BRENTANO AND HUSSERL ON SELP-AWARENESS Since Brentano in Payehotogle woe empirischen Stank reintroduced the retin of itetonaity. thas often Ben regan {5a decsve or even defining feature of consciousness. Bu this Focus upon subjeciviy’s ability to be dieced towards and co. upied with objets diferent from ise, should not obscre the fact ha it has another imporar, but apparenyantheial fear ture, namely selfawarenes, Obviously T ean be swe of rel to ses, rsh oe, or the 4, Symphony of Brahns, bt fea also be wie that these ae seen, smelt and ear, tht eiferet percep ‘ion are aking place, and furthermore tht 7am the one expe «ing them, jst as may Be avare tha am Sa, cris re. ‘What is selP-wvareness exactly? To start with, and in conti ‘0 whats frequently taken tobe the ease not any in peycholo sical Iiteature, but aso in much contemporary analyse pile Sophy of mind, it shold be emphasized tat snot only li ite to speak of selF-awarenes when I elie tht # am perce ing a candle, but also when I arn aware of my fling of sort, ‘or my burning pin, oF my perception of «etn tha is when fever Tam sequined with an experience ins fistpersonal mo eof givenness. cis posible to speak of elawareness the mo ‘ment Iam no longer simply conscious ofa foreign objet, but of ‘my experience of he object aswell, for in thi case my subject vty reveals iselfio me! “To say hat eonscinoness is (orean become) aware of itself however notin itself an import philosophical insight itis re thee to give name to a nuaber of perplexing problems. Just to |. Onis coun, a exper whe wee sonal ea eprcoc mes colo than aes ensns un ZAHAVE ‘mention one coming immediately to ind if bth intentionality And self-awareness are ese Fates of consciousness, what fate their elation? Ts seltawareness in vealtya special higher ‘ord ntentional ac, a when I eflect upon my at of perception, fetending it and aking i 35 my intentional object oF sic athe & ‘ompletely diferent mode of consciousness? Inthe later eases ‘ne then mone Fundamental than the other? Can the to exis in “epartion, ie, are there intetional 3c which ae unconscious ‘or non-intentonal experiences which are solhaware? Are they interdependent or perhaps rather, 95 has also heen suggested, m= tually incompatible? Thus, thas occasionally been claimed tat consciousness is tly dined by intentionality, that is by is selftraneending relerence (0 and occupation with something “ferent from tse, then i cannot aswell be pervaded ya fine ‘antl self presence and vie veesa. ln Rice's formulation: (nse présente oon laéfexion comme un conversion de comcience gu abd hors des, ene ese en sok septs som ifentoncemfage On est aor contain de tent In comsiene ore vers Ue comme icenscien {oie concen desi core eaesive def consciene intentionelie de ate queso. RE-enon sea usp. tho, news do pro ‘Asa frst sep towards an understanding of elf swareness. it sight be useful to point 19 the const between intentional ‘which is characterized by a difeeace between the subject a the objeet of experience, and elfacareness which implies some 0, p38. Ax Many sss. paseo ed resins wile Indian ong tc eat dees he compat Rwecn inenonsty nl seswames. Th, Sua he ha cm ‘Somes big esly econ nd suff was eae o ino neal ro sore ior oe wees the Narita th th eva eppsie sige fea eee Ute {tani soning irene oe tal. coos ond bat sel tes Bescaped wit Me 972 p37, 1ST BRENTANO AND MUSSERL ON SELF-AWARENESS 129 form of identity. Any convincing teocy of selEawareness has to be able to explain this distinction, and the most natural expans> tion seems ob that consciousness el aware, insofar a i has itself rather than anything ese as obec. In An Essay Con ering Human Understanding Locke ved the term flection to Clesignate our minds ability to tum is view inva upon isl ‘making its on operations the obec of ts encempation Ths, the can deserie a theory stating bat selFawareness i the result of consciousness dieeting is “gaze at self, taking sel a is fbjet and ths Becomiag aware of ise as a reflection teary of elfawareness “Although it might st Fist sight ser obvious tat self-aware ness i exactly characterized y the subject having itself, ater than anything else ais objec, this approach ulimately gener tes so severe dificties, however, that it must be abandoned, Tn