International Journal of Educational Development 33 (2013) 337–347

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International Journal of Educational Development

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijedudev

The British educational policy for the indigenous community in Malaya

1870–1957: Dualistic structure, colonial interests and Malay radical nationalism
Tan Yao Sua *
Centre for Policy Research and International Studies, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This paper examines the educational policy implemented by the British for the Malays, the indigenous
Colonialism
community of Malaya. Underpinned by the policy of divide and rule, the British implemented a dualistic
Educational policy
system of education for the indigenous Malays: one for the Malay peasantry and another for the Malay
Indigenous community
Nationalism nobility. The two systems of education served different purposes and needs of the British. The Malay
peasantry was provided with a rural-based Malay education which only had limited value in terms of
educational mobility. This rural-based education was to serve as a means of social control for the British
by entrapping the Malays in the semi-subsistence economy. On the other hand, the British provided the
Malay nobility with an elitist English education that was intended to co-opt the ruling Malay traditional
elites into their fold. But contrary to the intention of the British, the Malay-educated intelligentsia, in
particular those from the Sultan Idris Training College became radical nationalists who adopted an anti-
British stand. Such an unintended development was the result of the role played by O.T. Dussek (the
college principal), the infusion of nationalistic sentiment from neighboring Indonesia and the threat
posed by the Chinese immigrants. However, the radical stand of the Malay-educated intelligentsia was
neutralized by the Malay traditional elites who adopted a pro-British stand. It was the Malay traditional
elites who eventually led the Malays toward the independence of Malaya.
ß 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Education of indigenous communities under colonial rule has
always been a contentious issue. To begin with, a comparison
between the British and French educational and language policies
toward indigenous communities in their respective colonies will
provide perceptive insights to the topic under discussion. The British
and French colonizers differed markedly in the manner in which
educational policy in general and language policy in particular were
implemented in their respective colonies. The French were generally
more single-minded in the prosecution of their language, more
conscious of a ‘civilizing mission’ – a mission that relied at root on
education (Butts, 1973), and more intolerant of the use of indigenous
languages at any stages of education by resorting to a French-only
educational policy. In the main, French direct rule over their colonies
was aimed at la France outre-mer and the ultimate political union of
their colonies with metropolitan France. Thus, except for Indo-
China, the French were committed to the mission to ‘civilize’ the
indigenous people to win them over by educating them through the
medium of French (Phillipson, 1993). In contrast to the French,
* Tel.: +605 7212482/6016 4548111; fax: +604 6584820.
E-mail address: yaosua@usm.my.
British colonial rule was largely indirect. To facilitate this indirect
rule and help control the masses, the British adopted a divide and
rule educational policy. As early as the 1830s, the British educational
policy toward the colonies had been rather divided between the
diffusionists who favored the civilizing mission and the orientalists
who favored the conservation of the natives. However, it was the
latter group who eventually gained the upper hand by the 1870s.
Lord Mayo, the Viceroy of India from 1869 to 1872, for instance,
argued against the provision of English education for the Babus in
Bengal which he felt was at great expense to the British. He was of
the view that ‘‘the more education you give them, the more they will
keep to themselves and make their increased knowledge a means of
tyranny’’ (Loh, 1975, p. 3). He instead argued for the provision of
basic three Rs (reading, writing and arithmetic) for the rural Babus.
This kind of evaluation concerning the effects of English education in
India paved the way for the British to implement the divide and rule
educational policy to strengthen their indirect rule in the colonies.
The divide and rule educational policy was to be effectuated by
educating the elites exclusively through the medium of English, but
allowed the use of vernacular languages for the non-elites with a few
switching to an elitist English education at the secondary level
(Phillipson, 1993). Such a policy was aimed at controlling the
indigenous people by educating them differently through the
colonial and local languages.

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338 T.Y. Sua / International Journal of Educational Development 33 (2013) 337–347
While most historians of education tend to agree that the
British colonial educational policy was driven by a deliberate
policy of ‘divide et impera’, there are also those who subscribed to
different views. Gopinathan, for instance, posits that the British
educational policy was primarily underpinned by a policy of
‘benign neglect’, i.e., a policy of doing only minimum necessary and
responding only when their interests were threatened (cf.
Whitehead, 2005, p. 121). But such a view has not been widely
accepted. Whitehead (2005), on the other hand, argues that there
was no tangible evidence to conclude that the British sought to use
schooling, especially with reference to the establishment of
racially based schools in East Africa and Southeast Asia, as a
means to divide and rule and that the British colonial educational
policy must be judged by the norms, values and expectations of
society as it was and not as it is half a century or more later. He
maintains that British colonial educational policy was a traditional
adherence to the so called ‘voluntary principle’ (a British
educational practice dating back to medieval times that was
premised on the belief that anyone should be free to establish and
operate a school provided it met minimum standards of
construction, size and hygiene) and the accommodation of broad
guiding principles to the practical realities of population distribu-
tion, language diversity, cultural traditions and mutual racial
antagonisms, resistance to religious proselytization, and the ever-
present lack of adequate human and financial resources. While it
may be true that the British colonial educational policy was
fundamentally underpinned by these considerations, it is, howev-
er, difficult to deny in absolute terms the divisive outcome of such a
policy even if we are inclined to agree that the British did not, to all
intents and purposes, harbor any ulterior political aims in the
provision of education in the colonies. It is perhaps for this reason
that the British colonial educational policy was construed by many
historians of education as an attempt to divide and rule, more so
when they also perceived colonialism synonymously with
economic exploitation, racial prejudice and secret diplomacy,
though colonialism had also brought about positive impacts such
as the modernization of the rule of law, the stimulus given to
national sentiments, the growth of cities and the import of the
European languages and new ideas born of them (Hashim, 1983).
In the final analysis, it is reasonable to associate the British colonial
educational policy with divide and rule, especially from the
perspective of those who have suffered from the negative impacts
of British colonialism. Whitehead’s contention that the British
colonial educational policy must be judged by the prevailing
norms, values and expectations of the colonized society and not
retrospectively may not go down well with historians of education
who are more concerned with the outcome of the educational
policy.
Apart from racially based schools, there were other educational
means through which the British attempted to divide and rule. The
case of the British educational policy for the Malays in Malaya is
particularly worthy of note here. The British educational policy for
the Malays in Malaya is a strong case in point whereby education
has been used to serve the divide and rule intent of the British
rather than the interests of the Malay indigenous community at
large. This divide and rule educational policy had its origins in 1870
when the British started to propagate a system of Malay education
for the Malay masses (the peasantry). Although this system of
education was an improvement to the traditional form of
education, it, nevertheless, was a rudimentary form of education
which was meant to entrap the Malay masses in the rural semi-
subsistence economy by denying them educational mobility. The
co-option of the Malay ruling traditional elites (the nobility)
through the provision of an elitist English education beginning in
the early 20th century further consolidated the divide and rule
intent of the British. Clearly, the divide and rule educational policy
of the British was embedded in a dualistic structure that aimed at
controlling the indigenous community by perpetuating and
exploiting the feudal relationships between the ruling Malay
traditional elites and the Malay masses. This was because the
feudal relationships between the rulers and the ruled were built on
the unquestioning loyalty of the Malay masses to the traditional
elites (Muzaffar, 1979). In short, the British intended to control the
Malay indigenous community indirectly through the co-option of
the Malay traditional elites and the preservation of the Malay
peasantry by different educational means. The main casualty of
this deliberate attempt was the Malay peasantry who was deprived
of upward social mobility and became a disadvantaged group
within the mainstream society. The divide and rule educational
policy worked well for the British until the establishment of the
Sultan Idris Training College (SITC) in Tanjong Malim, Perak in
1922. The SITC Malay-educated intelligentsia emerged as radical
nationalists who adopted an anti-British stand contrary to the
intention of the British to maintain the Malay social order by
containing the Malay peasantry under the Malay nobility. It was
O.T. Dussek – the college principal, who provided the initial
impetus to this unintended development. Unlike other colonial
officials, Dussek pushed for the advancement of Malay education
as a means to strengthen the Malay race and in the process, spurred
the growth of Malay nationalism among the SITC students.
