OB AOM B (Operational Bulletin)

OPERATIONAL BULLETIN
OPERATIONS MANUAL
Table of Contents PART B
OB.00 TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................ OB-00 page 01
OB.01 Settlement of Required Documentation ................................... OB-01 page 01
OB.02 AP Quick Disconnect Button Malfunctions ............................ OB-02 page 01
OB.03 Bleed fail Due to REF ECS OFF ............................................. OB-03 page 01
OB.04 Procedures To Mitigate FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH EICAS

Messages Occurrences ............................................................. OB-04 page 01
OB.05 Hydraulic System related Spurious Message .......................... OB-05 page 01
OB.06 APU Bleed Valve Closing Due to High EGT During Bleed
Transition .................................................................................. OB-06 page 01
OB.07 Weather Radar Transmitting on Ground .................................. OB-07 page 01
OB.08 Anticipated Top of Descent when two at Altitude Constraint

are at the same Altitude/Flight Level........................................ OB-08 page 01
OB.09 FMS Anomaly in Terminal Area Procedures Using Heading

Legs Displayed as Fly XXX or as Assigned ............................ OB-09 page 01
OB.10 Primus EPIC Software – ARC Melding Issue.......................... OB-10 page 01
OB.11 Reduction of Navigation Database Procedures Content Due

to Possible FMS Lateral Navigation (LNAV)
Display/Guidance Issue ............................................................ OB-11 page 01
OB.12 FMS Misbehavior Upon Runway Change When No Arrival

or Approach Procedure Is Selected........................................... OB-12 page 01
OB.13 FMS Altitude Capability........................................................... OB-13 page 01
ORIGINAL OB-00 page 01

OPERATIONS MANUAL
Table of Contents PART B
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

OPERATIONS MANUAL
Settlement of Required Documentation PART B
OB.01 SETTLEMENT OF REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION
 OPEN SPACE – CM1

LEFT LATERAL CONSOLE  GLARESHIELD
- AFM - NORMAL CHECKLISTS
- OPERATIONS MANUAL VOL. 1
- OPERATIONS MANUAL VOL. 2  PEDESTAL
- PERFORMANCE CHARTS
 BRIEFCASE – CM1 - ABNORMAL/EMERG. BOOKLET
outside the bag
- GENERAL BASIC  FORMS FOLDER
inside the bag AIR SAFETY REPORT
- ROUTE MANUAL/GENERAL CABIN SAFETY REPORT
- ROUTE MANUAL/DESTINATIONS SEGNALAZIONI P. N.
- ROUTE MANUAL/ALTERN. (A-L) FDP EXTENSION IN ACTUAL OPS
- ROUTE MANUAL/ALTERN. (M-Z) LAYOVER REST REDUCTION
- RFC FOLDER NOTICE OF VIOLATION
BALANCE CHART
 BRIEFCASE – CM2 LOADSHEET
outside the bag LOADING INSTRUCTIONS
- RUNWAY TABLES GENERAL DECLARATION
inside the bag STAMOV DELAY CODES
- ROUTE MANUAL/DESTINATIONS RELAZIONE DI INFORT. P. N.
- ROUTE MANUAL/ALTERN. (A-L) SEGN. IRR.TA’ EFF. PERSON.
- ROUTE MANUAL/ALTERN. (M-Z) SCHEDA VERIF. SERV. A TERRA
- RFC FOLDER GB CHANGE REQUEST
- EMERGENCY SKETCHES
REVISION 02 OB-01 page 01
OPERATIONS MANUAL
Settlement of Required Documentation PART B
 MANUAL COMPARTMENT
- FMS PILOT’S GUIDE
 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION NOTE:

POUCH (N/A)
The Forms Folder , the Official
 OFFICIAL DOC. FOLDER Documentation Folder , the IATA
- C.O.A. (Air Operator Certificate) Dangerous Goods Regulations are
- AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATE located in the miscellaneous
- CERTIF. DI IMMATRICOLAZIONE compartment of the Galley G2 (E75-
- NOTA DI ASSICURAZIONE st.203, E90 – st.111).
- LICENZA RADIO PER A/M
- NOISE CERTIFICATE The Aircraft Log Book is located
- ORIG. APPROVAZIONE AFM outside the Briefcase - CM1
- DECRETO PER IL TRASPORTO DI
MATERIE RADIOATTIVE E The Cabin Log Book is located in the
FISSILI SPECIALI compartment of the Galley G2 (E75-
- BENESTARE TECNICO RAI st.203, E90 – st.101).
NOTE: In case of pouch not sealed
contact: AZ-TOT
ph 0665634361 or 3316181708
 S.B.A.L. POUCH (N/A)
REVISION 02 OB-01 page 02

