Team 12 Capstone

Supporting The Pigeon Project:
U.S. Foreign Policy to Aid Iranian Protesters Through the Use of
Sanction Reforms and Technological Developments
Team W, Group 12
Maja Janc, Eloise Marseille, Kayla Palmer,
Camille Sandage, Hannah Shahbazi, Molly Richendrfer

1
For Iranians Everywhere.

Zan. Zendegi. Azadi.
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Table of Contents
Abstract...........................................................................................................................................4
1. Introduction................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Background.......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Opening Statement.............................................................................................................11
1.3 The Pigeon Project Mission Statement.............................................................................. 12
2. Policy Proposal......................................................................................................................... 13
2.1 Our Recommendation........................................................................................................ 13
2.2 Sanction Reform................................................................................................................ 14
2.3 Application Proposal..........................................................................................................14
2.4 O.........................................................................................................................................15
3. Sanctions................................................................................................................................... 16
3.1 Analysis of Previous Sanctions on Iran............................................................................. 16
3.2 Wire Transfers and International Banking......................................................................... 18
3.3 Aiding Iranians with Remote Work Abroad...................................................................... 20
3.4 Endorsing the Mahsa Act...................................................................................................22
3.5 Global Examples................................................................................................................24
4. Technological Developments................................................................................................... 26
4.1 Importance of Supporting Technological Developments.................................................. 26
4.2 The Pigeon Project’s Strategy............................................................................................27
4.3 Our App Proposals.............................................................................................................28
4.3.1 Sedah, Meaning “Sound” in Farsi........................................................................... 31
4.3.1.1 Analysis of Challenges.................................................................................... 32
4.3.1.2 Strengths and Solutions Analysis.................................................................... 33
4.3.2 Bebin, Meaning “Look” in Farsi...............................................................................33
4.3.3 Biya, Meaning “To Come” in Farsi...........................................................................35
4.4 VPN Development............................................................................................................. 39
5. Logistics of Supporting The Pigeon Project.......................................................................... 40
5.1 Cost Breakdown of App Developments............................................................................ 40
5.2 Sources of Funding............................................................................................................ 41
6. Goals and Outcomes of The Pigeon Project.......................................................................... 43
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6.1 Goals.................................................................................................................................. 43
6.2 Anticipated Short Term Outcomes.....................................................................................44
6.3 Anticipated Long Term Outcomes.....................................................................................45
7. Global Impact of U.S. Implementation of The Pigeon Project............................................ 45
8. Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 47
Appendices:.................................................................................................................................. 50
Appendix A. (Biya App)..........................................................................................................50
Appendix B. (Biya App).......................................................................................................... 51
Appendix C. (Biya App Feature—Insan)................................................................................ 52
Appendix D. (Biya App Feature—Koja)................................................................................. 53
Appendix E. (Bebin App)........................................................................................................ 54
Appendix F. (Sedah App)........................................................................................................ 55
Bibliography............................................................................................................................... 56
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Abstract
This Capstone analyzes the context of the ongoing protest movement in Iran and
proposes a policy that can be implemented by the Biden administration to support Iranians facing
human rights violations from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Our goal as the nonprofit
organization, “The Pigeon Project,” is helping the individuals involved in protesting the
oppressive and undemocratic Islamic Republic of Iran through the establishment of a
multifaceted plan that incorporates purposeful lifting of sanctions and creation of three
applications. To achieve this, we propose policies encouraging the alleviation of U.S. executive
orders sanctioning Iran’s economy that both prevent civilians from having financial stability and
exacerbate social and political unrest. The focus of the project and proposal is ensuring the safety
and power of the protestors, but also improving the quality of life and economic stability of
everyone in Iran. Moreover, if such sanction alleviation policies prove to be impactful to the
protest movements and help the quality of life of civilians, the hope is that the U.S. government
may implement such policies in relation to other sanctioned nations in the fight for freedom and
democracy.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Background
On September 13, 2022, a 22-year-old woman named Mahsa Amini was violently forced
into a van to be detained by Iran’s morality police because she was allegedly violating the
government’s strict hijab law, which orders women to cover their hair and wear loose, modest
clothing.1 Following her detainment, Amini was taken to a hospital where she slipped into a
coma and died three days later due to injuries caused by torture from the morality police.2
Despite indisputable evidence from both Amini’s family and the doctors who treated
her—including photos of Amini’s extensive physical injuries after her detainment—Iranian
security forces maintain that she “had suddenly collapsed from a heart attack at the detention
center, while receiving educational training on hijab rules.”3 Public outrage over the Iranian
regime’s oppressive policies towards its citizens, especially women, had been building for years,
but Amini’s unjust death kickstarted a larger protest movement that is still ongoing.4
The hijab mandate, put in place during the 1979 Islamic Revolution, has been one of the
government’s most controversial policies, facing consistent opposition over the past four
decades. Since Mahsa Amini’s death, record-breaking protests have had women in Iran throwing
their hijabs onto the ground and cutting their hair during protests to express their anger and
1
Farnaz Fassihi, “In Iran, Woman's Death after Arrest by the Morality Police Triggers Outrage,” The New York
Times, September 17, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/world/middleeast/iran-death-woman-protests.html?login=smartlock&auth=log
in-smartlock&login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock&login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Shadi Sadr, “Iran’s ‘women, life, freedom’ revolution has a manifesto. Here are the next steps,” Atlantic Council,
February 23, 2023,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/irans-women-life-freedom-revolution-has-a-manifesto-here-are-the
-next-steps/.
6
opposition towards the oppressive rules enforced by the Ayatollah, otherwise known as the
Supreme Leader of Iran. They chant “woman, life, freedom” in the streets, pleading for their
rights to expression.5
While some living conditions have improved since the Islamic regime came to power in
1979, a plethora of harsh, discriminatory laws remain long past when other countries have
abolished them. Throughout its existence, the Islamic Republic of Iran has refused to recognize
people of different faiths, gender identities, and sexual orientations. The Ayatollah's legislation
and violent enforcement of the cultural and religious norms they subscribe to has racked up a
long list of human rights abuses. Their maltreatment of marginalized groups has led to
resentment that has been building up since 1979. The protests occurring today are an
accumulation of tensions dating back to both the 2009 Green Movement and protests that
happened in Iran from 2017-2018.
The 2009 Green Movement in Iran introduced one of the first anti-regime protests. The
Green Movement was a response, led by university students, to the newly ‘elected’ President of
the Islamic Republic, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.6 The protesters viewed the election as fraudulent
and in turn took to the streets demanding for a recall and the installation of the opponent,
Hossein Mousavi.7 But these protests were unsuccessful; they led to devastation and bloodshed
of citizens all over the country, especially in the streets of Tehran where the protests were most
prevalent.
5
Nazanin Shahkrokni, “Women, Life, Freedom,” History Today 72, no. 11 (2022),
https://www.historytoday.com/archive/history-matters/women-life-freedom.
6
Milani Abbas, “The Green Movement,” The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, October 6, 2010,
https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/green-movement.
7
Ibid.
7
The Green Movement became the first of many protest movements against the
government. Later in 2017, a series of protests started against the Islamic regime, these protests
turned into the Girls of Enghelab Street, or the Girls of Revolution Street protests, specifically
targeting the removal of the mandatory hijab law.8 These protests evolved into the ongoing
Mahsa Amini protests. Protesters of the Girls of Enghelab Street in 2017 were subjected to tear
gas and internet shutdowns, much of which is still happening during the current protests.9
The people of Iran are angry; more moderate Iranians want reform but the most radical
want destruction of the authoritarian regime. On February 13th, 2023, a manifesto, signed by
over twenty Iranian-based organizations and unions, was released. This manifesto states, “No
clear and attainable vision can be imagined to end [the current crisis] within the framework of
the existing political system.”10 Most Iranians want a full turnaround of the current system, with
democracy at the forefront.
Unfortunately direct U.S. involvement cannot bring these desires for democracy to
fruition. Although many Iranians seek the aid of Western nations, a complicated history of
Western involvement in Iran causes many to look for an alternate solution. In 1953, the CIA and
the British intelligence agency organized a coup against democratically-elected Prime Minister
Mohammed Mossadeq after he nationalized Persian oil.11 The U.S. and Britain helped replace
