[2022] 1 LNS 1783 Legal Network Series

DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA, DIPUTRAJAYA

(BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN)
[RAYUAN SIVIL NO: C-0UNCVC)(W)-474-09/2020]

ANTARA

TAN YANG LIANG

(KP No. 620614-06-5085) … PERAYU

DAN

TONG SWEE YING (KP No. 620612-05-5318)

(mendakwa sebagai pentadbir
harta pusaka Tong You Heng) … RESPONDEN

[Dalam Perkara Mengenai Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuantan

GuamanNo. CA-22NCVC-21-04/2017

Antara

Tong Swee Ying

(KP No. 620612-05-5318)
(mendakwa sebagai pentadbir harta
pusaka Tong You Heng) … Plaintif

Dan

1. Tan Yang Liang

(KP No. 620614-06-5085)

2. Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan

Pekerja ... Defendan-Defendan

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CORAM:
HAS ZANAH MEHAT, JCA
S. NANTHA BALAN, JCA,
MOHAMED ZAINIMAZLAN, HCJ

GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

Introduction

[1] This is an appeal by the 1 st Defendant (Appellant) against the

decision of the Learned Judge dated 27 August 2020 in allowing
the Plaintiffs (Respondent’s) claim. The Respondent
(“Plaintiff’) is the sister and administrator of the Estate of Tong
You Heng (“the Deceased”). The Deceased’s wife is Mdm.
Chew Yen Chin (“SPX”). The 2nd Defendant in the High Court
is Employees’ Provident Fund (“EPF”). By an EPF Nomination
Form dated 13 October 2016 (i.e. less than 2 weeks before his
death) the Deceased had nominated the Appellant as his
beneficiary. There was a sum of RM RM2I1,846.43 in the
Deceased’s EPF account at that time. The Plaintiffs suit in the
High Court was essentially to declare the Appellant’s purported
EPF nomination as having been procured through fraud and
misrepresentation and for an order directing EPF to pay the said
sum to the Plaintiff as the Administrator of the Deceased’s
Estate. The Appellant’s defence was that the Deceased had
agreed to and did nominate him to be the beneficiary of all the
monies which, are in the Deceased’s EPF account in order to pay
off an alleged debt which is said to be owed by the Deceased to
the Appellant. The Deceased suffered from end-stage liver
cancer and passed away on 25 October 2016.

[2] About 12 days prior to the Deceased’s death, on 13 October

2016, the Appellant together with one Ah Chun (Appellant’s

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manager) went with the Deceased to the EPF office (Kuantan) to

nominate the Appellant as the Deceased’s beneficiary.

[3] However, before he died, the Deceased had apparently

nominated his wife (SP1) to be his beneficiary for the monies in
his EPF account. About 1 day prior to the Deceased’s death, on
24 October 2016, SP1 took the EPF Nomination form by which
the Deceased had nominated her as his beneficiary to be
submitted to EPF. However, the nomination was rejected by EPF
because the Deceased used a stamp pad instead of an ink pad
when affixing his thumbprint on the nomination form.

[4] On 28 April 2017, the Plaintiff filed Suit CA-22NCVC-21-

04/2017 seeking various orders. The Plaintiff claimed that the
Appellant’s nomination was obtained by fraud/misrepresentation
as the Appellant told the Deceased to put his thumbprint on an
EPF form by deceiving the Deceased that it was a form to get
funds for disabled people.

[5] According to the Plaintiff, the Deceased did not understand that
it was an EPF nomination form to nominate the Appellant as the
Deceased’s nominee. The Deceased could not understand Bahasa
Melayu. A Palliative Specialist Doctor (SP3) testified that the
Deceased was not in the right state of mind when he made the
nomination on 13 October 2016.

[6] In the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff sought the following

reliefs:

(a) Satu Deklarasi babawa penamaan Defendan Pertama oleh

simati pada 13.10.2016 adalah diperolehi secara fraud dan
atau misrepresentasi dan penamaan Defendan yang dibuat
pada 13.10.2016 dikeluarkan daripadaKWSP.

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(b) Dan dalam altenatifnya, suatu deklarasi babawa simati

tidak ada keupayaan kewasiatan untuk membuat penamaan
pada

13.10.2016 menamakan Defendan Pertama sebagai

benefislarinya.

(c) Wang Simpanan simati Tong You Heng yang berjumlah

RM211,846.43 dibayar oleh Defendan Kedua kepada
Piaintif sebagai pentadbir harta pesaka simati dalam masa
14 hari daripada tarikh perintah.

