Ramos, Aldrin Administrative Law and Law on Public

Officers
JD 1-5 Atty. Abis

WEEK 5 - QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER

Case Title: William Dagan vs. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220,
February 12, 2009
Topic: Requisites of Valid Administrative Issuance
Doctrine:
• In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected.
• As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an
administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice and
hearing.
Facts:
Philracom directed Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club,
Inc. (PRCI) to immediately come up with their respective Clubs' House Rule to address
Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) problem and to rid their facilities of horses infected with
EIA. The said directive is pursuant to Admin Order No. 5 by the Department of
Agriculture declaring it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to ship, drive, or
transport horses from any locality or place except when accompanied by a certificate
issued by the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI).
Herein petitioners refused to comply with the directive, alleging that there had
been no prior consultation with horse owners and claimed that neither official guidelines
nor regulations had been issued relative to the taking of blood samples. And third, they
asserted that no documented case of EIA had been presented to justify the undertaking.
A complaint was filed before the Office of the President, in which the latter
instructed Philracom to investigate the matter. Due to failure of Philracom to act upon
the directive of the OP, they filed a petition for injunction with application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). Meanwhile, the trial court also upheld
the validity of the said guidelines as an exercise of police power.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 27 October
2006, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed directive and guidelines are valid
HELD: Yes. The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines,
hinges on compliance with the following requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
4. It must be reasonable.
All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances. Philracom's
authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the presidential decree is
valid. Philracom did not exceed its authority. And the issuances are fair and reasonable.
Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared policy in Section 1
which is "to promote and direct the accelerated development and continued growth of
horse racing not only in pursuance of the sports development program but also in order
to insure the full exploitation of the sport as a source of revenue and employment."
Furthermore, Philracom was granted exclusive jurisdiction and control over every
aspect of the conduct of horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of races, the
construction and safety of race tracks, and the security of racing. P.D. No. 420 is
already complete in itself. Clearly, there is a proper legislative delegation of rule-making
power to Philracom. Clearly too, for its part Philracom has exercised its rule-making
power in a proper and reasonable manner. More specifically, its discretion to rid the
facilities of MJCI and PRCI of horses afflicted with EIA is aimed at preserving the
security and integrity of horse races.
As to the second requisite, petitioners raise some infirmities relating to Philracom's
guidelines. They question the supposed belated issuance of the guidelines, that is, only
after the collection of blood samples for the Coggins Test was ordered. While it is
conceded that the guidelines were issued a month after Philracom's directive, this
circumstance does not render the directive nor the guidelines void. The directive's
validity and effectivity are not dependent on any supplemental guidelines. Philracom
has every right to issue directives to MJCI and PRCI with respect to the conduct of
horse racing, with or without implementing guidelines.
The third requisite for the validity of an administrative issuance is that it must be within
the limits of the powers granted to it. The administrative body may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute,
particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation
of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
Anent the fourth requisite, the assailed guidelines do not appear to be unreasonable or
discriminatory. In fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI and PRCI's premises underwent
the same procedure. The guidelines implemented were undoubtedly reasonable as they
bear a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be accomplished, i.e., the complete
riddance of horses infected with EIA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner William Dagan
Case Title: Rufino O. Eslao vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 108310, September 1,
1994
Topic: Requisites of valid administrative issuance
Doctrine: Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.
Facts:
On 9 December 1988, PSU entered in Memorandum of Agreement with DENR for the
evaluation of eleven (11) government reforestation operations in Pangasinan. Such
project was part of the commitment of ADB under ADB/OECF Forestry Sector Program
Loan to the Republic of the Philippines and among the identical project agreements
entered by DENR with sixteen (16) other state universities.
PSU Vice President requested the Office of the President to have the BOR
confirm the appointments or designations of PSU personnel with respect to the payment
of honoraria and per diems of those who engaged in review and evaluation project
corresponding to their specific roles and functions.
The MOA has been approved by the BOR. However, the approved honoraria
rates were found to be somewhat higher than the rates provided for in the guidelines of
National Compensation Circular ("NCC") No. 53. COA resident auditor, Bonifacio Icu,
issued a "Notice of Disallowance" disallowing P64,925.00 from the amount of
P70,375.00 stated in Voucher No. 8902007, mentioned earlier. Such action was based
on Compensation Policy Guidelines No. 80-4, issued by DBM and also the schedule for
honoraria and per diems applicable to work done under the MOA of 9 December 1988
between the PSU and the DENR.
On 18 October 1989, PSU Vice President and Assistant Project Director Espero
sent a letter to the Chairman of COA requesting for reconsideration of the action of its
resident auditor. The DBM then issued a letter upon the request of PSU clarifying the
basis for the project's honoraria should not be CPG No. 80-4 which pertains to locally
funded projects but rather NCC No. 53 which pertains to foreign-assisted projects.
Meanwhile, COA Decision No. 1547 was issued denying reconsideration of the decision
of its resident auditor ruling that ruled that CPG. No. 80-4 is the applicable guideline in
respect of the honoraria as CPG No. 80-4 does not distinguish between projects locally
funded and projects funded or assisted with monies of foreign-origin.
PSU President Eslao sent a letter to COA requesting reconsideration of COA
Decision No. 1547, which was then denied by the same.
Issue: Whether or not NCC No. 53 is the applicable one rather than the CPG No. 80-4
HELD : Yes. The Supreme Court held that under the Administration Code of 1987, the
Compensation and Position Classification Bureau of the DBM "shall classify positions
and determine appropriate salaries for specific position classes and review appropriate
salaries for specific position classes and review the compensation benefits programs of
agencies and shall design job evaluation programs." In Warren Manufacturing Workers
Union (WMWU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations, the Court held that "administrative
regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law have the
force of law and are entitled to great respect." It is difficult for the Court to understand
why, despite these certifications, respondent COA took such a rigid and
uncompromising posture that CPG No. 80-4 was the applicable criterion for honoraria to
be given members of the reforestation evaluation project team of the PSU.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
COA Decisions Nos. 1547 and 2571, respectively dated 18 September 1990 and 16
November 1992, are hereby SET ASIDE. The instant evaluation project being a
Foreign-Assisted Project, the following PSU personnel involved in the project shall be
paid according to the Budget Estimate schedule of the MOA as aligned with NCC No.
53:

Case Title: BPI Leasing vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127624, November 18, 2003
Topic: Construction and Interpretation
Doctrine: The principle is well entrenched that statutes, including administrative rules
and regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary
is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication.
Facts:
BLC is a corporation engaged in the business of leasing properties. BLC paid the
CIR a total of P1,139,041.49 representing 4% "contractor’s percentage tax" then
imposed by Section 205 of the NIRC based on its gross rentals from equipment leasing
for the calendar year 1986.
On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued Revenue Regulation 19-86 which
provides that finance and leasing companies registered under Republic Act 5980 shall
be subject to gross receipt tax of 5%-3%-1% on actual income earned. This means that
companies registered under Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable for
"contractor’s percentage tax" under Section 205 but are, instead, subject to "gross
receipts tax" under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC.
BLC then filed a claim for refund with the CIR for the amount of P777,117.05,
representing the difference between the P1,139,041.49 it had paid as "contractor’s
percentage tax" and P361,924.44 it should have paid for "gross receipts tax. BLC filed a
Petition for Review with the CTA to stop the running of prescriptive period for refunds.
Such decision, however, was dismissed by the CTA, in which they held that such
Revenue Regulations may only be applied prospectively such that it only covers all
leases written on or after January 1, 1987, as stated under Section 7 of said revenue
regulation.
The BLC appealed the Decision of the CTA to the Court of Appeals, in which the
latter affirmed the ruling of CTA.
Issue: Whether or not Revenue Regulation 19-86 should have retroactive effect as
contend by the petitioner.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that statutes, including administrative rules and
regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is
manifest by express terms or by necessary implication. In the present case, there is no
indication that the revenue regulation may operate retroactively. Furthermore, there is
an express provision stating that it "shall take effect on January 1, 1987," and that it
"shall be applicable to all leases written on or after the said date." Being clear on its
prospective application, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without further
interpretation. 20 Thus, BLC is not in a position to invoke the provisions of Revenue
Regulation 19-86 for lease rentals it received prior to January 1, 1987.
It is also apt to add that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, these
are regarded as in derogation of sovereign authority and are to be strictly construed
against the person or entity claiming the exemption. The burden of proof is upon him
who claims the exemption and he must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant
under Constitutional or statutory law, and he cannot be permitted to rely upon vague
implications. 21 Nothing that BLC has raised justifies a tax refund.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED, and the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Case Title: Security Bank and Trust Company vs. Regional Trial Court, Makati , G.R.
No. 113926, October 23, 1996
Topic: Construction and Interpretation
Doctrine:
• Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according
to its clear language
Facts:
On April 27, 1983, private respondent Magtanggol Eusebio executed Promissory
Notes in favor of herein petitioner, with Leila Ventura as co-maker. Due to failure of
Eusebio to pay the outstanding balance, a collection case was filed in court by petitioner
SBTC, in which the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.
On August 6, 1993, a motion for partial reconsideration was filed by petitioner
SBTC contending, among others, that the interest rate agreed upon by the parties
during the signing of the promissory notes was 23% per annum. Such motion, however,
was denied by the court
Issue: Whether or not the 23% rate of interest per annum agreed upon by petitioner
bank and respondents is allowable and not against the Usury Law
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the agreed rate of interest as stipulated on
the three (3) promissory notes is 23% per annum. The applicable provision of law is the
Central Bank Circular No. 905 which took effect on December 22, 1982. CB Circular
905 was issued by the Central Bank's Monetary Board pursuant to P.D. 1684
empowering them to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for loans and certain
forbearances.
All the promissory notes were signed in 1983 and, therefore, were already covered by
CB Circular No. 905. Contrary to the claim of respondent court, this circular did not
repeal nor in anyway amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latter's effectivity.
Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous,
the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the respondent court a quo, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the rate of interest that should be imposed be
23% per annum.