Subsequent impetus came from neighboring Indonesia
(Netherlands East Indies) which was involved in a revolt against
the Dutch colonizer. The influx of Indonesian revolutionary literary
works together with the propagation of nationalistic ideas by
Indonesian leaders who fled to Malaya following the failed revolt
against the Dutch and by Soekarno who was leading the revolt
invoked strong resentment among the SITC Malay-educated
intelligentsia against the British and their allies – the traditional
elites. The anti-British stand of the SITC Malay-educated radical
nationalists reached new heights in the 1930s as a result of the
British policy of engaging the Chinese and Indian immigrants in the
tin mining and rubber plantation sectors. The Chinese and Indian
immigrants who came to Malaya in large numbers beginning in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries had by then developed roots into
settled communities and they had made impressive economic
gains as compared to the Malays who were entrapped by the
British in the rural semi-subsistence economy. The SITC Malay-
educated radical nationalists were particularly wary of the
attendant economic dominance of the Chinese as well as their
increasing numerical strength and their assertiveness in demand-
ing their rights. Engulfed by a deep sense of ‘‘cultural nationalism’’
(see Ratnam, 1965, p. 133), they called for the political merger with
Indonesia to form ‘‘a larger Malay nation’’ (Hashim, 1983, p. 28) as
a means to counter British colonial rule. But their anti-British stand
was neutralized by the English-educated nobility who adopted a
pro-British stand. They were never a match for the traditional elites
who were well-entrenched within the Malay social order.
Although the Malay masses were well aware of their socioeco-
nomic deprivation, they, nevertheless, adhered to the feudal
relationships between the rulers and the ruled and gave their
support to the traditional elites who eventually led them toward
the independence of Malaya in 1957. Despite the attainment of
independence, the legacy of the divide and rule policy of the British
continued to plague the educational system to the detriment of the
Malays. The traditional elites adopted a neo-colonialist education-
al policy that allowed the continued use of English as a medium of
instruction. It was not until the early 1970s that the Malay
language was made the main medium of instruction in the national
educational system (Omar, 1976).
This paper examines the education of the Malays under British
colonial rule in Malaya from 1870 to 1957 with specific focus on
three key issues: dualistic educational structure, colonial interests
 T.Y. Sua / International Journal of Educational Development 33 (2013) 337–347
and Malay radical nationalism. It begins with a discussion on
British colonialism and educational policy for the Malays. It then
examines the different educational provisions for the Malay
nobility and the Malay peasantry. It goes on to examine the
problem of educational mobility faced by the Malay peasantry and
its attendant ramifications. Finally, it examines the emergence of
the SITC Malay-educated intelligentsia and their subsequent
propagation of radical nationalism against British colonialism as
well as the challenges they faced from the traditional elites who
adopted a different stand toward British colonialism.
2. British colonialism and educational policy for the Malays
Driven by the need to safeguard their commercial interests, in
particular trade with China, the British, through the trading house of
the East India Company, acquired Penang in 1786, Singapore in 1819
and Malacca in 1824 as colonies. These colonies were combined to
form a single administrative unit known as the Straits Settlements
(SS) in 1826. The SS were initially administered by the East India
Company (1826–1851) and later by the India Office (1851–1867).
The British influence in Malaya subsequently spread to the Malay
States. Problem of succession to the throne in the Malay State of
Perak led to one of the claimants seeking the aid of the British to
assure his ascendancy to the throne. The Pangkor Treaty was signed
in 1874 to pave way for the intervention of the British. A British
Resident was appointed to serve as an advisor to the Sultan (the
ruler). In the same year, another Malay State, the state of Selangor,
sought the intervention of the British. Like Perak, the reason for
intervention stemmed from disputes over succession to the throne.
In 1887, the British made further inroads into the Malay States. The
state of Pahang came under its indirect rule. In 1895, it was the State
of Negeri Sembilan that engaged the advisory service of the British.
These four Malay States were collectively known as the Federated
Malay States (FMS). The British control of Malaya extended into the
Malay States of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu under the
terms of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty signed in 1909. The four states,
collectively known as the Unfederated Malay States (UMS), were
accorded British protection from Siamese military intrusion. There
was a sharp contrast in the manner in which the British exerted their
influence in the FMS and the UMS. In the FMS, the British rule was
more direct than was stipulated in treaty arrangements, resulting in
the depriving of the Malay ruling classes of their traditional political
and administrative roles, whereas in the UMS, the British established
a separate State Civil Service where Malay rights within the system
of Rule by Advice were acknowledged (Johan, 1984).
The British educational policy for the Malays in Malaya was
designed primarily to preserve the traditional feudal structure of
the Malay society already in existence for centuries. The feudal
structure of Malay society was characterized by the absolute
authority of the rulers (Sultans/Rajas) with the nobility at the top of
the social hierarchy and the abject servitude and unquestioning
loyalty of the peasantry at the bottom of the social hierarchy
(Yahya, 2003). The Malay psyche has traditionally been one of
harmony and conformity with the Malay social order and going
against the Malay nobility was deemed an act of derhaka or
betrayal. According to the Sejarah Melayu or the Malay Annals –
one of the most comprehensive records of 16th century Malay
feudal society, the Malay royalty was endowed with a personal
mystical force known as daulat and the Malay subjects can be
spared the adverse effects of daulat only if they pledge loyalty and
submission to the ruling class (Maaruf, 1988).
The preservation of the traditional feudal structure of the Malay
society through educational means was facilitated by a dualistic
system of education for the Malays: one for the Malay nobility and
the other for the Malay masses. The Malay nobility was provided
with an elitist English education, which was meant to co-opt the
339
ruling Malay traditional elites into the British Administration.
Through this co-option, the British were able to exploit the feudal
relationships to their advantage (Muzaffar, 1979). By turning the
traditional elites into their allies, the British gained the much
needed political legitimacy among the Malay masses. In this
regard, the British had successfully built their colonial interests
into structures that had a traditional legitimacy (Puthucheary,
2008). In other words, British colonialism was largely premised on
the indigeneity of the Malays whose polity could be traced to the
15th century Malacca Sultanate (Tahir, 2003). As Chatterjee (1993)
puts it, ‘‘if the colonial state was to seek legitimacy, it had to do so
by picking out and bringing over to their side the ‘natural leaders’
of the various communities’’ (p. 223). This was instrumental to the
British as the traditional elites subsequently functioned as their
intermediaries to the Malay masses to facilitate indirect rule in
Malaya (Jadi, 1983).
