UPDATE ’~’’’~

EXCHANGE: The Organizational Behavior

1981, Volume VI, Number 2
Teaching Journal

Purpose: - The purpose of the UPDATE section is to provide teachers of OB with a summary of the major
conceptual areas in a specific topic including (1) a concise introduction to the major concepts, (2) a sense of the scope
and depth of the topic, and (3) a list (briefly annotated) of some key articles or books that would provide the reader
with a solid working knowledge of the conceptual work on the topic.
In the spirit of continuing education, such articles would allow us all to upgrade or at least update our concep-
tual knowledge on a wide variety of topics. In the spirit of an applied behavioral science, these articles could
strengthen the connection and dialogue between theory and practice.
Submissions should be sent to David Berg, UPDATE Editor, Yale School of Organization and Management,
Box lA, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.

BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION

Roy J. Lewicki
Duke University

According to Mintzberg (1975), negotiation is one e

Interpersonal negotiation occurs between two in-
of the ten roles that managers are most frequently dividuals who have different preferences or priorities
called upon to perform; yet the topic headings of for particular solutions to a problem. This might occur
&dquo;bargaining&dquo; and &dquo;negotiation&dquo; rarely appear in any between two individuals who have to work out con-
organizational behavior text. When these topics do flicting responsibilities in the jobs assigned to them, or
appear, they are treated within the context of either between two managers who agree to endorse each
lagor-management relations, or mentioned as a com- other’s proposals before they enter a committee
ponent of conflict and conflict management processes; meeting. It may also occur between two individuals of
both of these areas are themselves underdeveloped in different power - such as manager and subordinate
organizational behavior courses. -

in the determination of specific goals to be accom-

There are a variety of reasons why bargaining and plished (as part of an M60 procedure), or in discuss-
negotiation have been neglected in organizational ing salary for the upcoming year.
behavior courses. First, as will be shown in this paper,
the literature in this area has been frustratingly diverse Intergroup negotiation takes place when two
0

and diffuse; few authors have performed the task of
drawing this literature together and presenting it to a
managerial audience. The absence of this integration
has inhibited the development of conceptual models
for describing basic negotiation processes, or illus-
trating the broad range of managerial and organiza-
tional problems that may be viewed in these terms.
Second, models of bargaining and negotiation are also
tied to models of power, influence and &dquo;politics&dquo; in
organizations, themselves neglected topics in the OB
literature. Finally, bargaining and negotiation have
been treated as &dquo;formalized&dquo; managerial processes
which only occur at the interorganizational level, e.g.,
collective bargaining, merger and acquisition, pur-
chasing and sales. In fact, however, bargaining and
groups, projects or departments in a company have
conflicting preferences or priorities that must be
resolved, and when the groups seek to influence each
other to determine this resolution. Marketing and pro-
duction departments in a company frequently negoti-
ate on how new products should be developed and pro-
moted. A staff group debates with an operating group
on the relative usefulness of a long range planning
model. Two departments disagree on budget priorities.
Plant A, which manufactures component parts for
products that are assembled by Plant B, attempt to
resolve differences created by different standards of
quality control and allocation of costs.
Interorganizational negotiation occurs when two
9

negotiation usually informally

occur ongoing
as an major organizational units have conflicting prefer-
mechanism of influence and dispute resolution be- ences or priorities that must be resolved, and when the
tween individuals, groups, departments and divisions organizational units attempt to influence one another
within an organization. Thus, negotiation processes to resolve these conflicts. Collective bargaining be-
occur at three distinct organizational levels: tween union and management over salary packages,