Mossadeq to create a more “West-friendly” government with Mohammad Reza Shah in charge.12
This government was then rejected by some Iranians who were unhappy with the removal of
8
Mahsa Alimardani, “The ‘Girls of Revolution Street’ Protest Iran's Compulsory Hijab Laws,” Global Voices,
January 30, 2018,
https://globalvoices.org/2018/01/30/the-girls-of-enghelab-street-protest-irans-compulsory-hijab-laws/.
9
Ibid.
10
Shadi, “Iran’s ‘women, life, freedom’ revolution has a manifesto. Here are the next steps.”
11
“U.S. Relations With Iran.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2023,
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-iran-1953-2022.
12
Ibid.
8
13
Mossadeq and unsupportive of the Shah’s efforts to secularize Iran. This led to the Islamic
Revolution in 1979, the fleeing of the Shah, and the rise of the Islamic Republic.14 Ayatollah
Khomeini returned from exile and instituted a theocratic and authoritarian government which
used Islam as the basis of all rule.15 The involvement of the United States and Great Britain in
Iran’s government directly led to both the overthrow of democracy in Iran and the rise of the
current Iranian regime. If it had not been for the coup against Mossadeq in 1953, Iranians would
most likely have grown into a modernized democratic system.
While women are at the forefront of the current movement, minorities all across the
country are suffering. Before the 1979 revolution, Iran hosted one of the largest populations of
Mizrahi Jews in the world.16 But after the regime took over, most members of that community
left in favor of more religious freedom in the United States and Israel.17 While many were able to
migrate, those who remained in Iran were subjected to religious suppression. The Mizrahi Jews
were not alone in this—people of Christian and Baha'i faiths were also forced to hide their
religious identities under the Islamic regime.18 While the Islamic Republic recognizes
Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism as religions, their continuous anti-semitism and
discrimination against religious converts counteracts that statement.19 Ongoing protests began
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Rabbi Rachel M. Solomon, “Who Are Mizrahi Jews?” My Jewish Learning,
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-are-mizrahi-jews/.
17
“The expulsion of Jews from Arab countries and Iran – an untold history,” World Jewish Congress, February 2,
2021,
https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/the-expulsion-of-jews-from-arab-countries-and-iran--an-untold-histo
ry.
18
“U.S. Report on Religious Freedom in Iran,” The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, June 3, 2022,
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2022/jun/03/us-report-religious-freedom-iran.
19
Ibid.
9
with the removal of the hijab mandate, but have grown to encompass the desire for freedom to
practice any religion.
In addition to religious discrimination, countless laws and regulations restrict those who
are members of the LGBTQ community from free expression in Iran. Same sex relationships and
intercourse are sometimes subjected to punishment by execution. Younger members of the
LGBTQ community are usually kicked out of school and forced to enter a strict conversion
therapy program.20 The discriminatory offenses against the LGBTQ community and various
religious minorities have further isolated these communities from the rest of Iranian society. The
brutality these communities face concern many protesters and has been included in the
aforementioned manifesto.21
Women, too, are also not only subject to oppression through the hijab mandate, but face
various reproductive, domestic, and financial oppression throughout their day to day lives. The
Ayatollah deliberately instated laws to limit women's reproductive autonomy. Samira Izadi, a
public health center worker in Iran’s Mazandaran province, tells The BMJ, “Governmental
[public] health centers used to give contraceptives to women for free, but now contraceptives are
not available there.” The regime banned midwives from educating women on sexual and
reproductive health.22 In addition to the lack of reproductive rights, there is a serious domestic
violence situation in Iran. In 2018, 17.6 percent of women in Iran from the ages of 15-49
recorded experiences of sexual or physical abuse from a partner.23 The lack of proper
20
“Iran's War on LGBT Citizens,” United Against Nuclear Iran, 2023,
https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/irans-war-on-lgbt-citizens?gclid=CjwKCAjwl6OiBhA2EiwAuUwWZV6
4kVYwbNpUZvhwq1qPFyLg4yonkdC6SY-AKgqjz-xC2G54q1EsBxoCIR8QAvD_BwE.
21
Shadi, “Iran’s ‘women, life, freedom’ revolution has a manifesto. Here are the next steps.”
22
Geetanjali Krishna and Sally Howard, “How Iran's Protests Are a Response to the ‘Backslide’ in Women's Health
Rights,” The BMJ 379, (2022): 2839, doi: https://doi-org.ezproxy.bu.edu/10.1136/bmj.o2839.
23
Ibid.
10
reproductive healthcare and education combined with rampant sexual violence that goes
unpunished by law, creates a cocktail of oppression for Iranian women and the LGBTQ+
community, deliberately preventing them from being autonomous citizens.
The Islamic Regime of Iran has enacted a systematic exclusion of women from the
workforce through legal means and the misogynistic standards they perpetuate on a nationwide
level. In addition to the lack of reproductive and unpunished sexual violence occuring under the
regime, there is wage and hiring discrimination against women. The Ayatollah enforces social
stigma against women leaving the home, hiring processes to legally discriminate against
“liberal,” unmarried and childless women, and a gendered segregation of labor that leaves
Iranian women without a feasible and fair avenue for revenue. Women are denied equal access to
the labor market, leaving them at the mercy of their husbands and families for financial
decisions. They are not empowered to pursue their own livelihoods, passions and goals, forever
at the will and power of a spouse or the government. Women, religious minorities, and members
of the LGBTQ community all make up the protest movement because they are most incentivized
to advocate for social change—they are the most affected by the regime’s oppression, and have
the most to gain from its downfall.
The severity of the state response to protests requires participants to fight with their lives,
revealing a gaping need for resources and protection. It is incredibly risky to protest, citizens
caught participating are tortured and killed; the chances of being caught are high. The Iranian
government has an immense amount of control over the internet. Their spyware software SIAM
and constant internet shutdowns create a sense of danger for protesters and non protesters alike.
SIAM is a computer software that is programmed in all Iranian mobile devices. It allows the
11
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government to choose when, how, and if users can connect to the internet and send messages.
This software prohibits many protesters from joining in on the fight against the Islamic Republic.
While a few Iranians may have VPNs, between the inflation rates and the invaluable Iranian
currency, most Iranians are unable to afford it. This leads to many Iranians abstaining from
protests due to the fear of being monitored by the Iranian government—an incredibly damaging
reality for the movement’s mobilization.
Long before the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iranians had an intrinsic ability to advocate
and care for each other. They have survived and retained their humanity amidst decades of
abusive and controlling governments. Despite the regime's best efforts to divide their country,
Iranians persist and mobilize to defend their values of: community, tolerance, and peace. But
civilians are not on an equal playfield with a violent regime, they need help. They require
resources, endorsement, and advocacy from prominent nations, and protection. Iranians are being
cut down and martyred for their right to life, liberty, and justice. The protests that erupted after
the brutal murder of Mahsa Amini are more than just a rejection of the current regime—they are
a return to the core values of being an Iranian. Beyond just the impact the regime is having on
Iranians, Iran’s stagnant and even regressive state inhibits global advancement overall. With even
one nation still living in the past, the rest of the world cannot advance to a state where mass
equality is achieved.
1.2 Opening Statement
Our organization recognizes we must operate with an essential goal of helping the
protesters. We are a nonprofit organization called “The Pigeon Project,” addressing the Biden
24
Sam Biddle and Murtaza Hussain, “Hacked Documents: How Iran can Track and Control Protesters’ Phones,” The
Intercept, October 28, 2022, https://theintercept.com/2022/10/28/iran-protests-phone-surveillance/.
12
administration for our policy proposal. Our aid is designed to challenge the authority of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and aid the protest movement in a discreet and intelligent manner. We
will improve the living conditions of Iranian citizens through deliberate lifting of U.S. sanctions
and the implementation of extensively researched applications, which we have created in the
models of successful existing ones.
We recognize that as a foreign organization we cannot enter Iran without permission
(which would not be granted due to the nature of our mission), so we propose solutions through
technology that can infiltrate the country on our behalf. We developed our project by analyzing
the work of NGOs such as “United for Iran” and by analyzing protestors' needs for different
forms of protection. Our three apps are created under the name, “Pigeon Project,” which aims at
ameliorating current threats towards the wellbeing of the protest movement in Iran.
1.3 The Pigeon Project Mission Statement
The Pigeon Project’s name was inspired by carrier pigeons, which were at one point used
to send messages regarding a variety of topics. In this case the carrier pigeon has sent the
message of help to the west and has long been awaiting a response. Thus, The Pigeon Project
was created as a response to that message of help sent by the citizens of Iran. The Pigeon Project
is a series of several apps and policies that would use technology and the lifting of certain
economic sanctions to impact all rural communities on a global scale. The mission of Pigeon
Project is to directly help Iran through supporting the protesters who are currently fighting the
Islamic Regime. With proper funding, we will aid the Iranian protesters by giving them the tools
and resources they need to ensure they reach their goals, without facing the after-effects of
foreign intervention as they did once before. Both aspects of the Pigeon Project would target as
13
many needs of the Iranian people as possible. As with any project, The Pigeon Project has its
limitations, and there will be gaps in areas which cannot be filled. However, the goal of the
Pigeon Project is not to solve Iran’s problem or to reinstate democracy in western terms, but
rather to allow the citizens living in Iran to take control of the problem and to allow them to
choose Iran’s destiny. The Pigeon Project is only here to ensure that Iranian citizens have as
many resources available to them as possible and that they are in the best position to fight against
the Islamic Republic.
2. Policy Proposal
2.1 Our Recommendation
The current situation in Iran is extremely convoluted, which means U.S. foreign policy
responses must be equally as intricate to be successful. Based on current policies and actions
from both the United States government and different NGOs, we propose that the Biden
Administration should lead the Western world in supporting Iranian protesters through a
combination of reforming current U.S. sanctions placed on Iran and funding The Pigeon
Project’s technological resources for the protesters. With proper funding, the U.S. can aid Iranian
protesters through a dual approach of both top-down and bottom-up intervention. As a top-down
approach, the calculated use of sanctions directly uses Western power to apply pressure to the
Iranian government. As a bottom-up approach, sending direct resources to Iranian protesters
works to apply pressure to the Iranian government from the inside.

