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Active Support of Power System to Energy Transition—Article
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: The decreasing cost of solar photovoltaics (PVs) and battery storage systems is driving their adoption in
Received 20 October 2020 the residential distribution system, where more consumers are becoming prosumers. Accompanying this
Revised 7 September 2021 trend is the potential roll-out of home energy management systems (HEMSs), which provide a means for
Accepted 12 November 2021
prosumers to respond to externalities such as energy price, weather, and energy demands. However, the
Available online 05 March 2022
economic operation of prosumers can affect grid security, especially when energy prices are extremely
low or high. Therefore, it is paramount to design a framework that can accommodate the interests of
Keywords:
the key stakeholders in distribution systems—namely, the network operator, prosumer, and aggregator.
Demand management
Prosumer
In this paper, a novel transactive energy (TE)-based operational framework is proposed. Under this frame-
Transactive energy work, aggregators interact with the distribution grid operator through a negotiation process to ensure
Aggregator network security, while at the lower level, prosumers submit their schedule to the aggregator through
Grid security the HEMS. If network security is at risk, aggregators will send an additional price component representing
the cost of security (CoS) to the prosumer to stimulate further response. The simulation results show that
the proposed framework can effectively ensure the economic operation of aggregators and prosumers in
distribution systems while maintaining grid security.
Ó 2022 The AUTHORS. Published by Elsevier LTD on behalf of Chinese Academy of Engineering and
Higher Education Press Limited Company. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eng.2022.03.001
2095-8099/Ó 2022 The AUTHORS. Published by Elsevier LTD on behalf of Chinese Academy of Engineering and Higher Education Press Limited Company.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
P. Hou, G. Yang, J. Hu et al. Engineering 12 (2022) 171–182
following the ‘‘schedule and control” principle of conventional tively [22]; thus, a complete interaction framework covering the
operation. The model can be implemented in a distributed manner, interests of the prosumers, aggregators, and network operators
in which monetary value is the only information exchanged among that can ensure unbiased operation, responsiveness, the privacy
the parties, which protects their privacy and autonomy. Ref. [10] of the prosumers, and avoidance of grid security violations is miss-
elaborates on the bidding process of prosumers in a local market ing. This paper proposes a framework to address the abovemen-
environment. The work in Refs. [7,8] differs from the rest, as it tioned issues. To be specific, the contributions of this work can
attempts to develop a full TE market operation framework for pro- be broken down into the following aspects:
sumers, in which an independent market operator is introduced to (1) Most of the existing research on TE is based on an open-loop
eliminate the possible bias the system operator may display mechanism, whereas our work has closed-loop features and is
toward consumers; moreover, network constraints are taken into combined with an architecture in which the interests of aggrega-
account. tors, network operators, and prosumers are considered. The previ-
Although many TE schemes has been presented, the prosumers’ ous work in this area does not have the same mechanism or
devices are primarily assumed to be controlled directly by an formulation [21,22].
upper-level agent such as the aggregator. In Ref. [11], the TE is (2) An innovative price adder (PA) is proposed and applied to all
applied between a parking lot aggregator, with PV and eletric vehi- prosumers to activate the response, which makes it possible to
cle (EV) chargers, and a local trading agent. The transactive process avoid the bias that was introduced in previous work using a
is performed using the double-side auction method. In Ref. [12], dynamic tariff due to the network position of the prosumers. Pre-
the TE takes place between the DSO and the microgrid operator, viously, the PA concept was mentioned in the context of the trans-
where the microgrid operator controls the microgrid-owned mission grid [23,24] or implicitly used in the concept of distributed
assets. In Ref. [13], the aggregator controls the power dispatch locational marginal price (DLMP), as proposed in Refs. [18,19,25].
among EVs directly, using the proposed hierarchical bipartite The authors in Ref. [26] propose a new method that contains the
graph (HBG) matching method for optimizing the power exchange PA concept; however, the network constraints are missing.