OPERATIONS MANUAL
AP Quick Disconnect Button Malfunctions PART B
OB.02 AP QUICK DISCONNECT BUTTON MALFUNCTIONS

To inform the operators about the different situations related to AP QUICK
DISCONNECT button malfunctions.
OB.02.01 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The first issue of this Operational Bulletin provided information about the
AUTOPILOT aural warning that could not be normally deactivated after autopilot
disconnection, but could be deactivated using an alternative procedure. An event in the
EMBRAER fleet has revealed a new scenario where the deactivation of the aural may
not be possible. This revision presents additional guidance to cope with this new
scenario.
OB.02.02 OPERATING INFORMATION

The autopilot provides automatic pitch and roll control of the airplane by commanding
dedicated servos.
The autopilot is engaged by pushing the AP button on the guidance panel. Manual
disconnection of the autopilot is established by means of:
 AUTOPILOT QUICK DISCONNECT BUTTON (AP QD button) located on the

airplane control wheels.
 AP BUTTON located on the guidance panel.
During airplane normal operation, disconnection of the autopilot by means of AP QD

button or AP BUTTON is followed by an "AUTOPILOT" aural warning. Pressing the
AP QD button again cancels the aural, which sounds at least once.
When the AP QD is kept pressed (manually or stuck in due to a malfunction), the Pitch,
Yaw and Roll trim command are not available.
Two different events involving malfunctions of the AP QD button were reported in the
fleet. They are both described below together with procedures to mitigate the failures.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
Failure to cancel the "AUTOPILOT" aural warning due to Primus Epic Software
misbehavior
An event was reported in which, after a normal autopilot disconnection, the
AUTOPILOT aural warning could not be canceled by pressing the AP QD button.
After engagement/disengagement of the autopilot by pressing/depressing the AP
BUTTON on the guidance panel, the AUTOPILOT aural warning could then be
canceled by pressing the AP QD button.
Also, there was no associated EICAS message.
AP QUICK DISCONNECT button jamming

Although the possibility of this event was considered to be very low due to system
design and the historic record of the EMBRAER fleet (including the EMB-145 that
uses the same switch), recently it has been reported.
The pilot reported that after pressing the AP QD button, the AP was disengaged
correctly, but after the second press of the button, the aural warning was not canceled.
The AP could not be re-engaged and pitch, yaw and roll trim were not available,
although there was no EICAS message.
Although the failed switch could not be inspected, the report indicates that the AP QD
button was jammed.
In this scenario, pitch, yaw and roll trim will be inoperative and no EICAS message
will be displayed. There is the possibility to recover one pitch trim channel, by pushing
in the pitch trim sys cutout button associated to the jammed button (e.g: if the left seat
button is jammed, push in the sys cutout 1), but the pitch trim indication will be
inoperative (amber dashes).
During normal operation, the pilot presses the AP QD button once to disengage the AP
and a second time to acknowledge its disconnection. If the button jams in the first press
with the AP still engaged, the AP will disengage; the trims will be inoperative and the
"AUTOPILOT" aural will be triggered. As the button is not available to cancel the
aural, it will stay latched until the airplane is powered down.
If the button jams in the second press the same effects will be observed, but the aural
will not be latched, as it was canceled by the second press.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
NON ANNUNCIATED LOSS OF ALL TRIMS AND

AUTOPILOT
PITCH TRIM SYSTEM 1 CUTOUT BUTTON ..... PUSH IN ........ PNF
Pitch Trim normal?

 Yes

 Relevant Inoperative Items:
 Roll Trim Autopilot
 Yaw Trim Pitch Trim indication

 (END)

No
PITCH TRIM SYSTEM 1 CUTOUT BUTTON . PUSH OUT ........ PNF

Relevant Inoperative Items:

Roll Trim Autopilot
Yaw Trim Pitch Trim indication
The condition above indicates an AP QD button jamming in the second press.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
"AUTOPILOT" AURAL CAN NOT BE CANCELED
AUTOPILOT ....................................................... ENGAGE ........... PF

AP QD BUTTON .............................. PRESS TWO TIMES ........... PF
Aural is canceled?
 Yes

 (END)

No
NOTE: The aural warning can only be canceled by powering

down the airplane.
Relevant Inoperative Items:

Roll Trim Autopilot
Yaw Trim Pitch Trim indication
Pitch Trim normal?

