DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI ALOR STAR

DALAM NEGERI KEDAH DARUL AMAN, MALAYSIA

[GUAMAN SIBIL NO: 22-103-2004]

ANTARA

KANG BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD

(No. 49292-A) ... PLAINTIF
DAN

1. W.H. MARKETING (M) SDN BHD (No. 250561-D)

2. ONG BAN CHAI & CO
(Didakwa sebagai sebuah firma)
3. ALLIANCE BANK MALAYSIA BERHAD ... DEFENDAN-
(Dahulunya dikenali sebagai Multi-Purpose DEFENDAN
Bank Berhad)

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Appeal against striking out order -

First defendant had filed winding-up petition against plaintiff on grounds of
plaintiff’s debt for materials supplied - Plaintiff’s account with third
defendant frozen - Amount of debt disputed - Plaintiff obtained order setting
aside petition and unfreezing account - Plaintiff filed present suit for loss of
profits arising from defendants actions - Whether plaintiff’s suit a case of
malicious prosecution and abuse of process - Whether plain and obvious
case for striking out pursuant to RHC O. 18 r. 19(1)

Held (the appellant/plaintiff’s appeal allowed):

(1) The principle upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under
any of the four limbs of Order 18 r. 19(1) of the RHC, 1980 are well
settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be
had to the summary process under this rule and the summary procedure

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 can only be adopted when it can clearly be seen that a claim or answer
is on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable.’ It cannot be exercised by
a minute examination of the documents and the facts of the case in
order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence.
Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd v. UMBC Bhd (refd).

(2) In the instant case, the Court is of the considered view that perusing
the voluminous affidavits, pleadings and bundle of authorities filed by
both the parties, there are many disputes as to facts and points of law
which have to be adjudicated at the trial of the action.

(3) The other point which is to be noted is that the first defendant had also
filed an action against the plaintiff claiming for the sum of
RM170,912.43 which the plaintiff had disputed. The legal issue for
consideration is whether it is permissible for the first defendant to file
an action claiming the said sum outstanding and which is disputed by
the plaintiff and at the same time before the conclusion of the trial,
file a winding-up proceeding against the plaintiff.

JUDGMENT

Enclosure 29 is an appeal to Judge in Chambers filed by the

Plaintiff against the decisions of the learned Deputy Registrar given
on the 24 t h August 2005 in respect of two Summons -in-Chambers
filed by the First and Second Defendants in respect of Enclosure 12
and Enclosure 8 dated the 24t h August 2005 and 31s t October 2004
respectively under Order 18 rule 19, Rules of the High Court 1980
(hereinafter called the RHC 1980) allowing the Writ and Statement of
Claim to be struck-out.

The Court heard the appeal in respect of both Enclosures 8 and

12 simultaneously since they involved the same facts and issues and

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directed both parties to put in their respectively written submissions
which were duly complied.

On the 15 t h A u g u s t 2 0 0 6 , t h e C o u r t a f t e r r e a d i n g b o t h
Enclosures and also the Affidavits filed herein and after perusing the
written submissions and hearing oral submissions by the parties, the
Court allowed the Plaintiff’ s appeal with costs (Enclosure 29) in
respect of the decisions made the learned Deputy Registrar.

Both the First and Second Defendants who were dissatisfied

with the said decision has since filed an appeal.

Factual background of case

The Plaintiff is a trading company trading inter-alia tiles

purchased from the First Defendant which has an office at all material
time at Pasir Gudang Industrial Estate, Pasir Gudang, Johor. The
Second Defendant is at all material time a legal firm having an office
at Johor Bahru, Johor. The Third Defendant is at all material time a
commercial bank and having a branch in Alor Setar, Kedah. The
Plaintiff at all material time has a current account with the Third
Defendant’s branch at Alor Setar.

At all material time it was also alleged that the Plaintiff has an
outstanding sum due and owing to the First Defendant in the sum of
RM170,912.00 as at the 30t h May 1998 but the Plaintiff strongly
denied. On the 23 r d June 1998, the First Defendant filed a Winding-

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up Petition against the Plaintiff at the Johor Bahru High Court vide
Winding-up Petition No: 28-102-1998 (hereinafter called ‘the
Petition’), on the ground that the Plaintiff’s owed money to the First
Defendant. The Second Defendant then sent a letter dated the 25 t h
June 1998 t o t h e T h i r d D e f e n d a n t t o f r e e z e t h e P l a i n t i f f’ s current
account with the Third Defendant.

