CHAPTER 6 The European Parliament: powerful but fragmented Ariadna Ripoll Servent and Olivier Costa 6.1 Introduction 129 nck 62. The History and Main Func the EF 13066 To What Extent Is the EP ind Democratic? 6.4 To What Extent Is the EP Infuentia ona 3467.2. Facing DePasiament 18868 Conclusion DISCUSSION QUESTIONS jented Pattiomen!? 137 FURTHER READING. 65.1 The Cental Role of Potical OUP 37 » symbolizes mony of the struggles that character: ‘Summary ze o Jaf Integration and is at the core of many theoretical ‘and empirical debates about representation, accountability, and lecitin of thoorelicel approaches to explain the This chapter draws on the history and funotions of the assembly, followed by a t stical explanation mnpowerment over Yinued) 15 148 148 sec. cremation1¢ policymaking, both in legislative and non 1 FP is capable of intluen 1 the appointment of the Commmisso Jogsotive domains as well a5 It presents ine, poitica! cond committees. It discusse 1 role of parliamentary veness of the EP cnd tne irour: the representc en etic quality of ifs infeinal functioning, Final, it acaresses curr juture challenges f 61 Introduction .can Union (EU), the EP symbol “asthe only directly elected institution ofthe Europ af the struggles that characterize the process of Europeam integration: 4 supranational orga ional party systems and domestic concerns; it the centuality of the Commission and the coups but still la ‘1 made up of transnational polit anchored in nat plays a major role in fhe EU pol fereasing influence pays ofmany aking but sill has to face the Furopean Council; itis governed by polities Linterests. Therefore, the EP is atthe core but has to at attention to expertise and nations Hneoretical and empirical debates about repr # Futopem unification or the most visible spect of resentation, accountability, and Jegitimacy. Is it only a symbol of Faropean public sphere? Isita rubber-stampingassembly lon capable of imposing its views? Is ita place for representing domestic concerns en transnational European parties? Are European el whole EU oF ust endlessly leading representative instit {for political struggles betw tions determining the political momentum of the volition’ between Christian democrats and social democrats? tothe same ‘grand ¢ The LP isa deliberative, majoritarian institution in a political system withou nd dominated by norms of consensus, As a resull stable governmental majority jocracy; while the institu the EP often faces a trade-off betwe tional architecture of the EU demands high rn efficiency and de levels of bargaining and the ability to raphical cleavages, the lack of € makes it difficult for voters 10 ctions are still see find compromises across ideological and geog! poliey choices that emerge from EU policymakin npact oftheir choices. That is why European ¢ sional ones and why many citizens ign ises of the past few decades have understand the im ye the impact that ss lmportant than nat the EP has on their daily lives. The successive dd undermine the deliberative ed debat only served to accentuate the role of the executives an system. They have also led to more politic rand the core values of the FU—a phenomenon Therefore, character of the EUS political oon the future of European integral that alfeets not only domestic party systen but also the European one budgetary powers than ever before, als0 the EP, while enjoying more legislative and due to its internal fragmentation and the polarization of id aces mote challem mong and within its political groups retical approaches—from integration the: jonalism, logis This chapter draws ona variety of theot isin, new intergovernmentalism, and post-fun ories such as neofunctiona130 Aiacna Ripoll Sorvent an toa range of new institutionalisms—to explain the complex role the EP plays in with a brief overview of the history and the EUS political system. Section 6.2 sta nctions of the EP, followed, in section 6.3, by an exp! ion 6.4 explores the extent to which the EP is capable of influenc nation ofits empowerment tion 6.5 looks ing policymaking, both in legislative and non-legislative domains. Se at the political structure of the assembly and underlines the role of parliamentary roups and committees. Section 6.6 discusses the representativeness of the EP an¢ the democratic quality ofits internal functioning, Section 6.7 addresses current and ges for the EP and section 6.8 conclude fature chall | 6.2 The History and Main Functions of the EP “The EP started its life as the Assembly of the European Coal and St (ECSC) in 1952. The introduction of an Assembly inthe first European Community was not part of Jean Monnet plans but rather a compromise between those funding members that wanted to add a form of territorial representation (the Netherlands anid Belgium) and those that preferred to imbue the project with more democratic accountability (Rittberger 2009). In the end, the Common Assembly was granted ‘only limited powers, notably the capacity to force the High Authority to resign with gave the a successful motion of censure of its annual report. These modest origin: Assembly the will to fight for more powers and to extend the formal remits set by { the treaties, Key to that was the decision of parliamentarians to sit along political lines, with three political groups—Christian democrats, socialists, and liberals This decision fostered | recognized already in the 1953 internal Rules of Procedu ne EP the socialization of the members of the European Parliament (MI veloped a new ‘esprit de corps’ and ensured the gradual empowerment of (Guertieti 2008; Roos 2019, 2020) Th introduction of the consultation procedure in the Trea n—parrly due to the 1960s were characterized by the intergovernmental tur ty of Rome (1957) and the ompromise (1966). This procedure use of unanimity following the Luxembourg remained the most important until 2009 ancl it gave m alone, since the EP could only provide a non-binding opinion smber states the power (@ decide legislation “Although the EP learnt to use the consultation procedure so that it could exest some influence over policy outputs (e.g. by delaying decisions or lobbying the Commis: sion). its legislative functions dd not truly develop until the cooperation proceduté introduced in the Single Europea ‘an early form of bicameral decision-making) w: he 1970s proved a Act in 1986 (Kardasheva 2009; Varela 2009). In comparison, more beneficial decade for the EP. The Treaty of Luxembourg, (1970, entry into fore 1975) gave the EP some limited budgetary powers over non-compulsory 1 woul while the launch of regular summits of heads of state and government (hs! ed the necessary impetus for dice become