between vehicles. (3) The role of the aggregator is further clarified and enhanced
The interaction of prosumers and their agent has also been compared with the model in Refs. [6,7]. In the current work, the
explored. To activate the demand response from prosumers, the aggregator is not only an agent of the prosumers for energy trading
work in Ref. [14] attempts to activate the transactions between and a market participant, but also a mediator between the DSO and
prosumers with energy storage systems and a microgrid. The work the prosumers, formulating and spreading the PA to the prosumers.
in Ref. [15] promotes trading energy between the bidders and This setup also alleviates the potentially heavy computational bur-
askers. However, it rules out that the prosumers do not have the den for aggregators in other community-based markets [27].
ability to arrange their bidding functions and settlement. In Ref. The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the
[16], the demand response of each residential consumer is acti- proposed TE architecture is specified. The optimization model is
vated with the proposed nested TE; however, the mechanism only then described in Section 3. The simulation results and discussion
covers flexibility procurement and excludes normal operation and are given in Section 4, followed by conclusions.
network constraints.
Once network constraints are considered in the formulation, the
2. Transactive energy framework
cost paid by the consumers increases in order to motivate lower
network utilization. Security and grid constraints are considered
This section first discusses the tariff policy, followed by the TE
in Ref. [17]; however, it is assumed that the DERs are directly con-
framework.
trolled by the aggregators, so the preferences of the prosumers are
not fully respected. Research based on dynamic tariffs [18,19]
addresses the network cost based on the distributed locational 2.1. Current tariff model in Denmark
marginal price concept; however, due to the radial operation of
distribution systems, the interests of the consumers at certain loca- The tariff can be defined according to the customer’s production
tions (e.g., at the end of the feeder) are always harmed due to the or consumption and the connected voltage level [28]. At present,
higher power loss and voltage drop that are induced for power many countries have no production tariff for residential customers,
delivery in comparison with the other nodes in the network. who only pay tariffs for each kilowatt-hour of consumption, in
Although this type of design takes into account network impacts addition to a subscription fee [28]. In addition, a time-of-use tariff
such as loss and/or congestion, it introduces a natural bias toward is adopted by some DSOs in order to reduce the peak load [29]. In
certain consumers, thereby limiting the applicability. A fair market Denmark, the peak and off-peak load tariffs of the DSO for the
operational model must not introduce bias toward consumers in times between 17:00 and 20:00 during the period from October
terms of their geographical locations; otherwise, special policies 1st to March 31st are 0.09 and 0.03 EUR∙(kW∙h)1, respectively,
would be introduced to differentiate the users, which would lead while the tariff of the TSO is 0.01 EUR∙(kW∙h)1. This information
to an increased cost for the implementation of such a system. Fur- is not included in the optimization model of the aggregators, as
thermore, the tariff caused by network constraints may be much the tariff is paid by the prosumers regardless of the energy price
higher than the normal retail price, as illustrated in Ref. [18]. A [30], which implies the necessity for an energy management func-
multi-leader multi-follower (MLMF) Stackelberg game approach tion at the prosumer level.
is utilized in Ref. [20] to model the energy trading process among
microgrids (MGs) while the assets in the MG are directly controlled 2.2. The proposed transactive energy framework
by the MG operator. A network-constrained distributed bilateral
energy pricing scheme is proposed in Ref. [21]. Trading between Much of the previous work assumes a price-quantity character-
the prosumers is quantified in a distributed way using the mutual istic curve of consumers. However, it is challenging to approximate
reputation index. such a curve in reality. Furthermore, if such a curve is formulated
So far, previous research on TE that addresses the economic externally, the privacy of the consumers could be at risk. Instead,
operation of aggregators or prosumers mainly addresses aggrega- with the increasing use of controllable household solar PV and
tors or prosumers’ operational model interacting with the external storage (PVST) units and online appliances, prosumers tend to
market signal, or the interactions between the two parties respec- schedule their energy usage to maximize their self-sufficiency
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P. Hou, G. Yang, J. Hu et al. Engineering 12 (2022) 171–182
and hedge against volatile supply conditions. Home energy man- the transactive process. In this work, instead, this price quantity is
agement systems (HEMSs) can help prosumers to coordinate and used to formulate a PA that is communicated back to the pro-
optimize their schedules with respect to their forecasted produc- sumers through the aggregators, which represents the network
tion and consumption preferences. In this way, the residents’ cost of electricity due to their schedule. The HEMS will add this
energy consumption information is not shared, allowing them to PA to the original forecasted electricity price, reschedule the con-
retain their privacy [31], while their energy consumption informa- sumption, and submit to the aggregator again. If the new schedule
tion remains commercializable [32]. still results in violations of the network constraints, the process
Prosumers equipped with HEMSs may participate in the elec- will repeat until the security criteria are met. In fact, this PA is
tricity market directly, provided that they are allowed to access equivalent to a network tariff that is without bias toward individ-
the market and have the means to interact [33]. Otherwise, they ual prosumers. The overall conceptual architecture is shown in
can subscribe to an electricity aggregator/retailor as their supplier, Fig. 1.