As for the Malay masses, there was a deliberate attempt by the
British to maintain their status as rural peasantry engaged in semi-
subsistence economy through the provision of a rural-based
education and hence the preservation of existing class stratifica-
tion within the Malay social order. They were only provided with a
rudimentary Malay education that did not go beyond the
secondary level. The British were extremely careful not to over
educate the Malay masses as they were wary that this would result
in the unwarranted creation of a class of political malcontents
capable of overthrowing them (Stevenson, 1975).
The dualistic system of education implemented by the British
for the Malay indigenous community in Malaya was central to the
divide and rule policy, which was primarily aimed at strengthening
their political position in Malaya. Such a system of education was
not only discriminatory but also intra-ethnically divisive. It had a
subsequent effect upon the divergent nationalistic tendencies and
the mode of response that the Malays developed toward British
colonialism (Jadi, 1983). On the one hand, it led to the emergence of
Malay-educated radical nationalists who adopted an anti-British
stand. On the other hand, it led to the emergence of English-
educated conservative nationalists, comprising mainly the tradi-
tional elites, who were willing to collaborate with the British to
safeguard the traditional social order. The strategy of the British to
co-opt the Malay traditional elites proved to be an effective one, as
these elites adopted a strong pro-British stand and thus neutral-
ized the challenges posed by the Malay-educated radical
nationalists. They subsequently played a key role in the process
of decolonization of Malaya after the Second World War.
3. Education of the Malay nobility
J.P. Rodger, the Resident of Perak, was instrument in the
provision of English education for the Malay nobility in the FMS. In
the Rulers’ Conference held in 1903, he raised the issue concerning
the virtual absence of Malays in the prestigious Malayan Civil
Service (MCS) – a centralized bureaucracy created by the British in
1895 to oversee the FMS. He reminded his colleagues of the British
obligation to the Malay nobility:
It must never be forgotten that these are Protected Malay States
and not British Colonies and that the British officials are here to
advise and assist and not to supersede the Rulers in the
administration of their own States. One of the most difficult
problems to be solved is how best to employ in the
Administration, the sons and near relations of Rajas and Chiefs,
who but for British intervention would now be in full
administrative charge of large and important districts (cf.
Wong and Gwee, 1970, pp. 2–3).
While some key British officials were skeptical about the ability
of the Malays to serve in the Civil Service, Rodger did not share the
340 T.Y. Sua / International Journal of Educational Development 33 (2013) 337–347
same view. After the Rulers’ Conference, he suggested to W.H.
Treacher, the Resident-General, to establish a special English
school for the Malay nobility. However, his suggestion was not
well received by Treacher and Frank Swettenham, the Governor
and High Commissioner, though both of them conceded the need
for a greater effort to educate the Malay nobility. Things changed
when R.J. Wilkinson, who arrived in the SS as a cadet in 1889, was
appointed the Inspector of Schools of the FMS in 1903. He soon
took up Rodger’s proposal to establish a special English school for
the Malay nobility. Wilkinson’s job was made easier by the
departure of Swettenham, the main opponent to Rodger’s
suggestion, in December 1903. In a memorandum to Treacher
dated 12 December 1903, he argued for the establishment of a
residential English school for the Malays on the grounds that
existing English schools were of an insufficient standard to
produce reliable native officials, Malay pupils in these schools
were neglected and it was too costly to upgrade existing English
schools (Loh, 1975). Wilkinson’s proposal though initially
rejected by the Acting High Commissioner, W.T. Taylor, was
subsequently approved by John Anderson who succeeded
Swettenham as the Governor and High Commissioner in 1904.
In 1905, the Malay Residential School was opened with three
teachers and eight students on an experimental stage. It was
located at a temporary building in Kuala Kangsar, the royal town
of Perak, and catered primarily to the sons of the Malay nobility.
The reason for the location of the school in the royal town of Perak
was that the Sultan of Perak, Sultan Idris, had earlier shown a keen
personal interest in the establishment of the school. By the end of
1905, E.W. Birch, the Resident of Perak, proclaimed the school an
established success (Stevenson, 1975). In 1907, the success of the
school was also reported in the Supplement to the Perak
Government Gazette of 12 July (Johan, 1984). In 1909, the school
was re-housed in a new building and officially known as the Malay
College.
Referred to unofficially as the ‘Eton of Malaya’ or the ‘Eton of the
East’, the Malay College was modeled on the English public school
(Stevenson, 1975). Its curriculum prepared the students for public
examination conducted by the University of Cambridge Examina-
tion syndicate. Although Malay language and literature were
taught for some years, English history, language and literature had
a special place in the school curriculum with the aim to inculcate a
distinctively ‘‘English’’ orientation among the Malay nobility
(Yahya, 2003). For instance, textbooks in use for English history
and literature were similar to those in London schools and the two
subjects were taught specifically from the point of view of English
children (Chai, 1967).
In the main, the Malay College prepared the Malay nobility for
prominent positions in the Malay Administrative Service (MAS)
created by the British in 1910. The MAS was the subordinate of the
elite MCS dominated by the British. Some Malay nobility
eventually made it to the MCS. For instance, in 1931, there were
10 Malays in the MCS. In 1937, the number increased to 16
(Butcher, 1979). To the Malay nobility, the Malay College provided
another symbol as well as a practical means by which to bolster
the supreme position and status of the traditional ruling class in
relation to both the Malay society and the new plural society that
had arisen under British rule (Stevenson, 1975). The provision of
English education for the Malay nobility by the British was mainly
to serve British colonial interests. The British found in the
Sultanate, and often in the personal influence of the Sultan himself
a politically viable device to facilitate colonial rule (Loh, 1975).
This was due to the unquestioning loyalty of the Malay masses
toward the nobility. It was through the exploitation of this loyalty
that the British intended to control the Malay masses. The British
were well aware of this loyalty in the early years of their colonial
rule. In 1874, Swettenham (1941) observed that:
There was a broad line between the ruling classes and the
people. The Rajas and Chiefs ruled, the people obeyed. The
people had no initiative whatever: they were there to do the
will of the Raja or Chief under whose authority they lived, with a
general understanding that the commands of the Ruler must be
followed by all (p. 48).
Such was the extent of the unquestioning Malay loyalty toward
the nobility. It was thus inconceivable for any Malays to revolt
against the nobility lest he or she would be chastised by the larger
society.
4. Education of the Malay peasantry
The watershed in the development of education for the rural
Malay peasantry was the release of the Report of the Select
Committee of the Legislative Council to Enquire into the State of
Education in the Colony (the Wolley Report) in 1870. Although the
Report focused on the educational development in the SS, it,
nevertheless, had a profound impact on the educational develop-
ment of the Malay States, as many of the officials in the Malay
States during the first decade of Residential rule were either
seconded or transferred from the Straits Civil Service. The Report
recommended a large extension of Malay schools in place of the
Quran schools so that children would be educated in their mother
tongue and learnt the rudiments of sound knowledge and to read
and write in the native and Roman character (Wong and Gwee,
1970). The Wolley Report’s particular emphasis on the expansion
of vernacular education led to a spectacular growth in the number
of Malay schools during the late 1870s and early 1880s (Stevenson,
1975).
