Assessing the Chinese Navy’s ‘Numerical Superiority’

RICHARD A. BITZINGER
https://www.theepochtimes.com/assessing-the-chinese-navys-numerical-
superiority_4108394.html?welcomeuser=1
 
November 18, 2021 Updated: November 18, 2021

The China-watching community has been going through a bit of a freak-out

over the U.S. Defense Department’s (DoD) latest report on the Chinese
military. In particular, the report—an annual, congressionally mandated
publication—states that China now possesses the “largest” navy in the world.

In a nutshell, the DoD report asserts that “The People’s Liberation Army Navy

(PLAN) has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle
force of approximately 355 ships and submarines, including approximately
more than 145 major surface combatants.”

Moreover, the PLAN is expected to grow to 420 by 2025, and 460 ships by
2030. In comparison, the U.S. Navy (USN) operates just 305 ships of all
types.

It may seem like the PLAN already has a huge advantage over the USN, and
that it will only grow wider over the next decades. Simple numbers, however,
still require a lot of unpacking.

Yes, China has more warships than the United States overall, that is
undeniable. Moreover, the PLAN has a clear numerical superiority in the
Pacific Ocean in several types of platforms. The PLAN possesses 38 modern
destroyers, including the new 12,000-ton Type-055 Renhai-class heavy
destroyer. In addition, the PLAN operates 50 frigates, 70 corvettes, and 60
modern Houbei-class patrol boats (a stealthy, high-speed catamaran bristling
with anti-ship cruise missiles), as well as 50 modern attack submarines.

In comparison, the USN’s Pacific fleet comprises only 48 large cruisers and
modern destroyers, 24 attack submarines, and 13 frigate-sized Littoral
Combat Ships (LCS).

Numbers can be deceptive, however. As pointed out by several analysts, the

PLAN may have more hulls, but USN ships are, on average, much bigger.

The USN overall weighs in at around 4.5 million tons, more than twice the
PLAN’s 2 million tons.
A U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer displaces 9,700 tons; in comparison,
China’s Type-052C and Type-052D destroyers—the so-called “backbone” of
the PLAN’s “distant seas” forces—weigh in at around 7,500 tons. The newest
Virginia-class attack submarine displaces over 11,000 tons, while the PLAN’s
Type-039 and Type-039A submarine—which comprise the bulk of the PLAN’s
attack submarine force—displaces only 3,600 tons.

Larger warships hold more armaments, steam longer distances, and are
versatile weapons of war.

The USN also has numerical superiority where it counts. In particular, this
means power projection and amphibious assault. The U.S. Pacific Fleet alone
operates five nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, each equipped with around 75
combat aircraft. The USN has another five carriers deployed elsewhere
around the world.

Three F/A-18E Super Hornets fly in formation over the aircraft carriers USS
Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), USS Nimitz
(CVN 68), and their strike groups along with ships from the Republic of Korea
Navy as they transit the Western Pacific on Nov. 12, 2017. (Aaron B.
Hicks/U.S. Navy/Handout via Reuters)
In addition, the USN assigns four of its nine flat-deck amphibious assault
vessels to the Pacific, each capable of acting as a mini-aircraft carrier (flying
F-35s off its deck).

In comparison, the PLAN currently operates only two much smaller carriers,
each capable of launching at most two dozen fighter jets, and just two (soon
to be three) amphibious assault ships.

Large ships and aircraft carriers in particular are essential to creating a blue-
water navy. A blue-water navy is defined as a “maritime force capable of
sustained operations across the deep waters of open oceans,” according to
the Defense Security Service. A “true” blue-water navy can project power far
from home, while a smaller blue-water navy is able to dispatch a few vessels
for short periods of time.

The PLAN is not yet a true blue-water navy. It has some impressive
operational capability in Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and, for the
present, that’s about it.

Finally, no comparison of the PLAN and the USN is complete without also
factoring in America’s allies. Japan is increasingly concerned about the
growing Chinese military threat, and it is crafting a sizable naval force that it
could contribute to any Sino-American competition. These include 22
submarines, four large flat-deck helicopter assault ships—two of which are
being converted to fixed-wing aircraft carriers—and 36 destroyers, and it is
building 22 modern, multirole frigates.

Taiwan is also a likely partner, and it could offer its four destroyers, 22
frigates, and dozens of fast missile boats. In addition, it is presently
constructing 12 Tuo Chiang-class corvettes—stealthy, high-speed vessels
that are intended for hit-and-run actions against Chinese aircraft carriers and
amphibious assault ships.

Throw in just these ships—and perhaps Australia’s three new destroyers and
eight frigates—and USN/allied forces either roughly equal or outnumber the
PLAN in terms of large warships and submarines. In addition, USN forces are
better-trained, better-led, and more experienced than their Chinese
counterparts.

Nevertheless, all this discussion of comparative numbers of warships or total

displacement may be irrelevant where it counts most: the South China Sea
and the waters around Taiwan. This is where any Sino-American clash is
likely to occur and it also where China is likely to prevail, whatever the
numbers.

In any fighting taking place close to mainland China, the PLA could have a
critical “home field” advantage. In particular, the PLAN operates over 70
Type-056 corvettes and 60 high-speed Houbei-class missile boats, and these
ships could dominate the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. In addition,
PLAN forces would be protected by an extensive integrated air-defense
system along the Chinese coast, consisting of radars, land-based aircraft,
and surface-to-air missiles.

Chinese combat aircraft and anti-ship missiles based onshore could also
attack enemy vessels, particularly utilizing anti-ship ballistic missiles (such as
the DF-21D) and nascent hypersonic weapons—so-called “carrier-killer”
munitions expressly intended to take out U.S. aircraft carriers.

U.S. forces, meanwhile, would have to sail several days from their ports in
Hawaii, Guam, or Japan to reach this region, while U.S. air and naval bases
in Japan and Guam would be vulnerable to Chinese missile strikes.

One final point is also worth noting. While U.S. naval forces age overall, due
to fewer replacements and subsequently longer service times, the PLAN is
relatively young. Almost all of its surface fleet is less than two decades old.

In the end, it may not matter whether the PLAN or the U.S. Navy is the
“larger” of the two. Advantage accrues from where and how these forces are
used. In the open waters of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, U.S. forces
would probably prevail. On the other hand, the closer conflicts get to the
Chinese mainland—particularly in the South China Sea and around Taiwan—
the more the PLAN’s numerical superiority in small ships does matter—a lot.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
 
Richard A. Bitzinger
Richard A. Bitzinger is an independent international security analyst. He was
previously a senior fellow with the Military Transformations Program at the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, and he has
held jobs in the U.S. government and at various think tanks. His research
focuses on security and defense issues relating to the Asia-Pacific region,
including the rise of China as a military power, and military modernization and
arms proliferation in the region.