 Yes

 (END)

No
PITCH TRIM SYSTEM 1 CUTOUT BUTTON . PUSH OUT ........ PNF

The condition above indicates the software misbehavior in case the aural was canceled,
or a AP QD button jamming (in the first press) if the aural was not canceled.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
Bleed Fail due to REF ECS OFF PART B
OB.03 BLEED FAIL DUE TO REF ECS OFF

To inform the operators about the possibility of a BLEED FAIL EICAS message in
case REF ECS is set to OFF.

The Fan Air Valve bellows (FAV bellows) is a flexible joint installed on the FAV
scoop line, just before the fan air valve. Throughout the compliance flight test program,
there were some fan air valve bellows failure events that required its replacement
before the next flight.
This failure could lead to a BLEED 1 (2) FAIL message displayed on the EICAS, and
after the associated QRH procedure was accomplished, the message was still displayed.
Instrumented flight, engine ground and lab tests have discovered that the root cause of
the failure is high pressure caused by ram air against the closed fan air valve.
This OB explains the root cause of the FAV joint failure and presents an operational
procedure to avoid the failure.

The Fan Air Valve uses cold air from the fan to regulate precooler temperature. The
valve will open only if precooler temperature is high. In order to have high
temperatures, the Wing Anti Ice or the respective Pack must be in use.
When the valve is closed the ram air creates high pressure that may damage the joint.
When the joint suffers severe damage, the air flow leaks from the duct before reaching
the FAV. The AMS controller will detect a failure, then cut the associated bleed system
and the EICAS message BLEED 1 (2) FAIL will consequently be displayed.
There is also the possibility of minor damage in the joint, which would not result in an
EICAS message and even no immediate system failure. But the joint resistance will be
degraded and in this case, an actual failure could easily occur, which would require its
replacement.
Setting REF ECS ON guarantees the packs will be in use during takeoff, avoiding the
closure of the fan air valve, and consequently the failure.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
Bleed Fail due to REF ECS OFF PART B
A new design that eliminates the failure mode is already under certification process.
Until the solution is properly certified, takeoffs should be conducted with REF ECS ON
to avoid the failure.
OB.03.03 DISPATCHING INFORMATION

The MMEL allows the operator to dispatch the airplane with one bleed system
inoperative.
In such cases, because of the possibility of minor damage to the bellows that would
cause no message, it is recommended that a bellows check be performed from the
functional bleed system, before dispatching the airplane, and if it is damaged, to replace
it.

Procedures To Mitigate FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH EICAS OPERATIONS MANUAL
Messages Occurrences PART B
OB.04 PROCEDURES TO MITIGATE FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH EICAS

MESSAGES OCCURRENCES
To inform the operators about four distinguished cases of FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH
EICAS message and the associated mitigation procedures.

EMBRAER has been investigating the occurrences of FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH
messages in the fleet and has identified some of its root causes. For four of these root
causes, EMBRAER has developed mitigation procedures that can be applied by the
flight crew avoiding dispatch delays.

The Embraer 170 has several monitors to verify Flight Controls System integrity during
the pre-flight. If one of these monitors identifies a system malfunction or if the monitor
itself fails, the flight crew is advised via the FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH EICAS
message.
EMBRAER has been investigating the causes of this message in the fleet and identified
among them three cases with straightforward mitigation procedures to overcome the
message after its appearance and a fourth case in which the flight crew can avoid the
message appearance.
A) FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH RECOVERABLE BY FLIGHT CONTROLS

MODULE (FCM) BUTTONS RESET
Loss of AC Energy for More than 4 Seconds
Normal mode is the one where the FCMs are in the control loop providing software
based gains to the pilots inputs besides high level functions. The Direct mode removes
the FCM from the control loop, and the pilot's inputs have fixed gains. The operation in
this mode is intended for abnormal conditions only where some system deterioration
precludes the Normal mode operation.
After the AC power is established (GPU, APU or IDG is the airplane power source),
the P-ACEs wake up in Normal mode. If the AC power is lost for more than 4 seconds,
the P-ACEs revert to Direct mode. Once the system is in Direct mode, it does not return
to the Normal mode without intervention. When the hydraulic power is available, one
of the Flight Controls monitors detects the Direct mode condition and triggers the FLT