The person who provided the main impetus to the growth of
Malay education was A.M. Skinner, a young British official of the
Penang Administration. In 1872, when he was appointed the
Inspector of Schools, he proposed the idea of adopting the Quran
classes as the basis for the Malay schools (Chelliah, 1947). The
Quran classes existed long before the British set foot in Malaya and
were conducted in a number of ways. In small villages, they were
conducted in the house of the religious teacher. In big villages, they
were conducted in the surau (religious building) or on the steps of
the mosque. In the SS and in the Malay States of Kedah, Kelantan
and Terengganu, they were largely conducted in the pondok (hut)
(Stevenson, 1975). Skinner was of the opinion that no progress
could be made in Malay education until and unless the teaching of
Malay was separated from the teaching of the Quran. Skinner’s
proposal kept separate religious instruction from the teaching of
ordinary school subjects, which was held in the morning, while the
teaching of Quran was confined to the afternoon (Chang, 1973).
Despite initial hiccups, the number of Malay schools increased at a
phenomenal rate. In the SS, for instance, there were only 16 Malay
schools in 1872 with an enrolment of 596. But by 1882, the number
of Malay schools increased to 85 with an enrolment of 2230. The
number of Malay schools continued to grow and by 1892, there
were 189 Malay schools with an enrolment of 7218 (Chelliah,
1947). Meanwhile, in the FMS, the number of Malay schools
increased from 168 to 400 between 1900 and 1920 and the average
enrolment rose from 6000 to 20,319 (Roff, 1974). Following this
impressive development, the number of Malay schools far
outnumbered the English schools. In 1902, for instance, out of
the 218 schools in the FMS, 200 were Malays schools and only 18
were English schools (five were government English schools and
13 were government-aided English schools) (Chai, 1967). The
development of Malay education was given a marked infusion of
life with the establishment of the SITC in 1922 (Wong and Gwee,
1970). The SITC was not the first Malay teacher training college in
Malaya, however the first Malay teacher training college was
 T.Y. Sua / International Journal of Educational Development 33 (2013) 337–347
established in 1898 in Matang, Perak. But it was closed down a year
later when a new Malay teacher training college was established in
Malacca (Chai, 1967). The Malacca Malay Teacher Training College
ceased operation in 1922 following the establishment of the SITC
(Adam, 1991).
Unfortunately, Malay education could not provide the much
needed educational mobility to the rural Malays. They were
restricted to four years of primary education with the emphasis on
the three Rs, basic agricultural skills, basketry and weaving (Omar,
2007). The only available option for them to further their education
beyond the rudimentary level was by switching, at the fourth grade
for boys and third grade for girls, to the Special Malay Classes in
government English schools (Chai, 1977). After two years of
intensive coaching in English, they were then allowed to proceed to
an education in English. The first Special Malay Class was
introduced at the Penang Free School before the First World
War (Johan, 2005). The Penang Free School, established in 1816,
was the first English school in Malaya. But opportunities to attend
the Special Malay Classes were limited. Thus, education of rural
Malays was largely confined to four years of rudimentary
education. Many Malays remained entrapped in rural areas
without any possible means of upward social mobility. Undoubt-
edly, Malay education during the colonial period was a form of
social control aimed at confining the rural Malays in their social
milieu (Jadi, 1983). Even the establishment of the SITC – ‘‘the apex
of Malay primary school system’’ (Loh, 1975, p. 87), to train Malay
school teachers was mainly directed toward this end. To the
British, the SITC was meant to be a college to mould people who
would return to their villages to help make the village folks more
contented with their way of life (Salleh, 1979). The contrasting
roles played by the SITC and the Malay College were best
exemplified by Roff (1974):
On the one hand, at Kuala Kangsar, there were the sons of the
traditional ruling class and the wealthy, undergoing training for
entry into the English-speaking world of government and
administration and occasionally the professions; on the other,
at S.I.T.C., the sons of the peasantry and the poor, undergoing
training for return to the Malay-speaking world of the rural
village school (p. 143).
The dualistic educational policy implemented by the British for
the Malays created a wedge between the Malay-educated masses
and the English-educated elites (Jadi, 1983). This was inevitable as
the policy of maintaining a useful role for the traditional elites in
the colonial administration, dictated as much by practical
considerations as by political caution, had a conservative
concomitant: the preservation of the State’s peasantry (Loh, 1975).
Undoubtedly, the policy of depriving the Malay peasantry of
educational mobility was underpinned by the divide and rule
intent of the British. For one thing, the British were particularly
wary of the backlash of ‘‘over-education’’ among the Malay masses
that would lead to the emergence of political awareness. Such
development, as their experience in the Indian sub-continent had
shown, was detrimental to their interests (Yahya, 2003). The strong
provision of English education for the Indians in British India
advocated by Lord Macaulay, the chairman of the Governor
General’s Committee on Public Instruction, had had an adverse
effect on British colonial rule. Contrary to the expectations of the
British who looked to the English-educated elites as ‘‘interpreters
between the British and the millions of Indians they governed’’
(Phillipson, 1993, p. 110), the English-educated elites had instead
adopted an anti-colonial stand and revolted against the British.
Thus, the British were extremely selectively in the provision of
English education for the Malays in Malaya to avoid repeating their
mistakes in India. Consequently, too much education for the Malay
341
masses was viewed as a bad thing in general (Mauzy, 1985). Such a
stand was perhaps best illustrated by Swettenham who was
strongly against the provision of English education for the Malays.
In May 1891, he wrote in his annual report on Perak for 1890:
The one danger to be guarded against is to teach English
indiscriminately. It could not be well taught except in a few
schools, and I do not think it is at all advisable to attempt to give
to the children of an agricultural population an indifferent
knowledge of a language that to all but the very few would only
unfit them for the duties of life and make them discontented
with anything like manual labour (Stevenson, 1975, p. 57).
Significantly, some Malay nobility also openly supported the
view of the British on the provision of English education for the
Malay peasantry. One of them, Raja Chulan, argued in the Federal
Council:
We have to avoid the mistakes committed in other parts of the
world. History has taught us that under-education is not so
serious an evil as over-education, especially education of a kind
that does not provide the means to keep its young occupied
(Maaruf, 1988, p. 57).
The preservation of the rural Malay peasantry had thus become
the main concern of the British in maintaining a de jure Malay
Sultanate and a de facto British Administration during the first two
decades of colonial rule in the Malay states (Loh, 1975). As
previously mentioned, it was through the provision of a rural-
based education that the British attempted to preserve the Malay
peasantry. The architect behind this rural-based educational policy
was Richard Winstedt. When Winstedt was appointed the
Assistant Director of Education in early 1916 with special
responsibility for Malay schools in the FMS and the SS, he was
asked to inquire into and make recommendations concerning
Malay education. He was appointed because of his reputation as a
person conversant with Malay culture and literature. He visited
Java in Indonesia and the United States-controlled Philippines to
look into the relevance of their systems of vernacular and
industrial education to the Malay peasantry in Malaya (Wong
and Gwee, 1970; Maaruf, 1988). He released his report in 1917
upon his return to Malaya. The Winstedt Report or the Report on
Vernacular and Industrial Education in the Netherlands East Indies
and the Philippines recommended the maintenance of the status
quo of Malay education, despite the dire need of new directions
(Loh, 1975). Winstedt stood for the view that the basic character of
Malay education should be rural and with a strong manual and
agricultural emphasis in order to instill the idea of the dignity of
labor (Maaruf, 1988). He recommended the inclusion of handwork,
gardening and netting in the Malay school curriculum (Nagen-
dralingan, 2007). He also recommended the reduction of schooling
from five to four years. The Winstedt Report in fact laid the
foundation for the rural-based Malay education (Roff, 1974).