Case Title: People of the Philippine Island vs. Augusto A. Santos, G.R. No. L-44291,
August 15, 1936

Topic: Valid delegation of legislative power

Doctrine: Inasmuch as the only authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such instructions,
orders, rules, and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary and proper
to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising
under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated, contains no
provisions similar to those contained in the above quoted conditional clause of section
28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional clause in question supplies a defect of
the law, extending it. This is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has
not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being exclusively reserved to the then
Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law, and now to the National Assembly by the
Constitution of the Philippines.

Facts:

On June 18. 1930, the provincial fiscal of Cavite filed an information against the
accused regarding violation of Section 28 of the Administrative Order No. 2, issued by
Secretary of Agriculture, prohibiting fishing within 3 kilometers of the shore line of
islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval or military
authorities of the United States. The acts of the accused constitute a violation of the
conditional clause of section 28 above quoted, which reads as follows:
Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish
within the areas mentioned above (within 3 kilometers of the shore line of islands and
reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the
United States, particularly Corregidor) only upon receiving written permission therefor,
which permission may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon
recommendation of the military and naval authorities of concerned.

Issue: Whether or not Section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by Secretary of

Agriculture is valid

HELD: No. The Court held that inasmuch as the only authority granted to the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time
such instructions, orders, rules, and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be
necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of
proceedings arising under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as
stated, contains no provisions similar to those contained in the above quoted conditional
clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional clause in question
supplies a defect of the law, extending it. This is equivalent to legislating on the matter,
a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being exclusively
reserved to the then Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law, and now to the National
Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. Such act constitutes not only an excess
of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, but
also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore said
conditional clause is null and void and without effect

Furthermore, the Court opined that the conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative
Order No. 2. issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and
without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon him by
section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not been and
cannot be delegated to him.

Wherefore, inasmuch as the facts with the commission of which Augusto A. Santos is
charged do not constitute a crime or a violation of some criminal law within the
jurisdiction of the civil courts, the information filed against him is dismissed, with the
costs de oficio. So ordered.

Case Title: Securities and Exchange Commission vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No.
163314, September 26, 2008

Topic: Requisites of valid administrative issuance / Publication

Doctrine: The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that the interpretation given to a
rule or regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight
by the courts construing such rule or regulation.74 While this Court has consistently
yielded and accorded great respect to such doctrine, it will not hesitate to set aside an
executive interpretation if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law

Facts:

On March 26, 2002, respondent PICOP filed with petitioner, SEC, an application
for amendment of its Articles of Incorporation extending its corporate existence for
another 50 years. PICOP then paid the filing fee of P210 based on SEC Memorandum
Circular No. 2 Series of 1994 (1994 Circular). However, the SEC informed PICOP that
the appropriate filing fee of P12 Million, or 1/5 of 1% of its authorized capital stock of P6
Billion. PICOP then sought for clarification of the applicable filing fees and the reduction
of P12 Million prescribed by the SEC.

