Research Article

Journal of Asian Security

The Malacca Strait, and International Affairs
8(2) 174–194, 2021
the South China Sea © The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/23477970211017494
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Indo-Pacific

Paweł Paszak1

Abstract
This article aims to highlight security dynamics of the US–China competition
in the Indo-Pacific associated with the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea
through the prism of Balance of Threat Theory. It is argued that the control
over strategic lines of communication is a significant factor in the process of
constructing threat perception of East and Southeast Asian states as they remain
heavily reliant on maritime transportation of commodities and energy resources.
The US navy is the major security provider in the maritime domain which makes
China vulnerable to a potential naval blockade. China faces a double dilemma as
the status quo is interpreted as potentially detrimental to its interests, but any
attempts to undermine it are likely to prompt Asian states to join US balancing
efforts. China’s geographical proximity, its rising military power and revisionist
tendencies make the US the more desirable security partner to the region.

Keywords
Malacca, South China Sea, United States, China, India, Indo-Pacific

Introduction
China’s sustained economic and military rise and intensifying strategic
competition with the US have become defining trends in international relations
both on the political and academic levels. Among many themes, China’s rising
naval capabilities have been a key feature of the debate as the maritime domain
constitutes the bloodstream of the world economy and a major platform for

1
War Studies Academy, Poland.

Corresponding author:
Paweł Paszak, War Studies Academy, Jachtowa 12, Braniewo 14-500, Poland.
E-mail: p.paszak@akademia.mil.pl
Paszak 175

projecting military power. The US dominant position in the Western Pacific ‘has
been, is, and will remain largely defined by sea power’ (Gampert, 2013, p. xi) or,
as Barry Posen puts it, defined by its unrivalled ‘command of commons’ (Posen,
2003, p. 8). The US is the only actor that can credibly deny access to sea lines of
communication. Fiona Cunningham identifies naval blockade as a relatively low-
risk option across the escalation ladder that might help the US achieve limited
political objectives, without resorting to nuclear threats (Cunningham, 2020).
For China acquiring naval power sufficient to challenge the US in the Western
Pacific is, therefore, an imperative not only for safeguarding its security but also
achieving regional hegemony. Due to these reasons, China’s naval modernisation
and strategy have attracted considerable attention in recent years (Brewster, 2018;
Lim, 2017; Lim, 2020; Nan, 2009; Sheldon-Duplaix, 2016; Yoshihara & Holmes,
2018). Li argued that China’s naval strategy and capabilities have been shifting
from the near-coast defence, near-seas active defence, to far-seas operations (Li,
2009, pp. 163–164). Similar conclusions were drawn by Sheldon-Duplaix who
emphasised that China has embarked on a build-up aimed at making China a “sea
power” mainly in the Indo-Pacific region to deter US intervention in Taiwan and
to protect its trade in the Indian Ocean (Sheldon-Duplaix, 2016, p. 51). Lim and
Brewster argue that the main motivation behind increasing activity in the Indian
Ocean was to secure pivotal maritime lines of communications that carry a large
share of Chinese oil imports and a sizable part of Chinese exports (Brewster,
2018, pp. 25–26; Lim, 2020, p. 2). Holmes and Yoshihara point that breaking the
‘first island chain’ is integral to China’s ambitions of Great Rejuvenation. The
authors further argue that while it is the most immediate goal, it is not the definite
one, since China will try to secure its interests in the Indian Ocean and Persian
Gulf (Yoshihara & Holmes, 2018 pp. 154–155).
This article aims to complement and deepen the understanding of security
dynamics associated with China’s rise by highlighting the role of the Malacca
Strait, the South China Sea and in the context of US–China competition in the
Indo-Pacific. The author adopts the perspective of the Balance of Threat Theory
(BoT) within the structural realism framework. BoT goes beyond traditional
realist Balance of Power theory by incorporating perception of changing
distribution of power among actors in the system. Threat perception is constructed
through four interacting elements: aggregate power, geographic proximity,
offensive capabilities and offensive intentions (Walt, 1985, 1990). The BoT does
not explicitly name the control over crucial lines of communication as a factor
influencing the dynamics between states, yet the issue of Malacca Strait and the
South China Sea is nevertheless compatible with the theory. The sea power and
control of strategic lines of communication (SLOCs) is a component of state
aggregated power. Levy and Thompson claim sea power to be even more important
for balancing mechanisms than land power (Levy & Thompson, 2010). Command
of the commons, freedom of navigation and the ability to impose a naval blockade
are also inseparable elements of constructing threat perception given the
paramount position of sea transport for economic and energy security.
The argument made here is that BoT dynamics so far have favour aligning with
the US to balance the rising threat from China (Japan, India, Taiwan) as America
176 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(2)

does not have territorial claims in the area, and its intentions are not perceived as
offensive. ASEAN small and middle powers also employ a hedging strategy that
combines strengthening economic cooperation with China while engaging
politically and militarily with the US and elevating its military capabilities. The
control over SLOCs may drastically alter the strategic orientations of regional
actors. Asian nations such as China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea are heavily
reliant on energy imports from the Middle East crossing the South China Sea and
the Malacca Strait. If China successfully imposes its sovereign control over these
waters, it will provide it with additional instruments to coerce East-Asian states.
In that case, their behaviour might shift from balancing and hedging to band
wagoning with China, under the condition that the US forces will be expelled
from the first island chain. In this situation, the risk of confronting China without
the stabilising role of the US would be too great to take. However, this scenario is
still very unlikely as the US with its allies retains a military advantage. Any
unilateral attempts to alter the status quo in regard to Taiwan or the South China
Sea will prompt Asian states to join the US balancing efforts as they perceive
China as a much greater threat. The situation is further complicated by Beijing’s
deteriorating relations with India that plays an increasingly significant role in the
US Indo-Pacific strategy. Its growing maritime ambitions and capabilities,
deepening security partnership with the US and the perception of China as the
primary threat will hinder Beijing’s plans for greater control of SLOCs.