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2.2 Sanction Reform
Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the United States has placed more than two dozen
sanctions on Iran as a method of nonviolent response to tensions between the two countries.25
This method of implementing sanctions has proven to be ineffective at deterring the Islamic
Republic of Iran; however, we propose the U.S. government reforms the purpose of existing
sanctions on Iran to make sure it is directly supporting Iran’s protest movements.26 While we
recognize that removing all current sanctions on Iran would be incredibly radical and give
unnecessary power to the Iranian Regime, we have compiled a list of existing economic
sanctions on Iran that should be lifted in order to provide immediate resources to Iranian
protesters. The United States taking on the role of advocating for re-examination and reform of
sanctions on Iran from both its own and other Western governments is the first step towards
directing U.S. aid to Iran’s protesters, who are working to eventually reinstate a
democratically-elected government in their country. After the appropriate sanction reforms are
carried out, the U.S. government can continue supporting Iranian protesters by publicly and
monetarily endorsing non-governmental organizations that are developing technologies as
resources for Iranians.
2.3 Application Proposal
In addition to the lifting of select sanctions, we propose three apps to be implemented: an
anonymous news thread, a direct messaging app, a panic button and a missing persons app. Each
25
Ashish Kumar Sen,“A Brief History of Sanctions on Iran,” Atlantic Council, May 8, 2018,
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-brief-history-of-sanctions-on-iran/.
26
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, “How Sanctions Hurt Iran's Protesters,” Foreign Affairs, April 4, 2023,
www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/iran-sanctions-how-protesters.
15
of these apps would serve a unique function to help protestors remain as safe as possible, and to
communicate better with each other. Our app proposal will go into more detail in section 4.3.
2.4 Other NGO Efforts
“United for Iran” is a nonprofit, non-governmental organization started by dissidents,
Iranian activists, and former political prisoners. We have modeled our policy proposal after
“United for Iran”, using technology to address the needs of the Iranian populace. The NGO has
been developing technology-based campaigns to assist the Iranian protest movements, putting
pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran since they were founded in 2009.27 According to
“United for Iran’s” mission statement, they work to “advance civil liberties and human rights in
Iran and empower Iran’s movements, activists and citizens through capacity building, awareness
raising, technology, and documentation.”28 Over the last 14 years, “United for Iran” has
developed over two dozen applications within a project called “Irancubator” that act as “tools to
expand their civil, political and economic freedoms under the brutal regime.”29 Such applications
have been downloaded over 900,000 times, and have a range of functions, from a military police
tracker to an app where children can identify and report sexual abuse, to an app where women
can learn about their reproductive health and legal rights30. Such activism is crucial to aiding and
supporting the Iranian people, and so our “Pigeon Project,” is inspired by the effectiveness of
“United for Iran’s” applications.
We propose that the best way the U.S. government can support Iranian protesters is to
shift its central focus from imposing sanctions with the intent of pressuring the Iranian regime
27
“What We Do,” United for Iran, 2023, https://united4iran.org/en/what-we-do.html.
28
“Who We Are,” United for Iran, 2023, https://united4iran.org/en/who-we-are.html.
29
Ibid.
30
“What is Irancubator?” United for Iran, 2023, https://united4iran.org/en/irancubator/.
16
into change, to funding and supporting “United for Iran’s” efforts. Supporting the Iranian people
through partnering with NGOs, coupled with lifting sanctions that affect the lives of civilians,
will further isolate and pressure the Islamic Regime of Iran into changing.
3. Sanctions
3.1 Analysis of Previous Sanctions on Iran
Though sanction advocates claim that the government will be weakened and may even
collapse, they fail to account for the fact that this foreign policy strategy also weakens protest
movements. Worsening the financial reality for ordinary Iranians reduces their capacity to
mobilize and lessen their reliance on the Regime.
The first sanctions enacted by the U.S. were a result of the 1979-81 hostage crisis which
followed the Islamic Revolution. Since then, global sanctions have restricted Iran's nuclear
program (United Nations in 2006 and European Union in 2007).31 The number of U.S. sanctions
on Iran has markedly increased since 1979.
The tightening of sanctions in 2012 negatively impacted the economy due to the decrease
in available markets. Economic growth decreased, “to negative 6.8 percent and 1.9 percent in
2012 and 2013 respectively, with oil production dropping by one million barrels a day”(6).32
Auto industry production declined by half and the construction sector saw negative growth as
well.
31
“Timeline of U.S. Sanctions,” The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, April 27, 2023,
https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-us-sanctions.
32
Dylan O’Driscoll, “Impact of lifting economic sanctions on poverty and growth,” Knowledge, Evidence, and
Learning for Development, June 26, 2017,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5975ee0fed915d59bd000002/137-Impact-of-lifting-economic-sanctio
ns-on-poverty-and-growth.pdf.
17
2012 sanctions affecting energy, banking and financial sectors caused Iran's GDP to fall
by 17% in 2014.33 Sanctions targeting Iranian banks such as section 1245 of the National
Defense Authorization act imposed restrictions on the central bank of Iran.34 It legislated that: the
U.S. President could deny any foreign bank access to the U.S. financial system if it was found to
be doing business with Iran, enhance restrictions on the financial sector in Iran and freeze the
assets of Iranian financial institutions. In 2012, the EU froze the assets of Iran's central bank in
the EU and enacted an unprecedented oil embargo against Iran over its nuclear program.35
Consequently, following these sanctions, Iran’s oil production and export drastically decreased as
inflation increased until the sanctions were lifted in 2016 by former U.S.President Barack
Obama36. When the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, was deemed a success in
2016, the US, EU and UN repealed and suspended some sanctions.37 Obama’s administration
dropped secondary sanctions on Iran’s oil sector, which furthered the import of oil to almost a
pre-sanction level, stimulating their oil imports once again. When Trump exited the JCPOA deal
in 2018, and imposed debilitating banking and oil sanctions, the Iranian economy was on the
verge of collapse once again.
There is a direct link between sanctions, embargos, and the economy plummeting in Iran.
Poverty levels, unemployment, and inflation correspond with sanctions and restrictions.
Therefore, economic disenfranchisement of protestors can be traced back to these foreign policy
initiatives, proving they are counterproductive to our goal. We plan to enact specific and more
33
Ibid.
34
“Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,” U.S. Department of State,
November 8, 2012, https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/fs/200286.htm.
35
“EU Iran Sanctions: Ministers Adopt Iran Oil Imports Ban,” BBC News, BBC, January 23, 2012,
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16674660.
36
“Oil Dependence and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2023,
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/oil-dependence-and-us-foreign-policy.
37
“EU Iran Sanctions: Ministers Adopt Iran Oil Imports Ban,” BBC News.
18
sophisticated sanction policies that are designed to restore the political autonomy of Iranian
people and aid them in mobilizing against an oppressive government. The sanctions we will be
targeting to support protestors will be focusing on wiring money to protestors, enabling
protestors to work abroad, and the Mahsa Act.
3.2 Wire Transfers and International Banking
While the economic crisis in Iran continues, the need for some financial security remains
in the thoughts of many individuals living in Iran. Executive Order 13902, addresses the
sanctions implemented by the Trump Administration to restrict the transfer of many resources to
Iran.38 While this may have restricted the Islamic Republic initially, it harmed ordinary Iranian
citizens more. This sanction prevents members of the Iranian diaspora living outside of Iran from
sending money to family members, or even donating to those in need.39 Lifting this sanction
would allow for a direct flow of money to protesters in Iran. This would allow them to be better
equipped for the risks of protest and have greater financial security for the results of their
activism.
Money transfer services such as Venmo, Zelle, or Paypal are blocked in Iran. Western
Union Bank operates in every nation in the world, except for Iran and North Korea.40 Easing up
on this sanction would strategically help the Iranian people. The government leaders have long
since found ways to work around the money transfer issues; however, the middle and working
38
“Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran,” Federal Register, National Archives, January
14, 2020,
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/01/14/2020-00534/imposing-sanctions-with-respect-to-additional-sectors-
of-iran.
39
Batmanghelidj, “How Sanctions Hurt Iran's Protesters.”
40
“About Us: Our Mission,” Western Union, 2023,
https://corporate.westernunion.com/#:~:text=Western%20Union%20offers%20money%20transfer,averaging%2024
%20transactions%20each%20second.
19
class are the only ones subjected to this sanction. According to the World Bank, there are $1.3
billion which are transferred to Iran each year. This is equivalent to approximately $50 per
Iranian worker. In comparison, Egypt receives approximately $31.5 billion each year, which is
about $1000 per worker.41 This dramatic difference between both nations shows the necessity of
easily accessible and quick wire transfers.
With the lifting of this sanction and the increase of accessible wire transfers to Iran,
Iranian students, who are at the forefront of this movement, would have a larger financial
capacity to invest in the movement. The worry about job security and financial stability has also
been the guiding reason for those who have yet to join the movement. Many people feel as
though they may be fired for voicing their opinions or speaking out against the government. By
being able to receive aid from relatives and friends from outside of Iran, those citizens would
have more comfort and a better sense of security if they chose to join the protests.
Right now the same sanction, Executive Order 13902 also prohibits Iranian citizens from
storing their money abroad.42 Currently, the state of Iran’s disastrous economy encourages
Iranians to invest their money into property, gold, and other valuable material goods.43 While on
the surface this seems like a good idea, the Iranian fight against inflation has only benefited the
Islamic Republic. The reinvestment in Iranian products will not strengthen their economy, but
rather increase the power and wealth of Iranian elites, the very same people the protesters are
fighting against. If Iranian citizens were able to store their money in international banks, they
would be able to protect their assets while ensuring that it does not give more power to their
enemies.
41
42
“Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran,” Federal Register.
43
20
The implementation of Executive Order 13902 has done nothing to limit the power of the
Islamic Republic, instead it has hindered the capacity of the Iranian public. The lifting of the
sanction would instead redirect the power to the people and ensure that they are able to receive
the resources they need. With a stronger sense of financial security, those leading the protest
movement would be able to continue fighting against the Islamic Republic free of the threat of
financial disaster.
3.3 Aiding Iranians with Remote Work Abroad
We recognize that at times, economic sanctions may be the only logical way to address
certain issues, but Western governments can also supplement sanctions with resources and
programs to aid Iranian citizens who are negatively impacted as a consequence of said sanctions.
Exorbitant inflation rates caused primarily by the implementation of sanctions, coupled with the
high risk of Iranians not being able to find or keep a job if they are involved with the protest
movement, makes it essential for Western governments to aid Iranian citizens alongside
sanctioning the regime.44
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, founder and CEO of the Bourse & Bazaar foundation that
advocates for economic diplomacy, development, and justice in the Middle East, proposes that
Western governments should allow Iran’s young professionals to remotely freelance work for
foreign clients.45 In Iran currently, highly educated young adults skilled in digital media and
related fields are disproportionately underemployed compared to other demographics.46 Opening
channels for young Iranians to freelance in other countries would not only ease the negative
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
21
impacts of sanction-caused inflation by increasing opportunities for financial security, but also
reduce the risks Iranians face when getting involved in demonstrations and protests.47
Additionally, if Western governments were to implement programs allowing remote Iranian
freelancers, it could greatly reduce Iranians’ financial dependency on their government without
boosting Iran’s economy so much that the regime can benefit and gain more power. As of May
2022, “90 percent of Iranian households benefit from regular cash transfers from the
government.”48 Decreasing both this percentage and the number of Iranians who cannot join the
protests for fear of financial insecurity would decrease the Islamic Republic of Iran’s control
over its citizens, and therefore grant direct power and resources to Iran’s protesters.
Batmanghelidj also recognizes a possible risk of this policy being a significant amount of money
paid to remote Iranian workers flowing back to the regime.49 However, Western governments
would be able to set limits on the amount of money these workers could earn, ensuring the flow
of this income is always controlled in a way that the money will not make its way back to fund
the Iranian government.50
For these reasons, we propose the U.S. government should lead the Western world in
making Batmanghelidj’s recommendations a reality by instating a program for Iranians to be able
to freelance work from U.S. clients. Due to the urgency of this issue, we recommend this
program be brought into action by the end of 2023 through an executive order from President
Biden. This would be a low risk but high reward policy, as it would allow the United States to
have an “in” for getting money flowing directly to Iranian citizens without having to give up
economic sanctions. Implementing an Iranian remote worker program would also be a low-risk
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
22
investment for the United States, because workers would be hired by private companies or
clients and therefore not require U.S. government funds. Despite the decades of evidence proving
sanctions alone to be both ineffective at inciting governmental change and harmful to citizens,
they are still often used to put pressure on governments without the risk of violence or war. But
because economic sanctions are one of the largest contributing factors to a declining economy
