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Human Communication Research

VOl. 10, NO.4, Summer 1984, 557-574

DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURE
AND DECISION QUALITY

BRANT R. BURLESON
Purdue University

BARBARA J. LEVINE
Mellon Bank,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

WENDY SAMTER
Purdue University

Although communication scholars usually have assumed that social interaction is


intrinsic to the process of producing good group decisions. some writers have
argued that social interaction actually may harm the quality of group decisions.
Consequenrly, several noninteractive group decision-making procedures have
been proposed; among these are rhe staticized group procedure and the nominal
group procedure. While some research suggests rhe effectiveness of these non-
interactive procedures, no research has compared direcrly the effect of staticized,
nominal, and interacting decision procedures on the quality of group decisions
reached with respect 10 complex. multistage tasks. The present studyprovides such
a comparison. Reasoning that the open exchange of information, opinions, and
criticism is necessary for optimal decision-making on complex tasks, it was
hypothesized that groups employing an interacting procedure would produce
better decisions than groups employing either staticized or nominal decision
procedures. It was hypothesized further rhat subjects in the interacting condition
would produce better individual decisions than rhose in either the staticized or
nominal conditions. Both of these hypotheses were confirmed. In addition, there
was some evidence of an "assembly-effect bonus "among groups in the interacting
condition.

Traditionally, both researchers and teachers of small group decision-


making processes have assumed that interaction among group members
is necessary for the achievement of high quality decisions. The public
generation, testing, and validation of ideas that occurs through social

Brant R. Burleson (Ph.D., University o f Illinois) is an assistant professor in the


Department of Communication, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana. Barbara J.

557
558 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / Summer 1984

interaction supposedly produces better and more satisfying decisions


(Hirokawa, 1982a). However, several theorists have suggested that
rather than being a positive force in decision-making, social interaction
among group members may actually harm the decision-making process
and result in lower quality decisions. For example, Helmer (1967)
identifies several “pitfalls” of natural group interaction, including:
unwarranted compromise among divergent views, unwillingness to
abandon publicly expressed opinions, susceptibility t o specious persua-
sion emanating from supposed authorities or loud-voiced members, and
bandwagon effects resulting from unwarranted majority opinions. Lamm
and Trommsdorf ( 1 973) provide a complementary catalogue of harmful
effects that social interaction can have on group decision-making
processes: (1) time consuming irrelevant or “off-topic” talk, (2) the
deflection of individuals’ attention from their own ideas, (3) reduced
participation by relatively quiet group members, and (4) the inhibition
of the expression of ideas or evaluations due t o the fear of criticism or
social conflict. Several other theorists (e.g., McGregor, 1967; Steiner,
1972) have expressed similar sentiments with respect t o the negative
effects of social interaction on group decision-making.
Recognition of the potentially negative consequences of social
interaction on the quality of group decisions has led t o the search for
effective, noninteractive group decision-making procedures. Two some-
what different noninteractive decision-making procedures have been
proposed, each of which strives t o capitalize on the advantages of group
input while minimizing the potential disadvantages associated with free
interaction among group members. In what has become known as the
“statisticized” or “staticized”decision procedure (Lorge, Fox, Davitz, &
Brenner, I958), no communication occurs among group members.
Rather, the separate judgments of several individuals working alone
are pooled or averaged statistically to produce a “group” decision. In
essence then, the staticized decision procedure assumes that social
interaction among group members has n o positive effect on the
decision-making process o r the quality of decisions reached. Conse-
quently, in accord with the principles of statistical sampling theory, the
best “group” judgment is assumed t o be represented as the arithmetic
mean of several individual judgments.