China’s Malacca Dilemma

The Strait of Malacca is the shortest route between the Middle East and East Asia
helping to shorten the time and cost of transport between Asia, the Middle East
and Europe. The strategic location makes it a vital waterway for hydrocarbons,
container transport and bulk cargo transported from and to the world’s most
vibrant region. In 2016, on average 16 million b/d of crude oil and 3.2 million
b/d of liquefied natural gas (LNG) were carried across the strait (EIA, 2017, pp.
6–7), the second-largest volume in the world inferior only to the Ormuz Strait.
Like most Asian nations China is heavily dependent on imports of hydrocarbons
and apart from its major supplier and partner—Russia—other primary providers
are located in the Middle East or Africa. Therefore, over 70% of all crude oil and
LNG exports flow through the Malacca Strait making it extremely important for
China’s energy security. But it is not only hydrocarbons that define Malacca’s
importance—around 20% of world seaborne trade and around 60% of Chinese
trade flow through the strait and South China Sea (CSIS, 2017), making them the
most important sea line of communication for China’s economy.
The situation has been described by Hu Jintao in November 2003 as the
‘Malacca Dilemma’, referring to the strategic disadvantage resulting from high
vulnerability to a naval blockade. President Hu suggested that ‘certain powers
have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the [Malacca]
Strait.’ (Lanteigne, 2008, p. 144). It is clear that under the term ‘certain powers’
Hu meant the US and its unparalleled capabilities to command over the waters
Paszak 177

in the Indo-Pacific. The issue has been an object of discussion in China with most
of the works following Hu’s assessment acknowledging potential dangers
associated with overreliance on the single choke point (Jie, 2005; Zhang, 2011).
It is, however, worth noting that some Chinese scholars have dismissed the
concerns relating to the ‘Malacca dilemma’ downplaying its potential consequences
(Li, 2010). Nevertheless, it seems that the first perspective seems to resonate more
soundly among China’s decision-makers as Beijing is pursuing the diversification
of its energy supply and development of the ‘world-class navy’.
During the past two decades, the issue of sea lines of communication has been
growing in importance in China’s strategic discourse. China’s 2015 military
strategy declared ‘that the security of overseas interests concerning energy and
resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions,
personnel, and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue’. The document also
stressed that ‘the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned,
and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and
protecting maritime rights and interests’ (P. R. C. State Council, 2015). These
declarations signal the realisation of China’s military and political elites that the
sea domain will be crucial in the pursuit of China’s security and superpower
status. Deprived of strategic depth toward the US forces and control over sea lines
of communications China will remain highly constrained in its actions.
Overcoming the current encirclement is a sine qua non condition for China
departing from the status of a ‘partial’ superpower to a full-fledged superpower.
Beijing’s concerns over Malacca and the South China Sea arise from the fact
that the US Navy (7th and 5th Fleet) operating in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle
East is the only power yet capable of providing security to the SLOCs stretching
from the shores of Africa to East Asia. Since the era of Deng Xiaoping, China has
been a free-rider benefiting from America’s continuous commitment to provide
free navigation and security on Asian waters. As long as China remained relatively
weak militarily and oriented toward economic modernisation the role of the US
Navy was perceived as a constructive input into creating a positive international
environment. This ‘strategic window of opportunity’ enabled Chinese companies
to achieve remarkable commercial success and an unprecedented level of
integration with the global economy.
What makes the situation more complex from the Chinese perspective is the
enduring system of American alliances and partnerships built after World War II.
The so-called ‘San Francisco System’ or ‘Hub-and-spoke system’ nowadays
embraces Australia, Japan, and South Korea acting as a strong deterrent to
China’s potential expansion. Taiwan formally is not part of the system; however,
it plays a vital role in the American strategy and retains close military and
intelligence cooperation with the US. In the event of a conflict or attempt to
impose a naval blockade, it is not only the US military power that China has to
face, but also the combined capabilities of its close neighbours such as Japan,
and less likely South Korea and Australia. These countries, located in close
proximity to China’s shores, constrain their access to the Pacific Ocean and host
American forces, inflicting the sense of encroachment and insecurity among
China’s strategists. This was vividly exemplified by unequivocal criticism of the
178 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(2)

deployment of the THAAD (U. S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) system
in South Korea. President Xi Jinping assessed that the instalment of batteries
‘gravely harms the strategic security interests of China, Russia, and other
countries in the region’ (Reuters, 2017). Many scholars and analysts identify the
existing architecture of alliances as one of the greatest impediments for potential
Chinese expansion (Christensen, 2015, p. 51; Mearsheimer, 2014, pp. 361–362;
Nye, 2011, p. 186).
The overseas bases in Japan and South Korea in the so-called ‘first island
chain’ and ‘second island chain’ including Guam, Palau and the Marianas
constitute a focal point of US presence in the region amply described by Dean
Acheson as the ‘defence perimeter’ (Acheson, 1950). Those islands, and Guam in
particular, provide logistical support for units transiting from the US West Coast
as well as the strategic depth in case of an attack from Asia. Guam is not only one
of the front lines of the American forward defence but also a base for B-1, B-2 and
B-52 strategic bombers, Los Angeles Class nuclear submarines and Marines
headquarter. The US overseas bases within both first and second island chains
have to be considered both as a spear and a shield in the American national
security strategy.
Due to the vital role of American alliances, Chinese officials have voiced their
disapproval of the ‘cold war mentality’ and the pursuit of a ‘zero-sum’ game by
‘big powers’ (Liff, 2018). The pivotal role of ‘island chains’ has been also
emphasized by arguably the most influential maritime strategist in China’s modern
history—Liu Huaqing. The Chinese admiral advocated the enhancement of the
Chinese navy as the sine qua non condition for breaking American encirclement
(Liu, 2007). Liu’s vision involved the expansion of the PLAN operational area,
initially to the first island chain and later move into the North Pacific and the
‘second island chain’ formed by the US-controlled Marianas (Sheldon-Duplaix,
2016, pp. 45–46). The interpretation of the significance of the ‘island chains’
varies among Chinese sources. Some of them consider them as barriers for China
that need to be overcome to gain unconstrained access to the maritime domain.
Others perceive them as springboards for power projection or benchmarks for the
advancement of Chinese military control over the Indo-Pacific (Erickson &
Wuthnow, 2016). Holmes and Yoshihara also argue that the contemporary Chinese
strategic thought is heavily influenced by the Mahanian ideas, which leads them
to conclude that in the future China will strive to (a) uphold the flow of maritime
trade, (b) acquire naval stations adjacent to the sea lines but far from China’s coast
and (c) amass naval power sufficient to defeat the largest concentration of forces
likely to be brought against the PLA Navy in East Asian waters (Holmes &
Yoshihara, 2006, p. 173). Accepting this assumption results in a rather pessimistic
outlook for the future of Sino-American relations in the Indo-Pacific; however,
this explanation proves to be the most coherent one which finds justification both
in history and in the contemporary political practice. The Mahanian imperatives
alongside the ‘island chain’ strategy and the concept of ‘the great rejuvenation of
the Chinese nation’ indicate that the coming decades will most likely be
characterized by intensifying security competition.
Paszak 179