and the aggregator pools the distributed resources to join the mar-
ket operation. In the latter context, the HEMS communicates with 2.3. Rolling window operation for prosumers
the aggregator to submit the prosumers’ schedule and obtain price
information based on their type of supply contract. Such two-way The operation of prosumers is expected to follow a forward roll-
communication among prosumers and aggregators enables a TE ing time window, where the forecasted production and consump-
network. From the network operator side, to ensure efficient grid tion are known within the time window. The time window length
operation and fulfill network security, a TE framework can be set is designed to be 3 h, with 1 h resolution. The proposed rolling win-
between the aggregator and the network operator through a dow optimization (RWO) model is illustrated in Fig. 2.
distribution-independent system operator (DISO) [6]. In this way, The rolling window has a certain length (3 h, in this case),
a TE framework can be established to ensure the coordinated oper- where the prosumers submit their schedules before the actual
ation of prosumers, aggregators, and network operators at the operating hours. In each rolling window, a TE process will take
same time. place to ensure that there is no constraint violation in the time
In this framework, it is assumed that there is a variable price window. The rolling (a forward moving time window of 3 h) takes
contract between the aggregator and the prosumers, where the place for every time interval; therefore, only the schedule in the
prosumers create their schedule based on the predicted electricity first hour of the rolling window will effectively be implemented,
price from the associated aggregator and the forecasted consump- while the schedule for later time intervals will be subject to revi-
tion and PV production. The HEMS will then minimize the electric- sion in the next rolling step.
ity bills (or maximize profits in the case of excess generation). The The overall TE operation flow is shown in Fig. 3; it is an iterative
schedule from the prosumers in each time interval will be collected process until the aggregated schedule from the prosumers is feasi-
by their subscribed aggregator, who will then trade in the market ble for the network. Starting from Step 1, PVST prosumers will first
according to their bidding strategy. The schedules of all the aggre- optimize their own schedules according to their predicted price
gators will be sent to the DSO to verify the network security. If no and energy quantities, and then submit the schedule to their sub-
congestion or voltage limit is violated, the DSO will accept the scribed aggregators. In Step 2, the aggregated schedules will be
schedule. Otherwise, a negotiation process will be triggered passed on to the responsible DSO by the aggregators. If no viola-
between the DSO and the involved aggregators through the solu- tions are found in the network, the process will stop (Step 3),
tion process of a social welfare problem mediated by the DISO. This and the aggregators will go to the electricity market for trading.
transactive procedure will generate a price quantity representing If network constraints are violated, the TE mechanism will be trig-
the added cost due to security. In the literature, this price quantity gered to help reschedule the PVST prosumer’s schedule until an
has not been effectively used to activate individual prosumers after agreement is reached among the aggregators and the DSO (Step
Fig. 1. (a) The proposed TE architecture; (b) HEMS for PVST prosumers.
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P. Hou, G. Yang, J. Hu et al. Engineering 12 (2022) 171–182
4). Afterward, the aggregator sends the PA to its associated pro- 3.1. The prosumers’ operation model
sumers and then obtains an updated schedule from them. The
HEMS manages each prosumer’s schedule and implements the For the PVST type of prosumers, the HEMS mainly controls the
PA in its algorithm to influence the prosumer’s behavior. storage unit to achieve economic operation. Since the energy pur-
chasing/selling prices are asymmetric due to tariffs and taxes, bin-
3. Optimization models ary variables are required to indicate both the prosumer’s action
(i.e., buying or selling) and the battery operation status (i.e., charg-
The overall optimization problem is formulated as a social wel- ing or discharging). Table 1 provides a specification of the binary
fare maximization (and cost minimization) problem. variables.