(d) Kos.

(e) lain-lain relit yang manfaat.

[7] After a full trial, the Judge allowed the claim and made the
following orders.

a) satu deklarasi bahawa penamaan Defendan Pertama oleh

simati pada 13.10.2016 adalah diperolehi secara fraud
dan/atau misrepresentasi dan sepertimana yang terkandung
dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan Terpinda;

b) Dan dalam alternatifnya, suatu deklarasi bahawa simati

tidak ada keupayaan kewasiatan untuk membuat penamaan
pada 13.10.2016 menamakan Defendan Pertama sebagai
benefisiarinya;

c) Penamaan Piaintif yang dibuat pada 24.10.2016

didaftarkan oleh KWSP;

d) Wang simpanan simati Tong You Heng dibayar oleh

Defendan Kedua kepada Piaintif sebagai pentadbir harta
pesaka simati seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah
Peraturan 8 Peraturan- Peraturan Kumpulan Wang
Simpanan Pekerja 2001.

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DAN AKHIRNYA DIPER1NTAHKAN bahawa Defendan

Pertama membayar kos sebanyak RM 10,000.00 tertakluk kepada
ft alokatur.

Leave - S. 68(l)(a) Courts of Judicature Act 1964

[8] The Appellant was dissatisfied with the decision of the Judge.
On 18 September 2020 the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal,
without obtaining leave of the Court of Appeal per s. 68(l)(a) of
the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (“CJA”).

[9] The point relating to the need for leave to appeal seems to have
eluded the attention of the parties. In the course of the hearing
of the appeal it became clear to us that there was an issue in
regards to the competency of the appeal.

[10] The requirement for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is

stipulated in Section 68(1 )(a) of the CJA which reads as
follows:

(1) No appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of

the following cases:

(a) when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the

claim (exclusive of interest) is less than, two hundred and
fifty thousand ringgit, except with the leave of the Court
of Appeal;

[11] In 1996, a Practice Direction, namely, “Arahan Amalan

Mahkamah Rayuan Bil. 2 Tahun 1996 - Permohonan
Kebenaran UntukMerayu Ke Mahkamah Rayuan” (“the 1996
PD”) was issued in relation to the types of matters which do not
require leave. The matters which did not require leave (per the
1996 PD) are;

(i) Certiorari - berkaitan dengan mana-mana rayuan yang

meiibatkan keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan. keputusan

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Lembaga Tatatertib atau mana-mana badan yang

menjalankan fungsi 'quasi-judicial' yang meiibatkan
prinsip keadilan semuiajadi (natural justice).

(ii) Deldarasi - untuk mengisydharkan bahawa sesuatu

pemherian lesen, perbuatan, peninggalan atau keputusan
sesuatu badan atau mana- mana orang yang diberi kuasa
oleh undang-undang adalah tidak sah dim terbatal.

(iii) Injunksi.

(iv) Petisyen penggulungan syarikat - kecuali permohonan yang

dibuat dibawah sub-ss. 218(c) dan g(i) Akta Syarikat 1965
yang meiibatkan jumlah hutang kurang dari RM250,000.

(v) Prosiding bankrupsi.

(vi) Perkara-perkara berkaitan dengan prosiding ha) ehwal

suami isteri dibawah Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang
(Perkahwinan dan Perceraian) 1976.

(vii) Penghakiman untuk ganti rugi jumlah tak tertentu

(unliquidated damages/unliquidated amount).

[12] Under the 1996 PD leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is not
required only in respect of the type of declarations stipulated
therein.

[13] The 1996 PD was replaced by Arahan Araalan Mahkamah

Rayuan Bil. 1 Tahun 2008 (“2008 PD”). The matters which did
not require leave under the 2008 PD are as stated below:

PERKARA-PERKARA YANG TIDAIC PERLU KEBENARAN

MERAYU

Kebenaran merayu tidakperlu bagi perkara-perkara berikut:-

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(a) Certiorari - berkaitan dengan mana-tnana rayuan yang

melibatkan keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan, keputusan
Lembaga Tatatertib atau mana-mana badan yang menjalankan
fungsi 'quasi-judicial' yang melibatkan prinsip keadilan
semulajadi (naturaljustice).