Chinese authorities seek to alleviate the Malacca dilemma through the

development of military power and diversifications on energy imports. Beijing
undertakes efforts to create alternative overland connections and energy
cooperation with Russia (Yilmaz & Daksueva, 2019) Central Asia, Myanmar,
Pakistan, and potentially Iran and Turkey (Guo et al., 2019). The cooperation with
Pakistan through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was intended as
an opportunity to gain an additional point of access to the Indian Ocean through
the construction of a new pipeline. Nevertheless, the difficult topography of the
Himalayan region and the high costs of transit seriously limits the strategic impact
of this investment which may prove economically unsustainable (Garlick, 2018).
Chinese authorities also explore the possibilities of using the Northern Sea Route
(NSR) to diversify its trading routes, primarily with Europe and Russia (Gao &
Erokhin, 2020, p. 359). However, in the foreseeable future NSR cannot become a
viable alternative, due to geographical and environmental barriers. All these
measures are yet insufficient to significantly decrease the level of dependence on
the Indo-Pacific SLOCs. The potential solution to energy dependence on Persian
Gulf oil lies in the development of the renewable energy sector and new energy
vehicles. These structural barriers mean that transport through the US-controlled
Indo-Pacific is likely to remain a source of concern for Beijing.

The Ascent of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept

This article employs a concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ which embraces the Asia-
Pacific and the Indian Ocean creating a super-region. The concept has started
to grow to prominence since the late 2000s due to the intensifying cooperation
among four nations: the USA, Japan, India and Australia, and their deteriorating
relations with China. Up until that point the US, as a dominant power in the
region, advocated the concept of ‘Asia-Pacific’ designed to construct shared
spatial imaginaries among the US and vibrant Asian economies (Scott, 2018).
The rationale behind the idea was to embed the US as a natural and inseparable
part of Asian affairs in the collective imagination. Since 2007, due to the rising
concerns over China’s increasing power projection capabilities and growing
interdependencies of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, India has been recognised
as a strategic partner by Australia, Japan and the US. Since the beginning of the
twenty-first century, all American administrations have been making sustained
efforts to reengage with India achieving remarkable progress. During Barack
Obama’s second administration a belief grew in Washington that if ‘pivot’ to
Asia was to succeed, it is necessary to constructively engage with New Delhi
and ASEAN countries, especially with Indonesia and Vietnam (Clinton, 2011).
These new dynamics created a demand for a new, broadened spatial concept that
would emphasise to a greater degree the role of India and ASEAN and better
reflect economic and strategic independencies of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
In 2015, during his trip to India, Barack Obama asserted that ‘the relationship
between India and the United States can be one of the defining partnerships of
this century’ (Obama, 2015). It was however the Donald Trump administration
180 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(2)

that initiated the third and the most significant ‘discursive wave’ that strongly
established the concept in the political discourse (He & Feng, 2020, p. 151).
In May 2018, the US Pacific Command was renamed as the US Indo-Pacific
Command (INDOPACOM) and the ‘Indo-Pacific’ was fully incorporated in the
strategic documents (The White House, 2017). In 2019, the U. S. Department
of Defense issued a special Indo-Pacific Strategy Report which concluded that
‘The U.S.-India strategic partnership has strengthened significantly during the
past two decades, based on a convergence of strategic interests’ (U. S. Department
of Defense, 2019a, pp. 33–34). The concept has been widely accepted and
advocated by US partners in the region such as India (Modi, 2018), Australia
(Morrison, 2019) and Japan (Abe, 2018) and dismissed by China as anti-
Chinese in its nature (He & Li, 2020, p. 1). ASEAN adopted a restrained position
signalling that it is interested in the Indo-Pacific vision under the condition
it remains more inclusive, non-confrontational and development focused
(ASEAN, 2019).
The driving motive of American efforts to reconstruct spatial imaginaries lies
in the assumption that the Indian and Pacific Oceans will be key areas of Sino-
American competition. It is, therefore, necessary to provide an attractive narrative
that would suit the US strategic interests as well as the expectation of the region.
The idea has become a ‘mental map’ reflecting both perceptual changes of local
governments as well as objective connections in the areas of trade, investments,
transport and military deployments (Medcalf, 2020, pp. 5–9). The vision of the
‘Free and Open’ Indo-Pacific is a counterproposition to China’s revisionist
approach toward the status quo and its territorial ambitions in the Western Pacific.
Through the prism of BoT, it reinforces the incentives for balancing threats from
China and disincentives for band wagoning with Beijing.