Levine (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin) is a communication coordinator for Mellon


Bank, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Wendy Samter (M.A., Purdue University) is a doctoral
candidate in communication at Purdue University.
Eurleson et al. / DECISION-MAKING 559

Several studies have found that the decisions produced through the
statistical pooling of individual judgments are just as good, if not
superior to, the decisions reached by groups engaging in natural social
interaction (e.g., Beran, Albert, Loiseaux, Mayfield, & Wright, 1958;
Kaplan, Skogstad, & Girshick, 1950; see the review of Hare, 1976).
Building on these results, Davis (1973) proposed that the central
determinants of group decisions are members’ initial preferences and a
decisional rule (usually not known consciously to members) for
combining these preferences. As Poole, McPhee, and Siebold (1982)
note, Davis’ “social decision scheme” model has the net effect of
eliminating social interaction as a meaningful force in the production of
group decisions.
A second noninteractive decision procedure permits only limited
communication among group members under highly restrictive con-
ditions. Referred to both as the “nominal group technique” (Delbecq,
Van der Ven, & Gustafson, 1975) and the “Delphi” technique (Helmer,
1967), this method permits communication among group members
(usually only in written form) through the mediation of a leader-
recorder or moderator. By carefully controlling both the content of
messages and the channels through which messages are conveyed, the
nominal group procedure seeks to maximize the rational process and
the substance of members’ contributions, and to eliminate problems
arising from open social interaction. Several studies have compared the
effectiveness of nominal groups and interacting groups in the context of
brainstorming tasks; these studies generally have found that groups
employing the nominal procedure generate both a greater number of
ideas and more good ideas than naturally interacting groups (e.g.,
Dunnette, Campbell, & Jaastad, 1963; Philipsen, Mulac, & Dietrich,
1979; Taylor, Berry, & Block, 1958; see the review of Lamm &
Trommsdorf, 1973). In particular, when groups contain individuals
with high levels of “communication apprehension,” more ideas have
been generated in nominal groups than in interacting groups (Jablin,
1981; rlablin, Seibold, & Sorenson, 1977). The superiority of the
nominal group procedure also has been documented with tasks other
than brainstorming; for example, Kanekar and Rosenbaum (1972)
found that nominal groups outperformed interacting groups on an
anagram task. (For a general review of research supporting the efficacy
of the nominal or Delphi technique, see Emmons & Kaplan, 197 1 .)
While recognizing the potentially debilitating effects of social
interaction and the empirical support for the merit of staticized and
560 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / Summer 1984

nominal decision procedures, many writers continue t o maintain that


free interaction among group members yields the best decisions (see
Hirokawa, I982b). Theorists defending the efficacy of free interaction as
a decision procedure frequently have relied on some variant of what
might be termed “the group synergy hypothesis”( Hall & Watson, 197 1).
In its most general form, the synergy hypothesis maintains that the
quality of group outcomes exceeds what would be expected from a
simple sum of individual contributions. Such synergy is described by
Collins and Guetzkow (1964) as an “assembly effect”:

An assembly effect occurs when the group is able to achieve collectively


something which could not have been achieved by any member working
alone or by a combination of individual efforts. The assembly effect
bonus is productivity which exceeds the potential of the most capable
member and also exceeds the sum of the efforts of the group members
working separately. (p. 58)

The synergy hypothesis also has been referred to by Zaleznick and


Moment (1964) as the “psychological interdependence effect” and by
Fisher (1980) as the “principle of non-summativity.”
Other researchers have detailed more specific reasons why higher
quality decisions are achieved under conditions of free interaction. For
example, Shaw (1981, p. 64) lists six reasons explaining the relative
superiority of decisions reached under conditions of group interaction.
These include ( I ) summation of individual contributions, (2) rejection of
incorrect suggestions and the checking of errors, (3) the greater
influence of the ablest group member, (4) the social influence of the most
confident member, (5) the greater interest in the task aroused by group
membership, and (6) the greater amount of information available to the
group. Fisher (1980, p. 61) emphasizes that a critical exchange of ideas is
much more easily accomplished in interacting groups. Davis (1969, p.
40) suggests that the questioning and debating that occurs during social
interaction may stimulate new or different ideas that would not be
generated when members work in isolation from one another.
Several reviews ofthe literature (e.g., Fisher, 1980; Hare, 1976; Shaw,
1981) have noted that social interaction is likely t o be particularly
beneficial on the quality of decisions when groups work on fairly
complicated tasks, tasks involving values, or in those circumstances
when no member of the group possesses an especially high level of
task-relevant knowledge. In this regard, it is worth noting that staticized
groups have produced decisions matching the quality of interacting
Burleson et a l . / DECISION-MAKING 561