The SEC held that the P12 Million assessment is based on RA 3531 which
provides that in case an amendment of the AOI consists of extending the term of
corporate existence, the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive the same fees
collectible under existing law for the filing of AOI. PICOP elevated the matter to SEC En
Banc, which was then denied by the latter, stating that the assessed fee is based on the
pertinent provisions of R.A. 3531. Although SEC memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of
1994 and the Schedule of Revised Fees approved on 23 July 2001 do not provide for a
filing fee for extensions of term, these do not limit the Securities and Exchange
Commission from imposing the prevailing fees.
 PICOP sought for reconsideration of the En Banc ruling, arguing that RA
3531has been repealed by Corporation Codeof 1980 and Presidential Decree 902-A
Section 139 of the Corporation Code authorizes the SEC to collect and receive fees as
authorized by law or by rules and regulation promulgated by the SEC. PICOP posited
that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 (1986 Circular) rules on the
specific subject matter of "Filing Fees for Amended Articles of Incorporation Extending
the Term of Corporate Existence." In which, the prescribed filing fee is 1/10 of 1% of the
authorized capital stock, with the qualification that it should not be less than P200.00 or
more than P100,000.00. PICOP pointed out that no equivalent provision appears in any
of the subsequent SEC circulars such as the 1994 and 2001 circulars. Hence, the 1986
Circular should prevail.

The SEC En Banc denied the request of PICOP, contending that the provision on
the maximum imposable fee under the 1986 Circular has been amended by the 1994
Circular which removed the maximum imposable fee. Moreover, SEC contends that its
2001 Circular has been published in The Manila Standard on July 31, 2001.

On August 12, 2002, PICOP paid under protest and moved for reconsideration,
which was then denied by SEC Chairperson Lilia R. Bautista. PICOP appealed the
matter to the Office of the President regarding the amount for filing fee of amendment of
AOI, among others. The OP rendered a judgment in favor of PICOP.

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the SEC which was then denied by OP
through its Resolution dated December 19, 2003. The SEC likewise appealed for the
OP's consideration of the supervening event which caused the 1990 Circular to be
misplaced. The two motions for reconsideration were denied by the OP.

The SEC then elevated the matter to the CA, in which the latter dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed Circular is valid though it failed to satisfy the
publication requirement.

HELD: No. According to the Supreme Court, the rule is well-entrenched in this
jurisdiction that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those charged with its
execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the courts construing such rule or
regulation. While this Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to such
doctrine, it will not hesitate to set aside an executive interpretation if there is an error of
law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting
with the letter and spirit of the law.

In Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. International Communication

Corporation, the Court laid the guidelines in resolving disputes concerning the
interpretation by an agency of its own rules and regulations, to wit: (1) Whether the
delegation of power was valid; (2) Whether the regulation was within that delegation; (3)
Whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due process test.

In the case under review, there is an evident violation of the due process requirement. It
is admitted that the SEC failed to satisfy the requirements for promulgation when it filed
the required copies of the said regulation at the UP Law Center only fourteen (14) years
after it was supposed to have taken effect.