US Strategic Stance Towards the Indo-Pacific

During the 2010–2020 decade, Indo-Pacific has become a ‘priority theatre’ for
the US (U. S. Department of Defense, 2019a, p. 1) as the region is perceived
as embracing primary threats, challenges and opportunities. From the military
point of view, the major problem for the US is the limited ability to project
power due to logistical limitations and the dispersal of US forces in bases in
Japan, South Korea, Australia and in the second island chain. While the US
military and its allies still hold the military advantage over China in absolute
terms, the distance between the two powers and the fact that China operates
from its continental base puts the latter in a more favourable position, especially
in the Taiwan conflict scenario. The American authorities are well aware of
the issue as official strategic documents refer to the ‘Tyranny of distance’ as
one of the greatest challenges for the US military in the region (NDSC, 2018,
p. 34; U. S. Department of Defense, 2019a, p. 20). In this light, strengthening
existing alliances and forging new partnerships to adjust the hub-and-spokes
system to the new conditions emerges as a priority. This new ‘networked security
Paszak 181

architecture’ is aimed not only to strengthen cooperation with the US but also to
build independent security relations among Asian states. This process is seen as
necessary to decelerate the shifts in the balance of power that are detrimental to
the US interests (U. S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 9).
One of the key elements of the modified posture designed to implement the
vision of ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (Department of Defense, 2019a, pp. 4–6) is
to improve the logistics, basing and defence infrastructure of the US Army and its
allies. The idea of a special fund oriented toward improving these features has
already taken shape in the form of the Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative (IPDI)
which is set to be granted $1,4 billion for the FY 2021 and $4,5 billion for the FY
2022 (U. S. Congress, 2020). The purpose of the IPDI is to reduce the threats from
the increasingly sophisticated China Rocket Force which is regarded as the
primary threat to the US bases in the region as well as aircraft carrier groups.
DF-21, DF-26 and DF-17 missiles are regarded as the primary threat and could be
used in the initial phase of the conflict.
The US authorities have also initiated the reform of the Marines Corps which
is aimed to elevate: ‘long-range precision fires; medium- to long-range air defense
systems; […] high-endurance, long-range unmanned systems with Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Electronic Warfare (EW), and lethal
strike capabilities’ (U. S. Department of Navy, 2020, p. 2). The Marines reform is
meant to adapt the force to the challenges posed by China, geography and the
informatized battlefield.
One of the key challenges for the US will be to convince other regional actors
that it remains committed and retains sufficient capabilities necessary to provide
public goods and protect its allies and partners. IPDI is one of the measures taken
to ensure partners that Donald Trump’s and future administration are taking
problems seriously. Another is increased activity of the US Navy and US Air
Force in the contested waters of the South China Sea (Freedom of Navigation
Operations) as well as joint military exercises primarily with Japan, Australia and
India (Malabar, RIMPAC and others).
Maintaining a high level of activities, force readiness and interoperability with
partner armies constitutes one of the pillars of the American strategic posture
toward the region. However, the deterrent is the US nuclear posture is based on
the nuclear triad comprising land, sea and air-based platforms. The forward
deployment of the Ohio Class submarines and their successors, B-1, B-2 and B-52
strategic bombers as well as land-based platforms will be used to deter China’s
potential aggression. The present strategy is: ‘designed to prevent Beijing from
mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through the limited use
of its theatre nuclear capabilities’ (U. S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 32).
Due to the limited resources, the US authorities will be compelled to put greater
focus on the offshore balancing strategy by assisting defence efforts of regional
allies and partners and keeping the military footprint on a stable level. Empowering
the partners is associated with them taking greater responsibility for providing
security with the US intervention as the ‘last resort’ option. The US might
gradually decrease the military presence in Europe and the Middle East with a
greater focus on allocating resources in the Indo-Pacific. The Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (Quad/QSD) which comprises the US, Japan, India and
182 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(2)

Australia will serve as the primary framework for advancing these efforts in the
Indo-Pacific.
From the perspective of BoT, the US is a more desirable security partner than
China, since Washington does not have territorial claims endangering the interests
of Asian states. While the Americans possess formidable military power, it has
been used to maintain the status quo and unconstrained access to maritime routes.
The positive perception of the US and negative perception of China are reflected
in independent surveys. The research by the ISEAS team indicates that 48.3% of
responses express confidence in the US (China 16.5%). Among top concerns over
the South China Sea, ‘China’s militarization and assertive actions’ were chosen by
62.4% and ‘China’s encroachments on other littoral states maritime zone’ by
59.1%. By contrast, ‘US increased military presence’ was identified as a primary
threat by only 12.5%). If forced to align oneself in the on-going US–China rivalry,
the majority of respondents choose the US (61.5%). China as a choice dropped
from 46.4% in 2020 to 38.5% in 2021 (Seah et al., 2021). Similar conclusions can
be drawn from the RAND survey which showed that it is China that is considered
a primary threat and countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia
and Thailand are ready to support the US militarily and maintain military
cooperation (RAND, 2020). However, ASEAN countries are primarily hedging
states that pursue stability and economic development and refrain from engaging
in great power competition.