recent yeas one ofthe most thorough demonstrations of his fat ‘an be fou in the wings of Henrich, Frank, Cramer ad Pots Till not summarize all of thie argument, but lt me brey sell atte most imporant one “The refecion model of selh-awarenss operates with deal ‘of moments, No mater whether i comes about by one staking voter act as is objet, of oe at aking ise sits object, we 3. Loca 1925p. 1071. {Li oc eet oi comenpoary deeds of some vein of eis thy, ta Mais hoy of Mid Anson gue a {Batts enog teen yrepin a staves. A preton Ine vet hoe neal ajc sit in he rye Woe. troponin whore mental fet her ena aenngs exon he sme maid sn etoing te bt of ‘pce ft men sean be comes us a5 eee ay Eames or pgs eon‘ we doo perce te a Ima mots of whieh we ar coin, maya cose whch ‘Sruenteurenty beet sts ne ot sgh tee se 9 eon an ft ch peeled ne st asp between he fspcion an nat ich ripe. A esl Sec te 2a let ay mean man ect isl up. But fc, Benbo ‘ban ZaHAVL re dealing wih a kind of self-tvision, and have to distinguish the eeting rom the rected. OF course, thes of reflection {is then 1 overcome or negate ths ference and to posit both ‘momen 3s ental cherise we would not havea case of selE awareness. This statgy is however colored wih fundarontl problems. Why should the fact of standing ina cern relation to ‘2n unconscious higher-order ct confer cansciousnes (othe fis ‘otder experience? How can an awareness of somthing deren enerae se awareness (or vie versa how can the act of pereep- tion become seaware by being the object of a ferent ct) and how can the idenity of the tw relat be certified without re- supposing that which it is meant to explain: namely slfaware- ness. The rellection theory elim that selF-awarenes isthe r= ult ofa reflection tha that an ae of pereption ia doe to become selfaware (and not merely remain unconscious), must twits objectivaion by a subsequent act of reflection. In oder to speak of selfawarenes it is however nt sificient hatte act Jin question is eflexivelythematized and made ito an object. I ‘ust be grasped as being identical with the thematizing ae, fn fonder have shemarie selfawareness iti not enough hat Tam de faci thinking of myself Tso need to know or realize thai Is myself tat Cam aware of. In oder to be a ease of sel aware: resi snot slicient that As eonscous of BA must be eo ‘sis of B as being identical with A. In ater Woeds: To count sc caw of seleawareness the act of perception must be arasped {boing ental withthe at of reflection (ad since & numer fl erty is excded in advance, the identity in guesion ms. be that of belonging to the same sbjecor boing part ofthe sme stream of consciousness). This poses a dic. however. foe how ean the ac of reflection (which ck self-awarenos) bein 2 stn my Isa ee jet of fart spine ates ao Sn Aton 19, yp 325525). Prue cans tech Da scene ment ctv Gr nice rr coast ai) |sthe es ofa ghee ral orig: LYCAN SUP 189 357 BRENTANO AND HIUSSERL ON SELFAWARENESS 191 positon to realize thatthe et of perepton Belongs to the same ‘Subjectivity as isl? 13 to encoun someting as ise, Hi is to recognize or identify something a8 Hel, needs a prior cqusintance with isl. SelF-awareness cannot be the result of the encounter between {wo upeoascious acts. Consequently, the Gt of reflection must either swat Fuster act of election in fonder to become sell-sie, which exe We are confronted ‘sith «vious ininite regress, or it must be admit that ts self already in astae of ele awareness prior reflection, td ‘hat would ofcourse involve ws ina circular explanation, presu- posing thit which was meant to be explained, and implicitly ‘ejecting the tess ofthe reflection model of sel-awareness: ha allseltwareness is brought about by reection In the light ofthis erie the atterpt to conceive of self: awareness primarily through the model of reflection must be sanded, Weare consequently faced with the task of outining Some viable allemative. I the fflection-theowetial paradigms Uscless eather posites are there? ‘Let me tom to Brentano, and to his most famous pupil Husst, since both of thom, although being manly kaown for thei thoores of intentionality, also mae decisive conbatons to the claiiation ofthe ntreof self-awareness” 1. Brentano and the psychical phenomena {In connection with his