 Missile Defense System

REFERENCES

1. "Interceptor missile scores 'direct hit'". The Hindu. 7 December 2007. Archived
from the original on 26 October 2012. Retrieved 6 December 2012.
https://www,interceptormissile.com/WCES2010.html.
2. US-Japan military successfully intercept a ballistic missile target with SM-3 Block
IIA.
3. "Japan backs out of costly US missile system despite 'imminent threat' from
North Korea". The Guardian. 26 June 2020. Retrieved 27 June 2020.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_defense_system.
4. "Missile defense systems: Arrow". Claremont InstituteMissileThreat.com.
Archived from the original on 14 October 2009. Retrieved 19 August 2009.
5. "Development of Ballistic Missile Defence System: Year End Review" (Press
release). Ministry of Defence (India). 28 December 2007. Retrieved 26
January 2008.
6. Missile defense system at a glance
https://E:/Missile%20Defense%20Systems%20at%20a%20Glance%20_%20Arms
%20Control%20Association.html
7. Air Force Theater Missile Defense-Advantages and Challenges Maj Stewart
Kowall : file:///E:/kowall.pdf.
8. Missile Defense System By Country Wikipedia .
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_defense_systems_by_country .
9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_defense.

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