that hurts ordinary Iranian citizens exponentially more than Iran’s government elites, Western
governments should view it as their duty to implement resources to help innocent citizens and
suppressed protesters alongside the implementation of sanctions, and as a large world power the
U.S. should be leading in development of these resources.
3.4 Endorsing the Mahsa Act
Currently, the MAHSA Act has been introduced to the 118th Congress with 61
co-sponsors.51 As a part of our policy, we want to endorse the MAHSA Act in order to support
legislation that will help protesters in Iran. The bill puts pressure on the president to decide
whether head leaders of the Islamic Regime should have U.S sanctions imposed on them for
engaging in human rights violations and supporting terrorist activity.52 The bill aims to
specifically call out the Ayatollah as well as any official in the office of the supreme leader of
Iran. In addition, it targets the president of Iran and any official in the presidential office, as well
as any group that conducts underneath the Ayatollah that is directly or indirectly involved in
upholding human rights abuses and terrorism in Iran.53 The MAHSA Act calls for action for the
use of 3 executive orders that are currently in place. These include Executive Order 13224 (under
51
Simplyhostza, “The Mahsa Act,” NUFDI, March 30, 2023, https://nufdiran.org/mahsaact/.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
23
the Bush Administration), Executive Order 13553 (under the Obama Administration), and
Executive Order 13818 (under the Trump Administration).54
Executive Order 13224 serves as a method to forcefully hinder terrorist funding and lead
the way for international anti-terrorism efforts.55 Executive Order 13553 calls to block the
property rights of individuals in Iran who are responsible or complicit in human rights violations
on behalf of the Iranian government. This can take the form of any type of assistance, support
(financial, material), or control in acting against any Iranian citizen or person in Iran.56 Executive
Order 13818 targets individuals involved in grave human rights violations by blocking their
property.57 The use of these executive orders through the MAHSA Act would aid significantly in
imposing consequences on the Islamic Regime and its leaders, ultimately weakening their
leadership and control.
The MAHSA Act imposes sanctions on Ayatollah Khomeini and President Ebrahim Raisi
individually. This will demonstrate that the United States Congress is putting pressure on the
Islamic leaders and holding them accountable for their human rights abuses. In this way, the Act
aims to display that the United States Congress is looking out for the citizens and protesters of
Iran, ultimately fostering a greater sense of unity between them. By targeting the head leaders of
the Islamic Republic, it will make it more difficult economically for the government to engage in
protests and violence against the people.58
54
Ibid.
55
“Executive Order 13224 - United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State, April 12, 2023,
www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/.
56
Obama, Barack. “Executive Order 13553.” Federal Register. Presidential Documents, September 28, 2010,
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2010-10-01/pdf/2010-24839.pdf.
57
Antony J. Blinken, “Combating Global Corruption and Human Rights Abuses,” U.S. Department of State,
December 9, 2022, https://www.state.gov/combatting-global-corruption-and-human-rights-abuses/.
58
Simplyhostza, “The Mahsa Act.”
24
3.5 Global Examples
The United States has imposed economic sanctions on Venezuela for the last 15 years as
a response to the actions of the government and individuals. Similarly to Iran’s sanctions, the
sanctions in Venezuela were imposed due to the government and certain individuals perpetrating
human rights abuses, antidemocratic actions, and political corruption. After Venezuelan
President Nicolás Maduro’s actions appeared increasingly more authoritarian, the country was
heavily sanctioned, and Venezuela’s economy spiraled into a staggering collapse. Civilians are
left struggling to cope with the hyperinflation and economic devastation; the production of
Venezuela’s main exports has declined. In late 2022, President Biden proposed the idea of
removing select sanctions that are currently affecting Venezuela in order to incentivize Maduro
into openly negotiating with the United States. After their initial conversation, which took place
in Caracas, the capital, Maduro released two American prisoners59, giving hope to the possibility
of the success of alleviating sanctions. After the talks in November of 2022, Venezuela agreed to
the establishment of a UN-led humanitarian fund that would help the Venezuelan people, in
exchange for lifting sanctions on the oil conglomerate Chevron and allowing them to continue
extracting oil. “Approximately $3 billion (€2.88 billion) worth of frozen Venezuelan assets held
in foreign banks will steadily be unfrozen.”60 The fund will be primarily used to assist with
education, healthcare, and food for the struggling citizens.61 Venezuelan and American relations
in this example prove that lifting sanctions has led both to better relations between governments,
59
Atlantic Council Experts, “Experts react: As the US eases oil sanctions, is Venezuela coming in from the cold?”
Atlantic Council, November 27, 2022,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-eases-oil-sanctions-venezuela-chevron-maduro/.
60
Alexander Gale, “US Eases Oil Sanctions on Venezuela after Humanitarian Deal,” Greek Reporter, November 28,
2022, https://greekreporter.com/2022/11/28/usa-venezuela-oil-agreement-chevron/.
61
“Biden Eases Venezuela Sanctions after Poverty Fund Deal,” DW, Deutsche Welle, November 29, 2022,
www.dw.com/en/biden-eases-venezuela-sanctions-after-poverty-fund-deal/a-63904411.
25
and better living conditions for civilians. The sanction negotiations in Venezuela show that the
U.S. has immense influence on the economies and wellbeing of civilians, as well as an ability to
intervene peacefully.
In countries such as Russia, sanctions do not have much effect on the elites or the
government. Instead, just like in Venezuela and Iran, sanctions disproportionately affect working
class citizens. Due to Russia’s current war with Ukraine, sanctions were put in place by the EU
to discourage President Vladimir Putin from further aggression towards Ukraine, however these
sanctions have left Russia’s elites and government largely unaffected. These sanctions have
succeeded in making the lives of the “regular” people more difficult and have put halts on the
production of everyday necessities, such as cars and pharmaceuticals.62 A survey also reported an
“increase in prices, especially for products and other goods of the basic consumer basket: clothes
and shoes, medicines, furniture and goods for children and animals.”63 This conflict has been
economically devastating for Russia.64 People are fleeing to neighboring countries and beyond,
but they are now being turned away at EU borders.65 People’s incomes have begun to decrease
slowly, and employment is becoming more difficult to obtain or maintain.66 In Russia, Venezuela,
and Iran, the lives of civilians are significantly more affected than government employees or
other elites. Such sanctions will never have enough of an impact where the government will truly
be incapacitated. Continuing to level these aggressive economic sanctions on Iran that will only
terrorize the working class, as seen in Venezuela and Russia, and make them more reliant on the
62
Maria Snegovaya et al. “Russia Sanctions at One Year,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 23,
2023, www.csis.org/analysis/russia-sanctions-one-year.
63
Gontmakher, Evgeny. “Russia under Sanctions.” GIS Reports Online, May 31, 2022,
www.gisreportsonline.com/r/russia-sanctions/.
64
“Infographic - Impact of sanctions on the Russian economy.” European Council. Council of the European Union,
April 25, 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/.
65
“Factbox: Where Have Russians Been Fleeing to since Mobilisation Began?” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, October
6, 2022, www.reuters.com/world/europe/where-have-russians-been-fleeing-since-mobilisation-began-2022-10-06/.
66
Evgeny, “Russia under Sanctions.”
26
government for money. In all three cases, these sanctions have proven ineffective at weakening
the government and therefore aiding the resistance.
4. Technological Developments
4.1 Importance of Supporting Technological Developments
The use of technology is becoming more and more of a resource during the 21st century.
The United States can serve as a prime example of how technology has a system to protect the
rights of people. In the year of 2020, Darnella Fraizer used her smartphone to record police
officer Micheal Chauvin kneeling on the neck– and eventually killing George Floyd, a man who
was suspected of counterfeiting a twenty-dollar bill at a convenience store. The awful event was
uploaded on facebook, which led to a call to action as more people saw the event on the
internet.67 The post engagement had reached 3 million user engagements after 30 days and
continuously rose with each unjust black man murder that had come to light.68 Recording and
documenting human rights violations has steadily become a new way for people to protect their
rights where authority may be unjust or prejudiced. Technology has been enabling new kinds of
protests through social media in the United States.69 The ongoing protests have only gained this
much traction because it garnered a lot of attention on social media. The spread of the slogan,
“Woman, Life, Freedom” and other aspects of the protests have significantly gained popularity
through the usage of hashtags on various media platforms.70 Social media coverage of the
67
Ho-Chun Herbert Chang et al, “#Justiceforgeorgefloyd: How Instagram Facilitated the 2020 Black Lives Matter
Protests,” PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, December 7, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0277864.
68
Ibid.
69
Shira Ovide, “How Social Media Has Changed Civil Rights Protests,” The New York Times, June 18, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/technology/social-media-protests.html.
70
Raksha Kumar, “Not quite the Arab Spring: how protestors are using social media in innovative ways,” Reuters
Institute, December 6, 2022,
27
situation comes in different forms. For example, Shervin Hajipour released a song called,
“Baraye” a ballad which explained who the protesters were fighting for. The song led him to an
arrest, which he was later bailed out from.71 The song gained such popularity that it even won a
Grammy for best song for social change and Hajipour was listed in Time’s 100 Most Influential
People of 2023.72 Social media has organized and coordinated large groups of people fighting for
the same cause. While forms of social media may be banned in Iran, our group identifies the use
of technology as a useful method of aiding the protestors in their fight.
4.2 The Pigeon Project’s Strategy
The NGOs, using the funding provided, would hire teams of software developers; all who
have a background in cyber security, to work on the project.
Each team would work on the creation of a different app, each of which would target
different issues and tailor to the needs of the Iranian public. This group of apps, however, is
expected to be subjected to the censorship and vetting process of the Islamic Regime. The
Regime has a software called SIAM, which allows them to monitor all internet access, restrict it,
and even slow down cellular connection.73
The Pigeon Project development teams would group together after the completion of the
apps and would be responsible for a constantly-active cyber security panel that oversees the
mainframe of the program. Their responsibilities would include re-uploading banned apps and
websites to ensure user access, and to work on hacking into the SIAM network and allowing
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/not-quite-arab-spring-how-protestors-are-using-social-media-innovativ
e-ways.
71
“Iran releases singer arrested for protest song.” DW. Deutsche Welle, October 4, 2022,
https://www.dw.com/en/iran-releases-singer-arrested-over-protest-anthem/a-63332298.
72
Marjane Satrapi, “The Most 100 Influential People of 2023 — Shervin Hajipour,” Time Magazine, Time Inc,
April 13, 2023, https://time.com/collection/100-most-influential-people-2023/6269445/shervin-hajipour/.
73
Biddle and Hussein, “Hacked Documents: How Iran can Track and Control Protesters’ Phones.”
28
Iranian mobile users 4G or 5G access to cellular and internet connection without the threat of the
censorship and monitoring of the Iranian government.
4.3 Our App Proposals
Under Reza Shah, the first king of the Pahlavi dynasty, the wearing of the hijab was
discouraged, and later banned for modernization purposes, starting in 1936.74 However,
approximately 5 years later, during his son’s reign, many women chose to wear the hijab for a
multitude of reasons- even though it wasn’t enforced. Some of these reasons being tradition,
religious expression, identity, or sometimes pressure from family.75
While women chose to wear the hijab for these reasons, the overwhelming majority
associated the wearing of the hijab with lower class citizens.76 In this way, the hijab became a
marker of status and source of social persecution. After the 1979 revolution and the introduction
of Khomeini’s leadership, it was stated that women must observe Islamic dress codes.77
In 1983, the hijab mandate became law. Its harsh enforcement has led many Iranian
women to feel a great sense of opposition towards it. The vastly different rules surrounding the
hijab throughout the decades in Iran suggests that modern government structures in Iran have
used women and their public presence as the backbone for restructuring society. The current
74
Fatma Tanis, “Women across Iran Are Refusing to Wear Headscarves, in Open Defiance of the Regime,” NPR
(NPR, March 13, 2023),
https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2023/03/13/1157657246/iran-hijab-protest-regime-politics-religion-mahsa
-amini.
75
Ibid.
76
Fatma Tanis, “A Powerful Symbol in Iran's Recent Protests, the Hijab Has Long Been Contentious,” NPR (NPR,
March 1, 2023),
https://www.npr.org/2023/03/01/1160457177/a-powerful-symbol-in-irans-recent-protests-the-hijab-has-long-been-co
ntentious.
77
“Headcovers Have Always Been Political in Iran – for Women on All Sides,” USC Dornsife College News RSS,
October 10, 2022, https://dornsife.usc.edu/news/stories/3772/headcovers-have-always-been-political/.
29
opposition to wearing the hijab displays the dynamic nature of the hijab through history, as
leading up to 1979, many women chose to wear the hijab in opposition to the Shah.78
The outbreak in protests after the execution of Mahsa Amini are a direct result of the
oppressive hijab mandates that have existed for decades in Iran.79 These protests, which began in
September of 2022, have been responded to with increasingly more violence. Participating in
these protests puts Iranian citizens at tremendous risk and danger, as the Islamic Regime
continues to capture and even execute those who protest.80 Despite all of this, Iranian women
continue to put their lives into jeopardy in hopes of achieving their fundamental rights as
people81. Women in Iran have even begun ditching the head coverings as a form of protest.82 This
leaves all of the women participating in this form of protest subject to human rights violations by
the government and morality police.
Many of these human rights violations continue to go unreported as a result of the Islamic
Regime’s strict restrictions on what information can be shared. This causes great issues because
Iranian citizens are not informed when the Islamic Regime commits a violation during protests.
Many protesters have opted to keep their phones off during protests so that their location cannot
be tracked, though this creates a safety issue as protestors are unable to message others to alert
them about real-time regime sightings.83