demarcation between psychology and trl sienee in Prycholople vr empirschen Stondpunkt Bren- ano intradued a distinction between wo diferent types of 6 Sas 19915 p48, 08. mane is urbe es ote le te seam th pe. Wha ‘Sei t Hoen's nquited ramsey the ast ee lays ‘sete oa stn page unk be ier fe se [rcs tewne, Pes Rose Bet for erm ogi Dia ZAHA phenomena. As he wies,pychotogy’ isthe science ofthe py ‘hia! phenomena, whereas natal science isthe science ofthe physical phenomena. ‘When speaking ofthe psychical phenomena, Brentano is re- fering tothe peychical aes, that fo experiences such a pee captions, judgemens, ecllectios, expectation, wishes, belies ‘te. The physical phenomena, onthe contrary. are the immediate objets oF these ets, sa, diferent colors, igues, sounds and smells ts in his sterpt wo provide clearcut esti for whether something isa psychical phenomenon or not thar Brentano gels fn tthe topics of ist intentional and then selfawareness. AS forte fist, Brentano's most famous and most requeily quoted passage uns as follows Jadespsychiase Plnomen ist durch da charters, was ‘ie Schone des Milter de ntenoaale (auch wohl etal) lessens cies Gegenstales genaoton, ued ‘es wi, owl mick gan weedeat AUsdrken, {ie Bevchang aut einen Taba de Richtung auf ein Otek (wort hier niet ee Realist 2 version it) der ie ‘mmsnent Gegersndcheitrenen widen edes emt ‘tuna Objekt isch, oben jes ager Weise. ner Vortllung bt etvas sorgenlt i dem Urtee it ‘fas aerkant eer verworfen, der Lise ein dem ase uta in dem Begteen beget us." ‘Wheres all psychic phenomena are in possession oF inten. inaity this is not tue of any physical phenome, and Brent bo can cansyuenty define the psychical phenomena 3 the phe rnomeson which comin intentional object "As should be obviows, Brentano's description and choice of Samra 1, 18, 16.27. 19 137-10 Becta IRD pp 1-12 1. Brentano 187, pp. 125,128 BRENTANO AND HUSSERL ON SELF-AWARENESS 139 words sno only somewhat puting is also rather unfortunate, [As Chisholm has lle argued, it conan a tension between an ‘niologiel an psychological thesis. On the one hand, Bren tao apparently adopt a scholastic erminalogy and speaks ofthe ‘object's intentional iesstence in consciousness. The object of the ineion is consined immanent in the psychical at, and the existential made of his objec is therefore called ilemona {Op te ether hand, Brentano also claims that the psychical phe nomenon is chartered by i lectedness aor reference 10 an ‘bie Thus we ca alternately speak ofthe intentional (inex. Fstence ofthe objet, and of the incntonal dretedness of the ‘act. Althogh thse two features are by no means ideal they fre nevertheless brought together in Brentano's (arly theory of intenonality, insofar as be claims that coasciousness is inten- tionally directed tan intentionally (nexising object 1 Baber Tp. 7 1H. Afters sos inmanene esi in 1905 = ua, 31 sea sere piteaton a Psscheog em price Sand), BENNO ‘sc ely Utne fn etl sconce th ‘Sper neyo (esse ad a Teter Mary fom Api 7. TOUS be chen st he as aver dened sah i, Bu tS thay hte cmeeymsneypeed hy his ppl ding Tw Cvs ond ass Cer 1962, pe 860 Whee eto’ et ‘iiss pt a op estonia bows ta Nseaty eon of tenoniy deve fave. This cai er (ovo ise as ler lok at Bean's eto of he ph Larplcocn,Bcnns dicen Hetero te clases of p= ines ase won val orbs wooo pearance BEE ‘ew 674. 19) is i wrk sn worl ly se cons hcl and pyc perms, wes the eal extranet) we ‘fouphenongal fe gto is sepia veal ~ hich sev tage mt be chceried asm of keane a ‘kaon enon scp te dsison etree the penoenca i the oetely ern utente suns dhe el mode of acne snd tin dt te pgs ponent re mere eons they ix oe crane Ulin ny ses of sometigre)Brentano now coninues his analysis by turning to selaware- ‘ess, 0 as be calls it ime conscouines inneres Hew. ‘As we have just seen, Brentano lakes consciousness fo be charac terized by a relerence to an objet, namely to the object tht its sons of Buta he then pins out, te tem conscious, can ‘be used ina twofold sense On the one hand, we say of an act tht is conscious, insofar asi is aware af an object. On the other hand, we say of an object thar it conscious, insofar atone is aware of it All psychical acs are characterized by their being conscious of something. The question i