THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

2021, VOL. 34, NO. 1, 69–82

https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1923986

Defending a River line: The Soviet World War II Experience

Lester W. Grau
Foreign Military Studies Office

ABSTRACT
Large rivers, canals, and lakes dominate Eurasia and serve as
major arteries of commerce and industry, defensive barriers,
lines of communication, and avenues of advance. During the
Great Patriotic War (the Soviet Union’s War with Germany dur­
ing World War II), the Soviets conducted defenses that inte­
grated large rivers. During the defensive phase of the War
(1941–1942), they defended along the Don, Northern Donets,
Volga, and Neva Rivers, as well as smaller rivers. The most
famous is the Volga-Don River defense, which incorporated
the Battle of Stalingrad. In the Russian view, the river is often
the determining factor in selecting the forward line of defense
when establishing a durable and stable defense. Engineer pre­
paration of the battlefield in front of that forward line is critical,
as is a well-organized and integrated system of fire. Both banks
of the water obstacle are usually prepared for the defense.
Forces permitting, the operational defense of a water obstacle
is conducted in two echelons or by maintaining a strong com­
bined arms reserve.

Introduction
Soviet equipment was designed for use in large expanses of woodland and
tundra, intersected by broad rivers and massive swamps. The Soviet Union
was a northern country where severe winter weather is a normal training and
combat condition. Large rivers, canals, and lakes dominate Eurasia and serve
as major arteries of commerce and industry, defensive barriers, lines of com­
munication, and avenues of advance.1 In Central and Eastern Europe, an
advancing or withdrawing force would expect to encounter a 6-meter-wide
water obstacle every 20 kilometers, up to a 100-meter-wide water obstacle
every 35–60 kilometers, a 100–300-meter-wide obstacle every 100–150

CONTACT Lester W. Grau lester.w.grau.civ@mail.mil Foreign Military Studies Office, 731 McClellan Avenue,
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350.
The author assumes responsibility for the veracity, accuracy, and source documentation of the material, including no
use of classified material and conformity to copyright and usage permissions. The views expressed in this report are
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army,
Department of Defense, or the US government. The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) assesses regional military
and security issues through open-source media and direct engagement with foreign military and security specialists
to advise army leadership on issues of policy and planning critical to the US Army and the wider military community.
1
L. W. Grau and C. K. Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Ground Forces
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office 2017) p. 309, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2
/fmso/p/fmso-bookshelf.
© 2021 Taylor & Francis
70 L. W. GRAU

kilometers, and a water obstacle over 300 meters wide every 250–300
kilometers.2 During the Great Patriotic War (the Soviet Union’s War with
Germany during World War II), the Soviets conducted defenses that inte­
grated large rivers. During the defensive phase of the War (1941–1942), they
defended along the Don, Northern Donets, Volga, and Neva Rivers as well as
smaller rivers. The most famous is the Volga-Don River defense, which
incorporated the Battle of Stalingrad.3 Although World War II is long past
and technology has improved dramatically, many of the considerations and
principles of river-line defense remain relevant today.
The defense of a water obstacle is defined as: a defensive action, organized
and conducted with the goal of retaining a water line (river, canal, lake,
estuary) and preventing the enemy from prematurely forcing a crossing or
bypassing it. In the Russian view, the river is often the determining factor in
selecting the forward line of defense when establishing a durable and stable
defense. Engineer preparation of the battlefield in front of that forward line is
critical, as is a well-organized and integrated system of fire. Both banks of the
water obstacle are usually prepared for the defense. In the event of a broad
expanse of water, the defense may be conducted from the near bank only.
Forces permitting, the operational defense of a water obstacle is conducted in
two echelons or by maintaining a strong combined arms reserve.4

