WP 005

[WP-005]
Whitepaper: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport

A Theoretical Discussion About Securing Energy Transmission Lines within the U.S.
Version 040322
March 2004
Author: Bob Radvanovsky, rsradvan@unixworks.com
(A special thanks goes to those listed for being my “sounding board” on this project.)
Copyright © 2004 Bob Radvanovsky. All rights reserved.
Whitepaper [WP-005]: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport Page 1

“knowledge squared is information shared.” web::www.unixworks.com / email::info@unixworks.com.
Limited Liability Statement
In no event shall the author(s) be liable for any found errors contained herein or for any
direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages (including lost profit or lost
data) whether based on warranty, contract, tort, or any other legal theory in connection with
the furnishing, performance, or use of this material.
The information contained within this document may be subject to change without any
notice. No trademark, copyright, or patent licenses are expressly or implicitly granted
(herein) with this whitepaper.
Documentation pertaining to any security-related technical or proprietary information, its

data and all information provided and contained within this document is considered
proprietary in nature and subject to copyright protection and is intended solely for use by its
owner. Additionally, this documentation is solely for the purpose of discussing a possible,
proposed infrastructure issue, and is not dependent upon any specified infrastructure,
architectural condition or its issue(s).
No portion of this document is intended to promote, disable, destroy or alter the energy
transmission lines at any location, whether within, throughout or out of the United States;
instead this paper is intended to identify methods by which will reduce the possible risks
associated with the operation of high-tension, high-power transmission lines.
Under the United States Patriot Act of 2001, Title VIII, Section 802(a)(5), no portion of this
document is intended to involve activities that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended--
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Any such information is intended for “educational purposes only”, and is intended solely
for the necessary recipients thereof; no other information will be provided that will
demonstrate any such acts deemed as “domestic terrorism” under the laws applicable from
within the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001.
All other product names mentioned herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of their
respective owners. NOTE: Any names not outlined or mentioned above are fictional in
nature; as such, any relation to any name or trademark (if any) is purely coincidental.

Introduction
Since 9/11, the United States has become increasingly paranoid about its operations and
how “We” as “Americans” appear to be doing very little to ensure that similar
circumstances will not happen again. One such area of interest that has perplexed me
over the past several years prior to 9/11 has been the properly “securification” of high-
tension, high-energy transmission lines. Much of the political discussions surrounding
protection of America’s critical infrastructure have focused primarily on the energy
production and distribution facilities (aka. the “power plants” and “electrical
substations”), yet there have been little to zero discussions pertaining to the
“securification” of the lines themselves. Granted the impact of such an undertaking
would be, time and (mostly) resources (materials, labor, funding), which may be the
primary factors that may have raising these issue (before), and (more importantly) why
nothing appears to have been initiated.
This paper does nothing to encourage further the direction that the United States is going,
but rather a method of “protectionism” by which key, critical infrastructure may be safely,
quickly and effectively secured in a reasonable fashion that is fairly effective. Reiterating
again that, this paper is intended to “securify” the high-tension, high-energy transmission
lines that you might see as you travel across the United States. Within the United States,
there are (basically) 3 power grids (not including Alaska, Hawaii, or any U.S. protectorate):
the Eastern Interconnect System, the Western Interconnect System, and the Texas
Interconnect System. The largest and most complex of any of the interconnecting systems
is the Eastern Interconnect System, consisting of 8 power coordination councils (as specified
by the National Electric Reliability Council [NERC] – refer to the website for further
information: http://www.usdieselengines.com/US%20Power%20Grid.htm), each serving
several large metropolitan areas. Since the power disruption of much of the East Coast
Seaboard are, mostly affecting the New England area, with New York city being the most
significantly affected, there have been news bulletins possibility indicating that the power
disruption may have been relating to several contributing factors which included: weather
(lightning strike), voltage overload or computer-related. The only factor that was quickly
quelled was that power disruption was not computer-related. The discussions of the cause(s)
may never be publicly known except that further precautionary measures are currently being
looked at.
The question being asked is: Was there any evidence of physical tampering of the
transmission lines? At the time of this writing, none of the power companies appear to have
defined any physical security guidelines for the transmission lines outside of the power
generation and/or distribution facilities. Given sufficient time and effort, mapping the
coordinates of power-generating facilities would take very little time (less than 6 months) to
figure out which lines are crucial for inter- and/or intra-state transmission carriers. If
domestic terrorism were to occur, or if the disruption of power was a strategically devised
method of preoccupation, whereby while power companies were repairing crucial lines and
attempting to restore power, other attacks may be utilized. To the best of my knowledge,
there appears to be no progress in place to properly “securify” the transmission lines for the
power companies. Much of this is due to strong political infighting between corporations as
to who should (and will) accept the responsibilities of such an undertaking.
I’m Not a Crook
Not to sound similar to former-President Nixon, but for the record, “I am NOT a terrorist.”
I love this country, the land, the people and the ethnic and cultural diversity that “America”
has to offer. I love the freedoms that exist now, and hopefully, will continue to exist in the
near future. What bothers me immensely is that as our governments wallow in their own
bureaucratic juices, more often than not doing (very) little or nothing about something, and
if something is done, pass yet another useless (or almost useless) law that takes away or
prevents individuality, personal freedom, and/or speech, further altering the United States
into an “empire” and not a “commonwealth” (as stated by one news reporter recently).
Types of Power Transmission Lines