78
Maryam Sinaee, “Eighty Five Years on, the Shah's Ban on Hijab Still Divides,” Iran International, January 7,
2022, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202201070683.
79
“Hijab in Iran: From Religious to Political Symbol,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 13,
2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/88152.
80
Fatma Tanis, “Women across Iran Are Refusing to Wear Headscarves, in Open Defiance of the Regime,” NPR
NPR, March 13, 2023,
https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2023/03/13/1157657246/iran-hijab-protest-regime-politics-religion-mahsa
-amini.
81
“Hijab in Iran: From Religious to Political Symbol,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
82
“In Iran, More and More Photos Show Women Ditching the Hijab,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, December
27, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-women-without-hijab-protests/32195608.html.
83
“Protesters and Police Deploy Tech Apps in Fight for Future of Iran,” Al Arabiya English. Thomson Reuters
Foundation, November 8, 2022,
https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2022/11/08/Protesters-and-police-deploy-tech-apps-in-fight-for-future-of-Iran.
30
Women’s safety, and protester safety, in Iran has always been the least of the Iranian
government’s worries. Women and girls have been treated like second class citizens ever since
the 1979 revolution where the regime took over. The laws relating to women subject them to
mandatory veiling, child marriage, and instant divorce notified by mail. Their safety is not a
priority to the public nor has it ever been. In a broader sense women who are anti-regimists, and
other anti-regimists in general are even subjected to violence without any protection.
In addition to general violence, there have been mass murders of those who speak out,
and even the poisoning of young girls in school.84 Women in Iran at the hands of authoritative
police have been subjected to intense horrors. Mahsa Amini’s broadcasted death by police
violence was only one murder of many. The morality police and the government’s hands are
bloodied and bruised of the countless crimes they have committed. The morality police and other
security forces have used sexual assault to condemn protesters. Whether they commit sexual
violence against protesters within or out of prison, there is no protection whatsoever for the
victims.
Armita Abbasi was a normal teenager who liked to make Tik Toks of her cats in her free
time.85 However, during the protest the Islamic Republic suspected her as being a protest leader
and arrested her. Within some time between her arrest and her imprisonment, she was subjected
to brutal sexual violence. She was sent to the hospital in such a critical state that they suspected
she may have had cancer.86 This level of violence is expected when anyone is arrested regardless
84
“Iran: Deliberate Poisoning of Schoolgirls Further Evidence of Continuous Violence against Women and Girls,”
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, March 16, 2023,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/iran-deliberate-poisoning-schoolgirls-further-evidence-continuous-
violence.
85
Tamara Qiblawi et al, “CNN Investigates Female and Male Protesters' Accounts of Sexual Assault in Iranian
Detention Centers,” CNN, November 21, 2022
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2022/11/middleeast/iran-protests-sexual-assault/index.html.
86
Ibid.
31
of age or gender. There is currently nothing in place to protect those who are arrested or
imprisoned.
Through the implementation and features of our app, protesters would be able to
anonymously report human rights violations and Islamic Regime sightings. This would allow
people to communicate with other protestors without the fear of getting caught. By implementing
this, it could help to encourage mobilization of protesters, which has been historically very hard
to do. The app would allow people to send anonymous encrypted messages, so that they can only
be encrypted by the person receiving the message. This would also ensure that the message could
not be traced back to the person who sent it.
We would develop two different apps for communication: an anonymous news thread and
an encryption app for direct messaging. The news thread would allow users to anonymously
report protest updates and regime member sightings to help keep other protesters informed. The
encryption app would allow users to encrypt and decrypt messages sent through messaging
platforms such as Whatsapp and Telegram.
4.3.1 Sedah, Meaning “Sound” in Farsi
Sedah (See appendix F) is an anonymous news thread app we would develop using
inspiration from a currently existing app. Hafez, an app created by United for Iran, is designed
for protestors to report and record human rights violations.87 The news thread app would not be
connected to the individual's phone number or email, to ensure that their messages cannot be
traced back to them. It would also not use usernames, as this is a way to promote anonymity.
Users will be able to upload messages, video files, and pictures. The Hafez app structure will be
87
“Hafez App: Protecting Iran’s Brave Activists,” United For Iran, 2023,
https://united4iran.org/en/irancubator/hafez.html.
32
useful to us in reference to navigating internet censorship. Hafez uses technology that allows
people to receive news reports without needing to launch systems that bypass internet
censorship.88 The Sedah app will be linked to a Twitter account under the same name, Sedah will
automatically upload the anonymous messages onto the Twitter feed. This will serve as a backup
if the app is taken down, as well as an additional platform for spreading information. In addition,
linking the app feed to Twitter could lead to more visibility as Twitter is a much larger platform.
As another model for Sedah, we would take inspiration from the platform YikYak. While
it is currently used between college students as a social media platform, at its core is a function
that allows users to post messages with 100% anonymity. This platform has been successful in
allowing people to submit anonymous messages with the social freedom to say whatever they
want. 89 This concept would be extremely useful for protecting the identities of protesters, so
they may speak freely without the ramifications of getting caught.
4.3.1.1 Analysis of Challenges
The Iranian government has the ability to limit or block internet access, through the use
of technology like SIAM, a computer program system that works discretely within the Iranian
cellular networks.90 The system allows for in depth monitoring of how individuals use their
phones, as well as providing the operator with tools for disrupting the phone lines. It operates as
a method for collecting data on individuals and groups. It is able to go as far as tracking who was
in contact with whom, at what time, and where. Historically, these internet limitations have
88
Ibid
89
Alyson Shontell, “How 2 Georgia Fraternity Brothers Created Yik Yak, a Controversial App That Became a
~$400 Million Business in 365 Days,” Business Insider, March 12, 2015,
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-inside-story-of-yik-yak-2015-3#:~:text=Students%20liked%20the%20app%20
because,just%20that%20on%20Yik%20Yak.
90
Claudia Glover, “Iran Is Using Spyware to Track Citizens Attending Protests,” Tech Monitor, November 3, 2022,
https://techmonitor.ai/technology/cybersecurity/iran-protests-spyware-mobile-phone-tracking.
33
blocked Iranian citizens' use of Whatsapp and Instagram, two major platforms for digital
communication91. When these platforms are down, it can have a significant effect on protesters'
ability to get up to date information regarding protests.
It is also important to consider that once protesters are arrested or put into custody, their
phones are almost always taken away.92 This is significant because once their phones are in the
possession of the Islamic authorities, they can take whatever actions they wish. This means that
the police could get into the apps and seriously interfere with them, ultimately dismantling the
privacy of the users.
4.3.1.2 Strengths and Solutions Analysis
A benefit to having the apps developed by an NGO outside of Iran is that it limits what
the regime is able to do in terms of counter involvement. If the regime were to get heavily
involved in the news thread app for example, as we anticipate that may happen, the NGO who is
developing the app would have the power to take it down. The NGO would also be able to make
the call if the app needs to be completely taken down and relaunched, or even create a
completely new app to replace it.
4.3.2 Bebin, Meaning “Look” in Farsi
Currently, there is an app developed by United for Iran called “Nahoft” which we would
take inspiration from to help structure our own, by examining what has been successful and
where there can be improvements to adjust it to best fit our situation and the needs of the
91
Lorenzi, Daisy, “Internet in Iran and Useful Mobile Apps,” SURFIRAN, March 9, 2023.
https://surfiran.com/internet-in-iran-and-useful-mobile-apps/.
92
Khosro Kalbasi Isfahani, “Protests in Iran: How Cell Phone Use Can Lead to Arrest in the Country,” BBC
Monitoring. Time News, January 30, 2023,
https://time.news/protests-in-iran-how-cell-phone-use-can-lead-to-arrest-in-the-country/.
34
protesters. The Nahoft app allows people to insert any message into the app which then instantly
encrypts it.93 Our app, Bebin, (See appendix E) would use the same function. In addition to the
functions the “Nahoft” app has, the recipient would have to plug the message into the Bebin app
in order to unencrypt the message. Once that happens they will be able to successfully read the
message.94
The encryption app, Bebin, would allow people to communicate with each other
individually, for example with friends or family members. By using the encryption technology,
people can have direct communication during protests without the fear of their messages being
surveilled or traced back to them. Users would type their message into the app, which would then
produce an encrypted version of their message. The user could then copy the encrypted message
and paste it into any messaging service, such as Whatsapp, Telegram, Email, etc.. The encryption
technology would work by encrypting the message into a string of words in Farsi, or even by
hiding the encrypted message into a picture. Since Iranians still need to message each other from
their phone numbers or email (which are linked to their Whatsapp, Telegram, etc), the encryption
feature is crucial in order to protect their safety and the privacy of their messages.
While this technology would provide a space to allow people to communicate with each
other more safely during protests, one risk of protesters using this app is that the location of the
individual would be able to be tracked, since their phone would have to be on. Additionally, the
encryption of messages through the app we are implementing would not apply to phone calls.
93
“Nahoft - Apps on Google Play,” Google Play Store, Google,
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.nahoft.nahoft.
94
Lily Hay Newman, “A New App Helps Iranians Hide Messages in Plain Sight,” Wired
https://www.wired.com/story/nahoft-iran-messaging-encryption-app/.
35
This means that phone calls would still be at risk of being surveilled and monitored. Because of
this, we would advise Iranian protests to refrain from having phone calls as a form of
communication during protests.
In addition to having the app developed outside of Iran, which allows for more control
over the app, another strength is that the encrypted messages make it so that the content of the
messages cannot be traced back to the individual, even if their location is tracked. This would
assist significantly with maintaining individuals’ privacy. Using the Bebin app to encrypt a
message also provides a much more secure alternative to just using Whatsapp or Telegram on its
own.
4.3.3 Biya, Meaning “To Come” in Farsi
In order to target public safety, and women’s safety in particular, The Pigeon Project team
would develop an app that would work as a panic button. This app is modeled after the
Noonlight app and would work in a similar fashion.95 The Noonlight app is an app that acts as a
panic button by either manually triggering an alarm by pressing the button in the app or by
connecting its program to smoke detectors, smart watches, or video cameras when any of those
devices detect anything unusual. This program is currently only available in the United States,
but our adjustments would make the app accessible to Iranian protestors to help create safer
conditions for protestors.
95
“How Does the Button Work?,” Noonlight Help Center,
https://help.noonlight.com/en/articles/2114600-how-does-the-button-work.
36
Noonlight and Amber Alert have already proven great success in the United States.
Amber Alert alone has helped authorities recover 97% of missing children since 2002 alone.
Noonlight, while more recently developed, has also made a significant impact on public safety.96
A kidnapping victim in Colorado used Noonlight to alert authorities that he was in danger and
