1.

4 STATUTE TO BE CONSTRUED TO MAKE IT EFFECTIVE AND

WORKABLE
GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (also including General Clauses Act, 1897 with Notes), 14th ed
Justice G P SinghJustice A K Patnaik

GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (also including General Clauses Act, 1897 with
Notes), 14th ed > GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (also including General
Clauses Act, 1897 with Notes), 14th ed > CHAPTER 1 Basic Principles

CHAPTER 1 Basic Principles

1.4 STATUTE TO BE CONSTRUED TO MAKE IT EFFECTIVE AND

WORKABLE
The courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility.4. A statute or any enacting
provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative “on the principle expressed in the
maxim: ut res magis valeat quam pereat”.5. It is an application of this principle that courts while pronouncing upon
the constitutionality of a statute start with a presumption in favour of constitutionality and prefer a construction which
keeps the statute within the competence of the Legislature.6. The importance of the principle can be judged from the
fact that there is hardly any reported decision, where a statute may have been declared void for sheer vagueness,
although theoretically it may be possible to reach such a conclusion in case of “absolute intractability of the
language used,”7. or when “it is impossible to resolve the ambiguity,”8. i.e., when the language is absolutely
meaningless.9. As laid down by Farwell J “unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could do nothing at
all with them, I should be bound to find some meaning, and not to declare them void for uncertainty”.10. Lord
Denning approving Farwell J, stated the principle thus:

But when a statute has some meaning even though it is obscure, or several meanings, even though it is little to choose
between them, the courts have to say what meaning the statute is to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity.11.

And it was said by Lord Dunedin: “It is our duty to make what we can of statutes, knowing that they are meant to be
operative, and not inept, and nothing short of impossibility should in my judgment allow a Judge to declare a statute
unworkable”.12. The principle was reiterated by him in a later case where he observed:

A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial
omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.13.

The courts will therefore reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the Legislature even though
there may be some inexactitude in the language used.14. “If the choice is between two interpretations”, stated
Viscount Simon, LC “the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation we should
avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction,
based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result”.15. The
courts may complain that the enactment is “mind twisting” or an “enigma” yet they do not readily concede that no
meaning can be given to it,16. and in their comity with the Legislature, they strive hard to give meaningful life to
legislative enactments and avoid cadaveric consequences.17. “It is not an adequate discharge of duty”, said Holmes
J, “for courts to say: we see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, therefore we shall go on as before.”18.
So the courts are at least now, when purposive construction is gaining momentum, very reluctant to hold that
Parliament has achieved nothing by the language it used when it is tolerably plain what it wished to achieve.19.

An eg of the working of the rule is furnished in the construction of section 18-A(9) of the Indian Income-tax Act,
 Page 2 of 5
1.4 STATUTE TO BE CONSTRUED TO MAKE IT EFFECTIVE AND WORKABLE

1922, by the Supreme Court.20. The contention there, was that when action of imposing penalty was sought to be
taken under section 28 for failure to comply with section 18-A(3), the conditions as to notice under section 22(1) or
22(2) must be satisfied. The Supreme Court negatived this contention and supported its conclusion by pointing out
that the construction suggested will make section 18-A(9)(b) wholly nugatory. Gajendragadkar J said:

If we accede to this contention we must hold that though the Legislature enacted section 18-A(9)(b) with the very object of
bringing the failure to send estimates under section 18-A(3) within the operation of section 28, it signally failed to achieve its
object. A construction which leads to such a result must, if that is possible, be avoided, on the principle expressed in the
maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat.21.

Another such eg can be seen in the context of section 7(1) of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970, which
provides that the President, Vice President or member of the Central Council shall continue until his successor shall
have been duly elected or nominated. The Supreme Court, while repelling a challenge to the provision made under
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, observed that the provision was made by Parliament to take care of
situations when election to the post of President, Vice-President or member is delayed for various reasons and
upheld the provisions of section 7(1) of the Act applying the principle that a statute is to be construed so as to make
it effective and operative as expressed in the principle ut res valeat potius quam pereat.22.

The Income-tax Act, 1961, which repeals the predecessor Act of 1922 provides in section 297(2)(j) that
notwithstanding the repeal “any sum payable by way of income-tax, super-tax, interest, penalty or otherwise under
the repealed Act may be recovered under this Act, but without prejudice to any action already taken for the recovery
of such sum under the repealed Act”. In spite of this provision the Mysore High Court held that the group of sections
220 to 234 of the 1961 Act which deal with collection and recovery of tax could not be applied for recovery of tax
assessed under the old Act. Reversing the High Court the Supreme Court observed that the effect of the judgment
of the High Court was to nullify section 297(2)(j) and to declare it to be of no consequence and that an interpretation
leading to such a startling result should be avoided as it is opposed to all sound canons of construction. The court
held that the procedure of the new Act for recovery of tax will apply mutatis mutandis for recovery of tax assessed
under the repealed Act.23.

A further eg of the application of the rule may be noticed in a case relating to the Hyderabad District Municipalities
Act, 1956.24. The Act repealed an earlier Act on the same subject and by section 320 continued the committees
functioning under the repealed Act till the first meeting of the committee constituted under the new Act. By section
16(1) the Act provided: “Every general election requisite for the purpose of this Act shall be held by the Collector in
the manner prescribed within three months before the expiry of the term of office of the members of the committee
as specified under section 34”. The term of three years specified under section 34 was inapplicable to a committee
continued under section 320 for such a committee was to continue till the first meeting of the committee constituted
under the Act. The argument on the language of section 16, therefore, was “that the Collector’s power to hold a
general election is confined to section 16(1) and, as in the case of the members of the committee deemed to have
been constituted under the Act the second limb of the section cannot apply and as the Collector’s power is limited
by the second limb of the section, the Collector has no power to hold the first general election under the Act”.25.
Countering this argument Subbarao J said:

If this interpretation be accepted, the Act would become a dead letter and the obvious intention of the Legislature would be
defeated. Such a construction cannot be accepted except in cases of absolute intractability of the language used. While the
Legislature repealed the earlier Act with an express intention to constitute new committees on broad based democratic
principles, by this interpretation the committee under the old Act perpetuates itself indefinitely.26.

Section 16(1) was therefore held inapplicable to the first election after the Act came into force and was construed as
confined to subsequent elections.

Another example of the rule is furnished in the construction of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963. There was a
difference of opinion under the old Limitation Act whether time taken by the office in drawing up a decree or order
before the making of application for copy of the decree or order could be included in the time requisite for obtaining
the copy and thus excluded in computing the period of limitation for appeal, revision etc. The Law Commission
recommended that this period should not be excluded in computing limitation. With the object of giving effect to this
recommendation, an Explanation is provided in section 12 which reads: “In computing under this section the time