Although industrial education was one of the focuses of the Report,
it was not intended that Malay schools should deliberately supply
vocational training (Chelliah, 1947). Thus, despite highly regarded
for his writing about Malay literature and history (Bastin, 1964),
Winstedt was strongly criticized for his recommendations on
Malay education:
. . . Winstedt showed a fundamental lack of concern for Malay
intellectual development . . . At heart an administrator and an
analyst rather than a creator or a true scholar, he showed little
real understanding of the Malay spirit and its strivings . . .
Nothing in his 1917 report strikes one more than the absence of
any thoughtful reflection on the aims and effects of vernacular
education . . . or of any concern at all beyond the practical aims
342 T.Y. Sua / International Journal of Educational Development 33 (2013) 337–347

of British colonial rule. It is difficult indeed to discern amid the century, Wilkinson found the atmosphere surrounding Malay
plethora of comment and recommendation anything approach- education stifling and unreal:
ing a guiding principle for the educational process other than
that expressed in a stray assertion that it should be ‘‘designed to The natural gifts and abilities of pupils seemed often to be
develop the mind and not to deaden it with half-understood suppressed rather than encouraged by the dull processes of
detail’’ (Roff, 1974, p. 139). learning by rote that were a feature of most schools. Teacher
training was wholly inadequate, despite the establishment of a
In short, Winstedt tried to circumscribe Malay educational vernacular training college in the F.M.S. in 1898, and teaching
progress and to ensure that the Malay peasant did not get ideas was for the most part poor, unimaginative, and hampered by
above his station, than anyone before and since (Roff, 1974). The lack of suitable books (Roff, 1974, p. 132).
need to circumscribe the rural Malay peasantry by educational
means was put even more starkly by George Maxwell, a prominent The dire need for educational mobility led to increasing
colonial administrator. In 1927, Maxwell stated that the primary pressure from the Malays, especially in developed areas, to be
aim of Malay education was ‘‘to make the son of a fisherman or a given greater opportunities to receive an English education. In
peasant a more intelligent fisherman or peasant than his father had 1913, for instance, the Malay residents of two rice-growing
been, and a man whose education will enable him to understand districts, Lenggong and Krian in Perak, made requests for English
how his own lot fits in with the scheme of life around him’’ (cf. schools (Loh, 1975). However, the prevailing view among the
Searle, 1999, p. 29). It is not surprising then that an important British officials was against the provision of English education for
feature of the Malay school was its connection with the people it the Malay peasantry. Instead, they opted for an improved
served. As the 1938 Education Report puts it, this connection vernacular education in line with their objective to preserve the
provided ‘‘the links between the schools and the life and homes of Malay social order. The only avenue for the Malays to receive an
villages’’ (Cheeseman, 1979 [1947], p. 129). The rural character of English education was through the Special Malay Classes
Malay education was in fact looked upon by many as ‘‘the poor mentioned earlier. Thus, the number of Malays attending English
man’s education’’ (Wong and Gwee, 1971, p. 78). The degrading schools was alarmingly low. In the 19th century, only about 10
status of Malay education remained a permanent feature up until percent of Malays attended English schools (Johan, 2005).
the outbreak of the Second World War. The lack of social mobility Although the percentage of Malays attending English schools
via Malay education had resulted in many Malay parents losing increased during the first half of the 20th century, they were
their hope in Malay schools. Thus, the role of Malay education as an largely outnumbered by the Chinese and Indians. In the FMS, for
agent of social change was deemed irrelevant and dysfunctional as instance, the enrolment percentages of Malays, Chinese and
far as the British educational policy toward the rural Malay Indians in English schools from 1919 to 1937 clearly showed the
peasantry was concerned (Jadi, 1983). For the majority of rural under-representation of Malays in English schools (Table 1).
Malays, Malay education was designed to lead them to the paddy One of the main contributing factors to the low Malay
field or to swell the ranks of manual laborers. The only dignified enrolment in English schools is that the Malays were required
vocation was to become a Malay school teacher with a meagre to undergo four years of Malay primary education prior to their
monthly salary of twenty dollars (Chai, 1967). Although the salary enrolment in English schools, whereas the Chinese and Indians
of Malay school teachers improved following the introduction of were not subjected to the same requirement. This had given the
the first graded salary scheme in the early 20th century, it Chinese and Indians an advantage in gaining an English education.
remained relatively low. Malay assistant teachers, for instance, Although the traditional Malay leaders, among them the Sultan of
were drawing a salary less than that received by an Indian peon Perak and the Sultan of Johor, questioned the requirement imposed
(Roff, 1974). Such was the pathetic state of the rural Malays who on the Malay pupils, the British were not in favor of a change in
were unable to make any significant breakthrough in their existing policy that was deliberately designed to entrap the Malays
socioeconomic mobility via the provision of education. in the rural semi-subsistence economy in line with their divide and
rule policy. Also, as almost all English schools were located in
urban areas, the bulk of the Malays who lived in rural villages far
5. The problem of educational mobility among the Malays and
from urban areas were thus unable to attend the English schools. It
its ramifications
was the urban Chinese and Indians who benefited most from the
establishment of English schools. The reluctance of the British to
Although Malay education was largely encouraged by the
British, it was, nonetheless, driven by the intention of the British to Table 1
divide and rule. Malay schools were thus not given the much Total enrolment in English schools in the FMS (by percentage).
needed financial resources for infrastructural development, as the
Year Total Malays Chinese Indians Europeans Others
British did not want the Malay masses to excel in their educational
and Eurasians
pursuits. It is not surprising then that Malay schools were housed
1919 8456 9 48 30 10 3
in simple and often makeshift quarters with few skilled teachers
1920 9208 10 48 30 10 2
and little equipment. The greater part of the British organizational 1921 10,105 13 47 29 9 2
effort in education, however, was geared toward the development 1922 10,450 15 46 29 9 2
of English schools. There were two types of English schools during 1923 11,594 18 46 26 8 2
the colonial period: the first was the government English school 1924 12,806 18 48 24 7 3
1925 13,768 19 49 23 7 2
managed by the government where all expenses were paid for by
1926 14,509 19 49 23 7 2
the government; the second was government-aided English school 1927 16,283 18 49 25 6 2
which received grants-in-aid from the government and controlled 1928 16,185 17 49 26 6 2
by its own governing body. Mission schools set up by the Christian 1929 17,113 16 50 26 6 2
1930 17,997 16 49 27 6 2
missionary fall under the second category of the English schools.
1932 17,477 15 50 27 6 2
The emphasis given to English schools was to fulfill the increasing 1933 16,417 17 49 27 6 1
demand from government and private business alike for English- 1935 16,496 16 50 27 6 1
trained staff. Consequently, the Malay school system was left 1937 17,161 15 50 28 6 1
largely to look after itself (Roff, 1974). At the turn of the 20th Source: Loh (1975, p. 106).