was rescued after the local police force were able to track his location through Noonlight.97
According to the Noonlight website, over two million emergencies have been handled.98 Seeing
the already proven track record in preventing violence and other crimes, The Pigeon Project
version of the app would at least guarantee some protection for protesters against police
violence.
The Pigeon Project would partner with Noonlight to create a new version of the app,
named “Biya,” meaning, ‘to come,’ (See appendices A & B) which would ensure the safety of
protesters against the morality police and the government. This app would include the same
ability as the original in the sense that it would allow for the user to manually trigger the button
in the app to alert and start tracking the user. However, instead of how the original app would
contact local authorities, the new app would alert local protestors who have also downloaded the
app and grant them tracking services so they could find and help the user in trouble. If the user
pressed the button on accident they would have a 30-second grace period to enter a personal PIN
code to undo the action. The app in general would be similar to the Amber Alert system used in
96
“Frequently Asked Questions.” AMBER Alert, https://amberalert.ojp.gov/about/faqs#:~:text=acros,
s%20the%20nation.-,How%20does%20it%20work%3F,television%20and%20DOT%20highway%20signs.
97
Monte Whaley, “App That Works as Panic Button Helped Save Grand Junction Teen from Alleged Kidnapping,”
The Denver Post (The Denver Post, December 21, 2018),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/12/08/red-panic-button-app-saves-colorado-teen-kidnapping/.
98
Monte Whaley, “App That Works as Panic Button Helped Save Grand Junction Teen from Alleged Kidnapping,”
The Denver Post,December 21, 2018,
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/12/08/red-panic-button-app-saves-colorado-teen-kidnapping/.
37
the United States, except the user would also enable location services in order to provide the
tracking information to other users.
In addition to the tracking features, The Pigeon Project would install another feature on
the same Biya app, this feature would be called “Insan,” or, ‘human’ (see appendix C). While the
ability to protect those in police custody is out of anyone outside the government’s control, we
can help identify and spread awareness about those who are missing. The Insan feature would
work with families and friends who haven’t heard from someone in their lives for a while. They
would upload a recent image of the missing person with a detailed description of height, eye
color, and when they were last seen. Viewers would be able to submit, via anonymous direct
message, any information they may have. This would help spread awareness about missing
people in a way that can stay under the radar of the Islamic Regime.
This feature would be similar to the Amber Alert program used in the United States, but
with some key differences. Instead of reporting missing people to the authorities, they would be
reported only to the app.99 Unlike the process that is used for Amber Alerts, these reports of
missing people would not be shared with broadcasters or interrupt regular broadcasting on the
radio.100 These differences would help to ensure that the Islamic Regime is not aware of these
investigations of missing peoples. This means that the missing people investigations through this
app would be led solely through community efforts, and have no authority involvement.
Another feature within the Biya app is the “Koja,” or “Where,” feature (See appendix D).
The best way to ensure protester safety is to avoid the morality police altogether. The Koja
feature, within the Biya app, would allow users to track where the morality police would be
through user submissions. Users would be able to look at the map and avoid areas with a high
99
“Frequently Asked Questions.” AMBER Alert.
100
Ibid.
38
concentration of morality police. This functionality would greatly resemble the Waze map app.
Waze users similarly report police sightings on highways, roads, and other areas. This alerts their
users to slow down to avoid tickets.101 Using Waze as inspiration, the Koja feature would ensure
that protesters could avoid running into morality police, or at least being prepared when they do.
The method for the panic button feature is not foolproof. Seeing how the app needs to be
manually triggered, this leaves a gap for emergencies where you either don’t have access to your
phone or if you cannot open the app quick enough. There is also no guarantee that people who
use the app will receive the protection they need. After all, unlike the Noonlight app that inspired
Biya, Biya does not contact official authorities, rather only participating ordinary citizens in the
surrounding area. Also, to use the panic button and morality police tracker features, the user
would need to enable location services, which could be susceptible to tracking. However, in this
delicate situation, any sort of protection is better than nothing at all. The Insan feature also may
not guarantee the missing persons being found, and does not guarantee that the direct messages
won’t include spam, but the Amber Alert system does not either. Instead, it increases the chances
of finding people by notifying the community.
While it may be impossible to create an app that is completely foolproof, the ‘shortcut’
ability on iPhone 8 or newer would script an ability to open the app handsfree by saying “Hey
Siri, open Biya.” This allows for quick access to the app which can be especially helpful if
101
Ruben Navarrette, “Enough with the Speed Traps,” CNN, February 8, 2015,
https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/08/opinion/navarrette-waze-speed-traps/index.html#:~:text=The%20app%20also%20
uses%20a,input%20data%20into%20the%20system.
39
someone is in a situation where they need to act quickly. In addition, the app could also be
connected to wearable smart devices such as an Apple Watch. When your smart device detects
any bodily trauma it will automatically notify other users in your area of your location and other
information they may need.
4.4 VPN Development
Many protesters have been demanding for VPNs that would allow individuals to conceal
their identity and gain access to blocked sites.102 As a part of our policy, we would distribute
VPNs to protesters in Iran in order to increase information and web access to significantly assist
with the current issue of information censorship. In other countries such as China, students use
VPN services to hide what they learn from their government’s monitorization. Students who
study abroad in China use VPNs to access their U.S. based course content.103 Chinese
international students have been successful in their attempts to hide their internet history through
VPNs, giving good reason to believe that The Pigeon Project’s VPN creation and distribution
would be an effective measure to conceal Iranian mobile activity.
Two VPNs that have been successful in Iran are NordVPN, which is overall the fastest
and most secure, and PureVPN, which has the highest privacy protection in Iran.104 Both of these
programs change the user's IP address so that they can browse the internet as if they are in a
different country, free from the internet restrictions imposed by the Iranian government. In order
to protect the users privacy, the VPNs also encrypt the users internet connection to block that
102
“Protesters and Police Deploy Tech Apps in Fight for Future of Iran,” Al Arabiya English.
103
Bob Eckhart, “To Use or Not to Use Virtual Private Networks,” Inside Higher Ed, September 16, 2020,
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2020/09/17/why-professors-shouldnt-require-chinese-students-use-virtual-pri
vate-networks-their.
104
Cybernews Team, “Best VPNs for Iran in 2023,” Cybernews, April 18, 2023,
https://cybernews.com/best-vpn/vpn-for-iran/.
40
information from the individuals ISP, as well as websites and other internet features that ask to
track your data.105 NordVPN and PureVPN will serve as inspiration for the development of our
own VPN which would be created to ensure that all Iranians are able to access free and secure
internet services.
To develop this, we will use WireGuard as our VPN protocol, which refers to the set of
rules that determines how data transfers between a device and a VPN server.106 WireGuard is
currently the fastest and most simplified VPN protocol that can be easily distributed due to the
fact that it is free and open source.107 Our target platforms would be Android and IOS, as the
VPN would specifically be for cell phones. The software engineer interns we are employing
would be developing the VPN software. They will be responsible for releasing and maintaining
the app, through bug fixes, updates, and user support.
5. Logistics of Supporting The Pigeon Project
5.1 Cost Breakdown of App Developments
The Pigeon Project will need to employ a small staff to implement our plan of action
developing apps that support Iranian protesters. For most organizations of medium to large size,
the average cyber security team is about two to three members.108 Using this industry standard,
we have determined that The Pigeon Project will need to employ a total of 18 software
engineering interns to develop and maintain the apps previously outlined in our proposal. Half of
105
“Enjoy the protected internet you deserve,” PureVPN, 2023,
https://www.purevpn.com/deal-sp?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=aff-46870.
106
Jason A.Donenfield, “Fast, Modern, Secure VPN Tunnel,” WireGuard, 2022,
https://www.wireguard.com/.
107
Ibid.
108
Hussam Abdelgabar, “Scaling Cyber Security Teams in 2022,” Linkedin, May 23, 2022,
www.linkedin.com/pulse/scaling-cyber-security-teams-2022-hussam-abdelgabar.
41
these interns will be working from Monday to Thursday, while the other half would be working
from Friday to Sunday. The assigned interns for both of those schedules will be separated into
groups of three. These groups of interns will be based in three different cities and comprise
university students with backgrounds in software engineering, computer science, and
cybersecurity. To account for a 24/7 schedule we acknowledge that Denver, Paris, and Sydney
are cities that can collectively work on a 24/7 schedule from 9am to 5pm every day of the work
week, with no offline hour.
The industry standard pay for software engineering interns ranges from $14 to $35 per
hour.109 We plan to use the mean of that range, $23 per hour, as a base pay for our interns. This
would bring the total cost of keeping our internship program staffed to about $3,626,640 per
year. This sum would cover all costs related to the project, including app creation, free VPN
development, and 24/7 cybersecurity support.
5.2 Sources of Funding
Following 9/11, the United States and its allies have embarked on a never ending war on
terror designated to purging the world of Anti-West terrorists. The war on terror following 9/11
racked up a bill of about $5 trillion in taxpayer dollars, or about $16,000 per person (Brown
University Watson Institute for International Studies).110 Despite this extravagant budget, very
little success has been noted of these efforts in the Middle East. In fact, the Inspector General’s
offices of Iraq and Afghanistan estimate that $60 billion was wasted in fraud (Iraq), and billions
109
“Software Engineering Internship Salary,” Zippia, April 6, 2023,
https://www.zippia.com/software-engineering-internship-jobs/salary/.
110
Derek Paulhus, “Waste, Greed, and Fraud: The Business That Makes the World's Greatest Army.” The Institute of
Politics at Harvard University. Accessed April 27, 2023.
https://iop.harvard.edu/get-involved/harvard-political-review/waste-greed-and-fraud-business-makes-world%E2%80
%99s-greatest-army.
42
of dollars more were wasted in equipment that was left behind when troops withdrew from
Afghanistan. U.S. government defense spending is over ⅕ of the federal budget.
Harvard Kennedy School’s Institute of Politics writes that there is huge waste and
mismanagement of taxpayer dollars throughout post-9/11 military spending. Much of this budget
has gone, “...towards a broken military contracting system that is riddled with fraud and
authoritative negligence.”111 According to the Center for International Policies Arms and
Security Project Director, there is an, “...excess of usable military equipment relative to any
possible need.”112 Helicopters and aircrafts in Afghanistan that cost $30 million per plane are
underutilized and rusting away. There is a lack of organization and management of military
resources in the Middle East specifically, contractors and authorities will lose resources, destroy
functional ammunition and retire things early.
We are asking the Biden Administration for a yearly grant equivalent to our estimated
overhead cost of $3,626,640 to support our development of technological resources to help
Iranian protesters. This cost is only 0.00018% of the current Department of Defense budget.
Following 9/11, U.S. foreign policy has been characterized as asserting rapid force rather
than careful diplomacy. The American government has leaned towards military aggression when