whether they ae also ‘conseous inthe second sense, thats, wheter one is also aware ‘of them, or whether one must day tis and consequently admit the existence of unconscious psychical ats°. Benin en cosine pce hen ero) ars ied aly ne 1s pf 28, chs Brenan en ht he et xp ye el wen ttc rw ea ot tt a fe esd waa” nen er forma! een oe copay Er hg one ane Sinai Bones et leh wena 8p. 1) “De on ey tv ie chen Poorer Fae, Too nd et Toop, ‘cs ah an sc tan eh dren Gn se ett enchciang Loom koe Vso. Wi emer pen dlc she Willen sn i tome pv {he Bonmmangen ton ea sagen beret Wad Schand ebter lg unibar ns Teg 96 Ao thes ny of men ns dhe ete gr of Urea s(n ar) ie tne fom ah exp Content wit aii ss ee oa ‘hry eit of ftw shy ng AG eee mote 1925" rt ah es om ols Inet wicca Ban ste! Dae mae envi dr Ths Han etna 1, 8) Fry Sid psmaton of eects Has a of Bsn on of ‘ect feces Sal Tho A don ie ‘i ez tan 8 TS Brom ps BRENTANO AND HLSSERL ON SELF-AWARENESS 135 Brentano examines four diferent reasons for accepting the existence ofa unconscious consciousness (that isa oases ess whichis nentonlly directed towards an objet, but which lacks ze-awarenes), ut is only the ast one which is of ee ‘ance in his comext has been ciaimed that all psychical acts ‘were conscins, that, themselves something one were avare of, ‘one would be faced witha vicious infinite regres. In oder 10 {void this, one a o deny the premise and consequently accept Unconscious pyehicl acs, What sth argument? Let ws take a ‘Simple act a example, for instance de perception [Vorsellag] tf a one Ino psyched phenomenon were pss without being ‘eet conscious, that i, the object of 2 higher-order conscious: fs, then one would have two eiferen pecepions When per ving a tone’ () the persion ofa tone, ae (2) the perception of the peeeiion of the tone. However, the ripliaion would not ‘op ere since the perception f th perception of the tone would ko hve to be consious, Thus, we would also have (3) he pe ‘eption ofthe perception ofthe perception of the tne, and so forth ad iintun, Furthermore, as Brentano points out, this ‘would ot be the only problem. Ihe perception ofthe tone were tealy the objec fa bigherorder perception. ic would imply that the tne would be perceived ce, Ad inthe perception of the peteption of he perception of the tone, we would ave de tone { ofpect three, whereas the original perception would be per ‘sive twice, and o fo. Thus, the repress would be ofan ex: ‘ezedinglysiious kind, implying in addition to the simple init iteration @ smakanoous complication of is single members Since this consequence is absui, hat is, since it absurd that fever as simple an act as the peeception af atone should involve fn infinite complex series of psyches ats, one has o else the egies by accepting the existence of unconscious psychical ats, ie one must accep the existence of intemtona acts which lack selfawareness aan 874.91 17 Brcko 174. (7. Tis sp of exsning ca be Cod isbe in ZaHiavt Brentano, however, will not accep this conclusion, since it would imply that he selEawareness Which we do after all have ‘originates out of the unconscious, and he consequently fas to propose an alemaive model of seiéawareess, which avoids the egress, and which furthermore avoids being incompatible with the basi facts. As Brentano points out, we eed a theory of sl awareness which does noc fender is certainty and immediate ‘evidence imposible, and his i exactly what happens if we fake self-awareness to bean isentional relation between wo diferent mentonal ac; that is his approach makes it imposible to account for theif of seleawarenes IK we examine the phenomena once more, nobody will deny that we are ceeasonlly aware of psychical act while it hap ens, While Hearing a tne, we can be aware of hearing i. What ‘sth sucture of our consciousness in his ase? We have a per ye wh es ows: Een hop he setting a bein many meal Sate or poets ot ied ae main sega of eno, o 3s cmtging separ sop ope, SMI wt am comes i proces finery fea a ‘ache nering a prchesn of My cometurct a pact ‘ot iring, ty irae perp, 2 gta conto am soe revises. The val exanon of my lence mig ty case ths ban egal wal cre each angle 6 ees butte vera exeson of wt Im omnis of igh be tT a ecg sch a such om wa" Bu ist ed seem Ine seme nak