The SEC violated the due process clause insofar as it denied the public prior notice of
the regulations that were supposed to govern them. The SEC can not wield the
provisions of the 1990 Circular against PICOP and expect its outright compliance. The
circular was not yet effective during the time PICOP filed its request to extend its
corporate existence in 2002. In fact, it was only discovered in 2004, fifteen (15) days
before the SEC filed its second motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Case Title: Israel G. Peralta vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141966, June 30, 2005
Topic: Power of Regional Offices of Civil Service Commission
Doctrine: P.D. No. 807 and E.O. No. 292 provides that the Regional Offices of the CSC
are empowered to enforce Civil Service laws, rules, policies and standards on
personnel management or personnel actions of national and local government agencies
within their jurisdiction, and to enforce the same laws, rules, policies and standards with
respect to the conduct of public officers and employees. From this power necessarily
flows the authority to issue opinions and rulings regarding personnel management in
both national and local government agencies. Moreover, these opinions and rulings
perforce bind the aforementioned government agencies, otherwise, the authority given
by law to these Regional Offices would become useless and said Regional Offices can
be rendered impotent by government agencies which can simply choose to ignore their
opinions and rulings on the convenient ground that they are not binding.
Facts:
Peralta is the Director/OIC of Parole and Probation Administration, Regional
Office No. XII, Cotabato City, while herein respondent, Olegario, is the Budget Officer I
in the same office.
In 1993, the Central Office of PPA reported to the DBM that the position held by
Olegario was unfilled, causing the DBM to not release any allotment or funds for the
position. Peralta brought the matter to DBM and requested for allotment for the position
of Budget Officer I, but the same was not released for some time.
Peralta then issued an Order directing OLEGARIO and a co-employee Visitacion
U. Enilo, to cease and desist from performing their duties and functions effective April 1,
1995 and to ‘go on leave with or without pay, as the case may be’, on the ground of
insufficiency in the release of allotment under the plantilla of the office.
Such Order prompted Olegario to sough the opinion of CSC Cotabato City
regarding the legality of the said Order. The CSC then informed Peralta that Olegario,
being a government employee occupying a permanent position, cannot be removed
without valid cause. The CSC also declared that the said Order is illegal, and further
held that held that the alleged insufficiency of cash allotment for salaries is not among
the valid grounds provided by law for removing/separating employees from the service.
 Despite the ruling of CSC, Peralta persisted in enforcing the said Order,
prompting Olegario to seek the help of CSC once again. The CSC reiterated its ruling
added that the enforcement of the Order is tantamount to removal without just cause, is
without due process, and is in violation of the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure. The CSC ordered PERALTA to allow OLEGARIO and Visitacion Enilo to report
for work, in which Peralta, refused to obey.
Olegario then filed a complaint before the Ombudsman for grave abuse of
authority. After finding probable cause, the Honorable Ombudsman preventively
suspended PERALTA for ninety (90) days. He moved for a reconsideration but the same
was denied.
On November 26, 1996, the Ombudsman found PERALTA guilty of grave abuse
of authority, suspending him for one year as a penalty. Peralta moved to reconsider,
which was later then denied by the same.
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Director of CSC has no authority to render opinion
and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters which shall be binding on all
heads of departments, offices and agencies.
HELD: No. The Court held that Section 13 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807, known
as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, and Section 16(15), Chapter 3, Subtitle A,
Title I, Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, the Regional Offices of the CSC are empowered to enforce Civil Service
laws, rules, policies and standards on personnel management or personnel actions of
national and local government agencies within their jurisdiction, and to enforce the
same laws, rules, policies and standards with respect to the conduct of public officers
and employees. From this power necessarily flows the authority to issue opinions and
rulings regarding personnel management in both national and local government
agencies. Moreover, these opinions and rulings perforce bind the aforementioned
government agencies, otherwise, the authority given by law to these Regional Offices
would become useless and said Regional Offices can be rendered impotent by
government agencies which can simply choose to ignore their opinions and rulings on
the convenient ground that they are not binding.
In the present case, the provision of law being enforced by the Regional Office of the
CSC is Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 and Section 46 of E.O. No. 292 which both provide
that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except
for cause as provided by law and after due process. Hence, the ruling of the CSC
Regional Office that the memorandum of Peralta, dated March 23, 1995, directing
private respondent Nida Olegario to cease and desist from performing her duties and
functions and advising her to go on leave with or without pay is contrary to existing Civil
Service law and rules, is binding upon petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is denied. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54375 dated November 26, 1999 and February
15, 2000, respectively, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Peralta is directed to
pay the back salaries of Olegario from April 1, 1995 until July 21, 1995.
The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

Case Title: Pharmaceuticals and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Health
Secretary Francisco Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007
Topic: Valid delegation of legislative power

Doctrine: The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the
law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a
law enacted by the legislature.

Facts:

A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of Rules of Court was filed before the
Supreme Court to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive
Order No. 51 Otherwise Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant International Agreements,
Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR). Such EO was issued by
then President Cory Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president
under the Freedom Constitution. It was based on the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures
to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially
parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.

Petitioner contends that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are
not constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to implement.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed provisions of RIRR is valid and constitutional

HELD : No. The Supreme Court determined first if the pertinent international
instruments adverted to by respondents are part of the law of the land. After finding that
the aforementioned international instrument are not part of the law of the land, the Court
held that: for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it
obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris). Respondents have not presented
any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the
member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member
states; neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member states with
said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.

Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are
customary international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA

Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of

Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and
VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are
PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 15, 2006 is LIFTED insofar as
the rest of the provisions of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 is concerned.