(b) Deklarasi - untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa sesuatu

pemberian lesen, perbuatan, peninggalan atau keputusan
sesuatu badan atau mana-mana orang yang diberi kuasa oleh
undang-undang adalah tidak sah dan terbatal.

(c) Injunksi.

(d) Petlsyen penggulungan syarikat - kecuali permobonan yang

dibuat di bavvah seksyen 218(l)(e) dan seksyen
218(l)(g)(i) Akta Syarikat 1965 yang melibatkan jumlah
hutang kurang dari RM250,000,

(e) Presiding kebankrapan.

(f) Perkara-perkara berkaitan dengan prosiding hal ehwal

suami isteri di bawah Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang
(Perkahwinan dan Perceraian) 1976.

(g) Pengliakiman untuk gantimgi jumlah tak tertentu

('unliquidated damages/unliquidated amount).

[14] The 2008 PD was replaced by Arahan Amalan Mahkamah

Rayuan Bil. 1 Tahun 2017 (“2017 PD”). The 2017 PD removed
the restrictions as to the types of declarations which do not
require leave to appeal. Under the 2017 PD all declarations are
exempt from leave under s. 68 (1) (a) CJA. The relevant part of
the 2017 PD reads as follows:

18. Perkara yang tidak memerlukan kebenaran untuk

merayu

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Perkara yang tidak memerlukan kebenaran untuk merayu

adalah:-

(a) certiorari;

(b) deklarasi;

(c) injunksi (kecuali bagi tindakan yang berasal daripada

Mahkamah Sesyen);

(d) prosiding kebankrapan;

(e) perkara-perkara berkaitan dengan prosiding

matrimonial di bawah Alda Membaharui Undang-Undang
(Perkahwinan dan Perceaian) 1976 [Akta 164];

(f) petisyen penggulungan syarikat; dan

(g) penghakiman bagi ganti rugi jumlah tidak

tertentu/amaun tidak tertentu.

[15] According to case laws (see paragraphs 16-19 below) relating to

the 1996 PD, the exemption from leave is confined to
declarations which have no monetary value. In our view, the
case laws pertaining to the 1996 PD, the 2008 PD are equally
applicable to the 2017 PD. Thus, whilst the 2017 PD is not
restricted to any particular type of declaration, the monetary
value that is ascribed to the claim, either because it is already
quantified or quantifiable, will necessitate leave of the Court of
Appeal depending on whether the monetary value is less than
RM250,000.00. Thus, regardless of the type of or the
circumstances giving rise to the declaration, if the monetary
value is less than RM250,000.00, then leave is required. In the
instant case, it is clear that the Plaintiffs claim has a monetary
value of RM211,846.43. Thus, even although the Plaintiff
sought declarations, it did have a monetary value. As such leave
under s. 68(l)(a) CJA is required.

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[16] Our view is based on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Lam
Kong Co Ltd v. Thong Guan Co Pte Ltd [2000] 1 CLJ 1; [2002]
1 MLJ 129 (CA) (“Lam Kong”) which ruled that the 1996 PD
applies only to declarations respecting subject matters that have
no value attached to them or those with values that cannot be
quantified. In Lam Kong the relief sought were declarations as
well as general damages. The subject matter of the claim
pertained to a sale and purchase agreement which had stipulated
the purchase consideration for 26 pieces of land. The Court of
Appeal opined that leave to appeal was required as the value was
less than RM250,000.00. The relevant passages from the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Lam Kong read as follows:

In the case before us, the subject-matter was the sale and
purchase agreement with a contract price relating to the
sale price of the 26 pieces of land.

Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant also urged us

that the damages prayed for in prayer (vi) in the statement
of claim should be added to the value of the subject-matter
so that the total value would be unknown; thus it would
pass the test laid down in s. 68(l)(a) of the Act and
therefore leave would not be required. We however were
unable to accept such a proposition for the reason that s.
68(1 )(a) of the Act clearly specifies that the "value" that
is required to be quantified must be the "value" of the
subject-matter "of the claim". The damages as prayed in
prayer (vi) are only consequential. They are not the
"subject-matter of the claim."

In his final submission, the learned counsel for the

applicant/appellant asked the court that he be allowed to
file amotion for leave. We thought it was too late in the
day for the request to be entertained. The said Practice
Direction was issued in 1996, while the present

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applications were filed two years later. To interpret item

(ii) of the said Practice Direction against s. 68(l)(a) of the
Act is not a difficult task.