India and the US–China Indo-Pacific Rivalry

India is widely considered a crucial partner by countries such as Australia, Japan
and the US to be playing a ‘critical role in the future of Indo-Pacific’ (U. S.
Department of State, 2019, p. 9). A soon as the US strategic focus shifted from the
global war on terror to Asia in the late 2000s so grew the significance of India in
its foreign policy. Since the 2011 ‘pivot to Asia’ initiated by Barack Obama India
has been envisaged by Washington as the key elements of the potential coalition
oriented toward containing revisionist actions of the PRC. In 2011, Hilary Clinton
wrote: ‘Among key emerging powers with which we will work closely are India
and Indonesia, two of the most dynamic and significant democratic powers of
Asia, and both countries with which the Obama administration has pursued
broader, deeper, and more purposeful relationships’ (Clinton, 2011). In the
2010–2020 period, Washington has made a visible effort to integrate New Delhi
into its strategic plans. In the symbolic sphere, it was manifested in the ascent of
the Indo-Pacific concept and the 2015 publication of ‘Joint Strategic Vision for
the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region’. In 2016, the Obama administration
designated India as a ‘major defence partner’ and India and concluded the bilateral
Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) that gave the militaries
of both countries access to each other’s facilities for supplies and repairs. These
efforts were continued by Donald Trump’s administration that in 2018 elevated
India to Strategic Trade Authorisation Tier 1 status allowing licence-free sales
of dual-use military technologies. In September 2018, both parties concluded
the Communications, Compatibility, and Security Agreement (COMCASA)
Paszak 183

facilitating interoperability between militaries and the sale of high-end technology.

In November 2020, New Delhi and Washington signed BECA agreement focused
on sharing intelligence and geospatial data, sealing a framework for long-term
military and strategic cooperation.
India owes the US increased interest due to its rising economic and military
power, demographics and strategic location. India is expected to become the third-
largest economy in the coming decade as economists predict its nominal GDP to
reach between 7 (Deutsche Bank, 2019, p. 42) and 8.3 trillion USD (Gupta, 2019). It
is worth noting that in 2020, the Indian economy contracted by 6.9 per cent, due to
the pandemic. The second wave of the COVID-19 struck India in March and may
further delay its economic recovery. According to the UN, by 2027 it will also
become the most populous country (United Nations, 2019). India’s growing position
in the global distribution of power is perceived by the US as a positive development
as it benefits the American external balancing efforts toward China. India’s rise
is seen by Washington as peaceful and not detrimental to its interest, therefore ‘the
United States supports India’s emergence as a leading global power’ (U. S.
Department of State, 2020). A similar stance is taken in Australia’s strategic
documents where India is portrayed as the ‘pre-eminent maritime power among
Indian Ocean countries’ which ‘now sits in the front rank of Australia’s international
partnerships’ (Australian Government, 2017, p. 42). For Japan, India is geopolitically
‘an extremely important country’ (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019, p. 69) an
indispensable partner in promoting ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’. These converging
interests overlap with Japan’s ambitions to become India’s and South Asia’s major
partners in infrastructure projects such as high-speed railway (Government of Japan,
2019, pp. 6–7).
What primarily distinguishes India among other countries is not only its
growing material power but also its advantageous geographic location on the
crossing of the most strategically significant trade routes from the Middle East
and Africa to East Asia. While India is not directly engaged in the South China
Sea dispute or in the process of providing security for the Malacca Strait it can
play a substantial security role given the interrelatedness of the Indian and the
Pacific Oceans. India does not have to intervene directly to exert a profound
influence over the South China Sea or Malacca Strait security dynamics. It is
enough that it will take greater responsibility in providing public goods when it
comes to securing SLOCS passing through the Indian Ocean. The greater the
degree of the Indian and the US control over these lines, the greater the sense of
the Chinese insecurities related to the ‘Malacca Dilemma’. New Delhi’s
engagement in the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait is so far almost non-
existent, due to its limited power projections capabilities and reservations of
ASEAN countries. It was exemplified by India’s failure to join Malacca Strait
Patrol (MSP) initiative in 2018, mostly due to Indonesia’s concerns that this move
would alert Beijing and lead to increased tensions (Mitra, 2018).
However, if China insists on building maritime infrastructure in the IOR and
elevates its military presence, India may as well adopt a more proactive role
toward Exercises with the US, Japan and Australia. On 20 July 2020, shortly after
the escalation in Eastern Ladakh, Indian and US navies conducted a joint exercise
near Nicobar and Andaman Islands in the proximity to the Malacca Strait. Move
184 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(2)

like this has to be considered as a part of strategic signalling that China’s more
confrontational posture toward India, will result in more pronounced balancing
efforts in the Eastern Indian Ocean.
In the annual defence review, it has been already pointed out that India’s
national security imperatives and political interests stretched gradually beyond
the Indian Ocean (India Ministry of Defence, 2019, p. 32). The risk of India’s
rising involvement in the control of SLOCs is already acknowledged by some
Chinese scholars as Sun Shihai from Sichuan University and the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (Kinling & Liu, 2020) There are already some voices from
influential Indian institutions connected to the government advocating leveraging
its military outreach to the Malacca Strait through Andaman and Nicobar Islands
as a response to China’s rising assertiveness (Chinoy, 2020).
The evolution of China’s maritime strategy and more visible presence in the
Indian Ocean may drive India toward closer cooperation with the US Navy.
Beijing’s naval doctrine used to focus almost exclusively on securing its ‘near
seas’/offshore waters which are of fundamental importance for safeguarding core
national interests. Since 2015 there is a growing focus on ‘far seas’/open seas
defence and the protection of SLOCS (P. R. C. State Council 2015, 2019) which
has to be understood through the prism of growing ambitions in the Indian Ocean.
oceans While the Indian Ocean still plays a secondary role in China’s strategy,
PLA Navy gradually increases its presence in the Eastern IOR ignoring New
Delhi’s informal claims to this area as its exclusive sphere of influence (Ji, 2018).
This constitutes a natural point of friction between two regional powers and may
decisively push India toward participation in the anti-China coalition in the Indo-
Pacific. The BoT provides suitable tools to explain and predict the future
development of Sino-Indian relations. It identifies four key elements of a given
actor that define the state’s behaviour toward it and that is aggregate power,
geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and offensive intentions (Walt, 1985,
1990). The unresolved border dispute, rising power disequilibrium, divergent
interest in the maritime sphere and increasingly assertive foreign policy all
indicate that India will gradually depart from non-alignment policy.
China’s relation with India is strained by historical animosities, the unresolved
border dispute in the Himalayan Plateaus well as the competition for influence in
South-East Asia considered to be India’s traditional sphere of influence. Among
Indian security elites, there is a strong belief that China is aiming to contain India
in South Asia and encircle it (Joshi & Mukherjee, 2019, p. 25). By many analysts,
China, not Pakistan, is considered to be the greatest long-term rival that ‘is the one
major power which impinges directly on India’s geopolitical space’ (CFPR, 2012,
p. 13). The relations between the two powers are further exacerbated by Beijing’s
all-weather relationship’ with Islamabad—New Delhi’s historical enemy
(Holslag, 2009, pp. 824-833; Saran, 2017, p. 58). Its intensifying engagement
with Myanmar, Iran, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka through Belt and Road Initiative
further enhances the perception that China is playing a ‘great game’ with India (Ji,
2018). Jagganath Panda argues that India indeed does view China as a revisionist
power, albeit subtly, without officially or formally naming it thus like the US
(Panda, 2021, p. 2). The sense of insecurity is further deepened by disproportions
in terms of material power. China’s economy is still over five times larger than
Paszak 185