Army operational defense

During the initial phase of the Battle of Stalingrad, during the end of July 1942,
the German Army broke through Soviet defenses and advanced toward the
Volga River. The Soviets attempted to prevent the German advance. The
Soviet 21st Army conducted a defense north of Stalingrad along the Don
River. Colonel General Andrei Eremenko, the Stalingrad Front Commander,
issued the following order:
The 21st Army (63rd, 76th, 124th, 278th, 304th, 343rd, and 96th Rifle Divisions rein­
forced by the disbanded 28th and 38th Armies’ artillery) will defend the 140 kilometer-
wide sector from the mouth of the Khoper River to Malo-Kletski and retain two rifle
divisions in army reserve).5

The Don River has a large bend at Malo-Kletski, which meant that the army
defense had a 75-kilometer depth. The Soviet 4th Tank Army occupied the
bend to the west of the river (known as the Great Bend of the Don), which was
considered the Germans’ primary breakthrough sector. The 21st Army
2
Ibid., p. 311.
3
General-Lieutenant D. K. Slepenkov, Армейские операции [Army Operations] (Moscow: Voyenizdat 1977) p. 211.
4
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, ‘Оборона водной преграды’ [Defense of a Water Barrier], in Военная
Энциклопедия [Military Encyclopedia], Vol. 5 (Moscow: Voyenizdat 2001) p. 535.
5
D. M. Glantz and J. M. House, To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April–August 1942, Vol. 1
of The Stalingrad Trilogy (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 2009) p. 304.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 71

Figure 1. 21st Army in Battle for the Great Bend of the Don River, August 19426

established its defense along the Eastern Bank of the Don River on the night of
11 August 1942. The 21st Army had seven rifle divisions, a motorized rifle
brigade, five howitzer regiments, five anti-tank regiments, and three sapper
battalions. These units were all short of up to 50 percent of authorized
personnel and equipment. They were opposed by two German infantry divi­
sions of the 17th Army Corps of the 6th Field Army (see Figure 1).6 These
divisions had 70 tanks and four artillery regiments. Two more infantry divi­
sions were in the German second echelon. General-Major (one-star)

6
Ibid., p. 312, Map redrawn by Charles K. Bartles.
72 L. W. GRAU

A. I. Danilov, the 21st Army Commander, decided to defend with a beachhead

across the Don River, with the bulk of his force on his left flank defending the
east bank where he expected the enemy main attack. He deployed his force in
a single echelon with a reserve of two under-strength rifle divisions and
a howitzer regiment. A special composite detachment held the beachhead.7
The units were in their defensive positions by the morning of 12 August,
busy digging firing positions and strongpoints and installing obstacles and
minefields. Then they began constructing battalion defenses. These were
completed by 15 August. Special attention was given to anti-tank defenses
and covering division flanks and junctures with adjoining units. At least a rifle
company with an artillery battery and three to four medium machine guns
were assigned to a flank or juncture. Engineers paid particular attention to
river bends and crossing sites and strung barbed wire and laid mines in these
areas. Artillery and anti-aircraft guns paid particular attention to potential
enemy bridging and crossing sites. Artillery concentrations were planned on
crossroads, probable assembly areas, and deployment lines. Standing barrage
fire was planned in front of defensive positions and likely objectives of an
enemy attack. Moving barrage fire was planned on likely enemy tank avenues
of approach. Fires within the depths of the defense were planned in case the
enemy managed to break though the defenses. Interlocking fields of fire were
established in front of and within the defenses. The 63rd Rifle Division was
placed in reserve in the depths of the army’s right flank, while the 343rd Rifle
Division and the 57th Artillery Regiment were in reserve in the depths of the
Army’s left flank.8
The river frontage was not ideal for defense. The enemy held the higher
banks and could observe in depth many of the sectors of Soviet defense. The
east bank ground was sandy, which made construction of defensive positions
and truck movement difficult. The German-held west bank had many sections
covered by brush and forest, which masked German movements. On
13 August, the German 6th Army resumed its offensive. Its main attack fell
on the 4th Tank Army and penetrated its defenses, driving deep along the
southern flank of the 21st Army. The German attack was skirting the Don
River bank. General-Major Danilov committed first his 343rd Rifle Division
and then his 63rd Division to defend the opening 30-kilometer gap. The
Germans attempted to cross the Don River along the 21st Army’s southern
flank, but the defense held. The maneuver of artillery and massing of artillery
fire proved decisive in the defense. The artillery and engineers had worked well
together in hiding multiple firing positions. The Germans were unable to cross