The case of Amer Mohideen Dawood v. Sneh Bhar w/o Ter

Binder Singh [1996] 2 CLJ 955 (refd) was cited to us in
support of the proposition that an appeal the subject-matter
of which comes within the terms of s. 68(l)(a) of the Act
where the value is less than RM250,000 is incompetent.
The Court of Appeal in this case decided as to the meaning
of the words "the amount of the claim" or "the value of the
subject-matter of the claim" as found in s. 68(l)(a) of the
Act.

It decided that the "amount" or "value" must be "the total

amount of the claim in the action which has been adjudged
to be payable" or the value of the subject-matter of the
claim "in the action which has been adjudged as
recoverable because it is against the judgment (and not
against the claim made by the claimants ill the pleadings)".
That case was decided on 6 April 1996 which was before
the issuance of the said Practice Direction. (They were
issued on 27 June 1996). In the present case, the whole
action had been disposed of. The purchase price of the
land was S$52,000 (which was below RM250,000) as in
the agreement. Even if the 26 issue documents of title were
to be taken as the subject- matter of the claim, they must
still be considered as having value because they relate to
those 26 pieces of land as referred to in the sale and
purchase agreement which stipulated the total price. In the
Amer Mohideen Dawood case, the value of the subject-
matter of the order for specific performance of the sale and
purchase agreement of 14 September 1989 was the
purchase price of the land which was RM99,000. Being

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below RM250,000 the court ruled that the "appeal was

therefore incompetent as no leave to appeal was obtained
from the Court of Appeal."

In the case before us it was the matter of declaration

that added another facet to the case. Once the " subject-
matter of the claim" has been identified and its value
determined the question of declaration becomes a non -
issue.

[17] Thus, the principle is that once the value has been identified or
determined, the issue of declaration is irrelevant. The above-
stated principle as enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Lam
Kong was endorsed by the Federal Court in Harcharan Singh
Sohan Singh v. Ranjit Kaur S Gean Singh Harcharan Singh s/o
Sohan Singh v. Ranjit Kaur d/o S Gean Singh [2010] 3 CLJ 29;
[2009] 1 LNS 1185; [2010] 2 MLJ 479, [2011] 3 CLJ 593 (FC)
(“Harcharan”).

[18] The relevant passages from the decision of the Federal Court in
Harcharan read as follows:

[14] The phrase 'amount or value of the subject matter of

the claim' in s. 68(1 )(a) CJA. was considered by the
Supreme Court in Yai Yen Hon v. TengAh Kok & Sim Huat
Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 2 CLJ 68 FC and it was held that it
must be read as the amount or value of the claim filed in
the civil suit and not the judgment amount appealed
against, that would be the determinant factor in deciding
whether leave was necessary. That was a case where the
appellant claimed damages totalling RM4,000,000 arising
from an accident but only RM62,400 was awarded and it
was held that leave of the court was not required for his
appeal.

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The determinant factor is the value of the subject

matter as disclosed in the claim when filed. Applying
that test the appellant must necessarily obtain leave of this
court to pursue his appeal.

[15] As to whether leave was required in the case of a

claim for specific relief as in this case for a declaration, s.
68(I)(a) CJA makes no exception for such a case. The said
provision is clear and unambiguous - see Mohd Tahir
Mohd Shariff v. Ramlah Abdullah [2004] 1 CLJ865. In
Amer Mohideen Dawood v. Sneh Bhar (supra) the High
Court ordered specific performance of a contract for sale
of land against the appellant. His appeal was challenged
for being incompetent for failure to obtain leave although
the value of the subject matter was less from RM250,000.
The appeal was dismissed by this court for being
incompetent as the value of the subject matter of the order
of specific performance was the purchase price of the land
which was RM99,000 and no leave was obtained from the
Court of Appeal. Our case is no different except the relief
sought was for a declaration.

[16] To alleviate the then prevailing uncertainties faced

by legal practitioners, a guideline in the form of the Court
of Appeal Practice Direction No. 2 of 1996 was issued by
the then President of this court. It listed out instances
when prior consent of this court was not necessary before
Notice of Appeal may be filed 11 in cases not connected
with a specific amount or value." Item (ii) of the said
guideline reads:

ii) Declarations - to declare that the giving of a licence, an

act, an omission or decision of a body or person
empowered by law is invalid and annulled.

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The declaration sought by the appellant in our case do not,

by any stretch of the imagination come within the context
listed. In any event, learned President of the Court of
Appeal who issued the said guideline himself when
presiding over a panel of this court was faced with a
similar issue in Lam Kong Co Ltd v. Thong Guan Co Pte
Ltd (supra).