India’s, military budget over three times larger, and this disproportion is likely to
endure for decades albeit will it gradually decrease under the condition that the
Indian economy will realise its potential.
Until 2020 Indian authorities avoided directly taking sides in the US–China
Competition putting emphasis on strategic autonomy and working through the
network of semi-alliances and partnerships with Japan, Russia, Australia and the
US. This behaviour is deeply rooted in the tradition of ‘non-alignment’ (Pant &
Super, 2015). Keeping relatively equal distance to major powers and avoiding
excessive engagement with the one side constituted one of the basic assumptions
of the Indian foreign policy. Its strong cooperation with both Russia and the US as
well as constructive relations with China provided testimony to this policy (Pant,
2019). However, the most recent developments might mark the beginning of
India’s strategic realignment. The clashes on the contested Sino-Indian border in
July 2020 in Eastern Ladakh reignited the debate about the China threat and
provided the additional rationale for deepening cooperation with the US as well as
other members of QSD/Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). Through the
prism of the BoT theory, it is justified to assume that New Delhi will consequently
lean toward more pronounced cooperation with the US as well as other partners
as Japan and Australia. In the future, it may leverage its strategic location and
growing naval capabilities to deter China from taking aggressive action in the
Himalayas or the Western Pacific.
During Narendra Modi’s tenure as Indian Prime Minister, New Delhi intensified
security cooperation with the US, Japan and Australia within the Quad format. It
has also taken a more proactive direction toward the IOR through the ‘act east
policy’ (Chaudhuri, 2018, pp. 64–65) as well as adapted a more offensive military
strategy. Indian decision-makers perceive China’s advances in the Indian Ocean
and South-East Asia as an intrusion into its traditional sphere of influence
(Brewster, 2018, pp. 18–20). This perception is enhanced by Beijing’s lack of
understanding of India’s ambitions and concerns prompting some scholars and
officials to describe China as ‘autistic’ regarding this matter (Garver, 2018, p. 75).
Some scholars as Niclas Weimar argues that driven by their pursuit of energy
security and supra-regional influence Sino-Indian relations are likely to become
more competitive rather than cooperative. Weimar further states that ‘the Indian
Ocean Region and the South China Sea are likely to become future settings for
Sino-Indian military confrontation’ (Weimar, 2013, p. 7). While the former
assertion is well-grounded, the second about likely military confrontation in the
South China Sea is an overstatement as India has limited interests and power
projection capabilities in this region. India’s direct engagement in potential
conflict over the South China Sea (and likely Taiwan) would require New Delhi’s
formal security commitments to the US and no single hints are indicating that this
is going to happen. Nevertheless, given the fact that the ambitions of Beijing and
New Delhi overlap in these areas, India is likely to align with the US broader
balancing efforts to secure its position and limit China’s advances. Taking a
greater role in providing security in the Indian Ocean may also become a necessity
as the concerns about the American global withdrawal increase. Geographical
proximity coupled with rising military power and strategic mistrust makes the US
186 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(2)

the desired ally and China the most likely target of the balancing. In strict terms,
India is not a South China Sea actor, but China’s intrusions in the Eastern Indian
Ocean may prompt New Delhi to take a more proactive role in the contested space
through military exercises, freedom of navigation operations and leveraging
Nicobar and Andaman Islands.

Offensive Capabilities and Offensive Intentions:

The Impact of PLA Modernisation Programme
China’s goal of achieving a superpower status and asserting greater control over
near seas and strategic maritime routes within ‘the first island chain’ is impossible
without changing the current status quo in the Indo-Pacific region. That status
is grounded in American military presence and the system of bilateral security
agreements with Japan, South Korea and Australia, and sectoral cooperation with
other actors. The first and most important step is the incorporation of Taiwan
whose potential fall will undermine US credibility as the security provider in the
region. The inability to protect its semi-formal ally will enhance the perception of
the American demise and it will likely push Asian powers to abandon balancing
efforts and start bandwagon with China. According to the Balance of Power
Theory: ‘As soon as someone looks like the winner, nearly all jump on the
bandwagon rather than continuing to build coalitions intended to prevent anyone
from winning the prize of power.’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 126). Achieving this goal will
be extremely difficult without exerting strong military and economic pressure on
the neighbouring nations, therefore developing comprehensive military potential
stands as an imperative.
After 1991 and the spectacular success of the Desert Storm operation, Chinese
military modernisation has been oriented toward minimising the risk of analogous
scenarios concerning Taiwan. ‘Winning informatized local conflicts’ (Taylor
Fravel, 2020, pp. 92–94) has become a guiding principle of army reforms and the
US forces were designated as the primary reference point. The Chinese leaders
have strived to develop types of units and weaponry and an organisational
structure designed to inflict maximum damage on the US forces and dissuade
them from costly involvement. This kind of strategy was coined by American
analysts as the Anti-Access/Area-Denial strategy. A2/AD strategy focus is on
increasing military capabilities to a degree when potential losses for an adversary
will be too great to risk military involvement. The U. S. Department of Defense
defines A2/AD as a strategy aiming to ‘dissuade, deter, or if ordered, defeat
potential third-party intervention during a large-scale theatre campaign’ (U. S.
Department of Defense, 2019b, 54). For the Chinese authorities, this strategy
might be considered as an optimal way to change the current status quo as it may
lead to desired outcomes (the incorporation of Taiwan, greater control over
SLOCs) with a distinct possibility of avoiding a full-scale war against the US.
The ongoing militarisation of the PLA emphasises the development of a blue-
water navy, ballistic missile programme, anti-ship missiles, nuclear submarines
Paszak 187