The risks being identified are in the thousands (perhaps, millions) of transmission line towers
throughout the entire United States that have very little protection from serious terrorist
tampering. Sure, there is barbed wire protecting most towers from climbers, but basically
the towers are unprotected.
There appear to be several types of transmission lines (and if I have their “technical names”
wrong, it is because I do not, have not, nor currently work for any energy or power
production or generation companies whatsoever). I have found at least 4, possibly 5, distinct
categories:
1. Local-residential: single, wooden towers that service several homes in a small area.
2. Regional-residential: multiple, wooden towers that service an area of homes.
3. Metropolitan: backbone power distribution for metropolitan areas (such as Chicago).
4. Intra-state: backbone power distribution within any given state (Chicago vs. Peoria).
5. Inter-state: backbone power used for specified coordinating council regional area.
Shown below (and on subsequent pages) are pictorial references of the 5 power distribution
categories. The first group is Category 1: Local-Residential.
Figure 1-1 and Figure 1-2.

The second group is Category 2: Regional-Residential.
The third group is Category 3: Metropolitan.
NOTE: Some of the metropolitan power distribution lines may be wooden, some may be
metallic; not all are depicted as the ones above, but may be close to what may be
utilized for distribution lines for a geographically metropolitan area.

The forth group is Category 4: Intra-State.
NOTE: Some of the intrastate power distribution lines may be wooden, some may be
metallic; not all are depicted as the ones above, but may be close to what may be
utilized for distribution lines for a geographical area.
The fifth group is Category 5: Inter-State.
Figure 5-1.
NOTE: Interstate transmission lines are (usually) measured in terawatts (Tw) of power.

This Could Happen…to You!
Now that the types of lines have been identified, the next question is how they might be
rendered inoperative. There are several methods by which power transmission lines may be
brought down: explosion (conventional or nuclear), sheer force (pulling or pushing against
the tower structure), environmental (tornadoes/high-winds, hurricanes [Southern U.S.],
earthquakes [Western U.S.], fire, land-shifts, floods [Southern and Southwestern U.S.],
lightning/thunderstorm). Though there may other factors that may be disruptive to the
operation of the power transmission lines, these seem to be the most prevalent, with
environmental being the most unpredictable or unavoidable:
1. Most environmental circumstances may not always be preventable, such as most

weather conditions and their anomalies.
2. Explosive use of force may not be prevented either – someone with a large enough
of a backpack, several timers, several robes of explosive primer – can go undetected
in the rural portions of America through use of a motorcycle or “hoofin’ it” on foot.
The only drawback to explosive use of force is the impact, which will result in a large
sound emanating from the source. This may or may not be suitable for domestic
terrorists to use, nor might it be cheap enough.
3. Sheer use of force, such as pulling against, or pushing towards, the tower structures,
may be the more suitable method for bringing down a power structure or tower.
Most tower structures often have a concrete base (unless they’re wooden, such as
some of the intrastate power transmission lines seen in the recent past), and consist
of 4-post, 2-post or “unipost” (1-post) configurations. Generally the 4-post
configurations (usually) aren’t the newer configurations, and can date back several
decades (as far as 1950?). The 2-post configurations tend to be wooden; however,
there have been reports of 2-port metal configuration in several states – these
configurations are usually used for intrastate transmission lines or smaller. The 1-
post configurations are the newest configurations, with the “unipost” configuration
containing a hollow metallic center that is anywhere from 3-feet to 10-feet diameters
(or more). These structures tend to be the interstate power lines (representing the
newer configurations currently available today). The more power and lines that are
being carried, the larger the diameter the “unipost” structure.
All 3 general configuration are vulnerable to sheer force attacks, and can be taken easily
down by either a 5-ton truck or larger. For the “unipost” structures, a large semi-truck
tractor with a fully loaded trailer may be used – the sheer inertia of the weight from the
semi-truck alone could cause the structure to potentially fall.