7
D. K. Slepenkov, Army Operations, pp. 221–22. At this point of the war, a full-up TO&E rifle division had 9,435 soldiers,
thirty-six 76 mm howitzers, twelve 122 m howitzers, and 160 mortars, 123 trucks, and 1,700 horses. The problem
was, there were no full-up rifle divisions.
8
Ibid., pp. 222–23.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 73

the Don in the 21st Army sector but were making steady progress advancing
through the Soviet 4th Tank Army sector.9
To take pressure off the 4th Tank Army, on 18 August, the Stalingrad Front
commander ordered that the 63rd Army (the 21st Army’s northern neighbor)
and the 21st Army conduct a combined attack, using two divisions of the 63rd
and two of the 21st (the 304th and 96th Rifle Divisions) to conduct a river
crossing west across the Don River and attack in the direction of Serafimovich
to threaten the Stalingrad LOC of the attacking German 6th Army. The
19 August four-division attack succeeded in seizing a 50-kilometer front
west of the Don River that extended up to 25 kilometers in depth. The attack
slowed the German attack, and the Wehrmacht went on the defense at the start
of September. German attempts to cross the Don in the 21st Army’s sector
continued unsuccessfully. The 21st Army defended this position for three
months.
Takeaways:

(1) To hold a river line forward in strength or lightly with a strong reserve is
a function of the situation, terrain, and mobility of the force. Defending
in strength limits mobility, and the optimum point to counter-attack is
when the enemy is split by the river. However, most forces defend
a river line because the enemy is stronger, requiring weighting the
front. Mobile artillery is key to river-line defense.
(2) A river defense involves maneuver of fires and forces and engineer
assets. Thorough artillery planning is integrated with interlocking and
on-order fires of infantry crew-served and unit weapons and engineer
shaping obstacles. Anti-tank defenses and counter-attacks should be
deeply echeloned. Tying in flanks and junctures with adjoining units is
essential.
(3) The enemy cannot be strong everywhere. A cross-river attack to threa­
ten lines of communication or to engulf an enemy flank has risk but can
pay major dividends.
(4) A river-line defense involves strong stationary positions and effective
maneuver forces.
(5) Most armies consider that when their force is at 50 percent strength,
it is combat ineffective. At this point in the war, the Soviets were in
bad shape and were fighting units at half strength. Tactical units were
frequently fought down to 35 percent strength or collapse when
needed.

9
Ibid., p. 223.
74 L. W. GRAU

Division tactical defense

During World War II, rifle divisions often utilized water obstacles to consti­
tute a strong, stubborn defense. Defending divisions were usually under-
strength and had a wide front to defend. To compensate, they relied on the
water obstacle, carefully considered engineer preparation, and a thoroughly
prepared fire plan, including all organic weapons. Usually, the main defense
was close to the river bank. In those instances where the river ran through
a wide, open valley and the opposite bank dominated the area, the main
defensive line was located away from the river bank on more suitable terrain
from where the river and valley were under observation and within small-arms
and machine gun range. Or the defenders would construct fortified forward
security posts along the bank, which could be covered by artillery and mortar
fire from the main defensive line.10
In late September 1943, the 3rd Guards Rifle Division of the 2nd Guards
Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front participated in the Melitopol Offensive,
reached the lower course of the Dnieper River, and liberated Kharkovka on
the Black Sea Coast in November. Regiments of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division
then completed the destruction of enemy forces on the approaches to the
Dniepr River further north. It established a river-line defense at the end of
December 1943. The division was ordered to establish its defense along the
eastern bank from the Domakha Lake to the village of Krinki (located between
Kherson and L’vov in Ukraine). In this region, the Dniepr Rivers flows
through a lowland valley approximately 6 kilometers wide. The Western
bank is higher than the Eastern bank, and the low lands of the river have an
abundance of lakes and channels, allowing vehicle passage only in freezing
weather. The Western bank, which was occupied by the enemy, had heights
that were much easier to defend. The reason for the division defense was to
block an important avenue of advance. It was important to prevent the enemy
from crossing the Dniepr in this region to advance into the rear of those Soviet
forces moving to the Crimea to seize a southern beachhead on the Sivash Sea.
The division had to prevent a German river crossing.11
Since the defensive sector was approximately 30 kilometers wide, the divi­
sion commander decided to defend in a single echelon. The 9th and 13th
Guards Rifle Regiments manned the first echelon, while the 5th Guards Rifle
Regiment was the commander’s reserve. The forward regiments deployed in
a single echelon as well. The commander weighted his left flank in the area
where a railroad bridge crossed the Dniepr. This would provide a short route
to the Crimean Peninsula, and the enemy terrain in this region was favorable