It was there held that item (ii) of the said Practice

Direction applies only to declarations respecting subject
matters that have no value attached to them or those
with values that cannot be quantified. Likewise in our
case the subject matter of the claim had been identified
and its value determined, hence the question of
declaration became a non-issue. Failure to obtain leave
of this court to appeal was thus fatal.

[19] In Country Garden Danga Bay Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Tuntutan

Pembeli Rumah & Anor. [2020] 4 CLJ 865, [2019] 1 LNS 1693
(CA) the Court of Appeal speaking through Harmindar Singh
JCA (as he then was) said that leave is to act as a filter against
unmeritorious appeals and if leave is required then such an
appeal (filed without leave) is incompetent and the Court of
Appeal has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

[8] Where appeals are filed without leave having been

obtained, and where leave is required, the court has no
jurisdiction to hear the appeal (see Harcharan Singh Sohan
Singh v. RanjitKaur S Gean Singh [2011] 3 CLJ 593
("Harcharan Singh ")) The requirement for leave serves as
a filter against frivolous or unmeritorious proceedings
(O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237). It must follow
that no appeal can be filed against the decision of the
Court of Appeal regarding leave as otherwise the filter
principle would be defeated (Lam Kong Co Ltd v. Thong

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Guan Co Pte Ltd [2000] 1 CLJ 1; [2000] 1 MLJ 129 ("Lam

Kong ”)).

[20] In the present case, the declaration is quantifiable as the amount

in the Deceased’s EPF account is RM211,846.43. Hence, leave
is required. But in this case, the Appellant did not obtain leave
of the Court of Appeal before filing the instant appeal. The
absence of leave goes to the competency of the appeal as it
affects the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine the
appeal. As there is no leave, the appeal is incompetent and this
court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The appeal must
necessarily be dismissed in limine.

Merits of the Appeal

[21] In any event, even if we are to decide the appeal on merits, we

find that the Appellant’s complaints relate to the Judge’s
findings of fact after he had seen and heard the witnesses at a
full trial. The Judge made the following findings.

(a) The evidence of SP1 - Chew Yen Chin (Deceased's wife)

showed that Deceased was not aware of what he signed
before the EPF officer.

(b) The Deceased never talked about the Appellant to SP1.

(c) SP3 (Dr Teoh Cy Oun) (Specialist Palliative Medicine

Doctor- Hospital Selayang) testified that the Deceased’s
mind was unstable since 13 October 2016 i.e, the same
date that the Deceased nominated the Appellant. SP3 was
also present when the Deceased said that he wanted his
wife (SP1) to be the beneficiary to his EPF account. SP3
also witnessed the Deceased affixing his thumbprint on the
EPF Fonn. She explained to the Deceased what the Form

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was for and he understood and agreed. He then affixed his

thumbprint on the Form.

(d) The Appellant did not prove the existence of the debt (if
any) and how much was owed by the Deceased.

(e) The Judge also opined that if the Appellant was genuine,
then it is puzzling that he did not take SP1 together with
the Deceased to fill up the nomination form.

(f) The High Court found that the Plaintiff had proven fraud
against the Appellant for deceiving the Deceased that the
EPF Nomination form was a form to get funds for disabled
people.

[22] The Judge’s conclusion was as follows:

KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH

36. Adalah jelas bahawa daripada keterangan yang ada,

Defendan Pertama telah mengambil kesempatan di atas
ketidakupayaan simati pada 13 Oktober 2016 untulc
menamakan Defendan . Pertama sebagai benefisiarinya
kepada wang simpanan KWSP simati. Jelas telah berlaku
perbuatan fraud di dalam proses penamaan tersebut di
mana Defendan Pertama telah mengisikan borang tersebut
bagi pihak simati dan simati hanya menurunkan
tandatangan pada borang penamaan tersebut. Perbuatan ini
telah dirancang oleh kerana isteri simati telah tidak di
bawa bersama semasa proses penamaan di pejabat KWSP
Kuantan tersebut. Dengan itu, penamaan Defend an
Pertama sebagai benefisiari adalah tidak sah dan terbatal.

