RUIZ vs. BELDIA, A.M. No.

RTJ-02-1731, February 16, 2005

Topic: Bail
Doctrine: A person lawfully arrested and detained but who has not yet been formally charged in
court, can seek his provisional release through the filing of an application for bail. He need not
wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed since bail is available to "all persons" where
the offense is bailable
Facts:
Herein petitioner, the private complainant in I.S. No. 2000-1031 for violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law pending before the Department of Justice (DOJ), charged respondent Judge
Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. of Branch 57, Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority in connection with the grant of bail
and issuance of a release order in favor of one Lourdes Estrella Santos.
After the arrest of Santos, one of the respondents here, on May 24, 2000, she was
detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City, pending the filing of formal charges in court. Upon
inquest, she executed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Rule 112, Section 7 of the then applicable 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
Inquest Prosecutor thus set the hearing of the preliminary investigation on May 31, 2000 at 2:00
PM.
However, on May 30, 2000, Santos obtained an Order of Release signed by respondent
Judge Beldia who was then detailed as assisting judge of Branch 272, Regional Trial Court of
Marikina City (RTC-Marikina City). Such bail was granted and approved the corresponding bail
bond without serving notice to the prosecutor.
Ruiz then filed the instant administrative complaint contending that respondent Judge
Beldia had no authority to grant bail to Santos since the Investigating Prosecutor has yet to
conclude the preliminary investigation. She claimed that for as long as the information has not
yet been filed in court, a court has no power to grant bail to a detained person since it has not
yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Respondent Judge Beldia contends that Section 1 (c), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
allows any person in custody, even if not formally charged in court, to apply for bail. The OCA
was also informed that the records of release orders and bailbonds in her custody did not
include the subject release order issued by respondent Judge Beldia. As such, she could not tell
whether a formal petition for admission to bail was filed by Santos. It is likewise confirmed that
Executive Judge De la Cruz and Presiding Judge Enriquez were present and available on the
day that Judge Beldia issued the release order.
The OCA recommended that respondent Judge Beldia be held liable for gross ignorance
of the law and fined in the amount of P5,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law in granting
the bail of Santos
HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that Executive Judge De la Cruz and Presiding Judge Enriquez
were present on May 30, 2000 to act on the bail application of Santos. When respondent Judge
Beldia acted on the bail application of Santos on May 30, 2000, his designation was merely an
"assisting judge" in the RTC-Marikina City, his permanent station being in Branch 57, RTC-San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental. As such, his authority in the Marikina court is limited and he
could only act on an application for bail filed therewith in the absence or unavailability of the
regular judge.
A person lawfully arrested and detained but who has not yet been formally charged in
court, can seek his provisional release through the filing of an application for bail. He need not
wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed since bail is available to "all persons" where
the offense is bailable. Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a judge could grant bail to a person lawfully arrested but without a warrant, upon waiver of
his right under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as Santos had done upon her inquest.
Undeniably too, Santos was entitled to bail as a matter of right since the offense with
which she was charged does not carry the penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua or
death. Notwithstanding, it was incumbent upon respondent Judge Beldia to grant bail to Santos
in accordance with established rules and procedure. Respondent Judge Beldia failed in this
respect and must thus be held administratively liable.
Under the present rules, a hearing on an application for bail is mandatory. In Cortes v.
Judge Catral, the Court ruled that in all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,
reasonable notice of hearing must be given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation on
the matter must be sought.
Judge Beldia disregarded basic procedural rules when he granted bail to Santos sans
hearing and notice and without the latter having filed a formal petition for bail. Accordingly, the
prosecution was deprived of procedural due process for which respondent Judge Beldia must
be held accountable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. of Branch 57,
Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of
the law, and is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00. He is further WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
PADERANGA vs. CA, G.R. No. 115407, August 28, 1995
Topic: Bail
Doctrine: Only those persons who have either been arrested, detained, or other wise deprived
of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to
bail
Facts:
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a
co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family
sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time.
Upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his
resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor,
designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution
of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as a co-
conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information dated October 6, 1992.
A warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner but, before it could be served on
him, petitioner through counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the
trial court which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies
of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office,
and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court
proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only
Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office appeared for the
prosecution.
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was
waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November
5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following
day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then,
managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the
amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally
appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case.
A Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on November
26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for admission
to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated
March 29, 1993. Six months later,Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court
of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. The CA then annulled the Decision of
RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of RTC granting the bail of Paderanga is valid
HELD: Yes. The Court held that bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the
same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities,
either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested,
detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective
mantle extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the
auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him
as it is available to "all persons" where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to
the condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion
for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may,
however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which
attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof
he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it
known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General
Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the
hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the
specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served
upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical
custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital
bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard.
 The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail
court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly,
by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his
knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or
evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the
authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and
until the day of the hearing thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,
promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as
well as said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid
resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P.
Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
DE LA CAMARA vs. ENAGE, G.R. Nos. L-32951-2, September 17, 1971
Topic: Bail
Doctrine: The guidelines in the fixing of bail are as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the
accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of
the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa
fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases.
Facts:
Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental,
was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged
participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador
Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968. Thereafter, on
November 25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case
for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against petitioner, his co-accused
Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence.
On January 14 1969, an application for bail was filed by petitioner with the lower court,
premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident . He
likewise mantained his innocence. Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February
24, 1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing ofthe
petition, the defense had not presented its evidence.
Respondent Judge granted the petitioner's application for bail fixing fixed the amount of
the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the
information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated
murder. Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a
telegram to respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a
P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was likewise a motion
for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however remained adamant.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the recommended bail is excessive
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the said bail amount is excessive and is a clear
violation of constitutional provision against excessive bail. Under the circumstances, there being
only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00
for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder.
Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did recomend the total sum
of P40,000.00 for the two offenses.
The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as
follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the
offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6)
character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8)
forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases." Respondent Judge,
however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion:
"Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress,
however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a
refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to
exercise our supervisorypowers to provide the required remedy.
WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without pronouncement as
to costs.
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