CTRL NO DISPATCH message. The Flight Controls P-BIT may be successful or not,
depending on when the electric power interruption occurred.
This event is characterized by:
 An interruption of the AC power occurs for 4 seconds or more after the AC power
is established (APU RPM indication on the EICAS reaches 100%). This is
commonly observed when GPU is switched off before APU RPM reaches 100% or
due to some GPU malfunction.
 The FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH message comes up after the hydraulic power up.
CAN BUS Validity Monitor Malfunction

The P-ACE communicates with the FCM via CAN BUS channels. A P-ACE monitor
checks the integrity of the CAN BUS information sent by the FCM and, if a failure is
detected, the P-ACE does not engage during the electric power up.
Some FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH events have been occurring due to the spurious trip
of this monitor during the electric power up. In this case, the flight controls P-BIT does
not even commence.
This FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH occurrence is characterized by:
 It appears few seconds after the AC power is established.
 In the Flight Controls Synoptic page, at least one actuator is AMBER.
Recovery Procedure
For the two events described above, the FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH is removed shortly
after cycling the Flight Controls Mode (FCM) buttons (Elevators, Rudder and
Spoilers). An airplane Power Down and Power Up also overcomes this condition.
NOTE: Although the FCM buttons cycling can be more expeditious, it does not restart
the Flight Controls P-BIT. If it is necessary to run a new Flight Controls P-
BIT, the flight crew should perform a Power Down/Power Up.
Solution
For the Embraer 170, both misbehaviors will be corrected with:
 P-ACE PN 7028273-802 (SB 170-27-0029) and Primus EPIC Load 17.5.

B) FCM NOT BOOTING UP DURING POWER UP

Due to internal synchronization of the information processed by the FCM, it does not
successfully boot up during power up. The Flight Controls P-BIT might not occur due
to this failure.
This event is characterized by:

 It appears few seconds after AC power is established.
 At least one of the MAUs fault messages AVNX MAU 1 (2) (3) displays.
 The FLT CTRL FAULT EICAS message displays.
 The SPOILER FAULT and the AFCS FAULT EICAS messages may display.
This event can be overcome through an airplane Power Down and Power Up.
FCM Mod J available since Feb/2009 was tested and showed that no "FCM not booting
up" occurrence has been reported over 2000 power ups.
C) FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH CAUSED BY FLIGHT CONTROLS CHECK

DURING SINGLE ENGINE TAXI
If the Flight Controls check is performed during Single Engine Taxi operations and
more than one control surface (aileron, rudder or elevator) are checked simultaneously,
a spurious FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH EICAS message will be triggered.
To avoid spurious FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH message display, check one surface at a
time.


OPERATIONS MANUAL
Hydraulic System Related Spurious Message PART B
OB.05 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM RELATED SPURIOUS MESSAGE

To provide guidance to the Operator regarding Hydraulic System spurious message
displayed in flight.

Embraer has received reports of HYD ELEC PUMP FAIL advisory messages being
spuriously displayed in flight.
It was identified that the HYD 1 ELEC PUMP FAIL and HYD 2 ELEC PUMP FAIL
advisory messages are being spuriously displayed when the following conditions are
met:
 The Slat/Flap lever is at position 0;
 One of the following messages is displayed:
- FLAP FAIL
- FLAP LO RATE
- SLAT FAIL
- SLAT LO RATE
- SLAT-FLAP LEVER DISAG

If the HYD 1 ELEC PUMP FAIL and HYD 2 ELEC PUMP FAIL advisory messages
are simultaneously displayed after one of the Flight Controls related messages
described in the Background Information, accomplish the following procedure to
confirm that they are spurious:
 Electric Hydraulic Pump 1 Selector Knob ............................................................. ON
 Electric Hydraulic Pump 2 Selector Knob ............................................................. ON
 If the HYD 1 ELEC PUMP FAIL and HYD 2 ELEC PUMP FAIL advisory
messages are still displayed, they are not spurious.
Accomplish the associated QRH abnormal procedure.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
Hydraulic System Related Spurious Message PART B
 If the HYD 1 ELEC PUMP FAIL and HYD 2 ELEC PUMP FAIL advisory
messages extinguish, the messages are to be considered spurious.
Then accomplish:
- Electric Hydraulic Pump 1 Selector Knob .................................................... AUTO
- Electric Hydraulic Pump 2 Selector Knob .................................................... AUTO
NOTE: At any moment, if the Slat/Flap lever is moved out of position 0, the HYD 1
ELEC PUMP FAIL and HYD 2 ELEC PUMP FAIL advisory messages will
extinguish if they are spurious.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
APU Bleed Valve closing due to High EGT during Bleed transition PART B
OB.06 APU BLEED VALVE CLOSING DUE TO HIGH EGT DURING

BLEED TRANSITION
To inform operators about a scenario where bleed transitions from APU to engine or
during engine start may cause APU High EGT and consequently APU bleed closing.