WEEK 6 - QUASI JUDICIAL POWER

Case Title: Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Hon. Emmanuel Pena.
G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988

Topic: Jurisdiction

Doctrine: Doctrine of primary jurisdiction: The courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and of the regulatory statute
administered

Facts:

The Commission issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents, and
records of two export garment manufacturing firms denominated as American Inter-
Fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation.

On February 11, 1987, the OIC withdrew the amount of P400,000.00, more or
less, from the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company against the accounts of the said
corporations for payment of the salaries of the staff, employees and laborers of the
same for the period from February 1 to 15 of 1987. Respondents Yeung Chun Kam
Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan instituted an action against the said bank,
Commission, and the Commissioner and to OIC Saludo with Branch 152 of the
Regional Trial Court. On February 16, 1987, herein respondent judge issued ex-parte
the questioned temporary restraining order enjoining the bank, its attorneys, agents or
persons acting in their behalf "from releasing any funds of American Inter-fashion
Corporation without the signature of plaintiff Yim Kam Shing and to desist from
committing any other acts complained of ..." and the Commission "from enforcing the
questioned memorandum dated February 3, 1987"

A Motion to Dismiss was filed by the Commission with opposition to plaintiffs'

(private respondents herein) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that
the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case
and even if it has, it acted with grave abuse of discretion since private respondents as
33% minority shareholders are not entitled to any restraining order or preliminary
injunction. Respondent judge then issued an Order denying the Commission’s motion.

The Commission then filed a petition questioning the jurisdiction of the

respondent judge and prayed for the nullification of the said Orders and issuance of a
writ of prohibition to cease and desist respondent judge over the case.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over PCGG

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the Commission exercises quasi-judicial
functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body
with regional trial courts and "co-equal bodies have no power to control the other." The
Solicitor General correctly submits that the lack of jurisdiction of regional trial courts
over quasi-judicial agencies is recognized in section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), which otherwise vests exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over all final judgment, decisions,
resolutions, orders, or awards of regional trial courts and quasi judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions.

Moreover, under doctrine of primary jurisdiction “the courts cannot or will not determine
a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and of the regulatory statute
administered” Pursuant to Doctrine of primary jurisdiction and doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, the courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency must not casually be
overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of
the administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own competence."

Applying these fundamental doctrines to the case at bar, the questions and disputes
raised by respondents seeking to controvert the Commission's finding of prima facie
basis for the issuance of its sequestration orders as well as the interjection of the claims
of the predecessor of American Inter-fashion and De Soleil Corporations, viz. Glorious
Sun Phil., headed by Nemesis Co are all questions within the primary administrative
jurisdiction of the Commission that cannot be prematurely brought up to clog the court
dockets without first resorting to the exhaustion of the prescribed administrative
remedies.

ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition shall issue. The orders of
respondent Judge dated February 16, 1987 and March 5, 1987 are hereby set aside as
null and void. Respondent Judge is ordered to cease and desist from any further
proceeding in Civil Case No. 54298 which is hereby ordered DISMISSED. This decision
is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY, **
Case Title: Land bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eli G.C. Natividad, G.R. No. 127198,
May 16, 2005

Topic: Jurisdiction of RTC and DAR with regard to determination of just compensation

Doctrine: In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction

is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the
lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to
challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of
lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.

Facts:

On May 14, 1993, herein private respondents filed a petition before the RTC for
the determination of just compensation of their agricultural lands in Arayat, Pampanga,
which were acquired by the government pursuant to PD 27. The trial court rendered a
Decision in favor of the private respondents, ordering DAR and Land Bank to pay the
private respondents the amount of 30 pesos per square meter as just compensation.

DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration, in which the
court denied for being pro forma and did not contain notice of hearing. In a petition for
review by Land Bank, they argued that the respondents failed to exhause administrative
remedies when they filed a petition for determination of just compensation before the
RTC and not with DAR.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies
when it filed a petition directly to RTC for determination of just compensation

HELD: No. As a matter of fact, the record shows that private respondents did write a
letter to DAR Secretary over such matter, but the letter was left unanswered, prompting
the private respondents to file a petition before the court.

The Court also held that there is nothing contradictory between the DAR’s primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which
includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to
judicial proceedings.

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested

in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands
taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge
before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands
under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner

Case Title: Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) vs. Josefina
S. Lubrica, G.R. No. 159145, April 29, 2005

Topic: Jurisdiction

Doctrine:

• The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not
include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant
in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A

• In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an

administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise
such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute
creating or empowering such agency. The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-
judicial agency is not implied.