10
I. S. Liutin, Тактика в боевых примерах: Дивизия [Combat Examples of Tactics: Division] (Moscow: Voyenizdat
1976) pp. 288–89.
11
Ibid., p. 289.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 75

to their crossing. The 9th Regiment was on the left flank and occupied
a 7-kilometer frontage against this bridge.
The 13th Regiment strong-pointed the rest of the frontage. The reserve
regiment separated into battalions and occupied ready positions behind the
left flank regiment, prepared to conduct a two-pronged counter-attack. The
division commander further weighted his left flank with artillery. The most-
important element of the division defense was the nine anti-tank strong points
within forward battalion defenses. Six of these were on the left flank. Some of
these were reinforced with direct-fire 76 mm cannon. These strong points
were sited to cover entrance and exit points across the river. Engineer obstacles
were positioned at likely crossing sites, as were concentrations of fires. Direct-
fire howitzers also served as anti-tank weapons. Artillery planning was inten­
sive, covering likely assembly areas, march routes, and crossing points.
Observation posts covered the width of the sector. Coordination for covering
flanks and junctures was accomplished by the unit commanders on site. Night
patrols were active, looking for any indication of enemy activity. Local inha­
bitants were evacuated and their homes and buildings prepared for defense.12
Figure 2 shows that the German 312th Infantry Regiment of the 79th
Infantry Division was defending against them but lacked detailed information.
The 13th Guards Rifle Regiment was defending with three battalions on line
with the 1st and 3rd battalions with a company in the second echelon.
A company of the 2nd Battalion was the Regimental reserve. A battalion of
the 9th Guards Rifle Regiment was on their left flank. A battalion of the 122nd

Figure 2. Right flank of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division River Defense, September 1943–
February 1944.

12
Ibid., pp. 289–90. The rifle division TO&E included thirty 57 mm anti-tank cannon and 228 anti-tank rifles. Map from
V. G. Reznichenko, Тактика в боевых примерах: Полк [Combat Examples of Tactics: Regiment] (Moscow:
Voyenizdat 1974) Map Index 56. Map redrawn by Charles K. Bartles.
76 L. W. GRAU

Artillery was emplaced within direct fire range. The Kopka River runs through
the defensive position and joins the Dnieper at the junction of 9th and 13th
regiments. Seven 45 mm or 57 mm antitank guns were dug in forward of the
Kopka River in the Dniepr River valley. The hamlets of Krinki and Kazachi
Lageri are on high ground. The obvious question is: Why wasn’t the defense
primarily on the high ground instead of in the valley? In December, the Dniepr
does freeze over despite its proximity to the Black Sea. The Soviets wanted to
fight the Germans on the ice within the range of their anti-tank guns.
The Soviet force spent a great deal of time digging in and camouflaging their
positions. After all this, the enemy came, but only in small groups to test the
crossing sites and determine the location of the defenses and their key weap­
ons. The Soviets did not disclose their main fighting positions. They
responded to the crossing probes with duty machine guns, roving guns,
mortars, and sniper groups.13 The Germans did not attempt a major crossing
at this site.14 In February 1944, the Division moved to the Perekop Isthmus
and fought in the Crimea, including the Liberation of Sevastopol.
Takeaways:

(1) To be strong everywhere is to be strong nowhere. A commander has to

accept risk and over-extend his force when necessary to accomplish the
mission.
(2) A good eye for terrain is necessary, and a good understanding of how
the enemy fights guides the preparation of a defense.
(3) The Soviets used and Russians use artillery a lot closer to the forward
edge than Western armies. Artillery in the direct-fire role is quicker,
more accurate, and more vulnerable. Artillery firing in direct or low-
trajectory mode continues to fire when friendly aviation is overhead.
Russian artillery seldom fires from its actual firing positions when
Russian defenses are probed. Duty or ‘roving gun’ pieces answer probes
and provocations and then move on. Anti-tank long-range attacks,
near-range ambushes, traps, ditches, counter-attacks, and strongpoints
are a feature of the modern Russian defense.
(4) A defending force should not disclose the location of its crew-served
weapons when probed. Rather, return fire should be from locations
separate from primary fighting positions.

13
Ibid., p. 266. A ‘duty’ machine gun provides required fires from a temporary position separated from his normal
position to prevent the enemy from determining where the crew-served weapons are. A ‘roving gun’ is an artillery
piece that provides on-call fire from a temporary position and then moves to another temporary position. The
regiment had a battery of 120 mm mortars (not shown on graphic). Each platoon had several ‘snipers’ armed with
the Mosin-Nagant 7.62 x 54 mm bolt-action scoped rifle. At this point in the war, the bulk of Soviet infantry were
armed with a 7.62 x 25 mm submachine gun with an effective range of 125–150 meters. The snipers were needed
to engage longer-range targets.
14
S. Liutin, Combat Examples of Tactics, p. 292.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 77

(5) Smoke usually accompanies a river crossing. Smoke does not normally
hug a river but lies in a blanket above it. Forces close to the water line
can often see below the smoke. Russian combat vehicles, including self-
propelled howitzers, can lay their own defensive smoke screen.

Regimental tactical defense

At the beginning of August 1942, the 322nd Rifle Division of the 16th Army
was ordered to defend along the Eastern bank of the Resseta River with a 14-
kilometer frontage and a depth of 8 kilometers.15 The 324th Rifle Division
defended on the right, and the 387th Rifle Division defended on the left. The
flanks were tied in to allow a steadfast defense. The 322nd Infantry division
consisted of the 1085th, 1087th, and 1089th Rifle Regiments, the 886th Artillery
Regiment, and various divisional subunits. In addition, the division was
reinforced with the 117th Light Artillery Regiment. The total personnel
strength of the division on 10 August 1942 was about 9,000 personnel
(which included some 6,000 actual combatants). The armaments included
5,950 rifles, 490 submachine guns, 140 light machineguns, 56 medium machi­
neguns, 170 antitank rifles, seven 122 mm howitzers, twenty-nine 76 mm
cannon, eighteen 45 mm cannon, five 37 mm antiaircraft guns, sixty-one
50 mm mortars, and sixty-three 82 mm mortars. The ammunition supply
included l.1 combat loads of rifle cartridges, .8 combat load of 50 mm mortar
rounds, .1 combat load of 82 mm mortar rounds, 1.3 combat loads of 45 mm
cannon rounds, 1 combat load of 76 mm cannon rounds, .6 combat loads of
122 mm howitzer rounds, and .4 combat load of anti-tank rifle ammunition.16
The 1085th Rifle Regiment defended on gently sloping, sandy hills, thickly
overgrown with a variety of trees. The Resseta River flowed in front of the
forward edge of the defense. This winding, slow-moving river was 30 to 40
meters wide with a depth of up to 2 meters in places. Although the bridges over
the river were destroyed, there were fording sites, especially in the region of
Klintsi, height 149.7, and Khat’kovo. The weather in August 1942 was excel­
lent; therefore, the roads were passable for all types of transport. The local
population was evacuated in the spring of 1942 so the towns and villages were
deserted.17
The regiment dug over 100 fighting positions and constructed 150 covered
dugouts, emplaced 180 anti-tank and 5,500 antipersonnel mines, and
15
The Resseta River is a tributary of the Zhizda River, which is a tributary of the Oka River, which is a main tributary of
the mighty Volga River. It flows near Bryansk — an area that saw heavy fighting during WWII.
16
‘Оборонителеый бой 1085-го Стрелкого Полка 322-й Стрелковой Дивизии в Августе 1942 г. на р. Рессета’
[Defensive Combat of the 1085th Rifle Regiment of the 322nd Rifle Division in August 1942 on the Resseta River’,
http://militera.lib.ru/science/boy_strelkovogo_polka/16.html. A combat load is the amount of ammunition nor­
mally required for a 24-hour day of combat per weapon. A submachine gun had a 300 round combat load, a light
machine gun-800 rounds, a medium machine gun — 2,500 rounds, a 50 mm mortar — 120 rounds, an 82 mm
mortar — 120 rounds, a 76 mm howitzer — 80 rounds. The division was clearly short of ammunition.
17
Ibid.
78 L. W. GRAU