the European Council) in 1974 provi elections in 1979, The EP elections reinforced the parliamentary 4 a stronger role of the Parliament in I acter of the Communit slave and strengthened the claimsne European Periamer Iesion-making (Costa 2016), This argument became even more convincing when She Treaty of Maastricht moved the newly coined European Union into a political Project with competences in core areas of sovereignty (Rittberger 2005). Although jniergovernmentalism remained in some key areas—notably the area of freedom, geurity and justice (AFSJ), and foreign policy—the 1990s and early 2000s sup- Bposed « revolution for the ER which gained a right to co-decide on equal terms Sith the Council and forged a closer political link between the EP elections and the composition of the Commission, This rapid empowerment culminated in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009 entry into force), which institutionatized many of the infor- tal changes instituted during the previous wo decades and extended co-deeision land qualified majority voting in the Council—now known as the ordinary legisla five procedure (OLP)—to most policy areas, notably agriculture and the remaining {ntergovernmental areas of the AFSJ, the ratification of most international agr sents, tary power aver all types of expenses. Since 2009, the EP has had sixmain competences, which are similar to those of a national parliament and by far exceed those of the parliamentary assemblies of international organizations. First the EP has a power of deliberation, that is, the right to adopt non-legislative resolu tipns. Originally, it was the symbol of the lack of power of the institution, but it isa useful too] that has allowed the EP to express opinions on all sorts of issues and to develop a political discourse ata supranational level (Kreppel and Webb 2019). Sec ‘ond, the EP has significant powers of control. Beyond the right of censure, which has never been activated, the EP has significant means to contzol the Commission and, to some extent, the Council. To this effect, MEPs can use various types of questions, tem porary committees of inquiry, and procedures of budgetary control, and can enjoy in formation from various sources, including EU organs (European Ombudsman, Court of Auditors), Third, as mentioned, the EP is the FU co-legislator—with the Council for the adoption of the vast majority of European lav. Fourth, regarding budgetary imatters, the EP has a power similar to that of the Couneil for all expenses—but is still not involved in the vote on resources. Fifth, the EP has powers of appointment mainly regarding the Commission andl its president, as well as the Ombudsman. AS for the more intergovernmental matters (notably the common foreign and defence policy), the EP is only consulted, but it can express its views ina very open way In order co fulfil these various tasks, the EP has organized itself in a hierarchical structure that allows it to specialize and gain expertise. Although all decisions have to be ultimately decided by the plenary, most work is done in the twenty standing committees, which focus on specific policies or issues, Committees usally reflect the composition of plenary and are a place where specialized MEPs discuss legisla tive and non-legislative proposals (Yordanova 2013). Generally, committees appoint one rapporteur to write the report that is supposed to reflect the position of the EP as a whole and is ultimately voted in plenary. In legislative reports, rapporteurs, together with ‘shadow’ rapportewrs from the other political groups and the chair of the committee, form the EPS negotiating team in charge of interinstitutional negotiations with the Commission and the Couneil (tilogues). Therefore, the vote in plenary is often only a formal step—which means that its function is principally symbolic (Ripoll Servent 2018), In addition to these working structures, the EP is| | 132 politically led by the Conference of Presidents—where the EP president aril the core political decisions on the or leaders of the political groups make th isa tion and directions of the institution—and the Bureaw, which gathers the president vice-presidents, and quaestors and is in charge of the administration and relations et the supportive role of the EPS swith other institutions. Finally, one should not for ‘General Secretariat, as well as the MEPs’ assistants and political groups’ stall. This is total of 6,500 agents, who provide the necessary backstage support for partiamen: rians to fulfil their representative roles frontstage (Ripoll Servent 2018). 6.3 Why Has the EP Been Empowered Over Time? Explaining seventy years of EP competences development s not an easy task. Ther are two main theoretical explanations for the EP% rise of powers. A first approach focuses on the efforts and initiatives deployed by MEPs in order to claim more power Corbett 1998; Roos 2020; Westlake 1994), They have taken unilateral initiatives {ahe policy of small steps?) and have pressurized member states leaders in order vo ‘btain substantial changes in each treaty reform. MEPs have also taken care to maxt ize the impact of those formal changes, often by proposing audacious interpreta- tions of teates, This has been theorized asa strategy of ‘interstitial change’ that is tthe constant efforts of the EP to interpret treaties and rules so as to maximize thelr nts that have impact (Farell and Héritier 2007a). The interinstitutional agreen snultiplied sine the beginning ofthe 1990s have also helped to institutionalize these (Wiesner 2018). fe played in ‘changes and involve MEPs better in EU deciston-makn A second approach underlines the core role that member states hs Ine powers of the EP in each treaty reform since 1979, formalizing and expand Even ifthe empowerment of the EP sounds detrimental 1o the member states, since functional needs of it harms the predominance of the Council in law-making, 1 Turopean integration—especally in terms of legitimation—and the attachment of parliamentary sovereignty help © ty changes (Moravesik 1993). How re not necessarily competitive; constructivists insist some member states’ leaders to the principle o' explain why member states agreed to these tn ever, these two explanation: the role of ideas’ and underline the way MEPs have formalized a set of narratives EP, regarding the so-called democratic deficit that presents the empowerment o ve the most obvious solution (Costa 2004; Rittberger 2005). MEPs have also p swith isomorphism that i, impose the idea that the EP shouldbe a central ynsti thom in the FU because parliaments are also core to member states’ political systems (Radaelli 2000 However, these past few decades have seen new debates emerging arourd the 10 n, Post-functionalism understands the EP as a” U politics. 