groups most frequently when engaged in simple quantity estimation


tasks (e.g., guessing the number of beans in a jar). Further, nominal
groups generally have outperformed interacting groups largely in terms
of the quantity of ideas generated; few studies have compared nominal
and interacting groups in terms of the quality of the decision reached.
Indeed, to date no study has compared directly the quality of decisions
produced by groups employing the staticized, nominal, and interacting
decision procedures.
T o summarize, a somewhat perplexing state of affairs exists with
respect to the three different decision procedures. In prior research, the
staticized procedure has been employed most frequently as a method for
pooling individual judgments on relatively simple tasks and the nominal
procedure most often has been utilized as a method for generating
(rather than evaluating) ideas (see Davis, 1969; Shaw, 1981). While the
value of the staticized and nominal procedures has not been established
with respect to decision-making on relatively complex tasks then,
several textbook writers (e.g., Applbaum, Bodaken, Sereno, & Anatol,
1979; Cragan & Wright, 1980; Goldberg & Larson, 1975; Mabry &
Barnes, 1980; Verderber, 1982) recommend these procedures for
complex decision making on the assumption that they may result in
higher quality decisions than those produced through “normal” group
interaction. In contrast, some group communication researchers (e.g.,
Hirokawa, 1982b) recently have advocated the detailed study of group
interaction patterns on the assumption that group interaction (or, at
least certain specific forms of group interaction) lead to higher quality
decisions. Apparently then, incompatible assumptions currently are held
by group communication scholars about the relative efficacy of
interactive and noninteractive decision procedures. Clearly, these assump-
tions need to be subjected to an empirical test.
The present study was undertaken to compare directly the effec-
tiveness of staticized, nominal, and interacting decision procedures on
the quality of group decisions reached on a complex information
evaluation task. The preceding review suggests that the best decision on
such a task should be reached when the free and open exchange of ideas,
criticisms, questions, and opinions is maximized. Consequently, it was
hypothesized that nominal Rroups would produce better decisions
than staticized groups, and that interacting groups would produce better
decisions than either staticized or nominal groups. In addition, several
studies indicate that group discussion exerts a positive effect on
individual decisions made subsequent to interaction (e.g., Jenness,
562 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / Summer 1984

1932). It thus was expected that individuals in the interacting condition


would make better individual decisions subsequent to group discussion
than individuals in either the nominal or the staticized conditions.

METHODS

SUBJECTS

Participants in the study were 120 undergraduates enrolled in basic


communication courses at a large eastern university. Data were
collected during regularly scheduled class periods. Students were
requested to participate in the study by a n experimenter, but were given
the option to decline if they so desired. None of the students declined t o
participate even though n o inducements for involvement were offered.

GENERAL PROCEDURES

The decision-making task completed by all subjects was the NASA


Moon Survival Problem developed by Hall and Watson (1971). This
task instructs subjects to imagine themselves as crew members aboard a
spaceship that has crash-landed o n the moon, approximately 200 miles
away from a rendezvous point with the mother ship. The task
instructions specify that all ship’s equipment has been destroyed with
the exception of 15 listed items. The problem facing subjects is one of
rank-ordering the 15 items in terms of their importance for ensuring
survival.
This specific task was employed as it has a unique best solution, and
thus provides a n objective index of decision quality (for discussion of
scoring criteria, see Hall and Watson, 1971). Operationally, quality of
decision is determined by summing the absolute value of the deviations
between a n individual’s rank ordering of the items and the correct
ordering of the 15 items. In terms of Shaw’s (1973) task dimensions, the
N A S A task could be characterized as high in difficulty and intellectual
requirements and low in solution multiplicity and population famil-
iarity. This task has been employed previously in several studies of
group decision-making (e.g., Hirokawa, 1980, 1982a).
All subjects first completed the NASA problem individually. Care
was taken at this stage of the experiment to ensure that subjects did not
converse with one another. After all participants had finished this initial
phase, they were assigned randomly to four-person groups: these groups,
Burleson et al. / DECISION-MAKING 563