constructed over 6 kilometers of barbed wire obstacles. They dug 7 kilometers

of sharp escarpment on the East bank of the Resseta. Two kilometers in the
depth of the defense, they dug tank traps and created multiple entanglements.
They created tree falls up to 15 kilometers into the depth of the defense for
observation and fire fights. Tree cutting at the forward edge of positions was
designed to preserve camouflage, support observation, permit fires, and create
obstacles that would direct the enemy into defending machine gun fire.18
The regiment was defending in a single echelon. Its left flank was held by
the second battalion of the 1087th Rifle Regiment, while the right flank was
held by the 1095th Rifle Regiment. The right flank is where the Resseta joins
the Zhizdra River, so the Division was split by a waterway. The regimental
reserve was A Company of the northern flanking 1095th battalion. The ham­
lets of Karaynov and Voskhod are located within the sector, as is the Bozhan
woodworking factory. The Soviets had earlier destroyed a bridge crossing the
Rosseta sector. The division’s reserve was the division training battalion
located behind the regiment. Four ‘on order’ battalion defensive sites were
also constructed to the east of Figure 3.
The 1st Artillery Battalion of the Division Artillery Group was placed in
support of the regiment (1, 2, 3, and 7 Batteries). To decentralize artillery fire
direction, the 3rd battery commander’s observation post was located with the

Figure 3. Defensive combat of the 1085th Rifle Regiment on the Resseta River, 11 August 1942.

18
V. G. Reznichenko, Combat Examples of Tactics: Regiment, Map Index 57. Map redrawn by Charles K. Bartles.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 79

1st Rifle Battalion, the 2nd with the 2nd Rifle Battalion, and the 1st with the
3rd Rifle Battalion. The 7th Battery Commander and 1st Artillery Battalion
commander were collocated with the Regimental Command Post. The artillery
had the following missions: prevent the concentration of the enemy in the
villages and groves on the West bank of the Resseta; prevent the enemy from
crossing the Resseta, especially at the fords; should the enemy gain the woods
on the Eastern bank, suppress him in his assembly area; prevent the further
advance of the enemy; and support the counter-attack of the regimental
reserve (a company of submachine gunners) with the entire Division
Artillery Group.
Routes for the reserve counter-attacks were marked and rehearsed.
According to reconnaissance and German POWs, the enemy offensive mission
was to break through the Soviet defense at the juncture of the 16th and 61st
Armies and exploit their success to the north and northeast, cross the Zhizdra
River from the north, and reach the line Sykhinichi-Kozel’sk on 18 August.
The enemy assigned attack sectors to his force: The 365th infantry regiment of
the 211th Infantry Division had the Zhizdra River to Klintsi; the 52nd Infantry
Division (163, 181, and 205 Rifle Regiments) had Klintsi to the woods south of
Khat’kovo; the 19th Tank Division (27, 73, and 74 Tank Regiments) were
south of that. Opposing the 322nd Rifle Division were up to 150 tanks, with
300 more tanks to the south.19
Small groups of five to 10 German light and medium tanks, which fought in
close cooperation with infantry armed with automatic weapons, opposed the
1085th Regiment. The 1st and 2nd battalions each had about 20 anti-tank
rifles, bottles filled with flammable liquid (‘Molotov cocktails’), and anti-tank
hand grenades. The 3rd battalion position had six anti-tank guns, four anti-
tank rifles, eight flame throwers, anti-tank hand grenades, Molotov cocktails,
and anti-tank mines.20
The enemy had decisive air superiority. Every day they flew reconnaissance
missions. During an attack, the enemy would systematically bomb Soviet
forward positions. As much as a squadron of heavy bombers and dive bombers
would hit the division. The division had a single battery of five 37 mm antiair­
craft guns and the antiaircraft fire from its rifles, machine guns, and anti-tank
rifles.21
The Germans began to increase their reconnaissance on 20 July. Aerial
reconnaissance seemed particularly interested in the forward defenses and
artillery firing positions. The enemy began regrouping and reinforcing their
forces on 1 August. By 7 August, it became very difficult to scout the enemy. At
1930 hours on 7 August, a reinforced German infantry company conducted
a reconnaissance by battle from Khat’kovo to Karainov (the juncture of the
19
Оборонителеый бой.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
80 L. W. GRAU