wht, aczorsing othe doin, am ak cn Sci fig esc of ners tn psy le vapor ei sch ih fr 0 Ant hen tie woul! be sopping the would hve te ab ininie tuner ot onion sis of ems htelng sy ea slat process wtasocer, fs concn freee wl bane {o beamed at soe cere ems pees emt toss ‘haps me en be conics nay meee ch eee Spd ou seine of was paces and then cn Sct” eal no loge be ee a pi te dfn "ee (Rv 1508, pst) 18. BRON 87.198, BRENTANO AND HUSSERL ON SELF-AWARENESS 137 ception of atone, snd an awareness ofthe perception ad cone Sequently two objects: the tone and its perception, Contrary to ‘he account frst offered we do oe, however, have s¥9 psyehicl ‘es! As Brentano pints out, the pereption ofthe tne 3 = inscally and ivimately united withthe awareness of the per ception ofthe tone, hat hey oly constitute on single at only ‘one single psychieal phenomenon, Their apparent separation Is merely de toa concept diferntiaton: In damsetten pychischen Phinonen, in weleem dr Ton vorgeselt wd rfisten wir saglch das puyhisce Phir ‘omen ses upd zwar ach seiner doppler Eigetlch- ‘ei insofern eas tat den Tomi sh iy i infer es ‘lech sc eos als nhl gepenvig it. Wie kde den Ton das primiee st Hiren sels ds sehundie Objet des ivens earen. Deen zilch Ween sie ava Bede zl tu aber der Natu dee Sache nach st der Ton ds fee, Eine Vorseung des Tooes cine Voraing des Horns Fe von vorkarein wenisen, let aden, ene Vorstel- Ing des Horess che Vorseling des Tones dgegen in ‘flenbarer Widersprch, Dem Tone esha Hen ite ‘eaihsen Sine zygeman ued ade ex dss shit 5 sch Selb nent und a Zope mit ues Brentano consequently avoids the regress by claiming that very psythieal ats conscious, insofar a has tel as objet ‘Thus, even as simple an at as the hearing of atone hat double objet a primary and aSecondy. Te primary and thematic ob jets the tne, the secondary and unthemti abject is the beat= ing. tis imporat o notice, however, that the secondary abet 19. Benen 1874 pp. 179-180, 2. Tas count get ome ore erie he mont Br ‘nossa his sinlon Renee cert jc a eg {Oselrawtens lity caine Het ve ve» esd iene ‘hese ie "Und somite nach de nthe pyc Ace ‘race Ste von weer Gat wae Kan Ra eetoe Den ZAHAVE of the act although conscious is at themcally observed (eo fucker) To observe someting hema ist take is one's primary objet sr forthe ct Chothis wth iss rly impor sible, The tone which we eis bse, the hearing of te tne sine itis only by observing the toe, hat we ae stare ofthe ering ony by tending the pie ry cent tht we ae ear of the secondary objet. Ths, Bren- ‘ano gives priory to ntmionaity,deserbing it 3 a pecodion for self-awareness, rater than the ether way around. The outcome ofthis is tht Brentano actually denies the possibility and not ‘merely the primey) of areflecive elation between two simul neously existing 2s, operating instead with 1) the unthematc selfawarenes of select and, 2) with a thematic re Inospectiveselawareness, since we cin abserve & past at, nd take tas our primary abject (in tis ease the presenta f re leoepction would be or secondary objet)” ‘The only reruiing question which histo be answered is one which Brentano eases himself hear tone, tam cocanscios ‘of my hearing, but am Falko conscious ofthis peculiar esean ‘eiqusness? Brentano answers the question by saying that hit an Iysi as exactly show thatthe awareness of the Hering ofthe tone coincides with the awareness ofthis awareness, Tis, the awareness which accompanies the hearing ofthe tone is fer all ‘ue | Tiss yetaoter way (eat preimn werd ls Vows sies prints Obes, wie 28. der AR ia ‘else i Ton emptden wi as Hiren: eka abet ach ect ‘rere ae Vomiting sel lb a renin ars unde ‘Getta seins tt (Baran 174 9p 218219, heaps "ier heer moe evo BRENTANO AND HUSSERL ON SELFAWARENESS — 19 anawareness of rot ony the he pschical et inclaing sel) 1s thie account of seI-awarenessacsepable? Brentano is et. ‘ainly right in claiming that our intenonal act doe not need to ‘ovat secondary act of rellecion in oder to become sel aware ‘But although bis account of how this self-awareness 1 be ex plained avoid the problem confronting the version ofthe cel ‘ion theory which takes reflection to be 2 relation between two diferent ai, bis own proposal i, as Cramer ard Potast have ‘shown, faced with an equally