in turn, were assigned randomly to one of three experimental conditions.


Thus 10 four-person groups were exposed t o each experimental
treatment.

EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS

Staticized decision procedure. I n the staticized group condition,


subjects’ initial rankings of the 15 items were collected immediately by
an experimental assistant. Each group in this condition then was
assigned t o engage in discussion of the “Island Problem.”This task asks
group members to imagine that seven persons survived an airplane crash
on a deserted island. By chance, a small plane lands on the island, but
can return only one of the survivors to civilization. The groups were
instructed to attempt to reach a consensual decision on which of the seven
survivors should return and were given approximately 25 minutes t o d o
so. Regardless of whether or not a consensual decision had been reached
on the Island Problem, after 25 minutes a n experimental assistant
stopped the discussion and then distributed a blank form for the NASA
task. Individuals were requested t o rerank the 15 items privately. Once
again, care was taken t o ensure that no conversation occurred during
this time. N o explicit instructions were offered about how rankings
should be made; however, if sub.iects asked (as several did) whether or
not items should be ordered in accordance with their original decisions,
they simply were told that rankings should be made on the basis of
survival value.
Individuals’ final rank orderings of the 15 items were utilized t o
generate the staticized group decisions. For each four-person group, the
average score was computed on all 15 items. The deviation scores for
each item then were summed to provide the total average decision score
for the group. The same computational procedure was used on the set of
rankings obtained prior t o discussion of the Island Problem. Because
groups in the staticized condition did not engage in any interaction
regarding the NASA task, subjects in this condition serve as exper-
imental controls against which the effects of the other two treatments
can be assessed directly. In addition, because individuals in the
staticized condition were not exposed to a manipulation directly
involving the NASA task, the two sets of ratings generated by
individuals in this condition provide a basis for assessing the stability of
individual rank orderings. In the present study, test/ retest reliability of
individuals’ rankings was .75 as assessed by Pearson correlation.
564 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / Summer 1984

Nominaldecisionprocedure.Each four-member group assigned to the


nominal decision procedure was escorted separately to a quiet meeting
room by a n experimental assistant. Subjects in this condition were
instructed that they should not communicate during the session and
were seated apart from one another so as to minimize the likelihood of
any verbal interaction. The experimenter then told the subjects to study
carefully the rankings they had provided for the 15 items and to
compose for each item ajustification or reason why a particular ranking
had been awarded. After each of the four participants had completed
writing their justifications, the experimenter collected their task forms.
The experimenter then wrote each person’s anonymous rankings of the
15 items on a large blackboard. The four individuals were encouraged to
consider carefully the displayed rankings. After allowing several
minutes for this consideration, the experimenter read the justifications
supplied by each group member. The justifications then were read again.
When all justifications had been read twice, the experimenter asked if
any of the group members wished any of the rationales repeated a third
time. Group members then were encouraged again to study the
displayed rankings; several minutes were allotted for this. Finally, group
members were given a new form for the NASA exercise and were
instructed to rerank each of the 15 items. Members were urged to
consider the rankings and justifications of their coparticipants, and were
instructed that their final rankings should be based on what they now
believed to be the survival value of each item.
A “group”decision for subjects in this condition based on their final
rankings was computed by summing the average deviation scores for
each of the 15 items in each four-person group. This method was
employed since attempting t o achieve a consensual decision through
multiple iterations of the information exchange procedure proved
impractical in pilot work.