37. Di atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah

memntuskan babawa pihak Plaintif telah berjaya
membuktikan perbuatan fraud yang telah dilakukan oieh

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Defendan Pertama semasa penamaan di pejabat KWSP

Kuantan pada .1.3 Oktober 2016. Oleh itu, penamaan
Defendan Pertama tersebut sebagai benefisiari simati
adalah tidak sah,

38. Oleh kerana borang penamaan yang baru bertarikh 24

Oktober 2016 adalah tidak memenuhi peraturan. KWSP,
maka pembayaran kredit KWSP simati hendaklah di buat
berdasarkan prosedur pembayaran kematian tanpa penama
sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Peraturan 8
Peraturan-Peraturan KWSP 2001.

39. Dengan itu, tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan

Pertama adalah dibenarkan.

[23] For completeness, we should mention here that the relevant EPF
officer who attended to the Deceased at the EPF office on 13
October 2016 was not called to testify. The Appellant says that
the Respondent should have called that officer. We disagree. In
our view, since the Appellant was relying on the EPF
Nomination Form dated 13 October 2016, it was the Appellant’s
burden to have called the said EPF officer. The failure to do so
was fatal, to the Appellant.

[24] Quite clearly the outcome of this case turned primarily on

findings of fact. In our view, based on the evidence led during
the trial, it cannot be said that the learned trial Judge’s
conclusion upon the evidence was plainly wrong. Having
considered the matter carefully, and having due regard to the
comprehensive written submissions and the extensive oral
clarification before us, we find that there is no appealable error
to warrant any appellate interference in this case.

[25] In our view the learned Judge, having considered all the
evidence, was fully entitled to reach his evaluative judgement as

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per the grounds of judgment. Although the Appellant criticised

the Judge's approach and reasoning, we are not persuaded that
the Judge’s approach was erroneous, the reasoning flawed or the
conclusions wrong.

[26] We conclude by referring to the reminder by the Federal Court

in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of
The Estates Of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors. [2020] 10 CLJ
1, [2020] 1 LNS 1060 [2020] 12 MLJ 67, [2020] MLJU 1469,
[2020] 8 AMR 227 (FC):

“As long as the trial judge’s conclusion can be supported

on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the
fact that the appellate court feels like it might have
decided differently is irrelevant. In other words, a finding
of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought
not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a
margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence
is examined by the appellate courts.”

[27] Thus, by reason of the incompetency of the appeal due to

absence of leave, and based on absence of merits, we dismissed
this appeal with costs ofRMlO,000.00 (subjectto allocatur).

(S NANTHA BALAN)
Judge,
Court of Appeal,
Putrajaya, Malaysia.

Dated: 27 JULY 2022

COUNSEL:

For the appellant - Ong Siew Wan & Nichelle Puah Szu Ean; M/s Andrew-
David Wong & Ong

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Bilik 102-103, Tingkat 1

Bangunan Tokio Marine Life
Jalan Telulc Sisek
25000 Kuantan
Pahang
Ref: OSW-6080-02-CL9NC)

For the respondent - Kong Yit Har; M/s Siva Ram & Kong
No. B-54, Tingkat 1
Lorong Air Putih 2
Off Jalan Beserah
25300 Kuantan
Ref: S9079/ICyh/sm

Case(s) referred to:

Lam Kong Co Ltd v. Thong Guan Co Pte Ltd [2000] 1 CLJ 1; [2002] 1 MLJ
129 (CA)

Harcharan Singh Sohan Singh v. Ranjit Kaur S Gean Singh Harcharan Singh
s/o Sohan Singh v. Ranjit Kaur d/o S Gean Singh [2010] 3 CLJ 29; [2009] 1
LNS 1185; [2010] 2 MLJ 479, [2011] 3 CLJ 593 (FC)

Country Garden Danga Bay Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah &
Anor. [2020] 4 CLJ 865, [2019] 1 LNS 1693 (CA)

Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of The Estates Of
Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors. [2020] 10 CLJ 1, [2020] 1 LNS 1060
[2020] 12 MLJ 67, [2020] MLJU 1469, [2020] 8 AMR 227 (FC)

Legislation referred to:

Arahan Amalan Mabkamah Rayuan Bil. 2 Tahun 1996 - Permohonan

Kebenaran Untuk Merayu Ke Mahlcamah Rayuan

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[2022] 1 LNS 1783 Legal Network Series

Arahan Amalan Mahlcamah Rayuan Bil, 1 Tahun 2008

Arahan Amalan Mahkamah Rayuan Bil. 1 Tahun 2017

Courts of Judicature Act 1964, s. 68(1)(a)

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