1 of the EP in the EU's political syst srena that reflects the increasing connection between national and areca the rising representation of Eurosceptics in the EP a reflection of the gro sn integration (Hooghe and Marks d ing concerns of citizens with regard to Europ. ree sehmwer 2009), Neofederalisi shares this view and considers thatthe EM plays a central role inthe emergence of a European public sphere and a EuropeaThe Ewopean Poslioment 133 cal game, especially through the Spitzenkandidaren procedure (Christiansen mye: coman etal, 2014), New intergovernmentalism, howevet, challenges those fogs on the EP (Bickerton etal, 2015a) and insists on the fact thatthe expanston FEL corapetences has mainly benefited the European Coun and modes ofr Ign that are highly decentralized in the member states’ capitals (see also section My. since legislative proposals are still single-authored by the Commission, and aly influenced by the European Council, the power of nce its agenda Is today gre fie EP is considered as an optical sion 4 To What Extent Is the EP Influential in EU olicymaking? hese debates show that itis important to understand how: changes in treaty provle smal powers of the EP, both in legislative and Kons have affected the formal and in Fnon-legislative matters. ig) Has Co-Decision Given More Powers fo the EP? he empowerment of the EP has been most visible in the legislative arena, From & rere non-elected assembly with mostly consultative powers, the EP has become one ff the two arms in a de facto bicameral system. This means that the Council cannot Jtccide alone and has to find an agreement with the EP fora legislative proposal to become law. The shift in the Parliament’ legislative powers has raised consider able attention, especially among those interested in the inter-institutional balance of power Since power is linked to a logic of consequences, in which actors try 10 Taaximize their interests, rational-choice institutionalists have dominated decision making studies. The eatly ones used formal models to assess who won and who lost with the introduction of co-decision in the Treaty of Maastricht (e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000), These early models focused on the formal rules (i.e, as stated in the treaties) and often failed to capture informal channels of influence, such as the abil ity o play with the impatience ofthe other actors orto threaten with actions in front ofthe Court of Justice (Farrell and Heritier 2007b). These led some rational-chotece sstitutionalist authors to propose bargaining models as an alternative to measure and Commission under co-decision the relative power of Council, Parliament (Thomson et al, 2006). Although these models proved more adequate at captur- ing the formal and informal influence of each institutional actor, their methodol hat of the ogy tended to overestimate the power of the Council and un have tumed 10 Commission and the EP (Slapin 2014). Nowaday bicameralism to explain EU inter-institutional relations and, more specifically, the power-sharing dynamics between the two legislators (EP and Council). Rationale choice models have shown how, despite havin outcomes under co-decision, the Council still enjoys a dominant position. This is ‘in the second-reading stage, itis sition, for which ir only needs a formally equal powers to veto principally given by the structure of the procedu casier for the EP to accept the Council’ commonind o eject it, in which case itneeds to g imple majority, than to an lute majority of its members—often a difficult task (Hagemann and Hoyland However, the predominance of the Council can also be explained with the help of historical and constructivist institutionalist approaches, For one, the shift to condecision changed the way EP actors perceived their role as legislators and led aimed that ponsible’ behaviour. The Council had of 10 adopt a more ‘n ‘under consultation, the EP was not mature’ and realist’ enough, which made it very difficult for member tates to see it as a serious and engaged partner (Ripoll Setvent 2015). Hence, EP actors, especially among the centrist political groups, became mor active in an effort to build compromises that would hold not only inside the EP but also in negotiations with the Council. This trend has led to a preponderance of grand coalitions, with the liberal group holding a central position and acting often as king maker (Costello 2011; Hix and Hoyland 2013), In addition, there is a systemic bias link: 1980s (and in some cases until 2009), many EU policies were decid to the positionality of the Council in the EUs political system: until the late by the Council alone. Therefore, even nowadays, ifthe EP and the Council cannot find an agreement, member states are usually closer to the status quo (and hence have Tess 0 lose) than the EP (Costello and Thomson 2013; Trauner and Ripoll Servent 2016). This makes 1 mote difficult for the EP to push for (major) legislative changes, which ean often only be achieved when the EP is very united and can use its legitimacy as the only a rns (Kreppel 2018) ectly elected institution representing the interests of EU eit 6.4.2 Trilogues and the Rise of Informal Politics ‘The EPS capacity to stand behind a united position has become even more impor tant with the rise of trilogues. Trilognes are informal, albeit highly institutiona meetings where the Council, EP, and Commission meet to find agreements under the co-decision procedute. It is supposed to be a secluded forum where negotiators can discuss difficult points in a smaller setting; nevertheless, trilogues have become ple (Roederer-Rynming and Green ritualized event gathering often up to 100 pe wood 2014). This setting can be equally advantageous and disadvantageous for the P often comes with more people into the room and can tives of all political groups to convince the Council ath a weak majority, any divergence EP: on the one hand, the use the presence of represen on the other hand ifthe EP goes into trile om the mandate might preclude winning the vote in plenary, which makes it easter ‘or the Couneil to play divide-and-conquer (Brandsma et al. 2021; Delreux and Laloux 2018) ‘The necessity to enter trilogqes with a strong mandate has led the EP co gradually formalize the process leading to Parliament’ position, This is not surprising, esPe cially since trilogues emerged in a functional manner, driven by the need to make co-decision more efficient (Reh etal, 2013; Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood 2017 