The Third Defendant upon receipt of the said letter from the
Second Defendant had frozen the Plaintiff’s current account on the
13t h July 1998.

Upon knowing that the said current account had been frozen,
the Plaintiff instructed his Solicitors to file an application on the 5t h
August 1998 to set aside the Petition. On the 7t h September 1998 the
Court after hearing the Plaintiff’s application had set aside the Petition
and also made a consequential order that the freezing of the
Plaintiff’s current account be lifted within 7 days from the date of the
said order.

As a result of the Court allowing the Plaintiff’s application to set

aside the Petition, the Plaintiff has alleged that the action by the First
Defendant in refusing to supply the Plaintiff the delivery orders and
invoices relating to the purchase transaction and proceeding to wind
up the Plaintiff was tainted with malice and in bad faith.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff alleged that the Second Defendant in

advising the Third Defendant to freeze the Plaintiff’s current account,

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was also tainted with malice and in bad faith and an abuse of the
process of the Court.

As a legal redress to the Plaintiff’s grievances, th e Plaintiff filed

the present Writ and Statement of Claim dated the 20t h June 2004
against the First, Second and Third Defendants respectively for
general and exemplary and special damages of RM68, 000.00, loss of
profit of RM7,741,769.43, loss for interrup ted contract works, interest
and costs.

The First, Second and Third Defendants have filed their

respectively defence denying all the allegations as stated in the
Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim.

The Second Defendant proceeded to file a Summons -in-

Chambers (Enclosure 8) dated the 16t h September 2004 pursuant to
Order 18 r. 19 RHC, 1980 under the sub -rule 19(1)(b)(c) and (d)
respectively.

In the Affidavit -in-Support (Enclosure 9) affirmed by the Second

Defendant himself inter-alia stated that the Plaintiff’s claim was
misconceived in that the Second Defendant had instructed the Third
Defendant to freeze the Plaintiff’s current account No: 013-1-000099-
6 at the branch in Alor Setar. The Second Defendant further stated
that the First Defendant had the legal right to file the Petition No: 28-
102-1998 at the Johor Bahru High Court on the ground of insolvency
on the part of the Plaintiff and it was just and equitable to do so

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pursuant to Sections 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225 and 226(4) of
the Companies Act, 1965. It was further stated that the filing of the
Petition was made bone fide and without any malice or bad faith.

Not long after the Second Defendant had filed Enclosure 8, the
First Defendant also followed suit by filing a Summons -in-Chambers
(Enclosure 12) dated the 31 s t October 2004 pursuant to Order 18 rule
19(1)(b) of the RHC, 1980. The Affidavit -in-Support (Enclosure 13)
was affirmed on the 25t h October 2004. In the said Affidavit -in-
Support, the First Defendant stated inter-alia :-

i) that the Plaintiff had informed the First Defendant that it

had a credit facility with the Third Defendant in the sum of
RM500,000.00.

ii) that prior to the filing of the Petition at the Johor Bahru
High Court on the 23r d June 1998, the following had taken
place namely:-

a) the Plaintiff had purchased goods which was tiles

from the Firs t Defendant on credit terms. The
Plaintiff owed the First Defendant a sum of
RM170,912.83.

b) the Plaintiff had between the dates 5 t h March 1998

t o 7 t h July 1998 issued to the First Defendant
s e v e r a l p o s t-dated cheques and the said cheques

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 when presented for payment were dishonoured
with remarked ‘ Payment Stopped.’

c) in view of the fact that the said cheques issued by

the Plaintiff were not able to be presented for
payment had caused the first Defendant to appoint
the Second Defendant as its Solicitors with
instructions to issue a Notice of Demand to the
Plaintiff to demand the payment of the outstanding
sum due and owing to the First Defendant.

d) the First Defendant was informed by the Second

Defendant that the Statutory Notice pursuant to
Section 218 of the Companies Act, 1965 was issued
to the Plaintiff on the 26t h May 1998.

e) the Plaintiff did not respond to the Statutory Notice

issued within three (3) weeks as stipulated in the
said Notice.