Interacting decision procedure. Groups assigned to the interacting


decision procedure were told that individuals should take a few
moments to study their personal rankings of the 15 items and then, as a
group, attempt to reach a consensual decision about how the items
should be ordered. Individuals were permitted t o retain their original
rankings throughout the interaction. Each group was informed that it
would have approximately 25 to 30 minutes to reach an agreement. The
experimenter provided no specific instructions on how the group should
proceed on the task; thus groups were left free to structure their
Burleson et al. / DECISION-MAKING 565

interaction as they felt appropriate. Groups were told to record their


consensual rankings on a supplied form. If, after 25 minutes of
discussion, a group had not achieved final consensus, members were
instructed they would have an additional five minutes in which to reach
a consensus. All ten of the groups in this condition did reach consensus
within the allotted 30 minutes. After the group had recorded its
consensual rankings for the 15 items, both the individual and consensual
rankings were collected by the experimenter. The experimenter then
passed out another blank NASA task form to each member and instructed
the individuals to rank each item once more in terms of what they
personally believed its survival value to be. These latter individual
rankings were employed to assess the second hypothesis concerning the
effects of group discussion on individual decisions.

RESULTS

QUALITY OF GROUP DECISIONS

A hierarchical multiple regression approach to the analysis of partial


variance (APV) was the primary statistical technique employed to
evaluate the study’s hypotheses. This form of data analysis was
employed since the APV technique avoids many of the problems
associated with the analysis of change scores, repeated measures
analyses of variance, and the simple analysis of covariance (see Cohen &
Cohen, 1975, pp. 363-393).
Similar to the analysis of covariance, APV proceeds by initially
partialling pretest scores from posttest scores and then regressing the
dummy-coded experimental conditions on the residual posttest scores.
Pretest decision quality scores for the four-person groups in all
experimental conditions were created by computing staticized “group”
decisions from individuals’ initial rankings (i.e., by computing an
average total deviation score for thefirst rankings of the 15 items).
Membership in the nominal and interacting decision conditions was
dummy-coded; the effect of these experimental treatments was entered
into the regression hierarchically subsequent to the pretest decision
quality scores. Following the logic of dummy coding, membership in the
staticized decision condition was not entered directly into the analysis;
thus the groups in this condition serve as a reference category against
which effects of the nominal and interacting decision procedures can be
compared. The dependent variable was posttest decision quality. For
566 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / Summer 1984

groups in the staticized condition, this was the average total deviation
score for each four-person group subsequent to discussion of the Island
Problem; for the nominal condition, this was the average total deviation
score for the group subsequent to the controlled information exchange
procedure; and for the interacting groups, posttest decision quality was
the total deviation score derived from the consensual rankings gener-
ated during the course of the open discussion. For analyses on group
decisions, statistical power (with alpha = .05) was .37 for a medium effect
size and .83 for a large effect size.
Prior to conducting the main APV analysis, it was first necessary to
ensure that there was no interaction between pretest decision quality
and membership in experimental condition. To assess this interaction,
the two dummy variables coding the nominal and interacting experi-
mental treatments were each multiplied by the pretest scores and the
resulting product terms were regressed hierarchically on the posttest
scores subsequent to both the pretest scores and the experimental
conditions. The results of this analysis indicated that the interaction
term was not significant, F (2,24) = .047, ns; thus the regression lines for
the experimental conditions on posttest scores can be assumed t o be
parallel.
In the main analysis, pretest decision quality was regressed on
posttest decision quality initially. Somewhat surprisingly, pretest and
postest decision quality were not related significantly [r = .27, r2 = .07; F
( 1,28) = 2.15, p = .15]. The effect of decision procedure was entered into
the regression next. The total regression explained a significant amount
of variance in posttest decision quality [R2 .60, R2= .36; F (3,26) 14.94,
p < ,011. More important, decision procedure was found to account
uniquely for a large and statistically significant amount of variance in
posttest decision quality [semipartial R = .54, semipartial R2 .29; F
(2,26) = 5.96, p < .02]. Since the primary concern here is with the residual
variance in posttest decision quality (i.e., with the variance in posttest
scores after partialling out the effect of pretest scores), a more
appropriate index of effect size for the experimental treatments is the
squared multiple partial correlation; in the present context, the partial
R2 .32.
Table 1 presents the pretest means, the unadjusted posttest means, and
the posttest means adjusted for pretest scores for groups in each of the
three experimental conditions. Of central concern are the adjusted
posttest means. Our first hypothesis predicted that nominal groups
would produce better decisions than staticized groups and that inter-
Burleson et al. / DECISION-MAKING 567

TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Quality of Group Decisions

Decision Procedure
Type of Mean Staticized Nominal Interacting

Means a t Time 1 (pretest) 43.93 44.48 48.83


Standard deviations 3.66 5.58 7.64
Means a t Time 2 (unadjusted posttest) 43.58 40.25 34.10
Standard deviations 3.96 7.47 13.60
Means at Time 2 (adjusted posttest) 44.97 41.22 31.74

NOTE: A lower score indicates a better decision.

acting groups would produce better decisions than either nominal or


staticized groups. There was no significant difference in posttest
decision quality between groups in the staticized condition ( M 44.97)
and the nominal condition (M = 41.22), t (26) = 1.02, ns; the contrast
between staticized and nominal decision procedures accounted for only
3% of the residual variance in posttest decision quality. However, there
was a highly significant difference in mean quality of decision between
the staticized and interacting groups (M = 3 1.74), t (26) = 3.38, p < .002).
The contrast between the staticized and interacting groups accounted
for 29% of the residual variance in posttest decision quality. In addition,
groups employing the interacting decision procedure produced sig-
nificantly better decisions than groups employing the nominal proce-
dure, t (26) = 2.53, p < .02.
A subsidiary issue emerged from the analysis of the interacting
groups: whether the best decisions were produced by actual group
consensus or by averaging individual preferences expressed subsequent
to group interaction. To answer this question, the unadjusted posttest
mean for consensually achieved decisions in the interacting groups ( M =
34.10) was compared with the mean of pooled “group”decisions created
by averaging the final individual rankings supplied by subjects in the
interactingcondition (M = 38.03, SD = 12.12). A dependent groups t-test
indicated that consensually achieved decisions were significantly better
than average individual preferences expressed subsequent to interaction,
t (9) = 2.27, p < .05. To investigate further the possible presence of an
“assembly effect bonus,” the consensual decisions reached by the
interacting groups were compared with the best individual decision
made by members of the 10 interacting groups at the pretest. Although
568 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / Summer 1984

the unadjusted posttest mean for the consensual decisions (M 34.10)


was somewhat lower than the mean for the best individual decisions at
the pretest (M = 35.40, SD 9.14), this difference was not significant,
t (9) 0.37, ns.'