 T.Y. Sua / International Journal of Educational Development 33 (2013) 337–347
establish English schools in rural areas was again a deliberate
attempt to entrap the Malays in the rural semi-subsistence
economy through a divide and rule policy. In addition, since a large
number of English schools were set up by Christian missionary
groups, this had further deterred the Malays, who were Muslims,
from attending these schools, as they were wary of their children
being exposed to Christian proselytization. In 1941, for instance,
not more than 400 Malay students were enrolled in the Christian
mission schools (McLeish, 1941, cf. Basri, 1990, p. 9). It follows that
as a consequence of the lack of opportunity to attend English
schools, the Malays had lagged far behind the Chinese and Indians
in terms of upward social mobility. This was because during the
colonial period, English education was generally considered the
best means of social mobility. It was the only type of education that
prepared students to sit for the Junior Cambridge and Senior
Cambridge Examinations. Students who passed the Senior Cam-
bridge Examination could then proceed to post-Cambridge School
Certificate classes – a two-year pre-university course to qualify
them for entry into higher institutions of learning, and become
professionals upon graduating from these institutions (Johan,
2005). For those who did not possess a post-Cambridge School
Certificate, their Cambridge Examination qualifications and
working knowledge of the English language acquired through an
English education would help in the employment as a clerk in
government service or commercial firms.
Educational mobility of the Malays was also seriously
hampered by the reluctance of the British to establish Malay
secondary schools as well as to use the Malay language in
government departments, despite O.T. Dussek’s efforts in these
two crucial areas. When Dussek was appointed the Assistant
Director of Education in charge of Malay schools in 1924, he
proposed the establishment of Malay secondary schools in a few
centrally located towns. Also, as an effort to enhance the
instrumental value of Malay secondary education so that it could
lead to job opportunities comparable to those available for the
English educated, he proposed a considerable increase in the use of
the Malay language in government departments. However, both
his proposals did not find favor with the British Administration
(Loh, 1975).
It is obvious that the Malays were deprived of educational
mobility by the British. By so doing, the British had also deprived
the Malays of socioeconomic mobility via the provision of
education. Compounding the matter was the fact that the Malays
were purportedly encouraged by the British to engage in the rural
traditional sector, which could only provide them with little
socioeconomic mobility. In line with the divide and rule policy, the
British did not see the need to engage the Malays in the modern
sector of the economy (Abraham, 1997). The modern sector
remained largely the preserve of the Chinese. Thus, the Malays
were reduced to a peripheral role and excluded from the
modernizing process of economic development initiated by the
British (Abdullah, 1985). Contrary to the intention of the British,
the deprived position of the Malays did not subvert them into a
docile population, in particular those who had attended the SITC. It
was the role played by the college principal (O.T. Dussek) together
with the infusion of nationalistic sentiments from neighboring
Indonesia and the threat posed by the encroachment of the Chinese
that resulted in the emergence of the SITC students as radical
nationalists who adopted an anti-British stand. In this regard, the
SITC had become a cradle of Malay resurgence (Cheah, 1973, cf.
Abdullah, 1985, p. 8).
6. Malay intelligentsia and radical nationalism
The SITC played a vital role in the emergence of Malay school
teachers as radical nationalist intelligentsia. Although the SITC was
343
originally planned as an institution to strengthen the rural-based
education of the Malay peasantry as envisaged by the Winstedt
Report, its subsequent development, however, took a different
trajectory. The person instrumental in this development was O.T.
Dussek. Dussek served as the SITC principal from its inception in
1922 until 1936. While heading the SITC, he retained his position
as the Assistant Director of Education in charge of Malay schools.
As previously mentioned, he was appointed to this position in
1924. Although he shared most of Winstedt’s ideas about the kind
of education for the Malays, he, nonetheless, found it impossible to
restrict the intellectual content of teacher training in the SITC. As
one who had come to acquire a passionate affection to the Malay
people and a strong desire to be of service to them, he promoted
the study, use and development of Malay language, literature and
history. He openly pursued a monolingual policy in which the
teaching of English was kept out of the Malay schools and the SITC,
as he saw no practical relevance for the Malays to be associated
with English. He was committed to educate Malay school teachers
as well as to train them to become competent teachers. He was also
committed to raise the standard of Malay schools gradually until
secondary level of education. He further pressed for the use of the
Malay language as the language of the government (Roff, 1974). He
was certainly not disheartened by his earlier failures to establish
Malay secondary schools and to increase the use of the Malay
language in the government. His Malay language policy at the SITC
was possibly the most significant British contribution to the
growth of Malay nationalism prior to the Second World War (Loh,
1975). His strong support for the Malay language and Malay
education was perhaps best illustrated by his reminder to the SITC
students in the maiden issue of the Cendermata (the SITC college
magazine) in which he urged them to work toward the progress of
the Malay race (Salleh, 1979).
The transfer of the Malay Translation Bureau from the
Education Department in Kuala Lumpur to the SITC in 1924
marked a watershed in the development of Malay language and
culture among the SITC students. It was through this bureau that
translated literary works were made available to them. Soon, the
SITC became the hub of modern Malay literary activities. The
emergence of this literary hub subsequently facilitated the influx
of literary works from Indonesia published by the Balai Pustaka or
the Hall of Literature. These literary works not only had a catalytic
impact on Malay literary development in Malaya, but also the rise
of social awareness among the SITC students (Roff, 1974). Literary
works from Indonesia in the 1920s and 1930s were noted for their
revolutionary tone against the Dutch colonizer. Apart from literary
works, the Indonesian nationalistic influence on the SITC students
also came from leaders who took refuge in Malaya following the
failed revolt against the Dutch in 1926. These leaders spread anti-
colonial ideas among the SITC students leading to the rise of
political awareness. The establishment of the Parti Nasional
Indonesia (PNI) or the Indonesia Nationalist Party in 1927 by
Soekarno further imbued the SITC students with revolutionary
political fervor (Soenarno, 1960). The anti-colonial and anti-feudal
program of the PNI caught the imagination of the SITC students
(Khong, 1984), resulting in some secretly joining the party (Cheah,
2003). It is not surprising then that British intelligence reports
revealed that since the 1920s, a gradual awakening was taking
place within the Malay community (Colonial Office 717/5). British
intelligence had also identified Soetan Djoenain alias Pak Said as
the leading Indonesian political activist who had played a
significant role in influencing the emergence of Malay political
awareness since the 1920s (Colonial Office 273/616). It is, however,
important to mention here that apart from the SITC students, anti-
British sentiment was also propagated by Malay Arabic-educated
students who came back from the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo.
But this group of students who constituted the Kaum Muda (Young
344 T.Y. Sua / International Journal of Educational Development 33 (2013) 337–347
Turk) reformers (see Noor, 2004) did not get much support from
the Malay community as their ideas were considered ‘‘far too
advanced politically for their elders at home’’ (Soenarno, 1960, p.
9). It was the Indonesian inspired SITC students who were more
successful in galvanizing the support of the Malay community in
pursuing an anti-colonial stand.
The threatened position of the Malays as the indigenous
community under British colonial rule soon became the main
concern of the SITC Malay-educated intelligentsia. By the 1930s,
the population growth of Malaya underwent significant changes
(You, 1960) and a plural society had been fully instituted as a direct
consequence of the British policy of encouraging the influx of
Chinese and Indians as indentured workers in the tin mining and
rubber plantation sectors (Sani, 2008). The immigrant communi-
ties, though transient in the beginning, had by now developed
roots in Malaya. This was captured by the 1931 census which
indicated that 29.9 percent of the Chinese and 21.4 percent of the
Indians were local-born (Hirschman, 1975). The decision by the
Chinese and Indian immigrants to take up residence in Malaya was
seen by the Malays as a threat. For one thing, the Malays were
unable to match the Chinese and Indians in the economic sphere as
a result of the strong emphasis of the colonial economy on the tin
mining and rubber plantation sectors:
The colonial economy, based heavily on mining enterprise and
later commercial plantations, relied on the immigrants instead
of the indigenous population on labour, and areas of intensive
economic activities were, by physical constraints and human
design, spatially separated from the traditional settlements. As
a result, the urbanizing process was largely confined to areas
where colonial and immigrant enterprises were concentrated,
and the traditional society was bypassed or left out (Lim, 1978,
p. xxv).