1085th and 1087s regiments). This reconnaissance was deflected by small arms
and artillery fire from dug-in positions. From 7 to 10 August, the Germans
conducted powerful artillery strikes from the region of Klinitsi, and dive-
bomber attacks attempted to disorganize the Soviet defenses while concentrat­
ing their own forces.22
The enemy attack began at 0415 on 11 August 1942 with an intense artillery
and mortar strike from the vicinity of Klinitsi and Khat’kovo. Simultaneously,
dive-bombers struck the high ground of ‘Dlinnaya’ by the Bozhan woodwork­
ing factory and the high ground ‘Vystup’. After an hour’s artillery and aviation
preparation, the enemy laid a smoke screen over the Resseta River and fired
smoke rounds onto the Soviet forward defenses. At 0515, the Germans began
crossing the Resseta on a wide front under the cover of their smoke screen.23
After a bitter 5-hour battle, the enemy managed to wedge himself into
Soviet defenses only in the direction of his main attack. By 1030, the enemy
365th Infantry Regiment and 211th Infantry Division seized the high ground
‘Dlinnaya’ and the shattered woods a kilometer to the south and the high
ground at ‘Vystup’. The division commander ordered the 1085th Commander
to destroy the enemy on his right flank, counter-attacking with the division’s
reconnaissance company in conjunction with the forces of the neighboring 3rd
Battalion, 1095th Regiment. The 2nd battalion did not have sufficient combat
power to shift the enemy out of its area. A counter-attack by the division’s
training battalion and a company of submachine gunners from the 1095th
Regiment destroyed up to a company of enemy at the ‘Vystup’ high ground.
The enemy attempted to succeed in the second battalion area and resumed
their attack at the Bozhan woodworking factory, only to be defeated by the
fires of the 2nd Battalion.24
It was a successful defense due to a reasoned use of the advantages of the
terrain; skilled engineer layout of the defensive positions; a thorough, com­
prehensive fire plan; and the stubbornness and bravery of the soldiers. It is
necessary to understand how and where the enemy will plan to cross
a waterway to concentrate sufficient resources in an over-extended defense.
The commander must also consider the maneuver of reserves, fire, and
artillery. In a river defense, counter-attacks must occur earlier, and artillery
and mortars should be positioned further forward to the front line where their
destructive power can be maximized.25
Takeaways:

(1) A planned river defense is stationary, and the maneuver opportunities

available to the commander are his reserves, artillery, artillery fires, and

22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
V. G. Reznichenko, Combat Examples of Tactics: Regiment, p. 267.
25
Ibid., pp. 267–68.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 81

responsive engineer shaping obstacles (cratering charges, automated

mine fields, dead falls).
(2) It is difficult to conceal a defensive layout, particularly when a waterway is
involved. In this example, the German force knew where the regimental and
battalion boundaries were and directed their attacks accordingly.
(3) Rivers are more likely to be fordable in August in the northern hemi­
sphere. A northern river in winter is not likely to be much of an obstacle at
all. There is no mention of German bridging during this event. The
assumption is that any German vehicles drove across at a ford.
(4) Constituting an effective reserve is a challenge. This commander relied
on a company from a sister regiment, the division training battalion
(staffed with raw recruits learning to be soldiers and the division
reconnaissance company).