To protect the tower structures, several methods are available – some practical, some not
so practical. For this paper (and for one possible solution or recommendation), the use of
concrete barriers may be an effective and useful deterrent in reducing the risk associated
with a sheer force attack against any tower structure. Most concrete barriers are fairly
abundant and appear to be quite effective against such attacks. There are several types of
barriers, but the most cost-effective are the multishaped concrete barriers (see figure
below, as outlined by the web sites: http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/marapr00/concrete.htm
and http://www.roadstothefuture.com/Jersey_Barrier.html).
Figure 6-1. Side profile of multishaped concrete barrier.
Figure 6-2. Front profile of multishaped concrete barrier.

Figure 6-3. A simulated crash of a tanker or chemical semi-truck.

Emplacement of the Barriers
Based upon the type of tower structure (and its configuration), there are several methods
which are shown below for their respective configurations: 4-post, 2-post, or “unipost”.
The first grouping is 4-post configurations and 2-post configurations. Please note that 2-
post configurations may also apply to implementations of smaller diameter “unipost” tower
structures.
Figure 7-1. 4-post configuration. Figure 7-2. 2-post / 1-post (small diam.) configuration.

The second grouping is only the 1-post configurations for implementations using larger
diameter “unipost” tower structures.
Figure 7-3. 1-post (or “unipost”) (large diam.) configuration.
Pro Versus Con of Implementation

With any good idea or possible solution, obviously, all possible solutions must be weighed,
esp. with as large-scale of an implementation as this. There are several “pro” reasons for
implementing the possible solution given: (1) reduce the amount of risk associated from a
sheer use of force attack against targeted power distribution list tower structures; (2) creation
of jobs in energy industries (placement of concrete barriers), transportation industries (semi-
trucks used to haul concrete barriers to their destination), and materials/fabrication
industries (concrete plants, gravel removal, raw materials, etc.); (3) fairly effective barrier
utilization compared to alternative solutions which may not necessarily utilize the concrete
barriers; (4) emplacement of concrete barriers are strategic locations (such as access roads),
thus preventing further access to tower structures.

The “con” reasons for not implementing the possible solution might include: (1) time-
prohibitive (not be sufficient time to implement), (2) cost-prohibitive (unit cost for each 10’
to 14’ concrete barrier may be impractical), (3) resource intensive (would require a crew of 3-
5 members for placement team PLUS 3-4 members for concrete fabrication team PLUS 1-2
members for transportation team, totaling [roughly] 7-11 workers for each site location –
salaries along may be prohibitive, as every single one of those industries may be unionized).
Conclusion
Overall, a cost-benefit analysis may need to be performed if necessary; however, there is a
slight variation to this possible solution. At locations where the power distribution lines
cross significant roads or highways, protect the off-road roads from unnecessary or
unwanted use through the use of strategically located concrete barriers. Additionally, placing
signage referencing the ramifications of trespassing, and that tampering is a violation of the
U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 (et. al) may be wise.
Though this solution may not be affordable (time, resources, materials), it may be a potential
consideration for future protection against possible domestic terrorist attack against our
most critical of infrastructure within the United States: our power lines.


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[WP-005]

Whitepaper: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport

Author: Bob Radvanovsky, rsradvan@unixworks.com

Copyright © 2004 Bob Radvanovsky. All rights reserved.

Whitepaper [WP-005]: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport Page 1

Documentation pertaining to any security-related technical or proprietary information, its

Whitepaper [WP-005]: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport Page 2

Types of Power Transmission Lines

Figure 1-1 and Figure 1-2.

Whitepaper [WP-005]: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport Page 4

Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2.

The third group is Category 3: Metropolitan.

Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2.

Whitepaper [WP-005]: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport Page 5

Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2.

The fifth group is Category 5: Inter-State.

Whitepaper [WP-005]: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport Page 6

1. Most environmental circumstances may not always be preventable, such as most

Whitepaper [WP-005]: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport Page 7

Figure 6-1. Side profile of multishaped concrete barrier.

Figure 6-2. Front profile of multishaped concrete barrier.

Whitepaper [WP-005]: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport Page 8

Whitepaper [WP-005]: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport Page 9

Figure 7-3. 1-post (or “unipost”) (large diam.) configuration.

Pro Versus Con of Implementation

Whitepaper [WP-005]: Securing America’s Infrastructure: Energy Transport Page 10

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