VIOLENCE, by Jou Lawrence iolence is now a fashionable topic. It evokes diverse questions and con- ficting answers. Is violence an outrage or a necessity? An enemy of freedom and social order or their indispensable foun- dation? A rational means or a self-frus- wating instrument? Is i the outcome of perverted learning or 2 normal, instinct. ual need? Is violence a pathological or a voluntary form of behavior for which agents bear full responsibility? Can s0- cicties prevent its occurrence or must they resign themselves to an order in- cluding it? The need for philosophical darity is evident not only in the contro- versial answers to these typical questions, but also in the manner in which the very questions are stated. Their formulation suggests that there is a single form of behavior—always meriting the same mor- al assessment, the same psychological or social explanation. Is there anything in human experience carrying the Iabel “violence” which justifies such a pre- sumption? Or is violence so multiform. that we must forego such generaliza- tions, making instead numerous distine- tions which necessitate varied methodo- logies, explanatory principles and moral assessments? The essay that follows pro- vides clarification for the conceptual, empirical and moral issues associated with violence which currently prolifer- ate without a coherent framework for their interpretation. 81 1. DEFINING VIOLENCE The quest for a useful definition of violence must begin by acknowledging the prevailing definitional variety. There are several conflicting or unre- lated conceptions of violence in actual usage. Consulting a dictionary,* for ex: ample, one may find descriptive, non: moral uses designating the sensory qual ities of colors and noises: color schemes and musical compositions can thus ex. hibit violence. A non-moral use is also evident in describing the dynamics of a sudden or intense action as violent: one 1. VIOLENCE . .. La: exertion of any physi cal force $0 a to injure or abuse (as in war fare or in effecting an entrance into a house) 2 injury in the form of revoking, re- Pudiation, distortion, infzingcment, oF reverence to a thing, notion, or quality fitly valued or observed . . . $a: intense, tar bulent, or furious action, force or fecling, often destructive . . . b: vehement feeling ot ‘expresion: FERVOR, PASSION, FURY 4d: lashing, jarring, discordant, or abrupt quality... 4: undue alteration of wording for sense fas in elliting or interpreting a text) VIOLENT... 1: characterized by extreme force... : marked by abnormally sudden physical activity and intensity... 2: furious for vehement 10 the paint of being im- Proper, unjust, or illegal. . . 3: extremely for intensely vivid or loud (colors, noise) Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Springfield, Mass: G, E. Merviam & Co, 1963}, p. 2554,32 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE can violently close a book or violently shake his hand to remove a sticky sub- stance. Turning to moral uses, where “violence” conveys the notion of in- jury to human well-being, one finds a variety of types of damage and degrees of seriousness in them, ranging from misinterpretation of an author's words to the destruction of life and property. ‘These divergencies of meaning suggest the absence of any morally or socially significant feature or group of features commonly designated in every applica- tion of the terms “violence” or "vio- lent.” ‘This general plurality of conflicting meaning is paralleled by conflict in spe- cialized scholarly usage. One scholar, Raziel Abelson, in attempting to provide a definition of violence that indicates its unique axiological status, writes that ‘violence’ connotes illegitimate or ex- cessive force” and that “to apply the term ‘violence’ to some actions and not (o others is to condemn the first group and to excuse the second."* On the other hand, Graham and Gurr write, “"Violence’ is narrowly defined . . . as behavior designed to inflict physical in- jury to people or damage to property. Collectively, and individually, we may regard specific acts of violence as good, bad or neutral, depending on who en- gages in it and against whom.”* Defi- nitions treating the forms of responsi- Dility peculiar to violent behavior also reflect severe disagreement, Harold Lief defines violence as “an end point on a continuum of agressive behavior, It is characterized by extreme force .. . as 2. “Letters” New York Review of Books, Vol. 12, No. 12, 1969, p. 88, 8. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Rober. Gur, The History of Violence in Americe (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), p. xxx. well as by its irrational nature, so that its original goal-orientation may be lost as it becomes an end-initself."* Another scholar, H. L. Nieburg, defines violence as “direct or indirect action applied to restrain, injure or destroy persons or property."" He makes the claim, ruled out by Lief’s definition, that “AU acts of violence can be put to rational use, whether they are directed against others or against onescli."* Such conflicts de- stroy the hope that a coherent definition will emerge from a scientific and schol. arly vocabulary insulated from the di. vergent general usages of “violence. Reflecting on ways in which one might state a significant definition, he should recognize that definitions arc always relative to particular purposes and should be judged accordingly. If our definitions should not only mirror the objects of social and moral concern in what is labeled “violence” but also assist us in clarifying the issues wl grow ont of these concerns, then selec: tivity, rather than comprehensive fdel ity, should guide our search. Our con. cern with war, riots, homicide, the abuse of police powers, etc., as instances of vio: lence expresses our interest in events which are capable of destroying or sc- verely damaging the human being and hhis possessions, As compared with these life and death concerns, the violence of color schemes, musical compositions or book closings must be judged peripheral and subordinate. A definition of vio. 4, Harold I. Lief, “Contemporary Forms of Violence,” in Violence and Wer, with Clinical Studies, ed. Jules Maserman (New York, Lon- don: Grune and Stratton, 1963), p. 57. 5. HLL. Nieburg, “The Uses of Violence,” Toward a Theory of War Prevention, Pol. I, eds. Richard A, Falk and Saul Mendelovite (New York: World Law Fund, 1966), p. 1570, 6. Ibid, p. 160,VIOLENCE 33, lence that includes such morally inrele- vant sensory qualities would trivialize it and destroy the focus demanded by the more pressing issues associated with violence. Secondly, we must avoid loading a definition with controversial presuppositions. Abelson and Licf both depart from this principle: Abelson em- bodies a condemnation of all violence in his definition while Lief incorporates his belief that all violent acts are ir- rational. The effect of such definitions is to foreclose discussion of important topics with the mere application of a label: Abelson’s definition excludes any justification of violence and Lief's defi- nition makes it incoherent to talk about the rational qualities in violent behav- ior. On Abelson’s definition it is non- sensical to say, “Violence in selfadefense is approvable.” Such an exclusion would have little adverse effect on discussion if “violence” were a term like “murder” or “evil,” the application of which com. mits one to a corollary judgment of the wrongness of the acts so designated. An account omitting this judgment would reflect failure to understand the terms. This argument would be more ap- pealing if the sentiments toward what people label “violence” were in fact as uniformly negative as they are toward what is Iabeled “murder” or “evil.” But many persons wish to distinguish be- tween good and bad violence. This pos- sibility of justifying violence is implicit in neutral uses of “violence” and seems forced upon us by the existence of cer- tain occupational groups: police, sold. iers, athletes, bouncers, prison guards, executioners, etc; all possess a social license to inflict injury upon other per- sons in special situations. Such acts are generally approved or tolerated. Should they be described as “unviolent” or “notviolent" because they carry an aura of social legitimacy? Should a policeman who Iegally kills @ person murderously assaulting him be described as “unvio- lent.” Perhaps the policeman’s act will fail any test of ultimate moral justifica- tion, but the contention that some vio: lence is good or at least excusable must be capable of being considered. To dis- cuss such an important claim, we need a definition of violence neutral enough to permit its formulation, even though all such claims may ultimately be re- futed, A neutral definition clearly lends itself to a larger number of interesting assertions: it is compatible with every moral claim that can be made about vio Tence—including the claim that every violent act is unjustified. Similarly ‘with respect to responsi bility, since some contend that violence is rational and that persons can bear full responsibility for their acts of violence, a definition should make it possible to formulate this claim, if only for the purpose of demonstrating its falsity, and a neutral definition would permit this. ‘Therefore, a neutral definition emerges with a powerful advantage in facili- tating the clear statement of issues for debate, Thirdly, we must not allow our deft nition to be distorted by concentrating on what may be misleading features of “paradigm” cases of violence. A mugging or a riot would be clear examples of body violence or property violence. Body violence carries overtones of physical swiftness, intensity and the intent to inflict bodily harm or death upon the victim. Violent damage to property is associated with intentions to make the owner suffer through the injury to his possessions. There are two relevant aspects of these clear-cut instances ofa SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE violence: there is a process with certain physical characteristics, and there is an injurious condition which is the usual or intended outcome of that process. In thinking about body or property vio- lence, we should ask which is more im- portant—the type of process described as violent or the outcome that we nor- mally associate with such processes? Or are they equally important and insepa- rable except for purposes of analysis? Though suddenness, intensity, ete., are prominent in some uses of “violence,” such qualities in isolation from the in- tended outcome do not form the basis for concern about violence. The in- jurious results of violence rather than the specific physical qualities of the means take dominance. Consider 2 case of contemplated murder. It could be carried out by a rapid, intense action like shooting or stabbing and would clearly be labeled “violent.” But a mur- der could also be carried out by giving tiny doses of poison over a period of years. The cumulative effect is fatal. Is such a murder not violent because of its “slow motion” feature? Slow mur- ders do not require a separate category isolated from the category of “violence.” Speed, intensity, etc, should not be, therefore, thought of as necessary traits of violent acts, though they do figure prominently in the most physically dra- matic instances of it. What is important morally about a stabbing or a shooting is the harm to the victim and not the fact that it occurred at a certain rate of speed, with a certain degree of intensity, This viewpoint receives some support from actual usage. The dictionary entry reports that violence can mean “the exertion of any physical force so as to injure” and also “injury in the form of revoking, repudiation, distortion, in- fringement or irreverence.” These clearly encompass any type of injurious activity, regardless of its particular physical qual: ities. “Violence,” incidentally, derives from the Latin verb meaning “to injure or plunder.”) IE injury and the fact that it is ine tentionally inflicted are distinctive traits of violence, there is no reason why the concept “violence” should be restricted solely to cases of body injury or property damage. In actual usage, other types of processes have been designated as “vio- ence” in order to indicate the moral Kinship of all serious injuries to human well-being. The phrases “latent v lence,” “hidden violence,” “quiet violence,” “covert violence,” have all been used to convey the idea that a ser ious injury is being inflicted even though one cannot immediately perceive any act of biologically incapacitating a victim. ‘The addition of qualifying phrases con- cedes a departure from the paradigm of simple body violence, but there is no concession that these are any less im- portant as forms of human injury. These forms of violence require additional cate. gories.’ Using “biological violence” ta caused by body wounds, we can concep. twalize other forms of violence by using encompass body wounding or death the categories “physical” and “psycho- logical.” Physical violence (not to be confused with direct body violence) in- dicates the imposition of physical re- straints on the behavior of a victim so as injuriously to reduce his freedom to act, as in certain forms of enslavement 7.1 follow here some distinctions proposed by Johan Galtung, “Om the Meaning of Non Violence,” Man and International Relation Vol. It, Integration, ed. J. K. Zawodny (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co,, 1966), pp. 4128,VIOLENCE, 35 and: imprisonment. Property damage should also generally fall under “phy- sical violence.” “Psychological violence” has been used to cover destructive as- saults upon psychological autonomy and selfesteem.* In the instance of a parent ‘who hates his child, a mixture including each type of violence is easily conceiv- able-the child can be beaten and in- jured biologically, restricted in his space of action and harrassed verbally. Why accept extensions of the concept so different from the picture of the mugger assailing his victim? Because, if injury is the most important feature of violence, it would be arbitrary to draw the line at biological wounds and ex- clude gross restraints on the freedom to act and efforts at psychological tyranny. ‘These exclusions seem more arbitrary in view of the interdependence between physical and psychological injury on the one hand and biological well-being on the other. Second, we should ask, what in a given case is most important to the individuals whose well-being is affec- ted? Is biological violence more impor- tant than other types? Taking actual be- havior as a guide, the absence of physical restraints and the maintenance of psy- chological autonomy are in many stances given preference over biological well-being. Given the choice hetween a life of slavery and the loss of a hand, foot, or limb, how many persons would sacrifice a significant portion of their bodies in order to preserve their free- dom? Or given the choice between a loss of limb or vision and the permanent loss of personal identity through a bra washing treatment, how many would 8. C}. Erving Goffman, “On the Characteris- tice of Total Institutions" and “The Moral Career of the Mental Patient.” Asslums (Gar- den City, Nz Doubleday Anchor, 1961), choose to retain the identity which they have achieved through 2 lifetime of petsonal choices and actions? The exten- sion of the concept of violence to in. ude the physical and psychological elements of well-being is by no means a descent from the more to the less im- portant, but might well be an ascent from the less important toward the more important. Violence should there. fore be sufficiently broadly conceived to reflect the variety of important in. juries from which individuals suffer and the enormous variety of means through which those injuries can be produced. A definition which meets all. these requirements can be cast in the follow- ing form. “Violence” shall be defined to mean: the entire class of actions which resuli, or are intended to result, in ser. ious injury to life or its material con ditions® Serious injury must include the ideas of biological damage, severe physical restrainis or property destruc tion and psychological impairment. The above concept of "serious injury” is not 2 straightforward one concerning wl social and moral theorists have no dis agreements. Just as the specific meaning “deprivation” depends for its. specific meaning upon a normative judg: ment concerning what a person ought ta have, so the meaning of “injury” de. pends on a concept of well-being. But for the purpose of discussing violence, it is safe to assume that there are at least some widely agreed upon aspects of well-being and injury. For example, processes leading to biologically prema- 9. This defi jon reflects a crucial philo sophical cholee; rather han characterizing violence by uniquely distinguishing traits, 1 Ihave made “violence” synonymous with “doing serious harm.”36, SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE ture death are widely regarded as in- jurious. One should also notice the definition’s neutral character. It indi- cates varied phenomena but contains no partisan moral or theoretical predispo- sitions and therefore leaves open the possibility for a variety of value judg ments and explanations. This neutrality prevents no one from condemning or praising violence or from having theo- ries about its functions, control and cau- sation, Such neutrality simply means we must use words other than “violence” to express our convictions about what wwe so designate. Tl. Tue Acents oF VioLeNcr aN ‘Tuer Inventions ‘What forms of activity are capable of inflicting injury? Who is responsible for these activities? How much responsi- bility do they bear for them? Is it pos sible to control such activities If so, how? Answers to these questions will require that conceptual extentions take place which resemble that from the para digamatic body violence to other types of serious injury. Conceptions of respon- sibility will appear that implicate un- suspected agents and circumstances. Violence, as described thus far, is characterized by injurious outcomes of processes. It is a general condition (or rather, many conditions) which can be produced by a large number of signifi- cantly different processes. “Violence” and “disease” can be fruitfully com pared. To the single word “disease,” there corresponds no specific, uniform condition. To understand what causes disease is to discriminate the multiple circumstances producing specific diseases. Likewise, to understand violence, we must discriminate agencies and types of activity capable of producing i shall further be led to examine -the varying circumstances of mind and vo- lition which can enter into its creation. Forms of Agency. Violent acts can be performed by individuals or by groups, by individuals acting within the frame- work of institutions, where “institution” means a socially created agency em- ploying collective means such as taxa. tion, conscription, ete. Examples of bio- logical violence by these agencies would be: (Individual rape, mugging (ii) Group violence—lynching, attack on draft center, vigilante justice (iii) Institutional violence~capital execution, war, riot suppression violence—homicide, Intent and Responsibility. Criminal law recognizes differing types of intent and circumstance in the performance of violent acts which enter into their ap- praisal. Responsibility for violence varies by degree, ranging from cases where the agent is fully accountable morally to cases in which he is not responsible at all except in a causal sense. The fol- lowing categories afford a sense of the complexity in the morality and control of violence. (a) An act is deliberately violent it the agent consciously intends serious damage or injury. (b) An act is compulsively violent if the agent’s impulses in performing the act are so powerful that his capacity for choice is irrelevant as a determinant of his behavior. (© An act is neglecifully violent even though the agent does not con- sciously intend injury if such a con sequence could have been avoided. had he exercised foresight and con- tol.VIOLENCE 37 (@) An act is accidentally violent if the injurious results could not be foreseen or if the circumstances lead- ing to the injury could not be con- trolled. (©) Am act (or an omission) is dilem- matically violent if serious injury is a consequence of any alternative open in that situation (including the option of failing to act). The agent need not be aware of the injurious consequences of each alternative, Gonsistent with the theme of produc- tion of injury, these categories further extend the model of violence beyond the paradigm of body violence where an agent willfully harms another petson, But this extension is consistent with che dominant element in the concept of vio- lence, which is the production of injury. Af injury most deeply concerns us, rather than any single form of intention which leads to it, we must consider the diver- sity of states of mind and circumstance Teading to serious injury. To care seri- ously and consistently about life is to care about every circumstance resulting in harm, Taking the concept of negli- gent violence, which might be thought farfetched as an instance of violence, we ought to ask several questions. Should the failure to act in a life or death situation be classified as non-vio- lent because the individual did not con- sciously will the injury of the other person, but rather failed to do what would have prevented the injury? Is the failure to respect a person evidenced as much by what we omit to do for them as by the deliberately injurious acts we undertake? Is one being violent if he allows another to be tortured while possessing the power to prevent it? Fail- ing to apply the concept “violence” to such unusual situations would at least make us uncomfortable. Such extensions augment moral awareness. Items whose Kinship was concealed by fragmented terminology now fall naturally together. Examples can establish the descrip- tive plausibility of these categories. Cases of deliberate violence are common, First degree homicide, lynching and war, ex emplify individual, group, and institu- tional violence, respectively. This type of violence readily gives rise to the de. sire for punishment and retaliation be- cause its deliberate character removes the conditions excusing the agent from responsibility. Compulsive violence at the individ- ual level includes acts of insane persons. That individuals may be compulsively violent within group settings is sug- gested by some forms of crowd be- havior At the institutional level, many national leaders suffering from neuroses or psychoses have mobilized national forces for their deranged purposes.** Examples of neglectful violence gen- erally masquerade beneath the label “accident.” Large numbers of “acciden- tal gun deaths” (60 classified in official statistics) are failures to exercise fore. sight and control,? as when an individ. ual hunter with substandard vi shoots @ human being. He should have either refrained from an activity which his faulty vision rendered potentially lethal, or worn corrective lenses. But further: a governmental institution could disqualify hunters with poor vis ion, Its failure to do so may evidence a 10, Cf. Flias Canetti, “Panic.” Crowds ond Power (New York: Viking Pross, 1966), pp. 26:27. 11. Of. Jerome D. Frank, “Insanity or In. capacity of National Leaders,” in Senity ond Survival (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 58-04, 1%. Cf. Carl Bakal, No Right to Bear Arms (New York: Paperback Library, 1968), passim,38 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE neglectful indillerence to the fate of potential victims, or it may evidence the difficulty or disadvantages of regu- lations.* Genuinely accidential violence is troubling for the hope** of preventing serious injuries which men do to one an- other. In the strict sense of “accident” requiring unforesecability and uncon- trollability, accidental violence could be eliminated only if every injurious con- sequence of every action were knowable and preventable; which they are not. Accidental violence affects large num. bers, particularly where unknown conse- quences of a broad institutional policy are at work. A controversial example of institutional, accidental violence comes from a recent interpretation of the con- sequences of nuclear testing. A radiation scientist who has studied statistical pat- terns of infant and fetal mortality de- scribes “fan. association which appears to be of a direct causal nature” resulting in 875... mortalities during a fifteen year period in the United States.1* These numbers dwarf the more publicized forms of violence like robbery and riot- ing which generally provoke discussions of violence. Dilemmatic violence also troubles the hope that violence may be elimi- nated with development of an improved 18. A similar claim of negligence is plausible regarding the 50,000 victims of auto accidents in the United States each year. Of. the state- ‘ment of Carl Clark in Ralph Nader, Unsofe at any Speed (New York: Grossman Publithers, 1965), pp. $4545, 14. Cf. “Once we perform the revolutionary but simple act of deciding that we can change, ‘the era of violence can close.” John Poppy; “Violence: We can End It," Look, Vol. 38, No. 12, 1969, p. 21. 15, Eynest J. Sternglass, “Infant Mortality and Nuclear Tests.” Bulletin of Atomic Scien tit, Vol. XXV, No. 4, 1969, p. 20. human being. These are situations that involve serious injury as the conse- quence of every alternative. Consider England's institutional adoption of a muss radiography policy, described by Lord Adrian: Fourandwhalf million examina. ions were made in 1987. It has been estimated that bone marrow effects of the radiation might possibly have added as many as twenty cases of lukemia in that year; yet the exam. inations revealed cightcen thousand cases of pulmonary tuberculosis, as well as thousands of other abnormali- ties. The twenty deaths from leu- kemia were only a remote possibility, ut, Lord Adrian asks, if they were a certainty would they have been too high a price for the early detee- tion of tuberculosis in eighteen thousand. people* Similar dilemmas confront numerous in- stitutional policy making decisions. An economist has convincingly described highway planning as a process requiring conscious acceptance of death in the policy alternatives. The highway planner is sufficiently bound by budget so that a crusade against death on wheels can be no more than a limited war. Within the limits and because of them he is forced to economize, ration, allocate and reckon.#" In such cases, one may only attempt to 16. Henry K, Beecher, “Medical Reseorch and the Individual,” Life or Death, Bthice and Options (Geattle: University of Washington Pres, 1958), p. 150. VF, Peter 8. Albin, “Eoonomic Values and the Value of Human Life:” Humen Values and Economic Policy, ei. Sidney Mook (New York New York University Preis, 1987), p. 96VIOLENCE, 39 determine and act upon the least vio- lent alternative, Here total elimination is impossible. The diversity of the categories and examples should dissuade us from adopt- ing single cause-theories of violence. And violence is as complex morally as it is causally. There is no single intention peculiar to the occurrence of violence which uniformly justifies the same at- tribution of intent, responsibility and moral character. The examples also sug- gest the complexity and pervasiveness of violence as a social phenomenon. No social unit has a monopoly on violence: we find agencies of violence wherever there are agencies capable of affecting human well-being. Dilemmatic and ac- cidental violence seem woven into the fabric of life, not to be eliminated by any vigorous social campaigns. Moral alternatives will seldom polarize as ei- ther totally unviolent and good or whol- ly violent and bad. Different values will be balanced against one another. Often the choice is between the preserving of a freedom and eliminating it because of the types of violence which flourish in its presence: the freedom to own lethal weapons is the same freedom which can easily destroy the lives of others; the freedom of personal mobility which we derive from our cars is a freedom which results in bundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries; the freedom to enjoy private relations with one's chil- dren is a freedom which often results in tyrannized personalities or mangled bodies, Would a society necessarily be better if it could permanently elimi- nate the possibility for a particular type of violence? The answers are not ob- vious. These reflections are not meant to suggest that violence is inevitable or that its control is impossible or undesir- able. Even if we concede that some vio- Jence is inevitable, and that every at tempt to control violence has its costs, the desire to employ the power of hu- man choice to affect the occurrence of violence remains fully rational. LLL. Morives FoR VIOLENCE AND THE ConTROL oF VIOLENCE Control over violence would be in. effectual where compulsion for violence mechanically translates itself into violent behavior. Some hold that aggression, the will to inflict injury is a normal and human instinct. Konrad Lorena, writes that “intraspecific aggression is, in man, just as much as spontaneous, instinctive drive as in most other higher verte. brates." Such aggression is “phyloge. netically programmed" into human be: havior. Another popular author, Robert Andrey, holds that man is “a predator whose natural instinct is to kill with a weapon.” Such language—"‘spontan: ous instinctive drive,” “phylogenetic. ally programmed aggression” “natural instinct to Kill” evokes the image of toxic quanta of destructiveness Unit we struggle to release in violent behavior. ‘Various considerations come to mind in appraising such an account. First, what could “instinct” mean in reference to violence, and how much influence upon conduct would one expect it to exert? Suppose that an “instinct” for aggression is like hunger, sexuality, shel 18, “Ritualized Fighting.” The Naturat History of Aggression, eds, J. D. Carthy and F, J. Ebling (London & New York: Academic Press, 1964), p. 49. 19, An exprestion used by Lorenz in On Aggression (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and (Co,, 1966), p. 258. 30. Ajrican Genesis (New York: Atheneum, 1961), p. 316.10 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE terseeking, etc. Are these latter unaf- fected by our choice? The sexual instinct does not inevitably lead to and there- fore explain the practice of incest? Nor does hunger lead directly to the diet of the vegetarian or the cannibal. Even the most basic needs have highly differen- tiated, contextually-related satisfactions. So, to call aggression instinctual and “normal” tells us nothing about the situ- ations and modes for its satisfactions, or the frequency with which the instinet is acted upon. In short, the most inter- esting and humanly significant questions remain to be answered through a de- tailed knowledge of actual behavior. In examining the allegedly “instinc- tual” character of violent behavior, we must ask, “What are the highly differ- entiated occasions and satisfactions as- sociated with its performance?” Violence exhibits an enormous range of prag- matic appeals, which occur in all of the contexts of action suggested by the dis- tinctions regarding the forms of agency in violence. Individuals can use violence to secure life necessities, particularly in crises of scarcity or when the normal channels of competition for goods are closed through discriminatory practice. Violence may be used to acquire goods, as when the threat or employment of vio- lence is used in manipulating others to serve one’s interests." It may be used to cope with troublesome situations be- yond the reach of the agent’s verbal skills. It may be used to break bonds of dependency in establishing one’s ‘own personal identity. It may be used as a means of retaliating against others who have denigrated one’s reputation and threaten the esteem in which one 21. Several of the points in this paragraph are taken from Han Tach, Violent Men (Chie cago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969}, pp. 1888 wishes to be held. It can be a response to those who pose physical dangers to one’s safety. One may enjoy the sheer excitement of the violent encounter, as ;, or the aesthetic delight of destruction. Groups may use violence to commun. icate grievances to those who might otherwise ignore them. Violence may provide the hope that it can change existing distributions of power in ways that place the disaffected group on a more equal footing with other social groups and allow the group to become an effective participant in the institu. tions from which they have been prev. iously excluded. A group psychological benefit of violence, noted in recent riots in America, is the augmented sense of self-esteem and potency.2* Since institu: tions generally grant distinct advantages to some groups at the expense of others, there is bound to be some group dis affection with institutional p I is therefore natural that institutions should use violence or its threat to pre. serve existing distributions of power. Institutional violence raises the cost of changing the existing institutions; this can provide for order and stability (though not without the potential for revolutionary violence in the future.) ‘The police and army of a nation are also the visible manifestations of will- ingness to coerce conformity with exist- ing norms and political arrangements. In its international relations, national institutions can attempt to use war in preserving national security, and at- tempt to preserve or change existing distributions of political power among other nations. These processes are costly, frequently far more than they are meant to be, but war is far from being institu- in hunt 2. Cf. Hans Toch, op. cit, pp. 201-202.VIOLENCE 41 tionally obsolete. The wide range of instrumental motivations to be discovered in vio- lence suggest that it generally presents itself as a means to be considered in comparison with unviolent alternatives. Rather than being the unique satisfac. tion for an instinctual constant, violence functions as a contextually variable op- tion for action. Given the pervasive pragmatic appeal of violence, one should expect to find a variety of social pro- cesses whose purpose is the deliberate and effective control of violence. Since violence always involves at least two roles (agent and victim) who have a significantly different interest in the outcome of the violent act, the concept “control” has a pair of divergent mean- ings. For the agent “control” means at- tempting to guide the violent process to a successful conclusion; for him, vio- lence functions as means or as a source of desired qualities of experience (or both), The victim experiences violence as an alien force directed against his well-being; here, “control” means at- tempting to. the violent powers bent upon his injury, perhaps by re- sorting to his own counterviolence against the initiating agent. As with the highly varied occasions and motivations for violence, control of violence is evi- denced in every major social process— whether technological, military, educa- tional, legal-political. In some cases these processes are aimed at efficiently struc- turing and rationalizing the power to injure; in others they are aimed at the construction or protective barriers against it. Technology, for example, is well known for its contributions to the science of killing. But it can also serve to deter violence or minimize some of its effects, Technology may play an im portant role in preserving peace by al- lowing nations to monitor conditions which would indicate adherence to wea- pons and peace treaties. Education is as potentially double: edged as technology. On the one hand, it may be devoted to the spread of di visive ideologies and the promotion of demonic stereotypes of groups which are designated as enemies. The talents of intellectuals may be employed to ration: alize the necessity for wars against ene- mies who are viewed through distorted perceptual processes. Contemporary political-military bureaucracies could not function with. out large numbers highly trained in the arts of verbalizing and making computa- tions. But educational projects could be enrolled in the task of dispelling twisted perceptions which contribute to willing- ness for violent conflict. They can also teach attitudes of respect for Tife and provide training in the non-violent reso- lution of conflict. Political-legal processes contribute to violence when they make it possible to conscript soldiers, declare wars and to mobilize populations for destructive purposes. Laws can be used to injure permanently the interests of minority groups, as is explicitly done in legalized segregation. But law can also provide substitutes for violence, making it pos sible to exchange the judicial process for personal combat. Laws have been used to prohibit, punish, and virtually est, lowest = 1,200X 4, Murder Rates within the US2®—Ratio of Jowest, highest. = 25% (Vermont, 0.5: Alabama, 11.5) If we reject determinism in the form which depicts culture and individual behavior as the product of blind inter- action between man and physical en- vironment, and which consequently de- scribes autonomous choice as a fiction; we must assume that these variations express individual acts of choice, whe- ther they be the choices of purely per- sonal action or the choice (or tolera- tion) of group action, social custom or institutional policy. ‘The figures available are mainly rele- vant to determining success in the con- trol of violence from a victim's point of view and they tell a story of rel success and failure in large population units, In some of the countries men- tioned, rates for particular types of ¥i lence are so low that no policy or pat tern of individual choices could signifi- 2, ‘These figures are taken from Quincy Wright's study of 2600 military battles involving European states during the years 1480190, 4 Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago, Phoenix abridged edition, 1966) pp. 12-59. Lewis Richardson has zeached ‘similar conclusions in his The Statistics 0f Deadly Quarrels (Pitts. burgh: Boxwood Pres, 1960). 8. Figures taken from Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, op. cit, fn. 8, Table 17-8 p. 579. The Ggures are taken from the portion fof the table deteribing European and Latin “American nations. 1 arbitrarily assigned a value ‘of 0.1 to Sweden in order to establish 2 ratio. 2, Taken from “Table 4: Murder Rates by State, 1965." The Death Penalty in America, ed, Hugo A, Bedau (Now York: Anchor Books, revised edition 1967) p. 08, cantly lower them. An obvious case is Denmark, which had no deaths from civil disturbance over a four year period. Teeland had but one homicide in 1966. ‘The Netherlands had only four acci- dental deaths due to firearms in 1968.” ‘The extent to which these forms of vio- Jence are minimized would doubiless be regarded as almost entirely satisfac. tory from the perspective of potential victims. These minimal rates have been achieved without any radical changes in the nature of man. but rather through means which most cultures possess— legislation, the development of social ‘custom and taboo and the other cultural sanctions which influence conduct. ‘The agent's perspective on success in the control of violence—suecess main- ly meaning the achievement of one's goal in the performance or toleration of violence—is not reflected in the fig ures. We often hear the cliches that “Violence never settles anything.” or “Violence never pays.” These sentiments project negative moral valuations into conceptions of fact. There are successful homicides, robberies, rapes, bombings, etc. in which the agent carries out his aim and is never called to task, Some countries have enormously profited from the practice of slavery.:* Some nations successfully dominate others by military violence or its threat. Some nations have successfully defended their territorial and cultural integrity by the use of vio ence, Some communities use the threat of violence as a way of maintaining 30, Carl Bakal, op. cit, p. 856. 31. Cf, Sarvepalli Radakrishnan, “Violence and the Purpose of Education,” Alternatives to Violence, ed. Larry Ng (New York: Life Books, 1968), p. 105. 32, Cf. Ronald Segal, The Race War (New York: Bantam Books, 1957), pp. 19-119.44 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE civil order. Violence can pay very well indeed, though it has its own costs like any other policy, and it can settle many things, though it may do so in a morally odious fashion. We cannot have a full grasp of the human signifi cance of violence until we have struggled with the moral issues which underlie it. IV. Tue Morattry oF VioLENce ‘What is right or wrong about vio- ence? Is violence always wrong? What is one morally obliged to do about vio- Jence? The agent and victim would doubtless offer conficting answers. The agent will regard his violent act as justi- fied by the moral worthiness of its end. He might regard the injury he inflicts as an unfortunate moral necessity for dealing with some condition which vio- lates the sanctity of life. The justifica- tion for capital punishment often holds that if we respect life, then we must de- stroy life. The victim takes 2 different view: violence injures or is meant to injure his life, weakening or destroying the powers whose exercise makes life tolerable and valuable. The victim also feels a moral affront: violence expresses an absence of respect for his person. A major social value is negated—the con- sciousness of a mutally shared and cher- ished relationship. Those between whom violence occurs exist in hostile, destruc: tive separateness, a positive evil in itself. Nothing could seem more obvious to the victim than that violence is a terrible wrong, the most evil of which humans are capable. If tragedy be defined as the conflict, of good, then tragedy is clearly evident in the violent encounter, provided we 88. Cf. Charles Tilley, “Collective Violence in European Perspective,” in Graham and Gurr, op. cit, th. 8 p. Al grant partial legitimacy to the view- points of both agent and victim. The victim of violence is hardly likely to perceive the injury to himself as a moral necessity. The agent’s “necessity” is the victim’s gratuity. If anything the injury will increase the victim’s sense of right- ‘eousness about the behavior which pro- voked the injury. Hence a sense of tra gcdy is revealed through the inclusion of agent and victim perspectives, The tragedy is not merely that evil gratui- tously crushes good (victim's perspec tive) or that good must crush good (agent). Both parties feel morally vin- dicated. Js violence always wrong? 1 hope that this question will appear as mad- deningly simplistic in light of the dis. tinctions argued for in this essay. Of course, one can say, “Yes, violence is al- ‘ways wrong because the word ‘violence’ simply means a wrongful use of force. Therefore, we are always obligated to avoid violence.” ‘This type of answer settles nothing. The thrust of the moral question about violence concerns the possibility of justifying a willful injury. Saying that “Violence” means “unjusti fied use of force” does not tell us whe: ther such injury is ever justified, but merely forces us to use other words to entertain the possibility. A second. approach to the normative appraisal of violence can be taken via the categories of intention developed in this essay. If by “wrong action” one means the willful performance of an action whose avoidance is morally oblig- atory, several answers are dictated by the differing kinds of responsibility for vio- lent acts. Among the circumstances of mind, volition, and violent action de- scribed, only two—the deliberate and the negligent, ate avoidable. Hence theyVIOLENCE, 45 are the only types of violence to which wrongness could be imputed. In the in- stances of compulsive, accidental and dilermatic violence, the possibility for deliberate avoidance is excluded; one cannot ascribe the sort of responsibility which depends upon a prior free choice. The consequences of such actions are bad, but the circumstances prevent the imputation of wrongness to the choice or the moral character of the agent. If one accepts these distinctions, then the question about the wrongness of violence becomes, “Is all avoidable violence (de- liberate and neglectful) wrong?” Should one adopt the principle that no one ought ever to inflict injury or fail to prevent the suffering of injury in any Circumstance? As one analyzes what would be involved in accepting such 2 principle, the hope of finding a single ‘moral verdict about violence disappears. If one answers affirmatively that vio- lence is always wrong, the implicit moral principle is that the avoidance of in- jury to others is a more compelling moral obligation than any other. But why should one accept such an absolute? Does a belief in the sanctity of life re- quire us to accept an absolute obliga- tion to avoid injury? Consider how the sanctity of life and the avoidance of in- jury principles might be related to one another in a concrete instance. A person is being mugged and believes that he can protect himself only by injuring his assailant. The principle of always avoid- ing injury to others would prohibit this as wrong. But by avoiding injury to the assailant, would the victim fulfill the requirement to respect life, its condi- tions of well-being, etc.? The answer is no. In this situation, avoiding injury to others would mean submitting to the injury which another inflicts upon one~ self, Adherence to the absolute prohil tion against injury to others would amount to a sacrificial ethic rather than a sanctity of life ethic: it would require hhim to discriminate against the sanctity of his own life in favor of that of his assailant. But if life is sacred, why does not the sacredness of one’s own life de serve equal attention to that of others? What is it about being “other” which justifies special consideration? If we study the implications of the absolute proscription in other contexts, one finds additional difficulties. Should one say, in a revolutionary or counter-revolu- tionary context. that every existing po- litical institution or distribution of power, no matter how fair, should be sacrificed to attackers in order to avoid doing any injury to them? Should one say, in studying the ineffectiveness of African violence against the slave traders, that the Africans are to be com- mended for the little injury which they inflicted upon those who took them into captivity? Would it have been morally right for Africans to go peacefully into slavery? Would it be wrong for a phy- sician to withhold help in. stemming death by epidemic disease in a country which will Tater see millions starve be- cause of population pressure? ‘The defender of an absolute pro. hibition against violence might claim to find a false presumption behind these problematic questions—the presumption that violence is sometimes a unique means to values whose pursuit is mor- ally obligatory. He could say that for every morally obligatory aim, such as physical security, cultural integrity, etc., traditionally pursued by violence, there is an alternative non-violent means for obtaining it; therefore non-violence is always applicable as an effective, and46 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE moreover, morally approvable means: violence is never a unique means in a morally obligatory pursuit. Therefore, the assumption that an absolute prohi- bition against violence is a disguised ethic of sacrifice must be rejected. Be- lief in the utility of violence rests upon. impatience, unimaginativeness or neu It is difficult to assess accurately the claim that non-violent means could al- ways be efficacious if only they were tied. One might find examples of the success of non-violence in connection with every conceivable human good. And it may well be true that many, if not most, uses of violence are accom. panied by delusory beliefs about the efficacy of fear and threat and are less efficacious than some imaginable non. violent alternative. But as for the uni versal utility of non-violence, one must have doubts. The claim that non- violence has been shown to work on particular occasions for the achieve- ment of a broadly defined goal like physical security is compatible wi countless other contexts in which viow ence, because of the particular circum. stances, is a unique means. The truth, pethaps disappointingly pluralistic, is that non-violence is a unique means in some contexts, violence a unique means in others, with a middle range of cases in which either violence or non-violence can be efficacious in the attainment of morally obligatory goals. This seems in fact to be the position of most pacifists and advocates of the ideology of non- violence, who pragmatically proscribe violence in those contests where failure is likely or certain and prescribe vio- lence where it is a unique means of attaining what is morally required, Gan- ahi, for example, wrote, I do believe that, where there is only 2 choice between violence and cow- ardice, I would advise violence. ‘Thus, when my eldest son asked me what he should have done, had he been present when I was almost fatal- ly assasinated in 1908, whether he would have run away and seen me killed or whether he should have used physical force which he could and wanted to use, I told him that it was his duty to defend me even by using violence. ‘The fact that neither Gandhi nor most pacifists unqualifiedly accept the ptinciple of non-violence hints at the difficulty of finding it a tenable moral option, ‘The proposition that violence is not always wrong constitutes a feeble be- ginning at a socially responsive morality of violence since it merely expresses a commonly held and acted upon belief. Taken by itself, such a statement could bring little moral comprehension to a humanity threatened with collective ex- tinction by several violent possibilities. Provided that one is interested in sug. gesting desirable transformations in the moral world, it is surely more relevant (once having examined the thesis of total non-violence) to talk about the wrongness and dangers of violence and the attitudes whose perpetuation sus- tains these wrongs and dangers Tf, as T have argued, the rightness of violence on particular occasions is a function of its efficacy in the fulfillment of moral obligation, it would follow that the wrongness of violence consists in its failure to meet this condition. Specifi- cally, violence would be wrong in any #4. Quoted in Donald A. Wells, The War Myth (New York: Western Pablishing Cox 1868), p. $8.VIOLENCE ca one of several circumstances: (i) where it is employed to achieve purposes not obligatory, as in murder, or (ii) where it is employed to achieve an end which, while obligatory, does not require viol- ence as a uniquely efficacious! means, as would be true in a case of serious con- Riict resolved by a beating when verbal or judicial means would have provided a satisfactory resolution, or (iii) where it is employed to pursue goals which are obligatory but for which violence is not efficacious as a means; for example, assuming that the Czechs were morally obligated to preserve life during their Russian “normalization,” it would have been suicidal and hence wrong for them to attempt their defense by military means. Finally, (iv) violence would be wrong where it serves no means fune- tion at all, but simply expresses the ne- glectful indifference of an agent who does not wish to exert himself to pre- venting a serious injury. From the perspective of social con- cern about violence, one should ask, “Do any of these wrong forms of violence pose any significantly greater dangers than others?” If we take “greater” to mean a greater power to harm or destroy life and also take collective extinction of mankind or the destruction of entire nations as meaningful quantitative mea- 85, The requirement that violence can be right only if it is uniquely effienctous as a means to morally obligatory end depends upon the moral principle that one ought to 2void unnecesary injury. Violence which is merely ficacious 25 one among several alternatives, some of which are unviolent in character, vio: lates this principle, It could be said dhat the clement of injury in violence establishes its (prima fecie wrongness, bt that this does not tell ur whether violence is always unjustified. To pat it another way, violence always has Gisvalues, but isnot for dhat reason, autor matically the wrong option. sures, several conclusions follow. The first category of wrong violence—vio- ence employed toward nonobligatory ends (i)—poses the least danger, though saying so has a paradoxical air. In our quest for dramatic moral simplicities, we are inclined to believe that the greatest dangers emanate from agents who are self-conscious in their knowledge or evil doing, as was the Archangel Michael who said, “Evil, be thou my good.” It is true that the greatest amount of public fear and rage is directed at crimes like arson, rape, mugging, and murder (“crime in the streets”) which so clearly lack defensible moral purpose. But such behavior clearly does not constitute dan- gers for the survival of mankind or even of particular nations. The social order is hardly threatened if I kill my brother in a quarrel about money. On the con trary, the greatest dangers from violence are posed by those forms of it directed toward some aim generally regerded as obligatory or justifiable (ii, iii)—an ex- emplary instance being national defense, which virtually all persons accept in the abstract. National defense consequently commands infinitely greater resources for human destructiveness than the hum- ble brawler who drunkenly stabs his brother with a butcher-knife, And these resources of defense in their turn call forth matching resources of counter. violence from those who are not con. vinced that they are wholly defensive in character. It is in the institutional domain of violence that we find the powers ~ nuclear, chemical-biological that threaten social order and life. The most destructive powers of violence pos- sess social legitimacy because they rest on policies which are alleged to be (and often are) consensually defined. We are confronted with a kind of paradox here:48 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE the forms of violence posing the least danger are the most indignantly dis. approved while the forms of violence posing the greatest danger are the most vigorously approved. Who can fail to approve defending oneself The fact that the means employed may not be uniquely requisite or efficacious is ob- scured by the socially sanctioned charac- ter of institutional military violence, a character which demands ‘commitment and loyalty in the absence of proven efficacy or even in spite of proven, self. destructive inefficacy. (“They shall not have died in vain.”) Historically, socially critical magni- tudes of violence have resided in insti tutions rather than in individuals (though individuals can certainly move and use institutions for their own pur- poses.) The novelty in contemporary forms of violence is that a relatively small number of leaders possess the power to desttoy all human life; in the past, it would have required the strenu- ous efforts of almost all men to do so. Furthermore, the impersonality of the modern technological capability has permitted the processes of human de- struction to attain their ultimate po- tential without the need for the hot- blooded passions previously important in human extermination. The industrial- ization and rationalization of war has made mass lifedestruction possible as nothing more than a dutiful and pas- sionless bureaucratic routine. To con- front modern violence and to speak in the interests of human life requires one not to admonish people to do what are generally regarded as their solemn du- ties, but rather to demonstrate that those socially praised and heavily moral- ized tasks should not be their duties at all, Appealing to men’s “better natures” in the age of giant bureaucracies of death is but to appeal to those same self- less sentiments which loyally sustain the machineries of death. The moral re- straint of violence in its most awesome magnitudes requires a reordering of ‘moral priorities in moder culture, s0 that violent means, if they are necessary at all, are genuinely the servants of human interests rather than their great. est enemies. To descend from the perceptually remote but real possibility of collective extinction to violences of lesser magni- tude involves more controversial prob- Jems in moral adjudication. Everyone can agree that collective extinction would be wrong; to think at all is ak most to affirm the value of human sur- vival. But to see the wrongness of treat- ing violently some particular person or group is more difficult, Moral agents should be very self-conscious about the delusions and perverse twists in reason- ing to which the temptations of violence give rise. As stated previously, violence can only be right if it constitutes a uniquely requisite means to the attain- ment of a morally obligatory goal. Agents should be aware that in the heat of impatience, it is tempting to believe that violence is uniquely requisite, even though many unviolent alternatives ex- ist. Hence in the natural tendency to act decisively there is a predisposition for violence often unjustified by citcum- stance. Agents should also be aware of the ways in which violence shifis with so much fluidity from effectiveness to in- effectiveness; the process of violent con- flict, because of the frustrations to which it gives rise in coping with counter- violence, can lead the individual to believe that the violent conflict is a self-justifying end, to be pursued “hon-VIOLENCE 49 orably” regardless of cost in means. Even though the agent may have undertaken violence under conditions for moral rightness in violence, the violent means an easily become totally disproportion- ate in their cost in relation to the mor- ally approvable end they were meant to attain. A scrupulous moral agent weill doubtless find many occasions on which violence is tempting, but on fur- ther reficetion demonstrates itself a clear wrong. ‘This willingness to sort through de- liberatively the relevant considerations while struggling with the peculiar dif ficulties of violence is doubtless Iatent with the same potential for self-deceit, halftruth, and the other rationalizing vices characteristic of perverted reason- ing. But we should not conclude that the effective moral restraint of violence is impossible. At the very least, the in- formation suggests that there is nothing unattainable about a much less violent world than the one in which we now live. Violence will doubtless never be entirely eliminated; it is a permanent human potential with which every gen- eration copes rather than a “problem” which is given a “solution.” That we can hope to place greater amounts of vio- ence within effective moral restraints is sufficient motivation for attempting to moralize intelligently about violence and for trying to alter the contours of violence in the world which challenge ‘our moral sensibifities.* 86. Cf. Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glenene, TIL: Free Press. pb. 1964), pp. 485 for his analysis of the shift from realistic conflict to non-realistic conflict. “Many persons have contributed valuable criticim during the writing of the article, among them G. Bowles. R. Jewett, J. N. Jordan, J. M. Miller, R. F. Terry, R. Wallace and above all, R. ¥. 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