TS OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (Thomas Nagel) The Last Word About Nagel. and The Last Word In ui answer to this question because subjectivism is al qualification. On the other hand, he locates the solution in are thoughts that we simply cannot get outsi ford on ¢ERN PHILOSOPH (Thomas Nagel) ‘The Last Word Introduction (Chapter - 1) In the first section of the Introduction, Thomas Nagel tries to defend rationalism -against subjectivism while-attempting to explore the issue-“where justification and ~~~ ‘understanding, comes to an end in certain domains of thought”? According to him this is one issue that runs through almost every area of inquiry and has also invaded the culture in general. The question is whether they end with certain objective principles whose validity is independent of our point of view or they a come to an end within our point of view i.e. subjective point of view be it at the Kar individual or the collective level. If the answer lies in the second option then it om ‘implies, in his opinion, that most of what we apparently accept as objective or ne universal principles derive their “authority” from the perspective and practice of rab the community of people who follow them. It is this that he wants to clarify with t_answer for all such regard to certain domains|of thoughtand S2vous a ‘y ; as against a subjectivist one. In other words Nagel offers a defence of ay reason against subjectivism in this section, in objective principles whose withinrOur own point of view... such that even the apparently most objective and uriversal principles derive their validit who follow them. Nagel goes with the firs and in this context he, ‘reason is a category or form of thought in which we draw ty that is neither personal nor social but universal. And distance ourselves from received opinions. In other the view that our thoughts are perspectival or Sn his meNagel concludes the first section by asserting that objectivity of reason does not consist in making sense of the phenomenon as was done by some philosophers who maintained that objectivity implies accurate representation of reality following commensuration (Rorty). On the other hand he describes a rational position as one wherein the grounds of reason are universally valid and involve a sense off generality. In order to further elaborate his claim, Nagel, in the second section takes ‘on to explain the distinction between ordinary criticisms of reasoning or ordinary challenges to reasoning and philosophiical challenges to reason. We must remember here that he considers reason to be an authority in itself firstly because its validity is universal and secondly because it is used in the very criticism of itself. So there is no way we can go beyond reason. However he also says that this does not mean that ‘one cannot appeal against a particular exercise of reason. For instance he points out how easily one commits mistakes in reasoning and the corrections are done with an ication of reason itself, Thus he shows that ordinary ‘equal case only by further appli challenges to reason or criticisms of reason are different from philosophical challenges to reason. According to Nagel the former reveal mistakes in the results of reasoning. It involves pointing a mistake in someone's arithmetic or logic, failure to consider a possibility that is not ruled out by ‘evidences, disanalogy between two cases ‘that have eon put together and so on. This shows that a far as ordinary challenge fe reason is concerned one remains within the territory of rational justification and iticism, One does not question whether the method employed is a valid method for attaining truth. So Nagel calls this type of criticism of reason as internal type of criticism where the evaluation does not convey anything subjective. The f ica challenge to reason constitutes the m of ge questions the objectivity external form of criticism of of the grounds of reason on ‘ries to undermine the conclusion, Here it is : of reason is not a result ofHe further expiains that’in the former case reason is not questioned but already Presupposed while exposing the errors of a conclusion. But in the latter case the Source of belief is not reason but an alternative type of ground that is used to justify or demonstrate the truth of the conclusion. He holds that the external form of ctiticism when generalised is used to make a philosophical point for various purposes. Itmay aim at discrediting a supposedly rational claim altogether or try to show it as less universal. For example such a strategy, Nagel claims is often used to attack the role of reason in Ethics to reveal its true grounds. Further, it may also be offered as a reductive interpretation of what reason really is —a changing feature of a particular culture or form of life. Nagel, being a realist about reason, considers such reductionism as equivalent to scepticism because it shows a subjective or relativistic reinterpretation of reason. He maintains that external form of criticism, in this sense goes to the extent of challenging the strong rationalistic ideals of Plato and Descartes. It is thus directed at a particular category of claim which may be legal, ethical or scientific reason, or a more general category of claim. 7 ; But where Nagel is concemed he argues that although it is certainly possible i many cases to discredit appeals to objectivity of reason by showing that their sources lie either in wishes, or prejudices, unexamined assumptions or local habits ete, such “perspectival” or “parochial” interpretations will disappear sooner or later. He concludes that to be rational one has to take ibili Tesponsibility and deny that they are mere expressions of int orm @ conception of oneself. (pgs 7. nHe refers to kant’s austere division between perspectival and non-perspectival thought ie. between things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves and considers it to bé too minimal an objective frame. Therefore he advocates and believes in Separating the idea of reason from the idea that its results Must carry absolute certainty and emphasizes on the importance of reason for’ universality so that it checks any amount of subjectivity and relativity. Nagel’s defense of reason in this sense resembles Descartes’ Cogito which identifies the limits of self-criticism from an external viewpoint. He explains that Descartes’ began the Process of self-criticism (methodic doubt) because tealised that the causes by which his convictions were formed failed to justify | 0 validate them. This happens when we look at ourselves from outside. He exp that the reliance on reason is made expli. “destructive criticism”. ¢