Table 1
Specification of binary and bi-linear terms.
z2t;i Real 0 z2t;i ¼ d1t;i d4t;i P Dis The energy flows out from the battery when the prosumer is discharging and exporting to the grid
t;i
z3t;i Real 0 z3t;i ¼ d2t;i d5t;i P Ch The energy flows into the battery when charging while the prosumer is importing from the grid
t;i
z4t;i Real 0 z4t;i ¼ d2t;i d6t;i P Dis The energy flows out from the battery when discharging while the prosumer is importing from the grid
t;i
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P. Hou, G. Yang, J. Hu et al. Engineering 12 (2022) 171–182
X h S 2
Considering the electricity products provided by the aggrega- Obj:: min Ai ¼ Pt lSell þ PBt lBuy
t cBd zt þ zt =gDis ð12Þ
4
t
tors, the PVST prosumers’ objective function in each rolling proce- PS ;P B t2T
dure can be expressed as followsy.
Xh B Buy
i
Obj: : max Ai;k ¼ PSt;i lSell
t;k þ P t;i lt;k ð1Þ 3.2. The distribution system operators’ objective
P S ;P B t2T
X S
0 PCh Pþi ð5Þ PAgg
t;j ¼ Pt;i þ PBt;i ð14Þ
t;i
i2Xj
0 PDis
t;i P i ð6Þ X
s:t:; Pmax
trans P DSO
t;j P max
trans ð15Þ
j2N bus
SOCmin
i SOCt;i SOCmax
i ð7Þ
1 DSO
U min 0
trans U t;j J 21 P t;j U max ð16Þ
SOC1;i ¼ SOCinitial;i ð8Þ trans
LET ¼ Lc Ls DoD ð11Þ The aggregator can either provide up-regulation or down-
To consider the impact of the battery degradation discharging regulation, which is indicated in Eq. (17). The range of the up-/
cost (BDDC) on the scheduling, the objective function in Eq. (1) is down-regulation energy is described in Eqs. (19) and (20), respec-
modified into the following. tively. Considering the difficulties in obtaining the SOC information
of PVST prosumers via smart meters in the real world, a modifica-
tion is made in this work that relaxes the upper boundaries of the
charging/discharging limit by assuming a full battery storage in the
y
The nomenclature of the symbols used in the paper is provided at the end of the t–1 time interval. Eq. (21) shows the common interests between
paper. the aggregator and the DSO.
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P. Hou, G. Yang, J. Hu et al. Engineering 12 (2022) 171–182
3.4. Social welfare maximization between the DSO and aggregators by the rigid mathematical formulation, the application of the price
is restricted. In this work, we propose a price component based on
A social welfare optimization problem can be formulated as this converged price, which we call the PA. The difference before
follows. and after the initial schedule is normalized is represented by the
P P P X X normalized difference (ND):
Obj: : PS min i2Xj Bk PSt;i;k ; PBt;i;k þ D PDSO
k2NAgg t2T
;PB ;P DSO
t;i;k t;i;k t;j
t;j
j2N bus t2T
NDt;j ¼ PAgg Agg
t;j P t;j max PAgg Agg
t;j P t;j ð30Þ
ð22Þ t2½1;T ;j2Xj
s.t., Eqs. (17), (18), (20)–(23). There are a total of four combinations when the initial sched-
It can be seen that Eq. (22) combines the optimization problem ules of the PVST prosumers are required to be updated, as shown
of the DSO and the aggregators. in Table 2.
In Table 2, a positive ND means that the agreed-upon schedule
3.5. Distributed transactive energy model between the DSO and aggregator requires the PVST prosumers to
use less energy from the grid or inject more energy into the grid.