Shackleton 2000). Trilogues became so successful that in the 2014-19 legislative term 99 pet cent of legislation was agreed in an carly agreement—that is, on first of early-second reading (European Parliament 2019; 3). Trilogues have also brough' (the internal functioning of the EP On the one band, they have significant changes.Feinforced the power of committees and, particularly, those actors who are part of Gpter institutional negotiations, Although, originally, urilogues gave a lot of power Horapporteurs, who often negotiated bilaterally with the Council and the Commis their independence has been gradually curtailed with the institutionslization gotiating team formed of rapporteur, shadow rapporteurs from each political Boia rou. and the committee chait. The inclusion of a broader set of actors serves the Eouble purpose of controlling the rapporteur, while making it easier for the EP to Iadapt its position when something unexpected comes up in trilogues (Brandsma © snc) Hoppe 2020; Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood 2017). On the other hand, the fpercased fragmentation among political groups has shifted power from commit- jets to ‘shadows meetings’—informal settings in which rapporteur and shadow rap- -e and porters, as well a coordinators (in charge of liaising between the comm heir political group) discuss amendments with the aim of agreeing on a (broadly Supported) EP mandate for trilogues. This setting is also used to discuss ongoing developments in trilogues that might require changes to the EPS mandate (Ripoll Servent and Panning 2019). Hence, the use of trilogues brings to light an ongoing tension between efficiency and democracy (Brack and Costa 2018). While they have produced a new culture compromise and mutual respect among Commission, Council, and EP, chey still faise concerns about the lack of transparency and the difficulty to hold negotiators to account (Dionigi and Koop 2017; Reh 2014), Certainly, transparency has been im: proved within the EP—especially through changes in the Rules of Procedure, which huave introduced ex-ante and ex-post accountability mechanisms. However, some of these instruments are not capitalized on; for instance, rapporteurs are now asked to explain the main events of tilogue negotiations to other committee members, but ally these reports ate highly superficial and do not [Brandsma (2019) found chat gene {go into substance. Therefore, the debate around trilogues—as well as what some see asa misuse of early agreements—is still present in the EP and involves now judicial Dodies like the European Ombudsman and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (Hillebrandt and Leino-Sandberg 2021), Influence beyond Co-Decision Itis important to remember that the EP has other powers beyond co-decision. First, ithas to give its consent to ratify most international agreements, This has increased its influence when it comes to highly politicized agreements on data transfer for purposes (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications je Agreement (ACTA). (SWIFT)), copyright and piracy (Anti-Counterfeiting Tr and trade (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and Transat lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)). The EP also played a key role in the ratification of the EU-UK Brexit agreement (Closs 2020). The consent power has been labelled a ‘nuclear power’, since it only gives t ind of the process. However, the EP has often used it assertively to 1¢ BP a chance to say ‘yes ino’ at the gain informal influence over the Commission's mandate and its right to be informed (Bressanelli etal. 2019; Meissner 2016; Ripoll Servent 2014). In during the proalvier Cos while it has also tried to use similar strategies to gain influence ov annual Financial Framework (MEE), the EP has str Jed to undo or chat seements reached by the Exropean Council (Vitrey de Gardebose and Mesdag 2019). This y pow ers, sinee the MFF determines the ceilings and spending priorities, which limits fo negotiations on the Muli e the 18a long shadow over its budget the room for manoeuvre when it comes to negotiations on the annual budge which the EP is now a co-decider (Benedetto 2019). Finally, as we have seen, although the EP does not have a right of legislative initiative, it can still set the agenda through its power to appoint and serutinize t Commission, as well as other softer instruments such as debates, oral and writ itive reports (Jensen et al, 2013: Kreppel and Webb ten questions, and own-in 2019), These tools are also used to conuol other actors, such tral Bank and European agencies (Font and Pérez Durén 2016), but the EP is con- nda-sewing as the European Cen: lis say in the area of stanily searching for new forms of expand a and implementation—for instance, by drafting its own impact asse e European Council and rolling checklists to oversee the commitments made by d the transposition of EU legislation (ef. Anglmayer and Scherrer 2020) 6.44 The EP and the Appointment of the Commission President The EP has gained influence in the appointment process of the Commission through time. From an initial situation in which it had no involvement at all, it has f treaty revisions, the right to ‘eleet’ the president and obtained, over the course then approve the College of Commissioners. As usual, MEPs have tried to get more than that, and to be allowed to select the president. To do so, they have argued that the double obligation for the European Council to take into account the results fons when choosing a candidate and to: make ‘appropriate propose a name (Penalver Garcia and, of the European ele consultations’ created the right for the EP he objective was, in sum, to mimic general elections as organ imes, which have the double purpose of choosing a majority Priestley 2015) in parliamentary re and then ‘electing’ the head of government, This approach was also seen asa way 12 make EU elections mote interesting for citizens, With a view on the 2014 elections the EP thus urged European parties to nominate candidates for the presidency af the Commission (Tead-candidates or ‘Spitzenkandidaven’ in German) and to giv them a central role in the campaign. Five parties (European Peoples’ Party (EPP PES), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats fot the Party of European Socialists Europe (ALDE), the Greens, and the European United Left (GUE)) agreed to d2 0, After the election, the leaders of the Christian democrat, socialist, and liberal parties collectively supported the candidacy of Jean-Claude Juncker (EPP) to head the Commission, and urged the European Council to choose him. After complex negotiations, he