(Foreign Policy Security and Strategic Studies) David, Charles-Philippe - Lévesque, Jacques - The Future of NATO - Enlargement, Russia, and European Security-McGill-Queen's University Press (2014)

The Future of NATO
Enlargement, Russia, and European Security
In The Future of NATO the leading authorities in the field address the
complexity of present-day NATO, its inherent contradictions, and its
current direction. The authors reflect on the significance of these issues
for the Alliance's future prospects, for Russia, and for European secu-
rity generally.
Contributors look at the conceptual and theoretical approaches that
underlie the question of enlarging NATO'S membership and the conse-
quences of enlargement on international relations. They examine the
policies of some of NATO'S leading member states - including Canada,
which has recently begun a two-year term on the UN Security Council
- and deal with the issue of enlargement from the point of view of the
East European candidates, focusing on Russia and its opposition to
the current process.
CHARLES-PHILIPPE DAVID is professor of political science, Universite

du Quebec a Montreal, and holds the Teleglobe+Raoul Dandurand
Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies.
JACQUES LEVESQUE is professor of political science and director of

the Centre for Security and Foreign Policy Studies, Universite du
Quebec a Montreal.
FOREIGN POLICY, SECURITY, AND STRATEGIC STUDIES
Editors: Jacques Levesque and Charles-Philippe David
The Foreign Policy, Security, and Strategic Studies Series seeks to promote
analysis of the transformation and adaptation of foreign and security
policies in the post Cold War era. The series welcomes manuscripts offering
innovative interpretations or new theoretical approaches to these questions,
whether dealing with specific strategic or policy issues or with the evolving
concept of security itself.
The Future of NATO

Edited by Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque
The Future of NATO
Enlargement, Russia, and
European Security
Edited by
Charles-Philippe David
and Jacques Levesque
Published for
The Centre for Security and Foreign Policy Studies
and
The Teleglobe+Raoul-Dandurand Chair of
Strategic and Diplomatic Studies
by
McGill-Queen's University Press
Montreal &c Kingston • London • Ithaca
© The Centre for Security and Foreign Policy
Studies and The Teleglobe+Raoul-Dandurand
Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies 1999
Pages 27-3 5 © Jane Sharpe 1999
ISBN 0-7735-1850-9 (cloth)
ISBN 0-773 5-1872.-X (P a P er )
Legal deposit second quarter 1999

Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec
Printed in Canada on acid-free paper
McGill-Queen's University Press acknowledges

the financial support of the Government of
Canada through the Book Publishing Industry
Development Program for its activities. We also
acknowledge the support of the Canada Council
for the Arts for our publishing program.
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data
Main entry under title:

The future of NATO: enlargement, Russia and
European security
(Foreign policy, security and strategic studies)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-7735-1850-9 (bound) -
ISBN o-7735-i87z-x (pbk.)
i. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
2. National security — Europe. 3. Russia
(Federation) — Foreign relations - Europe.
4. Europe - Foreign relations - Russia
(Federation), i. David, Charles-Philippe.
n. Levesque, Jacques, 1940- . in. Teleglobe
Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and
Diplomatic Studies, iv. Universite du Quebec a
Montreal. Centre d'etudes des politiques
etrangeres et de securite. v. Series.
JZ593O.F88 1999 355'.o3i'o9i82.i
C99-900354-2
Typeset in Sabon 10/12

by Caractera inc., Quebec City
hhh
Acknowledgments vii
Contributors ix
Introduction 3
JACQUES LEVESQUE
PART ONE CONCEPTUAL DEBATES

OVER ENLARGEMENT
Fountain of Youth or Cure Worse Than Disease ?

NATO Enlargement: A Conceptual Deadlock 9
C H A R L E S - P H I L I P P E DAVID
The Case for Opening up NATO to the East 27

JANE M.O. SHARP
Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member 35

DAVID LAW
Will Enlargement Succeed ? 51

RICHARD L. KUGLER
PART TWO NATIONAL DEBATES

OVER ENLARGEMENT
NATO Enlargement and the United States:

A Deliberate and Necessary Decision? 79
GALE A. MATTOX
NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs 95

MARIE-CLAUDE PLANTIN
vi Contents
NATO Enlargement: Germany's Euro-Atlantic Design 108

PAUL LETOURNEAU AND P H I L I P P E HEBERT
Canada and the Enlargement of NATO 119

ANDRE P. DONNEUR AND MARTIN BOURGEOIS
The NATO of Its Dreams?

Canada and the Cooperative-Security Alliance 138
DAVID G. H A G L U N D
PART THREE IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON

RUSSIA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
NATO'S Eastward Enlargement:

An Instructive Historical Precedent 157
JACQUES LEVESQUE
NATO Enlargement as an Issue in Russian Politics 168

SERGEI PLEKHANOV
The Atlantic Dimensions of Central European Security 186

ANDRAS BALOGH
Phase II Candidates: A Political or Strategic Solution? 197

STANISLAV J. KIRSCHBAUM
Conclusion: Will NATO Live to Celebrate Its looth Birthday? 2.16

C H A R L E S - P H I L I P P E DAVID
Notes zz3
Acknowledgments
The editors would like to express their gratitude to the authors, the
organizations, and all others who made this book possible. Our fore-
most thanks go to our dedicated editorial assistant, Bruno Desjardins,
PhD candidate in political science at Universite du Quebec a Montreal,
who did not count the endless hours this project took to ensure that
we reached the end. As well, the contribution of John Detre was
invaluable for his translation of the French chapters. The staff of CEPES
and the Teleglobe+Raoul-Dandurand Chair deserve our deepest appre-
ciation for their constant support. McGill-Queen's University Press,
particularly Aurele Parisien, encouraged us all the way in publishing
the book as well as creating this new series in foreign policy, security,
and strategic studies.
This book is made possible by the financial support of the following
organizations: the Security and Defence Forum of the Canadian
Department of National Defence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation Office of Information and Press, the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Programme d'aide
a la publication of UQAM.
Jacques Levesque
February 1999
This page intentionally left blank
Contributors
ANDRAS BALOGH is director general of the Hungarian Institute of

International Affairs and professor of modern world history at the
Loran Eotvos University of Budapest. As a member of the Strategy
Task Force for European Integration, he is an adviser to the prime
minister on foreign policy and national-minority issues. From 1988
until 1994, he was Hungary's ambassador to India, Bangladesh, Nepal,
Sri Lanka, Myanmar, the Maldive Islands, and Afghanistan. He is the
author of more than 100 articles and books.
MARTIN BOURGEOIS is an MA candidate at the Universite du Quebec a

Montreal, his area of expertise being Canadian foreign and defence pol-
icy. He has recently co-authored "Le Canada et la consolidation de la
paix; La formulation d'une nouvelle approche pour la politique etrangere
canadienne" (Etudes Internationales, 2.9, no. 3, September 1998).
CHARLES-PHILIPPE DAVID is professor at the Universite du Quebec a

Montreal, where he holds the Teleglobe Raoul-Dandurand Chair of
Strategic and Diplomatic Studies. He taught in the Department of
Strategic Studies at the Canadian Military College in Saint-Jean, Quebec,
from 1985 to 1995 and has been a visiting professor at a number of
Quebec universities as well as the Institut du Droit, de la Paix et du
Developpement, Universite de Nice; Centre d'etude sur la defense et
la securite internationales, Universite de Grenoble; Fondation pour les
etudes de defense nationale; and UCLA'S Strategic Studies Center. His
recent publications include La consolidation de la paix (1997) and, as
editor, Les institutions de la paix (1997).
ANDRE P. DONNEUR has been a professor at the Universite du Quebec

a Montreal since 1969. He has also taught at the Beijing Foreign
x Contributors
Studies University, at the Universite des sciences sociales de Toulouse;

at the Ecole avancee des sciences sociales de Paris, at the University of
Geneva, and at a number of Canadian universities. The focus of his
studies is Canadian foreign policy. Recent publications include La
politique exterieure du Canada 1996 (1997) and Les forces trans-
nationales (1996).
DAVID G. HAGLUND is director of the Centre for International Rela-

tions, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, and professor in the
Queen's Department of Political Studies. He has held visiting profes-
sorships in France, at the University of Strasbourg (1989-90), and in
Germany, where he was affiliated with the German-Canadian Centre
of the University of Bonn (1996-97). He has also been a visiting
researcher at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen
(1997). His research focuses on transatlantic security and on Canadian
international security policy. His most recent book is The North
Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End
(i997)-
PHILIPPE HEBERT is a doctoral candidate in history at the Universite

de Montreal and a research assistant at the Centre for the Studies of
Foreign and Defence Policies. His current area of study is German
foreign and security policy.
STANISLAV j. KIRSCHBAUM is professor of international studies and

political science at Glendon College, York University, Toronto. Since
1980, he has been secretary of the International Council for Central
and East European Studies. He is a specialist on Central European
politics with a specific focus on Slovak politics in the post-Second
World War era. His latest publications are A History of Slovakia: The
Struggle for Survival (1996); A Historical Dictionary of Slovakia
(1998); and Historical Reflections on Central Europe (1998), of which
he is the editor.
RICHARD L. KUGLER is a distinguished research professor at the

National Defense University, Washington, where he advises senior
Department of Defense officials on strategic policy issues. His specialty
is NATO and global defence strategy. He holds a PHD from the Mas-
sachussets Institute of Technology, where he currently studies defence
analysis and management. From 1988 to 1997 he was senior social
scientist at RAND, and from 1975 to 1984 he was a senior executive
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is the author of multiple
books on u.s. defence policy, as well as articles in Foreign Affairs,
Contributors xi
Survival, and other journals. He is one of the original advocates and

architects of NATO enlargement.
DAVID LAW is a senior fellow at the Queen's University Centre for

International Relations in Kingston, Ontario. He has taught interna-
tional relations at a number of Canadian universities, including
Queen's and the Universite du Quebec a Montreal, and currently
lectures at the Royal Military College in Saint-Jean, Quebec, and the
Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Concurrently, he operates scenario-
planning exercises on behalf of private- and public-sector clients in
Europe and North America. From 1984 to 1994 he served with the
Political Directorate of NATO, where, as head of the policy-planning
unit, he played a leading role in the development of the Alliance's
approach to post-Communist Europe. A Sovietologist by training,
David Law has written widely on transatlantic and pan-European
security issues. Research activity presently focuses on the impact of
technological change on state profiles and governmental systems.
PAUL LETOURNEAU is a professor in the History Department of the

Universite de Montreal. He has published numerous articles on the
foreign and security policies of Germany, and he recently directed a
special number of Revue d'Allemagne (April-June 1998) which exam-
ined democracy and the military in Germany during the twentieth
century.
JACQUES LEVESQUE is professor of political science and director of

the Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Etrangeres et de Securite (CEPES) at
the Universite du Quebec a Montreal. He has written seven books,
some of which have been translated to English, Spanish, Italian, Por-
tuguese, Polish, and Hungarian. They are: Le conflit sino-sovietique et
I'Europe de I'Est (1970); Le conflit sino-sovietique (1973 and 1979);
The USSR and the Cuban Revolution (1978); Italian Communists
versus the Soviet Union (1987); L'URSS et sa politique Internationale,
de Lenine a Gorbatchev (1988); L'URSS en Afghanistan (1990); and
The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe
(i997)-
GALE MATTOX is a professor of political science at the U.S. Naval

Academy (1981-) and president of Women in International Security
(wns), an international, non-partisan network for women working on
international security issues. From 1994 to 1995 she served on the
policy-planning staff, u.s. Department of State, focusing on European
and non-proliferation issues. She has worked for the Congressional
xii Contributors
Research Service and been a Fulbright Scholar, a Bosch Fellow in the

German Defence Ministry, and a NATO Research Fellow. She has
published widely on security and NATO issues.
MARIE-CLAUDE PLANTIN is a senior researcher at the centre d'etude

et de recherche de 1'institut des etudes politiques (CERIEP) at the
Universite Lumiere Lyon 2,, France. She is also in charge of the Centre
de documentation europeenne de 1'institut and teaches at the Centre
international d'etudes franchises (CIEF). Her main research interests
are European and Atlantic security and defence issues. She is the author
of many articles; the latest focused on WEU enlargement.
SERGEI PLEKHANOV is associate professor of political studies and

coordinator of the Post-Communist Studies Programme at York Uni-
versity. Until 1993, he was deputy director of the Institute of the USA
and Canada in Moscow. His research interests include issues in the
political and economic transformation of Russia and other post-Com-
munist states, as well as problems of Russian foreign policy. His latest
book is Transforming Russian Enterprises: From State Control to
Employee Ownership (with John Logue and John Simmons, 1995).
JANE M.O. SHARP is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Defence
Studies, Kings College, London, and directs the Defence and Security
Programme at the Institute for Public Policy Research. She was for-
merly senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) and has held research and teaching appointments at
Harvard and Cornell. Recent publications include Honest Broker of
Perfidious Albion: British Policy in Former Yugoslavia (1997), and
About Turn, Forward March with Europe: New Directions for Defence
and Security Policy (1996).
The Future of NATO
Introduction
Jacques Levesque
Nothing succeeds like success! On the face of it, this saying should
apply perfectly to NATO as it celebrates fifty years of existence.
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and then of the USSR has been
NATO'S most striking historic success - a triumph in the view of those
who believe that NATO played a key role in that outcome. But even
the camp which argues that the fall of the Communist regimes stemmed
essentially from internal fundamental flaws will agree that a victory
by default is a success nonetheless.
In the early 19905, NATO'S mission and indeed its raison d'etre
seemed to have fallen victim to its own success. Many observers of
international relations were predicting its demise in the relatively near
future. But, in fact, quite the contrary happened. One after the other,
the countries of Eastern Europe and some of the former Soviet repub-
lics came knocking on NATO'S door, asking to be officially admitted to
the winner's circle. The Partnership for Peace (PFP) was created to give
NATO some breathing room - time to digest new successes, to give
them meaning and direction. But the breather was brief. The PFP was
so successful that, after long hesitating, even Russia decided to join,
hoping to slow the process from within.
NATO'S success thus spurred the process of enlargement which marks
the organization's fiftieth anniversary. With the apparent end of its
original mission and its new successes, NATO is to have a new, less ad
hoc role for the long term. This argument is put by many of NATO
defenders, who now see it as a collective-security organization and a
community primarily dedicated to building and reinforcing common
democratic values. But has NATO'S nature really changed? Has it indeed
found a new mission and ways to build on its recent triumphs? On
this score, the picture is not so clear; in fact, it is quite ambiguous in
many respects.
4 The Future of NATO
One of the purposes of this volume is to examine these ambiguities.

Paradoxically, it is the aspiring new members who are most strongly
committed to the traditional conception of what NATO is, while it is
among the old members that a new vision and a new role are advo-
cated. This, however, is only an apparent paradox, one that is readily
explained. The essays in this collection address the complexity and
contradictions that inhabit NATO'S nature and direction at this time.
They seek to foster reflection on the meaning of these contradictions
and their implications for the Alliance's future prospects.
Throughout the debate that has surrounded the enlargement process,
the thorniest issue has been Russia and its objections. Russia therefore
occupies a central place in this volume. As shall be seen, Russia's
concerns and objections have been based on two types of consider-
ations. On the one hand, despite Washington's and NATO'S protests to
the contrary, Russia has legitimate cause to feel, without being accused
of paranoia, that it is being targeted by NATO enlargement, despite all
its efforts to join the ranks of democratic states. Statements by a
number of leaders of aspiring NATO members in Eastern Europe are
quite telling on this point. And the intentions of which Russia com-
plains are sometimes present, if only implicitly, even in the West, as
some of the essays in this volume make clear. On the other hand,
Russians who believe that spheres of influence, geopolitics, and narrow
military considerations are outdated, and who believe in the potential
success of the project advocated by the proponents of a new mission
for NATO, similarly view enlargement, which will inevitably leave
Russia on the sidelines for the foreseeable future, as unacceptable.
While NATO does seem destined to become the only real collective-
security structure in Europe, Moscow can hardly accept exclusion from
full membership, given Russia's importance and its legitimate aspira-
tions. This is why it has consistently called for a new European security
architecture which fully reflects the great historic event that has
occurred with the end of the Cold War.
NATO, led by the United States, has of course considered the Russian
objections. While keeping on the path of enlargement, it has tried to
address Moscow's concerns, contending that it is possible to enlarge
NATO and improve relations with Russia at the same time. This bid,
which amounts to an attempt to square the circle, seems to have met
with at least partial success. The Founding Act of May 1997 on
relations between NATO and Russia, the meaning and scope of which
are analysed in this book, created a formal but non-binding structure
for cooperation between Russia and NATO. Will it be able to perform
its intended function and make Russia a genuine and satisfied partner?
Introduction 5
Russian reactions to the Madrid summit of July 1997, which approved

the first phase of the enlargement process, have been muted to say the
least, especially compared with what was portended by Moscow's
previous stance. The weak Russian reaction and the signing of the
Founding Act made it appear that Russia had dropped its opposition
to enlargement. Yet this is not in fact the case. Russia continues to
state its opposition to even the first phase of enlargement, though in
a less vociferous manner. If Russia continues to fight Phase I, which is
virtually an accomplished fact, it is above all to avoid legitimating
Phase II, which it fears much more than the first and wants to be able
to oppose effectively. Moscow has already served notice that the
admission of the Baltic states or Ukraine into NATO would spark an
overall revision of its relations with NATO and its members.
Consequently, the questions and dilemmas faced by NATO and its
member states, which are analysed in this collection of essays, will
become more pointed still when the time comes to make decisions on
Phase II, which already has the support in principle of the United
States.
Meanwhile, Russia is pursuing a profoundly ambivalent policy,
trying to develop ties with NATO in the hope that these will become
important enough to the organization to dissuade it from further
expansion, for fear of compromising them. At the same time, the
United States and NATO hope that building a strong relationship of
trust and cooperation with Russia will bring Moscow to an entirely
different view of matters and lead it to accept further enlargement,
even to the Baltic states. If this occurs, NATO will have virtually
succeeded in squaring the circle and might even contemplate a second
fiftieth anniversary!
But let us not anticipate too much. At this stage, it is still uncertain
whether a viable European security system can be built without firmly
anchoring Russia within an institutional framework, and whether
NATO is the most suitable instrument and arena for this purpose. This
is one of the questions addressed in this collection of essays. The scope
of the volume therefore extends to the general question of European
security.
It is evident that NATO enlargement is being pursued in the context
of and on the basis of a Pax Americana. While NATO is a multilateral
organization and a focal point of multilateralism, the tendency towards
American unilateralism within the organization has not abated; indeed,
it has increased since the end of the Cold War. If this trend continues,
will it prove compatible with the objectives, capabilities, and aspira-
tions of NATO'S other members and with the new role the organization
6 The Future of NATO
wants to play? The frequent displays of friction between the United

States, its allies, and the new Russia have never reached the critical
point. Does this mean that, as we approach the twenty-first century,
the Pax Americana is the only one possible, and therefore the only one
desirable?
This volume seeks to foster reflection on all these issues. It is divided
into three parts. Part One deals with the conceptual and theoretical
approaches that underlie the question of NATO enlargement, the sur-
rounding debate, and the possible consequences. It underscores the
issue's complexity and importance for the study of the theory of
international relations, given that NATO'S configuration and nature in
the years to come are yet to be decided: the manner in which enlarge-
ment is carried out could have a significant bearing on the direction
the organization takes, which at this stage is largely undetermined.
The essays in the second part examine the policies and interests of
some of NATO'S leading member states, and they also focus on Canada,
despite its more modest role. They consider the debates, past and
present, in each of these countries and the significance that the future
of NATO holds for them. Part Two seeks to shed light on the degree
of compatibility among the goals of the various parties, and how this
may affect the future course of events.
The third part deals with the issues involved in enlargement from
the point of view of the East European candidates and, most important,
Russia. It takes the measure of the gulf that separates their aspirations
and provides a full analysis of the reasons for Russia's opposition to
the current process. It also discusses the scope and limits of the options
available to Russia in light of the broader questions which were
submitted to the analysts who have contributed their reflections to this
collection of essays and the wider considerations underpinning it.
PART ONE
Conceptual Debates
over Enlargement
CHAPTER ONE
Fountain of Youth or
Cure Worse Than Disease?
NATO Enlargement:
A Conceptual Deadlock
"NATO is now an Alliance that opposes no one."

Sergio Balanzino, deputy secretary general of NATO,
2.2. June 1994
"Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of Amer-

ican policy in the entire post-cold-war era."
George Kennan, 5 February 1997
"The truth is that the Europe of Maastricht has neither the

organization nor the instruments necessary to guarantee
orphans of the Soviet system a steady transition to European
democracy and stability."
La Republica, 10 March 1997
Fifty years ago, few would have predicted that the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization would be viable in the long term or that American
troops would remain in Europe. In February 1951 NATO'S commander-
in-chief (SACEUR), General Eisenhower, stated, "If in ten years, all
American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes
have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project
will have failed."1 Yet U.S. troops were sent to Europe in large and
increasing numbers throughout the Cold War. When the Cold War
ended in 1989, experts again predicted the demise of NATO. "NATO
may soon be seen as suffering from old age - not a midlife crisis -
because it is becoming less relevant to the emerging European security
system," commented Christopher Layne in an echo of George Kennan's
proposal of the early 19505 for the mutual disengagement of the super-
powers and their alliances from the European continent. "The more
fundamental problem is that NATO itself may be an idea whose time
io Conceptual Debates over Enlargement
has passed," wrote Ronald Steel. "It is time to recognize that NATO
expired in August 1989," proclaimed Congressman Sam Brownback.2
Though some of these observations were, and still are, intellectually
defensible, it cannot be denied that NATO has, rather surprisingly, been
enjoying a new lease on life since the early 19908. Who, in 1949 or
prior to 1989, would have predicted that Central and Eastern European
states might be admitted into NATO, or that NATO would want to work
with Russia to build a new, pan-European security architecture? Who,
in NATO'S early days or at the end of the Cold War, would have pre-
dicted that the future of the organization lay in eastward expansion?
NATO, in short, is gaining new energy. Is it seeking a rejuvenation
of its missions and structures, or, as Albert Legault puts it, trying "to
slim down and put on weight at the same time"? 3 In either case, recent
moves indicate a desire for change: a new Strategic Concept (the
London summit of July 1990 and the Rome summit of November
1991), the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
in March 1992 (replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in
J
997)? the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the Combined Joint Task
Force (CJTF) in January 1994, the adoption in September 1995 °f
enlargement procedures and objectives, the signing of the NATO-Russia
Founding Act in May 1997, and, finally, the announcements of the
Madrid summit in July 1997, with the prospective admission of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance, along with
the signing of a NATO-Ukraine Charter.4 While the matter of who and
when was partially settled at Madrid, there are still questions about
what will happen beyond 1999. Also still at issue is whether countries
not selected during the Spanish round may yet become members.
While these developments are signs of vitality, the historic move
NATO is poised to make by proceeding with the inclusion of Central
and Eastern European states is open to question. The debates spurred
by the enlargement plan indicate that the efforts to renew NATO also
involve grave risks, which the elixir of eastward enlargement might
not eliminate or may even cause. If we review security theory and
concepts of security, we will see why NATO'S enlargement plan may
well lead it into an impasse from which there is no exit.
NATO E N L A R G E M E N T :
THE YALTA OR MAASTRICHT F O R M U L A ?
This chapter attempts to bring the conceptual debates surrounding the

enlargement plan into new focus. Our purpose is not to recount the
facts or practical considerations related to the offer of admission
extended to Central and Eastern European states, but to highlight the
A Conceptual Deadlock n
disturbing contradictions that these debates raise about the future of

security and stability in Europe. We argue that the enlargement formula
is proving to be a red herring and cannot resolve issues that are
fundamental to peace in Europe. To support our thesis, we will exam-
ine the (mostly American) conceptual approaches which argue for and
against NATO enlargement. We find that contradictory or nonsensical
assertions on a number of points undermine the logic of these
approaches. Unless there is a shift in the philosophy of the enlargement
plan, it is to be feared that applying these approaches as they stand
to NATO in its current form may in the long run ill serve the interests
of European security and stability.
Does opening up to the East enhance the security of Central and
Eastern European states and Europe, or is it occurring at the expense
of Russian interests and, consequently, of long-term stability on the
European continent? What threat would be countered and what secu-
rity needs would be met by expanding the Alliance eastward? Is it the
purpose to offer Central and Eastern European states guarantees of
protection or prospects of economic inclusion in order to ensure
greater security and stability? Is NATO necessarily the way to achieve
these goals and, if so, can they both be accomplished at the same time?
Is there a sustainable future for NATO in a changed security context?
What solution could be contemplated which would take into account
the political hurdles to enlargement?
There are two opposed visions on these questions, based on two
very different sets of theoretical literature. We find diverse, even con-
tradictory, opinions on the enlargement plan both within and between
these two bodies of literature. These visions yield irreconcilable judg-
ments on the appropriateness of enlargement, with no consensus even
among writers from the same school of thought. Consequently, our
survey of the literature reveals abundant, but rather confused, debate
on the desirability of NATO'S planned eastward move. What we refer
to as the "Yalta" and "Maastricht" approaches are the currently
dominant views in discussions on enlargement.5
"Yalta" is the geopolitical approach. On this view, the enlargement
proposed by NATO in 1997 would enshrine a new (fictional?) partition
of Europe, much like the division of Europe, according to myth, by
the United States and Russia at Yalta in February 1945. This partition,
like the earlier one, reflects prevailing geopolitical realities, which
today are dominated by the end of the Cold War. As the victorious
powers, the United States and NATO, wishing to control the strategic
space vacated in Central and Eastern Europe, have responded favour-
ably to the Central and Eastern European states' request, particularly
since these states are seeking protection from hypothetical Russian
12. Conceptual Debates over Enlargement
aggression. However, there is no universal support among theorists for

the prospect of a new Yalta, a redesigned partition of Europe, since it
poses a yet more serious threat to security than the plight of the Central
and Eastern European states, namely Russia's antagonism. The Cold
War is over, but will enlargement lead to a "cold peace" between
Russia and the United States? American Secretary of State James Baker
and German Foreign Minister Dietrich Genscher did, after all, promise
Soviet leaders in February 1990 that they had "no interest in extending
NATO to the east."6 There is a paradox here: for NATO, the price of
ensuring the security of the Central and Eastern European states is the
risk of fostering Russian insecurity, precisely the scenario feared by the
eastern candidates for NATO membership. The "Yalta" approach is
therefore a controversial solution which offers dubious benefits for
European security. Using the theoretical concepts of the structural-
realist school, we shall consider the role of security within the new
European geopolitical context.
"Maastricht" is the regionalist approach. The 1991 treaty, which
came into effect in 1993, fulfils the long-standing desire to develop the
European Union (EU), an enterprise that is not without its difficulties.
The philosophy of Maastricht is based on peace through integration
and institutionalism, which is expected to secure the stability needed
to ensure the growth and prosperity of member states European region-
alism and the development of European institutions are of interest to
NATO insofar as they can offer Central and Eastern European states
the advantages of a security community which is able to promote the
development and strengthening of democracy and the free market.
According to the proponents of this approach, a new regional identity,
encouraged by NATO, would stimulate cooperative or common security
among the old and new states in the region, an essential condition for
peace through integration. But, again, the advocates of the institu-
tional-liberal approach underlying this view are not in agreement that
NATO enlargement is the ideal solution for stabilizing the Central and
Eastern European states. A number of writers suggest other organiza-
tions (such as the EU, the Western European Union [WEU], and the
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]) as more
appropriate than NATO for implementing Maastricht's regionalist phi-
losophy. This view is warranted, since NATO is still essentially a
collective defence alliance (unless it were to take over from the weak
OSCE, which would then cease to exist). But, in this case, what of OSCE
members that do not belong to NATO? And if NATO'S mission is to
stimulate cooperative security at the regional level, how can partners
(such as Russia) - with which cooperation is just as important as with
the Central and Eastern European states, if not more so - be excluded?
A Conceptual Deadlock 13
The conceptual impasse that the debate on enlargement has reached

is illustrated by the fact that NATO is attempting to reconcile the
"Yalta" and "Maastricht" approaches by operating at both levels at
once. But the negative effects of the "Yalta" approach (the Russian
factor) are making implementation of a "Maastricht" policy difficult
at the security and regional levels. The problematic effects of Maas-
tricht (NATO'S partial unsuitability) are an indication of the obsoles-
cence of the geopolitical arrangements sought by the "Yalta" scheme.
Theoretically, the two approaches are mutually exclusive; in our view,
NATO'S attempt to pursue both at the same time may well be disap-
pointing (possibly ending in failure on both fronts) for the contradic-
tions between "Yalta" and "Maastricht" will continue to deepen.
Ultimately, NATO may leave the Central and Eastern European states
and Europe without any real security or stability.
THE "YALTA" APPROACH AND

THE CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING
A NEW G E O P O L I T I C S
In the new geopolitical context that characterizes the post-Cold-War
period, is the "Yalta" approach appropriate for planning and justifying
NATO enlargement? The structural-realist school of thought offers two
general responses to this basic question. The first, based on an analysis
of the balance of forces among the great powers, suggests that the old
bipolar system could ultimately be replaced by a new one, or by a
multipolar system, which enlargement may not be able to prevent and,
in fact, could even promote. That NATO continues to exist, despite the
lack of a clearly defined military threat, is something of an anomaly,
one that has received scant attention from commentators. The second
response suggests that strategic order is maintained by hegemony - in
this case u.s. hegemony - which can improve prospects for security
and stability through enlargement. While the first argument perceives
"balancing" as a source of conflict, the second sees "bandwagoning"
as a guarantee of stability. In the final analysis, the structural-realists
are in no agreement on the desirability of NATO enlargement.
The Structural-Realist View and the Future of NATO

The structural-realist school of international relations focuses on
power relationships between states. It attaches great importance to the
system's geopolitical balance (bipolar, multipolar, and so on), which
determines the evolution of these relationships. Alliances remain a
central element in defining this balance since they bring states together
in an effort to establish or preserve a power relationship that provides
14 Conceptual Debates over Enlargement
these states with security. That is why, according to this approach,

alliances can exist only in a context in which they promote balance
and protect their member states from the threat posed by other states
and alliances. Alliances are therefore an extension of power politics.7
There are two possible variants of this approach that apply to the
specific case of Europe and NATO. 8
One is the "balancing" argument - that is, the need to counter
geopolitical threats through the balance of forces - which attributes
the existence of alliances to the need for balance. Without threat
(especially of a military nature), there would be no need for balance
and there would therefore be no alliances.9 Such situations are rare.
But, in the view of some structural-realists, there is less justification
for an alliance such as NATO in the current European geopolitical
context since no threat exists today. "NATO'S days are not numbered,
but its years are,"10 writes Kenneth Waltz. On the other hand, in this
view, it is not inconceivable that a different balance should one day
replace the bipolar system. For example, a multipolar system - which
is by definition less stable - could develop, organized around several
opposed powers in Europe. Whatever the validity of this view may be,
NATO will not be able to forestall the emergence of a new geopolitical
balance. As shall be seen, NATO enlargement may even help speed up
the reconfiguration of power relationships and transform security
conditions. The structural-realists thus view "balancing" as the only
criterion for assessing the need for an alliance. And in theory, without
a "balancing" function, NATO has no raison d'etre.
Other observers question this assertion. Robert McCalla and Fred
Chernoff point out that, for the moment, NATO is not reducing but
increasing its missions, although there is no military threat.11 John
Mearsheimer and Jane Sharp suggest that it is the prospect of a long-
term threat that makes it necessary to maintain a symbolic balance
against Russian or even German hegemony; without NATO, these could
re-emerge in the form of traditional spheres of influence.12 It is there-
fore unclear whether the demise of the bipolar system signals the
disappearance of NATO; it is also not clear that enlargement can ward
off a return to forms of "balancing" in Europe. In our view, these
considerations must be borne in mind.
The other hegemonist argument - the "bandwagoning" one (that is,
jumping on a moving train) - postulates a tendency to join the winning
power and alliance in times of fundamental change in the international
system.'3 Where a hegemonic force exists, in which one country's
dominance leads to the emergence of a unipolar system (historically
rare and short-lived), states tend to support and tap into this domi-
nance in order to share in the benefits.14 In the case of some countries,
even partial backing for the bandwagon can save them, at least in
theory, from the primary threat they face. The international system is
now in such a "unipolar moment,"15 especially in Europe. With the
disappearance of the USSR, small Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, the Baltic states, and even Russia are looking to take advantage
of the opportunities the rising hegemony is leaving in its wake. It can
therefore be said that there has been a particularly pronounced ten-
dency to jump on the u.s. bandwagon since the end of the Cold War.
In terms of security, this movement can be explained not by fear of
threat but by the opportunity for gain. States are not forced to join
the bandwagon; they are voluntarily moving into the winning camp,
siding with the most powerful player.
Writers who apply a bandwagoning analysis agree that Central and
Eastern European states want NATO enlargement not to protect them-
selves against Russia but to climb aboard the NATO train (they also
covet the EU caravan). The debate therefore centres on the scope and
feasibility of bandwagoning. There is concern that NATO defence guar-
antees and missions may become overly diluted - to the point of
becoming impracticable - not to mention the fact that some passengers
who jump on the train (the Russians, for example) may wish to change
its direction. This type of disorderly conduct clearly is not in the
interest of u.s. hegemony.
The two versions of the structural-realist approach analyse power
relations differently. They do not agree on the relevance of NATO as
an alliance capable of keeping unknown threats at bay or of rallying
"conquered" states such as Russia. The proponents of the "balancing"
and "bandwagoning" arguments are thus sharply divided on the issue
of enlargement.
An Inconclusive Geopolitical Debate on Enlargement

In one form or another, realist views on the opening to the East reflect
two sets of perceptions. The first view holds that the United States
must benefit from the geopolitical void left by the fall of the Soviet
empire in Europe (through "bandwagoning") and prevent the rise of
a new Russian threat in the long term (far-sighted "balancing"). Pro-
ponents of this view support the enlargement plan. The second view
is that eastward expansion can lead only to the re-emergence of the
Russian threat, producing the opposite of the desired effect (a deadly
"debalancing" effect). Consequently, proponents of this view consider
the impact on European security to be cause for concern.
The pro-enlargement argument is put by a number of realist strategists,
including Henry Kissinger, Zbignew Brzezinski, and William Odom.16
Their thesis can be summarized in the following three observations:
• If NATO does not admit Central and Eastern European states, a

strategic void will develop between Germany and Russia, increasing
the likelihood of confrontation between these two great powers and
the emergence of an unstable, multipolar system in Europe.
• The admission process should be launched and completed rapidly
to take advantage of Russia's weakness (its military weakness in
particular) and prevent Russia from reclaiming its former sphere of
influence.
• NATO enlargement opens the possibility of a new security architec-
ture in Europe. Although the inclusion of Russia in this architecture
is the subject of considerable debate, the realists generally reject as
nonsensical the possibility of Russian membership in NATO.
These arguments are based on the hope that the "bandwagoning"

effect will take hold and on fear that the "balancing" phenomenon
will re-emerge.
Other realists, such as George Kennan, Michael Mandelbaum, and
Michael Brown,17 voice a more pessimistic view, opposed to the realist-
optimist argument. Their main points - which reflect a fear that
eastward expansion may cause a "debalancing"18 - are:
• Russia currently poses no military threat, but hasty enlargement

could herald the return to power of a radical nationalist regime in
Moscow, creating the equivalent of a Weimar Russia dedicated to
rebuilding a security zone in opposition to NATO; for example, the
commonwealth of Independent States (cis) might be turned into a
military alliance.
• Once the enlargement process is under way, Russia would be less
inclined to honour disarmament treaties or generally to maintain the
climate of trust that has developed between it and the United States,
particularly since it would fear further eastward moves by NATO,
drawing ever closer to its borders.
• If Central and Eastern European states truly feel threatened, why
are they scaling back their military forces (albeit redeployed to the
east) and why have countries with legitimate concerns, such as
Ukraine, expressed no intention of joining NATO ? In reality, there is
no strategic void in Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand,
the enlargement formula raises the whole question of exclusion -
that is, the discrimiNATory treatment meted out to the countries that
want to join NATO but are being shut out of the process (at least
for now).
• A new security architecture already exists in the form of "common
security" (to use Mandelbaum's expression). It has yielded the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (start) and Conventional Forces in

Europe (CFE) disarmament agreements, confidence-building mea-
sures, and the shift towards defensive military doctrines. In seeking
a military alliance with the Central and Eastern European states,
NATO would be undermining the progress of common security in
favour of a conception of defence rendered obsolete by the end of
the Cold War.
While they attach considerable importance to security for Central

and Eastern European states, the geopolitical arguments for and
against the "Yalta" approach focus mainly on the Russian question.
The real issue raised by the structural-realist analysis is how it is
possible to come to terms with Russian power, not to which Central
and Eastern European states security should be offered or when. As it
stands, the enlargement plan barely touches on this point, though it is
fundamental to peace.
THE "MAASTRICHT" APPROACH AND

THE HOPES INVESTED IN R E G I O N A L I S M
"Maastricht" is the second major approach to NATO enlargement. We
have defined it as the regionalist path, an attempt to develop and
consolidate a European economic, political, and security space founded
on integration and institutionalism.19 While proponents of this view
do not dismiss the existence of power relationships between states,
they argue that conditions in Europe today are such that states are
seeking prosperity and security through cooperation. The Maastricht
treaty reflects this desire for peace, secured not through geopolitical
balance but through regional stability. Stability is produced by three
factors propounded by three complementary points of view, all belong-
ing to the institutional-liberal school of thought on international rela-
tions: cooperative security, democratic peace, and economic
interdependence. Their implications for the debate on NATO enlarge-
ment are to complicate further the question of how Russia and the
Central and Eastern European states should be treated, insofar as
traditional defence concerns are giving way to a broader perspective
on the attainment of stability.
The Institutional-Liberal View and the Future of NATO

Without security there is little hope for trade and prosperity, but
without trade and prosperity security remains an illusion. This is the
classic chicken-or-egg dilemma. Theoreticians of the realist school
adhere to the first axiom, whereas institutional-liberals are convinced
that the second holds true.10 The dilemma may never be resolved,
although interdependence and cooperation are more important today
than in the past. They are redefining national and regional identities
to a point where, at the close of the twentieth century, security is being
viewed less than ever before in military terms. In this context, alliances
are tending to change their vocation. Whereas they once were instru-
ments of power, they are now becoming tools for the dissemination
and sharing of security, values, and resources. This sharing signifies a
decline in national interests and an expansion of the collective benefits
that assure stable change in international relations. The institutional-
liberal position can be subdivided into three theses: on security, politics,
and economics.
The security thesis affirms that institutions such as NATO reduce the
significance of often divergent national interests by forcing states to
negotiate and to respect common principles and standards.21 Multilat-
eral cooperation is thereby favoured by member countries since their
ability to resolve security problems by themselves is minimal. This is
even more true when problems are non-military in nature. The growing
interdependence of nations (with regard to refugees, human rights,
terrorism, the drug trade, illegal transfers of technology, and so on)
makes multilateral institutions particularly well suited to coordinating
national policies. States appreciate and back such institutions, not
because of threats against them, but because they facilitate mutual
cooperation. This philosophy differs significantly from that of the
structural-realists. In terms of security, cooperation translates into the
institutionalization of mechanisms for consultation, crisis prevention,
peacekeeping, military transparency, confidence-building, and disarma-
ment. (However, not everyone agrees that it is the role of NATO to
transform itself along these lines.)
Allen Sens puts the question incisively: "If NATO no longer stands
against the threat of the Soviet Union, then what does it stand /or?" 22
Many writers believe that revamping the Alliance reinforces the secu-
rity community and consolidates European stability, to which NATO
has always made a contribution.23 The examples of the CJTF, the nacc,
and the PFP confirm the success of multilateralism in various areas of
cooperation. Nevertheless, writers such as Josef Joffe and Michael
Mandelbaum seriously doubt that NATO can transform itself into an
organization for crisis management and peacekeeping - the successes
of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in
Bosnia notwithstanding.14 Others wonder if NATO is really better
qualified than the OSCE to carry out the new missions of cooperative
security. In the opinion of Peter Schulze, the OSCE precisely matches
the institutionalists' profile of a security community that can reinforce
cooperation - especially since the OSCE has carried out its tasks more
effectively since the end of the Cold War and, in contrast to NATO,
includes the former Soviet adversary as well as all the Central and
Eastern European states.25
The political thesis may be summarized as the beneficial effects of
a "democratic peace." It postulates that democracies avoid combat
since they tend to share a community of identical values and to
promote ever greater interdependence/ 6 When confidence reigns
among elites and in the community as a whole, peace is assured by
support for the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
Traditionally, the principal causes of war have included those that
relate to the internal situations of states, whether these reflect the
nature of their political regimes, their ideologies, their ethnic and
secessionist problems, or even their levels of militarism/ 7 For propo-
nents of the democratic thesis, it is precisely the growing identification
with liberal values (what an American writer calls the "we-feeling")
which determines the chances for a durable peace in Europe.
Is NATO necessary in a Europe that already includes a large majority
of peaceful liberal democracies? Over the years the Alliance has con-
tributed to containing crises involving some of its members - the
dispute between Greece and Turkey comes to mind. As such, to use a
formulation by Karl Deutsch revived by Emanuel Adler and endorsed
by Thomas Risse-Kappen, it acts as a political alliance with a view to
maintaining or reinforcing, among other things, democratic norms -
although this was contradicted by the era of authoritarian regimes in
Greece, Turkey, and Portugal.28 In fact, as suggested by recent studies,
the danger to security may also originate in the very process of
democratization, since elites may dread the spread of values contrary
to their interests.29 If the existence of NATO is based on the spread of
democratic values, a segment of Russia's political elite might fear for
its safety and oppose a "democratic peace." Thus, when a security
community propagates values that originate beyond the frontiers of
the Alliance, it must take into account the need for a transition period.
The economic thesis seeks the reinforcement of regionalism through
the adoption and consolidation of free markets, which inevitably create
enhanced security. This results from the production and distribution
of wealth as well as from increased trade, which make national and
regional economies more interdependent. Such is the view of Richard
Rosecrance, who believes that the achievement of economic security
will in the future constitute the main objective of states, including, and
perhaps especially, those he calls "late developers," such as the Central
and Eastern European states and Russia.30 Stability flows from eco-
nomic rather than military deterrence. This deterrence is effective to
2.o Conceptual Debates over Enlargement
the extent that it becomes impossible - unless one wishes to jeopardize

one's survival - to elude strategies for trade and investment within
regions and between blocs. Owing to the impossibility of avoiding the
trend towards integration, which is led by regional and international
coalitions, no great power can consider autarchy. According to Rose-
crance, this outcome has the effect of gradually decreasing chances for
conflict, and he notes in particular that "violating all historical prece-
dents, Russia, rather than seeking to balance against this strong central
coalition [the EU], is rather trying to join it."31 In this respect, the
Russian position greatly resembles that of the Central and Eastern
European states, something that can only encourage peace though
integration.
Institutional-liberals are not counting on NATO to bring stability to
Central and Eastern Europe. There are three approaches to achieving
economic regionalism. The EU, continuing along the Maastricht and
Amsterdam path, contemplates expansion to Central and Eastern
Europe - and one day perhaps even to Russia - so as to lessen chances
for conflict.3Z The economic alliance replaces the military alliance while
reducing Russian security concerns. A more modest approach consists
in starting up projects, such as the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity of forty years ago, which promote the development of intra-state
regional cooperation in a form which is less cumbersome than the EU. 33
Finally, regionalism can develop by way of "super-regions," structures
that lie half way between the individual European state and the
continental level and that might be more effective in pursuing common
economic-integration goals.34
The institutional-liberal school is divided over the relevance of NATO
in consolidating the "Maastricht approach." Its supporters are roughly
agreed on the benefits of regionalism, but where the enlargement plan
is involved, some give more weight to institutions other than NATO.
The Unresolved Debate on Regional Enlargement

Supporters of the Maastricht approach seek an opening to the East to
ensure greater stability for Europe. They nevertheless adopt two con-
trasting attitudes with regard to NATO: one that perceives the Alliance
as an ideal institution for rapidly bringing Central and Eastern Euro-
pean states on board the process of regional integration, and one that
judges the Alliance as the least appropriate mechanism for embedding
Central and Eastern European states in European regionalism. Once
again, this debate barely addresses the basic question of the fate of
Russia.
The pro-enlargement viewpoint has been advanced by, among
others, Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, Stephen Larrabee, Allen Sens,
A Conceptual Deadlock 2.1
Steve Weber, and, from an official perspective, Strobe Talbott.35 Their

reasoning contains three basic ideas:
• The fragile democracies of Central and Eastern Europe must be

stabilized. If the process of democratization were to suffer a setback,
the costs would be immense, in fact much greater than those asso-
ciated with expanding NATO. Every case of incomplete democrati-
zation would in all likelihood seriously undermine efforts to prevent
new territorial, irredentist, and ethnic conflicts.
• Enlargement would provide the small Central and Eastern European
states with all the benefits of multilateral security, benefits that are
fundamental to the policy objectives of theses states: in a climate of
reduced uncertainty, a significant benefit in itself, Central and Eastern
European states would gain the opportunity to influence decisions
made by the great powers as well as to make their own voices heard.
• NATO'S eastward enlargement must be carried out in tandem with
other institutions, such as the EU, since Central and Eastern Euro-
pean states require both economic growth and security. The admis-
sion timetables for NATO and the EU should therefore be
synchronized to achieve coordination among the institutions beyond
what now exists.
These arguments assign an important role to NATO enlargement in the

development of regionalism.
The liberal-institutional viewpoint opposed to NATO enlargement
has been expressed by writers such as John Newhouse, Emanuel Adler,
Philip Zelikow, and Charles William Maynes. 36 Its main tenets are:
• The need for stability and democracy has not been challenged by
the Central and Eastern European states targeted for expansion. For
the foreseeable future none of them runs the risk of political upheaval
or ethnic violence. If the "democratic peace" justification is imper-
ative, then it is countries such as Albania, Rumania, Estonia, and
even Russia that should immediately be admitted into the Alliance.
That, to be sure, would fundamentally transform the nature of
NATO, turning it into a larger-than-life OSCE.
• The OSCE forum acts precisely as a multilateral mechanism for
building a security community in various fields of cooperation
among great powers and small states. The OSCE agenda is more
closely attuned to the contemporary security situation than is NATO'S
traditional defence role.
• There should be expansion to Central and Eastern Europe but
without NATO. If the purpose is to promote regional stability, then
institutions such as the WEU and the EU should take the initiative
in eastward enlargement before NATO does so. Theoretically, this
avenue would increase the economic security of Central and Eastern
European states while decreasing the geopolitical insecurity of
Russia, which, furthermore, might eventually benefit from the lar-
gesse of the EU.
"NATO or Tomato?" asks Mandelbaum. "We are going to extend

the NATO nuclear umbrella to the Eastern Europeans, so that the
Western Europeans won't have to buy their tomatoes. It's like America
telling Mexico it can join NATO but not NAFTA." 37 Quite the opposite,
maintain the supporters of NATO. One can provide the tomatoes and
the (security) basket simultaneously. The debate remains unresolved.
CONCLUSION: R E C O N C I L I N G "YALTA"
AND "MAASTRICHT"
In the coming months and years, several scenarios will be available to
NATO for conceptualizing an eastward move and ensuring security in
Europe. According to Richard Kugler, five outcomes are possible38:
1 Following the example of the osce, NATO creates a vast security

community. Would this effort be redundant and would it thus expose
itself to the problems, such as institutional paralysis, encountered
by its sister organization?
2 By way of a transcontinental treaty, NATO sets up a system for
collective security. But would this system become an empty shell in
which national interests clash and in which consensus is unachiev-
able?
3 The Alliance and the Eastern states continue developing an institu-
tional framework. Would such a strategy needlessly provoke Russia?
4 NATO expands even further. Would hostility grow between Ukraine
and the Baltic states, on the one hand, and Russia on the other?
5 An East-West bipolar structure is created once again in Europe,
comprised of NATO and the cis, with both strengthened militarily.
Would this represent a return to the concept of "balancing"?
According to Kugler, the Alliance seems to be opting at the moment

for the third path and, consequently, risks having to choose eventually
between the fourth and fifth scenarios. This is a prospect whose logic,
from the standpoint of peace, is far from reassuring, although a new
bipolar structure could in principle be stable from a geopolitical per-
spective (if one is to believe the structural-realists).
A Conceptual Deadlock 2.3
Though starting with a "Maastricht" approach, NATO would ulti-

mately end up with a "Yalta" strategy. While one may reason that
such a development is foreseeable, it would work against the interests
of security and stability in Europe. A binary strategy makes no sense
if it pursues the benefits of the Maastricht approach but yields the
regrettable outcomes of Yalta. To be sure, there are lessons to be
learned from each approach and each contains both positive and
negative features. As such, the institutional-liberal thesis regarding
enlargement seems justified. The "Maastricht" approach can probably
co-exist with NATO'S efforts to reinforce regional stability in Europe.
On the other hand, the pessimistic structural-realist thesis on the
admission of Central and Eastern European states is without doubt
well founded. The "Yalta" approach probably indicates the limits of
a security built on a new geopolitical division of continental Europe.
Thus, the contradictions can be resolved only by taking Russia into
account. In the spirit of Lincoln's axiom about making friends of our
enemies, we may ask: why expand and concentrate on Central and
Eastern European states if the real problem remains the security and
exclusion of the Russians? The conceptual impasse that NATO con-
fronts is that, in rewarding Central and Eastern European states, the
Alliance is punishing Russia - at least in Russian eyes, unintentional
as this might be. This is surely not the real objective of the enlargement
plan. Consequently, NATO should conceive both a plan and credible
means for rallying the Russians, one that goes beyond the efforts made
over the last year (the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the
proposal to create a common brigade, and the revision of the CFE
Treaty).
In our view, NATO must continue to promote regionalism but must
also consider the second scenario suggested by Kugler, that of collective
security. Such a change in perspective could resolve several of the basic
contradictions that beset an enlargement plan located midway between
the "Yalta" and "Maastricht" approaches. To state the matter differ-
ently, it would be desirable that NATO and not a weak OSCE, which
wields no coercive power, "fashion a larger Western community within
the framework of a stable security system for the entire region." 39
Although other institutions might fulfil the objectives of cooperative
security and regionalism, none is a match for NATO and it is entirely
unrealistic to believe that the latter would subordinate itself to another
security organization. Clearly, any scenario that includes the downsiz-
ing of NATO must be ruled out.
What other options are available? One that has until now remained
dormant and that might merit revival is the "Geneva" approach - that
is, an improved League of Nations adapted to current conditions in
the European security system.40 In addition, a number of experts are

proposing that Europe shift from a system of collective defence to one
of collective security. "Europe's peace depends on the transition from
alliances to collective security arrangements built on new concepts of
common security," argues Beverly Crawford.41 Charles Kupchan sug-
gests that the EU and NATO join efforts to create a new "Atlantic
Union" that would seek to strengthen the integrated economic market
and establish collective security.42 "Enlargement must be part of an
evolutionary process, which could ultimately transform the Alliance
into a collective security system which could include Russia," says
Allen Sens.43 Zbignew Brzezinski, along with Kupchan and Sens, con-
templates Russia joining such a system: "The decision of the Alliance
to enlarge its membership should be accompanied by a simultaneous
invitation to Russia to help create a new transcontinental system of
collective security, one that goes beyond the expansion of NATO
proper."44 This idea makes sense and indicates the real security and
stability challenge for the Europe of the future: the formal inclusion
of Russia in a reorganized NATO dedicated to collective security.
Conditions have never been more favourable for putting this idea
into practice, and the possibility has long been studied. While the
supporters of collective security have always had great difficulty in
gaining acceptance for the idea - given the failure of the League of
Nations - two trends in the waning years of this century give cause
for optimism regarding the feasibility of such a security system.45 First
of all, for the first time in its history, all of Europe is evolving
inexorably towards a "democratic peace." Secondly, economic security
is gradually replacing military security and other traditional forms of
defence, owing to growing regional interdependence. These conditions
are unique and favour the setting up of a collective-security system.
Such a system, moreover, would benefit from the participation of
Russia and the preservation of u.s. hegemony, both of which constitute
additional conditions needed to ensure the success of Europe. Here is
why.
Admitted into a NATO moving towards collective security, Russia
would be free of its worst anxieties and embrace the advantages of
regionalism, "democratic peace," and cooperative security.46 It would
grow more peaceful and its behaviour would become more predictable
were it permitted to fully enjoy the benefits of the bandwagon effect.
Conversion to the principles of institutional liberalism would entail
security advantages for Russia. Instead of perpetually regarding Russia
as the vanquished of the Cold War, Americans and Europeans would
treat it as Germany and Japan were treated after the Second World
War or France after the defeat at Waterloo.
Also, preservation of an American hegemonic presence within the

Alliance will ward off any return to the "balancing" approach, although
the chances of such a reversion are slim in any event. It will prevent
a "re-nationalization" of defence policies and the constant risk of a
security competition among the large European nations, this in spite
of the praiseworthy efforts of the Maastricht Treaty to establish a
European security system based on the common foreign and security
policy (CFSP). In particular, the traditional double containment of
Russia and Germany, this time within a collective security system,
would still have its raison d'etre. The Americans would continue to
play the role of "night watchman," their military presence akin to a
"sprinkler system," inside the Alliance.47 Finally, the United States's
commitment to Europe would be secured since Russia would now be
in NATO - a circumstance that might enable it to avoid the fate of the
League of Nations seventy years ago.
CHAPTER TWO
The Case for Opening up NATO

to the East
]ane M.O. Sharp
Today, former adversaries in Western Europe never even contemplate

settling disputes between themselves by force. This is the state of affairs
we should strive for throughout the continent, by gradually bringing
into the fold all those European states that achieve genuine pluralistic
democracy, market economies, and a healthy respect for the rule of
law. No one advocating the opening of NATO to the new democracies
claims that the process will be trouble-free, but this does not undermine
the case for spreading the benefits of the Western security community
eastwards. As German Defence Minister Volker Riihe put it in October
1993: "If we don't export stability we shall import instability." Western
Europe cannot put up a barrier between itself and the former Com-
munist states; it must open up its institutions to those striving to meet
Western standards.
One obvious benefit of signalling in 1994 that NATO was prepared
to take in new members has been the dramatic modification in behav-
iour since then among those states that aspire to join. Some have
accelerated civilian controls over military forces, others have peacefully
settled long-standing disputes over minority rights and borders. In
January 1997 the Czech government gave a formal "expression of
regret" for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia in
1945 and 1946.: Over a number of years Hungary and Romania
transformed their relationship with each other, as did Romania,
Ukraine, and, to a lesser extent, Hungary and Slovakia.1 In March
1997 the Polish government sacked a general who was unwilling to
accept civilian control over Polish military forces.3 Estonia and Latvia
both softened their attitudes towards their Russian minorities, not least
to make themselves more acceptable partners to the West.4 These
actions reflect real progress towards democracy and deserve recogni-
tion. Yet, at present, it often appears to Central Europeans (including
z8 Conceptual Debates over Enlargement
the Baltic states) that Western governments keep moving the goal posts
farther and farther away from full membership in the Western club.
Far from aggressively expanding eastwards as some have charged,
until 1994 most NATO states were reluctant to take in new members,
some because they feared provoking Russia, others because they were
not yet ready to provide security throughout Europe. The initiative for
enlargement came not from NATO but from the former Warsaw Pact
states who in 1991 felt themselves in a security vacuum as violence
erupted in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. Initially,
NATO offered two outreach programs but fell short of offering mem-
bership. In December 1991 NATO established the North Atlantic Coop-
eration Council (NACC) for all former Warsaw Pact states including all
the former Soviet Republics, and in January 1994 it offered the Part-
nership for Peace (PFP) to the European neutrals as well as to NACC
members.
It was Germany's interest in stability on its eastern border that
finally drove the Alliance to consider accepting new members. Ger-
many also felt, more strongly than the other allies, a heavy responsi-
bility to right the wrongs of Yalta and to bring back into Western
Europe those pre-war democracies on whom Moscow had imposed
Communist governments in 1945. The other European allies acqui-
esced, realizing that if NATO did not provide security in Central
Europe, sooner or later either Germany or Russia would - thereby
taking us back to the uncertainties of the 19305. The Clinton admin-
istration did not endorse enlargement until 1994, when Richard Hol-
brooke returned from his post as U.S. ambassador in Bonn, and only
seriously began to communicate the rationale for enlargement to the
Congress in early 1997.5 France was perhaps the most resistant to
opening up NATO. 6 Even at the NATO ministerial meeting in Sintra,
Portugal, in late May 1997, France still seemed reluctant, unless NATO
agreed to take in Romania and Slovenia as well as Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic.7 France is always nervous about too much
American influence in NATO, as well as about too much northern as
opposed to southern weight in European institutions.
ANSWERING THE CRITICS OF ENLARGEMENT
Will Enlargement Create a Grey Zone Vulnerable to Russia?

Some warn that enlargement could create new divisions in Europe,
because states left out of the first intake of new members would
constitute a new grey zone increasingly vulnerable to pressure from a
Russia that would be angered and humiliated by an enlargement which
seems to exclude them.8 There might be some grounds for this anxiety
The Case for Opening up NATO to the East 2.9
if NATO had not changed its Cold War priorities and if it planned a
one-time intake of the three Central Europeans currently at the head
of the queue: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. But NATO
has changed from its exclusive focus on collective defence to include
a collective-security role, and, as U.S. and German spokesmen repeat-
edly emphasize, the NATO door will remain open for all those who
meet the criteria, even Russia in the long term.9 To quote from an
address by President Clinton to West Point graduates in late May 1997:
"NATO'S doors will remain open to all those willing and able to
shoulder the responsibilities of membership."10
Some Western strategists argue that Russia could never join NATO
because the Alliance cannot offer security guarantees against China.
Longer-term thinkers, however, adopt a "never say never" approach
to Russia because, in the event that Russia did adopt genuine democ-
racy, respect for the rule of law, openness, and civilian control of the
military, the world would have become such a different place that
NATO too would have to change beyond recognition.
Fears that enlargement will provoke Russian president Boris Yeltsin
to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus or Kaliningrad, or press
the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis) into a new military
alliance, appear to be unfounded. Some Russian scholars argue that
opposition to NATO enlargement has been exaggerated by equating the
extremists in the Duma with the public in general.11 In fact, when in
charge of the Russian cabinet, Boris Nemtsov, Anatol Chubais, and
the other pragmatists appear to have overruled the isolationists and
the expansionist imperialists to persuade Yeltsin to work for better
relations with the West parallel to enlargement. 11
Yeltsin accepted Clinton's reassurances in Helsinki, in late March,
that NATO would enlarge in a way that was sensitive to Russian
concerns, and that Russia could expect not only a partnership with
the new NATO but also a closer relationship to the Gj group of
industrialized democracies/3 Since the Helsinki summit, far from
reacting negatively, Yeltsin has shown a new spirit of cooperation. In
Moscow on 12 May 1997, for example, Yeltsin and President Asian
Mashkhadov of the Republic of Chechnya signed a second peace
agreement, and on 13 June they signed another agreement about the
use of 150 kilometres of the Chechen section of the oil pipeline that
goes from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. In addi-
tion, Russia lifted its economic blockade of Chechnya.14 In Paris in
late May 1997, at the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act
(which provides the framework for the new NATO-Russia relation-
ship), Yeltsin announced a less aggressive nuclear targeting policy.15
Since then Yeltsin has signed an agreement with Ukraine, which settled
several previously outstanding issues including the leasing of the

Ukrainian port of Sebastapol to the Russian navy/ 6 In early June, in
a dramatic reversal of policy, Yeltsin even began a conciliatory dia-
logue with Japan.' 7 NATO obviously needs to reinforce this new spirit
of conciliation by putting meat on the bones of not only the Founding
Act but also the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, a new organization
designed to prepare non-NATO states to work with NATO on crisis
management.18 NATO must also make its own planning as transparent
and open as possible so that the defensive orientation of the Alliance
is unambiguous/ 9
Meanwhile, Western opponents of enlargement would do well to
ponder the damage they do by encouraging Russian nationalists and
xenophobes to believe that NATO has not changed since the end of the
Cold War and still sees Russia as an adversary. Far more constructive
are those who encourage Russians across the political spectrum to
appreciate the extent to which Western governments are thoroughly
invested in Russian reform.
Many critics of enlargement seem surprisingly ignorant of the ways
in which NATO has already changed during the 19908. NATO govern-
ments have cut their defence budgets, pulled back nuclear and conven-
tional forces, replaced their former adversarial doctrines with polices
that emphasize cooperation and conciliation, and invested substantial
sums in helping Russia to clean up its nuclear-power plants and safely
dismantle excess nuclear warheads/ 0 NATO governments also tolerated
Russian violations of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty
in November 1995, and they made significant efforts to meet Russian
concerns at the May 1996 CFE review conference by redrawing the
flank zone and permitting higher limits for Russia/1 NATO has also
made further concessions to the Russians in the negotiations now
under way to adapt the CFE treaty/2
NATO can still draw on a formidable military capability, but it can
hardly be described as an offensive alliance. Indeed, the only operations
that NATO has conducted since its inception in 1949 are air strikes on
behalf of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1994-
95 and peace-enforcement operations (Implementation Force/Stabiliza-
tion Force, or IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia since January 1996. In these
operations, far from being belligerent, NATO has been criticized for
being combat-shy and risk-averse.
Why Not Enlarge the EU or the WEU instead?

Some critics of enlargement, especially in Washington and Moscow,
argue that Central Europeans are being thrown the bone of NATO
membership to compensate for exclusion from the European Union
(EU). Central Europeans, however, do not see these two organizations

as alternatives, but as complementary; and indeed, all of them have
signed association agreements and are on track to join the EU. Mem-
bership in both NATO and the EU is logical since, for most Western
Europeans, these are the two main institutions that comprise the
Western security community. It is true that former neutrals (Austria,
Finland, and Sweden) joined the EU but not NATO. But, for several
reasons, the Central European states are unlikely to be satisfied with
EU membership only.
First, unlike the European neutrals, especially Finland and Sweden,
which undertake substantial investments in military forces to make
their neutrality credible, none of the Central European countries can
afford similar investments. Rather, they need to pool their military
capability with others to achieve credible defence postures. Second,
Central Europeans find it difficult to see the EU as providing anything
more than economic security given the EU'S failure to mediate the crises
in the former Yugoslavia in 1991-9z. A third problem is that joining
the EU means turning one's economic structure and legal system upside
down to become compatible with other EU members.
The criteria for EU membership are much more demanding than
those for joining NATO. As agreed by the EU in Copenhagen in June
1993 and in Madrid in December 1995, in addition to the NATO
criteria of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection
of minorities, EU applicants must also have a fully functioning market
economy able to withstand competitive pressure and market forces
within the EU; they must adhere to the aims of political, economic,
and monetary union; and they must adjust their administrative struc-
tures to make them compatible with those of other EU members/ 3
Even fast-track Sweden took five years to achieve EU standards. So
even those states that have signed association agreements with the EU
will probably take at least a decade to achieve full EU membership.
Some prominent American statesmen suggest that enlargement of
the Western European Union (WEU) would be less provocative to
Russia than enlarging NATO/ 4 Despite some recent attempts to reju-
venate the WEU to perform light peacekeeping duties, and despite
efforts by the WEU to offer various degrees of association to the
aspirants to EU and NATO, Central Europeans do not regard the WEU
as any kind of substitute for NATO. There are at least two reasons.
The first is that the operations undertaken by the WEU so far (such as
monitoring the arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia and providing
police for the divided city of Mostar) have been unimpressive. The
WEU now has a planning cell in Brussels, but, as Sir Peter Inge, the
recently retired British chief of defence staff, told Defense Week in
32, Conceptual Debates over Enlargement
March 1997, the organization is far from achieving a serious military

capability/5 The second reason is that, despite its ambition to be the
European pillar of NATO, the WEU has no direct connection to the
United States. Like the current European members of the Alliance,
aspirants to NATO are convinced that the key function of NATO is to
prevent the domination of the continent by either Germany or Russia,
a function that, history teaches, requires the engagement of the United
States.
Why Not Strengthen the OSCE?