The First Defendant on advice given by the Second Defendant

had instructed the Second Defendant to file the Petition at the Johor
Bahru High Court on the 23r d June 1998 stating inter-alia that there
are grounds and merits in filing the Petition against the Plaintiff.

The First Defendant also stated in the said Affidavit -in-Support

that the said sum which is due and owing to the First Defendant and

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the First Defendant had filed a Summons and Statement of Claim at
the Sessions Court Alor Setar vid e SCCS No: 52- 324-2001 against
the Plaintiff and the guarantors claiming the said sum.

In reply to the Affidavit -in-Support of Enclosure 8, the Plaintiff

also affirmed an affidavit dated 19t h October 2004 where it was stated
inter-alia that:-

i) the Second Defendant knew all along that the Plaintiff

disputed the outstanding amount of RM170, 912.43 and
had requested the First Defendant to furnish the invoices
and the delivery orders of which the First Defendant had
failed to do so.

ii) the Second Defendant as Solicitor for the First Defendant

who was appraised of this disputed amount had
proceeded to advise the First Defendant to issue a
Statutory Notice to the Plaintiff and also had advised the
Third Defendant to freeze the Plaintiff’ s current account
with the Third Defendant at the Alor Setar branch.

The Plaintiff also stated that the Plaintiff was solvent which
featured the Plaintiff Profit and Loss Account as at 30 t h June 1997
and 30 t h June 1996 respectively showing that for the two (2) years
the Plaintiff was making profit after tax of RM257,058.00 and
RM3,776,407.00 respectively.

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 The Plaintiff further stated that the amount of RM170,912.43 as
claimed by the First Defendant was disputed by the Plaintiff in its
c a s e at the Sessions Court, Alor Setar vide SCCS No: 52 -324-2001.

The Plaintiff also stated that the Johor Bahru High Court had on
the 7t h September 1998 struck-out the Petition filed by the First
Defendant with costs.

Submission by the Second Defendant

It is the submission of Second Defendant that the act of

informing and publishing to the Third Defendant as Banker to the
Plaintiff was permissible pursuant to Sections 223, 224, 225 and
226(4) of the Companies Act, 1965 and read with Rule 24 and Rule
32 of the Company Winding-up Rules.

Section 223 states that no disposition of assets after Petition is

filed unless the Court orders otherwise.

Section 224 states no execution on Respondent’s assets.

Section 225 states that all encumbrances (Bankers) are

parties to the Petition.

Section 226(4) states that all creditors (the Bank may be a

creditor), shareholders are joint Petitioners.

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 Thus the Second Defendant may inform the Banker as per
Sections 223, 225 and 226(4). See R e G r a y’s Inn ’s case (see B.A.
p g . 3 - 16). The Court held that the Bank was not entitled to claim
priority over the advance on Overdraft to the Respondent Company
based on its encumbrances once the Banker had knowledge of the
Petition per section 219 of the Companies Act.

Abu Bakar bin Jaafer & Anor. v. Malayan Banking Berhad

[ 1 9 9 1 ] 2 ML J 4 8 7 ; B a n k r u p t c y c a s e . S e c t i o n 5 4 ( 1 ) ( b ) S e c t i o n
4 7 ( 1 )(2) Bankruptcy Act applied. See Section 293 of the Companies
Act. The Bank may freeze account. The Petitioner had no cause of
action against the Second Defendant (Ong Ban Chai), the Plaintiff
must show falsehood, malice and without reasonable cause. The
petition was filed with reasonable cause of action. See Quartz Hill
Gold’s case at pg. 1 - 2 and pg. 33 - 54 of B.A.).

Rule 24 and 32 of the Winding-Up Rules states that all Petition

shall be advertised, (see pg. 29 - 32 of B.A.).

The Plaintiff should only sue the Banker who froze the account;
Banker should answer why they froze on any legal ground. The Bank
will eventually get to know of the position because the Petitioner must
lodge it with the Registra r of Companies and that by Rule 24 of the
Companies Winding-Up Rules it must be advertised.

In the circumstances the Writ and Statement of Claim against

the 2nd Defendant should be struck-out as it shows no cause of action

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against the Second Defendant and it is an abuse of process by the
Plaintiff.

The Submission by the learned counsel for First Defendant

In the submission of the learned counsel for First Defendant, it

attacked the two cause of action filed by the Plaintiff in respect of
malicious prosecution and an abuse of process of Court. In
paragraph 10 of the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, the particulars did
not state with sufficient clarity the difference in the two cause of
action and also the alleged act which could be construed as an abuse
o f the process of Court as compared malicious prosecution. In this
regard, it is submitted that the pleading is defective and it has caused
prejudiced to the First Defendant in preparing its defence. Reference
was made by the First Defendant to he case of Sp eed Seal
Products Ltd v. Paddington and another [1986] 1 All ER 91 where
the Court of Appeal held as follows:-

“the tort of abuse of the process of the Court would lie against a
plaintiff where it could be shown that he had set proceedings on
foot to effect an object or purpose which was not within the
scope of the process. The tort was distinct from malicious
prosecution and unlike malicious prosecution did not depend on
the plaintiff ’s proceedings being completed before an action
could be brought. ”

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 The learned counsel for First Defendant also stated the legal
principles relating to malicious prosecution namely, malicious
prosecution the necessary elements to prove such action are:-

a) the bankruptcy or w i n d i n g-up proceedings has

commenced and terminated in favour of the plaintiff.

b) there is malice.

c) there is an absence of reasonable and probable cause;

and

d) There must be damages suffered .

I n t h e c a s e o f B u s i n e s s C o m p u t e r s I n t e r n a t i o n a l L t d v.
Registrar of Companies and Others [1987] 3 WLR 1134, the Court
h e l d t h a t :-

“It is implicit in the decision that commencement of bankruptcy

p r o c e e d i n g s o r t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a W i n d i n g -Up Petition
cannot found an action in damages unless associated with
malice. ”

The learned counsel for the First Defendant further submitted

that the action taken by the Plaintiff is an abuse of the civil process
which must encompassed the following elements namely:-

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 (a) the process complained must have been initiated ;

(b) the purpose for initiating the process must be some

purp o s e o t h e r t h a n t o o b t a i n g e n u i n e r e d r e s s w h i c h t h e
process offers.

(c) The plaintiff must have suffered damage or injury in

consequence.

The learned counsel for the First Defendant further argued that
the Plaintiff has failed to show the presence of malic e in the winding
up proceeding. The First Defendant has every right to proceed with
the winding up proceeding against the Plaintiff for the following
reasons namely:-

(i) the winding up petition was bone fide filed because the
Plaintiff has failed to make payment to the First Defendant
after the expiry of the stipulated time as mentioned in the
Statutory Notice.

(ii) prior to the filing of the Petition, the Second Defendant

had not informed the First Defendant that the Plaintiff had
disputed the debt amount. Furthermore, the Plaintiff by
giving the First Defendant post-dated cheques had
represented to the First Defendant that it did not dispute
the debt amount.

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 (iii) that the Petition was struck-out by the Court because the
First Defendant agreed to withdraw the Petition.

(iv) that the First Defendant agreed that the disputed amount
be tried at the Sessions Court Alor Setar after being
advised by the Second Defendant.

(v) that the First Defendant did not write any letter to the 3r d
Defendant to freeze the Plaintiff’s current account with the
Third Defendant’ s branch in Alor Setar. The freezing of
the account was done by the third Defendant and the First
Defendant should not be held liable.

The learned counsel for the First Defendant also averred that
the Plaintiff had not particularized the loss incurred as a result of the
freezing of the current account at the Third Defendant’ s branch in
Alor Setar.

The learned counsel for the First Defendant further alleged that
the Plaintiff had failed to show that the winding-up proceeding was
initiated for a collateral purpose.

The Submission by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff

The learned counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the alleged
debt was disputed by the Plaintiff and the First and Second
Defendants kne w before the Petition was filed that the debt was

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disputed by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s contention is supported by
documentary evidence by exhibiting two (2) letters collectively
marked as ‘KPK-2’. The said letters dispute the alleged debt and
notify the Defendants that if the dispute was not resolved, the Plaintiff
would have no alternative but to ‘stop payment’ of the post-dated
cheques issued in favour of the First Defendant.

The learned counsel for the Plaintiff further contended that

despite the said letters, the First and the Second Defendants
maliciously and without reasonable cause filed the Petition on the
23 r d June 1998. It is the contention of the Plaintiff that the dominant
and ulterior motive in filing the Petition was to pressurize and force
the Plaintiff to settle the disputed debt.

As against the Third Defendant, the learned counsel for the

Plaintiff submitted that, the Third Defendant had frozen the Plaintiff’s
current account with the Third Defendant upon receipt of a letter from
the Second Defendant.

The Second Defendant was at the material time the agent of

the First Defendant and it was the submission of the Plaintiff that the
following acts of the Defendants amounted to malicious prosecution
and/or an abuse of the process of the Court.

(a) filing the Petition with knowledge that the debt was
disputed;

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 (b) filing the Petition for an ulterior motive and not to obtain
genuine redress against the Plaintiff;

(c) informing the Third Defendant to freeze the Plaintiff’s

account two (2) days after filing the Petition;

(d) withdrawing the Petition with impunity and thereby

occasioning substantial losses to the Plaintiff.

The learned counsel for the Plaintiff in conclusion submitted

t h a t t h e a c t i o n i s n o t s o p l a i n a n d o b v i o u s t o j u s t i f y a summary
disposal. There are may be triable issues raised by both parties
which should be ventilated during the full trial.

Principles For Striking Out

In order for the Defendant to succeed for an order under Order

18 r. 19(1) of the RHC, he must satisfy the Court that the Plaintiff’s
claim is plainly and obviously hopeless and scandalous, frivolous or
vexatious where the defences are unarguable or where it may
prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action or it is
otherwise an abuse of the pro cess of the Court.

The Federal Court in S i m K i e C h o n v. Superintendent of

P u d u P r i s o n & O r d e r [1985] 2 MLJ 385 at page 386 held:-

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 ‘The principle governing the striking out of pleadings is clear in
that it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should
be had to the summary process under Order 18 r. 19 of the
Rules of the High Court 1980; the summary procedure under
this rule can only be adopted when it can clearly be seen that a
claim or answer is on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable. ’

This view was adopted by the Federal Court in the case of

B a n d a r B u i l d e r S d n B h d v. United Malayan Banking Corporation
Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7:-

“The principle upon which he Courts act in exercising its power

under any of the four (4) limbs of Order 18 rule 19(1) of the
RHC are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that
recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule
and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be
clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it
‘ obviously unsustainable.”

Order 18 r. 19(1)(b), (c)and (d)

Under Order 18 r. 19(1)(b), (c) and (d) of the RHC, the Court
may at any stage of he proceeding order to be struck out any Writ
and Statement of Claim in the action on the ground that (b) it is
scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c) it may prejudice, embarrass or
delay the fair trial of the action or (d) it is otherwise an abuse of the
process of the Court.

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 From the plethora of authorities pertaining to the question of
what amounts to ‘scandalous ,’ it is taken to mean ‘ wholly
unnecessary and irrelevant’ and not merely unpleasant allegations.
The cases which discussed the meaning of ‘scandalous ’ are
Technointan Holding Sdn Bhd v. Tetuan Tan Kim Siong @ Teh
Hong Jet [2006] 7 CLJ 541 and Boey Oi Ten g t/a Indah Reka
Construction & Trading v. Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd
[2002 ] 1 CLJ 405.

The word ‘frivolous or vexatious ’ on the other hand, mean

‘obviously unsustainable ’ (see Technointan Holding Sdn Bhd v.
Tetuan Tan Kim & Teh Hong Jet (supra).

With regard to (c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair

trial of the action. The pleading filed must not confuse or take the
opponent by surprise. A pleading is embarrassing where it is not
clear what is being pleaded, for example where the Defend ant does
not make clear in his defence how much of the Statement of Claim is
admitted and how much is not (see British & Colonial Land
Association v. Foster and Robins [1888 ] 4 TLR 574.