EMBRAER has received reports from the field, mainly from the EMBRAER 190/195
fleet, with occurrences of momentary APU bleed valve closing. These events were
observed in two scenarios on the ground:
 During engine start;
 During bleed transition from engines to APU.
The above scenarios can shortly increase APU bleed extraction that may result in high
APU EGT, causing the APU FADEC to command the APU bleed valve to close.
Analysis shows the high APU EGT condition is caused by bleed transients and
aggravated by anti-surge valve failure.
Such occurrence is more common on hot weather and/or at high altitudes that demand
more APU bleed airflow.
This Operational Bulletin brings recommendations in order to avoid such occurrence.

During bleed transitions from APU to engine or during engine start on the ground, APU
bleed valve may be automatically closed for 10 seconds due to high APU EGT (above
690°C).
The APU FADEC will automatically command the APU bleed valve closing for 10
seconds in order to reduce the APU EGT. After these 10 seconds, the APU bleed valve
is reopened and resumes normal operation.
It was also observed that during those 10 seconds on engine start sequence, before fuel
flow is initiated, there may be stabilization or even decreasing of N2 from engine being
started. A complete report to maintenance about the parameter behavior that caused the
engine start abortion due to a hung start would help maintenance troubleshoot and
consequent fix.
Although the crossbleed engine start logic already commands the packs to close, due to
packs valves reaction time being slower than engine starting command, APU may be
OPERATIONS MANUAL
APU Bleed Valve closing due to High EGT during Bleed transition PART B
overloaded for a few seconds during engine start. If the packs are already closed by the
time the APU bleed is used to start the engines, the APU load will be reduced, avoiding
high APU EGT.
To avoid transient APU HIGH EGT CMC fault message and temporary APU bleed
valve closing, the following operational procedure should be accomplished:
Before Engine Start, if APU bleed will be used to start the engine:
PACKS......................................................................................................... ...............ON
APU EGT......................................................................................................... ....CHECK
APU generator and APU bleed must be on.
If APU EGT is higher than 550°C:

PACKS ......................................................................................................PUSHED OUT
After Engine Start:

PACKS ............................................................................................ .......AS REQUIRED
EMBRAER is studying a fix to this behavior.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
Weather Radar transmitting on Ground PART B
OB.07 WEATHER RADAR TRANSMITTING ON GROUND

To inform operators about the possibility of having the Weather Radar inadvertently
transmitting on ground.

During ground operations some operators reported the weather radar transmitting
inadvertently while either WX or STANDBY mode is selected on the radar virtual
controller panel.
This situation can be identified by checking the indications, as follows:

 Green WX indication on the MFD, if “weather” is selected to be displayed on
MFD; or
 Amber WX/TX indication flashing on PFD in inverse video, if “weather” is not
selected to be displayed neither on MFD nor on PFD; or
 Green WX indication on PFD, if “weather” is selected to be displayed on PFD.
As per OM system description, when the airplane is on the ground, WX Forced

Standby (FSBY) mode is activated, so the transmitter and antenna scan are both
inhibited, the display memory is erased, and the FSBY indication is displayed.
The FSBY mode may be overridden by selecting FSBY OVRD or by selecting the
Antenna Stabilization checkbox (STAB OFF) 4 times in less than 3 seconds on the
MFD Weather Radar Virtual Controller. Both procedures enable the WX transmission
on ground.
During Weather Radar Warm Up, the previously mentioned overriding procedures may
be inadvertently commanded by the weather radar controller, thus enabling weather
transmission on ground.

If the airplane is on ground and, after Weather Radar Warm Up period, an inadvertent
weather radar transmission is observed, the weather radar shall be momentarily selected
to STAND BY mode via the radar virtual controller panel and then re-selected to WX
mode, then verify if the FSBY mode is active on the radar virtual controller panel.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
Weather Radar transmitting on Ground PART B

OPERATIONS MANUAL
Anticipated Top of Descent PART B
OB.08 ANTICIPATED TOP OF DESCENT WHEN TWO AT ALTITUDE

CONSTRAINTS ARE AT THE SAME ALTITUDE/FLIGHT LEVEL
To inform the operators about Primus EPIC FMS anomaly while using VPATH during
descent flight phase in specific scenarios.