and 5th generation fighters. These comprehensive and ambitious modernisation

programmes are set to transform the PLA into a ‘world-class military’ by 2049
and increase the costs of potential US intervention in defence of Taiwan. Since
1996, which marked the start of a comprehensive PLA modernisation programme,
China has strived to develop considerable anti-surface capabilities and anti-ship
ballistic missiles - means able to threaten US Aircraft Carrier battle groups and
regional military bases. The development of an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) able to reach the US has been designated as a priority by the military
circles and resulted in the build-up of the arsenal of 100 missiles (U. S. Department
of Defense, 2020). The Chinese missile programme has also succeeded in
constructing a wide range of mobile platforms for DF-31AG ICBM, DF-5B
ICBM, DF-26 IRBM, DF-21 MRBM missiles able to reach various types of
targets. While the advanced missile program is pivotal to the success of the A2/
AD strategy it does not translate into supra-regional power projection capabilities.
To gain power projection capabilities and the ability to control SLOCs China
needs a fleet comparable in size and sophistication to the US Navy. PLAN has been
in recent years the fastest-growing formation of its kind. Due to the massive
resources directed for its development and modernisation, PLA is already the
world’s largest formation in terms of the number of ships (350). The report prepared
for the US Congress predicts that by 2030 the Chinese navy will have 425 ships in
service and 2 to 6 new aircraft carriers will enter the service through 2035. It is also
reported that by the end of 2020 Chinese shipyards have launched the 8th Renhai
class (Type 055) destroyers and by the end of 2025 PLAN is likely to field 39 aegis-
type destroyers in service (Type 052/052D; Congressional Research Service, 2021).
It is still unclear whether the US would risk a full-scale conflict with the
country having similar military potential and nuclear arsenal at its disposal, but
starting a conflict far from its borders and close to China’s coast would greatly
complicate American power projections capabilities. The historical experience of
the Cold War and the fact that the US and the USSR never actually engaged in an
open conflict suggest that a similar scenario may take place in China’s case. The
RAND report estimated that due to successful 20 years of PLA modernisation,
China and the US reached an ‘approximate parity’ in the Taiwan conflict scenario
as regards ‘air superiority’, ‘Chinese attacks on airbases’, and ‘US airspace
penetration’ (RAND, 2015, p. 131). Another report composed by the bipartisan
National Defense Strategy Commission draws even more pessimistic conclusions.
The authors of the document anticipate that if the US had to fight China over
Taiwan, ‘the Americans could face a decisive military defeat’ and ‘attrition of US
capital assets—ships, planes, tanks—could be enormous’ (U. S. National Defense
Strategy Commission, 2018, p. 14). Thomas Christensen makes a similar
assumption indicating that even during the Clinton administration and the third
crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1999 Washington was reluctant to challenge the PLA
militarily. Christensen further argues that ‘What was true then is more than doubly
true today given China’s fast-paced military build-up since the late 1990s and the
dispersal of US forces around the world following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001’ (Christensen, 2015, p. 2). PLA’s modernisation programme
has so far achieved remarkable success, but a dramatic transformation of the
188 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(2)

security architecture will demand sustained development in the coming decades.

If China’s growth stalls and many indicators suggest this scenario, the PLA may
become a second-most powerful force in the region, but not strong enough to
expel US forces.
China’s growing rhetorical belligerence toward Taiwan, grey-zone operations
in the South China Sea, and skirmishes on the Sino-Indian border create the
perception that China’s rising military capabilities might become a major source
of instability in the region (Seah et al., 2021). In contrast to the US, the rise of the
Chinese navy and taking greater control over SLOCs in the South China Sea and
Malacca Strait is likely to be seen as detrimental to regional security. Any
unilateral action to reverse the status quo will provide incentives for Asian states
to join the US balancing efforts as China’s geographical proximity, its rising
military power and revisionist tendencies make the US a more desirable partner.

‘What If?’ Potential Consequences of China’s Control

over the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait
So far it has been argued that the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea are of
vital importance to China’s pursuit of security and superpower status. However,
without altering the current status quo it is impossible for this vision to materialise
since China’s strategic position is greatly exacerbated by the US military presence
in the Indo-Pacific. The US role as the almost sole provider of the security of
SLOCs puts China in a vulnerable position if a conflict between two parties
arises. This risk for Beijing is heightened due to the expanding role and ambitions
of the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean overlapping with intensifying strategic
partnership between New Delhi and Washington.
China’s pursuit of ‘world-class’ military and ‘Great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation’ translates into more confrontational behaviours towards neighbours,
namely India, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines and Vietnam. Through the BoT lenses,
rising aggregate power, geographical proximity, perceived offensive intentions
and capabilities make regional actors more inclined to balance China in the
security domain together with the US.
But what if China successfully secures its interests concerning Taiwan, the
South China Sea, and the Malacca Strait? It is not only China that finds itself in
this vulnerable position. The US key allies—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are
even more dependent on energy resources from the Middle East and exports via
the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Around 80% of Japan’s crude oil imports come
from the Persian Gulf and Africa; Taiwan and South Korea find themselves in a
similar situation. The fundamental difference between China and these three
countries lies in their respective relationships with Washington. At the moment,
the authorities in Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei do not need to face the ‘Malacca
dilemma’ as they support the current status quo and remain American allies. But
how would these governments react when faced with China’s militarily controlling
the South China Sea?
Paszak 189