solving conflicts, which has largely backfired.
Military aggression in the Middle East has been incredibly overfunded, and unsuccessful.
Defense companies win billions of dollars from pleading their case to U.S. politicians, and we
are simply asking for $3,626,640, for a nonviolent initiative that will at the least work more than
previously mentioned efforts in the Middle East. In decades past, there has been a strong desire
from the U.S. to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs, but rather than explicitly helping civilians
111
Ibid.
112
Ibid.
43
living under dysfunctional governments, previous U.S. involvement has exacerbated conflict and
violence. The U.S. government has proven that they will not sit idly by while injustice exists in
the world, so we ask that this desire to help and implement justice in the Middle East be funneled
into peaceful and effective projects such as our own, rather than violent and frivolous efforts.
6. Goals and Outcomes of The Pigeon Project
6.1 Goals
The aim of The Pigeon Project is to provide the Iranian people with forms of technology
that can effectively aid those who are taking part in the current protest movement. After much
analysis of the history of both past and present movements, we propose technological assistance
for the Iranian protesters as the most effective method. Through the form of four different
applications specifically designed to help and support, we have created solutions that will avoid
direct interference from the regime.
For these unique issues, we propose a few apps through a technological medium that is
highly independent and a form of bottom-up aid due to the dictatorial and hypervigilant state of
the Islamic Regime of Iran. Inspiration from other apps dedicated to human rights globally have
shaped the components of ours, namely: Moonlight, Nahoft, Hafez, and YikYak.
Another form of top-down aid we will implement in addition to the apps is sanction
relief. US relations with Venezuela provide tangible evidence that alleviating sanctions can
incentivize anti-democratic governments to negotiate and be reasoned with. Finance-based
sanctions and industrial sector sanctions must be lifted to rebuild the Iranian economy, improve
Iranian and US relationships and improve the lives of civilians in Iran. Lifting some current
44
sanctions will invite more regulation on human rights and other social issues. By proposing a
policy that will affect the U.S. sanctions, we can ameliorate the current situations of the people in
Iran, allowing The Pigeon Project to have a greater effect.
The Iranian regime controls and censors most media, including popular apps like
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and “the websites of foreign news outlets, human rights
organizations, political opposition groups and other not aligned with the theocratic regime.”113
Tens of thousands of websites are restricted, as they do not corroborate the image that the Islamic
Republic attempts to push forward to its people. The Republic has also initiated internet
“blackouts,”114 or “shutdowns” which completely cut off all of the greater population from
mobile internet access; a tactic which was used to prevent people from sharing videos of protests
and civil unrest during times of social conflict115 like the September 2022 protests following the
death of Mahsa Amini. The Iranian public must have ways to communicate and report and learn
that are independent to the Iranian regime, which uses the technological isolation of its people as
a form of complacency to prevent them from undermining the government and its top officials,
and the validity of the regime.
6.2 Anticipated Short Term Outcomes
Our anticipated short term effects of gaining The Pigeon Project are protecting the
protestors while engaging in protests. If the protestors feel as if they are constantly unprotected
they will eventually feel more and more discouraged as the situation of protesting has become so
113
Stephanie MacLellan, “What You Need to Know about Internet Censorship in Iran,” Centre for International
Governance Innovation, January 9, 2018,
www.cigionline.org/articles/what-you-need-know-about-internet-censorship-iran/.
114
Burgess, Matt, “Iran's Internet Shutdown Hides a Deadly Crackdown,” Wired,
https://www.wired.com/story/iran-protests-2022-internet-shutdown-whatsapp/
115
Ibid.
45
dangerous for many. By implementing these apps with features to protect their rights against
violations of the regime, they will feel motivated to keep advocating for the change.
6.3 Anticipated Long Term Outcomes
Our anticipated long term effects are: a sense of unity between Iran and the United States.
The protest movement would feel supported by NGOs and spark motivation to keep the protest
movement alive. The Pigeon Project would build a sense of community for the protestors as they
will have a collaborated project unifying their goals for Iran. The ultimate goal of the project and
policies is to encourage the people of Iran to advocate for necessary social and economic change
and to pressure the government into meeting their demands, and leading the nation into the plane
of a modernized democratic government.
7. Global Impact of U.S. Implementation of The Pigeon Project
We believe it is crucial for the Biden Administration to adopt our policy proposal for
supporting Iranian protesters as soon as possible because U.S. endorsement will likely prompt
support from other Western countries. In the case of the current Iranian protest movement,
Western powers have recognized the human rights violations and other unjust actions of the
Iranian government. However, the U.S. government has yet to provide enough tangible support
to actually aid the movement, meaning they have not done enough to support the Iranian people
at the core of it. The United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and members of the European
Union have all sanctioned the Islamic Republic of Iran and specific members of the regime in
46
response to the October 2022 protests, but the protesters and ordinary citizens of Iran have been
left behind in preexisting foreign policy considerations.116
By being the first Western power to both reform methods of sanction implementation and
heavily support NGOs that are providing direct resources to Iranians, the U.S. could lead by
example, using its influential reputation to garner more global attention and aid to Iranians
working to eventually drastically reform their country’s government.
Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports declare that since World War II, the
United States has maintained a role of global leadership, stating, “The United States tends to be
the first or most important country for identifying or framing international issues, taking actions
to address those issues, setting an example for other countries to follow, organizing and
implementing multilateral efforts to address international issues, and enforcing international rules
and norms.”117 Alongside global leadership, the CRS defines three other key elements of the U.S.
role in the world: “defense and promotion of the liberal international order; defense and
promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention of the emergence of
regional hegemons in Eurasia.”118
As of 2020, Congress was dealing with the issue of determining whether or not the U.S.
role in the world has been changing as a result of the Trump Administration, and the CRS claims,
“A change in the U.S. role could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security,
freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with
116
Brianna Navarre, “How Countries Are Responding to Iran’s Crackdown on Dissent,” U.S. News, October 7,
2022,
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2022-10-07/how-countries-are-responding-to-irans-repression.
117
Ronald O'Rourke and Michael Moodie, “U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for
Congress.” CRS Reports. Congressional Research Service, April 6, 2020,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44891/47#:~:text=Overview%20of%20U.S.%20Role%3A%20Four
%20Key%20Elements,-While%20descriptions%20of&text=global%20leadership%3B%20%E2%80%A2%20defens
e%20and,of%20regional%20hegemons%20in%20Eurasia.
118
Ibid.
47
allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign
assistance, and human rights.”119 The Biden administration must take actions that fall in line with
the CRS’s key elements for the U.S. to stay consistent with its global leadership role, beginning
with adopting our policy proposal for sending aid to Iranian protesters.
8. Conclusion
For four decades, the Islamic Regime has made Iran unsafe for any marginalized identity
in legislative, political and social circumstances. Bravely, and at great personal risk, individuals
of these marginalized identities have banded together in protest. Though lives have been
destroyed or ended by the state response to these protests, the movement cannot be furthered by
the sheer dedication and sacrifice of the people. Iranian civilians cannot defeat a controlling and
oppressive system on their own, they need allies.
We urge the Biden administration to act with the precaution and urgency that the human
rights crisis in Iran demands. Over the course of this proposal, we crafted a plan to lift current
sanctions that economically disenfranchise Iranian civilians. These sanctions prevent them from
being able to devote time, energy and labor into the protests and strikes that are required to level
the maximum amount of pressure on the oppressive regime.
Previous sanctions on Iran from the U.S. and the E.U. have devastated Iran’s economy,
making Iran’s working class heavily reliant on the Regime. We have identified the Executive
Order 13902 as a sanction that is counterproductive to our goals of aiding the Iranian protests
Lifting this sanction would allow for a direct route of money transfer into Iran, allowing Iranian
citizens to both store their money abroad and work remotely for international companies. We
119
Ibid.
48
endorse and urge the Biden Administration to enact the MAHSA act since it would impose direct
consequences on leaders of the Islamic Regime, rather than the working class.
In addition to our sanction proposal, we request funding from the U.S. defense budget to
financially support our three apps: Sedah, Bebin, Biya (with Koja and Insan). Technology is a
source of power for Iranians and a uniquely suited resource in providing aid to Iranian protests
through indirect means. The creation of these apps will improve communication between
protestors, human rights violations reporting, emergency aid, and the tracking missing persons
reports.
We acknowledge that there are drawbacks to our policy plan. These drawbacks include
the risk that the Islamic Republic might discover The Pigeon Project and retaliate actively
against the protestors. We have remedied this potential issue by creating an encryption program
that protects the identities of the users. Therefore if the app is discovered by the regime, the
protesters are protected from individually being targeted by the government. By not collecting
user data, they are highly untraceable. In order to be as accessible as possible to the general
public, the user interfaces will be simplistic and easy to understand and use.
By presenting this proposal to the Biden Administration we hope that they utilize the
information presented and take action towards supporting the NGOs involved with aiding Iran. If
the Biden Administration enforces our proposal we will see a stronger protest movement and a
more united Iran. As Iranians involved in the protest state in their manifesto, “[this] is a protest
against misogyny, gender discrimination, endless economic insecurity, labor slavery, poverty,
misery, class oppression, ethnic and religious oppression, and a revolution against every form of
religious and non-religious tyranny that has been imposed over the past century.”120 We deliver
120
“Trade Unions Issue Charter of Minimum Demands,” IranWire, February 16, 2023,
https://iranwire.com/en/politics/113866-iranian-trade-unions-civic-groups-issue-charter-of-minimum-demands/.
49
the reality and hopes of Iranian protesters like a carrier pigeon to the Biden Administration, just
as our namesake. By raising the flag of Iranian voices, we seek to respond to these messages
with aid and liberation.
As written on the entrance of the United Nations, famous Persian poet Sa’adi Shirazi
once said, “Human beings are members of a whole, in creation of one essence and soul. If one
member is afflicted with pain, other members uneasy will remain. If you have no sympathy for
human pain, the name of human you cannot retain”121 The protest movement is alive, it is built
on bones of bravery and survives on the dream of a liberated, kind, and loving Iran.
121
Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, “Bani Adam: the 13th-century Persian poem that shows why humanity needs a global
response to coronavirus,” The Conversation, March 27, 2020,
https://theconversation.com/bani-adam-the-13th-century-persian-poem-that-shows-why-humanity-needs-a-global-re
sponse-to-coronavirus-134836.
50
Appendices:
Appendix A. (Biya App)