dissuvous problem. An at which has tone ats primary objects tobe cases by having self as its secondary object. Bot ithe laters realy to esa in see aearenes, it has to comprise the entire at, and ont ony the pst ‘of t which is consious ote toe. hati, th secondary ject. ‘ofthe perception should not merely be the perception of the one, bt the perception whichis aware of bth the tone and of sl. [AST have just quote: ing ofthe tore, bu of he enite a demseltenpeycischen Phnom, fe welehem der Ton sore wid erasen wir zilch das psychic Phino- ten stb und war noch seine dopptn Egentumiihkc, Fnsfern esas Ih dea To fn sh hx, ond ntofen et gleich sich elit ls Int pepensti ‘But in this ese, self-areness interpreted as an awareness ‘of a secondary objet, which is alteady in posession of self awareness, and as an explaatin this ezclaiy will not 6°. itis acknowledged that prt of the reson forte lure of the flection theory ise to ts aller to understand ad ex- plain self-awareness through the subjec-objet model, one might Feasongbly ak if Brenano' fare was not de 1 ick of a cal? Despite his eriticism of the veection theory, be cosines to speak of consciovsness taking ise a sown object, and this 22a Ip. 18, 3.1 Pomsr Hi lep 15 sd Chai 1974p SL, Seo He ct 9709.26,M0 as ZAHAVE of setfawareness as a (econ) object swarenss. However 3s Femich points out wll no ove the problem simply to speak fof conselousess being per se fused with a reflective relation, ‘which doesnot need to be Brought forth by a separate at, for the telaity in th concept of such a self-elated knowledge is no femoved by srbuting to ite quality of immediacy ™. Thus, though Brentano's theory has occasionally been desrbed asa = fine theory of pre-refetive selF-avareness [think fe must be ‘ealized thi i fact merely 8 more unusual version of the reflection theory 1, Hasse and the problem of sl manifestation Let me change the foes and tr to Hose. Can he provide us “vith tue atemative tothe eleton theory A na utcommon nsw hasbeen no, Ths, Frank and Tugendhat all wecuse Hus ‘rl of defending refletion they of self-awareness ~ of taking, ‘bjstntentionality a he paradigm of every kn of ewareness. ‘As Frank ps it, Hoses ei investigation of consciousness is trsed on the tacit assmpton hat consciousness i conscious of somthing different rom itslf. Duc this fixation on iertona ly Huser never managed Wo escape the election theory of sl awareness He persistently operated wih a model of seltaware- ress based upon the subjct-objeet dichotomy, wit its enailed Uiference between the intending andthe itended, and therefore never discovered the existence oa pre-refecive self-awareness “Tis erm must he rejected, however. The notion of pre: reflective selP-avarenest 1s not ony to be fou im Huser, he So subjects toa bigly iluminatng analysis 1 ite cat one Tarly finds analyses dedicated expel and exclusively t0 the problem of setawarsness in Huser) But this is by 90 means 24. ene 190g. 297-288 25. eae 100.23, TUGENOHAT 19, 9p. 2-3. and pe cia Pen 1H, p30, 18H, pp 4S, 1 pp 5337. 19915, [BRENTANO AND HUSSERL ON SELF-AWARENESS 141 because the topic is absent, on the contrary, but rather beste Hussed's elections on this problem are usualy iterate int his analysis of numberof related ses, such asthe nature of inten inal, space, the body, temporality, tenon, inlrsubjetvity te This fat makes any allem ata more system sceount both challenging and rewarding. Rewarding because Huser» pheno ‘menological analysis of self-awareness is ofa for more dese, ‘concrete and substantial nature than the more fora conside-ns ions toe ound inthe writings of for instance Frank or Henrich Challenging because although there is profound and complex theory of sefawarencss to be found in Hiss writings, es ‘theory that wl frst have tobe pieced together, and simply oi Ine the relevant elements and svoid geting ns inthe adjacent ta XXIX (Doves: Kluwer AcalemiePubishrs, 193) essen, E: Efinng nd Ure Harbury: elx Mins, 198) JUsies, We The Prine of Psychology FHT (Landon: Macmillan ‘ado, 18918, eto end Meth der Posh (Btn: de Gaye, 175 Kuewoss dey Ontology (Odense: Osense Universietsora, 199). -uawost, Es “Kis Underspeie af Keen” in Risk Bey ring af Jets Ono, 8 D. 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