An operator recently reported an anomaly in which the airplane initiated the descent
before the expected point.
After further investigation, the anomaly was found to occur under a specific flight
scenario, where the FMS may incorrectly place the Top of Descent (TOD) and descend
prematurely. This occurs when the flight plan in descent/approach flight phases
include:
 Two or more AT altitude constraints at the same altitude/flight level;
 A following waypoint at a lower altitude; and
 A very specific geometry between all these points.

Primus EPIC FMS software has an anomaly that may cause VPATH to ignore an
altitude constraint and descend prematurely. The top of descent (TOD) computation
from the FMS may cause an early descent prior to the second AT constraint only if all
the following circumstances are met:
 The airplane is in descent or approach phase.
 Two or more equal AT constraints followed by a lower AT altitude constraint are in
the flight plan (see Figure below).
 The airplane must be in VALT level flight at the same altitude as the first AT
constraint.
 The altitude pre-selector value must be below the equal AT constraint altitudes.
Even if all the conditions are met the issue may not occur because it also depends on
certain geometry between the waypoints.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
FMS DATABASE AT CONSTRAINTS WAYPOINTS
The following picture shows a flight scenario of two equal AT constraints in the flight
plan with a third AT constraint and the flight scenario with the VNAV profile that is
encountered when the conditions defined above are present.
FLIGHT SCENARIO EXAMPLE IN WHICH TOD IS ANTECIPATED
To reduce exposure to the problem scenario, pilots should use caution when entering or
checking equal AT constraints to an existing descent flight plan waypoints or by
entering a pilot defined waypoint that meets the flight scenario.
If two or more equal AT constraints are in the descent portion of the flight plan the
pilot should follow one of Embraer recommendations, as enumerated below:
1) Prior to reaching the first AT constraint of this specific scenario, disengage VNAV
and use other vertical mode, as appropriate.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
2) If VNAV is the best choice for the crew, considering the route, training and crew
workload, then adjust the altitude preselector to the procedure altitude when facing this
scenario.
NOTE: This must be done until assurance of clearance or procedure altitude

constraint is complied with.
For other alternative workaround procedures which involve database adjustments, refer
to Honeywell Service Information Letter SIL D201010000078.

OPERATIONS MANUAL

OPERATIONS MANUAL
FMS Anomaly In Terminal Area Procedures PART B
OB.09 FMS ANOMALY IN TERMINAL AREA PROCEDURES USING

HEADING LEGS DISPLAYED AS FLY XXX OR AS ASSIGNED
To inform the operators about FMS guiding the airplane to turn in the opposite
direction from the expected in certain terminal area procedures.

Honeywell recently discovered a software anomaly in which the FMS may command a
turn inconsistent with a published terminal area procedure. The problem is more
prevalent with missed approach procedures, but also exists with a limited number of
SIDs and STARs.
For heading legs with a large course change, the navigation database specifies the
prescribed turn direction. The FMS displays these legs as FLY XXX OR AS
ASSIGNED on the CDU, but will make the shortest turn to achieve the heading
regardless of specified turn direction. Hence, heading leg course changes around 180°
may result in a turn in the wrong direction. On heading legs with a specified course
change of more than 180° the FMS will consistently turn the wrong way.
Honeywell issued a Service Information Letter SIL D201012000014R003 to inform
operators about such FMS anomaly.
After further investigation, the anomaly was found to occur under a specific flight
scenario:
 Procedure containing a heading leg displayed as FLY XXX OR AS ASSIGNED;
and
 Course change difference between current and desired charted heading is equal to
or greater than 180°; and
 LNAV is engaged and coupled to the autopilot.
The following picture shows an example of a flight scenario in which the airplane can
assume a heading less than 142° (141° or less), so that the airplane will turn left due to
a lesser course change to the desired course. For example, if the A/C assumes a heading
of 141°, than the airplane has a course change of 179° turning to the left, which is less
than 181° if turning to the right.

OPERATIONS MANUAL
FMS DATABASE AT CONSTRAINTS WAYPOINTS
To prevent the problem from occurring, the procedures ending with heading legs (FLY
XXX OR AS ASSIGNED) that can cause an incorrect turn will have the heading leg
removed from the procedure.
Approximately 600 procedures have been modified in the navigation database
beginning in 2011, Cycle 02. A list of modified procedures can be obtained at
http://www.honeywellaes.com or http://www.epicinds.com. A future Primus EPIC
Load will address the miscalculation logic for those procedures.
When a heading leg is removed from a procedure, FLY XXX OR AS ASSIGNED will
not be displayed and LNAV will disengage prior to turning.