51
Appendix B. (Biya App)

52
Appendix C. (Biya App Feature—Insan)
53
Appendix D. (Biya App Feature—Koja)
54
Appendix E. (Bebin App)
55
Appendix F. (Sedah App)
56
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Supporting The Pigeon Project:

U.S. Foreign Policy to Aid Iranian Protesters Through the Use of

Sanction Reforms and Technological Developments

Maja Janc, Eloise Marseille, Kayla Palmer,

Camille Sandage, Hannah Shahbazi, Molly Richendrfer

For Iranians Everywhere.

oppressive and undemocratic Islamic Republic of Iran through the establishment of a

her—including photos of Amini’s extensive physical injuries after her detainment—Iranian

happened in Iran from 2017-2018.

democracy at the forefront.

most likely have grown into a modernized democratic system.

Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism as religions, their continuous anti-semitism and

practice any religion.

intercourse are sometimes subjected to punishment by execution. Younger members of the

community, deliberately preventing them from being autonomous citizens.

the most to gain from its downfall.

reality for the movement’s mobilization.

1.2 Opening Statement

models of successful existing ones.

We recognize that as a foreign organization we cannot enter Iran without permission

1.3 The Pigeon Project Mission Statement

the Islamic Republic.

2.1 Our Recommendation

Iranian government. As a bottom-up approach, sending direct resources to Iranian protesters

works to apply pressure to the Iranian government from the inside.

monetarily endorsing non-governmental organizations that are developing technologies as

resources for Iranians.

2.3 Application Proposal

In addition to the lifting of select sanctions, we propose three apps to be implemented: an

2.4 Other NGO Efforts

“United for Iran” is a nonprofit, non-governmental organization started by dissidents,

“United for Iran’s” applications.

3.1 Analysis of Previous Sanctions on Iran

mobilize and lessen their reliance on the Regime.

on Iran has markedly increased since 1979.

verge of collapse once again.

targeting to support protestors will be focusing on wiring money to protestors, enabling

protestors to work abroad, and the Mahsa Act.

3.2 Wire Transfers and International Banking

easily accessible and quick wire transfers.

3.3 Aiding Iranians with Remote Work Abroad

sanctioning the regime.44

related fields are disproportionately underemployed compared to other demographics.46 Opening

Additionally, if Western governments were to implement programs allowing remote Iranian

the Iranian government.50

making Batmanghelidj’s recommendations a reality by instating a program for Iranians to be able

U.S. should be leading in development of these resources.

3.4 Endorsing the Mahsa Act

Executive Order 13818 (under the Trump Administration).54

leadership and control.

protests and violence against the people.58

the government and therefore aiding the resistance.

4.1 Importance of Supporting Technological Developments

of technology as a useful method of aiding the protestors in their fight.

4.2 The Pigeon Project’s Strategy

have a background in cyber security, to work on the project.

and even slow down cellular connection.73

censorship and monitoring of the Iranian government.

4.3 Our App Proposals

religious expression, identity, or sometimes pressure from family.75

the government and morality police.

them about real-time regime sightings.83

not be traced back to the person who sent it.

platforms such as Whatsapp and Telegram.