was appointed and then ‘elected’ by the EP with a large majority (Fabbrini 2013; Hobolt 2014) In 2019, the challenge for the EP was to institutionalize this approach, Howeveh things went differently, since there were tensions between the parties about the bThe European Parlioment 137 Hyay to organize FU clections and persisting reluctance on the side of the Euro. sn Council. The 2019 E> 9 campaign was org in as a competition between Spitzenkandidaten, but the EP was not able to support clearly the candidacy of Man nnkandidat, who was lacking experience at the highest feed Weber, the EPPS 5 Jevel and was too conservative for most of the socialists, After Jong talks within Fine European Council, Ursula von der Leyen emerged as a compromise candidate aiid the new president of the Commission was thus chosen with no involvement of the EP. The outlook for 2024 remained unclear at the time of writing, Without ar jastirotionalization of the Spitzenandidaten procedure in the Treaty ot, at least, an inter institutional agreement, the capacity of the EP to impose it will depend very much on the political contex 6.5 A More Fragmented Parliament? The EP is a highly complex institution, gathering 705 MEPs from 27 nationalities, who belong to more than 200 political parties. A major task for the institutions Jeaders has always been to fight against centrifugal forces and divisions, in onder 10 b le to find majorities and develop a global strategy in the context of an intense the develoy institutional competition. This has been done mainly throu ment o al. 2005; Hix etal. 2003; Hix and olitical groups and parliamentary committees (Corbett 1d 1997), 651 The Central Role of Political Groups Even ifthe treaties did not mention such an obligation, the members of t a. cd from June 1953 to sita mentary Assembly of the ECSC dec logical views (Westlake 1994). Their objective was to distinguish themselves from parliamentary assemblies of other international organizations, in which members sit in alphabetical order or by always been favoured: today a group requires twenty-three members from at least tional delegations. Hence, multinational groups have one-quarter of the member states (seven in the EU Asa result of the development of the institution and of the many enlargements, andscape of the EP has constantly evolved (see Table 6.1), of the EU, the politic lowever, surprisingly the overall structure of the partisan game has remained quite stable, The EP had six political groups prior to the furst European elections (1979), as compared to seven after the last elections (2019), with a maximum of ten reached in 1989, Despite some name changes, it always included the same political familie far left (GUE/Nordic Green Left (NGL), Socialists and Democrats (SSD), Greens and Regionalists (VertVALDE), Liberals (Renew Europe (RE)), Cliristian democrat (EPP), Burosceptics (European Conservatives and Reformists (CREECR)), far right come non-attached members, although dependence and Democracy (1D), their relative strength has varied aver time (Roos 2019) Historically, thete has always been a numerical domination of the Christian dem werats and the social democrats. However, for the firs time in the history of the t Parliament, the EPP and S8eD groups do not enjoy a majority of the seats—thanks 10the success of Eurosceptics, liberals, and greens during the 2019 European elections ne fundamental decisions of the EP are driven by for instance, to amendments to his change is crucial aan absolute majority of its members. This appl legislative texts in second reading and to the budget, as well as the ‘election’ of the Commission's president. Coneretely, the EP must find 333 voices out of 705, inde pendently from the number of MEPs present in the roomy; this means that, under this rule, the votes of absente the EPP and SSD groups only count 21), they can no longer contral those decisions and need to find at least 29 votes from the other groups, The inlluence ofthe latter in the deliberation is, thus, greater today than it was in the past (cf. Rose and Borz 2013) Even if the EPP and S&-D groups vote together in 90 per cent of the cases, the EPs deliberation is structured by raultiple cleavages (Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999). In the absence ofa stable coalition (that existed only between July 2014 and December 2016, with a formal alliance of the EPP, SSD, and ALDE groups, named ‘the bloc), majorities allowing the adoption of legislation are specific to the issues considered, and Borz nd abstainers systematically countas negative votes, As 87178 and 145146 members (as of August to the political context, and based on several levels of agreement (Ro: 2013). Tensions between Europhiles and Eurosceptics are, however, central in the dehy ‘raining for the EP, ince part of the MEPs systematically jon: dey ate ‘oppose decisions, but they also contribute to the alliance between moderate left and moderate right groups (Belun and Brack 2019) are also governed by national interests, and more specifi The EPS deliberation: and small, new and old cally by all kinds of divisions between member states: bi and they often depend on the rich and poor, north and south, east and west electoral cycle and governmenv/opposition dynamics of national parties back home 2018). These cleavages are rarely explicit, especially in the plenaty (Koop et al 1¢ decisive in the where MEPs avoid referring to their nationality, but they may conduct of negotiations within groups and committees or in MEPs votes. The main less, show a relatively high level of internal cohesion: about 70 pet groups, neve cent of MEPs respect the voting instructions adopted by their formation (Bowler and McElroy 2015; Kreppel 2002). Overall, the deliberation of the EP is quite consensual ne considers the final votes on texts, which usually gather an overlapping major ity (Novaketal. 