OPERATIONS MANUAL

The airplane will turn in the wrong direction when all conditions below exist:
 Procedure containing a heading leg displayed as FLY XXX OR AS ASSIGNED;
and
 Course change difference between current and desired charted heading is equal to
or greater than 180°; and
 LNAV is engaged and coupled to the autopilot.
If all the conditions above are met, missed approach must be flown manually or using
another flight guidance mode.
Also, if LNAV is disengaged due to a missing heading leg in the procedure, missed
approach must be flown manually.

OPERATIONS MANUAL

OPERATIONS MANUAL
Primus EPIC FMS sw – ARC Melding Issue PART B
OB.10 PRIMUS EPIC FMS SOFTWARE - ARC MELDING ISSUE

To inform operators about issue with incorrect lateral guidance and map display when
transitioning into arc legs.

During Honeywell internal testing of PRIMUS EPIC FMS software, it was identified a
software anomaly in which the FMS may incorrectly fly published terminal area
procedure.
The anomaly may occur in the following conditions:

 Procedures containing right turn arc legs;
 Procedures containing common waypoints between departure, arrival, and/or
approach segments.
The anomaly leads to an incorrect lateral guidance and map display when transitioning
into arc legs.
The melding logic for procedures with arc legs was identified as the root cause for this
behavior. The default value of software is a turn to the left side. The melding logic
resets the pre-defined turn direction of procedure and sets the turn to the left side. So,
only procedures with arc termination to the right side are affected.

The situation occurs when an arc leg terminates a procedure and the following
procedure begins with this arc leg termination. The last waypoint of procedure with arc
leg termination and the first waypoint of next procedure must have the same
denomination. The turn direction associated with the arc is lost when the arc segment is
melt with the next procedure.
Example: FMS routinely ‘connect’ NavDB procedures/legs together.

The end of one procedure is often the start of the next.
 STAR (A-B-C)
 Approach (C-D-E)
 FMS flight plan (A-B-C-D-E)
When the FMS software melds the termination of the STAR (A-B-C) to the waypoint
which defines the start of the Approach (C-D-E), the melding of the two procedures
inappropriately removes the turn direction and sets the default value (left side).

OPERATIONS MANUAL
Primus EPIC FMS sw – ARC Melding Issue PART B
ARC MELDING ANOMALY
Honeywell removed the procedures from the navigation database that can cause
incorrect guidance. Approximately 600 approach transitions and 400 SIDs and STARS
that are known to exhibit the anomaly have been removed from the navigation
database.
The flight crew should follow the procedures below:

 Verify availability of procedures in the database when preflight planning;
 Compare and monitor the charted procedure with the active flight plan.
The list of procedures removed from database can be obtained from:

http://www.honeywellaes.com
http://www.epicinds.com

OPERATIONS MANUAL
FMS Altitude Capability PART B
OB.13 FMS ALTITUDE CAPABILITY

To inform the operators about LOAD 23 performance database per which the FMS
calculated Ceiling Altitude is lower than the actual airplane Ceiling Altitude.

LOAD 23 introduces a new FMS Performance Database (Aircraft Database) based on
Embraer tabular data, thus better reflecting the OM performance numbers.
Based on this data, the FMS computes the Optimum and Maximum Cruise Altitudes for
Long Range Cruise (LRC), Maximum Endurance (MAX END) and Manual IAS/Mach
inputs.
However, erroneous altitude capability data were introduced in the Performance
Database and consequently the FMS may calculate lower values of Ceiling Altitudes,
when compared to the data presented in the OM tables.
A) INVESTIGATION FINDINGS
 FMS does not accept manual cruise altitude entry, inserted either on CRUISE 1/1,
PERF INIT 3/3 or PERF DATA 1/3 pages, above the calculated Ceiling Altitude;
 This behavior does not prevent the airplane from climbing to an altitude above the
FMS calculated Ceiling Altitude. However, if flying above the FMS Ceiling
Altitude, the FMS performance calculation (fuel and time predictions) are
performed using Ceiling Altitude given by the FMS, and the Vertical Situation
Display (VSD) will display the track altitude based on FMS cruise altitude;
 VNAV operation is not affected;
 Cabin Pressure Control System (CPCS) operation is not affected;
 The higher the airplane weight, air temperature and/or Mach number, the higher the
difference/discrepancy in the Ceiling Altitude computed by the FMS.
This is not a LOAD 23 behavior. It is a Performance Database issue.
OB.13.02 OPERATING INFORMATION:

This behavior does not prevent the airplane from climbing above FMS calculated
Ceiling Altitude.
A) CLIMBING THROUGH FMS CALCULATED CEILING ALTITUDE

Set Altitude Selector (ALT SEL) to desired altitude;
 Use the desired FD vertical mode to climb towards the selected altitude;
 VNAV vertical mode and non-VNAV modes are going to level the airplane at the
ALT SEL altitude;

OPERATIONS MANUAL
FMS Altitude Capability PART B
 FMS vertical calculations are not affected and the TOD is correctly computed for
the current altitude;
 VSD presentation must be disregarded above FMS calculated Ceiling Altitude.
B) TIME AND FUEL CALCULATIONS

 If the airplane is cruising above FMS calculated Ceiling Altitude all FMS
calculations are for FMS calculated Ceiling Altitude;
 If the airplane is cruising below FMS calculated Ceiling Altitude all FMS
calculations are for the cruise altitude.

OB AOM B (Operational Bulletin)

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OB AOM B (Operational Bulletin)

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OPERATIONAL BULLETIN

OB.00 TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................ OB-00 page 01

OB.01 Settlement of Required Documentation ................................... OB-01 page 01

OB.02 AP Quick Disconnect Button Malfunctions ............................ OB-02 page 01

OB.04 Procedures To Mitigate FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH EICAS

OB.05 Hydraulic System related Spurious Message .......................... OB-05 page 01

OB.07 Weather Radar Transmitting on Ground .................................. OB-07 page 01

OB.08 Anticipated Top of Descent when two at Altitude Constraint

OB.09 FMS Anomaly in Terminal Area Procedures Using Heading

OB.10 Primus EPIC Software – ARC Melding Issue.......................... OB-10 page 01

OB.11 Reduction of Navigation Database Procedures Content Due

OB.12 FMS Misbehavior Upon Runway Change When No Arrival

OB.13 FMS Altitude Capability........................................................... OB-13 page 01

ORIGINAL OB-00 page 01

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ORIGINAL OB-00 page 02

OB.01 SETTLEMENT OF REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION

 OPEN SPACE – CM1

 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION NOTE:

 S.B.A.L. POUCH (N/A)

REVISION 02 OB-01 page 02

OB.02 AP QUICK DISCONNECT BUTTON MALFUNCTIONS

OB.02.01 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

OB.02.02 OPERATING INFORMATION

 AUTOPILOT QUICK DISCONNECT BUTTON (AP QD button) located on the

During airplane normal operation, disconnection of the autopilot by means of AP QD

ORIGINAL OB-02 page 01

AP QUICK DISCONNECT button jamming

ORIGINAL OB-02 page 02

NON ANNUNCIATED LOSS OF ALL TRIMS AND

PITCH TRIM SYSTEM 1 CUTOUT BUTTON ..... PUSH IN ........ PNF

Pitch Trim normal?

PITCH TRIM SYSTEM 1 CUTOUT BUTTON . PUSH OUT ........ PNF

Relevant Inoperative Items:

The condition above indicates an AP QD button jamming in the second press.

ORIGINAL OB-02 page 03

"AUTOPILOT" AURAL CAN NOT BE CANCELED

AUTOPILOT ....................................................... ENGAGE ........... PF

NOTE: The aural warning can only be canceled by powering

Relevant Inoperative Items:

PITCH TRIM SYSTEM 1 CUTOUT BUTTON ..... PUSH IN ........ PNF

Pitch Trim normal?

PITCH TRIM SYSTEM 1 CUTOUT BUTTON . PUSH OUT ........ PNF

ORIGINAL OB-02 page 04

OB.03 BLEED FAIL DUE TO REF ECS OFF

OB.03.01 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

OB.03.02 OPERATING INFORMATION

ORIGINAL OB-03 page 01

OB.03.03 DISPATCHING INFORMATION

ORIGINAL OB-03 page 02

OB.04 PROCEDURES TO MITIGATE FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH EICAS

OB.04.01 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

OB.04.02 OPERATING INFORMATION

A) FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH RECOVERABLE BY FLIGHT CONTROLS

ORIGINAL OB-04 page 01

CAN BUS Validity Monitor Malfunction

ORIGINAL OB-04 page 02

B) FCM NOT BOOTING UP DURING POWER UP

This event is characterized by:

C) FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH CAUSED BY FLIGHT CONTROLS CHECK

ORIGINAL OB-04 page 03

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ORIGINAL OB-04 page 04

OB.05 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM RELATED SPURIOUS MESSAGE