The Malays were particularly wary of the Chinese who had
emerged more successful than the Indians in the colonial economy.
In the FMS, for instance, tin mining activities led to the
proliferation of townships that had become thriving commercial
hubs of the Chinese (see Lim, 1978). The increasing numerical
strength of the Chinese was also seen by the Malays as a threat
(Samad, 2011). By 1931, the Chinese constituted 33.9 percent of
the population of Malaya as compared to 29.4 percent in 1921
(Hirschman, 1975). Yet another threat posed by the Chinese to the
Malays was their demands for their rights through such channels
as the legislative council and the newspaper columns (Sani, 2008).
For instance, Tan Cheng Lock – a prominent Chinese community
leader from Malacca who served an unprecedented four three-year
terms as a member of the SS Legislative Council from 1924 until
1934 (Tregonning, 1979), was strongly against British land,
immigration and education policies during the tenure of Cecil
Clementi as the Governor of the SS and the High Commissioner of
the FMS (1929–1934) (Guo, 1996). Clementi was noted for his pro-
Malay and anti-Chinese policy. The enactment of the Small Holders
(Restriction of Sale) Bill in 1931 followed by the Malay Reserva-
tions Bill in 1933 was to prevent Malay lands from passing into the
hands of the Chinese (Cheah, 2009; Abraham, 1997). Similarly, the
enactment of the Immigration Restriction Ordinance in 1929
followed by the Aliens Ordinance in 1933 was to put an end to the
free inflow of Chinese immigrants to Malaya (Heng, 1988; Cartier,
2003). In the area of education, Clementi not only imposed a tight
control over the Chinese schools but also attempted to divert
Chinese children into the Malay schools (see Kua, 1999; Saad,
1986).
Among other things, the vulnerability of the Malays to the
threat posed by the Chinese could be attributed to their lack of
socioeconomic advancement as a consequence of the British
educational policy that entrapped them in the rural semi-
subsistence economy. Most vigorous in defending the position
of the Malays was the SITC radical Malay intelligentsia. One of
them, Ibrahim Yaacob, later became the founder-president of the
Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) or the Young Malay Union
(Mustapha, 2005). Ibrahim Yaacob joined the SITC in 1929 and
graduated in 1931. On graduation, he became a teacher at the
Malay School in Bentong in Pahang. In 1937, he was transferred to
teach at the Police Depot in Kuala Lumpur. He later resigned from
teaching and became a journalist (Sani, 2008). It was while
studying at the SITC that he first came into contact with the
Indonesian exiles. This contact obviously made him fully
immersed in political ideas (Soenarno, 1960).
The KMM, founded in April 1938, was the first pre-Second
World War Malay political party to transcend state boundaries
within the Malay Peninsula (Abdullah, 1985). However, it was not
the first Malay political organization in Malaya. The first Malay
political organization was the Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (KMS) or
the Singapore Malay Union formed on 14 May 1926 (Sani, 2008).
The KMS was, in the main, a state-led political organization. It
inspired the formation of similar politically orientated organiza-
tions during the following decade and especially from 1937
onwards (Ongkili, 1985). Thus, by the time of the formation of the
KMM, other state-led political organizations, such as the Persatuan
Melayu Selangor (PMS) or the Selangor Malay Association and the
Persatuan Melayu Pahang (PMP) or the Pahang Malay Association,
had also come into being. These political organizations were
mostly led by English-educated traditional elites who were pro-
British. It was never the aim of the traditional elites to mobilize the
Malay masses further along the path of social change. Instead, they
sought to preserve the traditional Malay political system – with
political power diffused among the individual state rulers (Sani,
2008). They pleaded for continued Malay privileges and were
against anti-colonial nationalism. The British were regarded by
them as the guardians of Malay rights, especially in preserving the
office of the Sultan (Roff, 1974). Thus, they favored general
cooperation with the British (Stockwell, 1979). Although the state-
led political organizations lacked political mobilization across the
various states in Malaya, they were the major political strand of the
1930s. This was mainly because of the strong attachment of the
Malay masses to the feudal relationships between the rulers and
the ruled. The state-led political organizations were instrumental
in the subsequent development of the main strand of Malay
politics, which was to reach its height of mobilization with the
formation of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) by
Dato’ Onn Jaafar (an aristocrat from Johor who had been educated
at the Malay College) after the Second World War (Roff, 1974).
In contrast to the state-led political organizations, the KMM
was led by Malays who were of rural origins. Leaders of the KMM
were less inclined toward a strong sense of loyalty to the
traditional elites due to their social distance from the established
authority (Sani, 1976). The KMM formed branches in Penang,
Malacca and in all the nine sultanate states except Perlis. Most of
its founding members were the alma mater of the SITC who were in
constant contact with each other either by direct personal
correspondence or intellectually through the various journals
and other forms of publications. In many ways, they were counter-
elites to the traditional elites. Ibrahim Yaacob claimed that even
before the KMM was officially formed in 1938, it had already
existed as an amorphous underground movement (Abdullah,
1985). It was obvious that the KMM first found its footing in the
SITC. During his three-year stay in the SITC, Ibrahim Yaacob
became the acknowledged leader of a group of students, some 35
in number, who found political inspiration in the Indonesian
nationalist movement and sought to reproduce it in Malaya (Roff,
1974). He rejected British colonial rule and called for the merger of
 T.Y. Sua / International Journal of Educational Development 33 (2013) 337–347
Malaya and Indonesia (Read, 1995) under the concept of Melayu
Raya or ‘larger Malaya’ (see Sani, 2008) – a political union of the
Malay Archipelago based on the Malay race (Cheah, 2003). On 1
December 1932, he wrote in Majlis, a Malay vernacular press to
propagate the concept of Melayu Raya:
. . . it is obvious that the peninsular Malays have not yet
understood the idea of nation and nationalism. Oh, my Malay
people, the entire peninsula and the Indonesia archipelago is
the possession of our common ancestors, the Malays. The
names Minangkabau, Bugis, Jawa, Brunei, Aceh, Lampung,
Palembang, Rawa, Kampar, Kelantan, Perak, etc. are not the
names of nations but of states. Our real ethnic identity is
‘Malay’. The entire Indonesia possesses a custom similar to that
of the peninsula Malays. What is it then that sets us apart? It is
simply the fate of our unity under the yokes of two colonial
powers, i.e. the Dutch in the Indonesian Archipelago and the
British in the peninsula. But this should not alter the unity of
our people, a unity that will not give way under the impact of
the rain nor crack under the impact of the sun (cf. Sani, 2008, p.
63).