2 652 The Committees: Main Actors of Policymaking If groups play a key role in the development of majority positions during the whole \g process, parliamentary committees also contribute to the eel gence of majorities and, more generally, to the management of centrifugal fore The EP currently has twenty parliamentary committees consisting of betwee twenty-five and eighty-one MEPs, Like most national parliaments, the EP large work in committees, based on a logic of division of labour (Whitakily conganizes its hat the FU fs a system of 0% 2011; Yordunova 2013). Some analysts thus consid role played by working groups al P col cernance by committees’, in reference to the ke ns advisory committees, and also the 002), Council committees, the Commi (Christiansen and Kirchner 2000; Egeberg 2The EP enjoys great freedom when it comes to creating standing, temporary, or inquiry committees. This ability enables the assembly to adapt to the EUs evolv ing policies and activities, This orgs jn the MEPS’ exercise of th ional autonomy has played a decisive role legislative, bud tary, and control powers, and their tiemand for the extension of the latter. It has also led to the distinctive culture and reputation of EP committees, with some showing a clear ‘esprit de comps’ and others being more divided on a left-right dimension. For instance, while the Committee fon Budgets (BUDG), the Committee on Agriculture (AGRD, and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) attract members with similar b: grounds and work, hence, consensually (which means that thetr positions are sometimes biased towards specific interests), other committees are increasingly divided on specific {leavages—for instance, an in sry-environment division in the Committee on the Environment (ENVD ora civil hberties-internal security opposition in the Commit tee on Civil Liberties (LIBE) (Burns 2013; Ripoll Servent 2015, 2018). As much of the discussions, technical work, and negotiations take place at com- mittee level, plenary sessions are usually only formalizing agreements reached in tommittees and inter-group negotiations (Settembri and Neuhold 2009). This or ganization of work tends to deprive them of their interest, In plenary, the time de voted to each point of the agenda is rather limited, and the EP rarely dedicates more than two hours to an important piece of legislation, Exchanges in the house have ite impact on the outcome of the vote, especially since, as we have seen in section 64, most decisions have been already agreed with the Commission and the Council ‘in trilogues (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood 2017), 6.6 To What Extent Is the EP Representative and Democratic? As the only directly elected EU institution, the EP 1 ses its role as represent live of EU citizens to justify its empowerment and legitimize its positions. However, the EP has long been, associated with the EUS ‘democratic deficit and blamed for the lack of connection between constituents and their representatives. Therefore, ‘we examine here how the European elections should be understood and how they shape the roles and functions of MEPs. 66. Are European Elections Still Second-Order? ‘Traditionally, European elections have been characterized as ‘second-order’. This thesis assumes that people consider that there is ‘less at stake’ in 1 se elections when casting their vote, which makes it more likely that they will choose ‘with their heat vather than ‘with their head; it also incteases the c ‘with the boot and use it to protest that they vote igainst thelr government (Viola 2015: 42), The assumption that chete is ‘less at stake’ explains, hence, why second-order elections show lower levels of turnout and tend to focus on national rather than European. issues (see Table 6.1); it also accounts for the To ses that larger political parties140° Avia a ‘6102 Ane nan aO/ONI TON/3nd vate sow sid ave aaa ‘loz eunr ‘yoo Aine 6661 ores 1 Aine su vye6t Aine os 6961 Aine et 961 Aine 6x61 Ane eyThe European Porlioment tend to suffer—especially if they are in government—to the benefit of smaller dand mote extreme parties (Reif and Schmitt 1980), However, more recently some juthors have noted that the ‘less-at-stake" assumption has lost strength with the a 5 rowing powers of the FU. Therefore, they have proposed an alternative thesis (known as Europe Salience’), which departs from the idea that the European dimension does determine the behaviour of voters in EP elections. This means that, for instance, since environmental issues are believed to be better dealt with na supranational level, Green parties do better than in national elections, in turn, since issues of European integration are more visible and polarized, Furosceptic pérties also have a better chance of success (Hobolt and Spoon 2012; Hobolt and ie Vries 2016; see Box 6.1), oa) Breuer The cromotization of tne EU elections as @ showelowin between pro-Europeans and ationalsis in many member stals resulted in a notable ction turnout {G20 Table 6.2) come fo 51.3 per cen on average, on 8.3 per cent increase com: pared 10 2014, However, this did not result in the anticipated nationalist surge, A rise Was eeen in some counties (Germany, France, Belgium, and Hunger), but in other member slates nationalst fesuts wore muted (8 In Poland) oF disappointing ¢in Spain, Portugal, Ireland, he Netherlanes. Denmark, Greece, and the Baltic counts) 2ups won twenty addional seats compared to 2014, bur their influ emains limited, especially shice the departure of Brilsh MEPs on 31 Jonucry 2020, The 2019 election also saw further weakening of the Socialists (S&D) andthe Chris tan democrats (EPP). The two groups went from 66 per cent af al MEPs in 1999 40 pet contin 2014; alter July 2019, the figure dropped to 45 per cent ond ater the Uk members let, 1047 per cant. This means that Ihe EPP ond S&D groups wore not {able to ensure, without adaitional support the elaction of the new president of the Commission—who should be ‘elected! by 0 mojonty of members. More general the two groups can ne longer pass legislation on thelr own, As result. the centrist foup "Renew'—bomn out of the ALDE group and French members from Mactor's Renaissance list—nes been signineanty strengthened. trom 67 to 108 seats. The (Groen group, which obtained seventyfour seats compared lo fitty previously. he dls0 become a potential kingraker, Just otter the elections, offciis of the Euro pean parties bagun inlense negotiations to forge more oF less formal alliances o' link them to the choice of EU leaders the president of the Commission, primarily But 130 the president of the Europecn Council, the governor of the European Centra! Bank (ECB), he High Representative, ond even the president of the EP Even ifthe EP wos not able to impose its candidate tothe presidency ofthe Com ‘mission, asin 2014, the 2 gon election revealed « poiliczotion of the EU regime in several respects, Firs, in every member state the campaign wos struc lured aroune! common themes (an top ot national ones) the desi«able degree of European integration, enviionmental issues, the possiblity of a social policy, and institutional reform. Second, the Union left the EPP-S&D cuopoly behind: now. in the European Couneil, Chrislian democrats, socialists, ond liberals have equal (Continuropean Council the EP, ar i807 logle. Third. Broxt andl cox 108 Intensified and today includes a p xd the ‘ule of law intensiied the debates on the EU's