QUALITY OF INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS

The statistical techniques employed to evaluate quality of group


decisions also were employed to evaluate quality of individual decisions.
Thus prior to conducting the main APV analysis on quality of
individual decisions, the effect of the interaction between pretest decison
quality and membership in experimental condition was assessed. N o
significant interaction was found, F (2,114) = 2.92, ns. Thus there is no
reason to believe that the regression lines for the effect of experimental
condition on posttest decision quality depart from parallelism. For
analyses on individual decisions, statistical power (with alpha = .05) was
.92 for a medium effect size and in excess of .99 for a large effect size.
In the main APV analysis, individual pretest decision quality was
regressed on posttest decision quality initially. Individual pretest scores
were found to account for a significant amount of variance in posttest
decision quality [r = .55, r2 = .30; F ( I , 1 18) = 5 1.27, p < .OO 11. The effect of
experimental condition was entered into the regression next; the total
regression was found to be highly significant [R = .63; R2= .40; F(3, I 16) =
9.52, p < .OOl]. Decision procedure uniquely accounted for a significant
portion of the variance in posttest decision quality [semipartial R =
.31, semipartial R2 .lo; F (2,116) = 9.96, p < .01]. As noted above,
a more appropriate index of effect size for the effect of decision
procedure is the multiple partial correlation since the primary analytic
concern here is with the residualized posttest decision quality scores. In
the present case, the partial R2= .17.
Table 2 presents the pretest means, the unadjusted posttest means,
and the adjusted posttest means for quality of individual decisions.
Comparisons among the adjusted posttest means indicated that in-
dividuals exposed to the nominal decision procedure ( M = 41.10)
produced marginally better decisions than individuals exposed to the
staticized decision procedure (M = 44.74), t (1 16) 1.85, p < .07; the
contrast between individuals in the nominal and staticized conditions
accounted for 3% of the residual variance in posttest decision quality.
The contrast between quality of decision for individuals in the staticized
condition and the interacting condition ( M = 36.02) was highly
Burleson et al. / DECISION-MAKING 569

TABLE 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Quality of individual Decisions
~~

Decision Procedure
Type of Mean Staticized Nominal Interacting

Means at Time 1 (pretest) 43.93 44.48 48.83


Standard deviations 11 .70 10.10 13.67

Means at T i m e 2 (unadjusted posttest) 43.58 40.25 38.02


Standard deviations 9.00 12.38 13.44

Means at Time 2 (adjusted posttest) 44.74 41.10 36.02

NOTE: A lower score indicates a better decision

significant, t (1 16) = 4.35, p < .001; this contrast accounted for 14% of
the residualized variance in posttest decision quality. Finally, subjects in
the interacting condition made significantly better individual decisions
on the posttest than those in the nominal condition, t (1 16) = 2.63, p <
.o 1.

DISCUSSION

The results of this study provide clear and consistent support for the
value of social interaction in small group decision-making. It was
hypothesized that groups employing an interacting decision procedure
would produce better decisions than groups employing either nominal
or staticized decision procedures; this hypothesis was confirmed
strongly. Moreover, the results of this investigation provide some
support for the existence of what Collins and Guetzkow (1964) term the
“assembly-effect bonus.” Not only were group decisions in the interact-
ing condition significantly better than those made in the nominal and
staticized conditions, but the consensual decisions reached in the
interacting groups were, on the average, significantly better than the
“pooled” decisions of these groups (which were created by averaging
individual preferences expressed subsequent to the achievement of
group consensus). This latter result emphasizes that the consensual
outcome generated through the give-and-take of social interaction can
transcend what would be expected only from knowledge of the average
individual contribution. It must be noted, however, that the results of
the study only partially support the existence of an assembly effect
570 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / Summer 1984

bonus since the consensually achieved decisions in the interacting


groups were not significantly better than the decisions of the best
individuals in these groups.
The findings that interacting groups produce better decisions than
either the nominal or staticized groups and that consensual decisions of
the interacting groups were better than the “pooled” decisions of these
groups are particularly striking in light of results recently reported by
Hirokawa (1982a). In the present study, the interacting groups were not
given any specific instructions about how they should structure the task
o r their interaction; they were told simply to reach a consensual decision
about the rankings of the 15 NASA-problem items within the allotted
time period. In contrast, Hirokawa had interacting groups reach
consensus on the NASA task under one of two instructional sets: one
collection of groups simply was told to reach consensus (much as in the
present study), while the other collection of groups was instructed to
employ a “vigilant” decision-making strategy in attempting t o reach
consensus. The vigilant strategy explicated how group members can
structure most effectively their interaction with respect t o the task (e.g.,
discuss the value of each item before making any rankings, begin the
decision-making process by first ranking the five most and five least
important items; for details, see Hirokawa, 1982a, p. 41 1). Hirokawa
found that the correlation between the quality of the consensual group
decision and individual preferences expressed subsequent to interaction
was significantly stronger among groups in the vigilant condition than
among groups in the nonvigilant condition. Hirokawa’s findings thus
demonstrate that the vigilant decision-making strategy produces greater
correspondence between group decisions and subsequent individual
decisions. These findings also lead to speculation that interacting groups
employing the vigilant strategy may make better decisions than
interacting groups not employing such adecision strategy (also see Hall
& Watson, 1971); clearly, this is a hypothesis that should be explored
in future research. Notice, however, that the findings of the present
study underscore the fact that even groups employing nonvigilant social
interaction make better decisions than groups where interaction either is
severely constrained or does not occur at all.
Because at least some interaction (albeit highly constrained) occurred
among group members in the nominal condition, it was expected that
nominal groups would produce better decisions than staticized groups.
Although the decisions produced by the nominal groups were somewhat
better than those of the staticized groups, they were not significantly SO;
Burleson et al. / DECISION-MAKING 571