Facts:

On August 4, 2000, Suntay filed a petition for fixing and payment of just
compensation under PD 27 against DAR, DAR Regional Director for Region IV and
Land Bank of the Philippines. The DAR and Land Bank determined the value of the
subject property at Four Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-
One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68) or Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Seven
Pesos and 50/100 (P4,497.50) per hectare, which valuation according to Suntay, was
unconscionably low and tantamount to taking of property without due process of law.

After summary proceedings, the RARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Suntay,

ordering Land Bank to pay the former the amount of One Hundred Fifty-Seven Million
Five Hundred Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100
(P157,541,951.30) as just compensation for the taking of a total of 948.1911 hectares of
Suntay's properties. Land Bank moved for reconsideration but was then denied by
RARAD.

Land Bank then filed a petition for just compensation before RTC praying that the
payment for just compensation for Suntay’s property be declared in their previous
declared amount. The RTC denied the petition for failure to pay docket fees within
reglementary period. The Motion for Reconsideration was also denied for being pro
forma, prompting the Land Bank to file Notice of Appeal before the CA.

While the petition was pending before the special agrarian court, the RARAD
issued an Order on May 22, 2001, declaring its January 24, 2001 Decision as final and
executory after noting that Land Bank's petition for just compensation with the special
agrarian court was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period in violation of
Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure In its July 10, 2001 Order, the
RARAD denied LBP's motion for reconsideration of the order of finality. On July 18,
2001, the RARAD issued a Writ of Execution, directing the Regional Sheriff of DARAB-
Region IV to implement its January 24, 2001 Decision..

Land Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction before the DARAB praying for the nullification
of the issuances from RARAD.

On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, successor-in-interest of Suntay filed

with CA a Petition for Prohibition, arguing that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which
confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR jurisdiction over
special civil actions for certiorari, in which the CA granted. DARAB filed a Comment on
the said petition,arguing that the writ of certiorari /injunction was issued under its power
of supervision over its subordinates/delegates like the PARADs and RARADs to restrain
the execution of a decision which had not yet attained finality.

On August 22, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision ruling, among
others, that DARAB's exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari had no
constitutional or statutory basis. It rejected DARAB's contention that the issuance of the
writ of certiorari arose from its power of direct and functional supervision over the
RARAD. In sum, the Court of Appeals declared that DARAB was without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of DSCA No. 0252 and issued a Writ of Prohibition, perpetually
enjoining DARAB from proceeding with DSCA No. 0252 and ordering its dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not DARAB does not have jurisdiction over Land Bank's petition for
certiorari

HELD Yes. The Court held that: Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a
cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law. It is settled that the authority to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is never
derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some
instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the
particular courts which have such power are expressly designated.

Pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 and Section 13 of E.O. No.
129-A, the DARAB was created to act as the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR. With the
passage of R.A. No. 6657, the adjudicatory powers and functions of the DAR were
further delineated when, under Section 50 thereof, it was vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and the Special Agrarian Courts. The same
provision granted the DAR the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take
testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of books and
documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum, and enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers, and the
broad power to adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases before it. Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-A also
authorized the DAR to delegate its adjudicatory powers and functions to its regional
offices.

To this end, the DARAB adopted its Rules of Procedure, where it delegated to the
RARADs and PARADs the authority "to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian
cases and disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned
territorial jurisdiction."In the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue
the said extraordinary writ of certiorari , the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only
limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Bank's petition for certiorari .
Neither the quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies
such self-conferment of authority.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative

agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the
extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if
not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. The
grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no
question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other
quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special
jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the
DAR's competence and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and
functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended to create a regular court
of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise
of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction
does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express
grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.

Case Title: Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission, G.R. No.27520,
January 21, 1987

Topic: Jurisdiction

Doctrine: the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent

Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those
granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such
jurisdiction is void and ineffective.
Facts:

A message addressed to Maria Diaz filed by private respondent Arnaiz with the
telegram office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was
transmitted to the Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded by herein
petitioner for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable
and Radio Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the
Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madri. The latter, however, mislaid said
message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee.

Private respondent Arnaiz, after being informed of the said fact, sent a unverified
letter complaint to the Public Service Commission. The petition questioned the
jurisdiction to the latter and denied its liability for the non-delivery of the message.