fate, which turned them into “istorder polly’ elections, where citizen about common values and identities (Galpin and Trenz 2019) losely linked to the use of distinct electo In most eases, these divergences are systems, since member states are only obliged to share a few ‘common principles Apart from dat, national systems / notably the tse of proportional representation Jiverge in how they elect members: in some cases, voting is compulsory, while some countries appl are differences in the use of open or closed list thresholds or divide the electoral d nd in the formula used ly. the 10 adjudicate seats (Ripoll Servent 2018). Does this matter? Several studies have shown that the electoral system has a di rectiniluence on the type of campaign and che level of interest it raises among voters For instance, voters will be more involved in the elections if the selection of ean dates is more inclusive and if they also have a bigger say in indicating their prefer- ences through open lists. Similarly, the type of electoral system affects the style o or in smaller distriets adopting ign, with candidates in open-lists syste ‘mote personalized style, while closed-list systems emphasize the figure of the partys Spitzenkandidat (Bowler and Farrell 2011; Farrell and Scully 2010; Pilet etal. 2015) 6.6.2 To What Extent Do MEPs Represent Their Constituents? elections; MEPs The type of electoral system can also make a difference after relation roles are largely influenced by how they perceive their mandate and their ship to constituents (Farrell and Scully 2005, see also Box 6.2). Certainly, most their role as one of ‘constituency representative’, especially if the | MEPs s 5) that allow for close from countries with electoral systems (e.g. those with open list 2019). This form of geographical repre links with constituents (Brack and Costa sentation is crucial if an MEP wishes to be re-elected or go on to have a career back home (Aldrich 2018). However, MEPs may choose to adopt other types of role in their parliamentary work. For instance, some decide to specialize on one policy + in the field; this career as ‘policy advocate’ is particularly cand become an exp o want to taise their profile quickly especially fist-timers attractive for those wh | and young MEPs. Others prefer to focus on strengthening the institutional influence of the EP or act as promoters of the European project in domestic or international settings. These roles, however, are only partially applicable to Eurosceptic MEPS fan arena to contest the EL among those who are present, many use the plenar flthough some engage with normal parliamentary work and participate like any P (Bale and Taggart 2006; Brack 2017; Navarro 2009; Ripoll Servent mainstream ME and Panning 2019b).Thé number of fomcle MEPs hat steadily increased since the fet direct elections, In h mare ate sill disagreements many women ate part of the candidates’ poo! in the early stages of the selection shite and Kenny 2016 Stockemer procedure (Fortn-Ritiberger and Rittberger 20 fond Sunstém 2019), More important, gender balan presence of quotas does help women break the glass celing but also promotes can- dicates with higher qualifications independent of thelr gender (Nieticn and Dani 2020) in addition. women de vote differen, especially on gender sensitive issues (McEvoy 2016). The issue of gendler one! harassment hes become more prominent 1098 matter. For one, the side the EP. lorgely helped'by the #MeToo movament—although the official respon 25 have often dsonpointed (Berthet and Kentola 2020; Kantolo and Agustin 2019) von more problematic is he issue of ethnic ane racial dversy. with ethnic minod ties clearly undetrepresented Psoledok’s 2019). The Euiopeon Network agalnst Roo- | Igm (2019) calculated that, after Bret, only 4 per cont of MEPS belonged fo an etic jrinotty and only 3 per cent were people of colour. This lack of diversiy in Brussols psthutions has insigatect the #GrusselssoWvhite campaign anc! led some MEPS 1 point oul the dlscrepancles belween an anti-acism theletie ond the absence of ethnic Tpinerty leaders in EU top posts, which often leads fo acts of raciol discrimination in he Institution (Bah Kuhnke and Hereberger-Fotana 2020; Heath 2007 Parveen 2019) These different roles do not just affect their priorities or the way they iey also colour the way they vote. Although, as seen above, political groups in the EP ae highly cohesive, there ate still occasions when individual MEPs or national party delegations decide to defect and vote against the group line. This decision d range of issues, such as their individual career ambitions, thei ability to assess when it isless problematic to defect, and the position of their national party back home (Koop etal, 2018; Lindstadt etal. 2012; Meserve et al, 2017; Malhlbock and Yordanova 2017). 6.7 Current and Future Challenges Despite its significant empowerment and its development into a ‘normal Parla ‘ment, the EP is currently facing internal and external pressures that shape its daily life and its capacity to exert influence in the EUS political system, 6.21 Polarization and Politicization As we have seen in the sections above, the EP has become a more polarized parlia ‘ment. This is lan ly due to the increase in Eurosceptic and populist parties but also 10 sntation, and par tional catch-all parties. This internal f the move aw ign iening for the EP’ functioning ticularly the rise in fringe parties, has been seen as thre:vier Cos | However, these last legislatures have proved that there ate several factors limiting the parties: first, sovercigntists have litte in. com potential disruptive impact of thes ‘mon beyond their aversion for European in 's ata supranational level, Second, deliberation in the EP is arranged from being obstructionists. Finally, the structure of right-wing Furosceptic groups was largely dependent on British members: 120 reduced their overall weight and influence. Indeed, ation and they are not good at omgar izing themselve in away that prevents minorities fore their departure in January tnainstream political groups have always made an active use ofthe ‘cordon sanitaire, which has excluded those groups per ing influence. For instance, they have been v and largely ignored in legislative work. However, the use of the ‘cordon ly stop the spread of radical ideologies: eived as Eurosceptics and/or tadieal from exert joted out of committee claitmanships innot effectv. is often a formality that especially when populist parties are part of mains! and when centrist forces decide to copy the messages of radical gi 2019; Ripoll Servent and Panniny stream groups (c.g. Fidesz in the EPP) oups to gain