thus this hypothesis was not confirmed. Perhaps the flow of information
was so constrained by the nominal decision procedure that the quality of
decisions reached by groups in this condition was undermined. More-
over, although the nominal procedure permitted the “exchange” of
information about individual preferences and reasons for these pre-
ferences, it did not allow for the direct criticism of these preferences and
reasons. As Davis (1969) suggests, it may be the debating and critical
evaluation that occurs in group discussion that accounts for the
superiority of group decisions.
Previous research has found that group discussion exerts a positive
influence on the quality of individual decisions made subsequent t o
interaction. Thus in the present study, it was hypothesized that subjects
in the interacting condition would make better individual decisions
subsequent t o interaction than subjects in either the staticized or
nominal conditions. This hypothesis was confirmed, Social interaction
thus not only improves the quality of decisions made by groups, it also
benefits individuals in their private decision-making.
Obviously, the benefits accruing from social interaction are not
generalizable t o all tasks. As noted above, social interaction among
group members appear t o foster high quality group decisions when the
task facing the group is relatively complex, requires a considerable
amount of information processing, raises value questions, or needs to be
approached in multiple stages (see Hackman & Morris, 1975; Sorenson,
1971). But as Fisher (1980) notes, it is precisely such tasks on which
groups are most likely to work. Thus while social interaction may not
result in better decisions for all tasks, it is likely that social interaction
will result in higher quality decisions on “everyday” group decision-
making tasks.
Although the present findings demonstrate that the mean decision
quality achieved by interacting groups exceeds that of noninteracting
groups, it should not be assumed that interaction inevitably will result in
better decisions. In the present study, two of the ten groups in the
interacting condition produced consensual decisions lower in quality
than “decisions” created by averaging initial individual preferences.
This suggests that ineffective interaction may result in relatively poor
decisions. Clearly, research needs to examine the interaction patterns in
groups that lead to better and worse decisions. Although some research
has attempted t o document differences in the patterns of interaction for
effective and ineffective groups, much of this research has employed
interaction coding systems that d o not permit examination of relevant
572 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / Summer 1984

differences (see Hirokawa, 1982b). Thus objectives for future research


lie in developing and applying interaction coding systems that will
enable researchers t o document relevant differences between effective
and ineffective decision-making groups.

I . The effect of decision-making procedure on the quality of decisions made by the


best individual in each group also was assessed through an APV analysis. Individuals
making the best decision at the pretest were identified for all 30 groups in the study. These
pretest scores were regressed o n the posttest decision quality scores of these 30 individuals.
Pretest and posttest decision quality scores of the best individuals were highly correlated;
r = .57, r’ = .33, p < ,001. The effect of decision procedure was entered into the regression
next, but failed to add significantly to the prediction of posttest scores; semipartial R2= .04,
F (2,26) = 0.83, ns. Thus different decision-making procedures did not meaningfully affect
the performance of the best individuals. Interestingly, the unadjusted marginal means for
best individual were virtually identical at both pretest (M = 34.20) and posttest (M = 35.43).

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