If by 2049 China becomes a ‘world-class’ military and surpasses the US, it

would be very costly for Washington to intervene in the local conflict over Taiwan.
The available reports highlight that the regional balance of power is shifting in
China’s favour and in the case of the Taiwan conflict the US ‘could face a decisive
military defeat’ (U. S. National Defense Strategy Commission, 2019, p. 14).
Furthermore, China would enjoy the advantage of operating from its continental
landmass, having access to its vast resources, while the US forces would be
deemed to operate from military bases in Japan, South Korea and the ‘Second
Island Chain’. The ‘Tyranny of distance’ (U. S. Department of Defense, 2019a,
p. 20) and the limitations it imposes on power projection could prove to be a
decisive factor deterring the US from direct involvement in the Taiwan conflict.
What is more, China’s development of power projection capabilities in the region
would enable the PLAN to engage in the control SLOCs passing through the
Eastern Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, reducing the threat of a naval
blockade. In this scenario, the PLAN could influence the flows of trade and
resources and exploit this ability to exert pressure on other South China Sea actors
and East Asian nations. What is now China’s Malacca Dilemma would become a
dilemma for Japan or South Korea. In this case and the expulsion of the US forces
to the second island chain could become a distinct possibility.
Rising economic interdependencies between China and East Asian nations
may provide another incentive for Asian nations to bandwagon with China. It
worth noting that China has already surpassed the US as the most important
trading partner in most East Asian states. In 2018, China accounted for 23% of
Korean trade (US 11%), 22 % of Japan’s exports (US 14.4%; Observatory of
Economic Complexity [OEC], 2019). In the case of Australia, these dependencies
reach even further with China accounting for 29.8% of Australian trade, as
compared with the US share of 6.57%. These interdependencies might become
even deeper through the completion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership and expansion of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
China’s continuous military and economic rise accompanied by the US gradual
decline would impose profound structural pressures on American allies in Asia
and could lead to the decomposition of the San Francisco system. While this
scenario remains hypothetical, it highlights the security mechanism associated
with control over the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. These areas act as
a bloodstream of Asia’s economy and the power that controls it gains a powerful
instrument of influence over other actors. Therefore, if China becomes powerful
enough to contest American supremacy these waters will offer the setting for this
confrontation.
There is however one significant obstacle that makes this course of events not
likely. China is already perceived in the region as one of the destabilising forces,
which makes the US military presence welcomed, even by hedging ASEAN
countries. Any unilateral attempt by China to take control over Taiwan and the
South China Sea is likely to deepen the perception of offensive capabilities and
offensive intentions – two primary factors constituting the BoT mechanism.
190 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8(2)

Conclusions
Given the intensifying competition between China and the US and the
interrelatedness of Indo-Pacific theatre, the role of the Malacca Strait and the
South China Sea continues to grow. As envisaged by Liu Huaqing and Alfred
Mahan, China’s transition to a global superpower status requires greater control
over the sea domain within the first and the second island Chain to alleviate
potential risk. China remains in a highly vulnerable position as the US Navy and
its allies command the commons in the South-China Sea, Malacca Strait and the
Indian Ocean. In the event of a conflict, the US Navy supported by its Japanese
and Australian allies and Indian partners may attempt to impose a naval blockade
and deny China access to vital energy resources from the Middle East and trade
opportunities.
India’s growing military position in the region and its emerging competition
with China in the Eastern Indian Ocean further constrain China’s ambitions of
gaining greater control over SLOC’s. The steep deterioration in relations between
two countries following clashes on the Himalayan border accelerated the security
cooperation with the US and Quad format states. The consequential deterioration
in India–China relations may prompt New Delhi to expand military build-up in
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, increase military cooperation within the QSD/
Quad framework and accelerate the expansion of India’s blue-water navy.
China’s long-term pursuit of ‘world-class military’ may undermine the US
ability to command waters ranging from the Persian Gulf to the Western Pacific
and as a result, decompose the existing US security architecture. The key in
China’s pursuit of security will be to achieve command over Taiwan, the South
China Sea, and as a result of the Malacca Strait Successful invasion on Taiwan
would provide China with ‘strategic depth’ and undermine the credibility of the
US as the primary and reliable security provider. In this scenario, the PLA could
oversee the flows of trade and resources and exploit this ability in favour of
advancing its regional interests and shaping behaviours of middle and small
powers. What is now China’s Malacca Dilemma would become a dilemma for
Japan or South Korea and create a powerful incentive to abandon balancing in
favour of band wagoning. Military pressure accompanied by economic instruments
would lay the foundations for China’s regional hegemony and the US decline as
the most powerful actor in the region.
China-dominated East-Asian security architecture is still an abstract construct
and meets numerous significant challenges. Looking at this issue through
the prism of the BoT, China meets all four criteria (rising aggregate power,
geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, offensive intentions) to be
considered the most potent threat/challenge to Asia. The US, on the other hand, is
in principle external power without territorial claims, able to provide public goods
without endangering the territorial integrity of regional states. These dynamics
favour balancing in the security domain while engaging it economically. China’s
hypothetical aggression on Taiwan or unilateral attempt to subjugate the South
China Sea would further deepen this threat perception resulting in a broader
Paszak 191

balancing coalition. China is therefore left with two very serious dilemmas: either
try to alleviate the Malacca dilemma and risk broader anti-coalition, or accept
status quo and vulnerability resulting from US-controlled SLOCs.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of
this article.

ORCID iD
Pawel Paszak https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7160-5320

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