As to the meaning of ‘an abuse of the process of the Court’

reference is made to the case of Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as
a firm) v. Wee Chang Jin [1998 ] 1 SLR 374 at page 384:-

“The term ‘abuse of the process of the Court’, in Order 18

rule 19(1)(d), has been given a wide interpretation by the

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 Courts. It includes considerations of public policy and the
interests of justice. This term signifies that the process of the
Court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be
abused. The Court will preven t the improper use of its
machinery. It will prevent the judicial process from being used
as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of
litigation. The categories of conduct rendering a claim
frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed and
will depend on all relevant circumstances of the case. A type of
conduct which has been judicially acknowledged as an abuse
of process is the bringing of an action for a collateral purpose
... if an action was not brought bona fide for the purpose of
obtaining relief but for some other ulterior or collateral purpose,
it might be struck out as an abuse of the process of the Court.”

Finding of the Court

The principle upon which the Court acts in exercising its power
under any of the four limbs of Order 18 r. 19( 1) of the RHC, 1980 are
well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should
be had to the summary process under this rule and the summary
procedure can only be adopted when it can clearly be seen that a
claim or answer is on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable. ’ It
c a n n o t b e e x e r c ised by a minute examination of the documents and
the facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of
action or a defence (see Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd v. UMBC Bhd
(supra)).

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 In the instant case, the Court is of the considered view that
perusing the voluminous affidavits, pleadings and bundle of
authorities filed by both the parties, there are many disputes as to
facts and points of law which have to be adjudicated at the trial of the
action. The other point which is to be noted is that the First
Defendant had also filed an action in the Alor Setar Sessions Court
vide SCCS No: 52-324-2001 against the Plaintiff claiming for the sum
of RM170,912.43 which the Plaintiff (Defendant) had disputed. The
legal issue for consideration is whether it is permissible for the First
Defendant to file an action claiming the said sum outstanding and
which is disputed by the Plaintiff (Defendant) and at the same time
before the conclusion of the trial, filed a winding -up proceeding
against the Plaintiff (Defendant).

For the reasons as adumbrated above, the Court hereby

reversed the decision of the learned Deputy Registrar made on the
24 t h August 2005 and allowed the Appellant’ s (Plaintiff) appeal in
respect of Enclosure 29 with costs.

DATED: 24 FEBRUARY 2009

T.t.

(DATO’ MOHD SOFIAN BIN TAN SRI ABD RAZAK)

JUDGE
HIGH COURT OF MALAYA, ALOR SETAR
KEDAH DARUL AMAN

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For the plaintiff - M/s Chuah, Halim & Co

For the first defendant - M/s Tay & Partners

For the second defendant - M/s Ong Ban Chai & Co

Case(s) referred to:

Abu Bakar bin Jaafer & Anor v. Malayan Banking Berhad [1991] 2 MLJ
487 (refd)

Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd

[1993] 4 CLJ 7 (refd)

Boey Oi Teng t/a Indah Reka Construction & Trading v. Trans Resources
Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] 1 CLJ 405 (refd)

British & Colonial Land Association v. Foster and Robins [1888] 4 TLR 574
(refd)

Business Computers International Ltd v. Registrar of Companies and Others

[1987] 3 WLR 1134 (refd)

Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v. Wee Chang Jin [1998] 1 SLR
374 (refd)
Quartz Hill Gold ’s case at pg 1 - 2 and pg 33 - 54 of BA (refd)

Re Gray’s Inn’s case (BA pg. 3 - 16) (refd)

Sim Kie Chon v. Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Order [1985] 2 MLJ 385
at page 386 (refd)

Speed Seal Products Ltd v. Paddington and another [1986] 1 All ER 91

(refd)

Technointan Holding Sdn Bhd v. Tetuan Tan Kim Siong @ Teh Hong Jet
[2006] 7 CLJ 541 (refd)

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Legislation referred to:
Bankruptcy Act, ss. 47(1)(2), 54(1)(b)

Companies Act, 1965 ss. 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226(4), 293
Company Winding-up Rules, rr. 24, 32

Rules of the High Court 1980, O. 18 r. 19(1)(b)(c) and (d)

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