SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117857. February 2, 2001.]

LUIS S. WONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Atty. Agapito P. Pagayanan and Tañada Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer

of calendars. He had a history of unremitted collections, which he duly
acknowledged in a confirmation receipt he co-signed with his wife for LPI.
Hence, petitioner's costumers were required to issue postdated checks before
LPI would accept their purchase orders. Wong issued 6 postdated checks all
dated December 30, 1985 and drawn payable to the order of LPI. The checks
were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of customers who
failed to issue postdated checks. However, following company policy, LPI
refused to accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to
apply the checks to the payment of petitioner's unremitted collections for 1984.
Before maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the
checks and promised to replace them within 30 days. He failed to honor his
words and upon deposit of LPI, the checks were returned for the reason of
"account closed." After being notified, petitioner still failed to make
arrangement for payments. He was charged with three counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 under three separate informations, all cases were raffled to the
same trial court. Upon arraignment, Wong pleaded not guilty. After trial, the
court issued its decision finding the accused guilty on all charges and was
sentenced to serve an imprisonment of four months on each of the charge. He
was also ordered to pay the amount due plus interest and trial costs. Petitioner
appealed his case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction.
Hence, this appeal. CTacSE

According to the Supreme Court the issue on whether the check was
issued as guarantee or as payment for the petitioner's unremitted collections
was a factual issue, which had been settled by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. Although Manuel Limtong, owner of the LPI, was the sole witness for
the prosecution, his testimony was found sufficient to prove all the elements of
the offense charged. Despite petitioner's insistent plea of innocence, the Court
found no error in the Court of Appeal's affirmance of his conviction for
violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. However, pursuant to policy guidelines
in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner
should be modified to a fine not less than but not more than double the amount
of the checks that were dishonored.

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 SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22; WHEN COMMITTED. —

There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing and
issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issue
that the check is not sufficiently funded; and (2) by having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient
funds therein or credit with said bank to cover the full amount of the check
when presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days.

2. ID.; ID.; MERE ACT OF ISSUING A WORTHLESS CHECK IS MALUM

PROHIBITUM; RATIONALE. — In cases elevated from the Court of Appeals, our
review is confined to alleged errors of law. Its findings of fact are generally
conclusive. Absent any showing that the findings by the respondent court are
entirely devoid of any substantiation on record, the same must stand. The lack
of accounting between the parties is not the issue in this case. As repeatedly
held, this Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, in Llamado v. Court of Appeals,
we held that "[t]o determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the
terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public
reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes,
and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act
of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum." Nothing herein persuades
us to hold otherwise.

3. ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS THEREOF, CONSTRUED. — The elements of B.P.

Blg. 22 under the first situation, pertinent to the present case, are: "(1) The
making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment." An essential element of the offense is
"knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its
presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the
statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where
payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in
or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date
of the check." To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute
provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days
from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes
arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the
amount of the check. Rather, the clear import of the law is to establish a prima
facie presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the
following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and
(2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements
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 for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the check
must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for
the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an
element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to
maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof.
Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be
presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer
will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay." By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six
(6) months, or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157
days after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale.
Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such
knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found
by the trial court, private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the
reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do
so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were
dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make
arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on
record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of
his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the
checks.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J : p

For review on certiorari is the decision dated October 28, 1994 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CR 11856 1 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 17, convicting petitioner on three (3)
counts of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) violations and
sentencing him to imprisonment of four (4) months for each count, and to pay
private respondent the amounts of P5,500.00, P6,410.00 and P3,375.00,
respectively, corresponding to the value of the checks involved, with the legal
rate of interest from the time of filing of the criminal charges, as well as to pay
the costs.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer

of calendars. LPI would print sample calendars, then give them to agents to
present to customers. The agents would get the purchase orders of customers
and forward them to LPI. After printing the calendars, LPI would ship the
calendars directly to the customers. Thereafter, the agents would come around
to collect the payments. Petitioner, however, had a history of unremitted
collections, which he duly acknowledged in a confirmation receipt he co-signed
with his wife. 2 Hence, petitioner's customers were required to issue postdated
checks before LPI would accept their purchase orders.
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 In early December 1985, Wong issued six (6) postdated checks totaling
P18,025.00, all dated December 30, 1985 and drawn payable to the order of
LPI, as follows:
(1) Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) Check No. 660143464-C for
P6,410.00 (Exh. "B");

(2) ABC Check No. 660143460-C for P 540.00 (Exh. "C");

(3) ABC Check No. PA660143451-C for P5,500.00 (Exh. "D");
(4) ABC Check No. PA660143465-C for P1,100.00 (Exh. "E");

(5) ABC Check No. PA660143463-C for P3,375.00 (Exh. "F");

(6) ABC Check No. PA660143452-C for P1,100.00 (Exh. "G").

These checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of

customers who failed to issue post-dated checks. However, following company
policy, LPI refused to accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties
agreed to apply the checks to the payment of petitioner's unremitted
collections for 1984 amounting to P18,077.07. 3 LPI waived the P52.07
difference.
Before the maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to
deposit the checks and promised to replace them within 30 days. However,
petitioner reneged on his promise. Hence, on June 5, 1986, LPI deposited the
checks with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). The checks were
returned for the reason "account closed." The dishonor of the checks was
evidenced by the RCBC return slip.

On June 20, 1986, complainant through counsel notified the petitioner of

the dishonor. Petitioner failed to make arrangements for payment within five (5)
banking days.

On November 6, 1987, petitioner was charged with three (3) counts of

violation of B.P. Blg. 22 4 under three separate Informations for the three
checks amounting to P5,500.00, P3,375.00, and P6,410.00. 5
The Information in Criminal Case No. CBU-12055 reads as follows: 6
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1985 and for
sometime subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
knowing at the time of issue of the check she/he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, with deliberate intent, with
intent of gain and of causing damage, did then and there issue, make
or draw Allied Banking Corporation Check No. 660143451 dated 12-30-
85 in the amount of P5,500.00 payable to Manuel T. Limtong which
check was issued in payment of an obligation of said accused, but
when the said check was presented with said bank, the same was
dishonored for reason 'ACCOUNT CLOSED' and despite notice and
demands made to redeem or make good said check, said accused
failed and refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to
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 do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Manuel T. Limtong in the
amount of P5,500.00 Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.

Petitioner was similarly charged in Criminal Case No. 12057 for ABC
Check No. 660143463 in the amount of P3,375.00, and in Criminal Case No.
12058 for ABC Check No. 660143464 for P6,410.00. Both cases were raffled to
the same trial court.
Upon arraignment, Wong pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

Manuel T. Limtong, general manager of LPI, testified on behalf of the

company. Limtong averred that he refused to accept the personal checks of
petitioner since it was against company policy to accept personal checks from
agents. Hence, he and petitioner simply agreed to use the checks to pay
petitioner's unremitted collections to LPI. According to Limtong, a few days
before maturity of the checks, Wong requested him to defer the deposit of said
checks for lack of funds. Wong promised to replace them within thirty days, but
failed to do so. Hence, upon advice of counsel, he deposited the checks which
were subsequently returned on the ground of "account closed."
The version of the defense is that petitioner issued the six (6) checks to
guarantee the 1985 calendar bookings of his customers. According to
petitioner, he issued the checks not as payment for any obligation, but to
guarantee the orders of his customers. In fact, the face value of the six (6)
postdated checks tallied with the total amount of the calendar orders of the six
(6) customers of the accused, namely, Golden Friendship Supermarket, Inc.
(P6,410.00), New Society Rice and Corn Mill (P5,500.00), Cuesta Enterprises
(P540.00), Pelrico Marketing (P1,100.00), New Asia Restaurant (P3,375.00), and
New China Restaurant (P1,100.00). Although these customers had already paid
their respective orders, petitioner claimed LPI did not return the said checks to
him.

On August 30, 1990, the trial court issued its decision, disposing as
follows: 7 CTHaSD

"Wherefore, premises considered, this Court finds the accused

Luis S. Wong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Violations of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in THREE (3)
Counts and is hereby sentenced to serve an imprisonment of FOUR (4)
MONTHS for each count; to pay Private Complainant Manuel T. Limtong
the sums of Five Thousand Five Hundred (P5,500.00) Pesos, Six
Thousand Four Hundred Ten (P6,410.00) Pesos and Three Thousand
Three Hundred Seventy-Five (P3,375.00) Pesos corresponding to the
amounts indicated in Allied Banking Checks Nos. 660143451,
66[0]143464 and 660143463 all issued on December 30, 1985
together with the legal rate of interest from the time of the filing of the
criminal charges in Court and pay the costs." 8

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. On October 28,

1994, it affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. 9

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 Hence, the present petition. 10 Petitioner raises the following questions of
law 11 —
May a complainant successfully prosecute a case under BP 22 —
if there is no more consideration or price or value — ever the binding
tie that it is in contracts in general and in negotiable instruments in
particular — behind the checks? — if even before he deposits the
checks, he has ceased to be a holder for value because the purchase
orders (PO's) guaranteed by the checks were already paid?
Given the fact that the checks lost their reason for being, as
above stated, is it not then the duty of complainant — knowing he is no
longer a holder for value — to return the checks and not to deposit
them ever? Upon what legal basis then may such a holder deposit
them and get paid twice?

Is petitioner, as the drawer of the guarantee checks which lost

their reason for being, still bound under BP 22 to maintain his account
long after 90 days from maturity of the checks?
May the prosecution apply the prima facie presumption of
"knowledge of lack of funds" against the drawer if the checks were
belatedly deposited by the complainant 157 days after maturity, or will
it be then necessary for the prosecution to show actual proof of "lack of
funds" during the 90-day term?
Petitioner insists that the checks were issued as guarantees for the 1985
purchase orders (PO's) of his customers. He contends that private respondent is
not a "holder for value" considering that the checks were deposited by private
respondent after the customers already paid their orders. Instead of depositing
the checks, private respondent should have returned the checks to him.
Petitioner further assails the credibility of complainant considering that his
answers to cross-examination questions included: "I cannot recall, anymore"
and "We have no more record."
In his Comment, 12 the Solicitor General concedes that the checks might
have been initially intended by petitioner to guarantee payments due from
customers, but upon the refusal of LPI to accept said personal checks per
company policy, the parties had agreed that the checks would be used to pay
off petitioner's unremitted collections. Petitioner's contention that he did not
demand the return of the checks because he trusted LPI's good faith is contrary
to human nature and sound business practice, according to the Solicitor
General.
The issue as to whether the checks were issued merely as guarantee or
for payment of petitioner's unremitted collections is a factual issue involving as
it does the credibility of witnesses. Said factual issue has been settled by the
trial court and Court of Appeals. Although initially intended to be used as
guarantee for the purchase orders of customers, they found the checks were
eventually used to settle the remaining obligations of petitioner with LPI.
Although Manuel Limtong was the sole witness for the prosecution, his
testimony was found sufficient to prove all the elements of the offense charged.
13 We find no cogent reason to depart from findings of both the trial and
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 appellate courts. In cases elevated from the Court of Appeals, our review is
confined to alleged errors of law. Its findings of fact are generally conclusive.
Absent any showing that the findings by the respondent court are entirely
devoid of any substantiation on record, the same must stand. 14 The lack of
accounting between the parties is not the issue in this case. As repeatedly held,
this Court is not a trier of facts. 15 Moreover, in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 16
we held that "[t]o determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the
terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public
reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes,
and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act
of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum." Nothing herein persuades
us to hold otherwise.
The only issue for our resolution now is whether or not the prosecution
was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense
penalized under B.P. Blg. 22.
There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing
and issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of
issue that the check is not sufficiently funded; and (2) by having sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to keep
sufficient funds therein or credit with said bank to cover the full amount of the
check when presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days.
17

The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the first situation, pertinent to the
present case, are: 18
"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment."

Petitioner contends that the first element does not exist because the
checks were not issued to apply for account or for value. He attempts to
distinguish his situation from the usual "cut-and-dried" B.P. 22 case by claiming
that the checks were issued as guarantee and the obligations they were
supposed to guarantee were already paid. This flawed argument has no factual
basis, the RTC and CA having both ruled that the checks were in payment for
unremitted collections, and not as guarantee. Likewise, the argument has no
legal basis, for what B.P. Blg. 22 punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check
and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
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 relating to its issuance. 19

As to the second element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum

that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of
the offense are present. 20 Thus, the maker's knowledge is presumed from the
dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. 21
Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks on June
5, 1986, or 157 days after the December 30, 1985 maturity date, the
presumption of knowledge of lack of funds under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22
should not apply to him. He further claims that he should not be expected to
keep his bank account active and funded beyond the ninety-day period.

Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making,
drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be
prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount
due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee
of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the

maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with
the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of
mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption
of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check." To mitigate the harshness of the
law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise
if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker
or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays
the holder the amount of the check. 22
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, nowhere in said provision does the law
require a maker to maintain funds in his bank account for only 90 days. Rather,
the clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1)
presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the
check and failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full within
5 banking days after notice thereof. That the check must be deposited within
ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption
of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense.
Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in
the account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for payment within a
reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability
thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By current banking
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 practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, 23 or 180 days.
Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the
check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private
respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner
that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained
to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was
duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment
within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence
that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with
the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks. And despite petitioner's
insistent plea of innocence, we find no error in the respondent court's
affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing
Checks Law.
However, pursuant to the policy guidelines in Administrative Circular No.
12-2000, which took effect on November 21, 2000, the penalty imposed on
petitioner should now be modified to a fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the checks that were dishonored.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Luis S. Wong is found
liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 but the penalty imposed on him is
hereby MODIFIED so that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted. Petitioner is
ORDERED to pay a FINE of (1) P6,750.00, equivalent to double the amount of
the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12057, (2) P12,820.00, equivalent
to double the amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12058,
and (3) P11,000.00, equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in
Criminal Case No. CBU-12055, with subsidiary imprisonment 24 in case of
insolvency to pay the aforesaid fines. Finally, as civil indemnity, petitioner is
also ordered to pay to LPI the face value of said checks totaling P18,025.00 with
legal interest thereon from the time of filing the criminal charges in court, as
well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, concurred in by Justices
Ricardo P. Galvez and Eugenio S. Labitoria.
2. Records, p. 119.
3. Id. at 130.
4. Otherwise known as "An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance
of a Check without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes,"
5. As to the three (3) remaining checks, petitioner was also charged with
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 violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 3 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 25078-R, 25079-R, and 28440-R. The MTC convicted
petitioner but on appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,
acquitted him for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Records, p. 89.
7. Rollo , pp. 185-199.
8. Id. at 198-199.
9. Id. at 88-108.
10. Id. at 11-86.
11. Id. at 17.
12. Id. at 290-321.
13. Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744, 749 (1998).
14. Bunag Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 440, 447-448 (1992); Morales vs.
Court of Appeals, et. al., 197 SCRA 391, 401(1991).
15. Aleria v. Melez, 298 SCRA 611, 618 (1998).
16. 270 SCRA 423, 431 (1997).
17. Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22.
18. Lim v. People, G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000, p. 7.
19. Dichaves v. Apalit, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1274, June 8, 2000, p. 6.
20. Sycip Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 125059, March 17, 2000, p. 8.
21. Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 657, 661 (1998).
22. Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323, 330-331 (1986).
23. Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126670, December 2, 1999, p. 9.
24. Lim v. People , G.R No. 130038, September 18, 2000, p. 11.

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