Ibrahim Yacoob’s writing articulated a clear conception of the
Malay nation that challenged old attachments and enunciated a
forthright and ideological anti-colonialism: they were a wakening
call to social awareness and political action (Harper, 2001). The
KMM was critical of British colonial rule for the exploitation of
Malaya’s resources and people. It condemned the local allies of the
British – the Sultans, the nobility and the English educated for
collaborating with and ultimately supporting the British (Khong,
1984). It also construed the state-led Malay associations as
‘‘feudalistic’’ and too absorbed with state rights and with allegiance
to the rulers and the British Administration (Cheah, 2003). By late
1939, Warta Malaya, the party organ of the KMM, carried articles
and editorials with a strong anti-British flavor (Soenarno, 1960).
Warta Malaya was bought by Ibrahim Yaacob with the financial
support of the Japanese with whom he had made contact before
the outbreak of the Second World War (Sani, 2008).
The anti-British stand of the KMM soon caught the attention of
the British. Between 13 and 18 December 1941, the British took
swift action against the KMM. Although the KMM ‘‘failed to gain a
mass following within the Malay community’’ (Stockwell, 1979, p.
xv), as ‘‘relatively few Malays were prepared to think in terms of
political unification of the separate states, let alone any form of
union with Indonesia’’ (Roff, 1974, p. 235), the British were,
nevertheless, alarmed by the dangerous intention of the KMM. 150
KMM leaders and supporters were arrested and detained, leaving
the KMM in disarray. But the KMM managed to reestablish itself
following the release of its leaders by the Japanese who defeated
the British and occupied Malaya during the Second World War. As
a matter of expediency, Ibrahim Yaacob adopted a cooperative
policy with the Japanese, while clandestinely collaborating with
anti-Japanese resistance movements: the Malayan Communist
Party (MCP) and the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army
(MPAJA). The Japanese soon became aware of these activities
and decided to ban the KMM (Abdullah, 1985). Leaders of the KMM
were not arrested by the Japanese, however. Instead, the Japanese
assigned them a new role. They were asked to head the Giyugun or
the Pembela Tanah Ayer (PETA – Defenders of the Motherland) – a
local Malay militia formed by the Japanese in January 1944.
Ibrahim Yaacob was appointed the commander-in-chief of the
PETA (Noor, 2004). The Japanese intended to use the PETA as a
bridge to establish rapport with the Malay masses. But things
changed when the Japanese began to realize that the war was not
going to end in their favor. As a means to prevent the possible
return of the British, the Japanese, in late July 1945, allowed the
345
formation of the Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (KRIS) or
the Union of Indonesian and Peninsular Malay Peoples headed by
former KMM leaders to work for the political merger between
Malaya and Indonesia. This plan was in line with the concept of
Melayu Raya propagated by the KMM in the 1930s. While leading
the KRIS, Ibrahim Yaacob met Indonesian leaders Soekarno and
Hatta when the latter were in Taiping, Perak on 12 August 1945.
This was the closest that the Malay-educated radical nationalists
ever got to realize their cherished goal of a merger between Malaya
and Indonesia (Noor, 2004). They had to abandon their cherished
goal following the sudden defeat of the Japanese by the Allied
forces. A new party, the Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM)
or the Malay Nationalist Party of Malaya, was formed on 17 August
1945 by former KMM leaders two days after the defeat of the
Japanese (Sani, 2008; Noor, 2004). Ibrahim Yacoob continued to
play an active role in the PKMM but in exile and under the assumed
name of Iskandar Kamel Agastja. He fled to Indonesia on 20 August
1945 just before the British returned to Malaya to avoid detention
by the British for his collusion with the Japanese. He established a
PKMM branch in Jogjakarta in March 1946 (Adam, 1999). But
subsequent developments show that the PKMM could not match
the political appeal of the UMNO during the period of decoloniza-
tion after the Second World War (see Adam, 2004). It was the
UMNO that managed to lead the Malays to seek for the
independence of Malaya from the British (see Fernando, 2009).
The transition from colonial rule to self-government was smooth
without any bloodshed. However, the UMNO had to work closely
with non-Malay political parties to reach a consensus in order to
secure independence for Malaya. The consensus was built on an
unwritten social contract that guaranteed the political dominance
of the Malays as the indigenous community (Crouch, 1996), while
the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, were given the assurance
that their economic dominance would be retained (Milne, 1970).
Despite the attainment of independence in 1957, the Malay
traditional elites continued to rely on a neo-colonialist educational
policy in which the role of English remained supreme. Such an
educational policy invoked strong protests from the Malays who
demanded the Malay language to be given a rightful place in the
post-independence educational system in order to improve their
educational mobility as well as to serve as the crucible of the nation
building process (see Roff, 1967; Jadi, 1983; Tan, 2012). But the
traditional elites were reluctant to do so citing the reason that the
Malay language was not ready to take over from English. It was not
until the early 1970s that the policy was finally abandoned in the
aftermath of the 1969 race riots, which among other things was
triggered by Malay discontent over the lack of educational mobility
(see Comber, 1986; Goh, 1971; National Operations Council, 1969).
7. Conclusion
The British educational policy for the Malay indigenous
community in Malaya was, in the main, driven by the policy of
divide and rule. The British adopted a two-pronged strategy where
educational provision for the Malays was concerned. It was the
intention of the British to maintain the traditional Malay social
order that they had provided the Malay peasantry with a rural-
based education to serve as a means of social control. On the other
hand, the Malay nobility, which was highly regarded by the Malay
masses in the traditional Malay social order, was given an elitist
English education that was meant to co-opt the ruling class into the
British Administration. With this, the British attempted to gain
political mileage from alliances with the traditional leadership of
the masses (Yahya, 2003). While the British succeeded in co-opting
the Malay nobility, they were less successful in containing the
Malay masses, in particular the SITC students. Spurred by the
strong support of O.T. Dussek for Malay educational advancement
346 T.Y. Sua / International Journal of Educational Development 33 (2013) 337–347
and the nationalist movement in neighboring Indonesia, they
became radical nationalists adopting an anti-British stand. Their
anti-British stand was further fueled by the British policy of
encouraging the influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants to
provide the much needed labor for the tin mining and rubber
plantation sectors. The Chinese immigrants, in particular, were
perceived by the radical nationalists as a threat due to their
attendant economic dominance, increasing numbers and strong
assertions for their rights in Malaya. Driven by a deep sense of
cultural nationalism, the radical nationalists called for the merger
of Malaya with Indonesia under a larger concept of a Malay nation.
This nation of intent propagated by them was meant to chart a
different trajectory of nation building against the aspirations of the
British. Their anti-British stand had also resulted in them
challenging the English-educated traditional Malay elites who
not only collaborated with the British, but also established political
organizations to safeguard the interests of the British and to
preserve the traditional Malay social order. However, they could
not stand up to the traditional elites who drew their strengths from
the feudal relationships between the rulers and the ruled. At the
end, it was the traditional elites who charted the destiny of the
country during the period of decolonization after the Second World
War. As far as post-independence educational policy was
concerned, the traditional elites continued to maintain the
supremacy of English education over Malay education – a colonial
legacy that was detrimental to the interests of the Malay masses. It
was only after the 1969 race riots that they finally realized the
urgent need to redress Malay grievances over the lack of
educational advancement. As compared to India, the British were
more successful in Malaya in that they had tactically exploited the
feudal structure of the indigenous community to their advantage
by carefully implementing a dualistic educational policy with only
minor resistance from the Malay masses. The adverse effect of this
policy only came many years later during the post-independence
period. By then, the British had accomplished their mission as a
colonizer of Malaya.
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