PSC then issued an Order finding the petitioner responsible for non delivery of
message, therefore violated Public Service Act, thereby ordering the petitioner to pay a
fine of 200 pesos under Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended and to refund the
remitter of undelivered message.

Issue: Whether or not PSC has jurisdiction over the subject matter

HELD: No. The Court contends that Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended otherwise known as the Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service
Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all Public services and their
franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent
Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge
the Public.

The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the
telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain.
Obviously, such imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject
matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was
empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a
Public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders,
decisions or regulations of the Commission. petitioner operated under a legislative
franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the
Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the
Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed,
defied or disregarded.

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the
jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are
limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the
legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void
and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby granted and the order of respondent
Public Service Commission in PSC Case No. 65-39-OC is set aside for being null and
void.

Case Title: Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27,
1940

Topic: Rights in administrative proceedings

Doctrine: The rights in administrative proceedings are:

1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof

2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented.

3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached

4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be "substantial.

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at

least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected

6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision

7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.

Facts:
 Respondent, National Labor Union, prays for the vacation of judgment rendered
of the Court and to remand the case to the CIR for a new trial, arguing that the
temporary lay off the members of National Labor Union Inc is discriminatory against
them and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood. Additionally, they pray to
acknowledge the newly discovered evidence obtained by them, which is inaccessible at
the time of the trial before the CIR, and such evidence has far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein.

Issue: Whether or not the case shall be remanded to CIR for new trial

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Industrial Relations is a special
court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth
Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of
the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a
court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked
and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more
active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions
in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are
far more comprehensive and expensive.

The Court also laid down the primary rights in administrative proceedings. Such rights
are:

1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof

2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented.

3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached

4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be "substantial.

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at

least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected

6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision
7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.

Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and
the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So
ordered.

Case Title: Ferdinand T. Santos et. al vs. Wilson Go, G.R. No. 156081, October 19,
2005

Topic: DOJ's decision not appealable to CA through Rule 43 of Civil Procedure

Doctrine:

• Though some cases describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a

preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent
that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at
this point.

• A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other

than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory
functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions
have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to
file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the
Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former's order or resolutions.

• Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies
whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause
to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals
via a Petition for Review under Rule 43

Facts:

On 17 October 1995, FEPI allegedly entered into Project Agreement with MSDC,
whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land allegedly owned by MSDC
located in Nasugbu, Batangas. The said Project Agreement clothed FEPI with authority
to market and sell the subdivision lots to the public.
 Respondent Go offered to buy a lot from FEPI. A Contract to Sell, prepared by
FEPI was signed by the parties. Under the terms of the said contract, Go will pay a
downpayment of ₱1,291,200 and a last installment of ₱840,000 on the balance due on
April 7, 1997, and in turn, FEPI would execute a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Go and
deliver the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT of the said lot upon complete payment of
Go.

Go complied with the terms of the contract, FEPI however, failed to develop the
said property as the project was temporarily halted due to some claimants who opposed
FEPI’s application for exclusion of the subject properties from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). FEPI assured its clients that it had no
intention to abandon the project and would resume developing the properties once the
disputes had been settled in its favor.

Not satisfied with FEPI's promise, Go made a several demands to FEPI to return
his payment of the purchase price in full, but the latter didn't granted, prompting Go to
filed a complaint before the HLURB. He also filed a separate complaint of Estafa with
Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig City.

After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the
complaint for estafa for insufficiency of evidence. Go then appealed to DOJ, in which
the latter reversed the ruling of City Prosecutor.

An Information was filed against Campos and Pantaleon before the MTC of
Pasig. However, the arraignment was deferred when they filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause, which was granted by the trial court. Petitioners then
filed a petition for review with the CA. Accordingly, the trial court deferred the
arraignment of petitioners until the petition for review was resolved.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, arguing that a
petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a mode of appeal from
the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or
officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. The decision to file an information or not is
an executive and not a quasi-judicial function.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was also denied.

Issue: Whether or not petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from
a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a
criminal case.

HELD: The Court ruled in negative. According to Supreme Court, DOJ was not among
the quasi-judicial agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43 of Civil Procedure in
which the CA can review. The Court also held that preliminary investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding.
Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose
decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43,
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for
estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review
under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition
for review.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, dated September 2, 2002
and November 12, 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED.