1.

Bare boat & fortuitious event not liable

2. Yellow cab is liable. Based on jurisprudence the relationship under Boundary System is an
employer-employee relationship. Wherein it provides that employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees. In this case, Brutus is considered an employee of Yellow
Cab who is the former’s employer, applying the provision Yellow Cab Company should be held
liable.

3. No, because the contract is against public policy. Because according to the law, a cpc cannot
be subject to another contract between private person or private parties, In the case, the contract
between A and B is against public since they subjected cpc for their own benefit..
4. The dismissal is improper. According to the jurisprudence, suits may be filed to the court of
the place where the contract is perfected. Since the contract of carriage is perfected in Japan,
Tokyo courts has jurisdiction over the case.

5. bare boat
6.1. Yes, According to jurisprudence local government units have the power to regulate
operations of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchise for the operation thereof. .
6.2. Based on jurisprudence local government units has been vested by the DOTC the power to
regulate operations to tricycles and grants franchise thereof. Their limitation is that they are
limited to the guidelines and authority given to them by the DOTC.
7. The defense is invalid. According to recent jurisprudence when an airline issues a ticket to a
passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The
passenger then has every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date. If
he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for a breach of contract of carriage. In this case,
the mere fact that DF and JL has already purchased the ticket and they were already seated on
their seats. But they were ejected from the plane by an unjustifiable reason, SAL has breach the
contract of carriage between them and the former. Furthermore, DF and JL moral damages since
it falls to the one circumstances that moral damages may be awarded where it is proved that the
carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if death does not incur. In this case, there was bad
faith on the part of the employee of the airline for having to remove DF and JL from their seats
on the airplane.

8. Yes, action shall prosper. According to the Code, the law does not distinguish between those
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both and one who does
such carrying only as ancillary activity. In this case JK is considered as a common carrier since
it is an ancillary activity to transport those people from work, wherein JK received fees.
Therefore, applying the foregoing, JK is considered as a common carrier and is liable for
damages.
9. No Filcom is not correct. Such case is cognizable under the Regional Trial Court, according to
recent jurisprudence held by the Supreme Court stating that board of communications, being a
creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are
expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute. Such functions are limited
and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by
necessary implication conferred upon it by Statute. That the proper forum for them to ventilate
their grievances for possible recovery of damages should be in the courts and not in the Board of
Communications. Applying the foregoing, RTC has jurisdiction over the case and not the NTC
since jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.
10.1. Only the common carrier or the airline would be impleaded in this action. The reason
being, is that according to jurisprudence, breach of contractual obligation to carry the passengers
safely to their place of destination, the common carrier is primarily liable for damages, and the
case is brought against the carrier alone, without the necessity of the driver, even if such breach
is due to the negligence of the driver. Because if the driver would be included with the carrier
that would make the carrier’s liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently,
entitled to recover only the share which correspondents to the driver.
10.2. Both The passenger who jumps from the airplane and that was run over by the ambulance
and the employee who hitch a free ride are entitle to damages. First is the passenger, the airline is
liable for damages by reason breach of contract of carriage, since jurisprudence provides that all
passengers are expected to be transported safely from their destination. That airline carriers are
to be expected to observed extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passenger, failure to do so
will constitute breach of contract of carriage. Applying the foregoing, since the airline company
did not observed extraordinary diligence to the passenger who jumps off from the airplane which
results to the runover of the ambulance that resulted to the death of the passenger the airline
company is liable for damages.
As for the employee who hitch a free ride from the airplane, the said employee is also
entitled to claim for full damages. Based on jurisprudence, it is true when a passenger is carried
gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common carrier’s liability for negligence is valid, but not
for willful acts or gross negligence. In this case, there was a gross negligence made by the pilot
when it grossly miscalculated the landing of the airplane which resulted to numerous deaths of
its passenger. Therefore applying the foregoing the employee is entitled to full claim of damages
even if the latter has been carried gratuitously.
11. RTC has jurisdiction since the case herein is a contractual breach whereby the court has
jurisdiction, again as held by the Supreme Court stating that board of communications, being a
creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are
expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute. Such functions are limited
and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by
necessary implication conferred upon it by Statute. That the proper forum for them to ventilate
their grievances for possible recovery of damages should be in the courts and not in the Board of
Communications.
12. Spouses Ocampo, cannot claim, neither parties can seek relief from courts being an illegal
contract, because the parties in this case operated under an arrangement, known as the kabit
system. According to jurisprudence a kabit system is whereby a person has been granted a
certificate of public convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate
under such franchise for a fee. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege by the
grantees thereof cannot be countenance. The kabit system even though it is not penalized as a
criminal offense, it is however recognized as being contrary to public policy and therefore, void
and inexistent. That the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract. Applying the
foregoing in this case, being an illegal contract, neither parties can enforce any action.
13. Such opposition made by BPC is unfounded. According to recent jurisprudence, that
franchises are not required before and each and every public utility to conduct operation. That
the Constitution does not indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable requirement for
any public utility in order to operate their business.
14. No, based on jurisprudence, it is true that old and existing operator are protected by the prior
applicant rule, however, the said rule cannot take precedence over the convenience of the public.
That the convenience of the public that must be taken into account, other things being equal, and
that convenience would be effectuated by passengers whontake buses at points in one part of a
line being able to proceed beyond points without having to change uses and to wait for the
arrival of buses of a competitive operator. So applying the foregoing in this case, public
convenience would be properly served if commuters from Tiaong, Quezon could go to their
destination without the need of changing buses.
15. No, the prohibition in Sec. 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of the Certificate of Public
Convenience , the same provision is deemed void ab initio to the 1987 Constitution. According
to Constitution, which states the prohibition against exclusive franchises. Since Sec. 47 of P.D.
198 vests an exclusive franchise upon public utilities it is deemed unconstitutional and the
reliance of LTWD to Section 47 of P.D. 198 on exclusive franchise cannot be granted.
16.1. Yes, such passengers are entitled to moral damages against the jeepney driver due to quasi-
delict. Based on jurisprudence whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay from the damage done. Such fault, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. Wherein compensation must be
made to a person suffering damage because of the act or omission of another, there being no pre-
existing obligation arising from contracts. Applying the foregoing, it is clearly establish in this
case that the jeepney driver has not contractual agreement with the injured passenger, whereby
the former has caused damaged to the latter. Thus, it is a quasi-delict and therefore the said
passenger is entitled for damages.
The passenger cannot claim for moral damages to the Taxi since according to
jurisprudence moral damages may be claimed to common carriers where the mishaps results in
the death of a passenger or where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith,
even if death does not result. In this case neither of the circumstances are present and therefore
the passenger cannot claim moral damages to his common carrier which in this case is the taxi
company.
16.2. Based on jurisprudence, the nature of the liability of the driver is criminal liability which is
reckless imprudence resulting to injury. While the common carrier’s liability is a civil action
based in contractual liability.
17. Philip may file for money claims for the loss of his luggage. Based on jurisprudence, it is true
that under the warsaw convention provides the limited liability of an international air carrier.
However the warsaw convention does not apply the availment of the carrier of limiting its
liability if the damage is caused by its willful misconduct or negligence or if the damage is
similarly caused by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment. In this
case, it is the willful misconduct of the airline company where such luggage of Philip could not
be found. Therefore, applying the foregoing Philip may claim for money claims.
18. I would advise Emmanuel that Prospero has no legal standing on the case because he is not
the registered owner of the vehicle. According to jurisprudence, based on the kabit system. The
operator could not sue without joining the registered owner of the vehicle as his principal. In
short only the registered owner is the one who may claim for damages. In this case, the jeepney
was not registered in Prospero’s name rather it is registered under Enrico. So applying the
foregoing in this case, since Prospero is not the registered owner of the vehicle he has not action
or legal standing over the case.