In 1990 many of those now backing NATO enlargement, including this
author, argued that because the Warsaw Pact was manifestly about to
collapse, Western governments could accord less priority to NATO and
invest more resources in the pan-European Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; since 1994, the OSCE) as the main post-
Cold War security organization. Since then, the OSCE'S inability to do
anything about the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya has undermined
confidence in the organization and reinforced NATO as the security
organization of choice. The OSCE can perform useful monitoring and
early warning functions, but it is unlikely to be endowed with any
military capability by its members states.
THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN C H E C H N Y A
Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the reformist Yabloko Party in Russia,

asserts that NATO is enlarging because of the Russian war against
Chechnya/ 6 This is not quite true, for Central Europeans had already
aspired to join NATO in 1991. Yavlinsky is right, however, to point to
Chechnya as a factor strengthening the motivation for enlargement.
Yavlinsky chastises Yeltsin for his misguided policy in Chechnya, and
he also criticizes the West, especially the Clinton administration, for
its mindless support of all Yeltsin's actions since 1991, however undem-
ocratic: not only the war in Chechnya, but also the closing of the
Russian parliament by force in 1993 as well as non-compliance with
the CFE treaty from 1992. to 1995. Yavlinsky claims that Western
support for Yeltsin hindered Russian reforms and alienated ordinary
Russians.
One of the benefits of opening up NATO is to show Russia that, for
Western democracies, the interests of small states in the new Europe
are just as important as those of big powers - something that Yeltsin
is only just beginning to understand. As Yavlinsky argues, Western
leaders would have helped Russia more by setting higher standards of
state practice than by consistently rewarding bad behaviour.
In the event, the lessons of Chechnya for Central Europe were stark
and unambiguous. Yeltsin ordered the attack on Chechnya in Decem-
ber 1994 just three days after leaving a CSCE summit meeting in
Budapest at which he had signed a code of conduct urging the peaceful
resolution of internal conflict. The bombing of civilians in Chechnya
not only undermined confidence in Russian reform but also destroyed
any vestige of confidence that Central Europeans had in the OSCE.
From the perspective of Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest, as long as Russia
had the potential to influence the OSCE, that organization was unlikely
to generate a European security system based on respect for the rule
of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. If anyone had doubts
before, Chechnya confirmed the view in Central Europe that NATO
was the only organization capable of defending the Western values that
Central Europeans crave.27
These are values to which many Russians also aspire. Keeping the
NATO door open, and constantly reassuring Russia that NATO'S new
priority is collective security for the whole of Europe, is not only the
best insurance policy for the smaller powers of Central Europe but
also the best hope for transforming Russia itself into a law-abiding
and peaceful democracy/8
THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN B O S N I A
Had NATO moved with greater speed to prevent the war in Bosnia, as
it could well have done by punishing Yugoslav president Slobodan
Milosevic for the bombing of Vukovar and Dubrovnik in 1991, or by
deploying preventive forces as requested by President Aliji Izetbegovic
of Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1991, Central Europeans might
have been reassured that NATO would protect them even if they
remained outside the Alliance, that NATO was (as it later demonstrated)
indeed concerned with more than the security of its own members. As
it was, however, in the absence of u.s. leadership NATO did not take
serious action until mid-1995. The message Central European leaders
learned from NATO'S procrastination was that European security was
divisible and that, unless states were inside NATO, protection would
be uncertain at best.
When NATO eventually did act to save Bosnia, it soon became clear
that Bosnia had also saved NATO. Before taking decisive action in
Bosnia, the direction NATO would take after the Cold War was still
uncertain. Then deployment of IFOR in 1996, and of the SFOR that
followed in 1997, demonstrated that (as long as the united States is
unambiguously in the lead) NATO has the capability for effective
peacekeeping and collective security. IFOR and SFOR also reflected the
success of NATO'S PFP program, which prepared non-NATO partners

for effective military action with the allies in joint task forces/9 NATO
could do much more to implement the Dayton Accords, but it deserves
credit for ending the fighting in 1995 and for preventing the renewal
of hostilities.
DEALING WITH THE HAVE-NOTS
The NATO operations in Bosnia also began to answer a basic question:

what should NATO do about those states that aspire to membership
but that will not be in the first tranche? One answer, obviously, is to
build up NATO'S PFP to maintain strong military and political links
with non-NATO partners, to establish NATO missions in the capitals of
partner states, and, where necessary, to take appropriate actions to
prevent or contain conflict. NATO cannot do this alone, but with willing
partners it can provide the backbone for peace operations throughout
Europe. To give credence to NATO'S proclaimed open-door policy,
Alliance leaders must now pay at least as much attention to those not
in the first tranche as they do to the successful new members.30
It is also clear that those left out of the first intake, like the Baltic
states, will be even more anxious to join the EU. The United States
will surely pressure its NATO allies who are also major powers in the
EU to accelerate the EU accession process. The EU summit in Amster-
dam in June 1997 did not give cause for optimism on this score, being
devoted to much navel gazing and arguments about monetary union.
But the United States is right to apply pressure on the EU, not least to
make the internal adjustments in the Common Agricultural Policy and
the distribution of structural funds which are preconditions for EU
enlargement.
CHAPTER THREE
Why Spain Should Have Been

NATO'S Last Member
David Law
Lest the title mislead, this chapter does not take the view that NATO
should go out of business. On the contrary, notwithstanding the sea
change that has taken place in the strategic environment that gave rise
to its founding fifty years ago, the organization remains irreplaceable.
NATO binds the two North American democracies to Europe in a way
that none of its sister institutions can replicate, and in a way that
brings benefits that none of them can provide. It is the only multilateral
security institution capable of dealing with anything other than the
most minor of military contingencies in Europe, and for that matter -
and if it were so inclined - anywhere else in today's troubled world.
It is the Western democracies' main instrument for their ongoing effort
to shore up the security of the transition countries of post-Communist
Europe. Beyond that, NATO remains indispensable as a pacifier of
bilateral relationships among its traditional members. However, it does
not follow, as the champions of NATO enlargement hold, that for others
to partake of such benefits, the Atlantic Alliance needs to expand its
membership. NATO enlargement, like so much else in life, is too much
of a good thing.
As the author and many other observers have argued, NATO'S pro-
jected expansion of membership does not make good strategic sense -
and this for three reasons in particular.1 First, enlargement is not fair
because, as it has been conceived, it brings into the Alliance first those
countries least needing a security umbrella and leaves to later - or
leaves out altogether - those needing it most. One can, of course,
argue that when it comes to decisions about security, fairness is neither
here nor there. Such a standpoint ignores, however, how a sentiment
of feeling ill done by can shape a community's security perceptions
over the longer term. Second, enlargement is not stabilizing, for at the
very least it complicates the delicate process of reordering security
relationships in post-Cold War Europe - and not just between the

West and Russia. But it also runs the risk of engendering substantially
more security problems - for new, non-, and old members alike - than
the architects of enlargement claim it can resolve. Third, enlargement
is in reality not necessary, because NATO has a more efficient and
effective way of addressing the security problems of today's and
tomorrow's Europe, namely, through further development of the
already quite impressive security arrangements organized under
NATO'S Partnership for Peace (pfp).
With the invitations issued to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland at the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 and the relative
ease with which one NATO country after another has ratified the
enlargement protocols, it now seems probable that the Alliance will
celebrate its fiftieth birthday with three new members.2 William Jef-
ferson Clinton, if he is still in office, will preside over the first expan-
sion of NATO membership since the end of the Cold War, and there
will be a collective sigh of relief at NATO headquarters and in nineteen
capitals. This chapter argues, however, that the most difficult part of
the enlargement process could well lie ahead, after the anniversary
summit scheduled for Washington in the spring of 1999.3
POLICY WITHOUT STRATEGY
If enlargement is so strategically flawed, how do we explain why the

project got off the ground in the first place? In actual fact, the
enlargement process was not launched within the Alliance as the result
of any serious debate on the strategic imperatives of the times. The
enlargement process was initiated because the United States and Ger-
many thought it made political sense, and because they thought that
if it made political sense to them, it would by definition make political
sense to others - as had almost invariably been the case during the
Cold War.
For the Clinton administration, but also for the Republican opposi-
tion in Congress, enlargement seems to have been driven initially by
domestic politics. A first consideration was that enlargement could be
electorally useful in strategically located electoral districts with a Cen-
tral and Eastern European ethnic profile.4 A second consideration was
that there was campaign money to be raised from a military/industrial
complex seeing dollar signs in NATO expansion, estimated by the State
Department to be worth as much as $80 billion dollars in arms sales
in the period running up to 2009.5 While the first issue has received
some attention, the second issue has been afforded relatively little. It
may have been decisive in launching the enlargement initiative.
Since the end of the Cold War, defence budgets have been downsized
worldwide. In the United States, the amount spent on procurement in
1996 was only half as much as it was ten years earlier. Production
lines have shrunk and there is increased competition for markets both
at home and abroad. At the same time, weapons systems have become
much more expensive to develop. This has led to far-reaching consol-
idation in the u.s. defence industry. The number of players has been
significantly reduced and unemployment in the industry is down by
almost half relative to the mid-1980s.
In an effort to keep costs manageable, the defence industry has
attempted to maximize economies of scale. For example, to maintain
the costs of the latest, state-of-the-art, joint fighter aircraft at the level
of $30 million per plane - roughly the cost of the F-i6 developed in
the 19705 - it is planned to have a production line of 2900 planes,
and to this end, to customize models for several countries and services.
The bottom line is basically this: the longer the production line, the
lower the cost.6
In fact, Alliance membership does not really impose an obligation
to purchase expensive weapons systems. Alliance members have widely
varying defence profiles, as comparison of the extremely limited capa-
bilities of Iceland and Luxembourg with those of most other NATO
members readily demonstrates. Moreover, NATO has made repeatedly
clear that it is not in the business of hedging against the kind of Cold
War threat that would require new members to make major new
procurement expenditures. In December 1997, for example, NATO
foreign ministers issued a statement estimating the cost of its first
enlargement to be a relatively modest $1.5 billion (u.s.). 7
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine how certain interests within
the American military-industrial complex may have concluded that
NATO enlargement would be better for defence sales than the pfp. In
the pfp there has been little peer pressure to modernize and standardize.
NATO membership, on the other hand, has been associated with a high
degree of interoperability of weapons systems. In its 1997 report to the
Congress on NATO enlargement, the State Department provided a
lengthy list of the kinds of military restructuring new members' mili-
taries might be expected to undergo. This included training of various
kinds, ground-force modernization, surface-to-air missile procurement,
and air-force modernization, including the procurement of one squad-
ron of refurbished Western combat aircraft per new member.8
It is this kind of numbers that may have convinced u.s. defence
manufacturers in the run-up to the 1994 NATO summit to attempt to
build support among Democrats and Republicans alike for member-
ship expansion. This coincided with the approach of the u.s. mid-term
elections and the typically frantic efforts of both parties to raise funds
for their campaigns. As it was, defence contractors gave, by conserva-
tive estimate, some $7.5 million through Political Action Committees
to congressional candidates in 1993-94. In an industry where produc-
tion of a new fighter aircraft can cost over $2.00 billion, this is a
pittance; for u.s. legislators, contributions from the defence sector can
be of decisive importance in running for office.9 And, despite NATO
attempts to downplay cost concerns, reports coming out of Central
and Eastern Europe in 1998 underlined that the push for arms sales
by u.s. defence manufacturers was still going strong.10
The calculation in Bonn seems to have quite different. Indeed, Volker
Ruhe, the former German defence minister and the first Alliance figure
to call publicly for enlargement, is on record as describing the need
for new members to acquire new weapons systems as "pure drivel."11
But in Germany as well there was initially no internal debate over the
strategic impact of enlargement. Bonn had even less interest than
Washington did in embarking on a policy that could lead to serious
friction with Russia. Yet, from the perspective of 1993, it must have
hardly seemed possible that enlargement would complicate relations
with a Russia that only three years earlier had been prepared to
swallow German unification.
In an absence of strategic concern about Russia, Bonn would be
moved by other considerations. Germany, in an Alliance of only six-
teen, was at the extreme western edge of post-Communist instability.
By bringing its neighbours into the Alliance, Germany could seek to
create a buffer zone between itself and Europe's most unstable
stretches. The inclusion into NATO of the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland, all three of which had been primary targets of German
capital investment from the early 19905, could have the additional
advantage of enhancing confidence about their economic future. Per-
haps most important, by taking the lead on enlargement, Germany
could help overcome memories of its past role in Mitteleuropa and
uneasiness about its possible intentions in the area. Beyond that, how
could Germany, which had only recently celebrated its own reunifica-
tion and the concomitant enlargement of NATO and the European
Union (EU) to include the former East Germany, deny to its neighbours
what it had gained for itself? IZ
If the Washington-Bonn consensus was a precondition for the launch-
ing of the enlargement project, the situation in other key capitals was
favourable. Paris, for example, preferred to delay EU expansion, fear-
ing the implications for its domestic politics of the serious reform that
this would necessitate on the European level. It was therefore prepared
to abandon its traditionally minimalist approach to the Alliance and
support NATO enlargement as a quick and easy fix that would reduce
Central and Eastern European pressures for early EU enlargement.
London, on the other hand, wanted to stave off efforts, primarily
French-led, to build a European Security and Defence Identity; for
Whitehall, enlargement was a way of thwarting plans to push for
integration of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU. Other
EU governments would soon come round to similar conclusions. Some
acted out of genuine enthusiasm for enlargement; others were simply
reluctant to oppose the enlargement initiative once it had become clear
that the Clinton White House had become wedded to its consummation.
Finally, the issue was driven by the strident demands for membership
lodged by the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles. They had, and continue
to have, a strong case for inclusion. They have insisted that they are
caught in a security vacuum, that they are natural extensions of the
Western and Central European cultural, historical, and economic com-
munity, and that they have suffered more than once as a result of
strategic neglect on the part of the leading Western democracies. In
fact, a major argument in favour of enlargement that could be heard
at NATO headquarters in the run-up to the Madrid summit was that
the three countries had grown so accustomed to the notion that they
would be included in the Alliance, that to disappoint them would have
represented a strategic faux pas. This may have been one of the most
important factors pushing the process.
NATO decision making on enlargement is a classic case of "part to
whole" politics. Partial arguments and individual interests came to
dominate reflection early on. There was no attempt to review whether
and why enlargement might be advantageous from a pan-European
standpoint. The issue soon took on a life of its own. At the 1994 NATO
summit, the decision was taken "to open a perspective on enlarge-
ment." Even though it would take another three and a half years before
NATO would actually extend membership invitations, it was already
clear at that junction that any further debate among Alliance govern-
ments would be about "how, when, and who." Actually, even the
"who" question was partially resolved by this time, however unoffi-
cially. Barring a major reversal in their internal reform process, the
Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles could be more or less certain that they
would be among the first invitees.13
From this point on, NATO policy - when not preoccupied with the
conflict in Bosnia - was fixated on the question of how to adapt the
European security situation to the pending mini-enlargement. This
remained true, notwithstanding the emergence of a number of devel-
opments that suggested that the light might not be worth the candle.
One was the rising opposition to enlargement in traditionally pro-
NATO policy circles in Alliance countries. A second was the increasing

nervousness in Central and Eastern European capitals, other than
Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw, as they realized that their prospects
for inclusion in the first wave were weak, and that a second and/or
third wave would be highly problematic. As an indication of such
concerns in the Baltic states, it was quasi-officially rumoured that no
enlargement would be preferable to an enlargement that excluded
them. Additional difficulties emerged as the question of just how much
enlargement was going to cost and who was going to pay for it heated
up in the Unites States.14 Then, as NATO struggled to please and
appease old, new, possible, and unlikely members, and address their
widely conflicting interests, it was confronted with the full complexity
of the enlargement project. Finally, NATO'S biggest headache - and the
catalyst for many of the other problems - was Russia's sharpening
opposition. But for many observers, well before the Madrid summit,
"the train had left the station." This chapter now looks at some of
the more daunting challenges that the conductors of this train will have
to contend with as it makes its journey through the Europe of the
turning millennium. 15
"EDUCATING RUSSIA"
NATO has consistently radiated optimism about its ability to bring the
enlargement process to a successful conclusion. Its assumption has
been, that with sound arguments, the occasional concession, and new
institutional devices, it would prove possible to overcome the reserva-
tions and scepticism that have accompanied the project in some Euro-
pean capitals from the beginning. This hope has been particularly on
display in NATO'S attitude towards Russia.
One argument put forward by the proponents of enlargement has
been that Russia needs NATO as a pole of stability for its own reform
process. An example sometimes cited is the way Moscow took advan-
tage of the Alliance's extended "hand of friendship" during the decisive
days of August 1991, in particular when Boris Yeltsin made his famous
phone call to then secretary general Manfred Worner at NATO head-
quarters to appeal for the organization's continuing support for Rus-
sia's embryonic democracy. This argument finds its continuation in the
idea that the charter on Russia-NATO relations and the NATO-Russia
Council that have been agreed to as part of the enlargement process
can be of similar utility.
A related notion is that enlargement will bring concrete benefits for
Russian security, because it will have a stabilizing effect on European
security in general and on Russia's western flank in particular. With
Central and Eastern European countries tidily tucked into the Alliance
- so the argument goes - there will be much less risk of instability in
their relations, and hence much less for Russia to worry about to its
west.
A third aspect is the Alliance's stated determination to go the extra
mile in meeting any Russian concerns that are in its view reasonable.
NATO has, in fact, worked hard to make enlargement decision making
fully transparent to Russia, keeping it informed of developments as
necessary and as possible. "No surprises" has been the proviso as the
process has unfolded. A further argument has been the slow pace with
which NATO has moved ahead on the enlargement front. Most impor-
tant, NATO has pledged that its defence posture on new members'
territory will be non-threatening. While not prepared to promise not
to station nuclear weapons or troops on the territory of new members
under any circumstances, Alliance officials have said that there is "no
plan, no reason and no intention" to deploy either.16
The fourth part of the NATO'S sales pitch is that it recognizes Russia's
apprehension about exclusion and the need to include it as appropriate.
Just as the Alliance wanted Russia to participate in the pfp, it now
wants the relationship to develop further through the NATO-Russia
Council. The view is that, if Russia is going to be excluded, it will be
because of decisions in Moscow, not in Brussels. At the same time,
NATO members have taken measures to open the door of other insti-
tutions. Russia was admitted the Council of Europe in 1996 and to
the G7 at its 1997 meeting in Denver.17 Finally, there is the as yet very
hazy idea of possible membership for Russia in the Alliance, an idea
not necessarily excluded by the United States and some other NATO
members but by no means uniformly accepted in the Alliance.18
In addition to this quasi-official view, a number of other perspectives
on Russia are at work in NATO decision making. One is that Russia
will ultimately overcome its objections to enlargement, even if it
remains in disagreement in principle. While by no means an official
line, this perspective figures strongly in Alliance thinking. It is under-
pinned by the notion that Russia has been brought around in the past
when the price was right and there are no reasons to believe this cannot
continue to be the norm in future. This view is fed by two assumptions
about Russia's situation and interests. The first idea is that the country
is financially "on the make" and can be bought with new injections
of capital. Whether this kind of horse-trading actually exists is difficult
to prove. It is worth noting, however, that after the Madrid summit,
such Western-dominated institutions as the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank took a number of initiatives designed to
ease the Russian government's liquidity problems. 19 The second
assumption idea is that Russia is strategically "on the make" and can
be persuaded to fall into line through Western concessions on arms
control, especially in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) context,
and tacit Western agreement to treat the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (cis) as Russia's sphere of influence.20 Again a direct
connection is difficult to prove. Russia did, however, obtain de facto
recognition of some of the adjustments it had demanded in the CFE
treaty in an "agreement in principle" to revise certain clauses that was
reached in July 1997.2I
Another standpoint, thankfully much less widespread, is that it does
not really matter an awful lot whether Russia accepts NATO enlarge-
ment or not. In this view, Russia's lowly post- Cold War status means
that it is no longer is a key consideration in Alliance decision making.
Put another way, Russia can like NATO enlargement it or lump it -
and if it lumps it, it is simply too weak or ineffectual for this to make
much of a difference.
Still another view is that Russia is on its own trajectory and that,
no matter what NATO does, it will again become the "bad guy" of
European politics. It is, therefore, incumbent on NATO to act now while
it still can and to use the available window of opportunity to build a
strong anti-Russian alliance. Whether intended or not, this is the kind
of thinking that seems likely to become self-fulfilling. A related view
from Henry Kissinger, one of the patrons of the realist school of
international relations, is that NATO has already given Moscow too
much of droit de regard over its own decision making by virtue of the
Russia-NATO Council.22
WHY RUSSIA WON'T BUY
With the membership invitations extended, and ratification proceeding

smoothly, the NATO-Russia debate over the pros and cons of enlarge-
ment has lost much of its earlier prominence. Nevertheless, fundamen-
tal differences persist, and the possibility of new tensions over the
pending new memberships and any others that may follow should not
be excluded.
There are several reasons for this. In the first place, opposition to
enlargement has been shown to pay. NATO efforts to persuade Russia
to accept enlargement have encouraged Russia to "play hard to get"
on issues that it might otherwise have been more prone to resolving
in cooperation with the West. The Yeltsin government cannot overplay
this hand, particularly in view of its financial dependence on the West.
Still, it would seem to enjoy a certain amount of room for manoeuvre,
especially in the area of arms control and disarmament.23 At the same
time, NATO efforts to placate Russia through the creation of the NATO-
Russia Council can have the effect of fostering precisely those feelings
of Russian superiority in European affairs that the Alliance should be
encouraging it to shed. The organization has made a point of practising
"one country, one vote," notwithstanding the huge disparities in the
profiles of its members. It has been disconcerting to see it promoting
a framework for consultation with Russia that de facto acknowledges
in the NATO context the superior power position in Central and Eastern
Europe and the cis to which part of the Russian elite continues to
aspire.14 The traditional allies of the United States would never have
bestowed on it such a status within the Alliance, even in the unlikely
event that they had been petitioned to this effect.
Second, a good case can be made for the probability that enlarge-
ment will lead to a deterioration of Russia's security situation. The
main problems here are not in the area of CFE ceilings or NATO
intentions, but concern the impact of enlargement on stability in
Central and Eastern Europe and on the cohesion of the Russian
Federation.15 With regard to Central and Eastern Europe, there are
reasons for being apprehensive about the impact of enlargement on
relations between those states that are slated to join in the first wave
of enlargement, and those hoping to be included in a later phase or
doubting their future chances altogether.
Romania, for example, worked hard in the run-up to the Madrid
summit to address issues that could stand in the way of its accession
to the Alliance. It sought to resolve problems in its relations with its
Ukrainian and Hungarian neighbours and to meet the concerns of its
sizeable Hungarian minority. In acknowledgement of this, the Roma-
nian candidacy received much support prior to the Madrid summit
and was rewarded with a half-promise that it would be included in
the next wave of enlargement. But, as doubts have grown about the
likelihood of the second enlargement, extreme nationalist forces in
Romanian politics have been strengthened at the expense of the mod-
erate nationalists who have dominated the government in recent years.
At the same time, Hungary's new government, elected in June 1998,
has signalled its determination to do more for the two million Hun-
garians living in adjacent countries.16 To bring one country in while
leaving the other out could make it extremely difficult for the two
countries to manage their bilateral security relationship. Similar prob-
lems can arise between other countries that share ethnic or religious,
communities and/or difficult pasts, and that find themselves on oppo-
site sides of the enlargement divide.
A related concern is the evolution of new members' policies towards
Russia. Will anti-Russian revanchisme in Central and Eastern Europe
be encouraged or checked by enlargement? In neither instance is the

track record of security institutions encouraging. Joint Greek-Turkish
membership in the Alliance certainly helped efforts to check bilateral
friction during the Cold War, but it is questionable to what extent this
can be relied to keep conflict at bay under current strategic circum-
stances. Nor has the experience of the WEU, where Greece enjoys full
membership but Turkey only associate status, been encouraging in this
regard.
Another set of strategic concerns relates to the cohesion of Russia
and the viability of the cis as a vehicle for addressing common problems
in post-Soviet territory. Russia can be forgiven for being apprehensive
about the impact of Central and Eastern European integration on post-
Soviet space. This could strengthen centrifugal forces in the Russian
Federation, for example, in Kaliningrad. NATO membership for the
Baltic states, and perhaps in time for Ukraine, would lock sizeable
Russian and Russian-speaking communities into a different security
community, and position at Russia's doorstep the world's most power-
ful military alliance. It is unrealistic for the West to expect that Russia
will not be alarmed by this prospect. Already, the enlargement process
has encouraged Yeltsin's government to drop earlier reservations and
move closer towards Lukashenka's unreforming Belarus.27 The result
- a Potemkin-like Union - is less important than the direction. The
efforts of the Baltic countries to distance themselves from the near
abroad have also raised concerns in Moscow. For example, then
foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov warned after the Yeltsin-Clinton
summit in Helsinki in March 1997 that inclusion of the Baltic states
would irrevocably compromise the Russia-NATO relationship/8
The third reason why Moscow will continue to resist enlargement
is that from a Russian perspective, it symbolizes the West's lack of
preparedness to seek Russia's integration into the post-Cold War West-
ern-led community. The contrast with other post-Communist states -
and particularly neighbouring Poland - is akin to a Western vote of
non-confidence in Yeltsin's government and the prospects for the
reform process. In the Russian domestic debate, this can be used as a
dagger in the government's back. For example, Communist leader
Gennady Zyuganov castigated the results of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit
as a crushing defeat for the government's foreign policy. In the Duma
two weeks prior to the summit, a vote opposing NATO enlargement
was supported by 300 to i. Z9 Yeltsin's position is too weak, his
relations with the West have been too close, and the resistance in the
Duma is too strong for him to accept enlargement on any terms short
of Russia receiving a veto over NATO decision making. For obvious
reasons, this will not be forthcoming. His only option is to put on a
brave face and to argue that the NATO-Russia Council can be used to
limit the damage to Russian interests.
Beyond that, for Russians in and outside the government committed
to working for the normalization and modernization of their country,
enlargement is a threatening diversion. For those in the Duma who
wish to focus the country's energies on building a strong military in a
strong state and who press for Soviet Reunion, however, enlargement
can be a welcome ally. In particular, it can serve as the centrepiece of
future attempts to rally the masses around political programs featuring
anti-Western policies.
A R I S I N G RUS SIAN
REVANCHIST STATE?
As yet there is little sign that Russia's beleaguered population is overly

concerned about NATO enlargement and Russia's responses. However,
in a community that has been invaded on four occasions from the West
in as many centuries, this can change. In the 19905, for the first time
in its modern history, Russia has had an opportunity to devise a
broadly based foreign policy that is not predicated on the country being
challenged by an imminently menacing national or a class enemy.
Enlargement seems set to narrow the opportunities for Russia escaping
from this historical pattern. In its reaction, Russia can prove strategi-
cally bothersome to the West over the short term. The really crucial
issue, however, is what impact it will have on post-Yeltsin governments,
on those who are now learning their political trade, trying to win a
public profile for themselves and reflecting on political platforms for
the first decade of the next millennium.
History never repeats itself exactly, but there are some disconcerting
parallels between Germany's development after the First World War
and that of Russia after the Cold War. Yeltsin's Russia now, like pre-
Hitler Germany then, is locked in an economic hypercrisis. Yeltsin's
Russia faces the prospect of exclusion, just as pre-Hitler Germany was
excluded from the post-First World War order. After 1918, Germany's
exclusion had a major impact on the debate between those in the
country who wanted to seek accommodation with the winners of the
war and the traditionalists who sought to keep Germany anchored in
the East. Exclusion from the Versailles order decided the debate in
favour of the latter and paved the way for the Rapallo Treaty of 1912..
This in turn set the stage for the strategic cooperation that was the
stuff of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. Russia's
modern-day exclusion increases the likelihood of Russian participation
in the anti-Western coalitions of the next decade.
While this parallel should not be taken too far, the possibility of
developments such as a Sino-Russian Rapallo cannot be entirely dis-
missed.30 The crisis-management systems of post-First World War and
post-Cold War are similarly weak. The League of Nations failed
because Germany and Russia were excluded, and the united States
excluded itself. The European security architecture of the 19908 can
yet fail because of a combination of factors, including Russia's exclu-
sion, exaggerated expectations of the role the united States is prepared
to play in European security in the post-Cold War era, and the inad-
equate contribution of the developed European states to their own
security affairs. We will return to the issue in the concluding section.
For the time being, the point to be stressed is that, from a Russian
perspective, NATO enlargement can constitute a bifurcation point in
the country's development. NATO-Russia strategic partnerships, char-
ters, and councils are well meaning, but these are diplomatic constructs
that fail to seize the deeper-lying issues shaping Russia's future.
THE SOLANA SCHEDULE
Symptomatic of this approach is NATO Secretary General Javier

Solana's view of how the enlargement process will unfold, as related
to a group of Russia experts visiting the Alliance in the spring of
1997.31 For the secretary general, enlargement is a process of security
"socialization" that will do for the new Central and Eastern European
members what it did for his own country when it emerged from
Franquist dictatorship two decades ago. Moreover, it is for him an
ongoing process that, in the ten-year period stretching from the Alli-
ance's fiftieth to its sixtieth anniversary, will see, in three or four
additional waves of enlargement, all the (current) twelve would-be
members of NATO joining the Alliance.
The deadlines laid out by the secretary general - the signing of the
Russia-NATO Charter in May 1997, the invitations issued at the
Madrid summit in July 1997, the preparation of the protocols of
accession by the end of 1997 - have so far all been met with ease. But
schedules for playing out political agendas can be notoriously inexact.
Take that of the Spanish accession to the Alliance. If there had not
been a change in government in Madrid in 1982, Spain's process of
accession would have been simple and straightforward. As it was, the
assumption of power of the Spanish Socialists - Solana's party - led
to a freezing of Spain's status in the Alliance. Four years then transpired
before a referendum could be organized on the principle and on the
terms of Spanish membership. While a majority of the electorate
supported NATO membership, the referendum text stipulated inter alia
that Spain would stay out of NATO'S integrated military structure. It

was to be the next decade before negotiations could be completed on
the "coordination" agreements required to govern the relationship
between Spain's national forces and the integrated forces of the Alli-
ance. Then, in 1996, following another change in government, Madrid
announced that it wished Spain to participate fully in the integrated
military structure. At the July 1997 summit, it was confirmed that
Spain would reintegrate once NATO had completed its review of its
command structure. With the completion of this process in the lead-
up to the December 1997 NATO foreign ministers' meeting, the way
was free for Spain to become a full member of the Alliance - no less
than fifteen years after the country's original accession.
This does not need to be the way of NATO'S next new members. It
could, however, well be. The domestic political circumstances of the
three invited states are rather more complicated than those of NATO'S
last new member, as are their relations with neighbouring states, large
and small. The then Soviet Union was hardly a major consideration
in Spanish decision making in the 19808. By the end of 1997, two
referenda on enlargement had already taken place in Central and
Eastern Europe: in Slovakia, whose membership bid was rejected at
the Madrid summit, and in successful Hungary.
The Solana schedule will also encounter obstacles if, as we have
suggested, an overall worsening of security relations in Europe accom-
panies the first wave of enlargement. Just how far this could go is
clearly difficult to assess. While a return to Cold War politics can be
safely excluded, we could witness a resurrection of some of the more
disconcerting strategic realities of the Cold War. If there is growing
apprehension over the security situation, NATO could find itself
addressing the issue of how new members interests are to be defended
in more detail and under more pressure than appeared likely when
new memberships were first embraced as a policy option. This could
mean new debates about the high cost of enlargement. More seriously,
it could give enhanced prominence to questions of nuclear defence and
nuclear roles.32 This could prove particularly problematic if the Alli-
ance fails to wrap up rapidly the review of the Strategic Concept that
was announced at the December 1997 foreign ministerial meeting.33
Against this background, NATO may begin its second half-century
with more new problems than new members, and in several respects
a more fragile institutional framework, much less capable of playing
a stabilizing role. Already in the lead-up to enlargement, institutional
arrangements seem to have become hopelessly complex. Post-Madrid,
NATO consultations on political issues are configured at sixteen (the
existing members), at 16 + i (the existing members with both Russia
and Ukraine), at 16 + 3 (with the three invitees), at 16 + 28 (in the

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), and at another version of 16 + i
(with each of NATO'S six Mediterranean partners). It remains to be
seen what will be the impact on this institutional hydra when the NATO
core group passes from sixteen to nineteen.
In the wake of enlargement, the structure for European security may
be weakened on a number of fronts. The Organization on Security and
cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the only all-inclusive security institu-
tion in Europe and the only one in which all European states enjoy
equal status. It may find its effectiveness undercut once countries, for
which it was the sole institutional home when the Warsaw Pact folded,
join the Alliance. Similarly, Alliance enlargement raises questions about
the future memberships of the WEU and the EU, and about the con-
gruity of their rosters with those of both NATO and one another. For
the time being, all ten full members of the WEU are members of both
the Alliance and the EU. The next phase of EU enlargement is to make
members of not only the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, but
also Cyprus, Slovenia, and Estonia. Theoretically, this should be man-
ageable as long as the latter three countries opt for a status similar to
that of the four members that are not members of the EU - Ireland,
Finland, Sweden, and Austria. But the security traditions of these states
are as different as night from day. It seems unlikely that the newcomers
will bend their identities to meet the requirements of European insti-
tutional coherence.
All this promises to discourage the Alliance from undertaking a
second round of enlargement. Should the Alliance limit itself to nine-
teen members, this would put the countries that have wanted to join
NATO but have not been invited for the first round of enlargement in
an even more difficult situation than if there had been no enlargement
at all. The air in their security vacuum will become correspondingly
lighter. For some of the second-round hopefuls, the process of adjusting
to non-inclusion may have already started. For example, the Romanian
prime minister has acknowledged that it is "unlikely" that his country
will be invited to join NATO in 1999 and "more realistic" to view
membership as "possible" between 2000 and 2003. He has also
warned that there should be no repeat of the "hysteria" that accom-
panied Romania's membership bid in i99y. 34 Any number of Eastern
capitals, including Moscow, would welcome a successful effort to
downplay the urgency and importance of the membership issue. But
this will not be easy. NATO'S fiftieth anniversary will not be a quiet
affair, and enlargement fortunes and failures easily lend themselves to
domestic political infighting. This points to the fundamental dilemma
that has underlain the enlargement project from its very inception.
While any enlargement at all is anathema to Moscow, too much

enlargement is worse still; too little enlargement, on the other hand,
can mean a deterioration in the security situation of the non-included
Central and Eastern European states.
THE ALLIANCE THAT IS NO LONGER
There is a twofold irony about NATO enlargement that has thus far
received little attention. One part of this irony is that the NATO that
Central and Eastern European countries have been lining up to join
no longer exists. The second part is that, for the reasons outlined
above, enlargement may well end up calling into question the NATO
that still does, with unfortunate consequences for European security
as a whole.
NATO is no longer the NATO it was during the Cold War in several
respects. One relates to the security guarantee embodied in Article 5
of the Washington Treaty. This foresees that "an armed attack against
one or more of [the member nations] in Europe or North America
shall be considered as an attack against them all." Actually, there was
never anything automatic about this guarantee; a decision to go to war
as an Alliance, as with any other NATO decision, requires a consensus
decision. In practice, however, this article became associated with
"automaticity" owing to the strategic circumstances of the Cold War,
the existence of the nuclear threat, and the likelihood that any shooting
war pitting NATO and Warsaw Pact countries against one another
would invariably involve a nuclear exchange. This perspective assumed
that members would have very little leeway, if any at all, in deciding
whether or not to defend an ally. In the strategic circumstances of post-
Cold War, not only have Article 5 contingencies become highly unlikely
but the prospect that mutual guarantees would actually be acted upon
in such contingencies is extremely questionable. This change in the
quality of Article 5 was already signalled in the fall of 1990 when
there was considerable hesitation within the Alliance about taking
measures to reinforce Turkey, at that time facing a menacing Saddam
Hussein.35 In the meantime, it has become clear that, whether NATO
countries are prepared to do battle for a just cause has little to do with
membership considerations. Bosnia is not a member, nor of course is
Kosovo; membership is not currently an issue for either.
As argued above, today's NATO remains the most effective multilat-
eral security organization in Europe, perhaps anywhere. But this is a
NATO that is far removed from the organization that enjoyed a virtual
monopoly over Western security affairs during the Cold War. In the
19905, the pattern is for NATO to share, and sometimes contest,
responsibility with other institutions. Similarly, NATO countries can

find themselves, as in Bosnia, participating in coalitions whose non-
NATO member countries outnumber them. This underscores that NATO
membership is no longer the badge of exclusivity that it once was. But
it also says that it makes little sense to approach the issues of interop-
erability and joint training from any context other than that of the pfp.
A third feature of "the Alliance that no longer exists" concerns the
American role. One of the most compelling attractions of NATO has
been the link it provides with the North American democracies, and
particularly the United States. But the nature of this link has evolved
considerably. During the Cold War, NATO was associated with unflinch-
ing U.S. leadership, and U.S. leadership was associated with NATO.
This has changed. Post-Cold War, the united States has reduced its
involvement. It has also signalled that it will no longer always wish to
take the lead in the continent's security. Washington will follow a
credible Euro-lead, but short of that, the best Europe can expect is
the kind of temperamental shifting between neo-leadership and neo-
isolationism that the White House has put on display in the Yugoslav
saga. As U.S. attitudes about American involvement in European secu-
rity have evolved, so have their institutional manifestations. The trans-
atlantic link is no longer the exclusive property of NATO. In the Europe
of the 19905, it has more diverse but also more modest dimensions:
the bilateral arrangement with the EU, the Concert-like function in
the OSCE and the Contact Group, and the pivotal pan-European role
in pfp.
To conclude, NATO membership offers little that could not have been
better provided for elsewhere, without the negative repercussions for
European security generated by Alliance politics of inclusion and exclu-
sion. The pfp, now five years old, offers a flexible self-differentiating
framework for security cooperation. It has an impressive track record
as a school for preparing multilateral security cooperation. It offers
participating countries the opportunity to request consultations when
faced with serious security challenges.36 Working in tandem with the
pfp is the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. With its forty-four
members, it constitutes a framework for political consultation that is
even more inclusive than its predecessor, the North Atlantic Coopera-
tion Council. These two institutions provide all European countries
that are so inclined with a post-Cold War version of the transatlantic
link - downsized, more diffuse, and less dependable. That is about as
much America as can be hoped for in today's Europe. But it is already
quite a lot. The challenge now for those who have the Alliance's best
interests at heart will be to ensure that enlargement does not end up
putting all of this at irreparable risk. 37
CHAPTER FOUR
Will Enlargement Succeed?

Richard L. Kugler
When the controversial idea of enlarging NATO burst upon the public
scene in 1994, it gave rise to an impassioned debate over a single
burning issue: Is NATO enlargement a good idea and should it become
u.s. policy? Although this debate continues with undiminished fervour
in many places today, the past few months have brought important
policy changes that are altering the terms of reference for thinking
about enlargement, and for quarrelling about it. The issue of whether
NATO will enlarge is now all but settled. Like it or not, NATO is going
to enlarge, and soon. As a result, a new issue is likely to come to the
forefront: Will enlargement succeed? Will it be carried out in ways that
actually bring about the powerful strategic benefits it is intended to
produce? Or will it fall on its face and produce a disaster - or a mess
and a dud?
These important questions are only in the kindling stage today, but
soon they may start burning, for their answers are not obvious. With
these questions foremost in mind, this chapter addresses the benefits,
costs, and risks of NATO enlargement. In particular, it analyses how
these critical performance indicators are likely to be affected by the
political-military strategy chosen by NATO for implementing enlarge-
ment. There are many different strategies for enlargement, and NATO
has not yet determined which one to pursue. The strategy chosen by
NATO will be key to determining whether enlargement evolves into a
success or a failure. Consequently, this chapter offers some insights on
how the benefits, costs, and risks are likely to play out as a function
of how the United States and NATO grapple with the challenges and
dilemmas of implementing enlargement.
This chapter flows in a straightforward fashion. It begins with
general observations that set the stage. It then describes the potential
benefits of NATO enlargement. Next, it discusses the importance of
implementation strategy in achieving these benefits. It then discusses

the costs of enlargement, and the risks. Finally, it suggests policy
changes that might help NATO implement enlargement successfully,
in ways that maximize the benefits, control the costs, and minimize
the risks.
SETTING THE STAGE
I write from the perspective that, although NATO enlargement is

opposed in some quarters, it is destined to happen. The Clinton
administration has issued a study strongly endorsing the idea, and
NATO has officially agreed. At NATO'S 1997 summit meeting in
Madrid, the Alliance has extended membership offers to several coun-
tries from East-Central Europe, namely Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary. Provided parliaments approve, NATO evidently intends
to admit these countries in mid-1999: the Alliance's fiftieth birthday.
Moreover, the Clinton administration and NATO have made clear that
enlargement will not end with this first group. Fully nine other coun-
tries have applied, and some may be invited to join in the following
years. Indeed, the door is being kept open to any European country
that meets NATO'S standards for democracy and peaceful relations with
its neighbours. Today's Alliance of sixteen nations will become a larger
alliance tomorrow - perhaps considerably larger.
Hence, our task here is not to judge whether NATO enlargement
should happen, but to help assess whether it will be a success once it
starts unfolding. Although there is room for honest debate, my appraisal
is cautiously optimistic. To me, NATO enlargement makes sense because
its potential benefits are powerful, its costs are affordable, and its risks
are manageable. It has the necessary ingredients to produce a success.
But this optimistic thesis is based on the premise that enlargement will
be implemented effectively: that is, strongly, in limited ways, while
wisely handling the countries outside an enlarged NATO, including
Russia. If enlargement is not implemented effectively, the opposite
could happen: a disappointing or even disastrous outcome. The bene-
fits, costs, and risks thus are not a constant. Instead, they are a
variable. They will depend upon how NATO enlargement is carried out.
In a journal article, I wrote: "Enlargement is an endeavour that must
be done right or it should not be done at all." This is a stark portrayal,
but it illuminates the stakes. Although NATO is launching enlargement
in the right direction, I am worried that the Alliance does not yet have
a clear idea of where it is headed and how it intends to get there. I
am also concerned that NATO has some questionable policies on its
mind, or at least policies whose internal consistency and coordination
Will Enlargement Succeed? 53
with each other is not apparent. Finally, I wonder whether NATO'S

governments as yet grasp the extent to which they will have to work
hard and commit resources if enlargement is going to yield something
more than lacklustre strategic results.
Owing to these reasons, my overall impression is that, at the
moment, NATO enlargement may be headed for trouble because a well-
developed implementation strategy has not yet been formed. Some time
ago, the main fear was trouble with Russia. Now that this fear is fading,
a different concern may be about to rise to the fore. It is that NATO
enlargement might deteriorate into a mess and a dud. A mess because
the many thorny complications are not worked out; a dud because the
process of enlargement is not carried out energetically enough. If this
lacklustre fate is to be avoided, a well-articulated implementation
strategy must be developed and then executed strongly.1
In saying this, I intend to be constructive, not critical. NATO enlarge-
ment poses complex policy questions that are made more difficult by
the need to achieve agreement among many governments. Moreover,
NATO'S decision to delay announcing new members until the Madrid
summit has made it difficult for all governments, as well as NATO'S
headquarters, to forge specific plans. To date, NATO has made good
progress on defining its military strategy for enlargement and deciding
upon new mechanisms for better consultations with Russia. But it has
not yet addressed a host of other weighty issues: for example, new
military roles and missions within NATO, the sharing of defence costs,
military reform in East-Central Europe, the admission of additional
members beyond the first tranche, better outreach programs to non-
members, and the future strategic order in the former Soviet Union.
The agenda of unresolved issues is thus quite large.
Although the u.s. government and NATO may be slow in developing
a coherent strategy, the reason is not that the issues raised by this
chapter are unknown on the inside. Nobody should be under the
illusion that forming a sound strategy is easy. Because multiple objec-
tives and complications are at work, no single line of reasoning pro-
vides an across-the- board solution. A sound strategy will have mixed
features and multiple dimensions. It will spring from a calculus that
weighs trade-offs, balances priorities, and accepts some painful sacri-
fices. These realities mean that the act of forming a sound strategy
poses not only challenges, but also dilemmas. This is all the more
reason for serious thinking, starting now.
Notwithstanding the difficulties ahead, I favour NATO enlargement.
I expect that, when the dust settles, enlargement will be done right.
NATO has a long track record of stumbling in confusion at first, then
getting its strategic bearings straight and finishing strong. The same
thing can happen again, and probably will occur. Even so, an era of
hard but worthy labour lies ahead. Because enlargement is a leap into
a strategic and intellectual void, a sound strategy cannot be crafted by
resorting to old, well-tested doctrines. A well-articulated plan based
on innovative thinking and hard work is a strategic necessity - not
something to be postponed in the hope that the Alliance can safely
muddle along, waiting to let the future make the tough choices for it.
The task facing NATO is to shape the future, not to be hostage to it.
The reality is that the enlargement drama will not end on the day
that new members enter the Alliance in 1999. Indeed, the drama will
just be starting. What happens afterward will be key to determining
whether NATO enlargement becomes a mess and a dud, or instead
succeeds in the ways that the future requires. Much depends upon the
constructive actions of many countries, and upon NATO'S ability to
resurrect its excellence at using coalition planning to master the chal-
lenges and dilemmas of a complex new era. Much also depends upon
U.S. leadership. The coming agenda is too important and too difficult
to allow the United States to sit on the sidelines, passively watching
events transpire. Passivity is a sure-fire recipe for failure; active lead-
ership is a recipe for success. NATO enlargement is one of the United
States's most important foreign-policy priorities. If the United States
wants a success, it will have to throw itself into the fray in order to
make success happen.
Although I have played a role in developing the theory of NATO
enlargement, my intent in this chapter is not to engage in advocacy.
Instead, my aim is to employ the methodology of "cost-benefit analy-
sis" in order to put forth a useful framework for thinking about the
implementation issue. Whether I accurately weigh the benefits, costs,
and risks of alternative implementation strategies is for readers to
decide. Because the future is so uncertain, we are all left speculating
about the likely consequences of NATO'S actions. This does not imply
that reasoned analysis is beyond the pale. Truth in this murky arena,
nonetheless, is partly a function of one's angle of vision. What I can
offer is informed judgment, nothing more.
If this chapter has an enduring contribution to make, it is more
fundamental than appraising the trade-offs and offering policy sugges-
tions. The contribution lies in pointing out that the debate about
whether NATO should enlarge is coming to a close. I am struck by how
much intellectual energy is still being spent on this dying issue, and
how little energy is being invested on the tough new issue of deciding
how to enlarge wisely. There are good ways to enlarge, and bad ways.
Doubtless governments everywhere will need help in sorting out the
difference between the two. Perhaps the academic community can help
by drawing focus on the increasingly important issue of devising
sensible strategies for NATO enlargement. Goodness knows, there are

plenty of weighty implementation issues to analyse, and to quarrel
about too.
THE BENEFITS
Enlargement will produce benefits to the extent that it helps achieve

NATO'S objectives, but what are these objectives? Critics charge that
enlargement is a narrow-minded replay of the Cold War: an exercise
in threat-based planning and wartime thinking aimed at preparing for
a new military confrontation with Russia. In fact, the opposite is true.
On countless occasions, the U.S. government and NATO have pro-
claimed that enlargement is driven by peacetime political and strategic
goals, and that they do not regard Russia as an adversary. Indeed, they
portray NATO enlargement as unfolding alongside a budding partner-
ship with Russia and a stable overall European security architecture.
Yet NATO is a military alliance. The act of admitting new members
means that solemn security commitments are being extended to these
countries. How can the act of extending peacetime security commit-
ments, made in the absence of threats and enemies, produce benefits
in terms of the announced objectives?
TOWARDS A STABLE EUROPE
Proponents of NATO enlargement answer this question by citing realist

and idealist arguments. To them, the main strategic benefit is that
NATO enlargement will help produce a more stable, peaceful Europe
in the years ahead. Many proponents see Europe as endangered by
future instability if NATO does not enlarge. They do not believe that
Western Europe can be walled off from Eastern Europe. Nor do they
view East-Central Europe - the large zone of ten countries and 150
million people separating Germany and Russia - as being owned
by Russia. What they hear is not Russia's complaints about NATO
enlargement, but the desperate pleas of nearly all these countries for
the West to come eastward so that they can adopt the West's values.
As a result, the proponents are willing to move key Western institu-
tions into this region - not only the European Union (EU) but also
NATO. After all, East-Central Europeans eagerly want to join the
Western community, and the Western countries have powerful reasons
to welcome them. This is an impending strategic marriage borne of
both passion and interest - one that allegedly should not be denied.
To the extent that the proponents are correct in predicting a rosy
future because of NATO enlargement, Europeans will obviously benefit
in direct ways because their homeland will be a safer, more prosperous
place. For its part, the United States will benefit not only directly but
also indirectly. It will benefit directly because a stable Europe is a vital
American interest. It will benefit indirectly because a stable Europe
will ease its broader, global security dilemmas in the coming era. The
United States will be better able to turn its attention to the endangered
regions of the Persian Gulf and Asia with less need to be always
looking over its shoulder to see whether Europe is coming unravelled.
Moreover, a stable Europe may allow several European countries to
contribute more help to the United States in these other theatres than
now. Today, for example, the United States is responsible for defending
the Persian Gulf almost alone - even though the Europeans need Gulf
oil as much as do the Americans. A stable Europe may allow European
members of NATO to contribute more military forces to defend the
Gulf, thereby lessening the burdens on the United States.
DIRECT BENEFITS OF ENLARGEMENT
How can NATO enlargement produce a more stable Europe? One direct
way, proponents claim, is to help keep NATO alive by giving it a
meaningful reform agenda. Advocates of this view argue that NATO
may unravel from irrelevance if it does not enlarge and otherwise take
on important new security missions that have a major bearing on
Europe's stability. If NATO unravels, this calculus holds, Europe may
unravel with it. Potential aggressors would be given a broader licence
to engage in roguish conduct. Equally worrisome, NATO'S own mem-
bers might fall victim to renationalization. They might return to their
old ways and start competing with each other. Renewed security
competition among Germany, France, and Britain is one possibility. If
so, the EU could also start unravelling, thereby administering a double
shock to Europe's stability. Beyond this, the collapse of NATO could
result in the United States not only losing its most important source
of influence in Europe but also disengaging from Europe itself. In this
event, Europe's stability would be dealt a triple shock.
Along with keeping NATO alive, enlargement is portrayed as con-
tributing to Europe's stability in three other direct ways. First, it
allegedly will help promote good strategic outcomes in East-Central
Europe. Second, it will help prevent bad outcomes in this region. Third,
it will help make NATO better prepared to handle bad outcomes if they
occur. These three contributions can be summarized in the peacetime
mantra "promote, prevent, and prepare."
The proponents argue that NATO enlargement will help promote
good strategic outcomes through several mechanisms. Enlargement will
help bring East-Central Europe back into Europe, its original home in
the centuries before it was pulled into the USSR'S orbit by the Cold
War. NATO enlargement will help bond this region to the transatlantic
alliance and Western Europe by bringing several countries into the
West's premier security organization, while also making it easier for
them to join other organizations, including the EU. NATO enlargement
will help promote integration and community-building with Western
countries, and within East-Central Europe itself, through such mech-
anisms as joint security planning and military cooperation. Perhaps
most important, proponents assert, NATO enlargement will lay the
rock-solid security foundation in East-Central Europe that is critical
to enabling democracy, market capitalism, and interstate cooperation
to take shape. The proponents argue that if NATO does not enlarge
into this region, the countries there will be left in an environment of
chronic insecurity, thereby inhibiting them from becoming democrats
and capitalists who regard military power as an instrument of self-
defence, not a club for menacing neighbours.
In addition to fostering democracy, they say, NATO enlargement will
have practical economic effects. It will do more than merely allow the
East Europeans to become capitalists. It allegedly will also create the
favourable security environment that allows Western businesses safely
to invest capital in the region. As a result, the region's prosperity will
be elevated. As economic prosperity grows, the likelihood of democ-
racy taking hold will further increase. This dynamic, proponents say,
is how Germany became a prosperous democracy and a good ally.
Germany's entrance into NATO in 1954 laid the foundation for all that
followed. The same thing allegedly can happen in East-Central Europe.
How will NATO enlargement help prevent bad strategic outcomes?
Proponents answer this question by pointing out that the current
situation - a neutral East-Central Europe - is allegedly unhealthy
because its creates a security vacuum (that is, the absence of credible
security guarantees) laid atop multiple imbalances of military power.
As a result, practically everybody is vulnerable to everybody else: if
not today, then some years from now. History shows that an unhealthy
situation like this can be a powder keg for a broad spectrum of future
disasters. One possibility is an upsurge of nationalism and militarism
among these countries, leading to intense conflict with each other.
Another possibility is perpetual vulnerability to Russia, when it again
acquires the willingness and strength to pursue imperial policies
towards Europe. The most feared outcome is renewed rivalry between
Germany and Russia, perhaps in ways that could pull Germany out
of NATO and thereby bring about a return of Europe's old and
unlamented tripolar security system. Proponents assert that NATO
enlargement can head off all these potential disasters by calming the
58 Conceptual debates over Emargement
East-Central Europeans, by reassuring Germany, and by sealing off this

region from future Russian intrigue.
What about preparing for bad outcomes if they occur? Proponents
argue that NATO enlargement will greatly strengthen the West's capac-
ity to resolve crises in their early stages. Moreover, an enlarged NATO
will possess greater military capabilities to intervene if crises start
escalating out of control. Proponents point out that NATO'S failure to
intervene earlier in Bosnia allowed an initially small ethnic war to
become genocide. To them, NATO will be far better able to act if it
already is present on the scene. The East-Central European countries
provide a good jump-off point for intervening in local conflicts any-
where along the vast arc stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black
Sea and beyond.
OTHER BENEFITS
Another important strategic benefit is that NATO enlargement allegedly

will contribute to the broader task of building a stronger all-European
security architecture. Proponents argue that an enlarged NATO will give
the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) more
muscle and better enable NATO to assist nearby countries that may not
be joining the Alliance (for example, Ukraine). Also, they say, an
enlarged NATO will be better able to pursue active military partnership
relations with Russia. NATO will move physically closer to Russia, and
by working with the East Europeans it will become more familiar with
Russian-style forces and doctrines. The proponents view the combina-
tion of NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) as a
vehicle for building a web of closer military ties to these and other
countries, thus enhancing security cooperation among many nations.
Their broader vision is that an enlarged NATO and Russia will collab-
orate together in making Europe a stable place.
The proponents further assert that NATO enlargement will enhance
the prospects for spreading democracy and other Western values even
farther eastward - in ways that affect the countries of the former Soviet
Union. Whereas critics argue that NATO enlargement is a recipe for an
authoritarian Russia, proponents judge that the step of bringing East
European countries into Western institutions will put greater pressure
on Russia, Ukraine, and other countries to become Western themselves.
They rest their case on the recent admission of former Russian Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozyrev. When Kozyrev was in office, he warned that
NATO enlargement could elevate Russia's nationalists and Communists
into power in Moscow. But since leaving office, he has begun to argue
the opposite: that a proper NATO enlargement will make it harder for
these people to gain power because it means that Western values are
truly coming East.
Irrespective of the impact on Russia, proponents argue, NATO
enlargement will have a positive effect on European military affairs by
reducing budget expenses. They assert that because East-Central
Europe is vital to Europe's stability, it would have to be defended by
NATO regardless of whether it is brought into the Alliance or not.
Enlargement allegedly will enable NATO to defend this region at far
less cost than would be the case if it is left outside NATO. The reason
is that alliances save money by allowing for combined planning and
other efficiencies. Moreover, NATO enlargement will allow the coun-
tries of this region to defend themselves at far lower cost. If they are
not brought into NATO, they will have to provide for their self-defence
by maintaining their own large military forces. If they join NATO, by
contrast, they will gain security commitments from powerful allies. As
a result, they will be able to protect themselves with smaller forces and
budgets, while focusing their defence investments on better-quality
forces that can work closely with NATO'S forces.
The final strategic benefit of NATO enlargement is that it allegedly
will help enable the Alliance better to prepare itself for new security
missions outside East-Central Europe. Proponents point out that NATO
today lacks the capability to project military power outside its borders.
Enlargement will compel NATO to become better at this mission in
order to carry out new security commitments in East-Central Europe.
This will be the case because, owing to Russian sensitivities, NATO will
not be stationing large u.s. or West European forces in East-Central
Europe. As a result, NATO will be required to develop a power-
projection capability for the region. This step, in turn, will elevate
NATO'S capacity to project forces elsewhere: for example, the Balkans,
the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf.
BIG BENEFITS REQUIRE

A SOUND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
If these are the anticipated strategic benefits of enlargement as seen by

the proponents, how significant are they likely to be? Will these
benefits be major: enough to make a truly big difference? Or will they
be minor: mostly a ripple? What are the implications for NATO'S
implementation strategy?
Proponents argue that the degree of strategic benefit will be huge.
They perceive that NATO enlargement will greatly enhance Europe's
stability and integration. The opponents argue the opposite. Some
assert that NATO enlargement may yield benefits, but only in modest
ways because Europe is already marching towards enduring stability

on its own. Other opponents argue that, although Europe may be
endangered, NATO enlargement is not the correct solution. Indeed,
enlargement may make the situation far worse. They especially fear
that enlargement will cause big, unwarranted troubles with Russia. The
wiser choice, they say, is to handle the future with other mechanisms.
Although both sides raise valid issues, I sided with the proponents
when this debate broke out three years ago, and I still do. I think that
Europe is genuinely endangered in ways that are mostly silent and
unseen but real all the same. The opponents are wrong in judging that
the current neutral zone in East-Central Europe will remain stable for
long if NATO does not enlarge there. The opponents are too fixated
on Russia. Many seemingly fail to realize that Germany is now Europe's
most important country and that Russia does not have the Soviet
Union's strength. Russia has legitimate interests that should be respected,
but some of its demands are inspired by unhealthy statist motives that
should not be honoured at the expense of other countries. Placating
Russia on this issue is not the way to make Europe stable, and standing
up to Russia's improper demands is not destined to cause a crisis.
Russia is far less able than NATO to contemplate the trouble and
expense of a new Cold War. Nor will standing up to Russia wreck
democracy in that country. The best way to encourage democracy in
Russia is to support it strongly in East-Central Europe. In the final
analysis, democracy in Russia will rise or fall on its own merits, not
in response to a prudent NATO enlargement that poses no threat to
Russia.
The Helsinki summit shows that, although Russia remains unhappy
about NATO enlargement, President Yeltsin does not want a confron-
tation and is willing to negotiate. At Helsinki, the Clinton administra-
tion said "no" to Russia on five key European issues: Russian veto
power over NATO enlargement, delays of enlargement, second-class
citizens in NATO (new members not to have NATO troops on their soil
or to be protected by the u.s. nuclear umbrella), exclusion of any
country from NATO, and subordination of NATO to the OSCE. But the
administration said "yes" on three issues: a charter (the Founding Act),
a partnership council, and CFE adaptation. It also made clear its intent
not to place nuclear weapons on the soil of new members in absence
of a threat. These u.s. concessions plus other pot-sweeteners - a
START III (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) negotiation on deeper
nuclear reductions and support for Russian interests in the World
Trade Organization and Gj - evidently were enough to gain Yeltsin's
begrudging acquiescence that NATO enlargement is inevitable.
Although Russia would be far happier if the West enlarges by other
mechanisms, NATO must be a key part of the process. Yes, the EU must
also enlarge. But the EU is an economic institution, not a security

alliance. Because strong security and economic measures must be
launched, the two bodies must enlarge together. One cannot substitute
for the other. I judge that NATO enlargement can greatly ease the
dangers ahead while working with an enlarged EU to produce a demo-
cratic and prosperous East-Central Europe. Yet I do not regard a
positive outcome as a given. Much depends upon how the two bodies
enlarge.
If the proponents of NATO enlargement can be faulted, it is not for
failing to think boldly. Unlike the opponents, they are showing the
imagination and creativity to look beyond the status quo and to think
about how to achieve something better. They are seeking a huge
transformation of the European security order for the purpose of
greatly enhancing the continent's security. For something this big to
succeed, more is involved than merely projecting NATO and the EU
eastward in ill-defined ways. A host of details about specific policies,
plans, and programs must be worked out before there are grounds for
confidence that the act of enlargement will bring about its desired
effects and benefits. A clear implementation strategy is needed.
Moreover, this strategy must be backed by adequate energy and
resources if its hoped-for benefits are to be fully attained. An old axiom
holds that "there is no free lunch." Another axiom holds that "you
get what you pay for." NATO enlargement is aimed at producing big
strategic benefits: otherwise an innovation this earth-shaking would
never be contemplated. Ceteris paribus, big benefits normally require
strong efforts, and lacklustre results are the typical consequence of
weak efforts. This likely will hold true for NATO enlargement, for
plenty of problems and constraints lie ahead in its path. Do NATO'S
governments grasp the heavy lifting that will be needed if enlargement
is to yield something worthwhile? Are they so inward-looking and
reluctant to annoy Russia that they plan only to go through the
motions: to admit new members but not truly extend NATO'S presence,
and that of the EU, into East-Central Europe? If so, they may get
exactly what they pay for.
The need for hard, effective work by NATO and its new members is
made especially important because the enlargement agenda is broader
than was NATO'S agenda during most of the Cold War. From the 19605
onward, NATO'S agenda was mostly military. It was focused primarily
on creating a force posture for deterrence and defence. The upcoming
enlargement agenda must take deterrence and defence into account as
an insurance clause, but its broader purposes are more political and
more complex. NATO enlargement is being targeted at shaping the
internal politics and defence affairs of new members and the interstate
relations of countries across the East-Central European region. The
6^ Conceptual Debates over Enlargement
twin goals are democracy for the new members and stability for a big
and diffuse region whose security structure will not be rigidly bipolar,
but instead fluidly multipolar. Proponents are confident that this
demanding agenda can be accomplished, and perhaps they are right.
But accomplishing this agenda will not be easy, and it will not be
attained merely by admitting some countries into NATO. The act of
admitting new members merely sets the stage for the drama that is
about to unfold. It does not make the play a success. The outcome
depends upon how the actors perform. Their script is anything but
simple.
Do the U.S. government and NATO have a properly comprehensive
and robust strategy worked out in the necessary detail? This question
is for them to answer. But I can attest to the importance of answering
it. My colleagues and I at RAND have published considerable material
about the military side of enlargement. The more that we plunged into
the details, the thornier they became. In the end, we were able to bring
coherence to the analysis of NATO'S military strategy for enlargement.
But, although we came away believing that the complex challenges can
be handled, we also were left painfully aware of the many ways that
these challenges can be mishandled, with quite negative consequences.
Moreover, enlargement involves a lot more than military strategy. It
also requires a political, economic, and diplomatic strategy: each with
thorny details of its own. These separate strategies must be coordinated
so that a "grand strategy" is produced.
This is not child's play. It is not an impossible task, but it is a hard
task. Because there are more ways to fail than to succeed, skilful
planning and strong execution are critical. The proper conclusion,
therefore, is that the benefits of NATO and EU enlargement are real,
but they are best regarded as a reward for a job well done, not as
outcomes that will be gained merely because the job is attempted. If
NATO and the EU enlarge wisely and effectively, they can achieve the
ambitious objectives being set for them and thereby provide great
strategic pay-offs. But if they enlarge unwisely and ineffectively, they
can fall far short of their objectives and thereby produce few benefits,
or even cause outright harm. This is why a sound implementation
strategy is key - especially for NATO.
THE COSTS
What will be the costs of enlargement? By "costs," I mean the financial

expense of defence-preparedness measures. I will address the issue of
possible negative strategic consequences when risks are discussed
below. Awhile back, public speculation about costs was dominated by
two polarized viewpoints. One viewpoint held that the costs would be
negligible because NATO enlargement is a purely political step with no
military consequences. The other viewpoint held that the costs would
be stratospheric - several hundred billion dollars - because NATO
allegedly will want to build a big-warfighting posture in East-Central
Europe akin to the one it maintained in the Cold War. In recent
months, a new consensus has been forming in the middle. It holds that,
although some military preparations will be needed, they will be
modest and the costs therefore affordable.
RAND was the first to stake out this position. In mid-199 5 we issued
an internal study (I was a co-author) on costs of NATO enlargement,
assuming that the Visegrad states of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech
Republic were admitted. Our study addressed the costs of carrying out
enlargement's defence measures per se, not the separate issue of keeping
NATO'S forces and those of the East-Central Europeans at proper
preparedness: an issue handled by existing defence plans and budgets.
We concluded that the costs would depend upon NATO'S military
strategy for enlargement. Our analysis laid out a wide spectrum of
three strategy options. It said that, if NATO'S strategy is one of merely
providing command, control, communications, intelligence, and logis-
tics support to new members, who must provide all of the combat
forces for defending themselves, the costs will be very low: $io-zo
billion through 2.010 for both NATO and the new members. We argued
against this option because it would provide an insufficient NATO
commitment to its new members. At the other extreme, our analysis
said that, if NATO stations large forces in East-Central Europe, the
costs will be much higher: about $110 billion. We argued against this
option because it is unnecessary on strategic and military grounds. In
the middle of this spectrum, we put forth our preferred option: a
power-projection strategy in which NATO would develop the capacity
to move forces from Western Europe eastward in a crisis. Depending
upon the exact reinforcement posture chosen, we said, the costs will
be $30-52 billion. We singled out a mid-point posture costing
$4Z billion as the one most likely to be adopted. The results of this
analysis were presented in the fall 1996 edition of Survival.2-
Subsequently, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a similar
study using the RAND methodology, but it put forth higher cost esti-
mates for a power-projection strategy. The costs, according to the CBO,
would be $1x5 billion. The difference between RAND'S estimate of $42.
billion and the CBO'S estimate of $115 billion largely boils down to
three variables. The CBO includes about $30 billion of measures to
modernize new-member forces: an expense excluded by RAND because
it will be necessary even if these countries do not join NATO. Also, the
CBO contemplates a larger NATO reinforcement posture than RAND'S

posture. Whereas the CBO'S posture includes about twelve divisions
and twelve wings, RAND'S posture is five divisions and ten wings. The
cost difference is $30 billion. The remaining $2,0 billion owes to more
ambitious CBO programs in such areas as command structures, com-
munications systems, exercise facilities, infrastructure enhancements,
and prepositioning of equipment.3
These two cost estimates are animated by different theories of
requirements for carrying out a power-projection strategy. The RAND
estimate calls for sufficient NATO force commitments to meet peacetime
needs in such areas as training, exercises, building multinational for-
mations, handling local contingencies, and reassuring new members
about their long-term security. By contrast, the CBO'S estimate identifies
the NATO posture that would be needed if preparing for a major
regional war is a dominant concern. The CBO rejects the criticism that
its analysis is anchored in threat-based planning. But it acknowledges
that a NATO force of this large size would be intended to balance a
real Russian military threat of about 25 divisions and 1000 combat
aircraft.
The Pentagon released its own estimate, which also employs the
RAND methodology for calculating the costs of a power-projection
strategy. The Pentagon's estimate projects a cost of $28-35 billion for
three categories of measures: NATO reinforcement, new-member
restructuring, and direct enlargement (for example, common infra-
structure). This estimate falls at the lower end of RAND'S spectrum of
a $30-52 billion cost. The principal difference between this estimate
and RAND'S $42-billion estimate is the size of the NATO reinforcing
posture. Whereas RAND'S posture includes five divisions and ten wings,
the Pentagon's posture is a little smaller: four divisions and six wings.
Had RAND costed the Pentagon's posture, its estimate would have been
$28-34 billion. The Pentagon has publicly said that the two estimates
are in the same ballpark. I agree.4
What these three studies accomplish is to lay a solid foundation for
thinking about NATO military strategy for enlargement. They reject the
argument that, because peacetime planning is at work, all defence
estimates are purely political and therefore arbitrary. In reality, peace-
time requirements can be calculated with about the same precision as
wartime requirements. Moreover, the act of meeting these peacetime
requirements has major implications for determining the way that
NATO enlargement is carried out, and whether it will be a success. In
important ways, the associated military measures will be key to shap-
ing the political consequences of enlargement. An adequate defence
program will make NATO'S new members genuinely secure. From this
outcome will flow the benefits that NATO enlargement is intended to

bring.
All three studies endorse a power-projection strategy. This strategy,
moreover, was endorsed by NATO'S enlargement study of late 1995.
This portion of the defence debate now seems settled. Indeed, the
Pentagon's study suggests that the issue is no longer purely theoretical.
A sensible defence plan for NATO enlargement is now starting to take
shape. In the coming months, NATO military authorities will be study-
ing the details in ways that allow this plan to gain further life and
momentum.
As for costs, the Pentagon's estimate is now being appraised by some
media critics as too low. My reaction is that the cost should be regarded
as a variable. Much will depend upon the number of countries admit-
ted. The Pentagon's study assumes admission of four countries. Since
the number is now three, the cost will drop by about $2-3 billion. If
the number admitted grows to six, the cost will rise to $42-48 billion.
Likewise, the cost to the United States could rise above the Pentagon's
estimate of $200 million annually. This figure includes only costs for
common infrastructure programs. The need to fund some purely
national programs (for example, bases, facilities, and outreach mea-
sures) could double the cost.
My expectation is that, when the dust settles, RAND'S original esti-
mate will stand up well: $42 billion for the entire program, of which
the United States will pay about $5-6 billion if the West Europeans
carry their fair share of the burden. Regardless, the key point is that
we are in the early stages of a lengthy process. In the months and years
ahead, the cost estimates may rise or fall as more is learned about the
coming defence agenda. But the conclusion of moderate costs is
unlikely to change. The core reason is that no new military forces must
be built: the necessary forces already exist. NATO has more than ample
forces to carry out a limited commitment through a power-projection
strategy. If anything, East-Central European forces should be down-
sized because they are larger than needed once these countries enter
NATO. The defence task is merely to configure NATO and new-member
forces so that they are compatible and interoperable. This is a demand-
ing agenda, but it is not costly.
To those uninitiated in defence-budget analysis, an expense of $42
billion sounds like a huge amount and therefore induces bumper-sticker
shock. In reality, this expense is moderate when judged in relation to
the major strategic innovation being pursued. Indeed, the CBO'S posi-
tion is that a cost of $125 billion is not excessive when the objectives
and benefits are taken into account. A cost of $42 billion is only two-
thirds the expense of buying a single u.s. army division or navy carrier
battle group. Moreover, this expense is readily affordable. To fund their

share, the West Europeans will need to allocate only 1-2 per cent of
the money now planned for defence through 2010. The United States
will need to allocate even less: about two-tenths of i per cent. The
East Europeans will have to increase their defence spending. But they
would need to do so anyway because their defence spending today is
low and their military readiness has suffered. They can pay their share
by merely increasing their defence spending in response to the growth
of their economies.
Clearly, the expectation of moderate costs is based on the premise
that NATO enlargement will be managed prudently, in ways that econ-
omize and avoid gold-plating. Provided this is the case, bumper-sticker
shock is the wrong reaction. These costs are not trivial, but they are
far from unbearable or unjustifiable. President Clinton did the best job
of framing the issue in his speech at Detroit in the fall of 1996. He
said that he expects NATO enlargement to impose moderate costs. He
also said that he is willing to pay the bill because the benefits make it
worthwhile.
Here again, nonetheless, a sense of caution is in order. The history
of U.S. and NATO defence policy is littered with programs that started
out with an affordable price tag and then suffered huge cost inflation.
Sometimes the initial cost estimates were wrong. Most often, however,
costs rose because programs were given added features as they evolved.
They became better at what they were designed to accomplish, but
unnecessarily so, and they broke the bank in the process. NATO
enlargement is vulnerable to this form of cost inflation. TJie program-
matic measures being contemplated - infrastructure, projection assets,
modernized technology in East- Central Europe - are an open invita-
tion to rising costs. Beyond this, the defence costs could skyrocket if
a military confrontation with Russia evolves: RAND and the CBO agree
on this judgment. The proper conclusion is that a low-cost NATO
enlargement is possible but not foreordained. It will require skilful
implementation, guided by a management philosophy that is equally
attuned to the twin tasks of fulfilling defence requirements and con-
trolling costs.
The importance of the first task - fulfilling requirements - should
not be forgotten. Thus far, the cost debate has been animated by the
hope of minimizing expenses. While this perspective is natural in
today's climate, it is noteworthy how little public attention is being
given to the issue of whether adequate resources are being committed
to make enlargement a success. These cost figures are more a metaphor
for gauging serious intent than they are a measure for calibrating the
drain on national defence budgets. The financial drain is minor; the
level of effort is far bigger. It is possible to work very hard while not
spending a great deal of money. A common thesis holds that the
military details do not matter because no threat exists. This thesis is
wrong because the defence preparations that take shape will have a
large bearing on whether NATO'S peacetime goals in East-Central
Europe are attained. My judgment is that the level of resources iden-
tified by the Pentagon and RAND studies is enough to get the job done.
But this money must actually be spent, and the associated activities
must take place. Otherwise, NATO enlargement could be a dud.
In the final analysis, costs will be determined by the defence goals
set by NATO and its new members. Achieving these goals will have a
major impact on determining whether enlargement succeeds. The issue
of future defence goals will be addressed by NATO'S civilian and
military authorities in the coming period. The goals adopted may not
be identical to the numbers being contemplated by current studies. One
key issue will be the number of reinforcing combat units committed
by NATO. The CBO'S illustrative posture of nearly twelve divisions and
twelve wings seems too high - a posture this large may not even be
necessary to defend against a Russian threat, should it emerge. The
CBO'S analysis may downgrade the capabilities of new-member forces
too far, thereby posing NATO reinforcement requirements that are too
high. The RAND and Pentagon estimates seem more plausible for both
peacetime needs and as a deterrent hedge. Yet their estimates are
notional. The final and authoritative estimate is something to be
decided by NATO. Success at building the decided-upon posture will
be determined by whether NATO'S current members take the new
reinforcement mission seriously.
Another key issue will be the defence goals set for the new members.
At the moment, the quantity of their forces is high, but their quality
is low. How much of a qualitative improvement is to be sought? All
three current studies implicitly assume that new-member forces should
achieve a qualitative level that is about average for NATO: that is, not
as high as Germany and Britain but higher than Turkey and Greece.
This concept seems adequate and achievable when judged in relation
to the strategic situation and the current capabilities and future budgets
of new members. Yet the future will be determined by NATO'S decisions
and by the efforts of the new members.
Thus, the costs of NATO enlargement are a variable. But so are the
defence arrangements that take shape. The easiest way to minimize
costs is to make few preparations. But this approach would be a recipe
for an ineffective enlargement that falls far short of its anticipated
benefits. A moderate amount of money needs to be spent in order to
make NATO enlargement a success. This is why the costs should be
viewed not as something to be avoided but as an opportunity to make

an intelligent investment in affordable ways.
THE RISKS
What are the risks facing NATO enlargement? The risks of a negative
strategic outcome fall into seven categories. Space does not allow for
a full treatment of these risks, but they merit a brief discussion. All of
them are serious enough to be safeguarded against. Equally important,
they are not mutually exclusive. To the extent that they spring to life
in batches, they could make enlargement a bungled affair and rob the
effort of its benefits or even worse.
The first risk is that NATO might fail to mobilize a satisfactory
internal consensus on how to carry out enlargement, quarrel over
policies, and thereby damage its own cohesion in ways that affect not
only East-Central Europe but the Alliance's effectiveness as a whole.
At the moment, NATO'S governments agree on enlargement, but their
enthusiasm for the enterprise varies. This situation likely will not
prevent new members from being admitted, but trouble could arise
when NATO must start spending money and accepting serious commit-
ments in East-Central Europe. At this juncture, the unenthused coun-
tries might back away, thereby casting the burdens on the more
enthused powers, including Germany and the United States. When these
powers start making decisions on how to implement enlargement, the
less involved countries might disagree with the priorities being pursued
and fail to provide even the minimum necessary support. If this negative
dynamic gets out of control, serious cleavages could develop. It is not
difficult to imagine NATO'S central countries and southern countries
drifting apart. Indeed, Britain and France plausibly could drift away
from Germany and the United States. NATO'S ability to act as a unified
alliance could suffer in multiple regions and policy settings.
The second risk is that NATO and the EU might not enlarge in
tandem. In particular, NATO might enlarge quickly, but the EU might
decide to stand pat for several years in an effort to avoid the disruption
of absorbing East European countries with their troubled economies.
In this event, NATO'S new members would join the Alliance without
the benefit of the Western assistance needed to bring their economies
to life. They would lack the resources needed to carry out their military
responsibilities to NATO. Their commitment to democracy might
weaken. As a result, Western enlargement would unfold partly crip-
pled, with only one arm. Inevitably its effectiveness would be damaged.
The third risk is that NATO might enlarge weakly, earring out the
defence side of enlargement in ways that produce a hollow commitment
in East-Central Europe: that is, a political commitment without the

military capability to carry it out in peace, crisis, and war. This
especially could happen if a widespread consensus favouring a strong
enlargement is not developed across the Alliance, but it could also
occur if the enthused powers themselves do not take the military side
of enlargement seriously enough or fail to generate the necessary
funding. As a result, NATO might not develop the appropriate power-
projection capabilities or work with the new members to reform their
defence postures in the required ways. The negative consequences
could be severalfold. The political benefits of multinational military
cooperation would not be realized. NATO'S flag would fly in several
East-Central European capitals, but the region would not enjoy much
greater military security than exists today. In event of a crisis there,
NATO and its new members might not be able to react with the
necessary speed and power. NATO might find itself unable to promote
or prevent much of anything, but hopelessly entangled in this region's
still-turbulent affairs: the classic nightmare of treaty-making run amok.
The fourth risk is that NATO enlargement's reform agenda for the
new members may fall well short of achieving its goals. The new
members might fail to reform their defence postures in the ways needed
to make their forces interoperable with NATO. Worse, they might take
their admission into NATO as an opportunity to become free-riders:
they might both slash their defence spending and not reform their
postures. Equally important, they might not continue making progress
to becoming democracies, and their economic progress could slacken.
As a result, they might emerge as weighty albatrosses around NATO'S
neck - as countries that consume security but do little to enhance
NATO'S overall health.
The fifth risk is that NATO might enlarge too far and too fast by
admitting more new members than prudence dictates. This outcome
could occur if NATO'S open-door policy is taken literally. Although
NATO has invited only three new members so far, the nine others are
standing at the door, eager to march through if given the opportunity.
How many new members can NATO safely absorb? The answer is
unclear, but the prospect of admitting the Baltic states, Bulgaria,
Albania, and Macedonia is enough to give even the most enthusiastic
proponents cause for concern. These countries would consume far
more security than they produce. NATO could find itself stretched thin,
unable to concentrate its scarce resources in the ways needed to absorb
successfully even the attractive candidates. Beyond this, a decision to
admit twelve new countries would elevate NATO'S total to twenty-eight
members. NATO might no longer be an alliance capable of serious
collective defence planning and decisive reaction in a crisis. Instead, it
jo Conceptual Debates over Enlargement
might become a loose collective security body: something akin to the

OSCE.
The sixth risk is the converse of the fifth. Since the first wave of
enlargement will soon allow three new members into NATO, the Alli-
ance may appear to have failed in its goal of strengthening security
ties to the countries not gaining admission - the "have-nots." This
oversight could leave several important countries, such as Romania,
Ukraine, and the Baltic States, with nothing more than PFP to cling
to. As a result, Europe would not become unified in security terms. A
two-tier structure would evolve in East-Central Europe: the favoured
few that belong to NATO and the majority on the outside looking in.
The negative psychological and political reaction could be severe. In
several countries, democracy could give way to authoritarianism and
nationalism. Some countries might seek closer relations with Russia.
Regardless of the steps taken, an enlarged NATO could find itself facing
the prospect of a dangerous frontier along its new borders.
The seventh risk is the one most feared by the opponents of NATO
enlargement. It is that, in the aftermath of enlargement, NATO'S rela-
tions with Russia might turn sour. An authoritarian government might
gain power in Moscow, energize the economy, and use its growing
funds to rearm. Russia might succeed in subordinating the cis states
to its control, including Belarus and Ukraine. It might then station
large forces on Poland's border in an effort to intimidate NATO and
the Poles, and also reach out to establish stronger ties with such
countries as Slovakia and Bulgaria. The consequence could be what
NATO most wants to avoid: a new Cold War, including a dangerous
military stand-off on the Bug River. This development, in turn, would
open the door to a vastly more expensive NATO enlargement, thereby
blowing moderate cost estimates out the window.
How serious are these seven risks? The answer is that they are
serious enough to have already gained the attention of several NATO
governments. Steps are under way to develop an enhanced PFP pro-
gram for those countries not gaining admission in the first tranche.
NATO'S willingness to adapt the CFE treaty reflects more than an effort
to placate Russia. It also reflects an attempt to start dampening the
coming military interactions in NATO-Russian relations as the Alliance
enlarges. For all their importance, however, these and other measures
are merely initial steps. They do not guarantee that the full spectrum
of risks will be effectively handled.
The ultimate disaster scenario is one in which, owing to a bungled
NATO implementation of enlargement, almost everything goes wrong.
NATO'S cohesion would come unravelled. The EU would stand pat.
NATO would enlarge weakly in ways producing a hollow commitment
and no gain in security. The Alliance would badly overextend itself by

admitting too many new members, all of which would be defended
weakly and integrated poorly. Meanwhile, NATO would turn a blind
eye to Ukraine and other important have-nots. To top things off,
relations with Moscow would plummet downhill and a new Cold War
would ensue with an aggressive and rearmed Russia. Something this
extreme is quite improbable. But there are other, less disastrous scenar-
ios that are more plausible and still spell failure for NATO enlargement.
The most plausible failure scenario is a NATO enlargement that
becomes a mess and a dud. This scenario could have four components:
a NATO that merely goes through the motions, new members that
become free-riding albatrosses, endless controversies and no progress
with the have-nots, and continued complaining by Russia. This sce-
nario is less menacing than that of a new Cold War with Russia. But
it is bad enough to make NATO enlargement an unappetizing meal with
no dessert.
The proper conclusion is that reduction of these risks must be an
important part of any sensible NATO implementation strategy. A case
can be made that NATO should start shifting its current approach to
managing the risks facing enlargement. For the past six years, it has
been so preoccupied with reducing the risk of bad relations with Russia
that it has paid much less attention to the other risks. As enlargement
gets under way, these other risks will loom increasingly important, and
they will require more attention by NATO. Enlargement can fail, or at
least not succeed in big ways, even if good relations with Russia are
maintained. Likewise, enlargement can succeed even if relations with
Russia are cool. What matters most is whether an enlarged NATO
remains an effective alliance, can carry out its new security commit-
ments, succeeds in fostering valuable new members, and has strong
ties to other European countries deserving of its help. The risks of
failure in this critical area should be guarded against carefully.
T O W A R D S A BETTER S T R A T E G Y FOR
IMPLEMENTING ENLARGEMENT
If the U.S. and NATO strategy for implementing enlargement is critical

to determining the endeavour's success or failure, to what degree does
a sensible strategy already exist? What ideas can be offered for fash-
ioning an improved strategy? These important questions are addressed
in this section. Again, space does not allow for a complete treatment.
What the following paragraphs offer is a brief discussion of the basics.
For NATO enlargement to succeed, the United States and the Atlantic
Alliance need a strategy that can maximize the benefits, control the
72, Conceptual Debates over Enlargement
costs, and minimize the risks. Moreover, they need a comprehensive

strategy that can pursue multiple objectives and juggle several different
policy balls at once. Such a strategy must craft a coherent relationship
between ends and means. It should establish priorities and apply
adequate resources to fulfil these priorities. This strategy should focus
on the key actors in the enlargement process: NATO'S current members,
the early invitees, later members, the enduring have-nots, Russia, and
other cis countries. This strategy should have political, economic, and
military components. Each component should make sense on its own,
and all of them should be coordinated together. Each component must
also be endowed with adequate resources to get its job done. These
considerations add up to a need for a strategy as well as an accompa-
nying strategic plan: not necessarily a fixed blueprint, but a flexible
creation that sets basic directions and provides a general game plan
for implementing enlargement over the coming decade.
This is a tall order, but illuminating it helps focus a bright spotlight
on where the current strategy stands today. Beyond doubt, NATO has
gotten off to a slow but decent start. At Madrid, it announced which
countries are to join the Alliance in the first tranche in 1999. NATO
has also identified its basic military strategy for implementing enlarge-
ment: a combination of new-member self-defence and NATO power
projection from Western Europe. It has decided to develop an enhanced
PFP for the have-nots. It has expressed willingness to adapt the CFE.
NATO has moved to create a charter and a partnership council with
Russia (Founding Act). All of these steps are to the good, but they fall
considerably short of qualifying as a comprehensive strategy. The core
problem today is not that NATO has a bad implementation strategy
but that it does not yet have a complete strategy at all.
Several potential problems account for my judgment that the current
strategy may be headed towards trouble, or at least towards a lack-
lustre performance. One problem is that a truly comprehensive strategy
has not yet been forged. Another problem is that NATO and its new
members may not yet be prepared to carry out the hard work that
must be performed. Still another problem is that NATO may be shying
away from the tough task of setting firm priorities. This applies to
dealing both with the have-nots and with Russia and its immediate
neighbours. Unless these problems are resolved, NATO enlargement
may yield fewer benefits than anticipated, and it may see more risks
coming to life than wanted. Enlargement might wind up becoming a
mess and a dud with lots of prickly thorns.
What needs to be done to improve NATO'S strategy? Until recently,
NATO has been mostly preoccupied with two issues: determining who
is to be admitted and when, and trying to calm Russia's anger. Now
that the first issue has been resolved and the second issue at least partly
settled, the time has arrived to begin addressing the many other issues
on enlargement's plate.
For openers, NATO and the EU must develop a better strategy for
enlarging in tandem and working together. At the moment, the EU
wants NATO to enlarge first so that it can delay the expense of having
to enlarge itself. In the interim, the EU wants the luxury of attending
to its internal agenda: Maastricht, the monetary union, subsidiarity,
and other issues. This internal focus is understandable, but it leaves
the West headed for trouble as it enlarges. The West cannot afford a
strategy whereby NATO starts entering East-Central Europe in two
years, and the EU arrives many years later. This approach risks leaving
new NATO members too poor to carry out their new NATO responsi-
bilities, such as reforming their defence postures and building market
democracy. A faster EU enlargement is needed, and it should focus on
those countries that will be joining NATO.
As for NATO, it needs to put its internal house in better order than
is the case today. It needs to mobilize a stronger consensus on behalf
of enlargement. It needs to make decisions on roles and missions for
carrying out enlargement. It needs to assign future missions on the
basis of strategic effectiveness and fair burden-sharing. It needs to
determine which countries are to take primary responsibility for car-
rying out enlargement, to give these countries adequate authority, and
to ensure that they are backed with adequate Alliance resources.
Moreover, these important decisions must be taken in the context of
equally weighty decisions for allocating roles and missions for new
Alliance strategic departures elsewhere. These considerations add up
to the conclusion that NATO should write a new Strategic Concept and
associated planning documents. The current Strategic Concept was
written in 1991. It is badly out of date. A replacement is needed if
NATO is to determine how it is to implement enlargement in ways that
are effective and that leave the Alliance's internal cohesion intact.
NATO also needs to develop a sensible defence plan and program to
ensure that enlargement is not hollow: that the necessary defence
arrangements take shape so that enlargement's political and strategic
goals vis-a-vis the new members are accomplished. NATO needs to
determine how many reinforcing units are to be committed to help
integrate new members and defend them. It needs to develop program-
matic measures to ensure that these forces acquire the necessary pro-
jection capabilities on the appropriate schedule. It also needs to
develop a military-reform agenda for the forces of new members, one
that downsizes these forces, enhances their quality, and elevates their
compatibility and interoperability for performing NATO missions under
Article 5 and Article 4. This demanding agenda calls for a ten-year

NATO defence plan of the sort pursued by the long-term defence
program and GDI initiatives of the 19705 and 19805. Nothing of this
sort exists today.
Once this plan has been created, NATO needs to roll up its sleeves
and get to work so that this plan is actually carried out. It needs to
put pressure on its current members, especially unenthused West Euro-
peans, to ensure that they carry out their measures. It also needs to
work hard with the new members to ensure that they reform their
defence postures. NATO needs to persuade new-member parliaments to
increase defence spending in the necessary amounts. It needs to per-
suade defence ministries to undertake the painful reorganizations that
are required. NATO forces need to exercise and train with new-member
forces so that they learn NATO'S doctrine. An activist u.s. and NATO
effort of this sort is needed to ensure that plans become realities in
ways that make enlargement succeed.
Equally important, NATO needs to develop a better strategy for
dealing with the have-nots. At the moment, NATO is adrift in this
critical arena. It is suspended between the theory of the open door and
the reality that, at least for the coming period, the door is not truly
open to everybody. My judgment is that NATO will be best off by
acknowledging that, although the door must remain open in theory,
enlargement will have its limits in the coming period. To me, NATO is
best advised to limit enlargement to the western part of East-Central
Europe. This means that Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia may enter
in the coming decade if they continue to make adequate progress in
relation to NATO'S criteria for admission. But the Baltic states are
unlikely to gain admission at least until they can do a better job of
defending themselves. Ukraine is unlikely to join, and the same applies
to the Balkan states. At the moment, NATO is planning an enhanced
PFP for these ten countries. The trouble is that the PFP today is so
minimalist and undifferentiated that enhancing it might not matter.
What the situation requires is for NATO to develop a differentiated
but genuine security agenda for each of these countries. An enhanced
PFP may suffice for countries not destined to draw close to NATO. For
those countries that are likely to join NATO, an agenda that powerfully
prepares them for membership is needed. For those countries that may
not join but will have quite close ties to NATO, there is a broad
spectrum of potential security relationships between the PFP and Arti-
cle 5. Something akin to associate membership may make sense.
Although NATO is averse to the specific concept of "associate member,"
the key point is that collective security ties, as opposed to collective
defence ties, can be an effective mechanism for promoting stability and
preventing conflict. An example is a relationship that offers important

non-members not only promises of consultation in a crisis but also
credible assurances of sympathetic consideration and a best-faith
response. This form of relationship undergirds u.s. strategy across
Asia. If it works in Asia, why can't it work in Europe?
The final topic for a better NATO implementation strategy is Russia
and the cis. At the moment, NATO'S strategy seems focused on prolif-
erating institutional mechanisms for reassuring Russia that it will be
treated as a true European power. NATO already has created the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council, the PFP, and the "16+1" formula. It
has also created the Founding Act and transformed the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC) into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Coun-
cil (EAPC) in order to consult more effectively with everybody. NATO
cannot forever continue creating new institutions every time that
Russia objects to enlargement policy. Moreover, nearly all of these
institutions provide only a forum for diplomatic meetings and related
consultations. Meetings can matter for little if there is nothing to agree
about.
What the emerging situation requires is an engagement of the stra-
tegic basics. The issue of greatest concern to Russia is whether NATO
will eventually enlarge into the former Soviet Union while not bringing
Russia into the fold. Russia's concerns are real. NATO will come under
growing pressure to admit the Baltic states and perhaps even Ukraine.
Moreover, Russia will not gain entrance into NATO or the EU anytime
soon. Among other considerations, NATO will not be willing to commit
itself to defending Russia's border with China, and Russia will not be
willing to help defend Spain and Italy from nuclear-armed countries
in North Africa. If NATO is going to bow to Russia's interests by not
entering into the former-USSR, then a mechanism must be found for
protecting the sovereignty and independence of countries there that are
important to NATO. The principal countries are the Baltic states and
Ukraine, but Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan also matter.
Close, non-membership ties by NATO and the EU with these countries
can help, but the key will be their relationship with Russia. At the
moment, the United States and NATO are preoccupied with encouraging
democracy in Russia. Notwithstanding the importance of this concern,
an equal concern is the development of democratic relations between
Russia and its immediate neighbours. If democratic interstate relations
can be brought to life within the former Soviet Union, then NATO will
have less incentive to enlarge there, and less reason to worry about the
safety of important countries. Russia, moreover, will be less able to
mobilize the support of its CIS neighbours for imperial adventures if it
must treat these neighbors as equal partners, not subordinates. At the
j6 Conceptual Debates over Enlargement
moment, the United States and NATO are saying little about this critical
subject. If they are to fashion a sound implementation strategy for
enlargement, they will need to say more.
In summary, the alternative strategy put forth here has six key
features. It aspires to prod the EU to enlarge faster, mobilize a stronger
consensus within NATO, carry out the defence side of enlargement in
robust ways, accept limits on enlargement, build stronger security ties
with the have-nots, and foster democratic relationships between Russia
and its immediate neighbours. Will this strategy work better than the
strategy currently being pursued? I think so, but the question is one
that must be answered through scrutinizing analysis. The key point is
that NATO will not know whether its strategy is the right one unless
it assembles the alternatives and evaluates them on the basis of their
likely performance. Equally important, a proper strategy will not by
itself guarantee success. NATO and its new members must be willing
to perform the hard work needed to bring this strategy to life, or
enlargement will become a mess and a dud.
A sound strategy can be fashioned and carried out in ways that make
NATO enlargement succeed. But this positive outcome will emerge only
if the United States leads in strong and visionary ways. The coming
enlargement agenda is too important and too difficult for the United
States to stand on the sidelines. It is NATO'S leader today, and it will
remain so tomorrow. The quality and energy of its leadership will have
a huge bearing on whether enlargement becomes a mess and a dud,
or instead evolves into a stellar contribution to Europe's health and
the United States's own vital interests.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has advanced the thesis that NATO'S strategy for imple-
menting enlargement will have a major impact on how the benefits,
costs, and risks play out. It has tried to assess emerging trends as
objectively as possible, and to present some recommendations for
developing a better strategy. It supports NATO enlargement as a good
idea provided the endeavour is carried out right. It is guardedly
optimistic about the future, but it judges that NATO needs to do a
better job of fashioning a proper strategy. Regardless of whether its
specific ideas are accepted, the more fundamental issue raised by it has
greater importance. The debate over whether NATO should enlarge is
coming to an end. The agenda for the future is one of determining
how NATO enlargement can best unfold. This is a complex agenda,
and it merits considerable thought by everyone - inside government,
and outside as well.
PART TWO
National Debates over Enlargement

CHAPTER FIVE
NATO Enlargement
and the United States:
A Deliberate and Necessary Decision1
Gale A. Mattox
Critics have argued that the u.s. decision on NATO enlargement was
made without debate or thorough consideration of the implications of
enlargement to the Atlantic Alliance.1 This is not the case: a review of
the governmental and public discussion in the United States reveals
that there was indeed close consideration of the issue and of the
ramifications of such a decision for the United States and for NATO.
NATO enlargement fulfilled the u.s. objective of engagement and
enlargement laid out in the National Security Strategy 1994 articulated
during the first year of the Clinton administration and it was viewed
as the appropriate policy for European security and the Alliance. Not
only has enlargement been a persistent theme of the Clinton presidency,
but the bipartisanship of the policy has been striking in an era of
divided government and contentious debates between the two political
parties.
The events of 1989 may today be traced to a series of problems and
tensions plaguing Central and Eastern Europe over the course of several
decades. Yet no scholar today can honestly claim to having predicted
an eruption of revolutions which may have been "velvet" and relatively
bloodless but represented nonetheless momentous change in the course
of history itself. It is not surprising that the Western reaction generally
and the u.s. reaction specifically were initially hesitant. After an enthu-
siastic reaction to the newly emerging democracies and a move towards
admitting them to the European Union (EU), the EU process then
slowed as the then-twelve members focused instead on adoption of the
single market, the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, which had
unexpectedly become more complicated and less sure of ratification
with the Danish referendum, and, not least, the admittance instead of
Austria, Finland, and Sweden, which coincidently were net contributors
8o National Debates over Enlargement
to the Union rather than costly dependants (as the Central European
states were predicted to be).
For the United States, the initial reaction to the events of 1989 was
cautious and focused particularly on a smooth German unification.
The combined impact of the Persian Gulf War and public desire for a
peace dividend resulted in substantially reduced force levels in Europe
(from over 300,000 stationed forces to near 100,000), albeit not yet
a clear definition of the direction of relationships with the newly
emerging democracies and the disintegrating Soviet Union. On the one
hand, the United States looked to Europe to address the mounting
conflict in the former Yugoslavia while, on the other hand, becoming
agitated over independent European initiatives (witness the "Bartho-
lomew Blast" after announcement of a German-French brigade). By
1993-94, a consensus had begun to form over the necessity to reach
out to the former East Bloc in a more substantial manner than that
represented by the early North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).
For the United States, such an announcement by NATO would reinforce
the traditional u.s. role in Europe, and for Europe it would anchor
the united States to the continent in a period of change and guard
against the risks posed by German unification.
PURSUING NATO E N L A R G E M E N T :
THREE PHASES
The policy of NATO enlargement underwent three distinct phases after

the revolutionary period of 1989-91, and with the Madrid summit in
July 1997 it entered a fourth phase. The first period was one in which,
first, policy makers attempted to deal with the changed geopolitical
situation on the continent within the existing security structures of
Europe, unifying Germany and adjusting NATO and the other organi-
zations to reflect the new circumstances without major disruption. This
phase spanned the Bush and Clinton administrations and could be
described only as a holding pattern for NATO while Germany and the
East were, in fact, undergoing major transformation. The period
included the decision to establish NACC and culminated in the intro-
duction of the Partnership for Peace (pfp), a transition to what would
become more substantial changes.
The u.s. policy with respect to NATO entered a second phase fol-
lowing the establishment of the pfp program, which, to the chagrin of
its supporters, did not quiet the movement for enlargement. The policy
shifted to adoption of enlargement as an objective with the speech
delivered by President Bill Clinton in the summer of 1994 in Warsaw
and later repeated in Prague. The final decision for enlargement was
Enlargement and the United States 81
driven by the president's instinct as well as his sincere belief that the
Central and Eastern Europeans should be given the opportunity to
participate in the Atlantic partnership to which they had been so long
barred after the Second World War. While internal debate continued
and the allies wavered during this period, the president's decision was
clear. In December 1994 the North Atlantic Council adopted the
principle of enlargement while leaving open the issue of who, how,
and when. In the bureaucratic style that plagues international organi-
zations as well as national governments, the following nine months
were filled with intra-alliance debate and haggling over the details,
culminating with the September 1995 issuance of the guidelines for
enlargement.3 This second period was one of consolidation both within
the U.S. government and within the NATO alliance and was marked
by a forging of a consensus on the terms of enlargement.
After the adoption of the principle of NATO enlargement to the East
in December 1995, the debate shifted from the internal governmental
and Alliance discussions to an external selling of the policy. Attention
now turned both to the opponents of enlargement, some of whom
would be necessary to win over in order to get approval by NATO on
the specific invitations to membership, and, perhaps even more impor-
tant, to the national governments that would be required to ratify the
decision to be taken in Madrid in July 1997. In the case of the United
States, the internal interagency debate had almost ceased by the fall of
1996, if not earlier, but the enlargement decision was vociferously
opposed by important segments of elite foreign-policy intellectual cir-
cles, particularly the community of U.S. experts on Russia. In addition,
there was a determined opposition outside the Alliance by the Rus-
sians, who would not be a party to the enlargement. In the case of the
latter, a NATO-Russian Founding Act a month before the Madrid
summit was forged to address Russian concerns (followed, five weeks
later, by a Ukraine-NATO Charter).
The fourth phase of the debate was surprisingly less contentious than
expected and took place after the Madrid summit when the treaty
faced ratification in the national governments, requiring a referendum
in some countries. While the votes appeared assured in the u.s. Senate,
a number of issues surfaced from July to final Senate ratification in
April 1998: the potential for the applicant countries to slide backward;
the threat of Russian opposition to other issues on the Russian-u.s.
agenda; the impact of the cost of enlargement for Western defence
budgets; and, finally, the inability of a weakened presidency to assure
ratification. Despite strong Republican support for enlargement at the
time, there was anxiety over the impact of the spring 1998 timing of
the ratification vote in the Senate, which would coincide with both the
8z National Debates over Enlargement
height of the congressional election campaigns and with the debate

over u.s. force withdrawal from Bosnia - not necessarily a recipe for
the necessary bipartisanship.
P H A S E ONE:
TINKERING WITH THE STRUCTURE
In the immediate period after fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutions
of 1989, the task of dealing with German unification was uppermost
on American and European minds. In Europe, opinion was divided
between the more sceptical, who feared a unified Germany, and those
younger people who were less influenced by the events of the 19405
and generally comfortable with unification.4 Until late 1990, German
unification took centre stage, followed then by the withdrawal of
Russian troops from the former Warsaw Pact.5
While there was already pressure by the Central and Eastern Euro-
peans for entrance into NATO, their interest was far greater in mem-
bership in the EU. But with the introduction of freer trade between the
former Communist bloc and the West, disparities in the cost of labour
and production gave rise to a fear of loss of jobs to the East. The
prospects for membership began to dim and the initially open arms of
Western Europeans folded shut. By 1993 the Central and Eastern
Europeans appear to have come to the decision that the more likely
and quicker road to Europe was through NATO.
In contrast to the major transformation achieved with the unification
of Germany, the initial reaction to the vastly changed security situation
on the European continent generally was much more one of tinkering
with the structure than of innovation and change. In fact, NATO and
the disintegrating Warsaw Pact continued their Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE) negotiations and signed a CFE accord in November 1990
that was virtually out of date before final signatures were attached.6
As Western government leaders looked around Europe for structures
to accommodate the new security order, the initial impulse for many
was away from the NATO alliance, which was perceived as a relic of
the Cold War, and towards the old concept of a European security
home embedded in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE, later the Organization on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, or OSCE). German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
was probably the most outspoken and prominent of the policy makers
who appeared to consider this idea seriously.
There was also support for the development of a European foreign
and defence policy which would take responsibility for Europe and
reduce greatly the need for a continued American presence. Although
usually couched in a way that assumed the United States would remain
on the continent, it was clear what the long-term and quite natural
implication would be - a Europe more detached from the United States.
In principle, this latter concept supported the "peace dividend" that
many political leaders were fond of predicting and that the public was
very willing to believe would now come their way. In practice it was
more difficult to implement - the United States was not so sure that
the Europeans could assure the security of the continent or that it was
ready to bring all its troops home. Even if it did not see the necessity
for a continued u.s. military presence in Europe, it did see the utility
of remaining in Europe, close to many other less peaceful regions.
President Mikhail Gorbachev's assent to continued German mem-
bership in NATO in July 1990 a few months before unification had
surprised a number of European policy makers, who then began to
reconsider the viability of NATO, perhaps (at that point) in combination
with CSCE and other instruments but in an arrangement that included
the Americans. In contrast to the musings over radical institutional
changes, in the end NATO members (some earlier, some later), including
the United States, opted to tinker with the existing system that had
been successful for over forty-five years. Why not adapt it instead of
throwing it overboard? Members began a slow adjustment of NATO
doctrine to fit the new "world order." If its feelings by this point about
a European security identity were not clear, the Bush administration's
sharp reaction to the proposal for a French-German brigade made it
plain that the United States would not tolerate any institutional devel-
opment of an European Community(ec)-only security structure if such
development were to come at NATO'S expense.7 NATO then began talks
on a European pillar at its June 1991 meetings and in November it
issued the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, which out-
lined a new strategic concept. In essence, the decision at this point was
to work with the existing structure of NATO and adapt it to the post-
Cold War world.
The decision to adapt NATO was not without its detractors nor
problems of its own. While retaining the old structures maintained
long-developed practices of cooperation, it also made innovation more
difficult. The changes came incrementally and slowly.8 As the ambiv-
alence of the European Community on the EC membership of the
newly emerging democratic states became more evident, the United
States was increasingly convinced of the need to incorporate these
states into the Atlantic community. A u.s. concept, NACC, was the
first step in the recognition that NATO needed to encourage democratic
developments in these countries and demonstrate that they were not
to be excluded.9 Its outlines were first drawn in the policy-planning
84 National Debates over Enlargement
staff of the U.S. State Department, and NACC held its first meeting in
1992-93.
But NACC membership was broad and included many states whose
readiness to participate in the Alliance more than on very general
cooperative issues was doubtful. Throughout 1993 the U.S. interagency
process worked to address the needs of the countries that wanted
deeper military cooperation, finally settling on the establishment of the
pfp in the fall of 1993. In a refined form, the pfp was offered to
former Warsaw Pact countries in December 1993/January 1994 in
Brussels.10 It "launched an immediate and practical program that will
transform the relationship between NATO and participating states."11
For the United States, this approach was in essence the lowest-common
denominator acceptable to the interagency process. It fulfilled the need
to tie the East closer to the Atlantic Alliance in a way that did not
commit NATO to an Article 5 commitment and that assuaged fears that
NATO was a threat to the East.
Its thrust was, however, still in essence a tinkering with the process
and structure. Cold War organizations were being adjusted, but within
the framework of the past. The United States entered an essentially
second phase on the issue of enlargement in the months after the pfp
was established.
PHASE TWO: GETTING TO YES
Within the U.S. government, the agreement on the pfp was clearly seen
as a compromise. Two factors were then at work and a third then
entered the equation. First, there were a number of committed Euro-
pean experts who from the time of the 1989 revolutions had been
arguing for the West to offer membership to the democratizing East,
at minimum on a selective basis as an enticement towards further
political and economic reform. Their approach was not always uni-
form, with some arguing for EU membership while a smaller number
argued for NATO membership or NATO/EU coordinated membership.
There were also differences in motivation for the conviction that the
West needed to move quickly to incorporate the former East Bloc
countries into NATO. On the one hand, some wanted to undo the
mistakes made in the post-Second World War era and encourage
particularly those countries that had been forced into Communism to
find a home in the Western community of democratic nations. Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott commented that "it would be the
height of injustice and irony - the ultimate in double jeopardy - if
these countries were, in effect, punished for the next fifty years because
they had been, very much against the will of their people, part of the
Warsaw Pact for the past fifty."12 Yet there were others whose moti-
vation was to avoid a situation in which the Central and Eastern
European countries would be pulled back into a reconstituted Soviet
Union. In both cases, membership in the Western structures could be
an avenue to resolving their concern.
A second factor was the conviction of the countries themselves and
the lobbying effort they undertook on Capitol Hill and with the
administration. Whereas initially the focus of the Central and Eastern
Europeans had appeared to be on membership in the EU, by 1994 it
was clear that such an invitation would not soon be forthcoming. 13
Their apparent assessment - which proved correct - was that the
United States would be their main advocate and this dictated a shift
in focus to NATO. In addition, the pfp provided the opportunity to
demonstrate their readiness for membership and to begin to adapt their
forces to appropriate standards.
A final and third factor at this point was the political campaign for
the U.S. Congress. While the congressional Republicans centered their
attention most directly on domestic affairs and their campaigns
reflected this focus, the one foreign-policy issue that resonated - and
was an aspect of point 10 in the Contract with America - was a call
for NATO enlargement. The ethnic constituencies could not have played
a minor role in this decision, but also important was the argument
that a resurgence in Russian strength might propel a grab at Central
Europe. Discussion in Russia of the "near-abroad" and the emergence
of far-right Russian parties, led by leaders such as Vladimir Zhiri-
novsky, reinforced this perception.
The administration's change of view came prior to the Contract with
America, and it is debatable how large a factor the Contract actually
was in the speech by President Clinton during his trip to Warsaw and
again during his stop in Prague, when he declared that it was not a
matter of "whether, but when and how NATO will admit new members.
We are committed to NATO expansion."14 That speech and later com-
ments by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher set in motion an
interagency process to make sure that the president's promise became
reality. To this point, the lines had been starkly drawn between the
State Department, which under new leadership in the European Bureau
of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke had been attempting
to pull along many of the other agencies, and a Defense Department
nervous that the United States would be over-extended by an enlarge-
ment that carried an Article 5 commitment.
The argument within the Defense Department was that the pfp had
only begun to be instituted and should be given a chance to develop.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Kruzel had become
particularly identified with the pfp and was especially adamant about
the need to wait for a few years and permit the new partners to adapt
to the pfp program. While NACC had not satisfied the countries con-
cerned with membership, the pfp was designed to involve interested
countries in the activities of NATO more directly and bring partners
into the NATO community in a more direct way, even at headquarters. 15
Because of the prevailing reluctance at the Defense Department in both
the civilian and Joint Chiefs of Staff (jcs) ranks, the process of striking
agreement on the issue was slow and arduous. The role of Assistant
Secretary Holbrooke was critical at this point in reminding the inter-
agency players of the president's speech and bringing about agreement
at his equivalent levels at State and Defense.16
By December 1994 the United States, with like-minded allies, had
an agreement at NATO that enlargement would occur, but still to be
determined was the how, when, and who.17 According to a background
briefing given at Brussels at the time of the decision, the U.S. position
had been fashioned in October and early November, with teams sent
to Europe and President Clinton meeting with at least three foreign
leaders on the issue. "It was not," this administration spokesman
commented, "as simple as flying from, let's say Prague or Warsaw or
Budapest to Brussels and picking up the locker key to the NATO
club."18
Proceeding painfully at times, more easily at other times, the intra-
Alliance process produced an enlargement study in September 1995
which would form the basis for an Alliance decision in December 1995.
The u.s. interagency process was perhaps even more difficult than the
Alliance process, but by the spring of 1995 the most vociferous oppo-
nents had been quieted and their efforts concentrated on delaying the
final decision as long as possible.19 In the United States, the public
debate was interesting. First and foremost, it was primarily and over-
whelmingly an experts debate.10 There was public support for enlarge-
ment, but the understanding of the commitments involved was
admittedly thin. Second, the debate was quite late in beginning and
appeared to remain a few steps behind the process throughout. While
the support from outside the government was led by a number of
researchers at RAND with expertise on Central Europe, Russian experts
feared that enlargement would force the Russians into a corner and
either drive them into further isolation or even provoke an aggressive
reaction/1 One opponent of enlargement, however, argued after the
Russian presidential elections in June 1996 that NATO could now
enlarge without fear of influencing adversely the elections.
During the Russian presidential elections and again during Boris
Yeltsin's subsequent illness, there was the added fear that the NATO
enlargement issue would strengthen the hands of the far right and give
rise to radical tendencies. The Russian outcry ranged at first from
warnings of the impact of a decision to enlarge by NATO to official
"threats" about the results of enlargement. The Russian reaction also
rose and ebbed over the course of nearly three years of intra-Alliance
discussion, with each side of the American intellectual debate grabbing
for the pronouncement most favourable to its own stance.11
PHASE THREE: DESIGNING THE PACKAGE
By the winter of 1996-97, there was a firm closing of the ranks within
the u.s. government behind NATO enlargement. After the fall 1996
campaign announcement in Detroit by President Clinton that enlarge-
ment would in effect occur by 1999, the administration pursued the
matter quickly both at home and in NATO. 13 The 1996 presidential
campaign was fought overwhelmingly on domestic issues, but NATO
enlargement did emerge briefly when Republican candidate Robert
Dole charged the administration with foot-dragging and promised that,
if elected, he would push for broader NATO membership by 1998.
When the president repeated the objective of enlargement by 1999
in his state of the union address in January 1997,Z4 attention became
directed in a very focused manner on the "package" to be presented
to the Russians as an assurance that NATO enlargement would not be
aimed against them. Negotiations on the final Founding Act between
NATO and Russia were conducted until the last minutes before its
signing in Paris on 2.6 May 1997. The act surprised many outside the
process with its breadth and the potential it opened for a far closer
and cooperative relationship than thought possible in the past/ 5 The
negotiators fashioned a Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council that
could substantially deepen the ties between NATO members and
Russia. Paragraph 13 stated that the council "will provide a mecha-
nism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent
possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with
respect to security issues of common concern." But "the consultations
will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member
states or Russia."16
The operative word, however, is "potential." While the act lays out
a joint council, the explicit issues to be discussed and the nature of
those discussions and/or any decisions are vague - hence the quite
varied interpretations by NATO members and Russia over whether
Russia would in effect be able to exercise the veto over NATO affairs
which opponents of enlargement warned about and supporters dis-
missed. Yet, whatever powers the eventual council will or will not
yield, the mere agreement on the Founding Act has in itself been
historic for the Alliance. As Deputy Secretary of State Talbott indicated
in the weeks preceding the signing of the Founding Act, there will be
expanded exchanges and inclusion of Russian officers "at all top levels
of the alliance command structure. " zy How the NATO-Russian rela-
tionship will develop remains to be seen and is highly dependent on
both the Alliance enlargement discussion in the West and the direction
of the internal Russian domestic debate/8
Despite the fairly contentious debate within Russia as well as in the
West before the Founding Act, the official negotiations and contacts
have been businesslike and the rhetoric over enlargement has become
significantly muted.29 There is also frequent mention of other avenues
through which the once-enemy states could broaden their cooperation
and defuse differences, for example, the osce.3° In sum, there is no
question of the historic nature of the Founding Act, but whether it
achieves its potential is an open issue. There is an inherent contradic-
tion between its operation at high-levels in NATO at the same time that
the member states have declared their determination not to permit any
veto of NATO actions.31
In another aspect of the package, NATO announced in December
1996 that it did not plan to station nuclear weapons in the new
member states: NATO members have "no intention, no plan, and no
reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. " 3Z
Furthermore, it announced that it does not foresee the need to station
any permanent forces in those countries, although joint manoeuvres
are to be expected.
All these efforts - the 1994 inclusion of Russia in the pfp, the
Founding Act, and the assurances about nuclear forces - have been
designed to address the Russians' desire for an inclusive process of
broader European security. This outreach to Russia has been accom-
panied at a somewhat lower level with efforts also to reassure the
Ukrainians. As the third-largest recipient of U.S. aid after Israel and
Egypt since it agreed to dismantle all nuclear capabilities, Ukraine has
had a particular significance for Washington. While its difficulties with
democratic and market reforms have often strained the U.S.-Ukrainian
relationship, there has been a broad recognition by both the united
States and its NATO allies of the need to reinforce the progressive
factions in Ukraine. Negotiated prior to the summit, the NATO-
Ukraine Charter was signed in Madrid, symbolically underscoring a
special relationship without detracting from the more prominent
NATO-Russia act.
In short, although opponents criticized these various measures as
insufficient, NATO has attempted to assure the perception of a NATO
enlargement not aimed against Russia or excluding any other state or

group of states. Rather, the objective is a stable relationship with
Russia and others, maintained at reduced levels of tension with "no
new lines" created. As the Alliance prepared to convene the July 1997
Madrid summit, NATO (and the United States) hoped that this package
to bring in selected Central and Eastern European countries while
forging a new relationship with Russia would lay the foundations for
a more secure Europe.
PHASE FOUR: SELLING THE ENLARGEMENT
The Alliance entered the fourth and final phase with its July 1997
summit. Attention now had to turn to the selling of enlargement to
parliaments to secure ratification. While the European parliamentary
system all but assured a smooth ratification of an agreement signed
by heads of state/government, there was no desire to repeat the embar-
rassment of the Danish rejection only a few years before during the
EU Maastricht Treaty ratification process.33 The NATO heads of state
met at Madrid determined to craft an agreement which would not face
difficult ratification processes, and the Madrid Declaration on Euro-
Atlantic Security and Cooperation reflected that objective. The decla-
ration addressed a number of issues: an offer to three states to begin
accession talks; an enhanced NACC for the states not acceding to NATO;
an enhanced pfp; an acknowledgment of the importance of a European
Security and Defence Identity and of the Mediterranean region/oscE/
cfe Treaty; and, of high priority, a reinforcement of the concept of
security for Europe as a whole (that is, with specific reference to the
Founding Act and the Ukrainian-NATO Charter).
In contrast to the European ratification process, the divided u.s.
government portended a potentially more difficult hurdle. For the u.s.
debate, the two Madrid issues of NATO membership for Central and
Eastern European states and of a form of cooperative security that is
inclusive for the continent were most critical and will be addressed
more fully below. A final potentially contentious issue was thought to
be one of cost, but it proved less important in the Senate treaty
debate.34
Membership
For the United States, President Clinton could expect the Senate to
examine particularly carefully the readiness of the membership candi-
dates in terms of their domestic stability (democratic processes, market
economies, civilian control of the military, and so on) and therefore
their ability to contribute to the Alliance they would join. Both the
<jo National Debates over Enlargement
constitutional prerogative of the Senate in the u.s. system of govern-

ment and the historical responsibility of the United States in terms of
defence of the European continent as a nuclear superpower resulted in
close scrutiny of the Madrid declaration and the aspirant states.35
While there was enthusiasm and support for the bid by Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic for membership, the efforts primarily
by the French on behalf of the Romanians and by the Germans on
behalf of the Slovenians met with significant hesitancy in the U.S.
administration. Despite support in some corners, the final administra-
tion decision to oppose more than three new members reflected political
reality - it would simply be difficult and possibly jeopardize the entire
package. Furthermore, there might then be pressure to include the Baltic
countries, which have close ties to Baltic communities in the United
States. Washington successfully opposed the inclusion of the Baltic states,
but it agreed to include specific mention of them in the declaration.
President Clinton added Bucharest to his trip through Europe after the
Madrid summit and was rewarded with huge and enthusiastic crowds.
Cooperative European Security:

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and an Enhanced pfp
To avoid uninvited countries becoming discouraged, a u.s. initiative
within NATO replaced the NACC with a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC) designed to enhance NATO relations with its pfp coun-
tries.36 Although the EAPC was initially unclear about the steps this
might involve, it has gradually adopted more issues for discussion and
held more regular meetings.
Defence ministers agreed as well to an enhanced pfp program which
has been enthusiastically pursued by u.s. Defense Department officials,
many of whom remain unconvinced of the wisdom of enlargement as
a result of the increased defence commitment under Article 5 for the
United States. The pfp involves and hopefully mollifies the dissatisfac-
tion of non-candidate states and, if they are invited to be members in
the coming years, it prepares potential future new members.
An ironic aspect of these efforts is the degree to which the military
programs in the pfp have surpassed the EAPC political forum. This
could prove problematic over the long term as many countries move
into the category of doubtful members. For this reason, there has been
a NATO restructuring to meet the new realities of the post-Cold War
era. Again, however, the more successful efforts have been in the
traditional area of NATO competence, the military. The New Strategic
Concept is an attempt to address the consequent political-military
imbalance, but progress has been slow and whether the 1999 Wash-
ington document is innovative in this area remains open to question.37
The approach to structures such as the EAPC and the pfp inside
NATO and to the OSCE and WEU outside it has been to foster a concept
of continental security which does not build new walls but is rather
inclusive. For the United States, the critical point has been the difficult
issue of Russia and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine. Both the Founding Act
with Russia and the Charter with Ukraine, as well as various efforts
within and outside NATO, were designed to address these concerns and
mollify Russian and other states' concerns.
The u.s. Senate Treaty Debate

In the immediate aftermath of the Madrid summit, u.s. discussion
focused on cost and the impact of enlargement on United States-Russia
relations. By the spring of 1998, surprisingly for many, the cost issue
had been diffused and was not a major issue in Congress. Senate
attention appeared caught more by, on the right, the challenge of
enlargement to the traditional mission of NATO, and, on the left, the
need to create a form of security for the twenty-first century that would
be unburdened by the trappings of Cold War structures.
The earliest discussions in the broader u.s. debate were over the
issue of cost. The first estimates that were widely reported and incor-
rectly represented were, however, alarmingly high, with a top figure
of $124.7 billion over fourteen years and the American commitment
potentially as high as $18.9 billion. Less often reported was the fact
that those figures were for four countries (including Slovakia) and
would have involved even the stationing of forward NATO forces. 38
Perhaps more realistic was the cost calculation from a group of rand
researchers which put the figure at anywhere from $10 to no billion
over ten to fifteen years, but with a reasonable force package and
strategy costing as little as approximately $42 billion.39 The report
from the administration to Congress submitted in early 1997 then
projected $700-900 million annually, with a total of $9-12 billion
over twelve years and a u.s. share of $150-200 million annually for
ten years. While these projections were attractive, they were roundly
assailed as too low. Still, they appear to have resolved the cost issue
by the October 1997 hearings in the House, where Secretary of Defense
William Cohen insisted that the increased cost would be insignificant.40
Essentially the same figures were presented in the Senate in February
1998. The focus now became the willingness of other allies to share
the expenses and of the aspirants to contribute. Participation in the
Bosnian peacekeeping forces was seen as an indication of this expected
commitment to the common security.
Threats from the Russian side were ominous in 1996-97, though
their seriousness was uncertain. In a particularly strong commentary,
92. National Debates over Enlargement
President Yeltsin's chief-of-staff, Anatoly Chubais, remarked in Febru-

ary 1997 that "if NATO enlarged before signing a treaty, that would
force Moscow to reappraise its policy of co-operation with the West,
threaten to trigger a fresh arms race, and destabilize Russia by unleash-
ing a resurgence of communism and nationalism ... it would be the
greatest mistake in western policy for fifty years."41 Added to this was
the unpredictable and ongoing leadership crisis in the Kremlin caused
not only by the illnesses of President Yeltsin but also by the activities
of the many contenders to his position.
More threatening from late spring 1997 into 1998 was the opposi-
tion from the academic and policy community outside government over
the impact of expansion of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. In
the United States, opposition to enlargement from an influential com-
munity of scholars and policy makers first surfaced quite late in the
debate - with an open letter issued to President Clinton less than two
weeks before the Madrid summit. It called the U.S.-led effort to expand
NATO a "policy error of historic proportions" because of is potential
to "unsettle European stability." The forty-six signers strongly urged
that the "NATO expansion process be suspended while alternative
actions are pursued," including an enhanced pfp program, a coopera-
tive NATO-Russian relationship, arms reduction, and an opening of the
EU'S economic and political doors.42 Ominous for supporters of
enlargement was the bipartisan and high-level list of signatories,
including former senators Nunn, Hatfield, Humphrey, and Johnston,
former Secretary of Defense McNamara, and others influential in the
foreign-policy field, such as Susan Eisenhower, Michael Mandelbaum,
the former ambassador to the ussr, Jack Matlock, and the former
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral Turner. Less crit-
ical but also posing hard questions was a letter to Clinton the same
week from twenty Republicans and Democrats. It included queries
such as "Will you make a cost-sharing agreement part of the expansion
negotiations?"43
With these two issues of cost and impact on Russia in the back-
ground, hearings of the Senate foreign relations committee concluded
in February 1998 with particularly high-powered testimony from sec-
retaries Madeleine Albright and William Cohen and Chairman Shelton
of the jcs. In the committee vote recommending that the Senate consent
to NATO enlargement, only two senators voted against the measure -
Ashcroft on the right and Wellstone on the left. While the Senate floor
debate was delayed a few weeks to mollify opponents who argued that
there had not been sufficient public debate, Senate leaders nevertheless
were determined not to allow the issue to become entangled in the
anticipated Bosnian force-extension debate and the bill was called up
in April during a stalemate over an education bill.44
To the dismay of its vocal opponents, the bill proved to have broad
support and the final resolution passed with an astonishingly large
margin for even the most ardent supporters - with sixty-seven votes
required for treaties, NATO enlargement received eighty-one!45 A series
of defeated amendments ranged a minor one requiring full cooperation
from the three aspirant members in accounting for Americans missing
in action from past military conflicts (senators Smith and Hutchison)
to a more significant one mandating a three-year delay in considering
additional members (Senator Warner). The potentially most disruptive
amendment would have required prior admission by new NATO mem-
bers to the EU (Senator Daniel Moynihan). However, the dire forecasts
of other issues intervening to torpedo the resolution, such as the
extension of the military commitment in Bosnia or the congressional
elections, proved incorrect.
Most important to the resolution's success was the bipartisanship of
the support, probably the most striking in a number of years.46 It was
assisted by a well-coordinated administration effort initiated forcefully
with the 1997 state of the union address and supported by significant
groupings in both political parties. A State Department office headed
by Jeremy Rosner and a concerted effort by the State and Defense
departments as well as the National Security Council reinforced the
political support. Other outreach efforts also proved successful - Pres-
ident Clinton, for instance, took a Senate NATO observer group to the
Madrid summit which included some of the sceptics of enlargement.
Finally, there was the often-overlooked congressional debate, with
hearings and even votes as early as 1996.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the arguments made by sceptics that NATO enlargement did

not receive sufficient attention or debate are, quite simply, not justified
by the facts. There was early and active discussion of the most appro-
priate manner in which to address the concerns of the emerging
democracies in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe. Within the administration, a vigorous debate aired the argu-
ments on both sides and converged with a presidential decision in
1994. Whether motivated by fear of the consequences of back-sliding
into Communism or the desire to reinforce democratic trends, the
supporters of NATO enlargement found common ground.
Outside the administration, Republican support for enlargement was
critical: the political consensus on the issue was a vital element in the
eventual positive Senate vote.47 While its opponents were correct that
public debate was largely absent - albeit robust in the national media
- polling showed public support for enlargement. There were numerous
resolutions of support and congressional testimony from 1996 to 1998

on enlargement. At any point, the clear congressional support for the
issue could have been challenged by the public - as has been the case
on too many domestic and foreign-policy issues to count. There was
clearly a large "interested" public- lobbying effort from the Polish,
Baltic, and other interested ethnic American communities. Less clear
is the extent of their impact in the debate. But the argument that there
was insufficient public discussion of NATO enlargement is misleading.
The simple fact - which opponents are reluctant to recognize - is that
NATO enlargement, whatever the motivation of its constituencies, met
with wide approval.
Finally, the vocal but minority opposition on the issue was hindered
by its late entry into the debate. Although Mandelbaum and a few
others had registered concern, the opposition surfaced visibly only in
June 1997. While it may have sparked closer consideration of dissent-
ing amendments, it was insufficient to block the final Senate resolution.
The decision by the United States reflected the 1994 National Security
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement and addressed a central
theme of the Clinton presidency - support for post-Communist states
meeting the twin requirements of free-market reform and democrati-
cally stable political systems. NATO enlargement was not a decision
taken lightly or without considerable effort to reassure the Russians,
as witnessed by the creation of the Permanent Joint Council under the
terms of the Founding Act.
In conclusion, the u.s. decision to enlarge NATO resulted from
robust debate and discussion within the administration initially and
by the Congress in the latter stages, thorough consideration complete
with studies within NATO, involvement and commitment on behalf of
the aspirant members, and high-level decisions by heads of state and
government. It addressed Russian concerns without according the
Russians a veto within the Alliance. The u.s. decision to enlarge NATO
was a deliberate and necessary decision.
CHAPTER SIX
NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle

to France's European Designs
Marie-Claude Plantin
In the post-Cold War world, France, like other Western countries,

needed to adapt to the new security environment created by the
collapse of the Communist bloc. From France's standpoint, the reshap-
ing of the European strategic environment was essential, and the
French therefore joined forces with a reunified Germany to champion
the building of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within
the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU).
This aim, built upon the tradition of Franco-German cooperation,
informed Francois Mitterrand's desire to influence and control, by
means of ever more complete integration, a now fully independent
partner wielding a combination of economic and political power. But
it was also consonant with another of France's main concerns. On the
strength of its special position in relation to the Alliance's integrated
military structures, France wanted to redefine the transatlantic rela-
tionship. The view in Paris was that an aggiornamento of the Alliance
was in order. The new geopolitical situation called for a new balance
within the Euro-Atlantic partnership. In light of the end of the Cold
War, there was no longer any reason for the Alliance to serve as the
agent of U.S. political and strategic domination, particularly when
American military capability in Europe was steadily shrinking.
This "Europeanist" logic was bound to clash with the perspective of
the White House. The United States was determined to maintain
NATO'S relevance and legitimacy and regarded the organization as its
"chief political instrument on the European continent."1 Hence, the
French government was impelled to wage a kind of guerrilla warfare
against any political or operational changes liable to lead to a rede-
ployment of the Alliance, whether by renewing its role or extending its
sphere of influence. Paris was not about to give in without a fight to
the move initiated in Oslo on 4 June 1992. to assign NATO responsibility
for collective-security missions in crisis situations beyond its official

defence zone. France's European partners did not really follow suit,
however, and Francois Mitterrand had to accept defeat - although he
did have the satisfaction of securing parallel recognition for the WEU
at the Council of Petersburg on 19 June 1992..
At the same time, with the collapse of the Communist world, the
Central and Eastern European states worried about becoming free
electrons in an unstable environment and turned urgently towards
Western organizations, which were seen as the embodiment of political
stability, economic prosperity, and military protection. The issue of
NATO enlargement was thus propelled onto the European stage.
To ensure their security, these states quickly applied for membership
in NATO, which was perceived as the only credible institution in light
of its defence capability and its promise of an American presence.
Although Germany supported their bid to join the Alliance, since it
did not want to remain NATO'S front line and sought to "stabilize the
situation east of the Oder-Neisse line,"2 their requests for instant
membership did not initially receive an enthusiastic response from the
allies - France foremost among them. There were many reasons for
this. First of all, there was Moscow's categorical opposition to having
its erstwhile Cold War adversary expand towards its borders. Although
Russia was a weakened country, its threats conjured up the hazards of
a new fissure within Europe. Some feared, moreover, that the entry of
new members would dilute the Alliance to some degree. Paris, for its
part, preferred a rapprochement with the WEU. The United States, too,
remained circumspect and sought to push back the timetable by pro-
posing various alternatives.
Therefore, the doors of the organization were only half-open to the
aspiring members in the fall of 1991. The Americans merely offered
to establish a relationship of "consultation and cooperation on polit-
ical and security issues" with the Central and Eastern European states,
as well as the former Soviet republics. This relationship would be
enshrined in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).
As limited as this plan was, the French government nevertheless
opposed it. Francois Mitterrand saw the plan as a bid by Washington
to bolster the legitimacy of the Alliance by transforming it into a
political tool that it could use to exercise control over the entire
European continent. Yet, although this was unacceptable to Mitter-
rand, he did not wish to appear too intransigent at the risk of alienating
the Central and Eastern European states. Thus, at the friendly prompt-
ing of the Germans, he yielded on this point - and did succeed in
securing the Alliance's endorsement of the principle of a European
defence identity late in 1991. He contented himself with initiating a
Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs 97
containment action of sorts within the WEU by setting up a "Consul-

tation Forum" for those Central and Eastern European states which
had already forged close relations with the European community.3
This was one of the first clear illustrations of the attitude France
would adopt towards NATO enlargement. The French were torn by
opposing interests. On the one hand, whatever reservations they har-
boured with regard to the general issue of NATO enlargement, France's
leaders, like those of other European countries, did not wish to disap-
point their future Central and Eastern European partners. In order to
keep Franco-German relations stable and to further the political con-
struction of Europe, it was also important to show support for the
Germans, who favoured enlargement. And in spite of their criticism
of the hegemonic behaviour of the United States, the French were not
averse to some degree of American military commitment in Europe.
Moreover, in practical terms, they came to cooperate with NATO on
the ground in the former Yugoslavia, where NATO was taking a
growing role. On the other hand, Paris had no intention of forsaking
its vision of a strategic balance in Europe that would not entail the
emergence of new opposing spheres of influence. The French were
determined to see the EU develop as an autonomous world power. And
that involved building a specifically European security and defence
identity as well as strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance.
It hardly needs to be said that France did not always succeed in
winning the full agreement of its partners on this score; and thus it
could not long continue to stoke the rivalry between the Alliance and
the EU-WEU tandem. French leaders therefore engaged in continual
haggling, trying to trade their acceptance of growing cooperation
between NATO and the Central and Eastern European states against
progress on the ESDI. For example, in view of the slow progress on
the WEU'S operational development, Paris supported the NATO Part-
nership for Peace (PFP) program at the January 1994 Atlantic summit
in exchange for an agreement in principle to grant the ESDI access to
the Alliance's military capabilities via the Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) concept. This did not prevent the French from joining with
Bonn to propose, at the same time, associate-partner status for the
Central and Eastern European states in order to strengthen their
cooperation within the WEU. 4
But this was little more than a symbolic gesture. To sustain the hope
of building a European defence, France had to yield to pressure from
the United States for the gradual extension of full NATO membership
to certain Central and Eastern European states. The Americans were
committed to this initiative, which became one of the cornerstones of
the United States's European policy.
In a press conference held prior to the January 1994 Atlantic sum-

mit, Francois Mitterrand had already accepted enlargement in princi-
ple: "The need for security felt by the former Warsaw Pact members
is legitimate ... If some of them consider themselves capable today of
assuming the duties and responsibilities that membership in a defence
organization, whether NATO or the WEU, entails, they are completely
within their rights to make their views known." 5 Although "initially
the French did not accept either NATO'S role in the dialogue with the
Central and Eastern European states or the enlargement of the Alli-
ance,"6 from that point on Paris fell in line with other European states
and officially accepted Washington's response to the security needs of
the former satellite states of the USSR as a natural and inevitable
process. Yet, though resistance to NATO enlargement ceased to figure
among the chief concerns of French diplomacy, the government's entire
strategy had a reactive and defensive character, consisting of an attempt
to "limit the damage" to France's European ambitions and plans that
might result from NATO'S eastward expansion. France sought both to
safeguard the building of the ESDI and to achieve balance within a
pan-European security architecture that included Russia.
E N L A R G E M E N T AS A R E A R G U A R D ACTION
TO PROMOTE ESDI
Of the various possible scenarios for the planned expansion of the EU,
the WEU, and the Atlantic Alliance, the possibility that NATO enlarge-
ment would take priority loomed larger in 1994 with the Atlantic
Council of 10-11 January, which explicitly allowed for this possibility
"as part of an evolutionary process." The American government set
out to speed up the process; at the same time, it became clear that
enlargement of the EU/WEU tandem would not proceed at the same
pace. The admission of full-fledged new members into a modified
Brussels Treaty Organization was put on hold until the Union could
be expanded, a process that was subject to strict economic criteria (and
members were divided over their application) and conditional upon
the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Revision
of the Maastricht Treaty (the difficulties surrounding these negotiations
are well known).
The French government was well aware of the dangers of this
scenario for the EU, inasmuch as it rendered the security component
less attractive. The Union might ultimately be confined to a purely
economic role, or worse still to serving as a receptacle for countries
excluded from NATO membership.7 NATO would remain the corner-
stone of European security, a development that would undermine
Europe's chances of making progress on the Common Foreign and

Security Policy (CFSP) and its defence dimension, as well as damaging
the prospects for "Europeanizing" NATO and bringing about a new
balance.
Thus, France sought to fight a rearguard action on behalf of the
ESDI. Counting on lack of enthusiasm on the part of its European
partners (except Germany) for NATO enlargement, France at first
argued for coordinating the various enlargement processes under way,
if they could not be made simultaneous. This bid clearly met with little
success, and the French then turned their sights on revamping the
Alliance, an issue they considered vital to their interests. They
attempted to use enlargement to advance the cause of overhauling
NATO. Lacking strategic resources, however, and often isolated in their
conflicts with the United States on this issue, they were forced to
confine themselves to cautious, sometimes ambiguous rhetoric, which
promised little in the way of results.
The Rhetoric of Complementary Enlargement of

the EU, the WEU, and NATO
Since they could no longer prevent the expansion of NATO towards
Eastern and Central Europe, the French leadership sought to safeguard
the similar expansion of the EU and the WEU by calling for the three
processes to unfold in parallel. Thus, Defence Minister Francois Leo-
tard wrote in Le Figaro of 3 January 1995 that NATO enlargement
should not take "any kind of precedence" over the other two, nor
should anyone "contrive to speed up the process." On 30 January
1995 Foreign Minister Alain Juppe stated that the debate on NATO
enlargement would be served by "placing it in the broader context of
European integration."8 While denying that he wanted to impose
"rigid procedures" for membership in Western security organizations
("We do not in any way wish to establish prerequisites, veto rights or
oversight by one organization over another"), he repeated in a speech
delivered several days later in Munich that "wisdom dictates that we
should, in actual fact, synchronize the enlargement processes."9
However, neither the Americans, who wanted above all to maintain
their freedom of action, nor the candidates for NATO membership were
prepared to accept any timetable that appeared to hold NATO enlarge-
ment hostage to that of the EU. Here again, France obtained nothing
except the minor, purely formal achievement of the inclusion of refer-
ences to the question of the European security architecture in a study
on enlargement released by the Alliance on 28 September 1995. This
document does indeed refer to the processes of NATO enlargement and
EU expansion as parallel, complementary, and mutually reinforcing.
ioo National Debates over Enlargement
But it makes it clear that these processes would unfold independently,

in accordance with their respective internal dynamics and procedures.
And the process of NATO enlargement did indeed make steady
progress. The new foreign minister, Herve de Charette, later acknowl-
edged that the United States controlled the pace and scale of enlarge-
ment and that, for the Americans, the process did not in any way
depend upon the enlargement of the EU. 10
Once France's hopes for synchronizing the enlargement process were
dashed, President Jacques Chirac and his government were compelled
to alter their strategy somewhat. They took advantage of the oppor-
tunity presented by their conditional rapprochement with NATO. Aware
of the difficulties, if not the impossibility, of realizing French plans for
an independent European defence outside the Alliance, Chirac
announced in December 1995 that France would once again play a
full role in NATO'S non-integrated military structures. To that point,
France had participated in a sporadic way, depending on the require-
ments of the Bosnian operation. Now, France, departing from the
Gaullist orthodoxy that had made its partners suspicious of French
intentions with respect to the Alliance, endeavoured to construct the
ESDI within the framework of the Alliance. Paris tried to increase the
pressure to revamp NATO by propounding a cause and effect relation-
ship between enlargement and an overhaul of the organization. But
here, too, the French hardly went beyond symbolic gestures of little
practical import.
Gambling on the Dialectic of NATO Renewal and Enlargement

First of all, the French government had to set the stage by a show of
good faith. At the North Atlantic Council on 5 December 1995, Herve
de Charette announced that the September 1995 NATO study was "a
good document that fulfils our expectations" and that enlargement
was "a natural process" which "none of us wish to impede." At the
same time, he underscored France's desire to have a "visible European
identity emerge within the Alliance, on both the military and political
fronts." And he pointed to the need to "continue to adapt the Alliance
to new conditions," especially by instituting the CJTF, "a test of the
allies' willingness to revamp the Alliance. " !I Eastward expansion thus
became one of France's official reasons for rapprochement with NATO:
"We agreed that the plans to enlarge and revamp the Alliance made
it essential for France to be inside rather than outside so that we would
be able to contribute to the work and the discussions."IZ
From then on, Paris banked on the vital importance of NATO enlarge-
ment to the United States, as reflected in U.S. efforts to hasten the
process and to establish a rather tight timetable.13 France therefore
sought to persuade its allies to make the revamping of the Alliance a

precondition for enlargement. The French leaders claimed that an
overhaul of the organization would facilitate enlargement.14 "It is
important to understand that change will encourage expansion and
not the converse," Herve de Charette stated in an interview with Le
Monde on the eve of the Berlin meeting on 4 June 1996. "It will be
easier for a revitalized and revamped NATO to admit new members.
By contrast, if the Alliance's structures were to remain unchanged
enlargement might weaken them. It is of the utmost importance that
we at least agree upon the principles and general direction of NATO
reform prior to enlargement." Later in the same interview, Herve de
Charette made his reasoning even clearer in response to a question
from the paper's editors about whether France viewed NATO enlarge-
ment as conditional upon consideration of the ESDI, replying that "it
is above all a question of the timetable; 1996 must see the revamping
of the Alliance. However, 1996 will not be a year for major decisions
about NATO expansion - it will be a period of preparatory work." 15
What was the likelihood that this coupling of NATO renewal and
enlargement would succeed? The prospects did not appear strong since
France did not really hold many bargaining chips in the negotiations
over "Europeanization" of the Alliance. The United States viewed
NATO reform as more of a technical adjustment than a political change.
The fact that France had the support of some of its European allies
did not mean that the latter completely shared its point of view.
Moreover, the French government ran the risk of taxing its partners'
patience with its intransigence, if only because of the blockage arising
from the conflict with Washington over NATO'S southern command.
In a different vein, as Andre Fontaine has noted,16 France was liable
to sap its credit with Central and Eastern European states. These states
could not fail to be upset by what some observers considered a type
of blackmail likely to slow the pace of new admissions. And they did
not refrain from expressing their anxieties - to the point that the
French leadership had to backtrack quickly and drop its demands. On
10 June 1996, in order to appease the Central and Eastern European
states, Herve de Charette attempted to demonstrate French good will
by making it clear in a statement to Le Figaro that France would not
"hold NATO expansion hostage in order to make progress on revamp-
ing the Alliance."17
Hence, the trial balloon floated by the French was not a great
success, and the government had to try to find other arguments to
achieve its goal of reshaping the Alliance. If France was unable to make
the revamping of NATO a precondition for enlargement, President
Chirac was nevertheless determined at least to preserve the simultaneity
IO2. National Debates over Enlargement
of the processes. He therefore called for a comprehensive deal provid-

ing a "package" solution to both problems - along with the question
of NATO'S relations with the Russian Federation - to be worked out
at the NATO summit in Madrid on 8-9 July 1997.l8 As we shall see,
his request fell on rather deaf ears.
It may have been an awareness of the weakness of the French stand
on these different issues that drove the leadership to rhetorical excess,
beginning in September 1996, in its appeal to enlarge the Alliance and
the EU at the same time. During his trips to Poland on 11-12. Septem-
ber 1996, to Hungary on 16 January 1997, and to Romania on 2,3-
2,4 February 1997, Chirac argued strongly for granting these countries
NATO membership in 1999. His comments regarding Poland and Hun-
gary did not come as a surprise, since these countries were among the
candidates most likely to be included in the first phase of enlargement.
The endorsement of Romania reflected the desire of the French and
their Mediterranean partners to consolidate the Alliance's southern
flank and to rebalance it towards the Balkans.
Why, then, did the French suddenly lend such enthusiastic support
to the enlargement of Euro-Atlantic organizations? Perhaps it was
because they wished to influence the development of the CFSP and to
clarify the relationship between the EU and the WEU (insofar as accord-
ing priority for NATO membership to some Central and Eastern Euro-
pean states would also make it easy for these states to enter the WEU
as full members, thereby raising that organization's visibility). Or
perhaps the French harboured a secret wish to weaken Anglo-Saxon
leadership of NATO by bringing in new Central European states. Did
this new show of support mask ulterior motives concerning future arms
contracts on the horizon? Would newcomers be more inclined than
existing members to participate in the Alliance's collective security
missions, wherein France played a major role? Or was it simply a
question of tactical finesse? Perhaps, as Pascal Boniface seems to
suggest,19 the French were trying to play the hero with the Central and
Eastern European states and correct the poor opinion these states had
formed of France because of its "Chiracian obsession"10 with reshap-
ing the Alliance - something the French could do at little cost to
themselves given their lack of influence on the process. Whatever their
motives, the sudden haste of the French made it look regrettably like
they were engaging in one-upmanship, with uncontrollable conse-
quences. Nevertheless, the new left-wing government that emerged
from the legislative elections of May-June 1997 did not alter France's
stance.
The Madrid summit would leave the French leaders with a bad taste
in their mouths. Still, they jumped on the bandwagon and supported
the three candidates slated for membership in 1999 - Poland, Hungary,

and the Czech Republic. In spite of this show of good will, they did
not manage to bend the lex Americana - any more than did some of
the other allies - and made no headway on their other goals. During
the first round of membership negotiations, France championed Roma-
nia's application, while Italy supported Slovenia's. The United States
firmly vetoed both candidacies in its desire to avoid increasing the cost
of enlargement and provoking Congress. And, at the Madrid summit,
Paris was unable to make any progress on the question of overhauling
NATO structures. Enlargement American-style was the order of the day
for all the allies.
Hence the French government's endeavour to use enlargement to
further its European plans fell through. On top of this, France had
muddied the waters by behaving in a frequently vacillating and incon-
sistent manner, particularly in connection with one of its other long-
standing stated objectives: to establish a stable and balanced pan-
European security system.
A GLOBALIZING C O U N T E R - S T R AT E G Y TO
PROMOTE A PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM
Like his predecessors, Jacques Chirac had endorsed "the old Gaullist
dream" of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals."21 He pursued
the diplomatic course charted by Francois Mitterrand in search of
renewed stability based on a reconfiguration of the European strategic
environment. France is in favour of a comprehensive approach to
European security that brings together all the players in a balanced
formation organized around the Atlantic Alliance, the EU/WEU tandem,
Russia (with the cis), and the Organization on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe (OSCE). The various interrelated institutions must be
complementary, without any hierarchy of importance or authority. As
we have already seen, Paris wants to prevent the Alliance from becom-
ing the single pivotal point in the European strategic environment, with
various cooperative institutions organized around it. The latest exam-
ple of such an institution is the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,
which France accepted only with grave reservations.
For the president of the republic, it was a matter of preventing
France from being locked into what he characterized as a "myopic"
approach to Greater Europe insofar as it "proposed limited NATO
enlargement as the solution to what was in fact a much larger prob-
lem." This was liable to precipitate "a new division of our continent
fby] excluding Russia and leaving parts of Central and Eastern Europe
and the Baltic in a dangerous void."22 Nor should those Central and
io4 National Debates over Enlargement
Eastern European states whose candidacies were not given priority feel
shut out of the European security environment. The principle of non-
exclusion had to be upheld to prevent frustration from destabilizing
the European order: "Each country, and I do mean each one, must get
a satisfactory response to its own security concerns. "^ The French
leadership was soon prompted to demand that partnership relations
be strengthened to allay the disappointment of those states not admit-
ted as members in I999.24 This was also what motivated Chirac late
in August 1996 to propose that a pan-European summit be held in
conjunction with the July 1997 Atlantic summit in Madrid.25
Paris shared the concerns of other European capitals, and especially
Bonn, about the danger of a reversion to bloc politics arising from
Moscow's categorical opposition to plans for NATO enlargement. Not
isolating Russia, sparing Russian sensibilities so as to prevent Moscow
from entrenching itself in a new logic of confrontation, became one of
France's main concerns. Thus, the French government tried, with some
success, to accord Russia the status of a major political player on the
international stage. And the French took an even longer view. Moti-
vated by the desire to maintain an acceptable level of security in
Europe, and also by the will to create a counterweight that could
render the inevitable extension of the Alliance as politically neutral as
possible, the French tried, with relatively slight credibility, to integrate
NATO enlargement into the pan-European security system embodied
by the OSCE. For now at least, the practical consequences of this effort
appear quite limited.
Making Russia a "Favoured Partner" of the Alliance

Alain Juppe expressed a widely shared sentiment when he stated: "We
want Russia to be a full member of the great European family ... The
worst outcome would be to isolate Russia with a new cordon sanitaire,
leaving the country to struggle with its own problems, humbled by its
weakness but still possessing thousands of nuclear weapons."16 The
French were not the only ones who did not want to see Russia treated
as the loser of the Cold War and believed it to be essential for the
country to assume its rightful place in Europe and the world. And with
the help of their partners, the French endeavoured to convince the
Americans that it was in the U.S. interest to accede to Russia's will to
be recognized as a great power. The importance of not humiliating or
intimidating Moscow thus became a leitmotif of NATO enlargement; it
was raised unfailingly by the French leaders in all their statements and
underpinned their actions.
In general, France sought to encourage Russia's integration into the
international community by offering "multiform support,"zy in spite
of Russia's foreign-policy misadventures, particularly the brutal and

ill-fated war waged against Chechnya. In cooperation with Germany,
France worked to make Moscow a full participant in the Gj and
expand the organization into the G8. Paris insisted that Russia take
part in the political oversight of Implementation Force operations in
Bosnia, according to the "16+1 Council" formula. The French also
supported Russia's candidacy for the Council of Europe.18 Jacques
Chirac persuaded his allies to acquiesce in the Kremlin's demand that
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty be revised to restore
a better balance.19 And within the EU, he tried to convince his partners
of the merit of a partnership agreement in order to develop cooperative
relations and a meaningful political dialogue with Moscow.30
On the more specific question of enlargement, the French leadership
willingly took on the role of unofficial spokesperson for the Russian
government when it sought special status as the West's favoured part-
ner.31 In the French view, concessions had to be made to eliminate the
most aggressive aspects of the Alliance and Moscow had to be offered
some compensation. Hence, it was Alain Juppe who was first to take
up the idea of a treaty establishing "clear and stable"31 relations
between NATO and Russia. In the face of U.S. reservations, this pro-
posal was quickly moulded into the more flexible shape of a political
declaration - a charter or an agreement "in a form to be determined
and to be negotiated in parallel with NATO enlargement." 33 The deter-
mination of France and the Europeans gradually won over Washing-
ton. The negotiations with Moscow were conducted by NATO'S
secretary general, under close u.s. supervision. The French government
tried to involve itself in the process by offering to host an informal
five-nation summit (the United States, Russia, Germany, France, and
Great Britain) in Paris to promote Russia-NATO relations. However,
this proposal was rejected by President Bill Clinton, in addition to
being sharply criticized by those European states not included. France
had to settle for the symbolic achievement represented by the signing,
in Paris on 2.7 May 1997, of the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation."
By establishing a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia,
this document certainly satisfied the aspirations of French diplomacy.
But it was also a double-edged sword insofar as it showed up the
ambivalence of French support for Russian demands in this area. To
be sure, the Founding Act has contributed to maintaining stability on
the continent. But the other side of the coin is that NATO is now
increasingly dominant in the European security arena and becoming
its focal point, relegating the other organizations to the background.
It is because of its awareness of this risk and its desire to obviate it
io6 National Debates over Enlargement
that Paris has suggested, with some insistence, that the OSCE be
strengthened, in an effort to introduce counterweights in the European
security system.
The Defence of the OSCE as a Necessary Factor

in Achieving Balance
France's plans to overhaul the European security architecture called
for the creation of a continent-wide framework. In the French view,
Europe needed "an organization that embraces all the States that make
up Europe." And, as Jacques Chirac observed, "the OSCE is currently
the only emerging institution where all the European states are repre-
sented an equal footing.34 But it was still only "a minimal structure
dedicated to collective security,"35 and, although it sometimes played
a useful role, its efforts at preventive diplomacy and peacemaking were
not always effective. The goal, then, was to strengthen the organization
and extend its role in such a way as to enable all its members - and
especially Russia - to be fully involved in European security. For the
French, this was yet another way to assuage Moscow's apprehensions
and to make NATO enlargement a more positive prospect. Underlying
their official reasoning, however, was a characteristically French dip-
lomatic tradition which sought to preclude, to the extent possible, any
direct dialogue between Washington arid Moscow that would bypass
the Europeans. 36 And France may also have harboured the secret hope
of delaying the prospect of the Alliance taking complete control of
European security.
French proposals for strengthening the OSCE answered Russian con-
cerns - up to a point. To counteract NATO'S eastward expansion,
Moscow urged the adoption of a pan-European security charter to
serve as a framework for cooperation and for some coordination of
tasks among existing institutions. A security council modelled on the
United Nations Security Council, in which each member had veto
power, would be responsible for executing decisions. In proposing this
structure and suggesting the neutralization of Central Europe, the
Kremlin clearly hoped to preserve the status quo, to prevent the Central
and Eastern European states from joining NATO, and to win a say in
Western organizations. Of course, at this point, neither Paris nor its
allies were prepared to entertain any plans to subordinate existing
institutions to a body of this sort.
For his part, Chirac argued for making the OSCE "an organization
with full powers, endowed with the appropriate legal status," and he
was in favour of codifying the founding principles in a single official
act - a treaty or a charter empowering it to exercise its responsibilities:
"The organization our continent needs is a dynamic OSCE, based on
clear standards, possessing greater means, able to play a vital role in

crisis prevention and management and to develop the arms control
instruments that Europe requires."37 But French aims met with either
opposition or scepticism from most member states. The EU gave Paris
tepid support. The United States was opposed to bolstering the OSCE
since such a measure might enable the organization to encroach on the
Alliance's turf. The Central and Eastern European states, not giving
the OSCE much credence, looked solely to NATO to assure their military
security. As for the Russians, under the circumstances they preferred
to begin negotiating with Washington in an effort to procure the
greatest possible recompense for NATO enlargement.
The OSCE summit held in Lisbon on 2. December 1996 ruled out
any concrete steps to strengthen the organization. The summit made
a purely formal concession to France by adopting the "Declaration on
a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the
zist Century." This general document did not go beyond enumerating
the founding principles of a common European space. The only con-
solation for Paris was the possibility that the European security charter
championed by Chirac would be adopted at a subsequent summit. But
on this occasion, French diplomacy did not succeed in rallying the
other states around a pan-European system which would ensure multi-
lateralism, as the French desired.
Thus, France's foreign-policy aims, not only on the specific issue of
NATO enlargement but also in many other areas, were clearly out of
step with those of its partners and not commensurate with its capacity
to influence the course of events. It would not be altogether fair to
accuse the French of getting too big for their bootstraps, especially
considering that a submissive and passive attitude on their part would
not have been welcomed either; it must be acknowledged, however,
that France has the resources of a middle power in a world in which
American unilateralism is the order of the day. What can we learn
from this? Perhaps we must accept that the opportunities for the
French to play the leading role to which they aspire in the international
arena are very limited - unless of course they succeed in assuming a
role within a strengthened collective diplomacy operating within the
EU. If France is willing, the time is ripe to take concrete steps towards
that end.
CHAPTER SEVEN
NATO Enlargement: Germany's

Euro-Atlantic Design
Paul Letourneau and Philippe Hebert
The issue of NATO enlargement represents an extremely important

stage in the development of European security in the post-Cold War
era. Of all the Alliance's members, Germany is the most directly
affected. In addition to geographic proximity and economic factors,
there are close political, historic, and cultural ties between Germany
and Central Europe.
Yet, although the stakes involved in NATO enlargement are high, the
issue cannot be said to have sparked heated debated in Germany.
Attention to the question pales in comparison with the controversy
that surrounded the creation of the Bundeswehr (army) in 1955, or
with the Euromissiles crisis of 1979 to 1983. In the present case, the
Germans (both the public and the political elites) seem to have been
the first to recognize that the reunification of 1990 would lead to the
inclusion of a good part of Central Europe in the Western institutions
created after the Second World War, most notably NATO and the
European Community.
We suggest that the lack of any debate worthy of the name may be
explained by the fact that NATO enlargement reflects the will of the
majority. Though it is certainly perceived as a positive development,
the enlargement process is not a fundamental issue for most Germans.
In 1995, when German political, economic, and social leaders were
asked what they considered to be the most important issues facing their
country, none of the top fifteen concerns mentioned related to matters
of foreign policy or security, with the exception of European integra-
tion.1 The absence of any foreign causes capable of rousing strong
support is probably one of the factors leading people to turn inwards
towards domestic issues. Indeed, since unification and the disappear-
ance of the Soviet military threat, Germans have been infinitely more
Germany's Euro-Atlantic Design 109
concerned with internal problems (high unemployment, reform of

social programs, healing the wounds of division, and so forth).
Nevertheless, enlarging the Alliance was one of the Kohl govern-
ment's main foreign- policy objectives after 1990. To get a clearer
understanding of the German standpoint in this debate, it may be
useful to review briefly the main considerations on this subject in
Germany. Our objective is not to judge their merit but to analyse them.
We shall then turn to the attitude of the political parties and public
opinion on this issue.
NATO ENLARGEMENT AND

GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
Germany's foreign and security policy has changed radically since

1990. Insofar as a clear consensus has been emerging in public opinion
and among the political elites, we may say that there has been a process
of maturation. Germany's foreign-policy priorities hinge on two major
themes, which are expressed in the discourse of the political class:
Germany needs to shoulder greater international responsibility and to
define its national interest. These themes converge in the issue of NATO
enlargement.
Debate on the issue of Germany's international responsibilities has
been fuelled by Bonn's initial reluctance to commit to peacekeeping or
peacebuilding operations within multilateral missions. After the bar-
rage of criticism it drew before, during, and after the Gulf War,
Germany today has almost completed the overhaul of its foreign policy,
abandoning chunks of its traditional policy of reserve. Sending combat
troops to Bosnia in 1997 as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) has
been the most striking example. Bonn's international responsibilities
are also directly linked to the expectations of its Western partners/
Germany's economic and military might makes it a major player on
the international scene, whether it wants to be or not. Bonn is therefore
being called upon to play a humanitarian, economic, and even military
role commensurate with its power. German leaders have understood
that they can put Germany's assets to good use only within multilateral
organizations such as NATO and the United Nations.3
In the process of NATO enlargement, Germany clearly wants to
contribute to keeping the peace on the European continent, in coop-
eration with its allies, by promoting the political and economic stabi-
lization of Eastern European states. Germany has also been starting to
use the concept of national interest as the basis for defining its prior-
ities in matters of foreign policy and security. In the view of many
no National Debates over Enlargement
observers, the recovery of full sovereignty following unification has

entailed a redefinition of Germany's national interest in line with its
political, economic, and geostrategic circumstances. Though some
writers take a narrow view of this concept, one that holds that states
have mutually exclusive interests,4 most argue that Germany's national
interests are quite similar to those of its major partners. The increased
interdependence that characterizes interstate relations in the current
system of international relations precludes strictly unilateral measures.
Germany's behaviour has a direct influence on other states. Germany
must therefore act in a realistic, cautious, and responsible fashion as
it defines and pursues its interests.5
Germany's national interest with respect to NATO enlargement is
relatively clear: Germany wants the limits of the West to be drawn not
along the Oder but along the Bug. The risk of border crises sparked
by instability in Eastern Europe must be reduced to a minimum, given
Germany's location at the centre of Europe.6 This perception that
German leaders have of Germany's national interest and responsibili-
ties is shaped by historic and geopolitical factors.7
MITTELEUROPA AND RECENT HISTORY
Historical considerations clearly figure prominently in German reason-

ing. No member of the Alliance is closer to Eastern Europe geopolit-
ically, culturally, economically, and historically - and particularly to
Poland, Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary, which made up the heart of
Mitteleuropa, Germany's old sphere of influence. Even after 1945, ties
with Mitteleuropa determined the perception many Germans had of
the inhabitants of this region, whom they considered to be closer to
themselves than to the Russians. For example, retired General Gerd
Schmiickle observed that, "for Adenauer, the Poles were a people of
Western culture, who happened to live farther East. He might have
said the same of the Czechs and the Hungarians."8
The legacy of the Second World War also remains of central impor-
tance. As demonstrated by the historical debate of the mid-1980s and
the powerful reactions to David Goldhagen's book,9 Germany today
remains very sensitive about the crimes committed in its name by the
National Socialist regime. How, then, can Germany forget its historic
responsibility to Eastern Europe, where Communist regimes were
imposed by force for more than forty years as a direct consequence of
the devastation caused by Hitler's armies?10 This desire to repair the
wrongs done by Hitler was also one of Chancellor Willy Brandt's chief
motivations in pursuing Ostpolitik in the early 19708. He saw recon-
ciliation with the East as the only way to transcend the burden of
history and the legacy of Nazism.11 The division of Europe during the
Cold War seemed unnatural and it was thought, particularly in Ger-
many, that if some day the Iron Curtain were to fall, Central European
countries would eventually have to be brought into the Western insti-
tutions from which they had been excluded against their will.
This sense of moral responsibility also derives from more recent
developments. Eastern Europeans played a key role in the fall of
Communism and hence in the process of unification. As then German
Defence Minister Volker Riihe noted, "the European revolution began
in the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk."" In addition to this debt to the
Polish people, Germans have not forgotten the role played by Hungary;
in the summer of 1989, that country opened a breach in the Iron
Curtain and allowed East Germans to flee to the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG). Czechoslovakia also played a part, following Hun-
gary's lead in October 1989, one month before the fall of the Berlin
Wall.
On the other hand, Germany's political leaders are also aware of
the key role played by Mikhail Gorbachev and Edward Shevardnadze,
who permitted German reunification, accepted that Germany would
remain in NATO, and agreed to withdraw Russian troops from the
territory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). The with-
drawal was completed in autumn 1994 under Boris Yeltsin. The
German government has therefore made a great effort to spare Russian
sensitivities.
GERMAN CONCERNS ABOUT THE EAST
These historical considerations, however, only partly explain the

German attitude towards the prospect of the enlargement of Western
institutions. Stabilizing the former Communist states of Eastern
Europe has rapidly emerged as one of the West's fundamental objec-
tives in the wake of German unification and the disintegration of the
USSR. Many consider political and economic instability in this region
to be the gravest threat to post-Cold War Europe. Clearly, given its
geopolitical position, the united Germany realized the importance of
avoiding turmoil on its eastern borders at an early stage. Thus,
Germany's policy on European security since 1990 has become, to
some extent, a policy of stabilization.13 Exporting stability to avoid
importing instability constitutes the basic principle of this policy. As
Defence Minister Ruhe, one of the first advocates of NATO enlarge-
ment, pointed out, it is in Germany's interest "to be surrounded by
stable democracies, to be surrounded by allies and partners. We do
not want to be the state on the edge of western Europe."14 Since the
ii2 National Debates over Enlargement
process of political transformation began in 1989, regional European

organizations have been the main instrument through which this
stabilization policy has been conducted. And Eastern European coun-
tries began expressing their desire to join most of these organizations,
notably the European Union (EU) and NATO, as early as 1990.
The first advocates of expanding Western institutions eastward were
in post-reunification Germany. Between 1990 and 1993, this issue
figured prominently in speeches by German political leaders,15 much
more so than those of their Western counterparts. Until 1993, the
Germans were the only ones to consider the inclusion of new members
in these institutions in concrete terms. Minister Riihe subsequently gave
the process new impetus by calling for swift integration of Eastern
European countries into NATO, 16 given the uncertain timetable for
accession to the EU: "The Alliance must not be a 'closed shop.' I cannot
see one good reason for denying future members of the European
Union membership in NATO." 17 This attitude appeared hasty to Ger-
many's allies in NATO and particularly the United States, which did
not look favourably on such prompt enlargement, even though a
number of voices in support of the plan were already making them-
selves heard/ 8
Bonn quickly became the standard-bearer of Eastern European coun-
tries within the Alliance, especially the states that in Visegrad, Hungary,
in February 1991 had asked for admission to NATO: Poland, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia.19 In 1990-91 German economic assistance to the
former members of the Warsaw Pact already made up the lion's share
of all international support to the region. Riihe's position gave them
hope for quick accession to membership. Chancellor Helmut Kohl also
came out for NATO enlargement quite early, notably after the Brussels
summit in January 1994 and the creation of the Partnership for Peace
(PFP) program. Kohl urged his Western partners to take the Eastern
countries' security concerns seriously.20
This benevolent attitude was particularly evident in relations with
Poland. Relations between Bonn and Warsaw are on the road to
normalization but memories of the war are still strong/1 Poland was
the first country to ask for inclusion in NATO 22 and the EU; German
support for its candidacy was welcomed by the Poles.23 During Presi-
dent Aleksander Kwasniewski's visit to Bonn in January 1996, German
President Roman Herzog stated that Poland should be offered the
opportunity to become a member of these two organizations as soon
as possible.24 This attitude demonstrates how seriously the German
government took Polish claims, recognizing that the two countries'
histories are now intimately linked. 25 Developments in the these coun-
tries and their rapprochement since 1989 have clearly worked in favour
of closer cooperation, leading some observers to speak of a German-

Polish community of interest.16
Relations with Eastern European states in general and Poland in
particular are not, however, the only factors that bear on enlargement.
Another key factor in the German government's attitude on this issue
is Russian intransigence. Moscow has on a number of occasions
expressed its opposition to NATO membership for former members of
the Warsaw Pact. Since the summit of the Organization on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE; previously the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe, or CSCE) in Budapest in December
1994, Bonn has generally been more attentive and more sensitive to
the Russian position;17 it has been trying to demonstrate that it takes
Russia's reservations seriously and recognizes that Russia, like Ger-
many, has security interests in the region.18 Thus, Chancellor Kohl took
a cautious tack; for instance, he insisted, along with some of his
colleagues, that the admission of Eastern European countries into
NATO would not mean that Western troops or nuclear arms would be
stationed there/9 Given Moscow's firm stand against the plan, Bonn
has played the role of mediator between its Western partners and Boris
Yeltsin.30 This development can probably be explained in part by the
special relationship between Helmut Kohl and the Russian president.
However, it places Bonn in the middle of the debate, for it must also
take into account the increasingly pressing demands of countries such
as Poland, which are also sensitive to the current negotiations on the
nature of future relations between NATO and Russia.31 Germany is
trying to ease tensions by avoiding statements that could offend Russia,
while supporting the continuation of the process of admitting new
members. This sensitivity to Russian demands is clear from the large
number of visits Kohl paid to Moscow and the statements made at
those meetings.3i
Russia had little choice but to agree to the enlargement which
NATO'S member states proposed to carry out. The logic and dynamic
of the transformation in Europe since 1989 are bringing about changes
that promote greater stability; in the view of many German observers,
this poses no threat to any state.33 Though President Yeltsin continues
to assert that NATO enlargement threatens the balance in Europe,34 it
seems that Germany's understanding attitude has eased the talks with
Moscow on NATO-Russian relations.35
TOWARDS A CONSENSUS ON SECURITY?
The Kohl government's initiatives on NATO enlargement received broad

support from the opposition parties (except the Party of Democratic
ii4 National Debates over Enlargement
Socialism, or PDS), including the Social Democratic Party (SPD). As

Karsten Voigt, the SPD'S spokesperson on foreign policy, observed, "the
disappearance of the bipolar East-West system has also erased the
bipolarity which has until now characterized relations between the CDU
[Christian Democratic Union] and the SPD on foreign policy and
security."36 Today, with the SPD in power, the type of polarization
observed during the Euromissiles crisis, which reflected bloc politics, is
almost entirely a thing of the past. There is in fact no major difference
between the SPD'S position on enlargement and that of the cou. 37
However, some voices have been raised within the SPD against the plan,
calling for the OSCE to be bolstered instead, on the grounds that the
OSCE is an organization that transcends the system of alliances and
offers better prospects for collective security.38 Once again, the objections
stem essentially from a desire not to isolate Russia. The consequences
of NATO enlargement could be "literally risky and dangerous"39
because of the possibility of antagonism with Moscow.
Strengthening the CSCE was in fact the option favoured by the Kohl
government, and particularly by former Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, in 1989-90. The idea of a European order, in which
the parameters of cooperation and security would be established by
the OSCE, also had the advantage of including the USSR (until 1991)
in the new architecture.40 However, the OSCE has not delivered on its
promises. Difficulties related to consensus decision-making and the
organization's glaring failures in Yugoslavia and Chechnya have con-
siderably tarnished its image. To be sure, Germany has not abandoned
the idea of a pan-European order that embraces Russia, but the OSCE
no longer seems to be the ideal forum in which to pursue this objective.
Some Social Democrats have also questioned the thesis that enlarging
the Alliance could realistically help stabilize the new democracies. To
what extent could what is basically a military organization influence
the behaviour of states in fields beyond that organization's scope? The
case of Greece and Turkey is often cited as an example that demon-
strates that membership in NATO does not necessarily eliminate the
possibility of conflict between members and does not guarantee a
democratic political regime.41
It could certainly be argued that NATO enlargement has not really
split the Social Democrats, despite some differences about the best
approach. Indeed, a general consensus on security issues did emerge
between the Kohl government and the opposition in the course of the
Bosnia crisis and the deployment of Bundeswehr troops outside NATO
territory. This delicate question, which ties in with the whole debate
on Germany's "normality" in terms of foreign policy,42 monopolized
media attention between 1993 and 1995. Following the failure of the
Somalia mission in 1993, when the German government sent 1600

soldiers to take part in humanitarian operations under UN auspices,
the question of the constitutionality of such missions was raised,
notably by the SPD and the Greens. In July 1994, the Federal Consti-
tutional Court in Karlsruhe handed down a decision which settled
some of the differences between the left-wing parties and the right-
wing government on the deployment issue. It confirmed that German
participation in military operations outside NATO territory was not an
infringement of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and that the deployment
of troops in combat zones could be authorized by a simple majority
in the Bundestag. This decision therefore constituted a turning point
in Germany's quest for a more active international role.
There was a clear consensus on this issue in the subsequent votes in
the Bundestag on sending troops to the former Yugoslavia, first as part
of the Rapid Reaction Force in June 199543 and more overwhelmingly
still after the Dayton Accords, signed in November 1995. At that time,
the Bundestag voted by margin of 543 to 107 to send 4000 German
soldiers to Bosnia and Croatia as part of NATO'S Implementation Force
(iFOR). 44 Such lopsided support demonstrates the extent to which the
SPD'S stance, though still opposed to the Bundeswehr taking part in
combat missions outside NATO territory, had drawn closer to the Kohl
government's position on this delicate issue.45 In January 1997 German
participation in SFOR again confirmed the like-mindedness of Ger-
many's main political parties.
Germany's Green Party has rallied to the same position, though less
overwhelmingly. At the end of 1994, 62 per cent of Greens supported
NATO intervention in European conflicts such as the war in Bosnia.46
This new trend created a split within the party between those who
were attached to pacifism at all costs and those who were prepared to
partially abandon it in exceptional situations. Faced with the atrocities
committed by the Bosnian Serbs in the summer of 1995, tne leader of
the Greens in the Bundestag, Joschka Fischer, called for a firmer
attitude towards the aggressors by the Western powers.47
On NATO enlargement, the Greens are also concerned by Russia's
attitude and favour constructing a pan-European security structure
through the oscE. 48 Green federal spokesperson Krista Sager considers
it understandable that Eastern European countries want to clarify their
security position by joining NATO. 49 But she argues that enlargement
of the Alliance may recreate the division of Europe into blocs, with
NATO on one side and Russia and the other Eastern European states
that have not been admitted into NATO on the other. The Greens,
therefore, have many reservations about rapid NATO enlargement; 50 to
some extent, their position resembles that of some members of the
n6 National Debates over Enlargement
SPD. Of course, they do not oppose the stabilization of Eastern Euro-

pean countries, but in their view enlargement must not be carried out
at the cost of isolating Russia.
The divisions on foreign-policy issues no longer break down along
official party lines. As we have seen, the SPD and the Greens in some
cases lined up behind the Kohl government's positions on issues that
are particularly sensitive in Germany, such as intervention in Bosnia.
To be sure, the reserved stance that has characterized Germany's con-
duct on the international scene since 1949 is still deeply rooted, par-
ticularly in the left-wing parties. This tendency is strong in the Green
Party and the left wing of the SPD, both of which feel that Germany's
past carries with it a moral obligation to create a "European order of
peace."51 The inclusion of Russia in this new European order therefore
seems indispensable, a view that explains the reservations of part of
the left towards NATO enlargement; they see the OSCE as better suited
to meeting post-Cold War contingencies in Europe. The Russia factor
is the dividing line between the two sides and the main argument raised
by most of the opponents of expansion, including Peter Glotz, Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, and Egon Bahr, some of the architects of Ostpolitik.
GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION

AND NATO ENLARGEMENT
There has been an interesting shift in German public perceptions of

security issues since unification. Most polls since 1990 show majority
support for a strongly pro-Western stance in Bonn's foreign policy.52
Germans are looking to regional security organizations to resolve the
crises and conflicts that may arise in Europe and on its periphery.
In a 1995 poll conducted by the United States Information Agency,
65 per cent of Germans responded that the admission of Eastern
European countries into NATO would be beneficial to European secu-
rity and 67 per cent believed that NATO is still essential to Germany's
security.53 These figures indicate that the German public remains
attached to Western security organizations but also understands the
new issues that the Alliance must face. In this respect, German public
opinion is closely aligned with that of other Western European coun-
tries. In the same poll, 57 per cent of French respondents and 69 per
cent of British respondents were favourable to NATO enlargement.
Support for NATO and the admission of new members into the
Alliance is also strong among the nation's elites. A series of surveys of
politicians, judges, industrialists, clergymen, Bundeswehr officers, and
academics conducted in 1995 by RAND and the Friedrich-Naumann
foundation 54 showed the same trends as in the general public, but with
still higher levels of support: 92 per cent of the German elite consider
NATO essential to the country's security. It should be noted that, once
again, this position cuts across party lines: it is shared by supporters
of all the major parties (Christian Democrats, Christian Socialists,
Social Democrats, and Free Democrats) and by nearly 60 per cent of
Greens.55 We therefore see a certain consensus emerging on security
issues. On NATO enlargement, 76 per cent of the elite support the
candidacy of the Visegrad countries. Among Bundeswehr officers, the
support is nearly unanimous (92 per cent). 56
Commenting on this convergence of views, some observers have
pointed out that German support for enlargement drops substantially
when respondents are told that German troops could be required to
intervene to defend an allied country. This public opinion reaction is
not unique to Germany, however; it is found in all member countries
of the Alliance. The populations of states that are members of a
military alliance normally want to enjoy the benefits of belonging to
a regional security organization while hesitating to assume the obliga-
tions, especially if they involve an advance commitment to armed
intervention. And we find this same tendency in the main Eastern
European states. For example, 49 per cent of Czech respondents and
68 per cent of Hungarian respondents are opposed to sending their
country's troops to defend a member of the Alliance, which does not
prevent them from wanting to join the organization.57
On the whole, these figures confirm a certain continuity in public
opinion and strong support for the Kohl government's approach to
security. There is broad support for NATO enlargement; hence the lack
of significant public debate on the question.
CONCLUSION
NATO enlargement does not present any difficulties for Germans since
it is in line with German priorities. We can distinguish three main
characteristics in the domestic debate on this question in Germany.
The first is that the majority of actors seem to agree with the idea of
extending security guarantees to the East, especially to the Visegrad
countries. Second, we note that differences of opinion and opposition
to the project do not necessarily correspond to political divisions. The
movement towards a national consensus on security issues is particu-
larly interesting in the case of the centre-left and left parties, such as
the SPD and the Greens; we are likely witnessing the end of the often
unrealistic pacifist politics that crested in the mid-1980s with the
Friedensbewegung (peace movement). The disappearance of the ideo-
logical confrontation between East and West and of the threat of
n8 National Debates over Enlargement
nuclear war in Europe has been a key factor in shaping this new
attitude. The fading importance of the military dimension of German
security policy, which had been the focal point of many debates during
the Cold War, also opens the door to a meeting of minds among the
main parties. Lastly, a clear sympathy is evident towards the claims of
Eastern European countries, especially Poland, in German political
discourse. The weight of the past and the desire to repair the wrongs
caused by Nazism and then by Communism is an essential factor in
explaining the conduct and attitude of the German elites.
The growing consensus of opinion and merging perceptions of
German interests is unsurprising in view of the fact that Central Europe
is a vitally important area for Germany, both economically (accounting
for 10 per cent of Germany's foreign trade in 199 6 58 ) and in terms of
security. At another level, enlargement will make it possible to reconcile
what is perceived as Germany's primary national interest, namely not
to be Western Europe's eastern front, with the new international
responsibilities that Germany's increasingly important role entails.
It would appear that Germany realized the importance of pursuing
an active policy to stabilize the new democracies in Eastern Europe by
enlarging Western institutions several years before its partners did.
Since 1994, the views of all members of the Alliance on this issue have
converged. The German government's role in achieving this objective
remains crucial, however, because of the growing ties between Ger-
many and the states that want to join NATO. The close cooperation
that has been established between Bonn and Moscow has also been a
central factor in breaking what seemed to be a deadlock until May
1997.59 For Germany, the decisions made at the Madrid summit
represent the culmination of a vital process for the pursuit of its
foreign-policy objectives.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Canada and the Enlargement of NATO

Andre P. Donneur and Martin Bourgeois
The Parties will contribute toward the further development

of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthen-
ing their free institutions, by bringing about a better under-
standing of the principles upon which these institutions are
founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-
being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their interna-
tional economic policies and will encourage economic collab-
oration between any or all of them.
Article 2. of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949)'
Since the end of the Second World War, NATO has figured prominently
in Canadian foreign-policy and defence programs. Militarily, Canada
has made a loyal, concrete contribution to the Atlantic Alliance by
providing troops for naval, land, and air operations, taking an active
part in multinational campaigns, and participating in the field training
of military personnel. On the diplomatic front, the Canadian govern-
ment has always been an ardent proponent of cohesion and coopera-
tion among NATO members and an advocate of NATO'S core values at
the international level.2
In the early 19908, Canada changed its conception of NATO'S role,
focusing more on the political and economic facets of the organiza-
tion's mandate (Article 2) and less on its military function, the impor-
tance of which seemed to have declined in the post-Cold War era. The
Canadian government instigated the creation of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (P£P).
Simultaneously, the Department of National Defence scaled back
Canada's military commitment to Europe. This move generated con-
siderable debate among the leading members of NATO. 3
Clearly, many observers assumed that in taking this decision Canada
was abandoning its involvement in NATO. However, in spite of the
izo National Debates over Enlargement
reduction in Canada's military commitment, Canada gave uncondi-

tional support to the Alliance to maintain its strategic and diplomatic
interests in Europe. In 1995 and 1996 Canadian troops were deployed
in the ex-Yugoslavia for peacekeeping and then peacebuilding missions.
In addition, many Canadian diplomats played an active role in over-
hauling the Alliance's mandate.4 Canadian armed forces remained at
the disposal of NATO to respond to any conflict involving Alliance
forces. In 1996, 1250 Canadians were part of the Stabilization Force
(SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Canada rightly took the view that
NATO'S contribution to the European security system needed to go
beyond the bounds of the traditional military-strategic framework and
enter a new political and economic phase, dictated by the altered
international situation.
Canada provoked further controversy by giving unqualified support,
well before most NATO members, to the process of enlarging NATO
into Eastern and Central Europe launched in July 1997 at Madrid.
Ottawa's stand was consistent with the spirit of the 1991 London
summit, which initiated the process of transforming NATO'S mandate
and structures. But it soon became apparent that not all foreign-policy
experts supported the government's position. Curiously, the harshest
critics included the editorialists of most major Canadian dailies. The
sceptics argued that taking a categorical stand on this issue could be
dangerous, given the highly precarious situation in Eastern Europe.
Furthermore, eastward enlargement would run counter to the basic
principles of Canadian foreign policy.5 On this question, Canadian
policy makers brought down the wrath of advocates of defence-budget
cutbacks and unconditional supporters of Canada's military commit-
ment to Europe alike.
The purpose of this analysis is to describe the Canadian perspective
on the NATO enlargement process and to demonstrate that Ottawa's
position was not taken hastily or clumsily but was, rather, in keeping
with its post-Cold War policy objectives. After surveying and analysing
Canadian public opinion on the enlargement issue, we will trace the
evolution of Canada's official position as set out by the Department of
Foreign Affairs. Next, we will attempt to explain Canada's support for
enlargement and the government's openness with regard to the selection
of new members. Lastly, based on analyses by a number of Canadian
academics, we will propose theoretical approaches to explaining
Canada's unequivocal support for an expanded Atlantic Alliance.
MEDIA OPPOSITION TO NATO ENLARGEMENT
Most Canadian daily newspapers felt that Canada and its NATO part-
ners were committing a serious error by extending membership in the
Alliance to Central and Eastern European nations. In this first section,

we will survey the opinions on NATO enlargement published in the
major dailies since 1995. As will be seen, media views stem from a
dominant current of thought on the issue. These views have essentially
reflected the "classical" perception of NATO, which is based on the
idea that NATO is a military organization whose primary role remains
to deter Russia. We will then assess the arguments informed by this
classical perception in light of the Atlantic Alliance's changing structure
and mandate.
A Categorical Position
In an editorial of 2.1 October 1995 entitled "Helping and Respecting
Russia," the Globe and Mail stated that the West should immediately
abandon all current plans to expand NATO, since "taking NATO to the
borders of Russia is unnecessarily provocative." The position taken by
the nationally distributed Toronto daily was significant and attested to
profound concern over this issue.6
On 8 January 1996 another Globe and Mail editorial warned against
any NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic. It said: "NATO should recognize that alienating Russia would
create the very insecurity that expanding the alliance would be an
attempt to contain." Instead, it recommended enlarging the pfp. 7 On
30 December 1996, in an editorial on President Bill Clinton's foreign
policy, the Globe and Mail maintained that the United States should
delay supporting the enlargement of NATO and reconsider its position.
The newspaper argued that it would be better policy to develop the
pfp and strengthen trading ties: "Instead of strengthening security, a
larger NATO would sow insecurity." On 19 February 1997 the paper
attacked pro-enlargement statements by U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright on the ground that proceeding with the process
would spark a crisis,8 echoing several editorials published in the New
York Times, including George Kennan's famous piece, which charac-
terized enlargement as the "the most fateful error of American policy
in the entire post-cold-war era."
The Globe and Mail's position was shared by the international affairs
editor of the Montreal daily La Presse. In an article dated 13 December
1996, Frederic Wagniere claimed that "the expansion of NATO to the
East would add nothing to the security of Western Europe" and would
"become a formidable obstacle in the search for a new relationship
between Russia and the rest of Europe." While some Eastern European
countries, such as Poland and Hungary, would have to be admitted to
NATO some day, the enlargement process could not be carried forward
until ties with Russia had been strengthened. He concluded that NATO
enlargement would foment "old prejudices and irritants" in Russia,
12.2. National Debates over Enlargement
Europe, and North America, "with the result that they would continue
to poison international relations."9
Editorial writers with the daily Le Devoir also condemned the
decision to accept new members into NATO. According to Francois
Brousseau, enlargement might humiliate Russia and, more ominously,
heighten its distrust of the West: "Enlargement to the East underscores
three things: i) the West's crushing victory in the Cold War; 2) the
distrust which Russia continues to inspire in the West and Central
Europe; 3) Russia's persistent resentment of the West." Russia would
be the major loser if the plan were carried out without its endorsement.
In reality, the West was still afraid of Russia and enlarging NATO was
a way to assuage its fears.10
The Ramifications of Enlargement

Why, in spite of these stern warnings from the majority of Canada's
dailies, did the government persist in supporting the enlargement of
NATO into Central and Eastern Europe? It must be said that the
editorialists do not appear to have been in possession of all the facts
in analysing the risks. For example, the Globe and Mail article of
19 February 1997 ignored the nuances which u.s. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright brought to the American position. The La Presse
editorial of 10 February 1997 seemed to be simply ill-informed, com-
plaining that Canada was not taking part in the discussions on NATO
enlargement because "Ottawa seemed to have no interest in them,"
when in fact the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT) had been demonstrating strong interest in the matter for at
least two years.11
In general, the line of argument which holds that enlargement into
Eastern Europe would have a highly negative impact on Canada's role
within the Atlantic Alliance is rooted in the articles by George Kennan
in the New York Times and Owen Harries in Foreign Affairs, as well
as in a RAND study on the costs of NATO enlargement.12 Three types
of argument are generally used to support the negative view of enlarge-
ment. We will analyse them critically here.
THE NEED TO AVOID IRRITATING RUSSIA
The argument most frequently cited by the media as a justification for

opposing plans to expand the Atlantic Alliance is the one that main-
tains that Russia would be annoyed if certain Eastern European nations
joined NATO. According to this view, political and economic instability
in Russia could spur the growth of nationalist groups and extremist
elements. Should this occur, it could easily lead to an outbreak of anti-
Western sentiment and a change in Russian foreign policy. Instead of
Canada and the Enlargement of NATO 12.3
promoting greater European integration, enlarging NATO would lead

to a new division of the continent, with demarcation lines separating
member states and non-members. As a result, extending the Atlantic
Alliance to Eastern European nations could disrupt the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) n disarmament talks and the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations on nuclear disarmament and
security.13
In this connection, it should be noted that NATO members have held
intensive negotiations with Moscow to bring Russia into a strategic
partnership. Significant efforts have been made to strengthen the pfp,
which includes Russia and Ukraine. An American delegation led by
Madeleine Albright travelled to Brussels and Eastern Europe to pro-
mote this partnership and garnered the support of all Alliance mem-
bers. Finally, it must be borne in mind that NATO'S mandate is in a
process of change, which is shifting the Alliance towards a more
political and less military role. The Alliance can no longer be consid-
ered solely a collective-defence organization. Rather than a wild west
posse that we trot out only when danger appears, it is a permanent
presence, designed to promote common endeavours and to prevent a
threat from ever arising. In short, NATO does not need an enemy. It
has enduring purposes.14
According to Albright, NATO'S new mandate will consist first and
foremost in ensuring stability in Europe through a common foreign and
security policy (CFSP). This would be guaranteed by close collaboration
among current and future members. In response to criticisms about the
possibility of a polarized Europe, the American secretary of state pointed
to NATO members' efforts to avoid offending Russia, the emphasis on
the pfp, the bilateral negotiations initiated by the Alliance with Ukraine
and Russia, and the willingness to bring Russia into the Gy, which
became the G8 at the Denver summit of June 1997.15 Albright also
stressed that NATO had no intention of encircling Russia. On the con-
trary, she maintained that the Alliance should be viewed as a constructive
organization, built on stability and cooperation, not confrontation.
It might be added that NATO did not pressure Romania, Hungary, or
Poland to join: it was the nations of Central and Eastern Europe that
applied for admission into NATO. "NATO expansion is not directed
against Russia. It is not true that the West is going East. After all, it was
the Eastern European nations which requested membership in NATO,"
NATO'S Deputy Secretary General Sergio Balanzino told the media.' 6
LOSS OF COHESION
The second argument against NATO enlargement is based on the belief

that the process could lead to a polarization of the Atlantic Alliance
and induce conflict between members with different regional interests.

Would Canada be ready to become involved in a confrontation
between Poland or the Czech Republic and a belligerent state? This is
a key question for critics of NATO enlargement. Another question is
whether the Atlantic Alliance might find itself paralysed by too many
members. By admitting up to five new members, was it not running
the risk of impairing its effectiveness and cohesion?17
To maintain, however, that NATO would be divided following
enlargement would be to underestimate the process for accession. Each
candidate for NATO membership must meet strict and rigorous selec-
tion criteria, which should in theory prevent the emergence of funda-
mental differences between members' interests. Every new member
must subscribe to NATO'S basic philosophy: it must have a democrat-
ically elected government that exercises control over its military,
develop a market economy, and abide by principles of good neighbour-
liness. The paragraph on principles of enlargement in chapter i of the
study on enlargement conducted for NATO clearly states that new
members must first and foremost undertake to: i) unite their efforts
for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security,
and settle any international disputes in which they may be involved
by peaceful means; 2.) contribute to the development of peaceful and
friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions;
and 3) maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance by sharing roles, risks,
and responsibilities, as well as the costs and benefits of assuring
common security goals and objectives.18 Canada will be committed, as
it has been for the last fifty years and as stipulated in the NATO Treaty
of 1949, to defending any partner whose sovereignty is threatened by
a belligerent state that does agree to settle conflicts by peaceful means
or violates the principles of democracy.
HIGH COST OF ENLARGEMENT
The final argument raised by most opponents is the idea that eastward
enlargement could entail astronomical financial and political costs. If
NATO admits new members, it will be obliged to support them mili-
tarily, thereby straining military budgets - a particularly difficult prob-
lem for minor military powers, such as Canada. This argument was
heard primarily in academic circles, especially among advocates of
quantitative methods, but not necessarily among experts on defence
policy.
It is, however, impossible to assess all the implications of enlarge-
ment. Although there will be real costs, the benefits and the multiplier
effect on diplomacy, trade, and the social fabric will obviously be hard
Canada and the Enlargement of NATO 1x5
to quantify. Members of the Atlantic Alliance hope that political

stability in Eastern Europe will also lead to closer trading ties with
Western Europe. We may also surmise that the new members will have
to upgrade their military equipment and infrastructure, which will
generate direct benefits for certain industries. We must be extremely
cautious, therefore, in attaching a figure to a process that will extend
over more than a decade.
An exhaustive study of the costs and consequences of enlargement
conducted by the U.S. State Department's Bureau of European and
Canadian Affairs19 concluded, first of all, that there would indeed be
costs related to enlargement. For all current members of the Alliance
combined, the costs would be in the order of $700 to $900 million
(u.s.) annually. Canada's share would amount to between $42 and
$54 million per year over the next decade, or about 6 per cent. The
study also concluded that the costs would not be as high as suggested
by some in the media. In fact, not expanding NATO could be much
costlier than enlargement. Canada has an ongoing interest in European
security, not only from a strategic point of view but also, and indeed
primarily, for economic reasons. It would be hard to predict the fate
of Canadian investments and exports should the political climate in
Europe become destabilized. It must be concluded, as shall be demon-
strated below, that the cost of enlargement will be modest and will be
a necessary expense in order to preserve and develop Canadian inter-
ests in Europe.
OFFICIAL CANADIAN POSITION
The Canadian position with regard to NATO'S post-Cold War mandate

has not always been as categorical as it is today. It has changed with
each new minister of foreign affairs and according to the aspirations
of NATO members and the state of international relations. If we review
the main points of the Canadian position in the 19905, we find that
Canada's views on the role of NATO shifted and solidified in late 1994,
as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce) was
losing ground as a key institution for ensuring political stability in
Europe. At that time, the Canadian government began supporting
changes in NATO'S objectives to make them more political, and it
expressed renewed hope that Article 2. of the Charter would receive
greater emphasis.
No to Enlargement and Yes to the pfp (1993)

On 2 December 1993 Foreign Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet attended
the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). He took
iz6 National Debates over Enlargement
advantage of this meeting to reaffirm Canada's support for NATO and

for a stable pan-European security system. Ouellet signalled Canada's
desire to promote multilateral cooperation to meet the security imper-
atives of the post-Cold War era, through either the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce, predecessor of the osce) or
the United Nations. He stated that the Alliance would have to change
in order to deal with a new security environment. Canada continued
to support peacekeeping as the instrument of choice for preventing
conflicts, and it argued that the pfp would serve to highlight this
component of foreign policy - much more so than NATO enlargement.
Ouellet maintained that enlargement could not be undertaken at that
time, since it could jeopardize stability in the region: "The integrity of
the Alliance and stability of the region should be our guidelines. But
we must positively engage this issue. Grudging treatment will make a
failure of our alliance and will disappoint our friends."20
A Long Embryonic Stage (1994)

In early January 1994, just prior to the NATO summit of 10-11 January
in Brussels, Prime Minister Jean Chretien stated that he wanted to move
more rapidly to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in
NATO. 21 However, the summit's final declaration confined itself to the
following statement: "We expect and would welcome NATO expansion
that would reach to democratic states to our East." It emphasized the
pfp proposal, which would include joint military exercises in order to
accustom the members to working together for peace, while putting
off enlargement until the end of an evolutionary process.22
At the June 1994 meeting of the Atlantic Council in Istanbul, Ouellet
reaffirmed his "strong support for the opening of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization towards Central and Eastern Europe."23 On
12. September 1994, when welcoming Polish President Lech Wasa to
Canada, Prime Minister Chretien stated that "Canada has for some
time supported the admission of Poland into NATO." 24 On 30 May
1995, at a ministerial meeting of the NATO Council held in Noordwijk,
the Netherlands, Ouellet stated that no Central and Eastern European
country should be excluded a priori.
It was with the publication of its white paper that the Department
of National Defence finally addressed the question of enlargement.
After reiterating that the Alliance should review its mandate and infra-
structure, and tailor them to the new security environment, the white
paper concluded that NATO could more effectively contribute to col-
lective security in Europe by promoting initiatives for cooperation and
partnership such as the pfp and NACC: "Canada will press for addi-
tional change," including enlargement to Eastern European countries.25
Canada and the Enlargement of NATO 12.7
Partnership with Russia (1995)

The Canadian position became even clearer in the foreign-policy state-
ment of 1995. At that time, the government defined its concept of
security with greater precision: "Movement will continue away from
security policies and structures based on containment toward new
architectures designed to build stability and cooperation."16 Hence-
forth, NATO would be a key organization for maintaining stability in
Europe. However, in the view of the Department of Foreign Affairs,
the Atlantic Alliance's mandate would have to be transformed; Canada
would use its influence to effect changes in the mandate so that other
nations that met the basic requirements could be admitted into NATO.
On 30 May 1995 the Department of Foreign Affairs stated officially
that NATO should in principle remain open to any candidate that met
the pre-established criteria. Any country interested in joining the Atlan-
tic Alliance would have to declare its intention to help strengthen
political stability on the continent. The statement also noted the
urgency of forming a close partnership with Russia: "Quite frankly,
Canada is convinced that NATO expansion, like the development of a
relationship between NATO and Russia, will not succeed without sub-
stantial reforms to NATO and its structures." 27 A few months after this
statement, and following the publication of a NATO study on enlarge-
ment, Andre Ouellet came out firmly in favour of the inclusion of
Latvia in the Atlantic Alliance, citing Latvia's efforts in the pfp and its
desire to help create a climate of stability in Europe.28
First Round of Enlargement (1996)

On 19 February 1996 Lloyd Axworthy, minister of foreign affairs, and
David Collenette, then minister of national defence, hosted NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana in Ottawa. They discussed the two key
issues, enlarging the Atlantic Alliance and reviewing its military man-
date. Axworthy and Collenette took advantage of this occasion to
renew their commitment to NATO, an organization that, in their view,
was in line with the new international situation and with Canada's
foreign- policy objectives.29 Subsequently, at the Atlantik-Briicke Con-
ference in Louisbourg, Nova Scotia, Axworthy outlined Canada's con-
ception of a pan-European security architecture in the post-Cold War
period. A reformed NATO, enlarged to include new members, was at
the core of the new Canadian approach.30
At meetings of NAC and NACC on 10 and n December 1996 respec-
tively, the minister of external affairs indicated his position on the
evolving role of NATO: "We must determine how we can establish long-
term security in this new landscape." It had become clear that NATO
was to be the key instrument for guaranteeing this long-term security.
iz8 National Debates over Enlargement
Canada unequivocally approved the criteria for admitting new mem-

bers. Those who were invited to join NATO must offer: stable and
durable democratic governments, with established records of respect
for human rights and the principles of good governance; clear and
unequivocal civilian control over the military, together with transpar-
ency and accountability in military budgets and management; durable
settlements to any disputes with neighbouring countries in full effect;
and, finally, well-established economic transformation.
Canada's minister of foreign affairs, in agreement with NATO'S sec-
retary general, stressed the importance of forging closer ties with
Russia in order to avoid diplomatic conflict: "We must ensure that the
Alliance no longer looks like a string of command posts lined up from
the Arctic to the Mediterranean, all facing Russia."31 If NATO'S struc-
tures were overhauled and streamlined, enlargement would be less
costly.
Plan to Admit at Least Five New Members(1997)

On 1 8 February 1997, at a special meeting of NAC, the Canadian
government gave unqualified support to rapid enlargement of the
Alliance. Canada not only backed this first round of enlargement but
also wanted to ensure that it would not be the only one: "Canada also
believes that the Alliance must also make it very clear at Madrid that
the first wave of enlargement is not the last." According to the criteria
established by the Department of Foreign Affairs, five candidates could
easily be included in the first round: Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Romania, and Slovenia. In addition, it was essential to
establish a dialogue with countries such as Ukraine in order to guar-
antee stability in the region. The Canadian delegation stated: "We fully
support concluding an agreement with Ukraine prior to Madrid." 32
With regard to Romania's candidacy, Prime Minister Chretien report-
edly stated that the country's strategic position was of prime impor-
tance to Canadian interests in Europe.33
UNEQUIVOCAL CANADIAN SUPPORT FOR

EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT
How is Canada's changing position on the role of NATO and on its

enlargement plans to be explained? Without embarking on a theoret-
ical analysis, it is possible to identify certain pressures that induced the
Canadian government to take a pro-enlargement stance. We will first
identify the internal pressures that have a direct impact on Ottawa's
conduct of national affairs. Then, we will look at some external
pressures, international events that have had a direct effect on Canada's
conduct within the international system.
Canada and the Enlargement of NATO iz9
Internal Pressures
Crisis in Government Finances Since the beginning of the 19905, the

Canadian government has been grappling with a major financial crisis,
as have all Western industrial nations. Faced with cutbacks, the depart-
ments of Foreign Affairs and National Defence were forced to review
their priorities. On the defence front, Canada decided in 1992. to
terminate its military presence in Europe. In practical terms, the bases
at Lahr and Baden-Sollingen were closed and the soldiers were brought
home. On the diplomatic front, Canada replaced or eliminated certain
bilateral ties which were considered important in the past and replaced
them with multilateral, sometimes virtual, diplomatic channels.
Canada's presence in Europe now hinges on the European Union (EU),
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
the osce, the Gy, and NATO. At the internal level, tighter spending
controls were introduced and a number of positions were abolished or
merged in an effort to rationalize the government's operations. All
these pressures led to government support for multilateral rather than
bilateral ties, since these yield greater international influence at a lower
cost. It was a question of doing more with less.
Domestic Economic Development Second, job creation and eco-

nomic growth are the Canadian government's current priorities. Since
the beginning of the 19905, a number of Canadian firms have made
massive research-and- development investments in Central and Eastern
Europe. The countries that have attracted the most investment are
Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Lithuania and Russia. In October 1996
DFAIT sent a delegation to Eastern Europe as part of a large-scale trade
mission to support Canadian industry. Minister Art Eggleton, accom-
panied by thirty businessmen, went to Poland and Russia in order to
establish new business ties with these countries. Canada also
announced a technical- cooperation project with certain trading part-
ners. Based on DFAIT figures for 1995, trade with Poland totalled
about C$3oo million, of which exports accounted for $180 million
and imports for $120 million. Poland offers numerous investment
opportunities and a pool of expertise for Canadian business, and it is
an important springboard for trade with the rest of Eastern Europe.
The industries most interested in this region are telecommunications,
consulting engineering, mining and resources, and banking. 34
Pressure Groups Third, interest groups representing ethnic groups in

Canada have lobbied the Canadian government to support the enlarge-
ment process. Some groups wrote letters and published articles on the
op-ed pages of most Canadian newspapers in an effort to persuade the
public of the merits of NATO enlargement. Others, which had leaders

with more political clout, managed to obtain interviews with Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs officials and even with Prime Minister Chretien.
In October 1996 Axworthy was host to Teodor Viorel Melascanu,
the Romanian foreign minister. Melascanu stated that Romania con-
sidered Canada's support for its membership in NATO to be of great
importance.35 In November of that year, the prime minister of Canada
welcomed a Hungarian delegation to Ottawa in preparation for the
upcoming round of talks on NATO enlargement. The head of the
delegation, Istvan Pataki, also met with DFAIT officials and explained
the basic reasons behind Hungary's desire to join NATO. Since Hungary
had expended much effort on transforming its institutions and econ-
omy, and had adopted the principles of liberal democracy, it was
counting on becoming a member of the Atlantic Alliance in the near
future. At a more fundamental level, NATO would ensure the political
stability needed for the country's economic development, and so,
Pataki argued, "it is in the interests of Europe and NATO to increase
stability in the region."36
In March 1997 Lech Wasa arrived in Ottawa as a special ambassa-
dor for Poland's bid for NATO membership. He contended that oppo-
sition to reforming NATO'S mandate constituted a threat to the political
stability of Europe. During his meeting with Prime Minister Chretien,
Wasa obtained Canada's support for NATO membership for Poland,
the country that Canada viewed as the most important nation for the
promotion of Canadian interests in Eastern Europe.37
In an article published in the spring of 1997, Andrzek M. Garlicki,
president of the Polish Canadian Congress, argued that the enlarge-
ment process is vital to Eastern European stability. Garlicki's view was
that Russia was seeking to re-establish a sphere of influence embracing
the former members of the Warsaw Pact. Russia's vigorous opposition
to NATO enlargement tended to confirm the danger to future NATO
members Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. By joining NATO,
Poland was ensuring that the progress it had achieved would continue
within the framework of a stable security institution which enjoys
influence on the international stage.38
External Pressures
Expanded Concept of Security At the international level, it is clear

that the concept of security has changed and grown more complex,
rendering Canada's position in the world more vulnerable. Some for-
eign-policy analysts argued that the fall of the Berlin Wall meant that
there was no longer any threat to the stability of the international
system. However, problems involving the security of nuclear technol-

ogy, control over chemical weapons, the increase in conflicts between
states, and the rise of terrorism have quickly put such claims to rest.
While some problems may not constitute a clear threat to the security
of Canadians, they have a constant impact on Canada's principal
partners or directly affect Canada's foreign-policy interests. The attacks
carried out in the United Kingdom by the Irish Republican Army and
the bombings of U.S. targets - in Oklahoma City, Dharhan in Saudi
Arabia, the World Trade Center in New York, the American embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania - all attest to continued political instability. In
response, the new conception of security, which Foreign Affairs Min-
ister Lloyd Axworthy calls "human security," manifests itself in new
forms and goes well beyond traditional military boundaries. It is built
on diplomacy, economic relations, and the promotion of democratic
values: the basic premise behind "human security" is that human rights
and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, and
social equity are as important to global peace as are arms control and
disarmament. In other words, security should be measured in terms of
the ultimate outcome for individuals and for peoples, rather than in
terms of the number of arms-control agreements signed.39
This new perception of security has prompted the government of
Canada to adopt a broader, more dynamic approach to maintaining
political stability. It has induced the government to devote more effort
to reforming both NATO'S mandate and its structure. NATO currently
has sixteen permanent members and it may admit up to ten more by
the year 2000. Canada plays an important role in NATO, which has
the ability to intervene on the military, political, and even economic
fronts.
Membership Solidarity The need to maintain consensus among NATO

members also had a direct impact on decision making with respect to
NATO enlargement and changes to the Alliance's mandate. To begin
with, Canada has been a member of NATO since 1949. At the 1990
London summit and the 1991 Rome summit, the Alliance's members
agreed unanimously to change the organization's mandate. The Cana-
dian government reaffirmed its support for the Atlantic Alliance at the
Brussels summit of January 1994, where it backed enlarging the orga-
nization to Eastern and Central Europe and broadening its mandate
to a more political role. Thus, it would be difficult for the founding
members to oppose the Alliance's plans. Second, the importance of
consensus in the organization is precisely NATO'S strength. For exam-
ple, the United States, invoking the need for consensus in maintaining
Alliance cohesion, was categorically opposed to a French proposal for
a five-nation summit to discuss the enlargement process.40 Third,

Canada is not in a good position at this time to challenge NATO
decisions. In the opinion of some NATO members, including France
and the United States, Canada has not shouldered its fair share of
European defence responsibilities, especially since deciding unilaterally
and without advance notice to bring its troops home from Germany.
A recent study of enlargement by a research group "hints at a long-
standing belief that some Alliance members, Canada in particular, have
not spent enough on defence over the years."41
AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
We have analysed the pressures that exert an influence on the behav-

iour of the Canadian government. Now we shall turn to Canadian
foreign-policy considerations. Would enlarging NATO meet the basic
objectives of Canada's foreign policy or run counter to them? To
answer this question, we must first assess Canada's position and
conduct in today's world.
It is clear to foreign-policy experts and practitioners with a knowl-
edge of Canadian diplomatic history that Canada's international posi-
tion is built primarily on the relations it maintains within international
organizations and other coalitions through which it can influence the
course of international events. Multilateralism has been the corner-
stone of Canadian foreign policy since the end of the Second World.42
The end of the Cold War, however, brought on a series of events that,
considered together, called for a reassessment of Canadian perceptions
of the world. To defend its strategic interests and influence interna-
tional relations, Canada had participated in most organizations and
forums that shared its interests and values, while paying scant attention
to potential threats to its own security. After all, it was recognized by
most states as a peaceful nation, a mediator, a champion of peacekeep-
ing operations, and an advocate of fundamental freedoms and human
rights. This reputation was secure at a time when the threat, largely
personified by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, was clearly
identifiable and "containable," to use a strategic term. In short,
Canada was seen as a leading figure among the middle powers. How-
ever, the environment has changed and new pressures have been
brought to bear on Canada, as we have seen, forcing it to adjust the
thrust of its foreign policy.
Ottawa has responded by committing more resources to institutional
multilateralism, that is, to pursuing its interests through institutions
and active diplomacy and to the strengthening of its networks of
economic partners. In spite of the new pressures, Canada is, paradox-
ically, more active today than ever on the international stage. As Lloyd
Axworthy has correctly observed, Canada "has no choice, given its
characteristics and history, but to get involved, for its own survival
could depend on this commitment."43
Canada is most likely, however, to intervene in spheres where it can
derive benefits and differentiate itself from other nations, particularly
its neighbour to the south. Some observers go farther, adding that the
Canadian state is now much more selective in its international activi-
ties, intervening only where most of its foreign-policy interests are at
stake. This approach is known as "niche diplomacy."44
It can be argued that the process of NATO enlargement is consistent
with the three fundamental goals of Canada's post-Cold War foreign
policy, as set out in its most recent foreign- policy statement. Essen-
tially, these are the development of economic interests; the creation of
a stable and secure political system wherever Canadian interests are at
stake; and the promotion of Canadian values on the international
stage.45 Four main arguments can be advanced in support of this
contention.
Need for a Stable Political System

First, Europe is still of paramount importance to Canadian foreign
policy. As Jocelyn Coulon has put it, "a stable and prosperous Europe
has always constituted one of the major goals of Canadian defense
policy and foreign policy."46 Most of Canada's economic and trading
partners are located in Europe. While potential conflicts do not nec-
essarily threaten Canada's security, they frequently do threaten its
interests and those of its leading partners. Ottawa therefore remains
deeply involved in Europe, both diplomatically and economically.
According to Kenneth Calder of the Department of National
Defence, the real debate on Canada's role in Europe no longer centres
on Canada's interest in European security but rather on how Canada
can most effectively contribute to building stability, promoting the
development of democratic institutions, and ensuring security. Working
for peace and cooperation are the avenues that Canada has chosen in
order to promote the development of a stable political climate. Extend-
ing NATO membership to nations such as Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic would expand the zone of stability in Europe, in line
with the Canadian approach to long-term security.47
Eminent University of Manitoba military specialist Paul Buteux
suggests that this policy option entails a lower cost and less risk for
the Canadian taxpayer than any other and could pay considerable
dividends, both politically and in terms of security. The criteria for
NATO admission are consistent with a "low risk, low cost" approach.48
Canada can kill two birds with one stone, without necessarily incurring
additional costs, by maintaining its commitment to NATO and allowing
new partners to join the Atlantic Alliance so as to strengthen political
stability in Europe. An enlarged NATO would therefore be an effective
vehicle for promoting political stability in Europe, a goal that could
not be achieved unilaterally. Simply put, "Canada alone does not
possess the weight to be an independent factor in the politics of
European security."49
Specialization in Fields of Expertise

Second, it is clear that the NATO enlargement process will gradually
require additional expertise related to the economic and political
transition in the newly admitted states. Since the end of the Cold War,
Canada has established a reputation in these fields, especially as part
of the ifor (implementation Force) and SFOR command in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Canadian soldiers and civilians have served in functions
ranging from civil engineering and construction to mine clearing,
and they have also played an important role in the conduct of the
elections.50
Another example of Canadian expertise in these types of niches is
provided by Canadian assistance to Central and Eastern Europe since
1989. Canada was one of the first nations to provide assistance for the
political and economic reforms in Poland and Romania, and to help
manage the transition towards democracy in the region. The Canadian
government was also one of the first Western economic partners for
the nations of Eastern Europe; it is not surprising that Canadian
institutions oversaw the economic transition in Poland, Ukraine, and
Romania. Since 1989, Canada and the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe have signed agreements on more than 500 technical-assistance
and cooperation projects.51
Moreover, continuing to assist the Atlantic Alliance in the areas of
peacekeeping, human rights, arms-control methods, conflict preven-
tion, and security intelligence helps deflect the pressure on Canada to
shoulder a larger share of the military burden. Canada specializes in
these fields where it has recognized expertise and is assuming its share
of responsibility for collective security in Europe. An enlarged Atlantic
Alliance would benefit Canada, enabling it to concentrate on what it
does best. It would confirm Canada's reputation for taking the initia-
tive on these important issues, even in this period of upheaval. This
argument has been put convincingly by Professor Allen Sens of the
University of British Columbia: "Expansion could also provide Canada
with an opportunity to engage in such soft security roles as human
rights monitoring, advising, and peacekeeping training, which rely
more on expertise, with which Canada is well endowed, and less on

military capabilities, of which Canada has fewer and fewer."52
Strengthening Economic Relationships

and Promoting Canadian Values
Enlarging NATO to Eastern and Central Europe would allow Canada
to develop significant trading ties with new partners and strengthen
existing ones. Canada has taken initiatives with this end in view. For
example, in October 1996, it organized several trade missions to
Central and Eastern Europe countries, including Poland, Hungary,
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Trade agreements and export contracts
were signed, and numerous investments were finalized. Ottawa thereby
secured new access to Europe in order to promote Canadian values.
Increasing the Relative Weight of Middle Powers

Lastly, the opportunity to increase the relative weight of small and
middle powers within the Atlantic Alliance is, for Canada, a powerful
incentive for enlarging NATO. On the one hand, Canada does not have
the clout that a major military power like the United States or even
France has to influence NATO'S priorities. On the other hand, NATO
remains the only transatlantic security organization that enables
Canada to play a role in Europe and contribute to the continent's
collective security, as do the great military powers.
By participating in NATO alongside other nations that share its
values, and by forming coalitions and cooperating with its partners,
Canada can continue to wield influence in the Alliance. The admission
of new members into NATO - particularly nations that share Canada's
goals, such as Poland, Romania, and Hungary - may enable Canada
to increase its diplomatic influence within the Alliance and reduce that
of the great powers, whose priorities tend to differ from its own.53
Increasing the number of members in NATO would reduce the weight
of the major powers by diluting their financial contribution and con-
sequently their influence. At the same time, the new situation would
benefit middle powers such as Canada, Spain and Italy, which excel in
coalition diplomacy. Also, the new NATO configuration would compel
the great powers to change their diplomatic approach; they would need
to seek consensus instead of relying on the balance of power.
The first round of informal talks on enlarging NATO was held on
30 May 1997 in Sintra, Portugal. It revealed a deep split between the
leading military powers on the one hand and the small and middle
powers on the other. Whereas the United States, Germany, and the
United Kingdom came out in favour of enlargement to only three
countries (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), Canada, Belgium,
Spain, Greece, Turkey, France, and Portugal were in favour of admit-

ting at least five new members, namely Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Romania, and Slovenia.54
Given the United States's important role in international security and
its relative weight within NATO as the largest financial contributor,
Canada clearly could not afford to remain in the background during
the deliberations on European security issues, especially since the OSCE
no longer seemed to be the organization that could defend Canada's
views and interests. Moreover, the United States seems to underesti-
mate Canada's financial and diplomatic contribution. Yet Canada's per
capita financial contribution to the Alliance is actually much higher
than that of most members. Canada is as politically active in NATO as
any of the major military powers.
NATO enlargement will enable Canada to develop a counterweight
strategy against U.S. leadership in NATO and U.S. domination of the
North American position on the European security architecture.55 A
counterweight strategy of this type could also be used if Europe were
inclined to further "Europeanize" its security by upgrading the role of
the eu, widening the mandate of the Western European Union, or
giving concrete expression to the cfsp concept. These are grey areas in
which Canada has little or no real presence, and still less influence.
CONCLUSION
In April 1998, a few months after Canada became the first member
of NATO to ratify the accession of the three new members, DFAIT
published an information document entitled Canada and NATO.
Ottawa continued to assign high priority to enlargement to the largest
possible number of members, integrated into the broader process of
transforming NATO'S mandate. The government of Canada intends to
work for the accession of all democratic states which are likely to
respect the organization's basic commitments.
Consolidating Canada's close relations with Russia and Ukraine will
be another priority for the Department of Foreign Affairs in the coming
years. In view of the important role of these two countries in Europe's
collective-security architecture, Canada intends to step up its diplo-
matic efforts for their gradual accession to the organization, beyond
the pfp. Ottawa is already using its position as a member of the Gjl
G8 to exert pressure towards this end, as it did at the Denver summit
of June 1997. The Gy/G8 is expected gradually to assume a leading
role in managing international security problems.
In conclusion, this analysis has shown that Canada's position on
NATO enlargement is consistent with Ottawa's post-Cold War foreign-
policy objectives. Enlargement will enable Canada to forge vital new

diplomatic ties in Europe, to participate in building a stable European
political system, and to continue making its voice heard on collective
security issues. NATO therefore remains a key organization for Canada,
acting not only as a means of implementing Canadian strategic objec-
tives but also as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy.
CHAPTER NINE
The NATO of Its Dreams?

Canada and the
Cooperative-Security Alliance
David G. Haglund
PLUS gA CHANGE . . .?
Thinking about Canada's contemporary attitude towards NATO brings

to mind the familiar image of the water glass, about which one
wonders whether it is half full or half empty. Mutatis mutandis, one
asks, of the topic of this chapter, is there too little, or too much,
Canadian attachment to the Atlantic Alliance?
Current assessments of Canadian participation within the Alliance
vary significantly, from dedicated partisan and indeed founding
member of the organization, to detached outrider (and often a "free"
one at that) on the transatlantic waterway.1 This analytical eclecticism
is hardly surprising, for it accurately mirrors what has been a shifting
appreciation, on the part of a succession of governments, of the place
NATO does or should occupy in Canada's foreign and defence policy,
or what we might term its international security policy (perhaps even
its "grand strategy").z Related to, and in a way responsible for, this
variation on the alliance theme has been a conflation of two separate,
but frequently interchanged, conceptual entities: Atlanticism, and
Western Europe. Depending upon which of these entities one prefers
to use as the referent for NATO, rather differing answers ensue to the
question of attachment. If NATO is first and foremost "about" enhanc-
ing the security of the Western European allies, it is not difficult to
find evidence of a growing detachment of Canada from the Alliance.
But if, on the other hand, the Alliance is equated with Atlanticism,
which in turn is regarded as a "community of values" and not just a
military alliance, then a different understanding emerges, of a Cana-
dian attachment that has stayed relatively constant for several decades.
The situation may now be changing, but in a manner, ironically, that
belies today's conventional wisdom, which has Canada ever more
disengaged from NATO. I will argue, instead, that the glass looks as if
it may be getting fuller.
This analysis will proceed in the following manner. First, I will
demonstrate that Canada has indeed blown hot and cold (and lately,
almost exclusively the latter) on the question of NATO conceived first
and foremost as a mechanism for promoting the security interests of
Western Europeans, and that it has evolved from one of the most
steadfast (and early) contributors to collective defence in Europe to
one of the least dedicated to that end.
I next turn to the Alliance itself and address the important question
of its transformation from what it has been, chiefly a collective-defence
organization, into what it might become, which must remain for the
time being an open, but very important, question.
I then return to Canada. Allowing myself the luxury of imagining
that even a non-superpower might have a "grand strategy," I try to
determine what such a construct could look like in Canada's case. For
lack of a better concept, I claim that "cooperative security" best
encapsulates the regnant security doctrine in Ottawa. This doctrine I
argue to be logically derivative of an earlier foreign-policy dispensa-
tion, Pearsonian internationalism.
From this latter observation I advance the contention that there has
been a rekindling of Canadian interest in the Alliance in the past couple
of years, as the latter has come to be regarded as more of a political
and less of a military organization (the institutional embodiment, as it
were, of the traditional Canadian understanding of Atlanticism). I
buttress this argument with an additional claim about the cooperative-
security Alliance of the post-Cold War period, namely, that for Canada
it is seen to imply lower costs and fewer risks than did the Cold War
Alliance.
THE CANADIAN NATO NEUROSIS
In some ways, Canada's relationship with NATO can be understood as

a continuation of the country's long-standing relationship with Europe,
and in the first instance of its historic relationship with Great Britain.
This is to say that it has been a complicated relationship, one for which
the qualifier "neurotic" seems hardly out of place.3 Britain (the early
equivalent, along with France, of "Europe" in Canadian identity) was
both the source of great comfort as well as the potential (if uninten-
tional) inflictor of enormous pain.4 It was a source of comfort, initially
as the generator of much that was good and distinct about Canadian
existence and identity, later as a valued European counterweight to the
ever-increasing American influence upon Canada. But Britain/Europe
was also a source of risk - risk that Canada's interests might be

sacrificed on the altar of a British bid for Anglo-American entente in
the late nineteenth century - and, even more troubling, it was a source
of danger (danger made manifest in the country's costly participation
in two world wars).
Canada, although a North American country, was born very much
a European one, and it remained so well into the current century.
Europe gave it its early identity and sustenance, ensuring its survival
as a polity distinct from the United States, and it was through partic-
ipating in European wars that the young country was able to stake
out claims both to sovereign status and to international influence.5 But
the cost of such international attainments was high, in lives destroyed
abroad and in serious political fissures at home.
After the First World War, Canada's political class (especially, but
not only, the Liberal Party) increasingly emphasized the country's
North American identity, and as was the case with its neighbour to
the south, with whom economic exchanges were multiplying, Canada
developed an outlook and a policy on international relations (and on
Europe) that could only be labelled "isolationist." There were differ-
ences, of course, in the two countries' versions of isolation: one country
belonged to the League of Nations but tried at every opportunity to
minimize any obligations that might attend that membership, while
the other dismissed the league as a pernicious European snare; one
country lived with the constant worry that foreign (that is, European)
interventions would upset the always delicate ethnic balance of domes-
tic politics, while, for the other, ethnicity - though a societal factor of
some importance - was hardly a determinant of foreign policy.
Yet there was a profound similarity in the two countries' isolation-
ism: for both, a desire to remain aloof from further European wars
reflected a recognition of the cost of involvement (especially for Can-
ada, which saw nearly i per cent of its total population die in the
Great War),6 as well as the futility of it. As late as 30 March 1939,
Prime Minister Mackenzie King could express to the House of Com-
mons his revulsion against the "madness" of Canadians having to fight
in a European war every generation, while a half year later, even after
Canada had officially entered the Second World War, he could lament
to a visiting British official, "This is not our war."7
After that second war a new historical lesson was absorbed by both
North American countries. Their security, it was now held, was insep-
arable from that of the Western Europeans. Whereas before the watch-
word had been "no commitments," now it became "commitment" -
to a military alliance with the Europeans, and to the grander vision of
an Atlantic community of shared values and interests.
It was a commitment the likes of which peacetime Canada had never

known before, and to which the post-war generation of policy makers
in that "golden age" of diplomacy gave the full measure of their
considerable talents. For the first time in more than half a century,
Canadian leaders could apply the country's energies to an international
security undertaking without fear of sowing discord at home between
English and French. Not only this, but the building of the Atlantic
Alliance was an unparalleled opportunity to marry American power
to Canadian interests, in such a way that enhanced the latter's security
and political influence in the broader world.
Although in later years the image of Canada as the Alliance's odd
man out became a staple of discourse, in the early years Canada was
actively engaged in both the defence of Western Europe and the
projection of an "atlanticist vision."8 It is well known (at least in
Canada) that Canadian diplomats were very much "present at the
creation" of NATO. 9 Less well remembered is the fact that Canadian
military involvement in those early years of NATO was also consider-
able. As one of the few countries to have emerged from the Second
World War strengthened economically, and as one of the world's
ranking military powers, Canada was seen to have an obligation to
the defence of Western Europe that surpassed even the obligation of
the Europeans, for whom defending themselves and their immediate
neighbourhood was about all one could ask in the Alliance's first
decade; for Canada, and even more so for the United States, respon-
sibilities were greater, entailing not only (or even chiefly) defending
themselves but extending that defence to the allies.10
In the jargon of the interwar years, Canadians and, a fortiori,
Americans had become "producers" of security, and the Europeans
were "consumers." Only this time, the North Americans knew their
duty. For Canada this would mean, by the time the Cold War build-
up set in motion by the Korean War had peaked, unprecedented
peacetime defence budgets, sustaining a military presence in Europe
that had great political and operational significance. By 1953 Canada
was allocating more than 8 per cent of its GDP to defence spending,
a massive increase from i94y's 1.4 per cent. During the Korean War's
final year, Canada's defence/GDP ratio stood fourth highest in NATO,
and its defence budget of nearly $2, billion accounted for 45 per cent
of all federal spending. (Today, defence outlays are equal to 1.3 percent
of GDP, and the defence budget is about 6 per cent of total federal
spending; moreover, Canada's defence/GDP ratio remains what it has
been for more than two decades, one of the Alliance's lowest.11)
As did the United States, Canada operated a Mutual Aid Program
for Europe, under which were made available to Great Britain top-of-
the-line F-86 Sabre jet fighters. In addition, and more important,

Canada from 1951 on would deploy in Europe a well-equipped brigade
group and an even more well-endowed air division, whose strength
would eventually reach iz squadrons, totalling 2.40 aircraft. For a time
during the later phases of the conflict in Korea, the RCAF would be
flying more advanced fighters than even the USAF in the European
theatre, prompting one American general to remark of the 1953 mil-
itary effort in that theatre: "Canada [was] responsible for the biggest
contribution ... to the expansion of West European air defence."11
All of this would be a far cry from the later years of the Cold War,
when Canada would typically be cited not for its military contribution
to European defence but for its virtual absence from the "Central
Front." What happened? At least three factors accounted for the
change. The first and perhaps most important one was that it simply
became too expensive for Canada to try to sustain a robust military
contribution to European defence, all the more so as it was also having
to assume responsibilities for the air defence of the North American
continent, in close partnership with the United States. Canada's loca-
tion on the flight path of any Soviet bombers intent on attacking the
American heartland gave the country a special geostrategic significance
and imposed unavoidable responsibilities, especially those associated
with the maintenance of the u.s. Strategic Air Command's deterrent
credibility, in an era before intercontinental ballistic missiles had ren-
dered that challenge of declining relevance. It was often lost on the
country's allies, especially the Europeans, that only the United States,
within NATO, had assumed security commitments whose geographic
extent surpassed Canada's own commitments.13
The second source of Canada's diminishing relative contribution to
Western European security had more to do with policy perspectives
than with budgetary outlays. Canadian visions of NATO at the time it
was being formed betrayed a conviction that the Alliance had to be
about much more than defence. This conviction was demonstrated by
Ottawa's dogged insistence on having Article 2, included in the Wash-
ington Treaty, calling upon the allies to constitute themselves into a
community whose goals involved political and economic as well as
military cooperation. As it turned out, Article 2 remained during the
Cold War very much a dead letter, and even the Canadian contribution
to the Alliance took nearly exclusive military form.14
Nevertheless, Canadian security policy makers continued to enter-
tain the aspiration that NATO must have a considerable political voca-
tion and that it should seek even to foster cooperative relations with
its Cold War adversary. No one at the time had developed the labels
"common" or "cooperative" security, but it is clear that Canada was
in the vanguard in trying to get NATO more committed to detente. The

first NATO foreign minister to visit Moscow had been a Canadian,
Lester B. Pearson, in 1955, prompting Germany's ambassador to
Ottawa, Herbert Siegfried, to report that Ottawa's European policy
was "remarkably naive."15 Three years later, another European would
issue a more colourful, though equally unflattering, judgment: Paul-
Henri Spaak, NATO'S secretary general, quipped (in private, he thought)
during a 1958 visit to Ottawa that the Canadians had become "the
Yugoslavs of NATO." 16 But it would be Pierre Trudeau who took
Ottawa's assessment of NATO to another plane altogether, singling out
Canada within the Alliance through his belief in the effectiveness of
minimal deterrence at a time when the other allies were trying to
enhance the credibility of extended deterrence, and telling Canadians
that "one of the most compelling reasons" to stay in NATO was the
Alliance's usefulness as a means of pursuing detente.17
The third source of Canada's lessened commitment to the defence
of Western Europe resulted from the belief that the Europeans, as they
recovered from the war, would be able to do more for their own
defence and therefore should do more. This conviction mingled with
a related belief on the part of some Canadians (usually policy intellec-
tuals on the left) that attention to Europe and its needs was depriving
Canada of the ability to focus its limited resources on parts of the
world where the case for assistance was even greater - and the enti-
tlement more justified. This perception of a jaded and selfish Western
Europe arose at a time when, because of the Vietnam War, some
Canadians were prepared to conclude that NATO was itself complicit
in misplaced interventionism if not aggression, leading them to demand
that Canada withdraw from the Alliance altogether/8
Pro-neutrality sentiment never made great inroads among the Cana-
dian public, and the one federal party that did as a matter of principle
advocate Canada's leaving NATO, the New Democrats, could hardly
be said to have benefited from the advocacy. But if Canada did not
"go neutral," it certainly looked, especially with the advent of the
Trudeau government in 1968, as if NATO was to be de-emphasized in
the country's grand strategy. Trudeau himself promised as much in an
important speech in Calgary in April 1969, when he asked whether it
made any sense for NATO to continue to determine the country's
defence policy and for the latter to determine the country's foreign
policy?19 He kept this promise.
Ever since the Trudeau years, Canada's perspective on the defence
of the Western Europeans remained relatively constant, up to and
beyond the ending of the Cold War. Membership in the Alliance would
be periodically reaffirmed, but so too would be the country's aversion
to regarding Atlanticism as simply an alternative way of saying "the

defence of Western Europe." And always, there was a lack of desire
(and means) to continue paying for as much of a military effort as the
allies would have liked Canada to make. There would, it is true, be
moments, in the mid-1970s and again in the late 19805, when Cana-
dian governments would sound and act as if they were willing to make
an enhanced contribution to Western Europe's defence (sometimes for
reasons having little to do with defence per se), but in the end other
priorities would prevail, rendering the decision to withdraw Canada's
stationed forces from Germany a relatively easy one to reach in 1992.
THE ENDURING NATO:

FROM COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TO ...?
One of the most significant geopolitical ironies of the post-Cold War

era has been the enduring centrality of NATO to transatlantic security;
like the bunny in the battery commercial, it just refuses to disappear.
NATO'S persistence certainly came as a surprise to policy makers in
Ottawa, who at the start of the current decade were imagining (and
they were hardly alone in this) that the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was going to emerge as the central
"architectural" element in European security.20 Instead, NATO has
remained the most relevant of the contemporary security institutions
- if anything, even more relevant than it was during the waning years
of the Cold War). In so remaining, NATO has forced a reconsideration
in the assessment made by various allies as to its ongoing utility for
their interests. One often thinks of France as being the ally to have
undertaken the most serious recalibration of interest vis-a-vis the Alli-
ance, but Canada has also been in the midst of such a reconsideration;
for it, the enduring NATO has become an endearing NATO.
While everyone can agree that NATO remains a collective-defence
organization, it is far from clear what meaning is supposed to be
attached to that agreement. It may be apparent to some in Europe -
for instance to Dutch Liberal Party leader Frits Bolkestein - that the
Alliance's "core function" continues to be that of collective defence,
but it is less apparent to others, both in Europe and in North America,
that such a function can really provide the allies with a common sense
of purpose in the absence of an enemy.21 While few will wish to deny
that Article 5 bestows a common defence upon all the allies (although
as Josef Joffe reminds us, during the Cold War that article's wording
served much less than did the "blood and iron" deployments at the
Central Front to provide the real defence of the collectivity22), many
analysts today argue the need for NATO to have something else to do,
if it is to remain viable.
So much attention has been focused recently on the theme of this
book, enlargement, that it is easy to lose track of that other large
(albeit related) issue: the question of NATO'S qualitative not its quan-
titative transformation from what it has been - a collective-defence
organization - into something different. How different NATO could or
should become is, of course, a matter of some heated debate, even on
the part of those who deny the sustainability of its current mandate.
Significantly, some who reject the need for NATO to develop explicitly
a new raison d'etre are not inattentive to the diminishing lustre of
collective defence. Thus, Michael Mandelbaum argues that, even
though NATO might still possess the form and membership of the Cold
War Alliance, and therefore can be said to represent the status quo
among contemplated European security futures, it nevertheless has
"undergone a transition in its principal mission, from deterrence to
reassurance."23
But others go much farther and make it clear that the NATO that
excites their passions has a decidedly different character from the Cold
War organization. Among some, discussion typically centres upon the
desirability of converting the Alliance into nothing less than a collec-
tive-security organization, a topic to which I shall return in the next
section of this chapter, when I rejoin the Canadian debate over "grand
strategy." For the moment, however, let us concentrate upon the origins
of the contemporary quest for a qualitatively transformed NATO.
It is not difficult to understand the felt need, both in NATO and in
various allied countries, for an altered alliance. Obviously, the old
conceptual cloak of collective defence could not help looking rather
moth-eaten in an age when there seemed (and still seems) to be no
enemy against whom that kind of defence is needed. It is true that a
case might be made that the enemy is the spectre of the renationaliza-
tion of defence, especially as among the Western Europeans themselves,
but this is not an easy argument to make with the North American
members of the Alliance, who rather incline to the view that the
Europeans should be beyond the stage of regarding each other as
potential enemies/4
Some NATO-watchers, a few years ago, were predicting that the
Alliance would die because its historic adversary had/ 5 That prospect
accounts for a good measure of the Alliance's bid to reinvent itself, for
policy makers in important NATO precincts have not been oblivious of
the historical record, namely, that no alliance has ever shown itself
capable of long outlasting the disappearance of its adversary/ 6 For
those who would reform NATO, the fact that there is no compelling
need for collective defence in an era without (great-power) threat need
hardly prove fatal, for if the Alliance can be transformed, it can be
saved.
The existential quest began with the Alliance's London summit of
July 1990, which resulted in what at the time looked to be an extraor-
dinary declaration of intent to reach out to the recent adversaries of
the Warsaw Pact and in so doing transform NATO from a predomi-
nantly military into an increasingly political organization, whose new
mandate would stress cooperating with, not containing, the East. In a
little more than a year, the Alliance would seek to give institutional
meaning to the cooperative thrust by the creation, at the Rome summit
of November 1991, of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC), which held its inaugural meeting the following month.
Although the NACC sought to foster dialogue and cooperation with
recent adversaries in the collapsing Warsaw Pact, actually doing so
proved to be less easy than originally imagined. Reflecting this diffi-
culty was the adoption of the Alliance's "New Strategic Concept,"
another outcome of the Rome summit. Perhaps the most important
aspect of this document was its acceptance that the "threat" of yore
had been replaced by "risks"that were both "multi-faceted" and
"multi-directional." And while the drafters did not see any less of a
need for the Alliance, they did recognize that now, more than in the
past, NATO would have to "frame its strategy within a broad approach
to security." Two new security functions in particular were highlighted
in the document, dialogue and crisis management.17
As we know, both these functions have been the subject of consid-
erable debate within NATO and elsewhere since the Rome summit.
Within a half-year of that meeting, the Alliance would embark on a
tentative journey into the world of peacekeeping. Alliance foreign
ministers, meeting in ministerial session in early June 1992, in Oslo,
announced their conditional willingness to assume peacekeeping
assignments, on a case-by-case basis, under the responsibility of the
CSCE. A year and a half later, dialogue would be given firmer institu-
tional meaning through the launching of the Partnership for Peace
(pfp). The two undertakings would embroil NATO in a new set of
problems as well as be implicated, in their own way, in a gathering
momentum by 1994 on the issue of the Alliance's enlargement.
There was nothing, in the first three years of the Alliance's ostensible
transformation, dictating that either dialogue or crisis management
need result in, or even require, an expansion of NATO. Indeed, when
the pfp was announced by the U.S. secretary of defence, Les Aspin, at
Travemiinde, Germany, in October 1993, and even when it was officially
embraced by the Alliance at the Brussels summit of January 1994, it

was widely (and not incorrectly) regarded as a means of putting off the
issue of enlargement rather than making it an inevitability. More gen-
erally, there was nothing in the Alliance's entire quest for transformation
that logically obliged it to take the decision to enlarge to the eastward.
Nevertheless, as NATO began to be seen as something new under the
European security sun, and particularly as it began to appear to some
to be an exporter of stability, the gap separating its qualitative from
its quantitative transformation narrowed appreciably, to the point of
disappearing completely.18 This was especially true as NATO began to
be regarded as a cooperative-security organization.29
COOPERATIVE SECURITY:
CANADA'S NEW "GRAND STRATEGY"?
Many students of Canadian foreign and defence policy have remarked
on the resistance of these two spheres of policy to efforts to meld them
into one, overarching, conceptual structure, which I referred to at the
beginning of this chapter as international security policy or, if the
reader prefers, as "grand strategy." It has not been from want of trying
- or at least not consistently from want of trying - that the analytical
division has been permitted to endure, and to its credit the Chretien
government did seek, during the public consultations preceding the
publication of its most recent defence and foreign-policy pronounce-
ments, to achieve a synthesis of sorts between the two domains. In the
event, the effort has been less than successful, and the two parliamen-
tary review committees that were supposed to have played such a large
part in developing that synthesis ended up working in relative isolation
from each other.30
This being said, the two policy pronouncements taken together do
provide some insight into what is emerging as Canada's newest grand
strategy - a strategy, moreover, that is unusual by Canadian standards,
in that it appears to be in striking harmony with contemporary think-
ing in and about NATO. It is not too much of an exaggeration to claim
that, for the first time in nearly fifty years (that is, since the drafting
of the Washington Treaty), Canadian policy makers are coming close
to realizing the Alliance of their dreams: a political community sus-
tained more upon the basis of common values and interests than upon
the felt need to respond to a common threat, and, more important
perhaps, an Alliance that holds out the prospect of imposing lower
costs, and fewer risks, upon Canada.
A superficial reading of those two Canadian policy documents,
respectively the white paper on defence of late 1994 and the foreign-
policy statement of early 1995, would not automatically lead one to

regard them as an embryonic grand strategy. After all, what the two
statements seemed to be saying was not particularly grand and could
almost be held to be banal: Canada intended to remain in NATO, and
it continued to regard the Alliance to be important for Canadian
security (though pride of place was, as usual, reserved for the United
Nations, said to be the core organization for Canadian security inter-
ests).31 Even this relatively modest set of claims, however, had to be
considered noteworthy given the temper of the times, for the first half
of the 19905 was a period when Canadians were raising more queries
than ever as to whether NATO meant very much to them (and by
extension, to anyone else) now that the Cold War was over and the
Soviet Union disbanded.
Some who were engaged in the debate at the time - including some
who were prone not to take NATO very seriously - were inclined to
the view that the Alliance should evolve into a collective-security
organization, even if more than a few taking this position also thought
that NATO'S place in Canadian security policy needed to be further
diminished. Illustrative of this was a policy recommendation issuing
from the Canada 2.1 Council, an influential advocacy group that played
an important role in the debates that preceded the Chretien govern-
ment's new defence and foreign-policy statements. The Council recom-
mended, in the first half of 1994, both that NATO be de-emphasized
as a pillar of Canadian security and that Canada "actively press for
the transformation of NATO into an inclusive collective security orga-
nization in the new Europe." 3Z
Although not all of the Council's thirty-seven recommendations
made their way into the subsequent report of the special joint com-
mittee of the House and Senate charged with reviewing Canadian
foreign policy, this latter one did. The committee argued that Ottawa
should "encourage NATO to continue moving to a collective security
role for the whole of Europe."33
It is possible that some who identified NATO as a potential collective-
security organization used that concept carelessly.34 Others may have
employed the concept deliberately, not because they were unaware of
its significance, but precisely because they understood that collective
security was, in theory, the most robust form of security arrangement
imaginable. In any event, the Canadian government has been more
cautious about terminology, and to my knowledge policy makers
neither regard NATO as a collective-security organization nor think it
should evolve into one. Instead, the Alliance is today considered, in
the words of Francis Leblanc, parliamentary secretary for the minister
of foreign affairs, to be "repositioning itself as a cooperative security

organization."35
Does it really matter what label we use to describe the new NATO?
If words are to have common currency, it does. Nor is it merely a
question of semantics, for there are potentially profound policy con-
sequences at issue. Collective security, as it is understood by most
students of international relations, is a mechanism for preventing
conflict that depends, ultimately, on the members of the collectivity
committing themselves, if need be, to go to war against aggressors and
in defence of interests that may not be, in their own particular cases,
"vital" (nor even important). As such, collective security imposes
unprecedented obligations on participants, and for this reason alone
has been often faulted as being impossible to implement. Yet others
have argued that even if the political will to make it function could
somehow be mustered, there would exist too many structural imped-
iments to allow it to work.36 For partisans of collective security
properly conceived, the historical record provides scant comfort, all of
which has prompted one critic to write that "when there was security,
it was not collective, and when there was a collective, there was no
security."37
Of course, some who use the term intend it to be taken more loosely
- so loosely that it becomes unclear what, if any, obligations are to be
assumed by participants. Thus, one analyst, writing recently about the
risk (he deems it great) of the American public's rejecting additional
collective-defence obligations in an enlarged NATO, nevertheless
blithely advocates subsuming both the Alliance and the European
Union into an Atlantic Union whose new tasks would include collective
security!38 This comes close to reversing the traditional understanding
and to making collective security a minimalist not a maximalist
arrangement, one that when it takes the form of a "concert" can
actually "play as important a role in orchestrating inaction as in
coordinating collective initiatives."39
Instead of collective security, with all its conceptual and semantic
problems, it would be far better if we were to use the concept of
cooperative security. Admittedly, problems exist with this rubric as
well. Some take it (wrongly I believe) to be nothing more than a
modernized label for collective security.40 Others, defying the sharp
edge of Ockham's Razor, simply define cooperative security by invok-
ing yet another concept, usually "common security," occasionally
"mutual security."42
As I understand the concept, and as I will be applying it here,
cooperative security refers to an arrangement that allows (indeed
obliges) members of the "community" to relax the assumption that

national interest must always be egoistic (if not autistic) in inspiration
and effect, in favour of an assumption that states can and do define
some interests as being those of the community within which they see
themselves situated.43 In short, I regard security cooperation between
sovereign, self-regarding states as possible and desirable even outside
the normal alliance context, though I also regard the more far-reaching
commitment to community required by collective-security arrange-
ments to be simply unattainable. David Dewitt and David Leyton-
Brown have captured the difference aptly, when they write that the
"romanticism of collective security is now so well understood to be
an ideal which needs to be tempered with large doses of reality. In
such a world, cooperative security which focuses on inclusiveness,
preventive diplomacy, reassurance, confidence building, functional
cooperation, shared concerns and the effort to build shared norms, is
appealing."44
All of this may be well and good, but does it follow that cooperative
security can be considered a Canadian grand strategy? I believe it does,
for three reasons. First, and least important, a case can be made (albeit
not with scientific rigour) that cooperative security is a Canadian
concoction. This case Dewitt in fact makes, when he claims that the
origins of the concept are to be found in the "Canadian-initiated North
Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue," which was launched by the
then secretary of state for foreign affairs, Joe Clark, in a September
1990 speech to the United Nations General Assembly.45
The second reason concerns the fit between cooperative security's
defining characteristics and Canadian foreign-policy values and, more
to the point, foreign-policy interests. The relevant characteristics of
cooperative security in this regard are the following: its inclusiveness;
its reliance upon an expanded understanding of security, which inter
alia conjures up visions of enhanced peacekeeping; its preference for
gradual not rapid institutionalization; and its recognition of the value
of building upon and transforming existing institutions inherited from
the balance-of-power context.46 A corollary assumption is that coop-
erative security is facilitated (necessitated?) by the increasingly diffuse
structure of the post-bipolar world, and that this diffusion can and
does create leadership opportunities for states that in the past were
not endowed with enough "structural power" to make much of dif-
ference (this assumption is simply asserted, not demonstrated, but it
nevertheless must be said to account for some of the attractiveness of
cooperative security).47
Readers will recognize, in the above, contemporary versions of
traditional Canadian foreign-policy attitudes associated both with the
"functional" principle and the closely related "middle-power" princi-

ple.48 Not so obvious, but also suggested by the cooperative-security
perspective, is the third way in which cooperative security can be linked
with Canadian strategy, namely, through the appeal it makes to the
country's domestic political culture. At a time when many American
writers are inducing from their observations about the domestic polit-
ical culture in the United States certain generalizations regarding the
origins and sustainability of today's multilateral order,49 it is refreshing
to be reminded that Canadian domestic values can also generate
foreign-policy orientations and outcomes. Thus, through its emphasis
upon inclusiveness (and its assumption that this must mean negotiation
and the search for compromise), and because of the stress it places on
conflict management, cooperative security can be linked to a Canadian
foreign-policy style that is synonymous with a Pearsonian tradition
itself characterized by a distrust of dogma, an abhorrence of grand
designs, a belief in compromise, and a disposition towards pragmatism
- all attributes that Denis Stairs sees as derivative of a domestic
political culture whose "ultimate origin ... lies in the application of
the basic principles of liberalism to the governance of a polity com-
posed of too few people, of too heterogeneous a composition, living
in a space too large, with a topography too varied."50
In a word, cooperative security, construed as a realistic alternative
to collective security, is Pearsonian internationalism. And if grand
strategy depends upon the maintenance over time of fundamental
foreign-policy principles adapted to evolving realities, then cooperative
security can be said to be today's iteration of that grand strategy.51 But
what does saying this mean for Canada and its relationship to the
evolving NATO? At the very least, it should spur us to query whether
the stress on cooperative security must lead Canada away from Europe,
a claim that has been made, curiously, both by those who think
cooperative security misguided and by those who see it as the very
epitome of policy wisdom.5Z
CONCLUSION:
THE NATO OF C A N A D A ' S D R E A M S ?
Canadian policy regarding both NATO and Europe is today at a cross-

roads, one at which the old signposts provide little direction while the
new ones remain to be erected. The best that one can say at the moment
is that the old, Eurocentric order has passed for Canada, but nothing
has replaced it.53 It has been argued by many that Canada's most
promising strategic horizons are increasingly going to be explored in
Asia, or in Latin America, or - for that matter - just about anywhere
else but in Europe.54 I would counsel against a premature conclusion

that just because Europe and NATO may no longer be the focal points
of Canadian strategy, they no longer count at all. Indeed, if my analysis
in the preceding pages makes any sense (and it may not), it is likely
that the current emphasis upon cooperative security, coupled with the
ongoing transformation of the Alliance, will occasion a return of sorts
to Europe. It is in Europe, after all, and only in Europe, that cooperative
security seems to have registered its most impressive gains.
I have been presenting cooperative security as a modest alternative
to collective security in an age when collective defence has lost much
of its significance. The post-Cold War period is one in which modesty
becomes Canadian grand strategy, not only because of the well-known
fiscal and constitutional crises of the present, but also because in an
era of no great-power threat Canadian policy can and should be more
discretionary than in former times. It is fitting that this chapter appears
in a collection co-sponsored by the Teleglobe*Raoul Dandurand Chair
of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, for today's era could indeed be
characterized as one in which Dandurand's interwar vision of Canada
living in a fireproof house far from inflammable materials has at last
been realized.55
Although there should be no minimizing the newly achieved har-
mony between NATO'S purposes and Canada's preferences in the era
of cooperative security, it is also true that part of the attractiveness of
today's NATO to a postmodern state such as Canada has to inhere in
the lightness of the burdens of Alliance.56 As a result, this looks like
becoming, to Canadian policy makers, the best of all possible NATOS,
one whose membership dues are nowhere near as steep as those of the
Cold War NATO: after all, does not the 1994 defence white paper
explicitly, and correctly, note that "the principal responsibility for
European defence must lie with the Europeans themselves?"57 Even
more important, the risks of the new NATO seem almost banal when
compared with those of the old NATO - risks that were nothing other,
in the event of nuclear war, than the physical destruction of North
America's societal and industrial infrastructure, with the loss of untold
numbers of lives.
The problem with dreaming, of course, is that the dawn always has
a way of intruding. It may be that the NATO of Canada's dreams will
turn out to be delusional. This we cannot know at the moment. But,
if the dream does become nightmarish, it will likely be as a conse-
quence of one (or both) of two contemporary Alliance issues. The first
concerns enlargement, which Canada, after some initial hesitation, has
come to embrace with enthusiasm, to the point of supporting, in the
months prior to the Madrid summit of July 1997, the early entry of
five new members and the subsequent admission of several more.58

The second relates to possible pressure from the United States to
convert NATO into a truly globalized security institution with robust
interventionist powers (and presumably, duties) outside its traditional
area of operations.59 It is not difficult to imagine that events misfiring
in respect of either (or both) of these issues could quickly alter the
assessment of Alliance costs and risks made in today's (relatively)
benign security order.
PART THREE
Impact of Enlargement on
Russia and Eastern and Central Europe
CHAPTER TEN
NATO'S Eastward Enlargement:

An Instructive Historical Precedent
Jacques Levesque
Contrary to what one might think, the issue of NATO'S eastward

enlargement into the Soviet Union's former sphere of influence is not
such a new one. Indeed, it was raised and resolved nine years ago,
during the intense international negotiations over the reunification of
Germany. At that time, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR)
was incorporated into NATO, after months of vehement opposition and
objections from Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviets.
That case, we will argue, provides a highly instructive historical
precedent for current issues. It sheds light in a particularly useful way
on the nature and meaning of many of the chief objections and counter-
proposals later made by Russia and on the problems, which might be
called existential, that NATO enlargement poses for Russia.
To understand the Soviet position it might be useful, before review-
ing Gorbachev's objections and counter-proposals regarding the inclu-
sion of a united Germany in NATO, to recall why Gorbachev and the
Soviet leadership let the Communist regimes in East Germany and the
other Eastern European countries fall, without using force to prop
them up as they had always done in the past and as they still had the
military wherewithal to do. The Soviets chose not to take that route
essentially to avoid jeopardizing a vast, ambitious plan to establish a
new international order in Europe, within which the USSR hoped to
play a new and important role. Somewhat in the Russian westernizing
tradition, Gorbachev and his team of reformers felt that the salvation
of a reformed USSR and the solution to many of its problems lay in
gradually integrating into Europe, economically and politically,
through a controlled easing of the division of Europe. In Gorbachev's
approach, the gradual elimination of European division would come
about through East-West rapprochement achieved on a bloc-to-bloc
basis, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and between the Council
158 Impact on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe
for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the European Com-

munity. Major arms-reduction agreements would be reached and the
antagonism between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would fade away; the
two organizations would become more political than military in nature
and serve as an infrastructure for a new European security system
founded on a strengthened, institutionalized Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (cscE). 1
In this new Soviet perspective, the gradual easing of European
division demanded a certain democratization of the Communist regimes
in Eastern Europe and a major rapprochement between the two Ger-
manics. Indeed, this is why Gorbachev played an instrumental role in
Erich Honecker's ouster.z Gorbachev's greatest illusion was his belief
that, if they democratized and instituted reforms, the Eastern European
and East German regimes could regain legitimacy and a reformed
socialism would be viable in these countries. His greatest historic merit
was that he did not use force to attempt to curb a process over which
he lost control.
Although he would have preferred a much slower process, one in
which he could have held on to some bargaining chips, Gorbachev
resigned himself rather quickly to German reunification. However, for
seven months, he fiercely opposed the admission of a united Germany
into NATO. Soviet opposition at that time stemmed from two quite
different sets of reasons. Much like today, these two sets of reasons
reflected the concerns and viewpoints of different political factions.
The first and most obvious was based on strategic and military con-
siderations. It was held primarily by conservative party and state cadres
and, of course, the military. Their main objection was to the gross
strategic imbalance which the united Germany's admission into NATO
would cause, to the detriment of the USSR.
However, for westernizing leaders such as Gorbachev and Edvard
Shevardnadze, and for the entire reformist intelligentsia which sup-
ported them, there was a far more important issue than military
balance and security. If a united Germany were part of NATO, the
raison d'etre and very survival of the Warsaw Pact (not to mention
COMECON) would be jeopardized. The Warsaw Pact was the main
structure linking the USSR to Europe and the primary vehicle through
which it could influence European affairs. If NATO expanded and the
Warsaw Pact disappeared - with nothing to take its place - the USSR
could well become a non-player in European political affairs, beaten
back, as it were, into the Asian hinterland. In this connection, it bears
reminding that one of the main purposes of perestroika and its foreign
policy was precisely to anchor the USSR structurally into Europe, as
firmly as possible.
NATO'S Eastward Enlargement 159
It was to avoid the marginalization of the USSR in Europe that the

Soviet leaders initially insisted that "the process of German reunifica-
tion must be organically linked and synchronized with the European
process and the creation of an essentially new security structure in
Europe, a structure which will [gradually] replace the alliances."3 This
was to be brought about, as we have seen, by transforming and bol-
stering the CSCE. Within this new structure, there would necessarily
have been a place for the USSR, a role for it in all important matters
related to Europe's future and security. The Soviet leadership proposed
various alternatives to Germany's inclusion in NATO. 4 First, they
demanded German neutrality. They well knew that the prospect of a
neutral Germany was problematic for Western countries, as in fact it
was for themselves. Their objective in suggesting it was essentially to
pressure the West into promptly setting up this new security structure,
which could contain and circumscribe a Great Germany. They also
proposed that Germany be simultaneously a member of NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. In addition to containing Germany militarily on two
fronts, this solution would, above all, have provided a rationale for
the Warsaw Pact's continued existence and guaranteed its survival until
an alternative European collective-security structure could be put in
place.
Faced with persistent resistance from the West, Gorbachev continued
to put forward other proposals/concessions. The USSR let it be known
that it was willing to accept the united Germany's membership in the
Atlantic Alliance, but not in its military organization; in other words,
that Germany have a status similar to that of France at the time. Once
again, the arrangement would have rapidly rendered NATO obsolete
and put pressure on the Western countries to create a new collective-
security system in Europe. Finally, the ultimate fallback option - and
certainly the most surprising and unrealistic — was proposed by Gor-
bachev in a tete-a-tete with President George Bush during the Wash-
ington summit in late May 1990: that the USSR join NATO. 5 Thus,
NATO would have become the pan-European security structure sought
by Gorbachev. At the time Bush side-stepped the suggestion with a
joke. Glancing towards Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, who was present
at the meeting, Bush quipped that he doubted the Soviet army would
appreciate being asked to serve under U.S. command.
Despite the disappearance of the USSR and the entirely different
international environment which now prevails, Russia has been making
objections to NATO enlargement and counter-proposals of exactly the
same nature over the past four years. To be sure, there have been others
as well. As was the case during the Gorbachev era, Russian leaders
who speak for various interests have raised issues of military security
and pointed to new threats to Russia in the event of NATO enlargement.

I will return to these issues and the way they were addressed during
the Gorbachev era, and demonstrate that here too there are parallels
with the current situation. Is it surprising to find that the objections
and counter-proposals made by Russia today mirror those put forward
by Gorbachev? In fact, the reasons and motivations underlying Russian
opposition have only intensified in the post-Gorbachev period.
The political hold and influence of the radical westernizers around
Boris Yeltsin during and after the fall of the USSR has gradually
weakened. However, their approach is still widely reflected in official
Russian positions. In rejecting outright the entire legacy of Soviet
foreign policy and accepting the dissolution of the USSR itself, the
people around Yeltsin said that these were prerequisites for Russia to
become part of the "civilized world" (to use their terms) at last, and
to be accepted as its full partner. These westernizers therefore feel that
Russia had provided every imaginable pledge of good behaviour in
order to enter the Western world. Indeed, it must be admitted that
Gorbachev and later Yeltsin made almost inconceivable moves which
have changed the face of the world.
NATO enlargement appears, from every point of view, less acceptable
to Russian leaders today than it did to Gorbachev in 1990. The
Warsaw Pact is gone; when NATO admits its former members, Russia's
exclusion from Europe will be all the sharper and more bitter. Further-
more, NATO'S eastward enlargement will possibly inject new life into
the organization, making it, more than ever before, the only real
structure for collective security and security cooperation in Europe,
and indeed the world. Russia's frustration at being excluded is there-
fore all the greater.
It is not surprising, then, that despite Yeltsin's rejection of Gor-
bachev, Russia has been essentially repeating his political counter-
proposals to NATO enlargement. Once again, it has pushed for a new
European collective-security system in which it could participate as a
full member. Once again, rather than starting from scratch, Russia has
proposed a new, strengthened role for the OSCE (organization on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, successor of the CSCE). The
current Russian leadership has had more time than did Gorbachev in
1990 to come up with detailed plans and soften Western scepticism
about whether an undertaking of this type would be realistic and
feasible. Russia has, for example, proposed that the OSCE be trans-
formed into a United Nations subsystem for Europe. It would have a
Security Council comprising of the same permanent members, each
with veto power - except of course China, whose place would be taken
by Germany.
In response to the West's expected refusal to consider the possible

dissolution of NATO, Russia has put forward a modified version of a
Gorbachev-era proposal to make NATO and the Warsaw Pact into the
two pillars of a pan-European security system, subordinated to a
superstructure such as a strengthened OSCE. In the new version of this
plan, the cis, rather than the Warsaw Pact, would be the system's
second pillar. However, here the proposal is much more unrealistic
than it was in the early Gorbachev era, for it seeks to re-establish
symmetry between Russia and the United States and its allies within
the proposed new structure.
At the same time, Russia has let it be known, as it did in 1990, that
admitting Eastern European countries into NATO'S political structure
but not its military wing would be less unacceptable. This would
narrow NATO'S scope as a European security organization. Finally, at
a 1996 press conference, Yeltsin stated, as Gorbachev had done in
1990 and for exactly the same reasons, but publicly this time, that
Russia would have no objection to NATO enlargement, provided Russia
itself were included. This statement has not often been repeated, owing
to considerations of status. Since it still claims superpower status,
Russia does not want to appear to be begging for admission into NATO,
especially since it knows it is bound to be turned down and thus suffer
a double humiliation. At the same time, the Russian leadership well
knows that Russia will never be admitted at a later stage, once coun-
tries like Poland and Hungary have veto power.
But let us return to the 1990 enlargement and its lessons for the
current situation. We shall focus now not on Soviet objections but on
the way the United States and the West tried to address them. Since
Gorbachev had so abruptly and unexpectedly ended the Cold War, he
had to be accommodated to some extent. It must be said, however,
that the concessions offered to Russia to induce it to accept Germany's
inclusion in NATO were slim indeed. They basically addressed the
USSR'S strategic and military concerns, which of course Gorbachev
expressed; for Gorbachev, however, this was not the main issue. Before
the concessions were finalized and formalized, the West had intimated
to the Soviets that NATO would not deploy nuclear arms or station
foreign troops on the territory of the former GDR. This is quite similar
to what was initially proposed to allay Russian fears in the present
case, except for the formalization of the offer. We shall return to this
point later. Subsequently, Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed to scale back
the forces of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and to accept a
ceiling of 370,000 troops on the united Germany's army, a 40 per cent
reduction in the existing combined forces of the FRG and the GDR.
Only one slight concession was made to Gorbachev to satisfy his wish
i6z Impact on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe
for a new European security system with a role for the USSR: at the
London summit in July 1990, NATO agreed to institutionalize the CSCE
by creating a secretariat and a crisis-control centre. It was quite out
of the question, however, that the CSCE might eventually supplant
NATO, or that NATO be subordinated to the CSCE in any way what-
soever, as Gorbachev had wanted.
Under these circumstances, it is surprising that Gorbachev ultimately
agreed to German reunification and that country's inclusion in NATO,
almost entirely on Western terms. It is even more surprising given that,
unlike the current Russian leadership, Gorbachev had veto power over
the conditions of German reunification under the Potsdam Agreement
of 1945 and, more significant still, by virtue of the massive Soviet
troop presence in the GDR. The Soviet army could simply have stayed
put, with no need to fight or even to threaten to do so. Today, the
conservatives of 1990 are not alone in criticizing him for not having
used his veto. But Gorbachev's entire policy was built on reconciliation
with the West. Had he blocked German reunification in 1990, he
would have been the spoiler in a process that he himself had set in
motion. He believed that the USSR could ill afford to antagonize the
United States and the ERG, especially at a time when he was in dire
need of economic aid.6
What lesson was learned from the events of 1990? It seems that the
conclusion which has been drawn was that NATO and the Western
powers need only hold firm to their core positions and Russia would
ultimately concede and agree to their terms, all the more so since it
no longer has a veto and direct power to obstruct, as Gorbachev did
in 1990.
Unlike the current Russian leadership, which for the last two years
has been threatening all sorts of retaliation in the event of NATO
enlargement - often not very convincingly - Gorbachev issued no such
threats. The only threat he made to attempt to sway the West related
to the potential effect on the USSR'S internal political situation. Russian
leaders today are sounding similar warnings. In May 1990 Gorbachev
told U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that Germany's inclusion in
NATO would spell "the end of perestroika."7 A few months earlier, he
had told French President Francois Mitterrand that he would soon be
replaced by a military leader in the event of German reunification on
Western terms.8
As Gorbachev feared, the inclusion of a unified Germany in NATO
did lead to the rapid disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, in spite of his
efforts to transform and salvage it and despite the promises made to
him by Lech Wasa and Mazowiecki in Poland and Vaclav Havel in
Czechoslovakia. They had pledged that their countries would honour
their international commitments to the USSR. A little more than one

month after the official dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in Prague in
early July 1991, a conservative putsch took place in Moscow to oust
Gorbachev. Clearly the collapse of the GDR and its inclusion in NATO
cannot be considered the direct cause or the main cause of the putsch.
However, a number of accounts indicate that it was indeed one of the
major reasons for the minister of defence's participation in the revolt.
Because the putsch failed, this fact is often forgotten. But it might well
have succeeded.9 And we can only speculate on what the implications
would have been for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany
and the subsequent course of international relations in Europe.
This time (leaving aside the nationalist, anti-West backlash), Russia
has proffered many other threats of all kinds, ranging from the
extreme and implausible to the more subtle and credible. The com-
ments made by former Defence Minister Pavel Grachev fall into the
first category; he stated that if NATO expanded to include the Baltic
states, the Russian army might move in to prevent it. And Yeltsin has
threatened to transform the cis into a military alliance to oppose
NATO. However, to carry out this threat, Yeltsin would need the
agreement of the other member states, a rather unlikely prospect.
Leaving aside the certain opposition of Ukraine, it should be noted
that Uzbekistan has successfully blocked moves to have the cis take
a collective position against the principle of NATO enlargement. Some-
what more credible were the warnings that NATO enlargement could
spark a crisis in Russia's relations with the countries of the former
USSR'S western rim, namely the Baltic states and Ukraine. They could
be subjected to Russian pressures of all kinds to force them to bow
to Russian security interests. Also plausible were Russia's threats to
reopen the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and not to
ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II, which were at
the mercy of an already recalcitrant parliament.
Russian leaders have also threatened to expand what they call their
"strategic partnership" with China, referring to their increasingly close
and wide-ranging relations with that country in the past two years.
The most credible threat, however, has been that NATO enlargement
would add grist to the mill of conservatives and nationalists, and that
Russia could increasingly play the role of a spoiler in European and
international security matters.
Despite all these threats, Russia finally accepted, without really
accepting, the first phase of NATO enlargement, betraying an utter
ambivalence quite different from its attitude in 1990. On the one hand,
it accepted expansion by endorsing a document which makes expli-
cit reference to it. On the other hand, it has continued to voice its
opposition, albeit less vehemently than in the past. Conservatives and

westernizers alike protest that NATO enlargement violates if not the
letter then at least the spirit of assurances given to Gorbachev at the
time of German reunification that NATO would not expand its military
apparatus east of the FRG'S borders. They also point out that in 1989,
to secure Gorbachev's tolerance of the political changes taking place
in Eastern Europe, Bush had assured him that the United States would
not try to take advantage of the situation and would respect the USSR'S
security interests in the region.
Of course, if Russia has come to an ambiguous acceptance of the
process, it has not been without obtaining some compensation. What
is the substance and magnitude of this compensation? The terms of
the compensation are enshrined in the "Founding Act"10 on relations
between Russia and NATO, signed in Paris on 27 May 1997 by the
heads of state of the countries concerned. In signing this Founding Act,
did Yeltsin make an "abject capitulation to Clinton's diktat"?11 The
words are from a Boston Globe editorial, not the Communist or
nationalist opposition in Russia! Or is the act, on the contrary, a great
victory for Russia, giving it veto power over NATO actions? Here,
again, this is not just bravado on the part of Yeltsin and his entourage;
the comments were made by none other than a dismayed Henry
Kissinger.IZ Clearly, then, there is room for interpretation.
This brings us back to the two categories of concerns to which we
referred earlier. Let us first consider Yeltsin's demands and the com-
pensation he received on the strategic and military score. With respect
to one of the main Russian demands, Yeltsin stated, in a speech two
days after signing the Founding Act, that it "enshrines NATO'S com-
mitment not to deploy nuclear arms on the territory of its new member
states." In fact, the document says nothing of the sort. At the very
most, it states that NATO has "no intention, no plan and no reason"
to do so. NATO did not want to establish two categories of members
by making a formal commitment of this nature, and it stood its ground.
There is a clear difference between an intention and a commitment.
Intentions may change with circumstances, without any commitment
being broken. The convoluted wording in the French version of the
Founding Act is rather comical; it reads, "NATO has decided that it
has no intention ..." This applies to Moscow's demand that the
Warsaw Pact's old nuclear installations not be used. The document
says nothing about stationing foreign troops in the new member states,
even in terms of intentions.
Throughout the laborious negotiations on the drafting of the Found-
ing Act, Russia asked that the addition of new members not increase
the total level of NATO arms and troops; this would have required
substantial reductions by NATO. Russia then softened its position

somewhat, asking that the increase resulting from NATO enlargement
be held to no more than 5 per cent above and beyond current levels.
Russia received no precise commitment on this score. However, NATO
did agree to reopen the CFE Treaty and reduce the numbers to reflect
the fact that, in redefining the balance of power, the Eastern European
countries being admitted to NATO were considered allies of the USSR
in 1990 when the treaty was signed whereas they henceforth will find
themselves in the opposite position. These negotiations have yet to take
place, however, and when they do Russia may also be asked to make
reductions.
On the whole, Yeltsin obtained appreciably fewer strategic and
military concessions than did Gorbachev at the time NATO expanded
to take in the former GDR. The more substantial and potentially
significant concessions that Russia did obtain are of a political nature,
even though these concessions do not have the force Russia would
have liked, and although the United States and NATO did not agree to
entrench them in a treaty. The Founding Act, as the name implies, is
a compromise between the "treaty" Moscow wanted and the charter
sought by Washington. It is interesting to note that, in this realm,
Yeltsin got more than Gorbachev did in his day.
Indeed, it may be said that the Founding Act has created and
institutionalized a new, permanent European security organization. It
provides for a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, at which minis-
ters of defence and foreign affairs will meet twice a year and ambas-
sadors once a month. There will also be summit meetings at unspecified
intervals. The "necessary administrative structures" to support the
work of the Permanent Joint Council have yet to be put in place. The
council will examine all security matters of concern to either party or
both parties, and may decide on joint initiatives, including peacekeep-
ing, conflict prevention, and crisis management. The act and the
structures associated with it create or at least imply a kind of symmetry
between Russia and NATO; this is particularly important to Moscow,
which sets great store by considerations of status, to compensate for
its lost power and the resulting sense of deep frustration. In this
connection, Russia's full inclusion in the Gy was substantial compen-
sation for Yeltsin.
The Founding Act specifies in many places that joint initiatives by
Russia and NATO in matters such as peacekeeping and conflict reso-
lution must be placed under the authority or purview of the United
Nations or the OSCE. On this point, therefore, Russia won accep-
tance, at least in principle, for the approach it had been advocating
for years.
Aside from principles, structures, and symbols (which are not incon-
sequential), the concrete gains for Russia are actually rather slim. The
Founding Act stipulates that the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
will make decisions and take action by consensus, which is why Yeltsin
and Kissinger said that Russia had won veto power over NATO'S
actions. In Kissinger's case, it is astonishing that he would make such
an absurd statement, since he had no need to save face. This interpre-
tation departs from both the spirit and the letter of the act, which
clearly stipulates that in the event a consensus is not reached, each
party retains its freedom to decide and to act. Kissinger's statement
notwithstanding, Russia has not become a de facto member of NATO.
It is true, however, that Russia can refer any matter concerning NATO
in which it feels it has an interest to the Permanent Joint Council. In
this sense, the Founding Act and its instruments provide principles and
a framework that could lend greater international legitimacy to Rus-
sia's demands and possible recriminations in the event that NATO
should act unilaterally in matters of European security. From this
perspective, the Founding Act can be compared to the Helsinki Act of
1975, which was not much binding on the parties but did prove to be
quite an effective instrument for pressure in cases of human-rights
violations in Eastern bloc countries.
To be sure, the future and the tenor of the Founding Act will
essentially depend on what the parties choose to make of it. In a speech
delivered in Moscow on 2, May 1997, u.s. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright stated that the document "embodies our solemn and lasting
commitment, at the highest level, to undertake a fundamentally differ-
ent relationship with Russia." If this proves to be the case, the act will
indeed be an extremely important document. However, given the scope
of Russian demands and the United States' s tendency to act unilater-
ally even with its allies, there is reason to be sceptical, at least for the
time being.
On the whole, what Russia actually gained seems slight indeed when
set against its barrage of objections to NATO enlargement, and in
particular its repeated threats of reprisals. The credibility of Russia's
threats and capabilities has been left even more tattered than before.
But Moscow does not seem to have learned all the lessons at this stage.
Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Duma's standing committee on for-
eign affairs and co-founder of the reformist Yabloko Party, has stated
that the West cannot be allowed to test Russia's tolerance indefinitely.
He proposed setting a clear tolerance threshold, beyond which Russia
would question its entire policy towards the West. As if this was not
precisely what it has been doing with all its threats about NATO
enlargement!
This time, the new tolerance threshold, for Yeltsin and his new prime
minister, Yevgeny Primakov, is the admission of the Baltic states or any
former Soviet republic into NATO. It is to block any such move that
Yeltsin is maintaining Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement,
despite the reference made to it in the Founding Act. Now that the
process is under way, and given the principles on which it is based, it
is difficult to imagine that NATO can long rebuff the Baltic states, unless
it more clearly recognizes that its policy is built on spheres of influence.
On the other hand, if the Founding Act gradually delivers its promises
and NATO begins to develop a relationship of trust and true partnership
with Russia in European security matters, this could lead Moscow to
accept the admission of the Baltic states into NATO.
But we are not there yet. Indeed, what could be interpreted as the
exclusion or simply the systematic neglect of Russia in the conduct of
European affairs, coupled with apparent attempts to undermine Russia
geopolitically and strategically, cannot bode well for the future of
European security. In fact, it can only help nationalist and anti-Western
elements on the domestic Russian political scene, if not now then in
the long term.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
NATO Enlargement as an Issue

in Russian Politics
Sergei Plekhanov
In Western debates around NATO enlargement, one of the main bones

of contention has been the question of assessing the implications of
Russian resistance to the new NATO policy. Russian political leaders,
both in the opposition and on the government side, have been vigor-
ously protesting the idea of moving the Atlantic Alliance's border
eastward. Since 1994, when the idea of expanding NATO began to be
openly discussed in Western circles, Russian political leaders have been
steadily - and nearly unanimously - voicing objections against this
idea. A wide gamut of signals - from warnings by westernizing reform-
ers that NATO expansion would boost resurgent Russian nationalism,
to direct threats by the nationalists themselves that Russia would resort
to force in case NATO did move up to the Russian borders - strongly
indicated that there was a major political risk involved in NATO
enlargement: the prospect of Russia's falling under the influence of
neo-imperialists and shifting to a belligerent anti-Western position in
world affairs.
Western opponents of enlargement have been giving high estimates
to this risk, agreeing with Russian liberals that the Alliance's move east
was strengthening the position of anti-Western nationalists and increas-
ing the likelihood that Russia might revert to an authoritarian regime
and re-emerge as the West's major opponent in the international sys-
tem. Obviously, such an outcome would present a very serious threat
to world peace and security. Thus, highly respectable figures like
George Kennan and former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock
branded enlargement as an historic blunder in American foreign policy.
Enlargement advocates retorted that including Russia's former sat-
ellites - and later, possibly, former Soviet republics as well - was more
likely to produce the opposite effect. According to this view, NATO
enlargement was needed precisely because Russia, all the changes of
Enlargement as an Issue in Russian Politics 169
the past decade notwithstanding, retained its imperialist and authori-

tarian traditions. Yielding to those who continued to see East European
and newly independent states as Russia's sphere of influence would
only reward and embolden the most dangerous forces in Russian
politics. NATO enlargement, on the other hand, would put Russian
hawks on notice that restoration of Moscow's sway over countries
around Russia was not a prudent policy option, since it would throw
Moscow into a no-win conflict with the world's dominant powers.
And in any case, this reasoning goes, should Moscow still choose,
under a more hardline leadership, to move in this direction, an enlarged
NATO would be a more effective barrier to such moves than the
Alliance as it is currently constituted.
In Helsinki in March and then in Paris in May 1997, President Boris
Yeltsin recognized the inclusion of at least three Central European
states in NATO as an inevitable development that Russia had no strength
to prevent. Russia and NATO decided to "agree to disagree" on this
issue. Under this strange formula, each of the two sides interpreted the
outcome of their negotiations on NATO enlargement in its own way:
while Yeltsin claimed that Russia had obtained a significant consulta-
tive role in matters of European security and a NATO promise not to
include former Soviet republics in the Alliance, Clinton and other
NATO leaders insisted that Russia had gotten only "a voice, not a veto"
and that NATO membership was open to all countries.
The contradictions and ambiguities surrounding Russian attitudes
to NATO enlargement soon lost their salience, however. In fact, by the
end of 1997 issues of sharing the financial costs of enlargement
assumed a much greater prominence than issues of Russian reactions.
Enlargement advocates celebrated a victory: the Russian problem
seemed to have been solved. In Madrid in July 1997 NATO did decide
to admit the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, thus repudiating
the half-century legacy of Yalta. Russia did accept enlargement, albeit
grudgingly and conditionally. Meanwhile, Russia's cooperation with
the West continued to develop. Russia's cooperation with NATO was
raised to a new level with the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent
Joint Council and the arrival of Russian officers for permanent repre-
sentation in Brussels. Above all, since the Asian financial crisis hit
Russia in the fall of 1997, obtaining additional Western loans to
prevent the country's economic and political meltdown became sine
qua non of the Yeltsin regime's survival.
Yet the issue of NATO enlargement is likely to remain a part of the
politics of Russian foreign policy. It has made ratification of the
START ii Treaty more problematic. It is certain to affect the next
Russian presidential election, which, as Gordon Hahn of the Hoover
Institution has noted, is scheduled to begin just when Poland, Hungary,

and the Czech Republic formally join NATO. 1 And, in a wider perspec-
tive, the decisions taken in 1997 are of such magnitude that this issue
has become a major factor shaping Russian views on world politics
and on Russia's evolving international role.
The current phase of Russia's relations with the West is character-
ized as a mix of cooperation and conflict, and the "agree to disagree"
formula offered in Helsinki in March 1997 may be seen as an expres-
sion of this. Indeed, one could argue that a cooperative-conflictual
relationship is more natural for both sides compared to the largely
cooperative mode of the first years after the collapse of Communism
- a mode that came into being as a result of Russia's choice to follow
the u.s. lead and seek Western help. But the dynamic of the shift
towards conflict may be very hard to manage, and the cooperative
elements in the relationship may be seriously undermined in the
process.
One of the "wild cards" in this new phase of the post-Cold War
interaction between the former adversaries is the transition crisis in
Russia. As Robert Legvold aptly puts it: "The future of Russian foreign
policy does not rest exclusively on the normal interplay of politics,
bureaucracy and the daily challenges of a complex world. The impact
of the deep, unsteady transformation remaking the country also threat-
ens to play its role. Until Russia has fashioned the critical institutions
of a mature democracy and they have been given time to take root,
no matter how tame its course at a given moment, the country will
remain partial to simple and arbitrary solutions to problems with
weaker nearby states. It will often act on hurt pride and suspicion in
dealing with the great powers. It will also too easily accept unilateral,
illiberal - that is, protectionist and militarized - responses to the
challenges posed by the world outside. "z
DEFEAT OR ADAPTATION?
The NATO enlargement issue in Russian politics has come to symbolize

and dramatize defeat. The politics of defeat is notoriously difficult hard
to manage, since it is divisive, explosive, and vindictive.
Of course, Western leaders have officially tended to play down such
an interpretation of enlargement - and thus Russian concerns over it
- as "old thinking" and to invite Russia to view the ongoing changes
in its international environment as an opportunity rather than a threat.
For example, in his testimony at congressional hearings on NATO
enlargement, u.s. Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, a former
ambassador to Moscow, described the Clinton administration's policy
towards Russia in the following terms: "A Russia that defines its
national greatness in terms of the peace, well-being and accomplish-

ments of its people is likely to be part of the solution to Europe's and
the world's problems. Conversely, a Russia that defines its greatness
at the expense of its own people or its neighbors could be in the
zist century just what it was in the 2,oth century - a great problem
for us and others. Our objective must be to craft the political arrange-
ments that help encourage Russia to pursue the first path rather than
the second."3
In other words, while Russian hardliners and unreconstructed impe-
rialists may understandably grieve over the contraction of Moscow's
military power and loss of sway over Eastern Europe and former Soviet
republics, true reformers, committed to making Russia a peaceful
capitalist democracy integrating with the West and respecting the
independence of its neighbours, have nothing to fear from NATO
enlargement. In this benign interpretation, NATO'S decision to expand
eastward in the face of Russia's persistent opposition presents a defeat
not of reformers but of hardliners and thus is more of an adaptation
to new realities than a defeat.
The problem with this interpretation is that it is not shared by
anyone with any political weight in Moscow, including the reformers
themselves. Any differences of significant opinion on the subject are
within the framework of classic Russian questions: "Kto vinovat (Who
is to blame)?" and "Chto delat' (What is to be done)?" Whatever the
reasons for it, there is now a major divergence of opinion between the
West and Russia on an important international issue, and this diver-
gence should be cause for great concern.
Objectively speaking, it does make sense to regard NATO enlarge-
ment as Russia's defeat in at least four respects. In the most direct and
immediate sense, it is a defeat of Russian diplomacy^ which for several
years desperately tried to prevent NATO from adopting this decision
and to promote the Organization on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) as the alternative to the U.S.-led bloc. Since 1992.,
Russia has been arguing for a new security system for Europe which
would erase the Cold War division lines, be inclusive, and rest not so
much on military as on political and economic foundations. It has tried
to persuade everyone concerned that Russia presents no threat to its
neighbours and thus there is no rational need to extend NATO'S pro-
tection to them. It has warned that this NATO policy holds dire
consequences for Russian democracy and for European security. And
still, in the end, the best it has obtained from NATO is sweeteners to
the bitter pill of enlargement.
The start of the enlargement process is a defeat also in the sense
that it signifies Russia's sharply reduced influence in international
affairs. This reduction is most vivid if the situation is viewed through
172. Impact on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe
the lens of traditional power politics. In a characteristic statement,

Harvey Sicherman, president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute
in Philadelphia, has noted: "NATO'S expansion eastward confirms the
post-Cold War reality in Europe. Russian power has retreated to the
eastern Ukrainian border, and Moscow lacks the economic, political
and military leverage to renew its influence over such countries as
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary."4 Of course, bemoaning, or
celebrating, this situation may be a sign of "old thinking," while an
enlightened analyst would shrug it off, but the fact is that the contrac-
tion of Russian power in its old forms has not been compensated by
any growth of Russian power in benign liberal forms. Quite the
opposite - it has gone hand in hand with a deepening economic,
political, technological, and moral decline of Russia as a nation.
Therefore, NATO enlargement cannot be presented to the Russians as
part of a tradeoff: enlargement is just the most visible and painful
manifestation of the larger trend of Russia's overall decline.
NATO enlargement signifies a defeat for Yeltsin's policy of engage-
ment with the West. His strategy of reconciliation, alignment, and even
identification with the West has been a key ingredient of his political
program. "Joining the West" was seen as Russia's path to salvation
and revival. In this context, NATO'S enlargement is an unmistakeable
signal to Russia that it continues to be seen by the West as a source
of dangers and as a country that does not belong to the Western world.
In the words of Grigory Yavlinsky, the leading opposition liberal,
"NATO expansion is bad for Russia because it shows that the Western
countries' leaders do not consider present-day Russia a free democratic
society and do not believe that in the foreseeable future it will become
one, placing the army under civilian control. NATO expansion shows
that the West is afraid of what is going on in Russia, even though it
is not saying this openly. This is really very bad."5 If NATO enlargement
puts strain on the notion that joining the West will bring Russia greater
security, the concurrent failure of Western-inspired and supported
reforms of Russia undermines the other rationale for westernization:
namely, that it is the best strategy for Russia's development.
Finally, NATO enlargement is a defeat for Yeltsin's policies vis-a-vis
the near abroad and Eastern Europe - to the extent that one can speak
of such policies at all. Having played the decisive, leading role in the
dissolution of the USSR, Yeltsin's Russia then behaved disastrously
towards its closest neighbours. Lacking both the potential and the
desire to dominate its neighbours, Russia proceeded on the presump-
tion that it could be to them what the United States is to Latin America.
This generated fears among Eastern European and post-Soviet states
and made them seek Western protection. Confronted with Russian
indifference, unpredictability, and heavy-handed pressure, Eastern

Europeans and newly independents states acted quite naturally, though
perhaps imprudently. How could Russia object to this, since it itself
had led the way in replacing the USSR with independent states and
alignment with the West?
The fact that the decision to expand NATO eastward, regarded by
Western governments as a historic achievement, looks to the Russians
as a major defeat should give us pause. Is it possible to reconcile these
opposing perceptions? Can the Russians be persuaded to abandon their
"old thinking"?
WHO WON AND WHO LOST THE COLD WAR?
According to a view held by influential Western figures, especially those

of conservative bent, Russia should regard NATO expansion as some-
thing entirely fair, since it happens to be the defeated party in the Cold
War. Indeed, in the opinion of Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
and Republican politicians in the United States, even those meagre
concessions that Russia obtained in 1997 for its consent to NATO
expansion were too much for a defeated power.
This line of thought is truly devastating for the current Russian
leadership - if only because it confirms the charges of its hardline
opponents. The reality, of course, is far more complex.
Mikhail's Gorbachev's drive to end the Cold War was presented to
the country and the world as a Soviet rejection of the traditional realist
approach in favour of a more enlightened, liberal-internationalist
policy which would bring huge benefits both to the USSR and to the
world at large. Disarmament, "deideologization," renunciation of the
Brezhnev Doctrine, and integration into the global economy were
supposed to make it possible to reform the Soviet system and improve
conditions of life in Soviet society. When Yeltsin launched his power
bid against Gorbachev in 1990, his approach to foreign policy, while
retaining a continuity with Gorbachev's "new thinking," added to it
a hefty dose of horse-trading. In effect, Yeltsin offered the West a deal:
he would lead an anti-Communist revolution which would abolish the
Soviet Union, and his reward would be Western support for Russia as
a new, capitalist nation-state firmly allied with the West. The other
Yeltsin deal was with leaders of the other former Soviet republics:
replacement of the USSR by fifteen independent states held great prom-
ise for those states' leaders.
Therefore, Yeltsin has even less reason than Gorbachev to agree with
the notion that he belongs to the defeated side in the Cold War: in
very real terms, Yeltsin consciously and decisively helped the West win
it. What he failed to realize was that his rewards for this help as
Russia's new leader would be determined almost exclusively by cold
calculations of Western interests: fears of Russia's "meltdown" as a
state, estimates of Russia's power and influence, and Russia's potential
as an emerging market.
Russian debates on foreign policy since 1992. have reflected a grad-
ual and painful realization of this logic. For the hardliners opposed to
Yeltsin, his role in the dismantling of the Soviet state became a key
element in mobilizing public backlash against his regime of "traitors."
Yeltsin and his supporters, meanwhile, struggled to prove that the deals
he struck were beneficial not just for a narrow group of new elites but
also for Russia as a whole. They appealed to Western fears and
interests to persuade Western leaders that Russia deserved much more
than it was getting. They tried limited balance-of-power moves to
outweigh American influence. They also tried to use Russia's leverage
in the post-Soviet territory to secure recognition of Russia's hegemonic
role in Eurasia. Finally, they stressed the need for Western assistance
and investments as a crucial condition of Russia's rebirth.
But in 1997 the chicken came home to roost. NATO began to move
East, while Western capital, scared by the collapse of Russian markets,
began to move back West, leaving Yeltsin to his own devices.
WESTERNIZERS AND NATIONALISTS
To understand the meaning of NATO enlargement for Russian foreign-

policy development, it is useful to view it in the volatile context of
new Russian nationalism - the surprisingly powerful force which, after
being generated by the crisis of the Soviet system, went on to deliver
the decisive blows against Soviet Communism and then formed the
foundation, in combination with other forces, of the new Russian state.
While many observers tend to view Russian nationalism as mainly a
continuation of Soviet imperial traditions, in reality this force, while
undoubtedly rooted in the past, is still primarily a product of the new
circumstances in which post-Soviet Russia finds itself.
Any nationalism is defined by an interplay between internal and
external factors. As far as contemporary Russian nationalism is con-
cerned, it emerged in response to the internal crisis of the Soviet system
- its inability to redress the imbalance between state and society, the
exhaustion of its ideology, the deadening impact of its militarism, and
the desire, prevalent both among elites and in the public, to have a
"normal," meaning Western-type, state. But after the new Russian state
was constituted and Russia became a new actor in international poli-
tics, the evolution of its nationalism has been increasingly affected by
the actions of external forces - Western governments, international

organizations, transnational corporations, and neighbours large and
small. NATO enlargement is perhaps the single most important external
factor so far, which has been shaping the Russians' perceptions of who
they are, what their place and their prospects are in the international
system, and what they can do to emerge successfully from the painful
transition of the past decade.
It is common knowledge that the key to Yeltsin's remarkable success
in the struggles for power within the USSR and then in post-Communist
Russia has been his identification simultaneously with both major
strands in contemporary Russian political thought - Western-oriented
liberalism and Russian nationalism - and his ability to build a political
movement and then a new state on a mix of both. The fact that a
Russian nationalist could emerge from the core of the Soviet party-
state and then become the leader of a revolutionary democratic move-
ment seeking to remake Russia into a capitalist liberal democracy was
an almost totally unexpected development for all concerned - Gor-
bachev, Soviet hardliners, Western leaders, Russian liberals, and, it
seems, Yeltsin himself, who was looking for any available winning
combination in his stubborn climb back to power in 1989-90.
Having taken over the Kremlin in 1991, the Yeltsin movement, of
course, evolved in terms of its composition, social base, and political
orientation. What has coalesced around Yeltsin is a group of post-
Soviet elites which have derived their power from four main sources:
the political-administrative power of the Russian state, which had
inherited a significant amount of the power left from Soviet system;
privatization of state property; a wide enough, though hardly stable,
mass base in the Russian society; and, last but not least, support from
key Western states and international institutions.
It is the fourth leg of Yeltsin's Kremlin chair that primarily concerns
us here. Western support has been crucial to the success of Yeltsin's
whole enterprise. Following in Gorbachev's footsteps, Yeltsin brought
the idea of Moscow's strategic reconciliation with the West to its
logical conclusion: elimination of the Soviet Union as the West's global
political and ideological adversary, and a radical westernization of
Russia.
Yeltsin's first foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, was in a position
similar to that of Leon Trotsky: much like Trotsky, who, as the first
commissar of foreign affairs in the Soviet government, thought that it
would be enough for him to issue a few revolutionary proclamations
to the world and then close shop, Kozyrev regarded his main task as
easy street: just follow the American lead (though closing the shop was
certainly ruled out). Characterizing the Russian foreign-policy mentality
of that "romantic" period, Vladimir Lukin, former Russian ambassador

to the United States and now chairman of the Duma's committee on
international affairs, said: "Back in the old days of totalitarian rule,
one would listen to the advice of America. We were naive to believe
what we heard, and what we heard was, 'Drop Communism, and the
United States, the West, will come forward to help you pave the way
toward a bright future for Russia.' And this is what we were all sort
of led to believe. This line was continued under President Bush and
President Clinton, but as it turned out, we were quite a bit misled on
that."6
While naivety and lack of experience in world politics did play a
role, Yeltsin's early foreign policy also involved a heavy dose of prag-
matism. Turning Russia, at least for a while, into a junior partner of
the United States was a rational option because it could - and did -
help Yeltsin defeat his political opponents and proceed with his
reforms. Since the late 19805, the main line of conflicts in Moscow
over foreign policy had been between Western-oriented reformers who
sought a decisive end to the Cold War as a goal crucial to the success
of reforms, and Soviet hardliners committed to maintenance of the
empire, the huge military-industrial complex, and the entire centralized
bureaucratic system.
The hardliners lost because the essence of their position was preser-
vation of the decaying status quo; it was easy to expose them as
defenders of the powerful Soviet bureaucratic interests which had
outlived their time and become nothing but obstacles on Russia's road
forward. Yeltsin's reformers won because they seemed to have history
and progress on their side: democracy, free markets, and friendship
with the West, all of which promised to free Russia from its defence
burden and open doors to foreign goods, ideas, and investments.
Supporters of the old Soviet system of power were confronted with a
de facto alliance between the Yeltsin movement and the U.S.-led forces
in the global system: an alliance driven by the common goal of dis-
mantling the Soviet power structure.
The situation began to change as the new Russian state took a more
or less definite shape, relying on the rapidly growing financial oligar-
chy, the privatizing managerial class, and millions of new private
entrepreneurs, as well as legions of recycled Soviet bureaucrats enjoy-
ing the fruits of freedom from central control. The new Russian elites
continued to view the West as a strategic base of support, but they
were no less concerned with building a state which would protect their
interests inside and outside Russia. Using Western liberal ideas was not
enough to build such a state: it had to utilize whatever people and
structures from the Soviet state would be available. The new Russian
state had to rely on those forces which only yesterday desperately tried
to prevent it from being born. The military-industrial complex, albeit
in a much weakened form, seasoned Soviet diplomats who were deeply
traumatized by the collapse of their country's superpower status, and
other conservative elites were gradually integrated into the new polit-
ical system. Some of them joined the government and others stayed in
opposition, but, taken together, they were now a key ingredient of the
Russian state.
Nationalism, in a "moderate" and civic form, took centre stage in
Russian politics as the most suitable ideology for a new state under-
going a painful, calamitous, and disorienting transition. "Radical" and
ethnocentric types of nationalism have shaped the views and politics
of the new right wing - Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal-Democratic
Party and Gennady Zyuganov's Communist Party. These groups made
vehement protests against Western-supported Russian reforms and the
westward orientation of Russian foreign policy the hallmark of their
appeal.
From 1993 on, the main action in Russian foreign policy-making
has been between those two wings of Russian nationalism - moderate
and radical. If moderate nationalism included continued reliance on
the United States and other Western countries as an important condi-
tion of Russia's development, radical nationalists defined Russian
national interests in opposition to the West and westernization. The
only kind of westernization that would be able to survive in this
situation had to be securely anchored in what would be perceived to
be Russia's national interests. It was an open question whether a major
Russian political leader could be both a Russian nationalist and a
friend of the West under these circumstances. Thus, westernizing
liberals who could not present credible nationalist credentials were
marginalized.
For Yeltsin and his supporters, the answer to that question would
depend on the actual results of their engagement with the West; if they
could prove that the West helped Russia overcome its crisis, they would
be able to maintain their policies; if their opponents could prove that
the results of Western policies were disastrous for Russia, Yeltsin would
suffer a crushing defeat.
In recent years, Western leaders and Russian nationalists have been
increasingly at odds with each other, despite periodic attempts to
contain the process. Both sides discovered that they had interests which
were difficult to reconcile, despite the fact that Communism had been
overthrown and they were now bound by a growing web of cooperation.
Reciprocal negative perceptions began to develop: whereas in the West

the spectre of Russian nationalism would revive Cold War traditions
of containment, in Russia the spectre of overwhelming Western power
would motivate Russian leaders to search for a more assertive foreign
policy.
THE MANY USES OF NATO
The subject of NATO enlargement surfaced in Russian politics in 1994,

but it was only in 1996 that it began to gain salience as an issue of
interest to a significant segment of the public. So Yeltsin's losing battle
against enlargement was waged without mass involvement. It has been
primarily an elite issue, and its potential and implications as a mass
issue remain to be seen.
As far as elites are concerned, the issue of relations with NATO has
never been among the most divisive in Moscow, since, from 1994 on,
virtually all significant political formations agreed that eastward
expansion of NATO would be a bad idea. The existence of this negative
consensus is an indicator that it is possible to rally the Russian political
class and, possibly, widen its mass base on a position of resistance to
the West.
To liberal westernizers, both pro-government (Egor Gaidar) and those
in opposition (the Yabloko Party), discussions of NATO expansion were
a sideshow, an irritating and harmful distraction from the much more
important issues of overcoming Russia's crisis. To them, NATO is a
vestige of the Cold War, and if it were to move closer to the Russian
borders, while excluding Russia, this would vindicate the most reac-
tionary forces in Russian society and revive power politics and milita-
rism. They appealed to the common sense of Western leaders, trying to
dissuade them from provoking a Russian backlash. The fact that NATO
did begin its enlargement despite the Russian westernizers' warnings
and pleas has contributed to the marginalization of these forces and to
the evolution of their foreign-policy thinking away from liberal inter-
nationalism and towards the power politics of conservative nationalists.
On the opposite flank were the old foes of Gorbachev's "new
thinking" - the military-industrial complex and remnants of the Soviet
Union bureaucracy and the Communist Party - joined by the new,
post-Soviet brand of hardline nationalists like Zhirinovsky, whose
hatred of the West stemmed from their perceptions of Russia's weak-
ness and retreat in the face of overwhelming Western power. To
hardliners, NATO enlargement is their issue. It confirms their rejection
of liberal views of international politics and security, their deep suspi-
cions of Western goals vis-a-vis Russia, and their demands that Russia
rebuild itself as a military power and develop independent policies

aimed at counteracting U.S. hegemonic pretensions.
Ironically, public debates on NATO enlargement were launched by
the government itself. The first official expression of opposition to
NATO enlargement was made by the Russian government shortly before
Yeltsin's 2.1 September 1993 move to dissolve the Supreme Soviet and
abolish the old constitution: Yeltsin needed the support of the military,
which was far from guaranteed, and a sign of his vigilance on NATO
was helpful in that regard. In December 1993 a document produced
by External Intelligence Service, then headed by Yevgeny Primakov,
gave a detailed critique of the idea of NATO expansion. This was not
some extremist ranting, but a serious policy document from within the
government, and the person responsible for its publication was to
replace the pro-Western liberal Kozyrev as foreign minister.
There were several reasons why the government stimulated debates
on NATO enlargement. First, strong objections to enlargement reflected
the views of influential conservatives in the military, intelligence, and
foreign-policy establishment. They viewed relations between Russia
and NATO as a zero-sum game and were anxious to alert the elites and
the public to the danger that the security vacuum created by the Soviet
retreat and collapse would be filled by the victorious Cold War adver-
sary. Once the issue was publicized, it found a rich soil in the emerging
nationalist consensus. The realist perspective of these groups could not
be successfully refuted by those Russians who did not share it - it was
up to NATO to persuade alarmed Russians that they should not fear
enlargement. But NATO was playing right into the hands of the hard-
liners and thereby increasing their credibility and authority in Russian
political circles.
Second, Yeltsin could not ignore the views of his conservative estab-
lishment, given his perilous political situation and his need to retain
the support of the "power ministries" and the foreign-policy bureau-
cracy. Third, Yeltsin apparently found that he could use the hardliners'
attacks on NATO expansion as leverage in his own dealings with the
West. Russian foreign-policy professionals are well familiar with the
"two-level game" tactic often employed by U.S. presidents who invoke
opposition in Congress as a bargaining chip in international negotia-
tions. Over and over again, Yeltsin and his spokesmen warned that
the NATO policy could provoke backlash from Russia, and they man-
aged to slow down the process to some degree as well as obtain
concessions from the West. In the meantime, Yeltsin himself, whose
original views on foreign affairs were extremely simplistic, was learning
the ropes of foreign policy and testing the possibilities and limits of
his cooperation with Western partners.
i8o Impact on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe
A LEARNING PROCESS
As Russian leaders were testing those possibilities and limits, they were
developing a new perspective on the West: a sense of vulnerability and
limited options in an increasingly competitive relationship, in which a
weak Russia would be losing more and more. Robert Legvold calls it
"latent threat perception: "For many Russians, the tendency to detect
evil intent lurking behind objectionable Western initiatives remains
strong. When the issue of NATO enlargement arises, or the West's stake
in the security of the Baltic states, or the scope and direction of Russian
arms sales abroad, an uncomfortably large percentage of politicians,
significant portions of the media, and even some parts of the policy-
making community instinctively view Western policies as not merely
ill-advised or insensitive to Russian concerns but as aimed at dimin-
ishing or endangering Russia."7
This perspective was especially stimulated by u.s. policies around
the Russian periphery: the strong interest in Caspian Sea oil, ant the
willingness to buttress the independence of former Soviet republics and
undermine Russian influence there. A whole new area of Western-
Russian competition has opened in what Moscow used to regard as
its backyard, a competition directly associated by the Russian govern-
ment with NATO'S eastward movement.
The sense of vulnerability is all the more explicable, since tradition-
ally Russia's great power and superpower status was rooted in military-
political and ideological factors. Having renounced those traditions,
Yeltsin's Russia now had to play by the rules of the game where its
assets are minuscule: in terms of market power, Russia is a marginal
country which cannot be an economic magnet even to its closest
neighbours (compare this situation to the wide attraction of the Soviet
model of socialism to newly liberated countries in the Third World in
the late 19508 and early 19605). Can Russia try to compensate for its
market weakness by rebuilding itself as a major military-political
power? This is exactly what NATO enlargement is designed to prevent.
Keeping Russia disconnected from its imperial heritage can be regarded
as fair in the ranks of Gy, but it is guaranteed to generate contrary
impulses in the Russian body politic.
It would be a mistake to exaggerate the degree to which the Russian
politics of resistance to NATO was orchestrated or even organized.
Much of the way NATO enlargement policies have interacted with
Russian politics was determined by the fact that the Russian state is
still in the formative stage. For several years after the Soviet collapse,
Russia could not by definition have a coherent foreign policy: the
change from the USSR to the Russian Federation was too swift and
massive, the institutional framework of the new state was just begin-
ning to take shape, the attention of elites was focused on their struggles
for political and economic power within Russia, and the country's
leaders lacked any clear set of ideas as to what Russia's interests are
in the world and how it should pursue them. This highly chaotic
environment made it possible for all kinds of foreign-policy ideas to
get a hearing. But, as a perception grew in Russia that the absence of
an effective, stable, and efficient state was becoming a threat to
national survival, it was only natural that the ideas of conservative
traditionalists, who did have experience with running a state and
dealing with strong adversaries and who were supposedly free of
illusions and possessed professional knowledge and skills, should gain
a rapid ascendancy.
KTO VINO VAT? CHTO DEL AT'?
While Russian policy makers focused on NATO enlargement very early

and have maintained steady opposition to it, it is remarkable that the
decisions of 1997 took the main political forces in Moscow by surprise.
Almost up to the last moment they seemed to expect that the West
would not do this to its new Russian partners.
Accordingly, a dominant note in Moscow discourse on NATO is that
Russia was compelled to accept something to which it had strenuously
objected. This usually makes for a politics of anguish and vindictive-
ness: somebody has to take the blame for defeat and something has
do be done in response to the challenge. The opposition, naturally,
blamed Yeltsin and his policy of reliance on the West. Yeltsin, just as
naturally, has to blame the West and thus adopt more elements of the
hardline analysis and program. Under NATO pressure, he could ill
afford to challenge the hardliners; indeed, he needed them to rally
around the Kremlin.
Russian leaders may be tempted to use the NATO issue to stir up
Russian patriotism. The idea that the Western challenge can help unite
Russia is gaining credence. According to prominent Russian historian
Sergey Lunev, NATO enlargement is a good thing for Russia, since it
"promotes the long-awaited rallying of our society ... Now an external
threat provides an opportunity for rallying together."8 General Alexandr
Lebed, a strong contender for the Russian presidency, sees NATO
expansion as a reason for forging an alliance between Russian eco-
nomic elites and proponents of a strong and militarily capable Russian
state: "Russia's owning class is only beginning to realize the connection
between the ongoing restructuring of world geopolitics and its own
interests. The positions of Gazprom, oil exporters and big banks in
18 2. Impact on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe
international and domestic markets have numerous ties with the coun-
try's international status, with spoken and unspoken rules of the game
which are shaping up after the USSR'S demise. It is naive to believe
that any oil-gas or financial 'state within a state' will survive if it should
leave the cover that it can receive only from effective state institutions.
Sooner or later, competitors will come and present their claims to oil
and gas - as debt payment or in the name of ecology."9
Anti-Western moods are on the rise in Moscow. Lunev writes about
the coming end to "residual illusions about the West's gentlemanly
conduct ... and the morality of anyone's foreign policy ... In the course
of the decade, Russia has professed universal love: less so in the
perestroika years, more so in the democratic era. The decision to admit
three new members to NATO was apparently the last nail to be driven
into the coffin of idealism. Russia needs a normal pragmatism, and
this is exactly what is now beginning to gain strength (at least at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs)." 10
In this climate, there is no lack of Cassandras. Alexei Mitrofanov,
chairman of the geopolitics committee of the Russian Duma and a
member of Zhirinovsky's party, sees Russia in a "situation of geopo-
litical Stalingrad": "It has become absolutely evident that the prospects
are for Russia's isolation from Europe, the creation around its perime-
tre of a quarantine belt of unfriendly states, bound by military bloc
ties to the United States and its allies, further weakening of our country,
development of centrifugal tendencies [in it], and [its] subsequent
demise, followed by the formation on its ruins of 10-15 satellite
countries, hostile to each other and totally dependent on external
suzerains."11
If Mitrofanov's is a voice of extremism, here is General Anatoly
Klimenko, a military analyst, writing in the mainstream and influential
Nezavisimaya gazeta: "Essentially, the West's intentions are, first, to
prevent the reemergence in the former Soviet space of a structure which
would be able to compete with the USA and other NATO states; second,
to have relative stability maintained in that space, and, third, to assure
the security of the property of Western investors and an unhampered
access to Russia's cheap natural resources." In case of a "political
confrontation" with Russia, Klimenko expects NATO to try to provoke
armed conflicts around Russia's perimetre and, possibly, even launch
a direct military intervention: preparing the ground for such an inter-
vention is the real goal of NATO enlargement, according to him. Such
an intervention would be aimed at knocking out Russia's military-
economic potential, occupying the Kaliningrad region and other dis-
puted territories, blocking Russia's access to the Atlantic through the
Barents and Baltic seas, and squeezing Russia out of Transcaucasia and
the Black Sea by defeating the Black Sea Fleet and depriving Russia of
its military bases in Armenia and Georgia. Japan would then retake
the Northern Territories (South Kuril Islands, in Russian terminology)
and thus block Russia's access to the Pacific.12
Challenging American hegemony, if only verbally, has become a
political fashion in Moscow. The influential Russian foreign-policy
specialist Alexei Pushkov, usually associated with a moderate western-
izing position, denounces the idea that Russia should behave as "Amer-
ica's junior partner who agrees with everything or almost everything."
He writes: "This variant was tried under Kozyrev and brought its
architect nothing but inglorious political death. It could hardly have
been otherwise, for such a path runs contrary to the Russian mentality.
Witness Boris Yeltsin's verbal escapades against the Americans: they
are seen as being already in control of Transcaucasus and having
gained too much influence in Europe. These charges illustrate that the
Americans' inexorable drive to affirm their moral and political lead-
ership everywhere, including the post-Soviet space, will always be met
in Moscow with irritation." 73
Integration with Belarus, which is led by the authoritarian and
vehemently anti-Western Aleksandr Lukashenko, has become an
important Russian policy to counteract NATO enlargement. The per-
ceived NATO challenge increases the value of Belarus as an ally. To
develop this alliance, Russian leaders have to turn a blind eye to the
reality of Lukashenko's dictatorial rule. A "deodorized" Belarusian
president thus becomes an important factor in Russian domestic pol-
itics, buttressing hardline Russian nationalists and even beginning to
figure as a contender for the leadership of the Russia-Belarus Union.
CONCLUSION
A close reading of Western discussions on enlarging NATO suggests

that the decision to take the risk of negative Russian political fallout
from the Alliance's eastward expansion was based on three calculations.
First, the main forces driving Russian foreign policy are in govern-
ment, not in opposition. President Yeltsin has enough political influ-
ence to persuade the hardline opposition to support policies he has
adopted. Since the government's posture includes both resistance to
NATO expansion and interest in continued cooperation with the West,
Yeltsin can be pressured into a deal under which he would have to
accept the expansion in the framework of a continued partnership
with the West. In other words, getting Yeltsin to agree is decisive; after
this has been done, it is his business to make sure the opposition is
mollified.
Second, the fact that Russian public opinion has shown little interest
in the issue of NATO enlargement means that the potential for mobi-
lizing a Russian political backlash against NATO and the West in
general is limited. So the opposition can be mollified.
Third, extreme variants of a Russian backlash (such as using force
and other sanctions against neighbours trying to join NATO) are unre-
alistic, given the crisis of the Russian military and of the Russian state
in general. In fact, it is current Russian weakness that can be used as
a strong argument for enlarging NATO now; the stronger Russia gets,
the more effective will be its resistance.
These calculations are based on a narrow view of the politics of
Russian foreign policy. Each of them can be countered with the fol-
lowing arguments.
On the first point, the government is the main force in foreign policy,
but it has been moving towards a more conflictual posture vis-a-vis
the West, especially the United States. Russian nationalism is becoming
tougher, more aggrieved, and more preoccupied with the Western
threat. SoYeltsin will not be confronting the opposition in foreign-
policy matters, but rather striving for a consensus with it, which he
will need both to strengthen his rule and to drive harder bargains with
the West.
In rebuttal of the second point, it needs to be understood that
Russian public opinion is slowly changing. For one thing, Russian
"defence consciousness" has not evaporated but rather has receded
since the late 19805. A sense of danger from the outside, magnified by
deep insecurity about the conditions of life inside Russia, is likely to
grow as Russian elite debates on NATO draw public attention to the
massive geopolitical losses suffered by the Russian state in the past
decade. Another problem is that, as the security challenge becomes
associated in the public mind with the failures of Western-inspired and
supported reforms in Russia, more and more Russians may become
susceptible to the idea that "shock therapy," which devastated the
Russian economy, and NATO enlargement, which changes the balance
of power in Europe drastically against Russia, are integral parts of an
intrinsically hostile Western drive to put an end to Russia as a great
power and turn it into a raw material-producing colony. Finally, even
while the public remains relatively complacent about NATO, growing
segments of the Russian electorate vote for nationalist politicians who
do make much of Russia's growing problems with the overwhelmingly
superior West.
That leaves the issue of Russian backlash. The extreme options are
not the only options available to Moscow at the present time as it feels
a need to resist increasing Western pressure. The value of keeping
Russia in a non-coerced cooperative relationship with Western powers,

and the costs of losing it, should not be underestimated. Moscow's
inclination to challenge the West in defence of perceived Russian
national interests may have a significant negative effect on the inter-
national situation even in the short run, fuel an action-reaction process
in Russian-Western relations, and develop into a dangerous obsession
of the kind all too familiar from the decades of the Cold War. In
Russian society, such a momentum would create favourable political
conditions for a crash rearmament program, which would make
extreme options more feasible.
On the other hand, the NATO challenge may stimulate positive
developments in Russian politics and foreign policy. Consensus-build-
ing becomes essential. A sense that NATO is gaining influence at
Russia's expense in the near abroad has stimulated a certain rethinking
of Russian policies there. In 1997 Russia finally normalized its rela-
tions with Ukraine, began to show a more thoughtful and flexible
leadership in the cis, and offered security guarantees to Baltic states.
The NATO challenge has encouraged Russian diplomacy to start
actively working for expanded cooperation with a wide range of
partners - China, Japan, France, Arab, and Latin American states. At
the same time, Russia has continued to maintain normal relations with
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.
Indeed, it may be possible to contain the negative political fallout
in Russia over NATO enlargement, but, for that to happen, Western
governments, and especially the United States, must avoid the tempta-
tion of pressing its advantage - for instance, by liberally interpreting
the terms of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in its provisions regarding
NATO military deployments in the new member states, or by extending
NATO farther east. Such policies are likely to produce results exactly
opposite to those expected. Having won a political victory over a
Russia in crisis, the West now needs to prove to the Russians that their
security has not been undermined as a result, and that the country has
more to gain than lose from a continued partnership with the West.
CHAPTER TWELVE
The Atlantic Dimensions of

Central European Security
Andrds Balogh
With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, the bipolar system in international relations ceased to
exist. This abrupt phenomenon surprised Western political elites as
well as influential political think-tanks, which obviously had no prac-
tical plan to develop a new international political and security system
to replace the old one. Their whole world-view was built on the West's
relationship of confrontation and cooperation with the Russians, who,
within a few years, had gone from being formidable giants to pitiful
dwarves.
In this period of uncertainty and ambiguity, two security-related
developments proved to be decisive: the stubborn determination of
Germany and Chancellor Helmut Kohl to achieve German unification,
on the one hand, and the triumph of activism and globalism in the
United States that has strengthened American leadership in world
affairs, on the other. It is needless to cite the statements and actions
of those who wanted to perpetuate the American/Soviet-Russian dual-
ism or rejected American involvement in the European developments.
By now, it is indisputable that any European - and global - security
system can be based only on the continuously active role of the United
States and a strong, stable, and unified Germany.
For Hungary, as well as other Central European states, long-term
national security must be pursued in all-European frameworks. Central
Europe since the dismantlement of the Habsburg monarchy has been
a fragmented, vulnerable area, its twentieth-century history a series of
courageous but mainly lost battles against invaders and of glorious but
mainly futile aspirations for democracy, sovereignty, and economic
improvement. This area has a long history of being a zone of interest
that more powerful states and alliances acquired, ceded, or exchanged.
But this is only the military-strategic dimension. According to Central
Europeans, the area inhabited by Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians,

Slovenes, and Croats has always been no less an organic part of
Western civilization than other Central European countries like Ger-
many and Italy.
THREATS AND CHALLENGES
With regard to the threats and challenges to Central European security,

we have selected three major issues to be analysed. The first is the
potential threat coming from the fluid situation in and around Russia,
the second is the Yugoslavian crisis, and the third is so-called minority-
related conflicts.
Russian Uncertainties
The disintegration of the Soviet Union is a fait accompli and, at least
for the foreseeable future, irreversible. The decision to be separated
from Russia seems to be final for all former Soviet republics with the
exception of Belarus.
The case of the three Baltic states is clear; the sovereignty and
independence of these countries enjoy massive domestic support and
worldwide recognition. Despite the strong historical, cultural, reli-
gious, and economic links between Russia and Ukraine, there is a
sufficient basis to state that Ukraine will be able to develop its distinct
national identity and to overcome the destabilizing cultural and reli-
gious antagonisms within the nation and to halt the recent economic
deterioration. Ukrainian independence is the most essential counter-
weight against any attempt to restore a Russian or Soviet empire. The
Moldavian, Caucasian, and Central Asian newly independent states,
whether they are ruled by former Soviet bureaucrats or not, would in
all probability resist any attempt to reintegrate them into a Russian or
neo-Soviet empire. Belarus is, at the moment, an exceptional case. The
situation is quite unusual: the leadership of a new nation is doing
everything to make the newly granted independence meaningless and
irrelevant.
In all the newly independent successor states there are two factors
that may pave the way to a restoration of Russian influence. One is
economic hardship, caused not only by a transition to market economy
but also by the destruction of old economic ties. The other factor is
the presence of large Russian minorities in many of the former Soviet
republics. Clearly, some degree of economic recovery and democratic
treatment of the Russian minorities should be the basic element of the
consolidation of the newly independent states of the former Soviet
Union.
Russia has lost its outer empire, that is, the member states of the
Warsaw Pact. It has also lost the political, ideological, and military
influence that it long exercised in many parts of the world. This
influence has disappeared in the Third World as well as in revolution-
ary and leftist movements. A nationalist and capitalist Russia cannot
be an alternative model for various anti-Western forces.
Russia itself would constitute the greatest danger to Europe and the
world through a possible weakening of central authority and through
uncontrolled and uncontrollable economic, social, and political devel-
opment. Contrary to generally held perceptions, the real threat may
come not from strong fundamentalist leadership (in the context of
security, the concrete forms, directions, ideologies, and slogans of
fundamentalism are irrelevant) but from the lack of, or shortcomings
of, a stable state structure and from weakening discipline in the armed
forces. The apocalyptic vision of starvation, epidemics, and growing
criminality cannot entirely be ruled out. And one cannot forget that
Russia continues to be a nuclear superpower. The more likely devel-
opment in Russia is, however, a long and slow process of economic
transformation in which former top-level bureaucrats and managers
will constitute a significant part of the entrepreneurial class 'currently
in formation. Production and consumption will decline or stagnate for
a period of time. The new Russia will live with severe social tensions,
its democratic institutions and practices developing slowly and with
occasional setbacks. It is likely that both democratic and authoritarian
regimes will help the expansion of the market economy. The Russia
described in this scenario would be not one of the two superpowers
but definitely a great power nonetheless, with immense human and
natural resources as well as sizeable military strength and influence.
War and Genocide in the Former Yugoslavia

The continuous South Slav crisis has provoked and continues to pro-
voke fear and uncertainty. Yugoslavian developments tragically
revealed that the post-Second World War European security system,
based on a sophisticated balance of power between the two blocs, no
longer exists. More precisely, its important elements survive but these
are insufficient for dealing with the entirely new security challenges
which Europe is facing. The traditional bipolar system suppressed
nation-state interests for the benefit of strengthened bloc solidarity.
The leadership of the superpowers made the territorial integrity of
states a sacrosanct doctrine and ruled out any armed conflicts on the
European continent. According to the commonly held opinion of the
Cold War era, an armed conflict in Europe would necessarily and
immediately lead to global nuclear confrontation. The special status
of Yugoslavia should be understood in this context. It was also an

important constituent part of the bipolar European and global balance.
As a result of the dismantlement of the bipolar system, Yugoslavia
lost its raison d'etre. The country was a product of the First World
War, when German and anti-Austro-Hungarian sentiment led to a
short-lived alliance of Croat and Serb nationalists. The artificiality of
the alliance was made evident during the Second World War, when
Croats and Serbs assumed their accustomed pose of mutual hostility,
and in the events of the 19908 that brought about Yugoslavia's break-
up. Today, many question the role played by certain foreign powers in
encouraging and supporting those who claimed independence for the
former member states of Yugoslavia. Foreign forces certainly did play
a significant part. But, contrary to many analyses, we are of the
opinion that the foreign influences involved did not render substantial
support to the secessionists. All that they were responsible for was the
reduction, and later the withdrawal, of support to the centralists in
Belgrade. Furthermore, after 1990, foreign powers did not work for
the termination of the Serb domination of Yugoslavia; they merely lost
any interest in encouraging and maintaining it in the name of Yugo-
slavia's territorial integrity.
After the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia was no longer a part of
a delicate balance of power. Consequently, the Yugoslavian crisis
became an almost purely local crisis. The conflicts and wars among
the ex-Yugoslavian states and nations no longer had a global dimen-
sion. Instead, like classical Third World conflicts, it was isolated from
the rest of the continent. The reactions of the external powers, though
certainly not corresponding with certain basic humanitarian principles,
were, from the point of view of European security, rational. Their
inactivity and later their rather limited and hesitant involvement was
based on the well-grounded conviction that there was no danger of
the inferno spreading to other regions.
According to our assessment, two conclusions can be drawn: first,
the Yugoslavian crisis was basically a local conflict and therefore
relatively easy to isolate; and second, the possibility of massive armed
involvement by Yugoslavia's neighbours in its conflict, and of Yugoslav
military actions against its neighbours, was always minimal. In short,
the Yugoslavian conflict was not associated with an immediate danger
to the security of Central Europe.
The Yugoslavian crisis had a great many dangerous aspects but,
without doubt, the complexity of the forces at work in Bosnia have
been the most obvious and the most difficult to handle. European
realpolitik was not able to reach any settlement for four years and
without even a fragile peace it has been impossible to persuade all the
warring parties to come to some compromise with each other. Finally,

relative calm has been restored by the first u.s.-led out-of-area NATO
operation. It was u.s. foreign policy that worked out and implemented
the Dayton Accords. This agreement may easily be criticized for its
approval of the de facto semi-independence of three entities that had
come into existence partly as a result of aggression and ethnic cleansing.
But, to be fair, one has to recognize that, in the given conditions, this
agreement has achieved the cessation of a long-lasting and extremely
cruel war.
Despite the unique character of the South Slav developments, the
entire Balkan conflict should be analysed in a wider international
context. An extended Balkan conflict would provide an opportunity
for certain external destabilizing forces to interfere into the affairs of
the Central European region. Unforeseeable developments in Russia
and in the Islamic world are security risks that need to be taken into
consideration when formulating a long-term security policy for the
former Yugoslavia and the entire Balkan area. Consequently, Central
Europeans consider the presence of NATO, and through NATO, that of
the u.s. peacekeepers to be a necessary measure to discourage the
above-mentioned destabilizing forces. The most essential lesson of the
Yugoslavian developments is that no credible security system exists in
Europe without NATO and NATO cannot function without a strong
u.s. commitment to Europe.
Minority-related Conflicts
As to security-related ethnic conflicts, many observers, mainly non-
Central Europeans, who draw their conclusions from the Yugoslavian
crisis and the loud rhetoric of certain states, voice the strong conviction
that ethnic tensions constitute the most important threat to the security
of the European continent. To our mind, this hypothesis is wrong since
the Yugoslavian developments are unique and isolated; the existing
minority problems of Central Europe have not led and cannot lead to
any military confrontation between the states of the region. This
statement does not mean that minority problems are not serious and
do not deserve special attention. However, one must remember that
all Central European states recognize existing European borders, all
national minorities of the region formulate their demands in accor-
dance with the accepted European Union (EU) principles and practices,
.and none of them has ever resorted to terrorism or to any forms of
violence. Therefore, Central European minority issues are part of the
broader framework of democratic values and human rights and should
not exclusively be connected with security threats.
We strongly criticize the concept (even the term) of minority-related

conflicts, since it gives the impression that the mere existence of
national minorities is the cause of international conflicts. In fact,
analysis of the unsettled issues in Central Europe shows that the
tensions and conflicts are, in most cases, generated by blind and
aggressive nationalism initiated and supported by states that identify
themselves with the strongest nation and treat a part of their citizens
who happen to belong to a national minority as a second-rank group
of people.
The definition of the most significant new risks and challenges the
world has to face is not easy but it is definitely not the national
minorities who constitute the main danger. The Founding Act on
Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the
Russian Federation gives a good list of the genuine risks and chal-
lenges, including "aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human
rights and of the rights of people belonging to national minorities and
unresolved territorial dispute, which cause a threat to all common
peace, prosperity and stability."1 Bilateral relations are important ele-
ments of a new security system. In Central Europe, where states and
nations do not coincide and in many cases national minorities belong
linguistically and culturally to groups that may be dominant in neigh-
bouring countries, and where in the last hundred years international
borders have changed frequently and never as a result of a democratic
decision making, the creation of "good neighbourhoods" is the most
essential requirement for regional and continent-wide stability.
Any lasting reconciliation in the region should be based on two
fundamental principles. The first is unconditional recognition of the
present international borders; the second is unconditional respect for
national minority rights, including free use of minority languages in
educational and administrative institutions, as well as the tolerance of
- and, further, the encouragement of - various national minority
entities that express their political interests in accordance with accepted
European norms and practices.
SECURITY OPTIONS
Having regained their full sovereignty, Central Europeans had, in

theory, a great many security options. The first was radically reforming
the Warsaw Pact to set up a new defence and security system, which
would have maintained continuity while at the same time diminishing
the overwhelming Russian dominance. This option has definitely and
192. Impact on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe
without any hesitation been rejected by the people and political elites
of the region. Soviet hegemony was so bitterly resented that no credible
political group has been willing to advocate reform of the Warsaw
Pact. One must not forget that just the fear of a Russian imperial
revival has prompted Central Europeans to rediscover their Western
links.
The second option was some kind of national self-reliance. Propo-
nents of this idea were motivated by national historical tragedies and
humiliations and did not place any trust in the good will of foreigners.
Their option is open to different interpretations, the most popular
among them being neutrality. The appeal of neutrality is understand-
able, for over the course of many centuries Central Europe was
attacked repeatedly and conquered from different directions. Neutral-
ity, too, is associated with the well-known success stories of Austria,
Sweden, and Finland. Why shift towards NATO, almost immediately
after liberation from the Warsaw Pact? Is there anybody, near or far
away, who wants to attack any of the Central European countries?
In Hungary and in some other countries of the region, political
experts and the public have not been impressed by this philosophy.
Most parliamentary parties have rejected the concept of self-reliance
or neutrality.
The third option was to form institutions providing for strong
regional cooperation in the field of defence and security. This idea had
some historical justification and was built on both Kossuth's revolu-
tionary vision and memories of the peace and progress that prevailed
during the era of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. However, the
Central European states did not see much advantage in close cooper-
ation; they were aware of the economic, political, and emotional
impossibility of setting up an efficient regional security system. The
publics of the Central European countries have refused to create a
security system parallel to the existing Atlantic one. In Poland, Hun-
gary, and the Czech Republic, there is widespread anxiety that any
institutionalized form of regional-security cooperation would put seri-
ous obstacles in the way of admission to the Atlantic security system.
There is a general impression that Central Europe lacks cohesion:
the population of this relatively small area is divided by tradition,
culture, language, and religion. Central Europeans, it is said, are not
capable of creating firm cooperative structures; they talk about Euro-
pean unity but have actually destroyed even the existing forms of their
own integration and, in some cases, their own multinational, federal
states. We are obliged to admit that this image is not merely a fabri-
cation of ill-informed Western scholars or of selfish politicians who
want to block the enlargement of the European institutions. Neverthe-
less, the case of Central European regional cooperation is not entirely

hopeless. The historical traditions of Central Europe cannot be iden-
tified solely with the constant triumph of disruptive and isolationist
forces. All of the Central European nations were, for a thousand years,
an organic part of European culture, economy, and politics. Hungari-
ans, Slovaks, Croats, and Romanians for centuries lived in the frame-
work of the Kingdom of Hungary, later with Austrians and Czechs in
the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, the traditions of multinational and
multireligious cohabitation in Central Europe are not shorter or
weaker than in the Western half of the continent. Furthermore, the
initiation of the Visegrad group (consisting of the three countries who
first asked to be admitted into NATO, Poland, Hungary, and Czecho-
slovakia), the Central European Initiative, the Central European Free
Trade Agreement, and many trans- border regional-cooperation instru-
ments show that the idea of Central European cooperation exists in
the region. Hence, reservations about and objections to the deepening
of regional-cooperation forms cannot be explained by xenophobic
nationalism alone. They should rather be explained by the fact that
political leaders in the Central European countries wish to avoid giving
the impression that they are thinking of an alternative to existing Euro-
Atlantic institutions. These states emphasize that the regional or sub-
regional frameworks they have established do not have any defence or
security aspects. Nevertheless, the very existence of various instruments
of regional and subregional cooperation is a valuable feature of the
European security architecture. Subregional cooperation, moreover,
would acquire a special meaning if certain states of the region were
admitted to NATO while others remained on a waiting list.
The fourth and most broadly supported security option of Central
Europeans is acceptance of the NATO umbrella. All influential Central
European political forces and all the Central European parliaments
and governments have formally declared their aim to attain full mem-
bership for their nations in NATO. Do they feel a direct or immediate
external threat? According to all assessments, none of the Central
European countries is exposed to any direct or immediate military
threat and most political forces of the region agree with this view.
Though pessimistic scenarios do not exclude the revival of Russian
imperial ambitions, the main motivations behind the Central European
scramble for NATO membership are not linked to military insecurity.
Public opinion is much more concerned with the hardships associated
with economic change, and NATO is seen as promising a significant
improvement of living conditions.
For the Central European public, membership in NATO is also of
symbolic significance. Accession to NATO is a political act symbolizing
their commitment to the Euro-Atlantic community. In the eyes of the

Central European political elite, NATO is an instrument that will help
realize their countries' primary aspiration: reintegration into Europe.
First of all, they want full integration into the EU. In their eyes, the
EU and NATO are interrelated and the only efficient security institution
in Europe is NATO.
Sometimes Western politicians express their surprise that Central and
Eastern Europeans want to join NATO under the new strategic context,
when no external power seems to threaten them. We think that Central
European considerations are the same as Western European ones. They,
for the same reasons, may wonder why Western Europeans, under the
new strategic realities, need to remain in NATO. Western and Eastern
arguments are not that different.
Many experts express concern about the international political,
strategic, financial, and institutional implications and consequences of
NATO enlargement. It is, to be sure, not a simple and easy process.
However, we cannot neglect the possible and very negative implications
and consequences that non-enlargement would hold for the develop-
ment of democratic institutions and for the consolidation of market
economies in Central and Eastern Europe. It would be useful to try to
estimate the costs of non-enlargement to the West.
In the political as well as in the academic discussions over NATO
enlargement, there are frequent references (not only by Russian speak-
ers) to the American commitment — at the time of the Bush-Gorbachev
talks on German unification - not to admit former members of the
Warsaw Pact into NATO. For those who really know the text of the
treaty on the final settlement with Germany,2 this argument is incom-
prehensible since the document does not contain any such obligation.
THE RUSSIAN FACTOR
It will be necessary for an enlarged NATO to come to some arrangement

with those states that do not intend or are not able to join NATO. Even
an enlarged NATO will certainly never cover the entire continent and
the dangers of a possible new East-West division line must therefore
be avoided.
In this respect, the role and function of Russia is pre-eminent. One
has to face two crucial facts: Russia is not and will not become a
member of NATO; and without Russia's cooperation a common and
comprehensive security system cannot be built. A good working rela-
tionship between NATO and Russia is an essential stabilizing factor for
Central and Eastern Europeans, and even more significant in a global
context. The successful extension of NATO into Central Europe and a
strategic partnership between NATO and Russia are the two basic
pillars of European stability.
Is Russia ready to accept this role? The latest developments of the
Atlantic/Russian relationship demonstrate that strong political forces
are ready to give up their stubborn resistance to the enlargement of
NATO to the former Warsaw Pact members, if they attain a clear
Western undertaking to allow continous and substantial involvement
by Russia in the global political, economic, and security structures.
Frequent Russian rejections of the u.s.-led "unipolar world" and
Russian efforts to get diplomatic support for the concept of "multipo-
larity of international relations," not only from China and quite a few
developing countries but even from France, cannot be considered as a
sign of meaningful alternatives in Russian foreign policy.
Russia would undeniably be able to fashion an alternative foreign-
security policy. It may try to return to self-imposed isolation or take
the initiative to build up close alliances with certain Asian powers, but
the price would be high. Surely, an anti-Western or non-Western Rus-
sian orientation would put an end to any progress towards a market
economy and pluralistic democracy and would further disrupt a vul-
nerable economic and financial system. By dramatically changing the
dominant pro-Western course, the recently emerged Russian elite
would commit suicide. It is undoubtedly significant, too, that the
Russian public does not seem to be involved in debates over NATO
enlargement. According to Russian public-opinion polls, only 18 per
cent of respondents think that Hungary's admission to NATO would
pose a threat to Russian security; 46 per cent believe that this does
not threaten them; and 54 per cent think that the issue is an internal
affair of Hungary. There is not sufficient data to analyse the aims and
strength of the Russian opposition.
In this context, the decision by NATO and Russia to sign the Found-
ing Act is of extraordinary significance. If NATO and Russia will take
seriously the statement that they "do not consider each other as
adversary" and that they "intend to develop, on the basis of common
interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring
partnership," an important element of the new European and global
security system will be laid down. The main merit of the Founding Act
is that NATO can preserve its military-defence capability, make further
progress towards institutional reform, and admit new members with-
out creating tensions with Russia. For prospective Central European
members of NATO, the Russian role in the enlargement process has
always been crucial. Polish, Czech, and Hungarian opinion has con-
sistently rejected any form of Russian veto over their joining NATO.
The Founding Act seems to be satisfactory for them; the creation of
the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which "will provide a

mechanism for consolidation, coordination and, to the maximum
extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action
with respects to security issues of common interests,"3 does not give
Russia the right of veto. Our understanding of the document of the
Founding Act is that Russia has given its consent to the enlargement
of NATO to the territory of former Warsaw Pact states.
The other concern of the Central European prospective members has
been the deployment by NATO of nuclear weapons on their territory.
None of them opposed the idea of such deployment; some of them
have openly advocated it. Their motivation was simple: they wanted
to make it plain that second-rank membership was unacceptable and
they stood ready to undertake all the responsibilities expected of full-
fledged NATO members. Since their acceptance of nuclear-weapons
deployment did not derive from any special enthusiasm for weapons
of mass destruction on their territory, the emphatic sentence of the
Founding Act need not be considered by them as a Western concession
contrary to their interest: "The members of NATO reiterate that they
have not intention, no plan, no reason to deploy nuclear weapons to
the territory of the new members, nor any need to change any aspects
of NATO'S nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any
future need to do so."4
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Phase II Candidates:
A Political or Strategic Solution?
Stanislav ]. Kirschbaum
Of all the institutions created in Europe after the Second World War,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), dedicated to collective
defence and security, and the European Union (EU), dedicated to
economic and political cooperation, are the two that have the greatest
potential, in the wake of the fall of the Iron Curtain, not only to
maintain security and stability in Europe but also to contribute to the
process of European unification. Both organizations have accepted
eastward enlargement as inevitable, despite misgivings about the effects
that expansion could have on democratic development in some Central
European countries.1
But carrying out the process of enlargement has proven to be
extremely complex, leading to NATO'S decision in July 1997 to create
Phase II candidates in addition to the countries selected for the first
round of enlargement. At that time, it was decided that some states
were not ready to become members of the organization in Phase I, that
political and/or strategic circumstances demanded that they join at a
later date.
Some observers have been tempted to use NATO'S past enlargements
as precedents to explain or indeed to justify this differentiation. Greece,
Turkey, West Germany, and Spain had joined the organization in 195z,
1955, and 1982 respectively, strengthening it politically and militarily
at the height of the Cold War. These additions were made on the basis
of the West's own political and strategic criteria and involved only the
West's segment of the continent. In the post-Communist era, however,
the decision to enlarge is based on considerations of quite a different
order: the objectives are still the security and stability of all of Europe,
but they now bear on the former Soviet bloc countries in particular,
especially since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, the
differentiation between aspiring new members has repercussions at a
number of levels: it affects Europe and the process of European

unification; it affects the definition and composition of NATO; and it
affects the candidates. We propose to examine these three areas. We
will also try to determine whether the differentiation between candi-
dates is a political or a strategic solution.
A UNIFIED EUROPE
Since the end of the Second World War, the idea of European unifica-
tion has made steady headway. Today, it is the backdrop against which
the future of NATO and the EU is being played out. Paradoxically, it
comes from the part of the continent - Western Europe - which was
the source of the division of Europe. This split dates back to the
Enlightenment, as Larry Wolff has argued in his important book
Inventing Eastern Europe.* It held firm during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries; the triumph of Marxism in the eastern half of the
continent after the Second World War was only one of its more extreme
manifestations.3 However, the ideological competition that marked the
Cold War also spurred Western political leaders and intellectuals to
seek to overcome the division of the continent.
The first moves towards European unification were made in the
wake of the Prague coup of February 1948, primarily in the spheres
of defence and security, with the creation of NATO and the Western
European Union (WEU) and later the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); economic cooperation, with the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and then the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC); and political cooperation, with the
transformation of the EEC into the European Community (EC) and
then the European Union (Eu). 4 To be sure, the process of unification
has not yet been completed and there are still many obstacles which
need to be overcome, but it is undeniable that great strides have been
made. Moreover, all these institutions have created what Andrew
Cottey calls the "Western security community,"5 which since 1990 has
become a powerful magnet for the former Communist countries.
There were similar attempts based on Marxist ideology in the social-
ist camp with the Communist Information Bureau (cominform), the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and the Warsaw
Pact. While these organizations did not extend beyond the borders of
the Soviet bloc, the expectation was that they would eventually encom-
pass all of Europe, in accordance with the principles of dialectical and
historical materialism. Their failure in relation to Western unifying
institutions spurred not only Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts to trans-
form the Soviet bloc6 but also his European vision, which was expressed
Phase II Candidates 199
in the phrase "Europe is our common home."7 However, once the

process of transformation began in Central Europe, it escaped Gorba-
chev's control and led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, COMECON
(COMINFORM had been dissolved in April 1956 by Nikita Khrush-
chev), and eventually the Soviet Union.8 Thus, the ideological division
of the post-war period came to an end. But it did not extinguish the
idea of a united Europe on either side. On the contrary, this was the
time to expand the process begun in Western Europe; there was a
continent-wide consensus.
The disintegration of the Communist bloc took the world by surprise
and left people at a loss as to what exactly should happen next. It also
created a situation in which, because of the demands and difficulties
caused by post-Communist transformation, Western Europe was left
holding the ball in the unification process. Certain events accelerated
the process; as the war in the former Yugoslavia indicated, the new
political situation in Central Europe demanded a new security archi-
tecture with mechanisms to contain and resolve local conflicts and
prevent them from spreading. Thus, in the wake of the fall of Com-
munism, the former Communist states of Central Europe set their
sights on joining NATO and the EU, which therefore became the driving
institutions behind a new European policy and the unification process.
Moreover, there was a positive attitude towards NATO, as one Amer-
ican observer has noted: "NATO was used to provide security, democ-
racy, and free-market economies for Europe after World War II, so it
can be used to do the same for the rest of Europe after the Cold War."9
NATO was involved indirectly - not to say surreptitiously - in the
process of European unification.
Following the July 1990 meeting of the Atlantic Council, NATO
began to consider the consequences of the end of the Cold War. The
statement that came out of this meeting issued a challenge to "rethink
Europe." One senior NATO official commented: "The task the Decla-
ration describes is the reordering and reorganizing of a Europe that is
seen as one geographical and cultural entity ... The Europe which the
London Declaration envisages is one of partnership."10 As the latter
phrase indicates, the concept was still vague. In fact, the statement's
formulation left little doubt about the lack of any conceptualization
and planning for a unification process of any kind, both within the
Alliance and in Western chanceries.
On the other hand, it was clear to most Central European countries
that the end of the Cold War, the fall of Communism, and later the
events in the former Yugoslavia left them with only one option: to join
European institutions. The main issue was the process by which this
option was to be achieved. The first move was made by three countries.
At a summit held in Visegrad, Hungary, in February 1991, the leaders

of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia indicated their desire to
achieve "total integration into the European political, economic, secu-
rity, and legislative order ... [to] harmonize their efforts to foster
cooperation and close relations with European institutions... [and to]
consult on questions concerning their security."11 The Visegrad group
was born, the contours of a European collective-security system were
traced, and the outlines of a unification process were suggested: the
eastward enlargement of institutions such as NATO and the EU. It must
be recognized that a differentiation policy was also implicit in the
Visegrad approach.
NATO'S initial reaction was negative, particularly to the suggestion
that the Alliance expand into Central Europe. In a spring 1991 article
in the organization's official magazine, Trevor Taylor gave seven rea-
sons why enlargement "would create more problems than it would
solve."IZ However, it was clear that NATO would have to take a
position on the expressed "interest in becoming associated with NATO,
with the three states of Central Europe - Poland, the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic (CSFR) and Hungary - having been the most seri-
ously involved."13 At the Rome summit held on 7-8 November 1991,
the heads of state and government of NATO members gave their first
response, setting out five goals for the accession of Central European
countries and defining the Alliance as "a willing partner in their desire
to draw closer to the West, and overcome a sense of isolation and
insecurity."14 The Central European countries and the Baltic states
were invited to "join the allies in an institutionalized framework of
consultations. This will take the form of regular meetings at NATO
headquarters."15 It was also at this summit that the Alliance published
its Strategic Concept, which reaffirmed NATO'S fundamental concepts,
particularly the transatlantic link, the need for a strategic balance in
Europe, and recognition that security is based on political, economic,
social, and environmental considerations, in addition to military
factors.
The summit made the first moves towards opening up the Alliance
but not towards enlarging it. These moves were followed by the
creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in Decem-
ber 1991 and, after the Brussels summit of February 1994, the Part-
nership for Peace (pfp). All of the former Communist bloc countries
agreed to join these two institutions primarily because, as Manfred
Worner observed, the pfp was also "linked to the issue of NATO
enlargement"; he added, however, that "the Allies reached a consensus
last autumn (1993) that there should be no immediate enlargement.
Such a move would risk creating new divisions in Europe, which
ultimately would harm rather than aid the security of the Central and
Eastern European States and of Europe as a whole."16 This reluctance
to consider enlargement stemmed from the fact that, since 1991, the
challenges posed by the political changes and the war in the former
Yugoslavia were forcing the Atlantic Alliance to attend to regional-
security issues.' 7
The idea was, however, on the table and in December 1994 the NACC
authorized a study of the question; the results were to be available in
September 1995. Also in 1994, the first NATO Participation Act was
introduced in the U.S. Congress. It dealt with four Central European
countries: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (the
latter two had become members of the Visegrad group after the
dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993). The NATO Participation Act
of 1995 applied to the same four countries. However, Slovakia was
dropped from the list in the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of
1996, which was passed by Congress in July 1996, confirming the
existence of the category of second phase candidates. On 10 December
1996 NATO decided to invite Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic
to apply for membership at the Madrid summit, scheduled for July
1997. At the same time, NATO declared that it intended to "extend
further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to
assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership." 18 Taken
together, the decisions made at Madrid justify NATO Secretary General
Javier Solana's conclusion that "the new NATO" is "much better geared
to manage Europe's long-term evolution."19
But the fact that the first phase of enlargement was confined to three
countries suggests that very narrow criteria were applied and a very
limited process was launched. This NATO decision, supported by the
U.S. Congress, has important implications for the process of European
unification. Yet it is only one element among others. It must be
recognized that two other institutions, the CSCE and the EU, are
involved in the unification question. At the beginning of the post-Cold
War period, the CSCE, to which the former Communist countries had
belonged since its inception, had appeared to be one of the institutions
likely to play a fundamental role in Europe, a role not confined to
security matters alone.20 (In 1995 the CSCE became the Organization
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE.) However, like NATO
before the creation of the Implementation Force (IFOR), the signing of
the Dayton Accords in December 1995, and the creation of the Stabi-
lization Force (SFOR), it fell victim to the war in the former Yugoslavia
and lost credibility: "The events in the former Yugoslavia revealed not
only the weaknesses of the institutions which should have facilitated
crisis management, the prime task of NATO and the WEU, but also the
total absence of instruments of preventive security, the CSCE having

clearly failed at the task."21
The EU is the other European institution which the former Commu-
nist countries have been seeking to join since the end of the Cold War.
But it is engaged in a process of change and the question of new
members is only one of the many problems it must resolve.22 This is
why the EU has been more cautious than NATO in setting a timetable
for admitting new members and establishing a process. In 1992 the
EU offered the former Communist countries the opportunity to become
associate members in order to encourage democratization and eco-
nomic transformation in those countries and maintain their desire to
become full members. Since then, these countries have been working
closely with EU bodies to prepare for full membership. It is a daunting
task, as one German study indicates: "Four related factors must be
present for the EU to expand eastward: the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe must be prepared to adjust to the EU to a greater
extent; from the political point of view, the Union must, on its side,
be ready to create the conditions for eastward enlargement with inter-
nal reforms and internal compromises between conflicting interests;
the process of integration must be organized into defined stages in time
and access groups; and the EU must be further developed through the
process of differentiated integration." 23
Today, the EU and NATO are the two driving forces in the process
of European unification, particularly since they accepted, under pres-
sure from German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the principle of parallel
expansion of the two organizations. The Madrid decision strengthened
the linkage: "The broadening of NATO'S membership, and eventually
that of the EU, are separate, autonomous, but complementary pro-
cesses: both are important elements of a wider set of approaches to
ensure a Europe which is peaceful, undivided and democratic."14 It
must, however, be recognized that it is the EU'S objectives, as set out
in the Maastricht Treaty, that define the main elements of European
unification. As Yves Doutriaux has observed, "the treaty signed at
Maastricht consolidates a 'political union' and an 'economic and
monetary union'... The European Union encompasses and integrates
the results of the Conference on Political Union and the Conference
on the European Economic Union." 25 The treaty was the product of
different visions of a unified Europe26 and the EU'S development since
then has not been free of problems related to the organization's objec-
tives. According to an analysis by Germany's Bertelsmann Foundation,
"individual interests, shortsighted proprietary calculations and
national egoism are superimposed on the unique project of European
unification." 27 Yet, in the view of one French analyst, there are also
Phase II Candidates 2.03
promising prospects: "In the coming decade, the process of European

construction will go through a period of intense transformation related
essentially to the enlargement of the Union to nearly thirty members
... It is clear that the face of Europe in the year 2005 will have little
common with the Europe of today."28
It is difficult - some would say impossible - for the EU, and even
more so for NATO, to foresee the outcome of the unification process;
nevertheless, the uncertainty has not dampened the desire of the former
Communist countries to join the two institutions. This is an indication
of the importance they attach to unification and, therefore, their
implicit desire that the unification process not be aborted or postponed
indefinitely. There has also been a recognition in parliamentary and
public debate in these countries of the fact that unification cannot be
accomplished just by enlarging European institutions; there must also
be public support for and participation in the objective and the process
(in Slovakia there was a referendum, which we discuss below). The
difficulties that attended ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in a
number of member states had indicated what can happen when there
are problems, real or perceived, surrounding political objectives. These
referendums were also a judgment on the unification process estab-
lished by the Maastricht Treaty. The challenge of European unification
resides, therefore, in the objectives as much as the process.
Some observers think that "in the process of building Europe, it can
be expected that the pace of integration will be differentiated ... and
among the patterns of differentiation in the Europe of tomorrow,
variable geometry is the most pertinent."29 If this is the case, the
process remains to be defined. Aside from questions related to the
timetable for admitting new members and the admission criteria, there
is also the question of acceptance of the process. Only when the process
has been accepted by all EU members and candidate states will it be
possible for the project to proceed, even if the final objective is not
always clear and is likely to yield a sui generis definition of European
unity.30 The decision to enlarge NATO eastward, and especially to create
the category of second-phase candidates, has added new challenges to
the process, notably the differentiation of candidates.
Differentiation raises a number of problems. What will happen if
expansion is not parallel because NATO is, for the moment, ahead of
the EU? Two consequences, which go to the heart of the unification
process, are foreseeable. First, as Martin Walker wrote in the Guardian
before the Madrid decision, "without EU membership, the NATO mem-
bers of eastern Europe face a fate as grimly impoverished and second-
rate as that of Turkey, a NATO member kept out of the European
club."31 The second consequence, which stems from the first, relates
zo4 Impact on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe
to the Phase II candidate states, which would be relegated to the

waiting room, their voices ignored in the debate on unification and
their chances of development significantly diminished, despite the
assurances given at Madrid. Walker correctly suggests that "enlarging
NATO is a poor second to enlarging the European Union."31 The
greatest dilemma presented by European unification could well be
caused by the delinkage of NATO and the EU. As a result, Phase II
states may conclude that membership in NATO will yield scant benefits
and that they would do better to devote their efforts to joining the EU.
In this event, the process of European unification could suffer a serious
setback.
If, on the other hand, expansion does proceed on a parallel basis,
Phase II states may still conclude that they are being sidelined to some
extent in both the discussion on the future of Europe and the process
of unification. They would feel they had been left hanging in the
process of creating a new security architecture based on NATO and the
enlargement of the EU, even if only temporarily, and they might seek
other solutions for their security and development. They might also
consider their odds of joining the EU to be still longer. All things
considered, their future prospects would depend on the form European
unification takes, the process, and the agreements between the EU and
NATO.
With the creation of Phase II candidates, the unification of Europe
has become a still more complex process than before; at this stage, its
main features are differentiation and variable geometry. Unification
may also find itself at the mercy of the second-round candidates later,
given the choices with which they will be confronted after the first
phase of expansion. All the guarantees that the process will continue
are not enough: they will need to agree to participate. The Phase II
candidates are therefore not without importance, not only for the
future of European unification but also for the future of NATO.
DEFINITION AND COMPOSITION OF NATO
NATO'S eastward enlargement is only one aspect of the redefinition of

the organization which has been under way since the end of the Cold
War. According to Alyson J.K. Bailes, NATO is "reinventing itself in a
typically workaday, piecemeal fashion" and is moving towards a new
synthesis.33 The other important elements of this redefinition include
France's proposals in the sphere of military cooperation; the demands
to make the "Eurodefence" capacity within the Atlantic framework
more operational; the challenges related to the IFOR missions in Bos-
nia; implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force concept; and
the reform of NATO'S military command structure. What NATO stands

to lose through its piecemeal approach, in Bailes's view, is "the potent
synergy between these different processes of change."34
One secondary disturbance effect of the way enlargement is being
implemented could be that this synergy is undermined because of the
Phase II candidates. The report on this question submitted to the
member states in September 1995 constituted a thorough study and
"an exercise in clarification, where all aspects of the Alliance - such
as the obligations and commitments of members, or the nature of their
participation in military structures and collective-defence arrangements
- are described in detail."35 However, it includes neither a timetable
nor a list of potential Phase I candidates nor specific criteria for
accession. Its six chapters set out eight main points related to enlarge-
ment,36 none of which addresses the question of Phase II candidates.
All candidate countries were urged to explore their intended contribu-
tion to NATO'S collective defence "through bilateral dialogue prior to
accession negotiations."37
The decision made in Madrid was influenced by a number of factors.
The choice of Phase II candidates was made on the basis of NATO'S
strategic objectives in the enlargement process and also on the basis
of selection criteria. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has had four
main strategic objectives: preserving the Alliance's effectiveness; sup-
porting the process of integration in Europe; avoiding a new division
of Europe; and consolidating democratic reforms in former members
of the Warsaw Pact. There was never any consensus on the hierarchy
among these objectives, and without consensus it was difficult to set
admission criteria. Moreover, these criteria were related to which
approach was taken towards enlargement. According to RAND research-
ers, there were three approaches: evolutionary expansion, promoting
stability, and strategic response.38 Each entailed a different hierarchy
of strategic objectives for enlargement.
The first, evolutionary expansion, emphasized not only the economic
and political development of the former Communist countries but also
recognition of the fact that there was no immediate threat to their
security. Therefore, their future would be secured by membership in
the EU rather than NATO and for this reason they should be admitted
into the EU before or at least at the same time as NATO. In this
approach, strategic and military criteria were secondary to political
and economic criteria, particularly the issues of democratic rule, eco-
nomic development, minority rights, the absence of territorial claims,
and civilian control of the military.39 In addition to minimizing Russia's
reaction, this approach placed the responsibility for accession on the
peoples and governments themselves rather than on NATO. In the short
2,o6 Impact on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe
term, the question of Phase II candidates was seen as primarily a

domestic political issue for these states, related more to their demo-
cratic development than to any perceived need to join NATO immedi-
ately. Enlargement was no longer a priority and the organization would
be free to attend to other matters of concern. A factor that could have
disrupted the required synergy was thus eliminated.
The second approach, promoting stability, was a response to the
perceived "security vacuum" in Central Europe in the wake of the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Starting from the necessary link
between democracy and security, this approach proposed to expand
NATO in the near future to countries that felt this vacuum particularly
keenly and/or where democratic development was well advanced. The
admission of new members into the EU was to be put off until later.
Strategic interests, a democratic government, the absence of territorial
claims, and minority rights were the main criteria for selecting coun-
tries for admission. This approach was closely linked to NATO'S con-
ception of defence and to the perception that Russia would react quite
strongly to enlargement. The choice of Phase II countries was to be
based primarily on strategic considerations; in view of their proximity
to Russia and the desire to avoid further provoking Moscow, the three
Baltic countries would automatically be included in this category.
It must be recognized that this approach had a geopolitical and
geographic logic which NATO expansion limited to three countries did
not: it created a contiguous zone stretching from the Baltic Sea to the
Black Sea, giving NATO a presence in the Balkans and still greater
influence in the region. It would force NATO to examine thoroughly
the consequences of enlargement for its military doctrine and its com-
mand structure, in addition to the financial and military consequences
for the organization and for the armed forces of the former Communist
countries. But it would also have significant international political
repercussions, in the view of RAND analysts who supported this
approach: "It will anchor not only the East-Central Europeans in the
West, but also keep the United States front and centre in European
security ... The best policy package for these countries is rapid NATO
membership coupled with immediate and improved [Western] market
access, the latter paving the way for entry into the EU. NATO must
drive the process."40 With this approach, NATO could find its new
definition in enlargement to the East.
The third approach, called the strategic response, would be activated
only if there was a strong reaction from Russia as a result of the
emergence of an authoritarian regime or an expansionist policy. This
approach was based primarily on strategic considerations and was
unconcerned with the question of Phase II candidates. Responsibility
for enlargement lay almost entirely with Moscow. For NATO, the issue
was fundamentally strategic rather than political, prompting the orga-
nization to consider the other processes referred to above. For the
countries of Central Europe, this approach could address their percep-
tion of a security vacuum in the region and also encouraged them to
continue along the path to democratization, expanded participation in
the pfp, and closer cooperation with the NACC. Their desire to join the
EU would not be dampened but rather encouraged.
Since Russian President Boris Yeltsin implicitly accepted NATO'S
eastward expansion at the Russian-American summit in Helsinki on
19-20 March, 1997, the second approach, promoting stability, was
adopted at Madrid. In this approach, the question of Phase II candi-
dates was explicitly addressed. The decision to include countries in this
category was based on political considerations - that is, each candi-
date's democratic development. The list of countries in the NATO
Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 passed by the U.S. Congress
(Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic) was accepted. However,
there was a risk that NATO would be perceived more as a political
organization than a military one, and there were doubts about its
ability to defend stability in the region, since the decision could well
undermine cohesion and security. This concern stems from the fact that
Hungary, one of the new members, does not border on any other NATO
country; it is cut off from them by Slovakia to the north, Austria to
the west, and Slovenia and Croatia to the south. We might also ask
what NATO could do for Hungary if it found itself in conflict with
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, or Ukraine over the treatment of Magyar
minorities. Proceeding with enlargement based on political priorities
had opened the door to a series of strategic and security problems.
NATO could have based its enlargement decision on purely strategic
criteria; in that case, the question of Phase II states would have been
less critical. This approach was supported by the Canadian govern-
ment, which wanted enlargement to include, in addition to the coun-
tries usually mentioned, not only Slovakia and Slovenia but also
Romania.41 In that case, the list of Phase II candidates would have
included the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Albania, and the successor states
to Yugoslavia, except Slovenia. The countries least satisfied with this
status would have been the Baltic states, which considered their geo-
strategic position to be particularly critical both for their own security
and for Europe's. This perception was not shared within the Alliance:
"Many in the West - rightly or wrongly - do not see the Baltic states
as an area of vital Western strategic interest." 42
The decision to create a category of Phase II candidates was thus
based not only on a hierarchy of strategic objectives and the type of
zo 8 Impact on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe
enlargement chosen but also on the way the organization had decided
to define itself: "Now, the Alliance focuses more on developing the
means to act with partners in defence of wider, common interests."43
It therefore had a clear policy that included a commitment to "a robust
'open door' policy concerning further accessions."44 In the case of the
Baltic states, this was necessary because of their proximity to Russia.
As two RAND analysts suggested before the Madrid decision, "Alliance
officials in Washington and key European capitals should make it clear
that this is not just a passive and rhetorical commitment, but that the
U.S. and its allies are committed to creating the conditions that will
eventually make Baltic membership in NATO possible."45 NATO will
also need to examine opportunities for regional cooperation for each
Phase II state - for example, Baltic cooperation with the Nordic
countries.46 Finally, EU enlargement should be encouraged and become
"the central building block of this strategy." In the case of the Baltic
states, it is suggested that at least one of them be considered and
Estonia seems to be in a good position to be the first candidate.47
In the wake of the Madrid decision, it is clear that NATO remains a
traditional collective- defence institution which is, however, prepared
to become involved in conflicts outside its territory. In its enlargement
policy, NATO accepted the need to strengthen the pfp, to replace the
NACC by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and to carry
out internal adjustments.48 The creation of the EAPC is important to
the Phase II states: "The EAPC will pick up from where the NACC ended
and provide a framework within which both political consultations
and practical activities under pfp could be taken forward. It combines
the best elements of the NACC and pfp processes. Moreover, the EAPC
provides for the inclusion of all partners - former NACC members and
pfp participating countries automatically become members of the
EAPC, if they so desire."49 These changes in NATO'S structures seem to
suggest that the Alliance has done everything possible to implement
its new "open door" policy.
It must be recognized, however, that NATO'S future will depend, in
the final analysis, on its policy towards the Phase II candidates. Not
only will the organization need to specify criteria for their accession
at a later date, but it will need to determine the process and the
timetable. In addition, firm commitments that set out the responsi-
bilities on both sides will be required. If, on the other hand, there
are shortcomings in the planning of enlargement or the process,
NATO'S development may well depend still more heavily, in the
medium term, on the countries which were not admitted in the first
phase of enlargement.
THE PHASE II CANDIDATES
Before the Madrid decision, there had been no official statement from
either NATO officials or the White House naming the Phase II candi-
dates. People began to speak of such candidates by default, after the
U.S. Senate passed the NATO Participation Act of 1995, which listed
the Phase I candidates. In the case of the countries that knew or
suspected that they would not be part of the first group, this Phase II
candidacy was not without consequence for their future or NATO'S.
The Western press most often mentioned the Baltic countries, Slovenia,
and, after 1996, Slovakia. Bulgaria and Romania were also sometimes
mentioned.
The three Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - were
in a particularly delicate political and strategic position. As noted
above, it was this strategic position that justified their inclusion in the
Phase II group. From their point of view, however, this solution entailed
a risk of aggravating their situation instead of improving it. According
to RAND analysts, "Baltic leaders fear that NATO enlargement to East-
Central Europe will leave them in a kind of grey zone, exposed (as in
the past) to Russian pressure and possible neo-imperial ambitions."50
Most of all, they feared that this solution would give Russia the green
light to claim a say in their affairs. Since independence, each had
sought to "increase the political and economic stability of the Baltic
states and to achieve a balance of influences from East and West."51
The main features of this policy were and remain participation by the
Baltic states in the process of European integration, consolidation of
their relations with their neighbours, strengthening of regional-security
mechanisms, and development of the Kaliningrad region.
Aside from their proximity to Russia, the Baltic countries' strategic
position is also shaped by their newly won independence and the legacy
of the Soviet experience. Not only did they need to define a security
policy and create national defence forces, but they also had to take
into account the Russian minority - 28.7 per cent in Estonia, 32.8 per
cent in Latvia, 8.4 per cent in Lithuania - border problems, Russian
access to the Kaliningrad region, the problem of naval facilities built
by the Soviet Union, and particularly the significance of their geostra-
tegic position in the Baltic Sea for Russia. Their desire to join NATO
and the EU derives from their awareness that they are incapable of
guaranteeing their own security. For all these reasons, paradoxically,
they enjoyed limited support in the Alliance52" and were therefore
relegated to the second round. But these reasons also forced NATO to
be particularly attentive to them, as the RAND analysts observed: "The
zio Impact on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe
fact that the Baltic states have little chance of being in the first phase
of NATO enlargement only increases the need for a credible Western
strategy to support their independence and security."53
Knowing the obstacles that lay in their path, the three countries had
adopted a common strategy both in their efforts to join NATO and the
EU and in their economic and political development. On z8 May 1996
the presidents of the three countries released a statement in Vilnius in
which they declared their intention to apply for membership in the
two bodies together.54 Their desire to make common cause was reaf-
firmed during the Perry incident in September 1996. On zy September
u.s. Defense Secretary William Perry stated in Bergen, Norway, that
the Baltic states would not be among the first to be admitted into
NATO. That remark, which violated the White House's policy not to
comment on any candidate, was a political bombshell. The Baltic
countries responded the next day that they would do everything nec-
essary to meet NATO'S requirements. After lobbying by Baltic represen-
tatives in Washington, Perry sent a letter to the three governments
assuring them that they were "fully eligible" and that no country had
a veto "over their aspirations - whether de jure or de facto."55 They
subsequently increased their military cooperation, their involvement in
the pfp, and their contacts with the Nordic countries.
The three countries' post-Communist economic and political devel-
opment was and remains the determining factor in their Phase II
candidacy, in the medium term and the long term. In 1995 Lithuania's
GNP grew by 2.5 per cent and Estonia's by 3.8 per cent, while Latvia's
dropped 1.6 per cent. The employment rate was 7.3 per cent, 1.8 per
cent, and 6.6 per cent respectively.56 At the political level, their devel-
opment towards democracy was evidently proceeding normally,
although all three experienced political crises related to crime and
corruption in 1995. On the whole, the Baltic countries were aware
that their future depends not only on NATO'S decision on their admis-
sion but also on Russia's reaction to NATO'S commitments to them.
The Helsinki summit of March 1997 seemed to have eliminated their
main fear, which was falling under the sway of Russia. In a joint
statement, President Bill Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed
their recognition of the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their
own security."57 Nevertheless, the Baltic states still feared Russian
disapproval: "The Baltic countries are aware that Moscow will con-
tinue to fight their bid for NATO membership. The conflict could erupt
again if there is a second round of NATO expansion."58 Until they are
full members of European institutions, they will feel insecure and will
continue to resist falling under Russian influence again. The way to
alleviate their insecurity and at the same time guarantee good relations
with Russia is to ensure their economic and political development and
to give them a presence and voice in all bodies and institutions involved
in European unification. The Baltic states could play a positive or
negative role, depending on how the political and economic situation
develops.
Before the Madrid summit, it was not at all clear whether Slovenia
would be included in Phase I or Phase II. A last-minute amendment
had added Slovenia to the other three countries listed in the NATO
Enlargement Act of 1996. However, international press reports did not
usually mention it along with the others.59 The reasons for excluding
Slovenia seemed to be based on strategic considerations diametrically
opposed to the ones that applied in the case of the Baltic states: the
absence of any political and/or military threat. Yet there is a geostra-
tegic consideration which could not be taken lightly in Phase I: Slovenia
is located between Italy, a member of NATO, and Hungary, a Phase I
candidate. By virtue of its geographic location, it provides a direct link
between Hungary and the other members of the Alliance. Nevertheless,
Slovenia was excluded from the first group at Madrid. On the other
hand, it is certain to be included in the second round of NATO
enlargement, particularly since it has made considerable progress in
terms of political and economic development.
In 1995 Slovenia recorded GNP growth of 3.5 per cent; the inflation
rate dropped from zz per cent in 1994 to 8.6 per cent in 1995; and
the unemployment rate held steady at 14.5 per cent.60 The nation's
political life was stable on the whole, but there was one factor that
had a powerful impact on both domestic and foreign policy: national
identity. As the analysts at Germany's Bertelsmann Foundation noted,
"Five years after acquiring independence, Slovenian national identity,
which had long been suppressed by foreign powers, has not yet sub-
sided."61 There was therefore some public scepticism about the EU 6z
and NATO. Meanwhile, the government was entirely in favour of
NATO'S eastward enlargement and had applied to join, but it did not
display the same enthusiasm as other candidates. Its caution may be
explained by two factors. First, there was the unstable situation in the
rest of the former Yugoslavia and in the region in general. Second,
there were the challenges Slovenia faced, particularly in the area of
national defence: "Slovenia is a rather unique case in that it is building
its forces from scratch, equipping them in conformity with Slovenian
legislation, strictly according to NATO standards, and making its force
structure in the image of NATO." 63 Slovenia's domestic situation was
and still is driven by its own dynamics, in which its candidacy for
NATO membership has not seemed to play an important role.
zi2 Impact on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe
The case of Slovakia most clearly reveals the foundations of NATO'S

policy of eastward enlargement. The decision to relegate Slovakia to
the second phase of expansion was made on the basis of political rather
than strategic considerations. There had been uncertainty about the
economic and political viability of an independent Slovakia since its
birth. But after a slow start, due in part to problems of transformation
in post-Communist Czechoslovakia, 64 Slovakia's economy began
booming in 1995.65 At that point, the critics turned towards the
political situation.
In March 1994 Slovak politics entered a period of instability when
the government of Vladimir Meciar fell, with the encouragement of
President Michal Kovac. Early elections were held in September.
Meciar won the elections but did not get a majority on the National
Council; it took him three months to form a coalition government.
Following this crisis, there were political tensions throughout 1995
and 1996, particularly between the prime minister and the president.66
According to some observers, the Meciar government's political style
was authoritarian and represented "the classic model of the 'tyranny
of the majority.'"67 u.s. State Department human- rights reports were
also highly critical of the political situation in Slovakia in 1995 and
I996.68
The unofficial demotion of Slovakia indicated by the NATO Enlarge-
ment Facilitation Act of 1996, which was confirmed at the Madrid
meeting, had repercussions on domestic politics during the months
leading up to the NATO summit. It brought to the fore resentment of
Western criticism of Slovakia's political life and fuelled uncertainty
about the benefits of NATO membership. In the view of one Slovak
analyst, "comparison of the benefits and disadvantages of joining
[NATO] indicates that the main advantage for us would be a security
guarantee. If we consider the risks ... we must ask ourselves whether
this is a sufficient reason for so momentous a step and whether it
would not be possible to obtain security guarantees otherwise, and in
a friendlier manner."69 After the unofficial demotion, two parties in
the coalition government expressed doubts about the need for Slovakia
to join NATO as well as the EU. Public-opinion polls in Slovakia did
not show a majority either for or against joining.70 The result was a
public debate in which two alternatives to NATO membership were
proposed: developing a pan-European security system71 or neutrality
on the Finnish model.7Z Meanwhile, the government held to its policy
objective of inclusion among the first group of new NATO members
and continued to make diplomatic efforts to this end throughout the
fall of I996. 73 In the view of some observers, however, the govern-
Phase II Candidates 2.13
ment's political conduct on the issue confirmed the merit of relegating

Slovakia to Phase II.
In January 1997 Meciar announced that there would be a referen-
dum on the issue. On 14 February the National Council approved
three questions: i) Are you in favour of Slovakia's accession to NATO?;
2.) Are you in favour of the deployment of nuclear arms on Slovak
territory?; and 3) Are you in favour of having military bases in Slo-
vakia? 74 The opposition parties accused the government of trying to
intimidate the public with the second and third questions - particularly
the third, in which it is not clear whether the bases referred to are
Western, Russian, or Slovak - and thereby clouding the first question.
Some felt it was important that these questions be put to the people,
since they were vital to the country's security,75 while others, particu-
larly in the West, saw them as a political ploy: "The Slovak government
... apparently wants to use this referendum as an official 'excuse' for
not fulfilling its promises when the new candidates are announced this
summer. If citizens reject Slovakia's accession to NATO in the referen-
dum, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and his government will be able
to say that not joining NATO was a decision made by the people, not
a result of their authoritarian policies or of a lack of democracy."76
Meciar acknowledged that Slovakia probably would not be in the first
group of countries admitted to NATO, but he nevertheless urged his
party's members to vote yes in the referendum. 77
The referendum turned out to be a fiasco, partly because the three
questions on NATO were accompanied by a fourth question on the
election of the president, which prompted a petition campaign and
challenges before the Central Referendum Commission and the Con-
stitutional Court. On 2,1 May the court ruled that the referendum on
the presidency was legal but it did not rule on how the constitution
should be changed if the vote carried. In response to this decision,
Interior Minister Gustav Krajci ordered that the ballots be printed with
only the three questions on NATO. However, some ballots with the four
questions had already been printed, and voters were given ballots with
three questions or four depending on the political affiliation of the
local authorities. Faced with this situation, 90 per cent of the electorate
did not vote. Prime Minister Meciar declared the vote on the two
questions null and void; the Central Referendum Commission con-
firmed this conclusion on 2,6 May, citing the procedural irregularities
as the main reason. The only political fallout was the resignation of
Foreign Minister Pavol Hamzik. Beyond that, Slovakia's political life
was not disrupted. However, the referendum did nothing to enhance
the government's reputation; more than anything, it reinforced the
impression of political instability and the doubts about democratic

development in Slovakia.
The Madrid decision confirmed Slovakia's inclusion in Phase II and
prompted comments on the implications for the country's politics and
security. One observer suggested that "the psychological shock of the
refusal to accept Slovakia can be expected to play a role in political
change in the country during the [1998] elections."78 The opposition
parties allied in the Slovak Democratic Coalition and the Magyar
Coalition stated that Slovakia's early admission into NATO and the EU
was one of the objectives of their political program. Another commen-
tator saw the Madrid decision as an opportunity for Slovakia to
develop a policy of neutrality: "The current situation in the world and
particularly in Europe is very favourable for Slovakia and the Slovaks.
Russia is prepared to support and guarantee the Slovak Republic's
neutrality. For the moment, the U.S. and the EU do not have a better
alternative for Slovakia, aside from political pressure"79 The govern-
ment did not view the Madrid decision as a catastrophe, and that
decision did not prevent it from making every effort to ensure that
Slovakia would be among the first countries invited to join the EU. On
this question at least, Meciar and Kovac set their political differences
aside and declared on 17 October that they would work together to
achieve this goal.80
The Madrid decision to create Phase II candidates surprised no one.
It had been implicit since NATO began considering the question of
eastward enlargement. Therefore, there was no immediate negative
reaction after the Madrid summit. On the contrary, most governments
remained committed to joining NATO and EU as soon as possible. Only
in Slovakia was the reaction slightly different; there, the political
debate that began in 1996 continued with a search for other options.
The reaction in Slovakia was strongly influenced by the West's and
NATO'S attitude towards the Slovak government since the NATO
Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996. In the final analysis, the case of
Slovakia suggests that NATO must avoid developing a differentiated
strategy towards Phase II countries.
C O N G LUS I ON
The case of Slovakia is indicative of the difficulties NATO is encoun-

tering as it considers the issue of eastward enlargement. Was the
decision on Phase II candidates a political or a strategic decision?
Western reactions to Slovak politics, Slovakia's demotion, and the
implicit recognition of other Phase II candidates prior to Madrid
indicate that political considerations prevailed over strategic ones.
They signalled the need to ensure continuation of the process of

democratic development in the former Communist countries; one
recent study suggests, for example, that there has been a slackening of
democratic control over the armed forces in these countries.81 They
also signalled that NATO does not believe that there is any near-term
military threat in Central and Eastern Europe, and that enlargement
is rather part of a political process which is being driven both by the
broader process of European unification and by the political and
economic development of the transatlantic zone. At Madrid, NATO sent
a clear message to the Phase II candidates in order to keep the process
from losing either its significance or its momentum. But NATO must
strengthen its security guarantees - through either the pfp or another
collective-security mechanism.
The confirmation at Madrid in July that there would be a second
round of enlargement indicated that NATO is heading towards differ-
entiated integration speeds and variable geometry, somewhat like the
EU. But the ultimate goal - the inclusion of all European states in
NATO - will depend more on the will of those countries' peoples to
join NATO than on NATO'S own decisions. The lesson we can draw
from the referendum in Slovakia is that this will can be secured only
if the enlargement process has a clear policy towards the Phase II
candidates. All things considered, it may be in these countries that the
future of NATO and of Europe will be played out.
CONCLUSION
Will NATO Live to Celebrate

Its looth Birthday?
Few observers or analysts, if any, would have predicted that, on its

fiftieth anniversary, NATO would be the most important and vigorous
defence organization in the world. On numerous occasions during its
history, NATO was jolted by upheavals that shook its foundations and
threatened its unity. Notable examples include France's withdrawal in
the 19608 and the Euromissile crisis of the 19805 When the process
of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe began, many
analysts again raised the spectre of destabilization. The opposite has
in fact occurred, and NATO'S glowing health and increasingly stout
constitution fifty years after its creation are remarkable to observe.
The transatlantic Alliance has characteristics that make it unique in
history - hence the contradictory perspectives and the debates on the
secrets of NATO'S success and its ability to adapt to strategic changes
as we approach the twenty-first century. NATO represents the greatest
institutional, multilateral hope for the development and implementa-
tion of common security policies in Europe - more so than the Euro-
pean Security and Defence Identity which the European Union aspires
to create.
Each of the essays in this volume examines the implications of NATO
renewal from a different angle, proceeding from the observation that
never in its history has NATO enjoyed such influence, despite the
conventional wisdom which had held that with the end of the Cold
War and without a common enemy, the organization would wither
away. None of the contributors to this volume is predicting the grim
future that so many of their predecessors once foretold for NATO. The
bipolar system no longer exists, the USSR has vanished, but NATO is
spreading geographically (to Eastern and Central Europe) and militar-
ily (conducting its first missions outside the Treaty zone, initially in
Will NATO Live to Celebrate its looth Birthday? 217
the form of the Implementation Force and then of the Stabilization

Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and more recently in Kosovo). There is
food for thought here; the contributors to this volume raise questions
and offer conclusions which add to our understanding of the theoret-
ical and empirical puzzle of NATO'S survival and enlargement.
WHY HAS NATO SURVIVED?

WHY IS IT EXPANDING?
NATO was originally conceived as an alliance in the strict sense of the

term - that is, a grouping of nation-states for the purpose of defence
against and containment of a common enemy; it therefore had little
hope of reaching the age of fifty. As described in the theoretical
literature (of which this writer provides a survey), realist theory pre-
dicts the end of alliances when there ceases to be a need for defence.1
To begin with, perceptions of the threat change considerably when the
balance of forces shifts (in the case of NATO, with the replacement of
the bipolar system by American strategic hegemony) and member
countries no longer fear an enemy or feel any need to band together.
Second, dependence on a Great Power that will come to the rescue of
smaller states declines as the need to seek security guarantees dimin-
ishes. Third, domestic support for continued membership in an alliance
fades as economic, political, and diplomatic interests shift to other
sectors or regions and ideological motivations change. Based on these
factors, NATO should not expect to celebrate its centennial.
If we suppose, however, that the underpinnings of NATO'S success
extend well beyond military reasons (as liberal theory contends), the
Alliance's chances of survival and longevity appear much enhanced. 2
First, existing members and aspiring members alike want the benefit
of belonging to the hegemonic camp (particularly since they share its
liberal values). Second, the Alliance's high level of institutionalization
yields benefits in terms of continental stability, conflict prevention and
management, and coordination of national security policies. These
benefits go well beyond geopolitical considerations. Lastly, NATO
reflects the existence of a community of nations which share demo-
cratic values, practise consultation and collective decision making, and
wish to increase the attraction of these values and practices. The liberal
approach therefore appears to explain the past importance and present
attraction of NATO for many of the Eastern European countries that
want to join. This approach offers a more useful perspective than
realism not only on the justification for NATO'S survival and enlarge-
ment but indeed on strengthening security in Europe.
2.18 Conclusion
WHAT C O N C L U S I O N S CAN BE DRAWN FROM

THE INITIAL ENLARGEMENT TO EASTERN AND
CENTRAL EUROPE ?
The decision to admit the first three Eastern and Central European
States to NATO was preceded by extensive and vigorous debate in
universities and research institutes alike. These discussions appear to
have exerted little influence, however, on the manner in which NATO
member states proceeded with the enlargement, and they have had
remarkably little effect on the national ratification processes; even in
the United States, where constraints and demands of all kinds are often
attached to this type of exercise, there has been no controversy what-
soever.3 And the debate has attracted little media interest (except in
scholarly journals) or public attention. The qualitative and quantitative
costs and benefits of enlargement have been widely discussed and
assessed by researchers (Richard Kugler's chapter provides an excellent
overview of the arguments for and against, and of the risks associated
with the project). In the wake of the Madrid summit decision to go
ahead with the first phase of enlargement, there is still considerable
criticism of the merit of this decision and of any further enlargement
to other Eastern European countries.4 Some observers see the process
as a bonanza for arms exporters and defence industries. 5 Others believe
that it will entail enormous expenses for upgrading infrastructure and
armed forces in Eastern and Central European states; they estimate the
cost at between $10 billion and $40 billion over the next decade,
depending on the states' contributions, their growth rates, the objec-
tives, and the reforms involved.6
It has been argued that we must look to the lessons of history to
understand the consequences of the changes in NATO. These lessons
are important, but their meaning is not always clear. We must certainly
consider past enlargements, including the admission of Spain in 1982
and the addition of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR),
as part of a reunified Germany, in 1990; these are discussed by David
Law and Jacques Levesque respectively. In both cases, NATO experi-
enced the full extent of the difficulties of enlargement. Law and
Levesque both suggest that the lessons of the past argue for extreme
caution in the pursuit of the process, for different reasons. Law believes
that the admission of Spain should have put an end to the process, in
view of the risk it entails for European security and the unfairness to
rejected aspirants. He asks whether history will repeat itself and Russia
will feel it is the victim of a new Versailles (in being excluded from
NATO) and seek to craft a new Rapallo (a rapprochement with China
to counter NATO expansion). Levesque traces an interesting parallel
between the hostile Soviet reaction to the inclusion of the former GDR
in NATO and the negative Russian reaction to NATO enlargement to
Eastern and Central Europe prior to the Madrid summit of July 1997.
But what parallels can we draw between these past events and the
NATO of 1999? For the moment, Russia seems to be taking the
admission of the three new members better than it did that of the GDR.
The anticipated consequences and the lessons to be drawn cannot
necessarily be generalized from one case to the other, for the strategic
environment has changed radically and perceptions of security matters
are of a shifting nature.
The very definition of security is subject to dispute, and there is in
fact no consensus on NATO'S relevance today among the contributors
to this volume. Some, such as Andras Balogh and Richard Kugler, see
it as an organization that remains essentially dedicated to defence: a
military alliance, not a social club. Others, such as this writer, see
NATO'S role shifting towards "collective security," a thrust that could
extend as far as the formal admission of Russia. Most, including David
Haglund, Andre Donneur, and Martin Bourgeois, expect NATO to
remain focused on "cooperative security" in the medium term, mean-
ing that governments will coordinate their policies to address common
problems and threats which are less and less military in nature (this
could include peacekeeping operations). The visions of security now
emerging within NATO are the product of debates and compromises
among nations. Close attention is therefore paid in this volume to
national policies on enlargement.
The essays in this book betray a range of attitudes towards the
positions of member states, Eastern and Central European states, and
Russia. The enlargement plans bear directly on U.S. interests, if only
because under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States
will automatically contract a commitment to the security of Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The United States has never wavered
on the question of enlargement: it has largely decided which countries
would be admitted, when, and how. This may seem surprising, as Gale
Mattox notes; the vacillations of U.S. foreign policy, which have
nourished the academic debate on enlargement, are much less so. Torn
between the isolationist, unilateral, and multilateral tendencies in u.s.
foreign policy, policy makers have not charted a precise course, and
enlargement has not settled the basic debate, Mattox argues, even
though the Clinton administration seems to have settled on a combi-
nation of cooperative security (the multilateral route) and selective
engagement (the more unilateral option). It remains to be seen how
the u.s. position on the possible admission of other Eastern European
states and the treatment of Russia will develop.
220 Conclusion
Canada's stand on the plans for NATO enlargement has been informed
by the traditional thrust of Canadian foreign policy, Andre Donneur
and Martin Bourgeois argue. Particularly since the end of the Cold
War, Canada has strongly advocated a redefinition of security. Canada
therefore views NATO enlargement as a way not only to widen the
Alliance to new members but also to broaden security arrangements
to an approach which is still more consistent with Canadian values:
expanding democracy, strengthening the role of middle powers, spe-
cializing in certain niches. According to David Haglund, NATO enlarge-
ment is strengthening Canada's interest in safeguarding transatlantic
ties founded on traditional Pearsonian internationalism - a happy
outcome, for there had been reason to fear that this interest might
temporarily fade with the end of the Cold War. Indeed, NATO may
fulfil the Canadian dream of a well-established collective- security
system in Europe.
Among European members of the Alliance, the French and German
positions contrast sharply. True to form, France is wavering between
its respect for NATO and its desire to see a united Europe develop its
own foreign policy and defence policy. Marie-Claude Plantin traces the
ambivalent French stance, informed by ovine loyalty on the one hand
and overweening ambition on the other. She notes the disjunction
between France's aspirations and its influence, which yawns wide in
its attempt to build European security arrangements alongside NATO
structures. It would appear unlikely, Plantin concludes, that such
arrangements can be created at the expense of NATO.
On the other hand, Germany has taken an unequivocal position on
enlargement. Paul Letourneau and Philippe Hebert describe the strong,
remarkably solid consensus which drives the coherent strategic vision
behind German diplomacy. Letourneau and Hebert relate how,
throughout the process, Germany has championed the collective Euro-
pean interest, which it believes matches its national interest. In this
respect, Germany's attitude resembles the British stance, which gives
NATO enlargement priority over building the European Security and
Defence Identity.
The European security architecture is central to the concerns of
many of the contributors to this volume. Two questions in particular
are addressed: what is Europe's role in designing this architecture?
What are the prospects for revamping the Alliance? On the first point,
Marie-Claude Plantin and Jane Sharp take opposing views. While
Plantin is moderately optimistic that, in the long term, it will be
possible to reconcile the efforts to build Europe and NATO, Sharp is
pessimistic indeed and suggests that NATO, not the Western European
Union or the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, is
in the best position to ensure the long-term security of the continent,

including the organization's new members. On the second point, the
changes seem cosmetic to some (including Jane Sharp) and promising
to others (such as Marie-Claude Plantin). According to an analysis by
the Institut frangais des relations Internationales, it is clear that the
European order will be "unipolar" - that is, "organized around a
single policy-making centre, the Atlantic Alliance, and a single imperial
power, the United States."7
Moscow's reaction is, of course, a major source of concern. Russia
would have every reason to want NATO membership itself, but at this
stage it has shown no inclination to ask for inclusion - beyond the
Founding Act, with which it seems satisfied. Russia has always expressed
doubt that NATO is the appropriate vehicle to ensure the security of
Europe as a whole. It has therefore endeavoured to limit the damage,
rather than adamantly opposing the first phase of enlargement. But
the issues raised by the enlargement process have in no way been
resolved, warns Sergei Plekhanov, and the consequences of expansion
will continue to be a subject of debate within the Russian system. This
will need to be borne in mind when discussions start on the second
phase of enlargement, which will push NATO farther east and hence
closer still to Russia. Western policy in this respect will have a decisive
impact on Russia's stability in the years to come.
NATO'S NEXT FIFTY YEARS
So, then, whereto NATO after this first phase of enlargement into
Eastern and Central Europe? Many of the chapters in this volume ask
this question. There seems to be general agreement that the future
course of events is a complex matter. The first phase of enlargement
is going ahead, though not without debate and questions about its
purpose; however, any further enlargement promises to be more com-
plicated. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum argues that not only will the decision
on which countries to admit be a subject of still more heated debate,
given its political nature, but it will inevitably be based on different
objectives than the first phase. Kirschbaum identifies considerations of
strategy, culture, and democracy as the factors that will weigh heavily
in the balance (and point towards very different choices). This returns
us, therefore, to the fundamental questions underlying this volume:
what is the logic behind the enlargement process? What approaches
(and which new members) will give it the best chance of success?
There can be little doubt that the success of the first phase of
enlargement, and of the others that may follow, depends on Russia's
reactions and its acceptance of NATO'S objectives. This collection brings
222 Conclusion
special attention to bear on this question. Admitting the first three

Central and Eastern European countries is one thing; contemplating
the admission of the Baltic states or the Ukraine is quite another. At
that stage, it will be impossible to avoid the inevitable question of
partnership with Russia. The Founding Act is a very important step
in the more formal rapprochement between NATO and Russia. It has
not really brought Russia into the European fold (yet) nor made it into
a more European country. But Moscow's seat on the Permanent Joint
Council makes it a vital and influential de facto player in any further
enlargement plans. Under these conditions, it is difficult to imagine
that, should the enlargement process continue (as appears likely),
Russia would long be barred from formal membership in NATO.
Stability and democratization in Europe are largely being shaped by
developments in Russia, and these are two of the leading objectives of
the enlargement strategy. If NATO is to survive and serve to spread a
liberal-institutional vision of security, it cannot forever exclude Russia.
If NATO wants to continue as an organization dedicated to the expan-
sion of a broad community of values and identity - founded on
democracy, consensus, and consultation - in Europe, then the inclusion
of Russia within the next few decades would appear to be a reasonable
possibility. All will depend on how quickly the reforms in Russia
convince NATO that the westernizing trend in that country is irrevers-
ible, and on whether NATO is willing to make accommodations to
satisfy the Russian authorities.8 But Moscow must also demonstrate
that it itself is interested in inclusion without the existing order in
Europe, and especially NATO'S leading role, being placed in question.
At the time of the Carolingian empire, Charlemagne imagined a
united Europe, the contours of which were quite similar to the present-
day territory of the six founding members of the EU. He was the first
to conceive of a European union (albeit a forced union). More than
twelve centuries later, the enlargement of NATO in the lands that
Charlemagne and his successors fought to conquer and keep is being
accomplished by consensus, under a benign u.s. hegemony. It would
appear that security is progressively becoming more a cultural, less a
military matter, as identities and ways of thinking change. From this
perspective, the process of NATO enlargement is rich in promise.
Notes
CHAPTER ONE
1 Quoted by Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New

York: Touchstone 1990), 255.
2 Christopher Layne, "Superpower Disengagement," Foreign Policy, 77
(winter 1989-90), 2.1; Ronald Steel, "NATO'S Last Mission," Foreign
Policy, 76 (fall 1989), 90; Congressman Brownback quoted by Carroll
Doherty, "New Generation Challenges Established Orthodoxy," Congres-
sional Quarterly, 3 Feb. 1996, 306.
3 Albert Legault, "La formule choc de POTAN: comment maigrir tout en
prenant de 1'embonpoint?" Bulletin du Maintien de la paix, no. 2.6
(February 1997).
4 For a comprehensive review of these efforts and the NATO enlargement
debate, see Philip Gordon, NATO'S Transformation: The Changing Shape
of the Atlantic Alliance (Baltimore: Rowman and Littlefield 1997); Rob
de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: The Battle for Con-
sensus (London: Brassey's 1997); The Pros and Cons of NATO Expansion:
Defining u.s. Goals and Options (Washington: Stanley Foundation
1997); "The Debate over NATO Expansion," Arms Control Today, 27
(September 1997), 3-10; Gerald Solomon, The NATO Enlargement
Debate, 1990-1997 (Washington: CSIS Press 1998); Sean Kay, NATO and
the Future of European Security (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 1998);
Eric Bergbusch, "NATO Enlargement," International Journal, 53 (winter
1997-98), 147-68; and from International Institute for Strategic Studies
(nss), "Making a Bigger NATO," Strategic Survey 1997-98 (London:
Oxford University Press 1998), 2.9-36.
5 These approaches represent ideal types that are of pedagogical rather
than historical value. What interests us here is their usefulness as analo-
gies more than as specific facts.
224 Notes to pages 12-15
6 Quoted in Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels:

The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War ("Boston: Little Brown
1993), 185.
7 The most authoritative work on the question of alliances remains Stephen
Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press
1987); see also his "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse?" Survival, 39
(spring 1997), 156-79.
8 These variants are inspired by the analyses offered by David Haglund,
"Must NATO Fail? Theories, Myths and Policy Dilemmas," International
Journal, 50 (fall 1995), 655-9; Beverly Crawford, "Causes of War and
the Future of Peace in the New Europe," in B. Crawford, ed., The Future
of European Security (Berkeley: University of California Press 1992.),
7-16.
9 This is Kenneth Waltz's argument in Theory of International Politics
(Reading, U.K.: Addison-Wesley Publishing 1979), 163-70.
10 Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," Inter-
national Security, 18 (fall 1993), 76.
11 Robert McCalla, "NATO'S Persistence after the Cold War," International
Organization, 50 (summer 1996), 454-5; Fred Chernoff, After Bipolarity:
The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation, and the Future of the
Atlantic Alliance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 33.
12 John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the
Cold War," International Security, 15 (summer 1990), 5-56; Jane Sharp,
"Security Options for Central Europe," in B. Crawford, The Future of
European Security, 12.6.
13 Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,"
International Security, 9 (spring 1985), 4-18, defines "bandwagoning"
as the process of rallying around the most threatening power; Randall
Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back
in," International Security, 19 (summer 1994), 88-9, goes farther by
demonstrating that "bandwagoning" also involves rallying around the
strongest power. We prefer this definition, which appears to us to be
more accurate than Walt's; see also K. Waltz, Theory, 12,6.
14 On the concept of primacy, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illu-
sion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," and Samuel Huntington, "Why
International Primacy Matters," International Security, 17 (spring 1993),
5-51 and 68-83 respectively.
15 The expression was coined by Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar
Moment," Foreign Affairs, America and the World, 1990-1991, 70
(February 1991), 22-3.
16 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster 1994), 823-
5; Zbignew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs, 74 (January-
Notes to pages 16-19 225
February 1995), 26-42; and William Odom, "NATO'S Expansion: Why

the Critics are Wrong," National Interests, 39 (spring 1995), 38-49.
17 Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: Twen-
tieth Century Fund Book 1996); Michael Brown, "The Flawed Logic of
NATO Expansion," Survival, 37 (spring 1995), 34~5 2 ? an d George Ken-
nan, "A fateful error," New York Times, 5 Feb. 1997, A-i9. Historian
John Lewis Gaddis suscribes to the realist-pessimistic view in his op-ed
"The Senate should halt NATO expansion," New York Times, 27 April
1998, A-i9.
18 See David Law and Neil Macfarlane, "NATO Expansion and European
Regional Security," in David Haglund, ed., Will NATO Go East? The
Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance (Ottawa: Department of
Foreign Affairs 1996), 45-51.
19 Regionalism is dealt with comprehensively in Charles-Philippe David, ed.,
"La Paix par 1'integration? Regionalisme et perspectives de securite," spe-
cial issue of Etudes Internationales, 28 (June 1997); Charles-Philippe
David, ed., Les Institutions de la paix? Integration europeene et perspec-
tives de securite (Montreal and Paris: L'Harmattan 1997), "Raoul-
Dandurand" Collection.
20 On this issue, see Charles-Philippe David and Afef Benessaieh, "Theories
sur 1'interdependance et nouveaux problemes de securite," in C.-P. David,
"La paix par 1'integration."
21 See Beverly Crawford, "Causes of War," 17-21; F. Chernoff, After Bipo-
larity, 33-9; and D. McCalla, "NATO'S Persistence after the Cold War,"
461-9.
22 Allen Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian
Interests in a Changing Alliance," International Journal, 50 (fall 1995),
678.
23 See, for example, Karl Kaiser, "Reforming NATO," Foreign Policy, 103
(summer 1996), 128-43; and Steve Weber, "Does NATO Have a Future?"
in Beverly Crawford, The Future of European Security, 3 60-81.
24 Josef Joffe, "NATO after Victory," in D. Haglund, Will NATO Go East,
57-68; M. Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, ch. 2.
25 Peter Schulze, "Competing for European Security: The OSCE, NATO, and
the European Community in a Changing International Environment," in
B. Crawford, The Future of European Security, 348-53.
26 Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., Debating
the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1996); John Owen,
"How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security, 19
(fall 1994), 87-125; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Prin-
ciples for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press 1993). See also B. Crawford, "Causes of War," 21-8.
27 Stephen Van Ever a, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War,"
International Security, 13 (winter 1990-910, 7-57.
28 Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security
Community," in B. Crawford, The Future of European Security, 287-326;
Thomas Risse-Kapen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European
Influence on US Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press 1995), and his "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community:
The Case of NATO," in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press 1996), 357-99.
29 Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of
War," International Security, 20 (summer 1995), 5~3&-
30 Richard Rosecrance, "The Prospect of World Economic Conflict: Implica-
tions for the Global System and for Europe," in B. Crawford, The Future
of European Security, 122-51. This entire question of economic security
in a regional framework has received little attention in strategic studies,
as noted in Michel Fortmann, Neil Macfarlane, and Stephane Roussel,
eds., Tous pour un ou chacun pour soi. Promesses et limites de la
cooperation regionale en matiere de securite (Quebec City: Institut quebe-
cois des hautes etudes internationales 1996), 18 and 365.
31 Richard Rosecrance, "The Prospect of World Economic Conflict," 144.
32 Peter Schulze, "Competing for European Security," 349-56.
33 David Long, "La PESC et au-dela: Les conceptions fonctionnalistes et ter-
ritoriales de la securite de 1'Union europeenne," in M. Fortmann et al.,
Tous pour un ou chacun pour soi, 115-34; and Philip Zelikow, "The
Masque of Institutions," Survival, 38 (spring 1996), 6-18.
34 John Newhouse, "Europe's Rising Regionalism," Foreign Affairs, 76
(January-February 1997), 67-84.
35 Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion:
The Next Steps," Survival, 37 (spring 1995), 7-33; Allen Sens, "La
cooperation selon le neo-realisme: la cooptation des petits Etats d'Europe
centrale et de Pest," in M. Fortmann et al., Tous pour un ou chacun pour
soi, 135-53, and, by the same author, "Saying Yes to Expansion," 675-
700; Steve Weber, "Does NATO have a Future?"3 60-95; and Strobe Tal-
bott, "Russia has nothing to fear," New York Times, 18 Feb. 1997, A-i9.
36 John Newhouse, Europe Adrift (New York: Pantheon Books 1997); E.
Adler, "Europe's New Security Order," 300-18; P. Zelikow, "The Masque
of Institutions," 6-18; and Charles William Maynes, "No, expansion
eastward isn't what NATO needs," International Herald Tribune, 21 Sept.
1993. 15-
37 Quoted in Thomas Friedman, "NATO or tomato," Neiv York Times,
22 Jan. 1997, A-2i.
38 Richard Kugler, Enlarging nato: The Russian Factor (Washington: rand

1996), ch. 7.
39 Ibid. 267.
40 On the League of Nations and its operation see Pierre Gerbet, Le reve
d'un ordre mondial. De la SON a I'ONU (Paris: Imprimerie nationale
1996), ch. i. The concept of collective security is analyzed in Thomas
Weiss, ed., Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner 1993); see also the collection of articles edited by Stanislav
Kirschbaum, La securite collective au XXF Siecle (Quebec City: Centre
quebecois de relations internationales 1994).
41 Beverly Crawford, "Causes of War," 35.
42 Charles Kupchan, "Reviving the West," Foreign Affairs, 75 (May-June
1996), 92-104.
43 Allen Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion," 695.
44 Zbignew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," 35.
45 Joseph Lepgold, "The Next Step Toward a More Secure Europe," Journal
of Strategic Studies, 17 (December 1994), 22.
46 Coral Bell, "Why an Expanded NATO Must Include Russia," Journal of
Strategic Studies, 17 (December 1994), 27-41. An interesting argument
for including Russia is made by Richard Biondi, "Evaluating the Suffi-
ciency of NATO Reforms for the Inclusion of Russia," paper presented at
the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Minne-
apolis, 17-21 March 1998.
47 The expression is from Robert Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the
United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, n (winter 1996),
37-
CHAPTER TWO
1 Craig Whitney, "Germans and Czechs try to heal hatreds of the Nazi era,
New York Tmes (hereafter NYT), 22 Jan. 1997.
2 Miklos Haraszti, "Toward a new Europe," NYT, 27 Jan. 1997.
3 Reuters, "Poland sacks military chief," Guardian, u March 1997. See
also Jane Perlez, "Poland's top commander resists terms for NATO," NYT,
22 Jan. 1997
4 Max van den Stoel, OSCE high commissioner on national minorities,
deserves a large part of the credit for persuading the Baltics to be more
accommodating towards their Russian minorities.
5 President Clinton's Report to Congress on the Benefits of NATO: Ratio-
nale, Costs and Implications (Washington: 24 Feb. 1997).
6 Francois Heisbourg, "At this point only Washington can slow the reckless
pace," International Herald Tribune, 28 Nov. 1996; Paul Webster and
Denis Staunton, "Albright rebuffs French agenda for NATO talks,"

Guardian, 18 Feb. 1992.
7 Steven Lee Myers, "US now at odds with NATO allies on new members,"
NYT, 30 May 1997.
8 Mikhail Gorbachev, "NATO enlargement would backfire on the West,"
International Herald Tribune (hereafter IHT), 22-3 Feb. 1997; see also
editorial, "No NATO Gray Zone?" ibid., 24 Oct. 1996.
9 Christoph Bertram, "Why NATO Must Enlarge," NATO Review, March
1997, 14-17-
10 Alison Mitchell, "Clinton at West Point says bigger NATO lessens chance
of war," NYT, i June 1997; see also Steven Erlanger, "NATO tries to
speed integration of Russia in Nato," NYT, 7 Sept. 1996.
11 See, for example, Tatiana Parkhalina, "Of Myths and Illusions: Russian
perceptions of NATO Enlargement," NATO Review, May-June 1997, n-
15. For the more conventional view that emphasizes Russian opposition
to NATO enlargement, see Michael McGuire, NATO Expansion and Euro-
pean Security (London Defence Study #37, Brasseys for CDS 1997); and
Tom Angelakis, Russian Elites' Perceptions of NATO Expansion: The Mil-
itary, Foreign Ministry, and Duma (Institute of Strategic and International
Studies Briefing Paper #11, May 1997).
12 I am indebted to discussions with Lilla Shevstova of the Moscow office of
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for the Russian reaction
to the Helsinki package.
13 "The Joint US-Russian Statement on European Security," issued by Boris
Yeltsin and Bill Clinton in Helsinki in late March 1997, is reprinted in
The Arms Control Reporter 1997, PP4O2.D. 117-18.
14 Robert Chenciner, "Agreeing to Agree," War Report, June-July 1997.
15 David Buchan, "No missiles pointed at NATO, says Yeltsin," Financial
times, 28 May 1997.
16 Michael Specter, "Setting past aside, Russia and Ukraine sign Friendship
Treaty," NYT, i June 1997.
17 Mary Jordan, "Russia signals a new status with Japan," IHT, z June
1997.
18 The Foundation Act is reprinted in The Arms Control Reporter 1997,
402.0.119-27; the European Atlantic Partnership was launched at
NATO'S Madrid summit in July 1997.
19 NATO tabled its "Transparency Measure on Infrastructure" proposal with
the Forum for Security Cooperation in Europe in Vienna on 16 April. See
The Arms Control Reporter 1997, page 402.6.357-8.
20 Roland Smith, "A Changing NATO," NATO Review, May-June 1997, 8-n.
21 The U.S. senate ratified the CFE flank document that emerged from the
May 1996 review conference on 14 May 1997. For text of Senate resolu-
tion, see The Arms Control Reporter, 1997, 407.0.110-16.
22 NATO'S "Basic Elements for Adaptation of the CFE Treaty" were agreed
to by the High Level Task Force on 21 Feb. 1997 and presented in
Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright a few days later.
Russia responded in the Joint Consultation Group in Vienna on 22 April.
Both the NATO and the Russian documents are reprinted in The Arms
Control Reporter 15*517, IO 5~9-
23 John Palmer, "Expansion Process Explained," Challenge Europe, January
1997, 5-
24 For example: Jonathan Dean, Paul Nitze, and Jack Matlock.
25 John Donnelly, "UK Chief: Europe not ready to run Bosnia operation,"
Defense Week, 17 March 1997.
26 NYT, 9 June.
27 Flora Lewis, "What East Europe seeks is a model of civilization," IHT,
13 June 1997.
28 Sandy Berger, "The aim is neither to shut Russia out nor to let it dictate,"
IHT, 18 March 1997; see also Sherman Garnett, "Help Russia join the
world," IHT, 17 March 1997, and "The West doesn't threaten Russia,"
IHT, 18 March 1997.
29 Sebastian Gorka, "Hungary Reinvents Its Defence Force," Jane's Intelli-
gence Review, May 1997, 197-200; Jaromir Novotny, "From pfp to
IFOR: the Czech Experience," NATO Review, July 1996, 25-9; plus
appropriate cites for Poland et al.
30 Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO and the Have-nots,"
Foreign Affairs, 75, no. 6 (December 1996), 13-20.
CHAPTER THREE
1 See David Law and Neil MacFarlane, "NATO Expansion and European
Regional Security," in David G. Haglund, ed. Will NATO Go East? The
Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's
University, Centre for International Relations, 1996); and David Law,
"The Problems of Widening NATO," Brassey's Defence Yearbook (Lon-
don: Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London 1994).
2 As of 23 July 1998, the only NATO member countries yet to ratify the
enlargement protocols were the Netherlands, Portugal, the United King-
dom, and Turkey. Only in the latter country would there still appear to
be a chance of ratification being rejected. See the NATO official webpage.
3 An earlier version of this article was entitled "Why Spain Should Be
NATO'S Last New Member." It argued that, as the ratification debate
unfolded in the parliaments of NATO member countries, opposition to the
project would grow, and with the arithmetic of NATO consensus decision
making being 16 minus 1=0, even a single member's vote against enlarge-
ment would derail the entire project. This would have confirmed Spain in
its current status as NATO'S last new member. From the perspective of
summer 1998, this seems a remote possibility, barring a shooting war in
the Aegean, or a similarly dramatic development - hence, the revised title.
4 Douglas Stuart, "Symbol and Substance in the US Debate," in Haglund,
Will NATO Go East? argues this point in some detail.
5 "Report to the Congress on NATO Enlargement: Rationale, Benefits,
Costs and Implications," Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs,
U.S.Department of State, 24 Feb. 1997, available at http://www.fas.org/
man/NATO/wh970224.html (pg. 21). The United States, with the strongest
defence industry in the Alliance, would stand to reap the greatest bene-
fit.For an analysis of party campaign financing in U.S. elections, see the
website of the Center for Public Integrity.
6 "Linking Arms: A survey of the global defence industry," Economist,
14 June 1997.
7 The communique of the meeting at which this statement was made can
be found at the official NATO webpage. See also www.NATO.org for all
other information from official NATO sources in this paper.
8 "Report to the Congress on NATO Enlargement."
9 "Linking Arms: a survey of the global defence industry" reports the Pen-
tagon's estimate for developing the joint-strike fighter at $210 billion. For
information on the financing of recent U.S. campaigns, see the website of
the Federal Election Commission. For the role played by defence contrac-
tor PACS, see "The Best Defense," available at the website of the Center
for Responsive Politics at http://www.crp.org/pubs/defense/defenseo.html.
10 A Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline report of 3 Aug.
1998 had the Romanian finance minister blasting U.S. officials for their
"immoral" efforts to promote the sale of Bell helicopters to a "country
whose economic situation is difficult." Another report of 16 June 1998
from the same source claims that U.S. Defence Secretary Cohen was in
Warsaw in June to press the Poles to maintain their defence spending and
to discuss the possible purchase of multi-purpose fighter aircraft.
11 M. Michalka, "How Much Will Enlargement Cost?" RFE/RL Dateline,
10 July 1997.
12 For a description of the way the issue surfaced in Germany, see David
Haglund, "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolution of an Idea," in Will
NATO Go East?
13 The material for this section draws extensively on the author's own expe-
rience.The author produced the first study within NATO'S International
Secretariat on the issue of NATO expansion in the summer of 1993. His
assignment was not to examine the pros and cons of enlargement but to
develop a concept for managing the process.
14 See the article by the godfather of U.S. post-Second World War policy
towards Russia, George F. Kennan, "A fateful error," New York Times,
5 Feb. 1997, and the open letter of some forty former U.S. ambassadors
and policy makers, "Open Letter to President Clinton," available at
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/NATO/postponeo6i697.
15 This was the standpoint taken by a number of speakers at the colloquium
in March 1997 at which the original version of this paper was given.
16 This expression was, I believe, first used in connection with the Alliance's
nuclear posture in the above-cited "Report to the Congress on the
Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." The expression
was also in common currency at NATO headquarters in the spring of
1997. In this connection, one senior official argued that the NATO non-
nuclear option was that much more significant in view of the fact that,
whereas NATO had reduced its nuclear arsenal by 85 per cent since the
end of the Cold War, Russia had dragged its feet on its commitments. On
the question of a formal commitment on nuclear roles and forward
deployment, the NATO communiques for both the Madrid summit and
the December 1997 Foreign Ministerial meeting are silent.
17 Reuters, 25 Feb. 1996.
18 Clinton also promised Russia U.S. assistance in joining the Paris Club of
official creditors in 1997 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
1998. While Russia became a full participant at the Denver summit, it
may find the going in the WTO more difficult. It has been trying to get
into the WTO (and its forerunner, GATT) since 1993. Open Media
Research Institute (OMRI) Daily Digest, 24 March 1997.
19 The World Bank approved new loans of almost $600 million in the
course of 1997. From the International Monetary Fund, Russia received
another $7oo-million dollar tranche of the three-year loan negotiated ear-
lier. Russia joined the Paris Club of official creditors, following an agree-
ment that $40 billion in Soviet debts to foreign governments would be
rescheduled over twenty-five years. In the wake of this agreement, Russia
negotiated a deal with the London Club of commercial creditors restruc-
turing the repayment of its $32-billion debt over a period of twenty-five
years. See RFE/RL Dateline of 6 June, 5 Sept., and 8 Oct. 1997.
20 See Peter Rutland, OMRI Daily Digest, 12 March 1997, which refers to
U.S. Ambassador Richard Morningstar calling for a 44 per cent increase
in American aid to the newly independent states (NTS) in 1998, whereby
aid spending would rise from $625 million in 1997 to $900 million in
1998, while spending on Russia alone would go from $95 million to
$225 million. According to Rutland, total U.S. aid to the NIS peaked at
$2.5 billion in 1994 but fell to $850 million in 1995 and $641 million in
1996. Rutland reports that Rep. Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the
House International Relations Committee, objected to the idea of increas-
ing aid in return for Russian acquiescence in NATO expansion, describing
this as a non-starter.
232, Notes to pages 42-7
2i RFE/RL newsline, 3 July 1997.

2.2. For a review of different currents of opinion on enlargement, see the
draft special report of the Working Group on NATO Enlargement of the
North Atlantic Assembly (Giorgio Napolitano, Karsten Voigt, Tamas
Wachsler, Special co-rapporteurs), "The Enlargement of the Alliance,"
NAA International Secretariat, October 1995.
2.3 See the entries describing recent developments concerning Russia's chemi-
cal and short-range nuclear weapons in the RFE/RL, 6 May 1997.
24 The situation with respect to NATO'S strategic partnership with Ukraine,
and Ukraine's status vis-a-vis its smaller neighbours, is not dissimilar.The
main redeeming logic of the strategic partnership with Ukraine is that if
Russia is given a special consultative relationship, so must Ukraine.
25 A related question is what will happen to the Russian position on the
Central and Eastern European arms market.
26 Michael Shafir, "Irrational Irrationality in the Carpathians," RFE/RL
Newsline, 3 Aug. 1998.
27 For Russian and other cis reaction to the Russian-Belarusian Treaty, see
RFE/RL Newsline for 3-4 April 1997.
28 OMRI Daily Digest, ±4 March 1997. Primakov repeated this position in
June 1998, noting that while EU membership was acceptable, NATO mem-
bership would create "threats and inconveniences" for Russia. RFE/RL
Newsline, 15 June 1998. The United States has endorsed membership for
the Baltic states.
29 Ibid., 13, 24 March 1997.
30 See, for example, Paul Johnson, A History of the Modern World (Lon-
don: Weidenfeld and Johnson 1984), especially chsi-2. On Sino-Russian
relations, see the author's "Principal Directions in Russian Foreign Policy
[towards?] the CIS," in S. Neil MacFarlane, ed., Coming Together or
Falling Apart: Regionalism in the Former Soviet Union (Queen's Univer-
sity, Centre for International Relations, 1997). This article argues that,
despite historical and ideological divergences, Russia and China share a
number of strategic interests, including a desire to weaken or throw off
balance the United States, and are capable of forging a partnership that
could change security equations in both Europe and Asia.
31 Much of the material for this article is based on information gathered
during a briefing tour to Alliance headquarters sponsored by the u.s.
Delegation to NATO in April 1997. This brought together "Russia-watch-
ers" from all sixteen member countries for a series of high-level briefings
by senior Alliance officials that focused on NATO'S approach to Russia in
the context of enlargement.
32 Russia's announcement in the spring of 1997 that it would envisage
nuclear first-use in the event that its forces found themselves under duress
in a regional-security contingency could prove to have been the first salvo
in a possible new nuclear debate. RFE/RL Newsline, 30 April, 9 May

1997.
33 According to insiders, reaching consensus in the exercise that produced
the Strategic Concept of 1991 was excruciatingly difficult.
34 RFE/RL Newsline, 30 June 1998.
35 See Strategic Survey: 1990-1991,175-6 (London: Brassey's, International
Institute for Strategic Studies). After considerable intra-Alliance debate,
Belgium, Dutch, and German components of the ACE mobile force were
deployed to Turkey on 2 Jan. 1991.
36 Albania took advantage of this possibility in the spring of 1998 as the sit-
uation in Kosovo deteriorated and concern about military activities in the
vicinity of its northern border increased.
37 Other anomalies in the Washington Treaty are the emphasis on the pro-
tection of territory and the attention paid to the area in which the treaty
is operative. In the post-Cold War era,, NATO is more involved in protect-
ing communities and behavioural norms than in defending territory. After
the agonizing debates about out-of-area action during the Cold War, the
Alliance has managed to extend its radius of action beyond the treaty
zone, the only institutional limitation being the availability of a United
Nations Security Council mandate.
CHAPTER FOUR
1 Richard L. Kugler, "Enlargement at the Crossroads," Brown Journal of

World Affairs, winter/spring 1997.
2 Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "What Will
NATO Enlargement Cost?" Survival, autumn 1996.
3 Congressional Budget Office, "The Costs of Expanding the NATO
Alliance," CBO Papers, March 1996. CBO estimates the cost of a
new-member self-defence strategy at $60 billion, as compared to RAND'S
estimate of $2.0 billion.
4 See Clinton administration's "Report to Congress on NATO Enlarge-
ment," February 1997.
CHAPTER FIVE
i The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do
not represent the views of the U.S. government or any organization or
other agency with which the author is affiliated. The author thanks the
Miller Center Journal for its permission to draw on research used for the
earlier time periods in "The U.S. Role in Europe," May 1998, 115-30.
The original research for this chapter was done with funding provided by
the Institute for National Security Studies, the u.s. Air Force, and the
Naval Academy Research Council. The initial paper was presented in

Washington at the annual conference of the International Studies Associa-
tion in 1997 and in Montreal at the Universite du Quebec a Montreal
NATO Enlargement Conference in March 1997.
z White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlarge-
ment, July 1994," Z9.
3 NATO Enlargement Study (Brussels), September 1995.
4 See Mitterrand speech warning against hasty unification in the spring of
1990 to the Bundestag, Bonn.
5 The surprise Iraqi attack on Kuwait in the summer of 1990 vied also for
U.S. and allied policy makers' attention, of course.
6 U.S. Congress, Senate, Message from the President transmitting the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Treaty
Doc., ioz-8. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 9 July
1991.
7 Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "The Future of European Security: An
Interim Assessment," Brookings Occasional Papers, Washington, D.C.,
1995, 73-
8 In 1991 NATO foreign ministers issued statements on partnership with the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe; there are steps to include the
Central Europeans within the OSCE as well. Kelleher, "The Future of
European Security," app. A, "Selected European Security Chronology,
1948-94, 160-73.
9 NACC was hammered out in the policy-planning staff of the u.s. State
Department and held its first meeting with members in 1992-93. NATO
opened membership to all of the former Soviet Union, including Cen-
tral Asia and Central and Eastern Europe as well as neutral European
states. Membership was broad, with a few exceptions (for example,
Tajikistan).
10 Kelleher, "The Future of European Security," app. B, "Partnership for
Peace: Invitation," 174-8.
11 Ibid., 174.
iz Strobe Talbott, "Russia has nothing to fear," New York Times, 18 Feb.
1997, Az 5 .
13 While ten countries have been given associate status with promises of
consideration for full membership, the truth is that the EMU will occupy
a great deal of time and effort over the next few years, conveniently
making delay of EU enlargement understandable. See, for instance, Ian
Davidson, "In the fast lane," Financial Times, 19 Feb. 1997, iz, for a
critical review of the obstacles to EU enlargement.
14 The citation is from the statement by Secretary of State Warren Christo-
pher before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 30 June 30 1994
(xerox), relaying the president's strong convictions on the issue.
15 Adelphi Paper, 306 (December 1996), International Institute for Strategic

Studies.
16 There was a hard-fought battle which called on Secretary Holbrooke's
forceful skills.
17 NATO, ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO
headquarters, final communique, MNAC 2 (91) 116 Brussels, i Dec.
1994.
18 Background briefing by a senior administration official, U.S. mission to
NATO, Brussels, i Dec. 1994 (xerox), 2.
19 Two articles written over the summer during the Alliance study process
exemplified the debate: Senator Sam Nunn argued against enlargement in
a speech entitled "The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World" and deliv-
ered on 22 June 1995 in Norfolk, Virginia; and Strobe Talbott responded
two months later in "Why NATO Should Grow," New York Review of
Books, 10 Aug. 1995. Talbott also pointed out that those favouring
enlargement included senators Richard Lugar (Ind) and Mitch McConnell
(Ky) as well as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, James Baker,
and Henry Kissinger.
20 While this chapter is focused on the U.S.. debate, I do not mean to ignore
the fact that the Europeans were at the same time, albeit often at a differ-
ent tempo and at a more elitist level (involving more policy makers than
the general public), engaged in a discussion of the enlargement issue. For
one of many accounts that takes on a hard line on the Russian issue, see
Christoph Bertram, Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the
Cold War (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1995).
21 One of the most vocal of the opponents, and an early one, was Michael
Mandelbaum. See his recent Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: Twen-
tieth Century Fund, 1996).
22 In February the Communist politician who finished second to Yeltsin in
the presidential elections, Gennady Zyuganov, commented that the expan-
sion of NATO "would undermine the whole system of arms-race treaties
and ... be the biggest mistake of U.S.. foreign policy for the last fifty
years, since it will force a new round of mistrust and military force"
(Washington Post, "Bigger NATO, big U.S. 'mistake,'" 21 Feb. 1997,
A24). However, Alexander Lebed commented on a visit to NATO in Octo-
ber that "however much it dislikes the western alliance's plan to expand,
Russia will not 'go into hysterics' over this issue." Financial Times,
"Russian demons," 8 Oct. 1996.
23 President Clinton, September/October 1996 speech delivered at Detroit.
This was essentially the only major foreign-policy address of the cam-
paign. See Alison Mitchell, "Clinton urges NATO expansion in 1999,"
New York Times, 23 Oct. 1996, A2O, for the relevant citations from
Clinton's remarks with regard to NATO.
24 President Clinton, "Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the

State of the Union, February 4, 1997," Presidential Documents, 33, n. 6
(10 Feb. 1997), 136-45-
25 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between
NATO and the Russian Federation, 16 pp. (xerox).
26 Ibid., Paragraph 13: 6.
27 Strobe Talbott. "Russia has nothing to fear."
28 For an overview of Russian-NATO relations, see Andrew J. Pierre and
Dmitri Trenin, "Developing NATO-Russian Relations," Survival, spring
1997, 5~ I 4-
29 NATO Secretary General Solana reached out to Russia in a lead article in
the May-June 1997 issue of the NATO Review, "NATO-Russia Relations:
A Key Feature of European Security," 3.
30 NATO-Russian Founding Act, Paragraph 7: 3. Sections dealing with the
OSCE describe it as the "primary instrument in preventive diplomacy,
conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and
regional security cooperation." There is also support expressed for the
OSCE'S "Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the
2i st century," a long-term Russian interest.
31 Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has voiced his concern on
this issue, arguing that the council as a political structure is inappropri-
ate within NATO and should have been established outside the NATO
structure.
32 Founding Act, Section 4: 12.
33 The Danish referendum initially defeated the EU Maastricht Treaty and
French President Mitterrand was embarrassed when the vote in France
was far closer than he had anticipated, indeed, almost failed!
34 While all five of these issues in the Madrid Declaration were important to
various constituencies, the comments here will focus on the issues that
became more critical in the U.S. debate.
35 Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, press
release, meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Madrid, 8 July 1997.
36 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO, 20 May
1997 (English document: NACC/PFP[C]Df9 7 ] 5 ).
37 In the chill of the Cold War, the opening sections of the NATO Treaty
calling for democratic governments and market economies were often
overlooked. The New Strategic Concept - and enlargement specifically -
is an opportunity both to address the military challenges of the post-Cold
War era and to reinforce the concept of an Atlantic community based on
democratic and market principles.
38 Congressional Budget Office, "The Costs of Expanding the NATO Alli-
ance," CBO Papers, March 1996. Note that the low end, with possible
reinforcement and simply enhancement of new countries' defences, would
have run $60.6 billion for fourteen years ($4.8 billion for the United
States).
39 Ronald Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "What Will
NATO Enlargement Cost?" Survival, fall 1996, 5-26.
40 Report to the Congress, Enlargement of NATO: Rationale, Benefits,
Costs and Implications, submitted pursuant to section 1048 of FY 1997
Defense Authorization Act, February 1997, 3ipp. (xerox). Secretary
Cohen appears to have laid the issue to rest in hearings at the U.S. House
of Representatives in October 1997 and thereby precluded it from being
a concern in the Senate Foreign Relations hearings on 24 Feb. 1998.
41 Guy de Jonquieres, "Russia softens NATO stance," Financial Times, 4
Feb. 1997, i. A more vehement response to NATO enlargement itself
came from Secretary of the Security Council Ivan Rybkin, who com-
mented that "people should know that in the event of a direct challenge,
our response will be fully fledged, and we are to choose the means ...
including nuclear weapons. Of course, we are not speaking of a preven-
tive nuclear strike, but if an aggressor starts a war against us using con-
ventional weapons, we might respond using nuclear ones." See "Kremlin
chief warns of nuclear response to attack," Financial Times, 12 Feb.
1997, 12.
42 "An Open Letter to President Clinton," 26 June 1997 (xerox).
43 "Americans yet to be sold on need for larger NATO," Washington Post,
3 July 1997,1, A26.
44 The timing incensed enlargement opponents who had called for more
public debate. Should not a bill dealing with such a serious topic be given
more attention?
45 NATO Enlargement Ratification: "Resolution of Ratification to the Proto-
cols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic as agreed to by the Senate, Washington
DC, April 30, 1998," 14 pp.
46 Interestingly, the president's problems with Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr did not appear to play a role in the vote or the debate.
47 Support by Republicans was substantial and high-level. See Henry
Kissinger, "NATO: Make it stronger, make it larger," Washington Post,
14 Jan. 1997, Ai 5 .
CHAPTER SIX
Note: all quotations are translations.

1 Helga Haftendorn, "Le triangle strategique Bonn-Paris-Washington,"
Politique etrangere, 3 (fall 1996), 561.
2 Peter Schmidt, "Defis et perspectives de la politique europeenne de secu-
rite de PAllemagne," Politique etrangere, 3 (fall 1996), 577.
3 As of 31 Dec. 1989, France also tried to respond to the Central and East-
ern European states' westward yearnings by proposing a "European Con-
federation." This proposal was not perceived as a serious response to the
needs of these states and fell flat. Vaclav Havel made their position crys-
tal clear to Francois Mitterrand at the June 1991 Prague conference.
4 The Stability Pact constituted another French attempt at "diversification."
Proposed by Edouard Balladur in 1994, it never went beyond being an
add-on to European security.
5 Francois Mitterand, 9 Jan. 1996, interview with Agence France Presse
prior to the NATO summit: Documents d'actualite Internationale, 4
(15 Feb. 1994), 75-
6 Jacques Andreani, "Les relations franco-americaines," Politique etrangere,
4 (winter 1995-96), 897.
7 This is one of the main reasons why, when it became clear that the Baltic
states could not be part of the first batch of new members (or possibly
the next batch, if there was one), the French government opposed the
American proposal to grant them rapid entry into the EU by way of com-
pensation.
8 Alain Juppe, speech delivered on 30 Jan. 1995 on the twentieth anniver-
sary of the Centre d'analyse et de prevision (CAP), Politique etrangere, i
(spring 1995), 252.
9 Alain Juppe, 4 Feb. 1995, Defense nationale, April 1995, 10.
10 Herve de Charette, statement by the foreign minister on 2 April 1996
before the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense nationale, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Politique etrangere de la France, textes et documents
(March-April 1996), 163-7.
11 Herve de Charette, 5 Dec. 1995, Documents d'actualite Internationale, 2
(15 Jan. 1996), 76-7.
12 Herve de Charette, interview with Le Figaro, 20 Dec. 1995, Ministry of
(November-December 1995), 314.
13 Following the Russian presidential elections in the spring of 1996, the
enlargement process picked up steam with President Clinton's statement
on 6 Sept. 1996 in Orlando (Nouvelles atlantiques, 2845 [11 Sept.1996],
i), confirmed the same day by Warren Christopher in Stuttgart (Docu-
ments d'actualite Internationale, 21 [i Nov. 1996], 875). They announced
that, during a summit planned for the spring or early summer of 1997,
several partners would be invited to open NATO membership negotia-
tions. In Detroit, on 22 October, Clinton established the timetable and
came out in favour of an initial enlargement involving a first group of
countries in 1999, on the occasion of NATO'S fiftieth anniversary in April
(Nouvelles atlantiques, 2859 [25 Oct. 1996], 2).
14 Jacques Chirac, speech before the United States Congress, i Feb. 1996,
Documents d'actualite Internationale, j (i April 1996), 247.
15 Le Monde, 2-3 June 1996.
16 Andre Fontaine, "De la difficulte de boire dans son verre," Relations
internationales et strategiques, 25 (spring 1997), 44-52.
17 Herve de Charette, interview with Le Figaro, 10 June 1996, Ministry of
(May-June 1996), 225.
18 Jacques Chirac, speech before the Conference of Ambassadors of France
in Paris, 29 Aug. 1996, Documents d'actualite Internationale, 20 (15 Oct.
1996).
19 Pascal Boniface, "Avantages et limites du volontarisme en politique
etrangere," Relations internationales et strategiques, 25 (spring 1997),
19-26.
20 Le Monde, 17 Jan. 1997.
21 Andre Fontaine, "De la difficulte de boire dans son verre," 49.
22 Jacques Chirac, speech before the Conference of Ambassadors of France,
817.
23 Herve de Charette, meeting with his counterpart Yevgeny Primakov in
Moscow, 8 Oct. 1996, Le Monde, 10 Oct. 1996.
24 Particularly with the Baltic states and Ukraine (although the latter was not
a candidate), with which Paris wanted to establish a "special relationship."
817.
26 Alain Juppe, speech delivered 30 Jan. 1995, 251.
27 Anne de Tinguy, "Paris-Moscou: vers un partenariat privilegie dans une
Europe reconciliee?" Relations internationales et strategiques , 25 (spring
1997), 85.
28 After suspending the membership process owing to the war in Chechnya,
the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers invited the Russian Fed-
eration to join the organization on 8 Feb. 1996, following authorization
from the Parliamentary Assembly on 25 January.
29 Discussions on the modernization of the CFE Treaty were initiated in
Vienna, under the auspices of the OSCE, in January 1997.
30 The ratification of the EU/Russia partnership and cooperation agreement,
signed in Corfu on 24 June 1994, was delayed by the Chechen war. But
an interim agreement allowed the trade component to come into effect on
i Feb. 1996. Moreover, France pushed the Union to support the principle
of Russian membership in the World Trade Organization.
31 Before signing its pfp document in 1995, Moscow had already demanded
that the document be accompanied by a "document on special relations
and on broad and strengthened dialogue and cooperation."
32 Alain Juppe, speech delivered 30 Jan. 1995, 252..

33 Alain Juppe, press conference held on 19 March 1995, at the close of the
EU meeting in Carcassonne on relations between Europe and Russia,
Nouvelles atlantiques, 2.704 (22 March 1995), i.
817.
3 5 Herve de Charette, hearing of the National Assembly's Commission de la
defense nationale et des forces armees, 19 March 1996, Politique
etrangere de la France, textes et documents (March-April), 85.
36 Another instance of this position was France's proposal (rejected by the
United States in particular) to hold an informal five-country summit in
Paris to promote Russia-NATO relations in the context of negotiations on
NATO enlargement.
37 Jacques Chirac, speech delivered at the OSCE summit in Lisbon, 2 Dec.
1996, Documents actualite Internationale 4 ( 1 5 Feb. 1997), 143.
CHAPTER SEVEN
1 See Ronald D. Asmus, "Kein Kult der Zuriickhaltung mehr," Frankfurter

Allgemeine Zeitung, n April 1996.
2 Michael Kreile, "Verantwortung und Interesse in der deutschen AuSen-
und Sicherheitspolitik," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 26 Jan. 1996, 4.
3 On this question, see Gunther Hellmann, "The Sirens of Power and
German Foreign Policy: Who Is Listening?" German Politics, 6, no. 2
(August 1997), 29-57, and Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, The
German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1997).
4 See Hans-Peter Schwarz, Zentralmacht Europas: Deutschlands Riickkehr
auf die Weltbuhne (Berlin: Siedler 1994).
5 Christian Hacke, "Die neue Bedeutung des nationalen Interesses fur die
AuSenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Aus Politik und Zeitge-
schichte, 3 Jan. 1997, 9.
6 Lothar Riihl, Deutschland als europaische Macht (Bonn: Bouvier 1996),
47-
7 On the influence of history on the framing of German foreign policy and
national interests, see Thomas U. Berger, "The Past in the Present: Histor-
ical Memory and German National Security Policy," German Politics, 6,
no. i (April 1997), 39-59-
8 Gerd Schmiickle, "Schwankende Haltung," Der Spiegel, 10 Feb. 1997.
9 David Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and
the Holocaust (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1996).
10 Eckhard Liibkemeier, "The United Germany in the Post-Bipolar World,"
Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 2 (1994), 151.
Notes to pages 111-13 M1
ii Thomas Banchoff, "Historical Memory and German Foreign Policy: The

Cases of Adenauer and Brandt," German Politics and Society, 14, no. 2
(summer 1996), 46.
iz Volker Riihe, "Growing Responsibility," German Comments, 42. (April
1996), 35-
13 Peter Schmidt, "Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen von EU, WEU,
NATO," Aussenpolitik, 47, no. 3 (1996), 22,1.
14 Riihe, "Growing Responsibility," 34.
15 See Paul Letourneau and Marie-Elisabeth Rakel, "Germany: To Be or
Not To Be Normal?" in Philippe G. LePrestre, ed., Role Quests in the
Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press 1997), 116-17. This article presents a content
analysis of forty five speeches by German political leaders, focusing on
recurring themes in relation to foreign-policy issues.
16 See David Schoenbaum and Elizabeth Pond, The German Question and
Other German Questions (New York: St Martin's Press 1996), 205.
17 Volker Riihe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a
New Era," Survival, 35, no. 2 (summer 1993), 135.
18 See the important article by Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F.
Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 4
(September-October 1993), 28-40.
19 See Karl Feldmeyer, "Deutschland: Unterstiitzung und Sympathie," Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 Jan. 1994, 6-7.
20 "Kohl: Die NATO mufS die Sicherheitsbediirfnisse der ostlichen Nachbarn
ernst nehmen," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 Jan. 1994, i.
21 Helga Hirsch, "Leiden an der Vergangenheit," Die Zeit, 14 July 1995, 5-
22 For a Polish view of the debate on enlargement, see Wlodzimierz
Cimoszewicz, "L'adhesion a I'OTAN, objectif cle de la construction de la
securite de la Pologne," Revue de I'otan, May 1996, 3-7.
23 Kazimierz Woycicki, "Zur Besonderheit der deutsch-polnischen Beziehun-
gen," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 5 July 1996, 14. See also Krzystof
Skubiszewski, "Deutschland: Anwalt Mitteleuropas," Internationale Poli-
tik, 2 (February 1997), 29-33.
24 "German-Polish Relations, Future EU and NATO membership dominate
Kwasniewski visit to Bonn," The Week in Germany (New York: German
Information Center, 12 Jan. 1996), i.
25 Paul Letourneau and Jan Grabowski, "Les nouvelles relations germano-
polonaises," Revue d'Allemagne, 27, no. 3 (July-September 1995), 339.
26 Friedbert Pfliiger, "Die deutsch-polnische Interessengemeinschaft," in Karl
Kaiser and Joachim Krause, eds., Deutschlands neue Auflenpolitik, 3
(Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag 1996), 143-9.
27 "Jelzin wendet sich bei der KSZE in Budapest gegen eine Ost-Erweiterung
der NATO," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 Dec. 1994, i.
z8 S. Neil MacFarlane, "La Russie et la securite de 1'Allemagne dans la nou-

velle Europe," Revue d'Allemagne, 27, no. 3 (July-September 1995), 375.
Z9 Entwicklung im Prozejl der NATO-Osterweiterung, Wissenschaftliche
Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, Fachbereich II (Bonn: February
1996), 10.
30 Entwicklung im Prozefi.
31 "Polen warnt die NATO vor iibergrofien Zugestandnissen an RuEland,"
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 April 1997, i.
32 "Kohl: Bei Ost-Erweiterung der NATO miissen RuSlands Sicherheitsinter-
essen beachtet werden," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 Feb. 1996, i,
and "Kohl: Discussion with Russia on NATO expansion should not be
forced," The Week in Germany (New York: German Information Center,
23 Feb. 1996), i-z. See also "Problemlos anflanschen," Der Spiegel, 9
Sept. 1996, 37-8.
33 Christoph Bertram, "Kein Feind, viel Ehr," Die Zeit, 28 Feb. 1997, i.
34 "NATO-Erweiterung zerstort Gleichgewicht," Siiddeutsche Zeitung,
18 March 1997.
35 "Bedroht und beleidigt," Der Spiegel, 13 Jan. 1997, no-n, and "Kinkel
in Moscow: NATO and Russia will find a solution to expansion impasse,"
The Week in Germany (New York: German Information Center, 21 Feb.
1997), i.
36 Karsten D. Voigt, Zur Osterweiterung der NATO, Diskussion in der
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 12 April 1995 (Bonn), i.
37 See "Bald NATO-Manover mit den beitrittswilligen Osteuropaern.
Regierung und Opposition einig," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14
Jan. 1994, 2.
38 Mary M. McKenzie, "Competing Conceptions of Normality in the Post-
Cold War Era: Germany, Europe, and Foreign Policy Change," German
Politics and Society, 14, no. 2 (summer 1996), 8.
39 Hermann Scheer, "NATO-Osterweiterung: Eine historisch falsche Weichen-
stellung," Vierteljahresschrift fur Sicherheit und Frieden, 14, no. i (1996),
40. See also Eckhard Liibkemeier and Oliver Thranert, NATO, osze und
Europdische Sicherheit, Reihe Eurokolleg, 35 (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
1995), 7-9-
40 McKenzie, "Competing Conceptions," 7-8. See also Ludger Kiihnhardt,
"Germany's Role in European Security," SAIS Review, 15 (fall 1995),
112-15.
41 Oliver Thranert, "NATO-Erweiterung? Vorerst nicht!" Internationale
Politik und Gesellschaft, 2 (summer 1995), 191-3. For the opposing
argument, see Peter Schmidt, "NATO-Erweiterung: moglichst bald," in
the same issue.
42 On this subject, see the excellent article by Wolfram Wette, "Sonderweg
oder Normalitat? Zur Diskussion um die internationale Position der
Bundesrepublik," Blatter fur deutsche und Internationale Politik, i Jan.

1996, 61-70.
43 "Der Bundestag mit deutlicher Mehrheit fur den Bosnien-Einsatz der
Bundeswehr," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, i July 1995, i.
44 "Der Bundestag mit grower Mehrheit ftir die Entsendung der Bundeswehr-
Soldaten nach Bosnien," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, j Dec. 1995, i.
45 On the SPD'S attitude during the Bosnia crisis, see Franz-Josef Meiers,
NATO'S Peacekeeping Dilemma, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Poli-
tik, 94 (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Auswar-
tige Politik May 1996), 61-75.
46 Ronald D. Asmus, Germany's Geopolitical Maturation: Public Opinion
and Security Policy in 1994 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND 1995), 19-20.
47 Paul Letourneau and Philippe Hebert, "L'Allemagne: la culture de la
retenue revue et corrigee," in Alex Macleod and Stephane Roussel, eds.,
Interet national et responsabilites internationales: six Etats face au conflit
en ex-Yougoslavie (Montreal: Guerin universitaire 1996), 77-8. See also
"Fischers langer Schatten," Der Spiegel, 24 July 1995, 26-8.
48 Angelika Beer, "Starkung und Reform der osZE-Ziele einer Europaischen
Friedensordnung," Vierteljahresschrift fur Sicherheit und Frieden, 14,
no. i (1996), 25-8.
49 Krista Sager, "Grime Friedens - und Sicherheitspolitik," Internationale
Politik, vol. 51, no. 8 (August 1996), 47.
50 Ibid., 48.
51 McKenzie, "Competing Conceptions," 4.
52 Asmus, Germany's Geopolitical Maturation, 47.
53 Mary Mclntosh, A Congressional-Executive Dialogue on NATO'S Future
and us Interests. Public and Parliamentary Opinion: European and
American Attitudes toward NATO (Washington: United States Information
Agency 1996), tables i and 4.
54 Ronald D. Asmus, What Does the German Elite Think about National
Security Policy? RP-52I (Santa Monica: RAND May 1996), i.
55 Ibid., 3.
56 Ibid., 4.
57 Mclntosh, A Congressional-Executive Dialogue, table 7. On fluctuations
in public opinion in these countries, see Michael Mihalka, "The Emerging
European Security Order," Transition, vol. i, no. 23 (December 1995),
15-18.
58 "Germany and Eastern Europe," International Security Review (Royal
United Services Institute for Defence Studies: London 1996), 30.
59 The signing of the Founding Act between Russia and NATO was well
received in Germany and many observers see it as an important stage in
the pursuit of closer cooperation between Moscow and the West: Gernot
Erler, "Zwischen Einbindung und Ausgrenzung: Perspektiven der NATO-
Osterweiterung," Blatter fur deutsche und Internationale Politik, August

1997, 936.
CHAPTER EIGHT
1 NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2 (also known as the Canadian
article because Canada was its architect), Washington, D.C., 4 April
1949.
2 Canada, Department of National Defence, "Canadian Contribution,"
Canada and NATO, Information document (Ottawa: 1996).
3 On this debate, see Paul Buteux's concise analysis, "Commitment or
Retreat: Redefining the Canadian Role in the Alliance," Canadian
Defence, 23, no. 2 (December 1993), 12-16; and Douglas Alan Ross,
"From a Cheap Ride to a Free Ride to No Ride at All?" International
Journal, 50 (fall 1995), 721-30.
4 On Canadian missions in the former Yugoslavia, see, for example, the
following articles: Canadian Press, "Un hiver rude pour les soldats cana-
diens en Bosnie," La Presse, 6 Jan. 1996; and "Un millier de Canadiens
regagnent 1'ex-Yougoslavie," Le Devoir, 8 Jan. 1996. On diplomatic mis-
sions, see: Canada, DFAIT, "NATO Secretary General to Visit Canada,"
Press Release #22, 16 Feb. 1996; Lloyd Axworthy, "Notes for an Address
by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the
Atlantik-Briicke Conference, Louisbourg, N.S.," 7 Oct. 1996.
5 For a typical example of this line of reasoning, see Stephane Roussel and
Charles-Philippe David, "Une espece en voie disparition? La politique de
puissance moyenne du Canada apres la guerre froide," International
Journal, 52 (winter 1996-97), 39-68.
6 "Helping and respecting Russia," Globe and Mail, 21 Oct. 1995.
7 "Slowing NATO'S expansion," Globe and Mail, 8 Jan. 1996.
8 "No NATO expansion," Globe and Mail, 19 Feb. 1997.
9 Frederic Wagniere, "L'oTAN fait fausse route," La Presse, 13 Dec.
1996.
10 Francois Brousseau, "Ne pas humilier la Russie," Le Devoir, 21 March
1997, A8. On this newspaper's position, see also Graham Fraser, "Le prix
de 1'expansion de POTAN," Le Devoir, 18 March 1997.
11 Frederic Wagniere, "L'oTAN fait fausse route."
12 See Owen Harries, "The Collapse of the West," Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 4
(September 1993), 41-53; George F. Kennan, "A fateful error," New York
Times, 5 Feb. 1997; Graham Fraser, "Le prix de 1'expansion de I'OTAN."
13 "Opening the Door."
14 Madeleine Albright, Why.
15 Russia has been attending the annual Gj summits and the parallel politi-
cal meetings (P8) on an unofficial basis since 1991.
16 Jocelyn Coulon, "L'OTAN elargie sera un gage de stabilite," Le Devoir,

i April 1997.
17 J.E. Killick, "Letters: No to NATO expansion," Economist, 8 March
1997.
18 NATO, "Chapter I: Purposes and Principles of Enlargement," Study on
NATO Enlargement, Brussels, September 1995.
19 u.s. Department of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs,
Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications (Washington
D.C., 24 Feb. 1997).
20 Andre Ouellet, "An Address to the Ministerial Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council," Statement #93/63, DFAIT, Brussels, 2 Dec. 1993.
21 See articles in Le Devoir, 5 Jan. 1994, and Globe and Mail, 19 Jan.
1994.
22 NATO Review, i February 1994, 30-3.
23 Canada, DFAIT, News Release #114, 3 June 1994.
24 La Presse, 13 Sept. 1994.
25 Canada, Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence, 1994.
26 Canada, DFAIT, Canada in the World: Government Statement (Ottawa:
Canada Communications Group 1995), 34-5.
27 Andre Ouellet, "An Address to the NATO Council: NATO Expansion and
Russia," Statement #95/35, DFAIT, 30 May 1995.
28 Associated Press, "Ouellet favorable a 1'expansion de I'OTAN," La Presse,
5 Sept. 1995.
29 Canada, DFAIT, "NATO Secretary General to Visit Canada."
30 Lloyd Axworthy, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd
Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Atlantik-Briicke
Conference."
31 Lloyd Axworthy, "Notes for an Address by President d'honneur the
Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Opening
of the North Atlantic Council," Statement #96/56, DFAIT, Brussels,
10 Dec. 1996.
32 Lloyd Axworthy, "An Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Special Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council," Statement #97/9, DFAIT, Brussels, 18 Feb. 1997.
33 Jocelyn Coulon, "La Roumanie adherera rapidement," Le Devoir, 22 Feb.
1997, Cn.
34 Canada, DFAIT, "Eggleton Travels to Poland and Russia to Promote
Trade and Investment," Press Release #186, 9 Oct. 1996.
35 Canada, DFAIT, "Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Visits Canada,"
Press Release #181, 3 Oct. 1996.
36 Hugh Windsor, "Hungary lobbies Canada for support," Globe and Mail,
28 Nov. 1996.
2,46 Notes to pages 130-5
37 Juliet O'Neill, "Walesa pushes NATO bid," Ottawa Citizen, n March

1997.
38 Andrzek M. Garlicki, "Enlarging NATO membership," Globe and Mail,
19 Feb. 1997.
39 Lloyd Axworthy, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd
Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on Sustainable Development in
Canadian Foreign Policy," Statement #97/2.1, DFAIT, Vancouver, 17 April
1997.
40 Madeleine Albright, Why.
41 Graham Fraser, "Canada's defence cost to jump," Globe and Mail, 25
Feb. 1997.
42 Multilateralism is essentially defined as the pursuit of policy coordination
on a given problem by three or more states, leading to a common solu-
tion. Multilateralism may be conducted through agreements, ad hoc
arrangements, or institutions. For more on this subject, see the article by
Robert Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," Interna-
tional Journal, 45 (fall 1990), 731-65.
43 Lloyd Axworthy, "Entre mondialisation et bipolarite: pour une politique
etrangere du Canada globale et humaine," Etudes Internationales, 28,
no. i (March 1997) 105.
44 See two interesting recent articles on this subject: Andrew Cooper, "In
Search of Saying 'Yes' and Saying 'No' in Canada's International Rela-
tions," Canadian Foreign Policy, 3 (winter 1995); and Evan H. Potter,
"Niche Diplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy," International Journal, 52
(winter 1996-97), 25-38.
45 Canada, DFAIT, Canada in the World.
46 Jocelyn Coulon, "L'option multilateral cachee," International Journal,
50 (fall 1995), 738.
47 Kenneth J. Calder, "Doing the Things that Matter: Canada and Euro-
Atlantic Security," International journal, 50 (fall 1995), 703.
48 Paul Buteux, "A Canadian View of the Trans-Atlantic Relationship,"
paper delivered at the 4ist general assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Asso-
ciation, Toronto, 4 Oct. 1995.
49 Paul Buteux, "Constructing a New Consensus," International Journal, 50
(fall 1995), 73 6 -
50 Canada, DFAIT, "Canada Providing Mission to Observe Elections in Bos-
nia," Press Release #160, 12 Sept. 1996; and Jooneed Khan, "Retisser, en
Bosnie, les liens entre ennemis d'hier," La Presse, 28 May 1996, C2O.
51 Myriam Gervais and Andre Donneur, "Le Canada et la securite: 1'exem-
ple de 1'assistance technique a 1'Europe centrale et de Test (1989-1995),"
Revue de Sciences Politiques 36 (2nd semester 1996), 15-40.
52 Allen G. Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and
Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance," International Journal, 50
(fall 1995), 675-700.
53 Tom Keating, "Multilateralism in the Nineties," Canada and World

Order (Toronto: McClleland and Stewart 1993), 232-44.
54 Agence France Presse, "L'oTAN divisee sur 1'expansion," La Presse,
30 May 1997, A2O.
55 Andre Donneur and Stephane Roussel, "Le Canada: quand 1'expertise et
la credibilite ne suffisent plus," in A. Macleod and S. Roussel, ed., Interet
national et responsabilites Internationales: Six Etats face au conflit en ex-
Yougoslavie (1991-195)5,) (Montreal: Guerin 1996), 143-60.
CHAPTER NINE
A shorter version of this paper has been published under the same title in
International Journal, 52 (summer 1997), 464-82. I would like to thank
the editors of the journal for permission to draw upon that article in this
volume.
1 For two such conflicting images, see Jocelyn Coulon, "L'option multi-
laterale affichee," International Journal, 50 (fall 1995): 738-42; and
Douglas Alan Ross, "From a Cheap Ride to a Free Ride to No Ride at
All?" ibid, 721-30.
2 On the need for Canadian policy makers to synthesize a "security policy"
out of disparate foreign and defence policies, see David B. Dewitt and
David Leyton-Brown, "Canada's International Security Policy," in Dewitt
and Leyton-Brown, eds., Canada's International Security Policy (Scarbor-
ough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada 1995), 1-27. That Canada has had,
during the Cold War, a "grand strategy" is argued by Allen Sens, Hang-
ing Out in Europe: Necessary or Discretionary? working paper no. 4
(Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, University of British
Columbia, August 1994).
3 See Norman Hillmer, "The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: The Case of O.D.
Skelton," in Peter Lyon, ed., Britain and Canada: Survey of a Changing
Relationship (London: Frank Cass 1976), 61-84.
4 For English Canadians it tended to be a source of positive identification;
for French Canadians it tended to be the reverse.
5 Not for nothing did some Canadians regard the battle of Vimy Ridge as
the crowning moment in "Canada's war of independence." See Desmond
Morton, A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to the Gulf
War, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1992), 145.
6 Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 3rd ed.
(Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice Hall Canada 1997), 151-3.
7 For these comments, see, respectively, John Bartlet Brebner, North Atlan-
tic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Brit-
ain (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1966), 323; and Donald
Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 19351-1957 (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart 1976), 4-5.
8 For the depiction of Canada as an ally that was less than fully commit-
ted, see Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, Canada and Collective
Security: Odd Man Out, Washington Papers/izi (New York: Praeger
1986). At the time they wrote this monograph, the authors were proba-
bly correct in discerning a flagging of Canada's interest in the Alliance,
but it was a declining interest in "collective defence not "collective secu-
rity" that was being manifested.
9 No one has put it better than John Holmes: "Contrary to views widely
held, especially by American revisionists, the United States did not create
NATO. If it was a plot, as they allege, it involved the British and Canadi-
ans along with some West Europeans and some members of the us State
Department." See his "The Dumbbell Won't Do," Foreign Policy, 50
(spring 1983), 7. But for an argument (non-revisionist) that neglects the
"Euro-Canadian" role in the formation of the Alliance in favour of an
emphasis upon domestic American political factors, see Steve Weber,
"Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO,"
International Organization, 46 (summer 1992), 633-80.
10 According to RJ. Sutherland, Canada in 1945 was "very probably, the
fourth most powerful nation in the world." See his "Canada's Long Term
Strategic Situation," International Journal, 17 (summer 1962), 203.
11 Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, "Statement on
Defence Budget Reductions," Ottawa, March 1996; briefing, senior DND
official, Ottawa, April 1996. For an excellent review of Canadian defence
spending in the post-Second World War era, see John M. Treddenick,
"The Defence Budget," in Canada's International Security Policy, 413-54.
12 Quoted in David J. Bercuson, "Canada, NATO, and Rearmament, 1950-
1954: Why Canada Made a Difference (but Not for Very Long)," in John
English and Norman Hillmer, eds., Making a Difference? Canada's
Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order (Toronto: Lester Publishing
1992), 104-5.
13 R.B. Byers, Canadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and the Chal-
lenges, Adelphi Papers 214 (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, winter 1986), 9; William T.R. Fox, A Continent Apart: The
United States and Canada in World Politics (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press 1985), 122-3.
14 Kim Richard Nossal, "A European Nation? The Life and Times of
Atlanticism in Canada," in Making a Difference? 85-7.
15 Quoted in Roy Rempel, Counterweights: The Failure of Canada's
German and European Policy, 1955-1995 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press 1996), 40-1.
16 Quoted in Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign
Policy in the Trudeau Era (London: Oxford University Press/Royal
Institute of International Affairs 1972), 31.
Z
17 See Paul Buteux, "NATO and the Evolution of Canadian Defence and
Foreign Policy," in Canada's International Security Policy, 162-3; ar>d
Tom Keating and Larry Pratt, Canada, NATO, and the Bomb: The
Western Alliance in Crisis (Edmonton: Hurtig 1988), 36-7.
18 Peter C. Dobell, "Europe: Canada's Last Chance?" International Journal,
27 (winter 1971-72), 114-15.
19 See Charles C. Pentland, "Canada's European Option in the 19805," in
Nils 0rvik and Pentland, eds., The European Community at the Cross-
roads: The First Twenty-Five Years (Kingston: Queen's University Centre
for International Relations 1983), 268.
20 Notes one observer apropos the then secretary of state for external
affairs, the "essential element of [Joe] Clark's vision of the new Europe,
'the drawing board for the new European architecture,' is the CSCE pro-
cess." See Robert Wolfe, "Atlanticism without the Wall: Transatlantic
Cooperation and the Transformation of Europe," International Journal.
46 (winter 1990-91), 158.
21 Frits Bolkestein, "NATO: Deepening and Broadening," NATO Review, 44
(July 1996).
22 Sharing this position is Nicole Gnesotto, "Common European Defence
and Transatlantic Relations," Survival, 38 (spring 1996), 24-5. According
to her, "NATO'S credibility ... particularly in the eyes of its European
members, requires the maintenance of its primary collective defence func-
tion - including nuclear deterrence."
23 Josef Joffe, "NATO after Victory: New Products, New Markets, and the
Microeconomics of Alliance," in David G. Haglund, ed., Will NATO Go
East? The Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance (Kingston: Queen's
University Centre for International Relations 1996), 64. Here Joffe wor-
ries that an expanded NATO will be a different NATO, one unable to prof-
fer its traditional "product" to the new members in Central Europe.
"What is the 'core product'? It is not Article 5, which actually contains
but a very weakly worded pledge of mutual succour. The 'Real Thing' is
the blood-and-iron arrangements on the ground that turned verbal
pledges into tangible guarantees: the forward-deployment of troops, the
'layer cake,' the integration of forces under an American SACEUR, and the
insertion of U.S. nuclear weapons into the deterrence equation."
24 See Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund Press 1996), 173.
25 This is not to pass judgment on the merits of the case itself, only to com-
ment upon its ability to mobilize supporters in Canada and the United
States. For the conceptual merits of the case, see Robert J. Art, "Why
Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science
Quarterly, in (spring 1996), 1-39. Support for Art's argument, from a
European perspective, can be found in a remarkably candid conference
summary published recently in the Netherlands. See Arie Elshout, "British

Perspectives on the German EU Policy, Round Table Conference, 13 Sep-
tember 1996" (Amsterdam: Germany Institute of the University of
Amsterdam 1996), especially 9, which reports on some conferees' worry
that a failure of the European Monetary Union might lead France "to
seek protection [from Germany] in a renewed alliance between [itself],
England and Russia." No less concerned about the political consequences
of a failure of monetary union is Christoph Bertram, "Europas Jahr der
Entscheidungen," Die Zeit, 31 Jan. 1997, 3: "If this ambitious plan fails
... then power in Europe will become newly distributed, and newly
contested."
26 See David G. Haglund, "Must NATO Fail? Theories, Myths, and Policy
Dilemmas," International Journal, 50 (fall 1995), 651-74.
27 For a discussion of various explanations of the rise and demise of
alliances, see Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,"
Survival, 39 (spring 1997), 156-79-
28 "The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Agreed by the Heads of State and
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
in Rome on 7-8 November 1991," reproduced as Appendix IX, NATO
Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press 1995),
235-48.
29 One such analyst is Christoph Bertram, who argues that unless NATO
becomes a stabilizing factor for the Central and Eastern Europeans
through enlarging, it will have no future whatsoever. See his "Kein Feind,
viel Ehr'," Die Zeit, 21 Feb. 1997, i. Also see Karl Kaiser, who identifies
NATO'S primary task today to be that of spreading democracy to the east:
"Reforming NATO," Foreign Policy, 103 (summer 1996), 135-7.
30 For NATO'S increasing self-definition in the context of cooperative secu-
rity, see the chapter written by the head of the policy-planning section of
NATO'S international staff, John Barrett, in "NATO'S Year of Study:
Results and Policy Implications," in Will NATO Go East? 93-114.
31 For the frustrations of coordination on the part of the parliamentary
committees, see Denis Stairs, "The Public Politics of the Canadian
Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews," Canadian Foreign Policy, 3 (spring
1995), 9 I -n6.
32 See Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994
Defence WhitePaper (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1994); and
Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Canada in the World (Ottawa 1995).
33 Canada zi: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century
(Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto 1994), 67.
34 Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada's
Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future (Ottawa: Parlia-
mentary Publications Directorate, November 1994), 21.
Notes to pages 149-50 2.51
35 Noted one prominent participant in the debate, we are now in an age

when "common" security has assumed greater resonance, meaning inter
alia that there will be more "emphasis on collective security rather than
on alliances against enemies." Janice Gross Stein, "Ideas, Even Good
Ideas, Are Not Enough: Changing Canada's Foreign and Defence Poli-
cies," International Journal, 50 (winter 1994-95), 66-7.
36 See "Notes pour une intervention par M. Francis Leblanc, Secretaire par-
lementaire de 1'honorable Lloyd Axworthy, Ministre des Affaires
etrangeres a 1'occasion de la conference annuelle du Conseil atlantique du
Canada," Ottawa, 4 Oct. 1996.
37 For standard but nonetheless valuable introductions to the concept, see
Marina and Lawrence Finkelstein, eds., Collective Security (San Fran-
cisco: Chandler 1966); Arnold Wolfers, "Collective Defense versus Collec-
tive Security," in Wolfers, ed. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on
International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1962,);
and Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House
1956). A more recent treatment of the topic is Richard K. Betts, "Systems
for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the
New Europe," International Security, 17, i (summer 1992,), 5-43.
38 Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams
and Dead Ends," Survival, 34 (spring 1992.), 39.
39 Charles A. Kupchan, "Reviving the West," Foreign Affairs, 75 (May/June
1996), 93.
40 Charles A. and Clifford Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the
Future of Europe," International Security, 16 (summer 1991), 140-1.
41 Joffe, "Collective Security," 36.
42 This is the case with Michael Mandelbaum, who holds cooperative secu-
rity to be a synonym for "common security," the defining characteristics
of which are, first, the absence of state-level causes of conflict, and sec-
ond, the recognition that since anarchy can sometimes lead to unintended
("defensive") wars, concrete measures are required to minimize the secu-
rity dilemma. See Dawn of Peace in Europe, 75-6.
43 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Con-
struction of Power Politics, " International Organization, 46 (spring
1992), 401.
44 Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, "Canada's International Security Policy," 20-1.
45 David B. Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,"
Pacific Review, 7 (1994), i, 7.
46 Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, "Canada's International Security Policy,"
13-14.
47 See the assertion that "in such a diffuse international system, states a
rung or two below the level of great powers will harness capabilities in
pursuit of their interests, undertaking to establish extended bilateral rela-
tions while, simultaneously, seeking multilateral fora for the pursuit of
252. Notes to pages 151-2
wider, systemic concerns, most notably military security and economic

stability, and in so doing enhance both their own and the coalition's stat-
ure and legitimacy." Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative
Security," 8-9.
48 Excellent discussions of these two principles can be found in Denis Stairs,
"Will and Circumstance and the Postwar Study of Canada's Foreign
Policy," International Journal, 50 (winter 1994-95), 9-39; and R.A.
MacKay, "The Canadian Doctrine of the Middle Power," in J.L. Granat-
stein, ed. Towards a New World: Readings in the History of Canadian
Foreign Policy (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman 1992.), 65-75.
49 For this claim, see, in addition to Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance
of Power," Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Logic of the
West," World Policy Journal, 10 (winter 1993-94), 17-25; G. John
Ikenberry, "The Future of International Leadership," Political Science
Quarterly, in (fall 1996), 385-402; and John Gerard Ruggie, "Multi-
lateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," International Organization,
46 (summer 1992,), 561-98.
50 Denis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," Cana-
dian Journal of Political Science, 15 (December 1982), 684-5.
51 For the argument that grand strategy must be cumulative and build upon
interests and principles inherited from the past, see James Kurth, "Amer-
ica's Grand Strategy: A Pattern of History," National Interest, 43 (spring
1996), 3-19. Interestingly, cooperative security has even been proposed as
a possible American grand strategy in the post-Cold War world; see Barry
R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strat-
egy," International Security, 21 (winter 1996-97), 5-53.
52 For instance, Rempel, Counterweights, 200, sees cooperative security as
fruitlessly deflecting policy attention away from regions of the world "of
real strategic and political importance to Canada," such as Europe; while
Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security," i, regards
cooperative security to be a "promising" arrangement for the Asia-
Pacific.
53 See David G. Haglund, "No Compass, Just an Anchor: Canada and the
Centre-Periphery Question," in Haglund., ed., The Centre-Periphery
Debate in International Security (Clementsport, N.S.: Canadian Peace-
keeping Press 1996), 15-28.
54 For examples, see Brian Job et al., "International Institutions in the
Twenty-First Century: Can Canada Help to Meet the Challenge?" Cana-
dian Foreign Policy, 3 (fall 1995), 103-12; and Jean Daudelin and Edgar
J. Dosman, "Introduction: The New Era in Canadian-Latin American
Relations," in Daudelin and Dosman, eds., Beyond Mexico: Changing
Americas (Ottawa: Carleton University Press/Canadian Foundation for
the Americas 1995), i-n.
55 Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Dandurand Revisited: Rethinking

Canada's Defence Policy in an Unstable World," International Journal, 48
(spring 1993), 380-401.
56 Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "The Rise of 'Lite' Powers: A Strategy for
the Postmodern State," World Policy Journal, 13 (fall 1996), i-io.
57 1994 Defence White Paper, 35.
5 8 See the address by the minister of external affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, at the
special meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 18 Feb. 1997,
as abstracted in "The Week in Trade and Foreign Policy" (Ottawa:
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 17-2.3 Feb.
1997), 2.
59 For one such recent advocacy, see David C. Gompert and F. Stephen
Larrabee, eds., America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era (New
York: Cambridge University Press 1997). But cf. the cautionary commen-
tary of Martin Walker, "Home truths for the White House," Guardian,
Weekly, 9 March 1997, 6.
CHAPTER TEN
i See Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Libera-
tion of Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press 1997),
37-5I-
i His role was prudent and indirect, however.See Vadim A. Medvedev, Ras-
pad: kak on nazreval v "mirovoi sisteme sotsializma" (How the World
"Socialist" System Collapsed), (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia),
i88ff.
3 Yuri Solton, 21 Feb. 1990, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-
SOV-9O—039, 27 Feb. 1990 (emphasis added).
4 For more on these alternatives, see Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev and
German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power," Prob-
lems of Communism (July-August 1990), 1-23.
5 See Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe
Transformed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1995), 277-
6 On the economic considerations, see A.A. Akhtamazian, Ob'edinenie
Germanii, Hi Anshlious GDR k FGR (German Unification, or the
Anschluss of the GDR by FGR), Part II, (Moscow: MGIMO 1994), 75.
7 Quoted in P. Zelikow and C. Rice, Germany Unified, 265.
8 Reported by Mitterrand's advisor Jacques Attali, Verbatim III (Paris:
Fayard, 1995), 350 ff.
9 Yeltsin later wrote that the putsch would have succeded had Gorbachev
endorsed it. See Boris Eltsine, Sur le fil du rasoir: Memoires. (Paris: Albin
Michel 1994), ch. 4.
10 Published by the NATO Press Service (Brussels), 28 May 1997.
11 Boston Globe, 16 May 1997.

12 "The dilution of NATO," Washington Post, 6 June 1997.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
1 Gordon Hahn, "Russian Domestic Politics and NATO Expansion," Focus,

4, no. 6 (August-September 1997).
2 Robert Legvold, The "Russian Question," in Vladimir Baranovsky, ed.,
Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (Stockholm: Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute 1997), 53.
3 United States Information Agency 30 Oct. 1997: "Pickering Praises
Cooperative NATO-Russian Relations." Johnson's Russia List, #1324,
31 Oct. 1997, no. i.
4 Harvey Sicherman, "The NATO-Russia Agreement," Foreign Policy
Research Institute, 3 June 1997 (Internet version).
5 Delovoy Mir, 30 Oct. 1997. JRL, #1337, 5 Nov. 1997, no.i.
6 "Nuclear Umbrellas and the Need for Understanding: 1C Interview with
Ambassador Lukin," Intellectual Capital.com, 25 Sept. 1997.
7 Legvold, The "Russian Question," 47.
8 Sergey Lunev, "Nothing Brings People Together like a Threat from Out-
side: The Minuses of the North Atlantic Alliance's Expansion Have Been
Counted, Time to Count the Pluses," Obshchaya Gazeta, no.39, 2-8 Oct.
1997, JRL, #1269, 9 Oct. 1997, #9.
9 Aleksandr Lebed, "Rossii podbrosili dokhluju koshku" (Russia Has Been
Tossed a Dead Cat), Izvestia, 27 June 1997.
10 Lunev, "Nothing Brings People Together."
11 Alexei Mitrofanov, "AntiNATO: Novaia ideiarossijskoj geopolitiki.
Taktika i strategiia na sovremennom etape" (AntiNATO: A New Idea
for Russian Geopolitics. Tactics abd Strategy at the Present Stage),
http://win.aha.ru/-geopolit/3.html, 10 July 1998.
12 Anatoly Klimenko, "Vojny Dlja Rossii" (Wars for Russia), Nezavisimaia
gazeta, electronic version, GlasNet, no.040, 24 Oct. 1997.
13 Alexei Pushkov, "Novyj evropejskij porjadok" (A New European Order),
Nezavisimaia gazeta, electronic version, Glasnet, no. 201, 24 Oct. 1997.
CHAPTER TWELVE
1 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between

NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997.
2 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Article 5,
Moscow, 12 Sept. 1990.
3 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security.
4 Ibid.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
1 See Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "L'Europe centrale entre la democratic et la

securite," Etudes Internationales, 28, no. 2 (1997), i97~312-; also in
Charles-Philippe David, ed., Les institutions de la paix? Integration euro-
peenne et perspectives de securite (Montreal: Harmattan 1997), 250-72.
2 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the
Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press
I
994)-
3 For more details see Z.A.B. Zeman, The Making and Breaking of Com-
munist Europe (Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell 1991).
4 For more details see Jean-Pierre Maury, La construction europeenne, la
securite et la defense (Paris: Presses universitaires de France 1996).
5 Andrew Cottey, East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary in Search of Security (New York:
St Martin's Press 1995), 6.
6 Jacques Levesque, 1989. La fin d'un empire. L'urss et la liberation de
I'Europe de VEst (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po 1995), 125-42.
7 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the
World (New York: Harper and Row 1987).
8 Levesque, 1989, 271-8, 309-17.
9 Jeffrey D. McCausland and Robert H. Dorff, "Foreword," in David G.
Haglund, ed., Will NATO Go East? The Debate over Enlarging the Atlan-
tic Alliance (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's Univer-
sity, 1996), xi.
10 Henning Wegener, "Revamping the Alliance," NATO Review, 38, no. 4
(1990), 3. For the full text of the statement, see 32-3.
1 1 Text of the statement issued by the Visegrad Summit in Report on East-
ern Europe, 2 (i March 1991), 31-2, quoted in Cottey, East-Central
Europe, 128.
12 Trevor Taylor, "NATO and Central Europe," NATO Review, 39, no. 5
(1991), 17-18. The seven reasons are: the USSR'S reaction; the disruption
to NATO'S operations; the fact that NATO countries lack the means to
expand their defence commitments; the danger of a split within the Alli-
ance; the difficulty of accepting only three countries; the danger that
NATO would be drawn into conflicts involving the new members; and the
absence of any military threat in Central Europe (18-19).
13 Taylor adds that, in response to Western resistance, "there was renewed
pressure for Poland, the CSFR, and Hungary to become political members
of NATO in a similar position to that of France." Taylor, "NATO and Cen-
tral Europe," 17.
14 Manfred Worner, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome
Summit," NATO Review, 39, no. 6 (1991), 3. The five goals were: to
2.56 Notes to pages 200-2
forge a new relationship with the countries of Eastern and Central

Europe; to develop a new military strategy; to confirm the desire to
strengthen the CSCE; to continue the arms-control process beyond the
CFE Treaty; and to encourage Europe to develop a security identity.
15 Worner, "NATO Transformed," 4.
16 Manfred Worner, "Shaping the Alliance for the Future," NATO Review,
42, no.i (1994), 5-6.
17 In a 1992 special issue of NATO'S official magazine, Manfred Worner
wrote that "NATO'S main role in a transformed security environment is to
secure and project stability." Manfred Worner, "The Transformed Atlan-
tic Alliance: An Anchor of Stability and Security for Central and Eastern
Europe," NATO Review, special edition (1992), 3.
18 "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation," NATO
Review, 45, no. 4 (1997), special report, documentation, i.
19 Javier Solana, "Building a New NATO for a New Europe," NATO Review,
45, no. 4 (1997), 2.
20 See Charles-Philippe David, "Que nous reserve la fin de la guerre
froide?" in Charles-Philippe David, ed., La fin de la guerre froide (Que-
bec City: Centre quebecois de relations internationales 1990), 234. See
also the following articles by Victor-Yves Ghebali: "The CSCE in the Post-
Cold War Europe," NATO Review, 39, no. 2 (1991); "The July CSCE Hel-
sinki Decisions: A Step in the Right Direction," NATO Review, 40, no. 4
(1992); "The CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation: The Opening Gam-
bit," NATO Review, 41, no. 3 (1993); "After the Budapest Conference:
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe," NATO
Review, 43, no. 2 (1995).
21 Alex Macleod, "La politique franchise et 1'affirmation du leadership inter-
national," in Alex Macleod and Stephane Roussel, ed., Interet national et
responsabilites internationales: six Etats face au conflit en ex-Yougoslavie
(1991-1995) (Montreal: Guerin universitaire 1996), 46. For another
analysis of the OSCE'S role, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, L'osce dans I'Europe
post-communiste, 1990-1996. Vers une identic paneuropeenne de securite
(Brussels, Etablissements Emile Bruylant 1996).
22 "The European Union is facing the most important process of enlarge-
ment in its history. But for the moment, the process of internal reform in
the EU surpasses all other challenges": Martin Brusis and Cornelius
Ochmann, Central and Eastern Europe on the Way into the European
Union," in Werner Weidenfeld, ed., Central and Eastern Europe on the
Way into the European Union: Problems and Prospects of Integration in
1996; Strategies for Europe (Giitersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publish-
ers 1996), 9.
23 Werner Weidenfeld et al., A New Ostpolitik: Strategies for a United Europe;
Short Version (Giitersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers 1996), 9.
24 Gebhardt von Moltke, "Accession of New Members to the Alliance:

What Are the Next Steps?" NATO Review, 45, no. 4 (1997), 6. According
to Moltke, a Europe that is at peace, undivided, and democratic is the
common objective of NATO, the EU, the WEU, and the Council of Europe.
25 Yves Doutriaux, Le traite sur I'Union europeenne (Paris: Armand Colin
1992), 9.
26 Doutriaux, Traite, 5-8.
27 Weidenfeld, A New Ostpolitik, 5. In the view of one French analyst, not
only was there already a unification crisis in 1993, but "the prospects for
the future of the European Union in general are very uncertain." See
Claude Nigoul, "L'Europe et la crise de Punification," in Francis
Rigaldies, ed., Le Traite de Maastricht: des Communautes a I'Union
europeenne (Montreal: Themis 1994), 14.
28 Fabrice Fries, Les grands debats europeens (Paris: Editions du Seuil
1995), ii.
29 Fries, Les grands debats, 505-6. See also "Central and Eastern Europe,"
in Weidenfeld, A New Ostpolitik, n.
30 The Bertelsmann Foundation argues that the EU should embrace the con-
cept of an all-European neighbourhood. Fries, Les grands debats, 27-31.
31 Martin Walker, "East looks west to escape bear hug," Guardian Weekly,
23 Feb. 1997, 6. Walker adds: "The real 2ist century nightmare for
Europe would be an enlarged NATO facing a hostle Russia while the
front-line states remain poor, disgruntled, and politically unstable."
32 Walker, "East looks west."
33 Alyson J.K. Bailes, "NATO: Towards a New Synthesis," Survival, 38,
no. 3 (1996), 27.
34 Bailes, "Synthesis," 28.
35 John Barrett, "NATO'S Year of Study: Results and Policy Implications," in
Haglund, Will NATO Go East? 96.
36 These eight points are discussed in Barrett, "NATO'S Year of Study," 96-8.
37 "Study on NATO Enlargement," paragraph 49, quoted in Barrett, "NATO'S
Year of Study," 99.
38 Ronald Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larabee, "NATO
Expansion: The Next Steps," Survival, 37, no. i (1995), 8-9.
39 Asmus et al., "Next Steps," 12.
40 Ibid., 28.
41 "Chretien lengthens NATO list," Globe and Mail, 21 Feb. 1997. Prior to
Madrid, however, Slovakia was no longer on Canada's list.
42 Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the
Baltic States," Survival, 38, no. 2 (1996), 124.
43 Moltke, "Accession of New Members," 6.
44 Solana, "Building a New NATO," 3.
45 Asmus and Nurick, "Baltic States," 135.
46 The various aspects of regional cooperation for the Baltic states are dis-
cussed in ibid., 132-3.
47 Ibid., 133.
48 For more details on this adjustment, see Anthony Cragg, "Internal Adap-
tation: Reshaping NATO for the Challenges of Tomorrow," NATO Review,
45, no. 4 (1997), 30-5.
49 Sergio Balanzino, "Deepening Partnership: The Key to Long-term Stabil-
ity in Europe," NATO Review, 45, no. 4 (1997), 15-16.
50 Asmus and Nurick, "Baltic States," 121.
51 Audrius Butkevicius, "The Baltic Region in Post-Cold War Europe,"
NATO Review, 41, no. i (1993), 9.
52 "What the Baltic states most lack is the active support of the strongest
European powers in the Alliance - Germany, France and the United King-
dom." Asmus and Nurick, "Baltic States,"123.
53 Ibid., 126. For details on this strategy, see 125-40.
54 With respect to Estonia joining the EU, the Bertelsmann Foundation sug-
gests that "it often appears that, when its real political interests are at
stake, Estonia prefers to go it alone." See Undine Bollow and Villu Zir-
nask, "Estonia," in Weidenfeld, Central and Eastern Europe on the Way
into the European Union, 91.
55 Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) Analytical Brief I, no. 101
(10 October 1996).
5 6 The OMRI Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet
Union 1995: Building Democracy (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe 1996),
56, 63, 71. See also Seija Lainela and Pekka Sutela, The Baltic Economies
in Transition (Helsinki: Bank of Finland 1995).
57 Quoted in Geoffrey York, "Old fears of being annexed by Russians
fading in Baltics," Globe and Mail, 25 March 1997, Ai5-
58 Ibid.
59 See, for example, "Some progress in Helsinki," Globe and Mail,
24 March 1997.
60 The OMRI Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet
Union 1995, 107.
61 Joe Mencinger and Rienhard Olt, "Slovenia," in Weidenfeld, Central and
Eastern Europe on the Way into the European Union, 244.
62 Ibid., 246.
63 Ignac Golob, "Preparing for Membership: Slovenia's Expanding Ties to
NATO," NATO Review, 44, no. 6 (1996), 25.
64 The rate of growth was -2.5 per cent in 1990, -14.5 per cent in 1991, -
7.5 per cent in 1992, and -4.1 per cent in 1993. See Jarko Firdmuc et al.,
The Slovak Republic: After One Year of Independence (Vienna: Bank
Austria AG, July 1994), 19-20.
Notes to page 2.12. 259
65 The latest Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD) report, dated 1996, shows that Slovakia posted one of the best
macroeconomic performances in Central Europe in 1995, with GDP
growth of 7.4 per cent. See OMRI Daily Digest, Part II, 17 Sept. 1996.
66 For more details see Stanislav Kirschbaum, "Dilemmas of Democracy in
Slovakia," Osterreichische Osthefte, 38, no.4 (1996), 477-96; also in
Andre Liebich, ed., Dilemmas of Democratization after Communism
(Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales 1997),
2.1-41.
67 Zdenek Lukas and Sona Szomolanyi, "Slovakia," in Weidenfeld, Central
and Eastern Europe on the Way into the European Union, 202.
68 Sharon Fisher, "Slovakia's Schizophrenic Relations with NATO," OMRI
Analytical Brief, I, 36, 2.1 March 1996, and OMRI Daily Digest, Part II,
31 Jan. 1997.
69 Jan Skoda ek, "Prinosy a nebezpe enstva. Prispevok do diskusie o naom
vstupe do NATO" (Risks and Benefits: A Contribution to the Discussion
on our Entry into NATO), Slovenske ndrodne noviny, n (1997),
18 March 1997, 9.
70 An April 1996 poll on joining NATO (and the EU) showed that 49.7 per
cent were for while 27.1 per cent were in favour of the "Slovak path";
Lukas and Szomolanyi, "Slovakia," 223.
71 This was the preferred option of both supporters and opponents of mem-
bership in NATO. In the words of one supporter of NATO membership,
"I am of the opinion that until a real functional pan-European security
model is accepted, NATO is the appropriate and genuine guarantee of the
Slovak Republic's security." Jan Azud, Zdruky bezpe nosti Slovenskej
republiky. Problemy globdlnych a europskych truktur (Security Guaran-
tees for the Slovak Republic: The Problems of Global and European
Structures) (Bratislava: Veda, Vydavate stvo Slovenskej akademie vied
T
995)> T-6o. Meanwhile, an opponent of Slovakia's membership in NATO
wrote: "NATO should be replaced by a more modern pan-European
model which would act on the basis of broad European and world secu-
rity ... If it enters NATO, the Slovak Republic will lose its state sover-
eignty and its independence." Jan Dobransk, "NATO a naa suverenita"
(NATO and Our Sovereignty), Slovenske ndrodne noviny, 50 (1996),
17 Dec. 1996, 3.
72 "The Finnish example clearly shows that not belonging to a military bloc
in no way means passivity in defence policy or national isolation," kodd
ek, 7 (1997), 18 Feb. 1997, 9. The Slovak National Party, a member of
the governing coalition, openly advocated neutrality.
73 John Karch, "For Peace on Earth ... and in Central Europe," Jednota,
25 Dec. 1996, 2.
74 The Slovak National Party unsuccessfully proposed an amendment

including a fourth question on Slovak neutrality.
75 Nata Hos ovecka, "Ucta k ob anovi" (Respect for Citizens), Slovenske
ndrodne noviny, u (1997), 18 March 1997, 4.
76 Anna Siskova, "Slovakia's Western Integration in Danger," OMRI Analyt-
ical Brief I, no. 552, 14 Feb. 1997. One Slovak daily argued that the gov-
ernment's real intentions on the matter of Slovakia joining NATO would
be revealed by the degree to which the members of the government par-
ticipated in the referendum campaign. See Pravda (Bratislava), 8 March
1997.
77 Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest, Part II, 24 March 1997.
78 Duan D. Kern, "Kto vymyslel rozirovanie NATO?" (Who Thought of
Enlarging NATO?), Slovenske ndrodne noviny, 22 (1997), 3 June 1997, 7.
79 Julius Pecha, "Uvahy o neutralite" (Reflections on Neutrality), Slovenske
ndrodne noviny, 3 (1997), 5 Aug. 1997, 7.
80 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 141, Part II, 20 Oct. 1997.
81 Reka Szemerkenyi, "Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk,"
Adelphi Paper, 306 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies
1996). It is interesting to note that this study covers the Visegrad four.
The problems of democratic development in these countries do not seem
to have weighed in the balance in the case of the three which have been
accepted for Phase I of NATO enlargement.
CONCLUSION
1 Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse?," Survival, 39 (spring

J
997). !56-79-
2 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European
Influence on US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press
1995), and "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of
NATO," in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security:
Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press 1996), 357-99; John Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation: Alliance Theory," in Ngaire Woods, Explaining International
Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), 337-54.
3 Alison Mitchell, "NATO debate: From big risk to sure thing," New York
Times, 20 March 1998, Ai, A8.
4 Philip Gordon, NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the
Atlantic Alliance (Baltimore: Rowman and Littlefield 1997); Rob de
Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consen-
sus (London: Brassey's 1997); Gerald Solomon, The NATO Enlargement
Debate, i^yo-iyy/ (Washington: CSIS Press 1998); the conference report
The Pros and Cons of NATO Expansion: Defining US Goals and Options
(Washington: Stanley Foundation 1997); and "The Debate over NATO

Expansion," Arms Control Today, 27 (September 1997), 3-10.
5 Katharine Seelye, "Arms contractors spend to promote an expanded
NATO," New York Times, 30 March 1998, Ai, A6.
6 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
1997-1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), 268-73 (figures
based on studies by RAND, Congress, the Pentagon, and NATO); see also
Amos Perlmutter and Ted Galen Carpenter, "NATO'S Expensive Trip
East," Foreign Affairs, 77 (January-February 1998), 2-6.
7 Institut franc.ais des relations internationales, Ramses 1998 (Paris: Dunod
J
997K 40.
8 The possibility of Russian membership is discussed by Richard Biondi,
"Evaluating the Sufficiency of NATO Reforms for the Inclusion of Rus-
sia," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the International Studies
Association, Minneapolis, 17-21 March 1998, 33; Djanguir Atamali,
"The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security
Between NATO and the Russian Federation," report on the conference
organized by the Czech Atlantic Commission, NATO Summit 1997, and
Further Enhancement of European Security, Cesky Krumlov, October
I
997> 5~8. See also Richard Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russian Factor
(Santa Monica: RAND 1996).

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The Future of NATO

Enlargement, Russia, and European Security

CHARLES-PHILIPPE DAVID is professor of political science, Universite

JACQUES LEVESQUE is professor of political science and director of

Editors: Jacques Levesque and Charles-Philippe David

The Future of NATO

Legal deposit second quarter 1999

Printed in Canada on acid-free paper

McGill-Queen's University Press acknowledges

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

Typeset in Sabon 10/12

PART ONE CONCEPTUAL DEBATES

Fountain of Youth or Cure Worse Than Disease ?

The Case for Opening up NATO to the East 27

Why Spain Should Have Been NATO'S Last Member 35

Will Enlargement Succeed ? 51

PART TWO NATIONAL DEBATES

NATO Enlargement and the United States:

NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs 95

NATO Enlargement: Germany's Euro-Atlantic Design 108

Canada and the Enlargement of NATO 119

The NATO of Its Dreams?

PART THREE IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON

NATO'S Eastward Enlargement:

NATO Enlargement as an Issue in Russian Politics 168

The Atlantic Dimensions of Central European Security 186

Phase II Candidates: A Political or Strategic Solution? 197

Conclusion: Will NATO Live to Celebrate Its looth Birthday? 2.16

ANDRAS BALOGH is director general of the Hungarian Institute of

MARTIN BOURGEOIS is an MA candidate at the Universite du Quebec a

CHARLES-PHILIPPE DAVID is professor at the Universite du Quebec a

ANDRE P. DONNEUR has been a professor at the Universite du Quebec

Studies University, at the Universite des sciences sociales de Toulouse;

DAVID G. HAGLUND is director of the Centre for International Rela-

PHILIPPE HEBERT is a doctoral candidate in history at the Universite

STANISLAV j. KIRSCHBAUM is professor of international studies and

RICHARD L. KUGLER is a distinguished research professor at the

Survival, and other journals. He is one of the original advocates and

DAVID LAW is a senior fellow at the Queen's University Centre for

PAUL LETOURNEAU is a professor in the History Department of the

JACQUES LEVESQUE is professor of political science and director of

GALE MATTOX is a professor of political science at the U.S. Naval

Research Service and been a Fulbright Scholar, a Bosch Fellow in the

MARIE-CLAUDE PLANTIN is a senior researcher at the centre d'etude

SERGEI PLEKHANOV is associate professor of political studies and

One of the purposes of this volume is to examine these ambiguities.

Russian reactions to the Madrid summit of July 1997, which approved

wants to play? The frequent displays of friction between the United

"NATO is now an Alliance that opposes no one."

"Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of Amer-

"The truth is that the Europe of Maastricht has neither the

This chapter attempts to bring the conceptual debates surrounding the

disturbing contradictions that these debates raise about the future of

aggression. However, there is no universal support among theorists for

The conceptual impasse that the debate on enlargement has reached

THE "YALTA" APPROACH AND

The Structural-Realist View and the Future of NATO

these states with security. That is why, according to this approach,

An Inconclusive Geopolitical Debate on Enlargement

• If NATO does not admit Central and Eastern European states, a

These arguments are based on the hope that the "bandwagoning"

• Russia currently poses no military threat, but hasty enlargement