Eq. (22) will be solved iteratively between the DSO model and In such a situation, it can be imagined that, regardless of the sign
the aggregator’s model using a price signal that represents the cost of the CoS, a positive PA should be given to the prosumer so that
of security (CoS). As specified in Section 3.1, the whole problem has the right response can be activated from the PVST prosumer. Like-
been reformulated into a convex problem; therefore, the alternat- wise, if ND has a negative sign, a negative PA should be applied.
ing direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is adopted here to The PA krev
t;j is formulated by the following formula:
PAgg
t;j ¼ PAgg B S
t;j þ P t;j P t;j ð29Þ Table 2
PA direction according to the sign of the ND and CoS.
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P. Hou, G. Yang, J. Hu et al. Engineering 12 (2022) 171–182
4.1. Parameter settings chasing and selling prices of the aggregator and reflects the differ-
ences of aggregators’ bidding strategies. The predicted purchasing/
In this work, it is assumed that there are a total of 18 PVST pro- selling electricity prices by the PVST prosumers associated with
sumers contracted with two different aggregators in a 0.4 kV low- Aggregator 1 are shown in Figs. 5(a) and (b), and were obtained
voltage distribution system, which is the same as the test system based on the prices in Fig. 5(c). For brevity, the predicted electricity
used in Ref. [6]. The power transformer capacity allocated to all prices from Aggregator 2 are not shown here.
residents in that area is 220 kW. The minimum and maximum It can be seen in that Aggregator 1 gives a cheaper electricity
voltage of the bus is set at 0.9 and 1.1 per unit (p.u.) respectively. product to its contracted customers and purchases the surplus
The parameters of the batteries are specified in Table 3. energy from its customers for a lower price as well, compared with
the business strategy used by Aggregator 2. For Aggregator 1 and 2,
the purchasing profit coefficient xbuy,k are set at 10% and 12%
4.2. Results and discussion respectively, while for selling xsell,k are 8% and 11% apiece.
Due to low diversity in PV production and likely similar fore- lAgg
t;k ¼ 1 þ xbuy;k lt
DAM
ð33Þ
casts of the electricity price, schedules from prosumers can coin-
cide, which can lead to violations of the network constraints
t;k ¼ 1 þ xsell;k lt
lsell ð34Þ
DAM
during high or low price periods. For simplification, it is assumed
that all the prosumers under one aggregator have the same fore- Based on the procedure in Section 3, the simulation results of all
cast of electricity prices. The predicted variable electricity price the prosumers are shown in Figs. 6–9. The aggregated schedule
that is applied for the PVST prosumers is compared with the orig- before and after the TE in each RWO process is compared in
inal variable electricity price in Fig. 5. Fig. 6(a), where the solid color lines represent the schedules for
The day-ahead market prices shown in Fig. 5(c) were obtained each RWO without the TE process, and the dotted lines represent
from Energi Data Serivicey, from 00:00 to 23:00 on 5 March 2019 the schedules for each RWO with the TE. This corresponds to Step
for the Estern Denmark (DK2 area). The profits of each aggregator 1 of the optimization problem in Fig. 3. The final aggregated sched-
are considered by using a profit coefficient, which is a profit margin ule after each rolling step is shown in Fig. 6(b); for each step, the
that each aggregator expects, assuming that each aggregator is a process will go through Steps 2–7, in case congestion is taking
price-taker. This profit coefficient concept applies in both the pur- place in a rolling window. It can be seen that a congestion problem
Table 3
Battery parameters.
Type Eb (kW h) SOCmin (%) SOCmax (%) P+/P (kW) gCh/gDis (%) cBd (EUR∙(kW∙h)1)
1 13.1 20 90 2.86 0.90/0.95 0.07
2 25.4 20 85 5.57 0.90/0.95 0.07
3 21.8 20 85 4.77 0.90/0.95 0.07
4 12.3 20 90 2.70 0.90/0.95 0.07
5 12.8 20 85 2.81 0.90/0.95 0.07
y
https://www.energidataservice.dk/
177
P. Hou, G. Yang, J. Hu et al. Engineering 12 (2022) 171–182
Fig. 5. Variable electricity price provided by the aggregator. (a) Predicted electricity selling price in each rolling process (prosumers in Aggregator 1); (b) predicted electricity
purchasing price in each rolling process (prosumers in Aggregator 1); (c) day-ahead market price.