vote 2021), (or prevent further losses) (Ripoll Servent Facing De-Parliamentarization the EP faces a challenge that is not exclusively European | 6 Despite its growing powers, ‘but is reflected in many national systems, namely the Jatures. The state of polycrisis’ experienced since the mnments, which have not growing role of the executive power at the expense of le tend of the 2000s has reinforced the role of national gov inary procedures to find solutions to the diverse er: such as the EU-Turke; hesitated to by-pass the ord The use of non-legislative instruments ses facing the EU Statement on asylum-seekers) and intergs framework mean that the EP has no say on decisions cover, the fact jovernmental treaties (such as the ‘fiscal compact) outside the EL or is restricted to implementing them in follow-up legislation, Mc state powers’ of member states that these successive ctises have touched upon ‘core has also helped governments to legitimize their primary role as decision-makers and placed MEPs under the shadow of the European Cour fe seen how the EP has had limited influence in shapin ncil and, hence, intergov ernmentalism. We hav mie and refugee crises, although some have note substantive outputs of the Eu ed to reinforce the standards of democratic oversight and jotti 2020, Fasone 2014). | the gone chains of accountability (Bressaneli and Chel he COVID-19 criss. The EU has prayed principally» coordinating role and the European been the ep Tr vhih has als been lngelymargalized doing There, MEPs often stu es of the MEF vem to have largely held for Council ha icontre of crisis decis legislative intervention of the debates on the Recovery Fund and the 2021-7 MF petween wishing to exert some influence and rebalance the objectiv ) and not being seen for instance, avoiding farther cuts to programmes lke Era by their constituen very instrament that could help a lat number of citizens. The \ difficulties of the EP to set the to continue fanctioning but at a much lower inter ‘as obstacles for a reco. risis, and particularly the lockdown, have accentuated ate of urgency. The move to digital solutions allowed the EPThe European Postioment Bj usual. Legislative work stopped almost completely, and plenary moved online, Gpniclvalso reduced its visibility and inclusiveness. ithe aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis is likely to shift the internal workings of Spe EP forthe long term. 1thas accentuated the need for efficient decision-making, spith committees and plenary meetings being shorter and leaving less space for de- Tberation. These are not new debates in the EP, which has often struggled to find a riddle point between efficiency and democratic representation. At the same time, ie EP has shown its ability to mutate and adapt itself to new clxcumstances—a Jechnique developed since its very origins, which has allowed it to gradually assert {is legislative, budgetary, and scrutiny powers. 6.8 Conclusion ‘The EP continues to position itselfas the main supranational insttution—since its the nly one directly elected. However, this des not mean that it can avoid the shadow of F ntergovernmentalism, Externally, the rising influence of the European Council gives snéimber states a stronger voice and makes national cleavages more visible. Internally Jigher levels of politicization lead to more polarization, both amon} F cal groups. Euroscepticism and radical ideologies are not himited to fringe parties but fan be found in most mainstream groups. This often undermines the supranational Character of the EP and its ability to fight for more powers and a deepening of the integration process. Therefore, the transnational character of the EP continues to be Important, but one should not forget that it can equally be utilized to upload Furo sceptic and populist messages coming from European party federations and cities This shows that, in order to understand the EP, we need to situate it in the broader tnvironment of a political system that has become more politicized. It reflets also the ongoing debates on the form of goverament that the EU should adopt. While the current system fits well into a separation of powers model, the EP has often sought to jparliamentarize’ the EU with the hope that it would allow it to gain more powers Hovzever, efforts to politicize the Commission have proved challenging until now and dfien have only served to obfuscate responsibilities and made it moze difficult for citi- zens to understand how the EU works. The backlash of the Sptizenkandidaten in 2019 isa good example of how trying to fuse these powers can lead to more disillusionment and a loss in legitimacy. Indeed, ifthe COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated anything, i {show fragile the representative function of the EP can be and how dependent itis on its capacity to be visible and show that it has a say on issues that matter to citizens. This is probably the biggest challenge thatthe EP faces in the years 1 come; namely Ihow can it provide leadership and political change, while facing stronger executive forces and more divergent voices within the chamber. A key to solving this question ‘night come in the shape of the Conference on the Future of Europe. However, COVID-19 pandemic has broken the momentum, and left enough time to the main EL instinutions Commission, Council, and FP—to affirm their leadership on it, and to take sure that it will ead to no significant treaty change. Its, thus, quite unlikely that the Conference will help o clarify the nature and the functions of the FPee 1981 1984 1987 1989 1994 2007 2009 2013 2014 - 9209 90.73 52.38 Finlana Caechia 9039) 5954 4327 5864 pony OL uo jusiseg yody(7) pisoussion auestions 1. Could we imagine Euro Jing the majority within the EP? tic 2. Is the consensual functioning of he EP detrimental fo its public image’ 2 formal right of legislative init 3. Doss the EP QOL See Ripoll Servent (2018) fora detailed inttoctction to the EP with an emphasis sbates ond recent theoretical developments. For a more prac ‘sunt of the EP's workings, see Corbett et a (2016) and Clark anc Priestley 1) staff members. For an update on the latest devel (2012), bath written by (fo ‘opments of research about the EP, see Costa (2019) Clark, $. and Priestley, J (2012), Ewope's Parliament: People, Places, Pol (london: John Hore. Corbett, R., Jacobs, F, and Nevill, D, (2016), The European Parliament (th ed. |endon: John Harper), n Paiament in Times of Criss: Dynamics ond Coste, ©. (ed) (2019), The Europear Transformations (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. don: Palgrave RipollServent, A. (2018), The European Portiamont ‘Macmillan.