LEASES PROBLEM ANSWER

A periodic tenancy may be implied by the fact that the agreement specifies that a charge is to be
paid on a monthly basis even though the term's length is not specified. If a monthly payment is
made, a monthly periodic tenancy will ensue, and this arrangement may continue indefinitely unless
notice to quit is provided, according to Hammersmith LBC v. Monk. In any case, a periodic tenancy
may still exist if the agreement is not executed by deed as needed by s.52(1) LPA 1925 to satisfy the
formality requirement of a valid legal lease.

Possession exclusivity is the problem. If there is exclusive control of the flat, they have the right to
keep everyone out of the building in accordance with Street v. Mountford. It should be noted that
while Street v. Mountford also acknowledged rent as a necessary component of a lease, Ashburn
Anstalt v. Arnold questioned the necessity of rent because it had been devalued by the definition of
term of years absolute in s.205(1)(xxvii)LPA 1925.

If they enter into the same agreement, the apartment would be shared occupancy; nevertheless, in
order to be considered leaseholders, they must demonstrate all four elements of joint tenancy as
outlined in Mikeover v. Brady. They are likely to sign at the same time and may have unities of title,
time, and interests in a single agreement rather than separate agreements with different
stipulations.

Paying a monthly charge could count as rent in relation to clause (a). In the case of Mikeover v.
Brady, it was decided that in cases of joint tenancies, each tenant is responsible for the full amount
of rent payable even though they typically only pay a portion of it. They may have unity of interest if
it is truly anticipated that they will share responsibility for the monthly fee since they have joint
rights of obligation. They are therefore probably joint tenants, and the agreement may serve as their
lease.

The cases Antoniades v. Villiers and AG Securities v. Vaughan are pertinent in determining whether
they may be licensees or renters in relation to clause (b). A couple hired a one-bedroom apartment
with a separate couch bed in Antoniades. Although it was technically conceivable for the landlord to
select additional residents, it was decided that it is absurd to think that he planned to send
additional people or that he intended to share the couple's bed. Even if the clause was incorporated,
it is likely that they will be leasees based on Antoniades. One could contend that clause (b) was
included as a ruse to circumvent statutory protection. This term will be disregarded by the court in
light of Street v. Mountford as there is no intention of enforcing it.

The issue is whether they have sole control over this space or merely their bedroom, as was the case
in AG Securities v. Vaughan, where the licensees had a maximum amount of sole control over their
quarters. They were declared to be only licensees.

The residents of AG Securities did not know one another, signed various agreements at various
times, and changed rooms based on seniority.

Regarding clause (c), it was determined in Addiscombe Garden Estates v. Crabbe that this just serves
as proof of the parties' intentions and is not conclusive, despite the fact that it is stated that the
agreement only produces a license and not a lease. The court, as in Abbeyfield (Harpenden) Society
Ltd v. Woods, will consider the context in which the agreement was struck. The court must take into
account elements including the relationship between the sharers and the type and amount of the
accommodations offered in light of Stribling v. Wickham.

The inhabitants may be licensees and have sole ownership of the apartment if they sign the
contract, based on the explanation above and the relationship of the occupants.