occurrs between 11:00 and 13:00, which corresponds to the time Due to the congestion constraint, the TE will be activated at
interval of high solar irradiation. Under the incentive price signal hour 11 in Fig. 6, which corresponds to the 6th rolling step in the
created by the TE, the smart device will make a new schedule simulation case. The aggregated schedules before/after the TE at
and thus will not violate the network constraints, as shown in the 6th rolling step are shown in Fig. 7(a), while the voltage profile
Fig. 6(b). is shown in Fig. 7(b). It can be seen that there is a remarkable volt-
Fig. 6. (a) Aggregated schedule of prosumers before/after the TE in each RWO process; (b) aggregated schedule that is finally submitted to the DSO.
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P. Hou, G. Yang, J. Hu et al. Engineering 12 (2022) 171–182
Fig. 7. Summary of the TE results at hour 11 at the 6th rolling step. (a) Aggregated schedule of prosumers before/after TE; (b) system voltage before/after TE; (c) CoS of each
node.
age rise in each bus node. The CoS is shown in Fig. 7(c) after Step 4 reschedule; thus, higher prices are paid to so that they will be will-
in Fig. 3 in the first TE process. ing to change their schedule. This is not fair for those customers, as
The aggregated schedules before/after the TE at the 7th rolling the network voltage issues are affected by all customers. Therefore,
step are shown in Fig. 8(a), while the voltage profile is shown in we recommend broadcasting the same PA signal for all the
Fig. 8(b). Both the congestion and the voltage violation problems customers.
occur in this period. After the TE, the system voltage constraints
are met, as indicated by the green line in Fig. 8(b), while the con-
gestion problem is also solved, as shown in Fig. 8(a). The corre- 5. Conclusions
sponding CoS is illustrated in Fig. 8(c). The CoS for each node is
the same, even when the voltage violation problem is solved. Thus, In this paper, a new TE framework for distribution systems with
the CoS benefits from the flexibility of the PVST prosumers, and prosumers is proposed. The framework contains two interactions:
especially from their storage units. aggregators with DSOs and aggregators with prosumers. A PA is
To elaborate on this situation, we reduce the battery size of the formulated to reflect the CoS for the prosumers’ operation. The
PVST prosumer on buses No. 16 and 32 from 13.1 and 12.3 kW h to procedure has closed-loop characteristics that ensure a response
4.8 and 3.6 kW h, and the power rating to 1.05 and 0.80 kW, from the prosumers and can preserve the privacy information of
respectively, and rerun the program. The overall simulation results PVST prosumers when participating in a TE market to help meet
are quite similar to the graphs illustrated in Figs. 6–8. However, the the system constraints.
CoS of the 7th rolling step exhibits a different feature, as shown in The model is scalable, as the calculations of the schedules are
Fig. 9. solved at the prosumer level. For a large distribution network
Due to the voltage constraints, a larger CoS was induced at involving thousands of prosumers and many aggregators, the
buses No. 16 and 32, respectively. In this case, the PVST prosumers aggregators’ model would be more complex, as each would have
with smaller batteries cannot help the grid when they are asked to their objective, variable, and constraints. However, as the negotia-
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P. Hou, G. Yang, J. Hu et al. Engineering 12 (2022) 171–182
Fig. 8. Summary of the TE results for hour 12 at the 7th rolling step. (a) Aggregated schedule of prosumers before/after the TE; (b) grid voltage before/after the TE; (c) CoS for
each node.
Fig. 9. CoS for each node of hour 14 at the 7th rolling step when assuming smaller batteries.
tion process is solved in a distributed manner through the the TE may be relaxed to a certain extent while there is still room
exchange of price only with the DSO, scalability can be preserved. for DSOs to use other control methods to regulate the voltage and
Each aggregator will still decide on the PA for their customers. congestion issues. Alternatively, the DSO optimization problem in
In practice, the flexibility of the prosumers may be insufficient the TE framework can be extended to a distribution system opti-
to mitigate the grid issues. In this case, the stopping criteria of mal power flow problem that includes more control variables.
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181
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