Back to the future

History does not have all the answers, but it helps frame the questions. The
Russians do not see future conventional maneuver war under nuclear-threatened
conditions as a repeat of World War II. They don’t see millions of soldiers on
battlefields with thousands of miles of connected trenches. They do see fragmen­
ted (очаговый) battlefields that are fought with open flanks protected by fires,
shaping obstacles, strongpoints, counter-attacks, and maneuver. They see trad­
ing ground for time, drawing an enemy into the depths of Russia where his
supply lines are overextended and he has reached his culminating point. At that
point, a strong operational counter-stroke will bring about his defeat.26
The Russians are well equipped and trained for river crossing.27 They also
consider rivers as being a temporary ally in the defense. In the Russian spring
and fall, off-road maneuver comes to a standstill, unless equipped with machines
designed to operate particularly in Russian terrain. In winter, rivers freeze and are
not much of an obstacle. In summer, the ground is hard and the rivers are low.
The Russians may have an answer to scraping together an extra reserve.
During the Afghanistan War, the Soviets introduced the броннегрупа [bron­
negruppa-armored group] concept.28 What does a US infantry commander do
with his Bradleys when the soldiers dismount and move ahead on line? They
follow and support by fire. What does a US infantry commander do with his
Bradleys when the soldiers dismount and dig in for a defense? They are
integrated into the defense. The Russian commander often pulls the infantry
fighting vehicles back to form a mobile reserve. Occasionally, they are
26
L. W. Grau and C. K. Bartles, ‘Russian Aviation in Support of the Maneuver Defense’, Aviation Digest (October–
December) (2018), https://www.rucker.army.mil/aviationdigest/assets/archive/AVN_DIG_2018_10-12.pdf.
27
L. W. Grau, ‘Russian Deliberate River Crossings: Choreographing a Water Ballet’, Engineer (October–December)
(2019), https://home.army.mil/wood/index.php/download_file/view/7441/676.
28
L. W. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press 1996) p. 2.
82 L. W. GRAU

supplemented with any spare tanks or anti-tank or reconnaissance vehicles.

Under the command of a deputy, the bronnegruppa is a potent, rapid reserve.29
Defending a river line implies that most of the defense will be weighted
forward on the river line. Even if the camouflage effort is good, enemy artillery
will still probably concentrate on the river line. During World War II, when
the Russians defended prominent defensive terrain (such as high ground),
they would often dig in their defenses on that terrain, but man it lightly during
the enemy artillery preparation and keep the bulk of the force back. After the
enemy artillery preparation, they would move the unit into the just-shelled
defensive positions to fight the enemy. This is still a valid tactic. The Russians
would want to retain reconnaissance forces and remote sensors deep in enemy
territory to detect movement of high-value targets, including bridging assets.
Robotic firing systems and FASCAM systems may well be integrated into
forward river defense in the future.

Notes on contributor
Dr.Lester W.Grau is a senior analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served the US Army for 53 years, retiring as an infantry
Lieutenant Colonel and continuing service through research and teaching in Army profes­
sional military education. His on-the-ground service spanned from the Vietnam War to Cold
War assignments in Europe, Vietnam, Korea, and the Soviet Union, to the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq. He has conducted various assignments in Russia, including collaborative research
with the Russian General Staff’s Military History Institute. He has conducted collaborative
research in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and with numerous organizations in Europe. Dr. Grau is the
author of 18 books and over 250 articles and studies on tactical, operational, and geopolitical
subjects, translated into several languages.

29
Ibid., throughout.
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