33
Downloaded from jme.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 14, 2015
fringe benefits, and working conditions is the most
obvious example. Mergers between companies, sales
and purchasing agreements, acquisition of financing,
and the management of relationships with governmen-
tal organizations -
e.g., regulatory agencies are
other types of negotiation that frequently occur at the
interorganizational level.
Given this wealth of examples, it is clear that
negotiation skills are essential for the successful
manager. The purpose of this review is to sketch an
overview of the field that will be helpful to the
uninitiated reader, and to point out some of the basic
source material that currently exists. In conducting
this review, the dominant models of negotiation will
also be emphasized. Following the review, several sug-
gestions will be made for integrating negotiation topics
into typical organizational behavior courses.
Growth and Development of Research
Interest in Bargaining and Negotiation
In order to understand the current research
literature in bargaining and negotiation, it is necessary
to understand its intellectual roots and traditions. This
is not a purposeless exercise, since most of the impor-
tant and seminal works on negotiation were born, and
continue to flourish, outside of the traditional
organizational behavior literature. The disciplines
which contributed most to early theory development,
and which will continue to do so, are:
Experimental economies and applied mathematics,
particularly the early conceptions of game theory
(Rappaport, 1966; Shubik, 1964). Game theory pro-
vided simple models and paradigms for representing
the choice alternatives available to decision makers
with interdependent economic interests, as well as
theories and models for predicting &dquo;economically
rational&dquo; behavior in these situations. Contemporary
research may be found in Young (1975); good treat-
ments for understanding applications to negotiation
are found in Davis (1970) and McDonald (1975).
Basic social psychology. There were several
streams of research in social psychology that made
early contributions to current research in negotiation.
One group extended the work of the economic game
theorists, examining the impact of various forms of
economic games and models on behavior. Research
efforts were determined to discover whether economi-
cally &dquo;rational&dquo; solutions would prevail when various
social psychological factors were manipulated - e.g.,
the nature of the payoff matrices, the number of inter-
action trials, opportunities for communication be-
Downloaded from jme.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 14, 2015
tween players, characteristics of the interacting par-
ties. etc. Examples can be found in books by Tedeschi
(1972) and Wrightsman, O’Connor and Baker (1972).
A second stream of social psychological research
-
originated with interest in processes of cooperation
and competition between individuals and groups (c.f.,
Deutsch, 1973; Sherif, 1966). These authors contri-
buted extensively to the understanding of cooperative
and competitive relationships between individuals and
groups, and the antecedents and consequences of these
relationships. Finally, a third stream of research
probed the nature and structure of attitudes and atti-
tude change. Since much of the ongoing process of
negotiation involves the presentation and &dquo;pack-
aging&dquo; of information in order to persuade one party
to change their position, research on attitude change,
persuasion and &dquo;influence&dquo; processes can be used to
describe or explain aspects of the negotiation process.
Much of the early opinion change research provided
the foundations (e.g., Hovland, Janis and Kelley,
1953), whereas more contemporary and updated
theories may be found in Fishbein and Azjen (1975) or
Zimbardo, Ebbesen and Maslach (1977).
Labor-management relations. Several early works
in the labor area provided the basic background and
framework for understanding the negotiation process.
There are a number of important works in this area.
Clearly, the most well-known - and still a classic in
the area -
is Walton and McKersie’s A Behavioral
Theory of Labor Negotiation (1965). Walton and
McKersie describe two basic forms of bargaining -
distributive and integrative roughly corresponding
-
to competitive and cooperative negotiations, or
&dquo;hard&dquo; bargaining and problem-solving. These two
distinctions continue to pervade current thinking
about negotiation processes, and will be described
more extensively below.
A second area of focus in the labor-management
area was in procedures for dispute resolution, par-
ticularly arbitration and mediation. The arbitration
and mediation models were well-understood by practi-
tioners of labor relations, but poorly described and
understood by behavioral scientists. Descriptions of
the functions and activities of third parties can be
fvound in Elkouri and Elkouri (1978) and Stevens
(1963). Douglas (1962) presents an outstanding exam-
ple of the mediation process by reproducing the
transcript from a negotiation and mediated dispute.
Political science and international relations. The
last group that contributed a great deal to early con-
ceptualization of the bargaining process were political
and behavioral scientists, who were most interested in
describing, modeling, simulating and/or resolving
34
conflicts between political groups or nations. Par-
ticularly during the cold war of the late 1950s and early
1960s, a number of social and behavioral scientists
turned their attention to the increasing international
tension and its implications. Kenneth Boulding, Erich
Fromm, Harold Lasswell, Thomas Schelling, Lewis
Coser, Otto Klineberg, Herbert Kelman, Roger Fisher
and Morton Deutsch all wrote extensively on the
behavioral scene about aspects of conflict escalation,
negotiation, and conflict management. Representative
samples of early work in this area can be found in
Smith (1971) and Kelman (1965). Schelling (1963) and
Ikle (1964) remain as brilliant classics in the area.
As can be determined from this review, a number
of social science disciplines have made early theoretical
or conceptual contributions to the current literature in
negotiation. These approaches represent either the
development of basic theory and models (as repre-
sented by the work in economics, game theory, and
basic social psychology), or descriptions of negotiation
processes and problems within certain areas of applied
concern (particularly labor relations and international
affairs). In the past ten years, there has been an exten-
sive bridging of theory and research between the con-
ceptual models and the applications. Research on bar-
gaining in social psychology and organizational
behavior has become more rich and realistic by
enhancing the complexity and realism of the experi-
mental designs and negotiation scenarios. Conversely,
much of the writing in labor relations, international
relations and other areas of negotiation has been
strengthened by basic economic and psychological
models. The remainder of this review will focus on
these more contemporary integrations. In examining
this work, several models for organizing the contem-
porary literature will be proposed and described.
Classification Schemes and Key Concepts
No single model or conceptual approach has
received general acclaim as the sole approach for view-
ing and understanding negotiation processes. As the
various historical roots of contemporary research have
been intertwined by more recent writers, three domi-
nant approaches to negotiation have emerged: the
&dquo;types of negotiation&dquo; model, the &dquo;components of
negotiation&dquo; model, and the &dquo;stages of negotiation&dquo;
model. The &dquo;types&dquo; approach proposed different
kinds of negotiation for different issues and different
parties. The &dquo;components&dquo; model treats negotiation
as a complex social interaction, and subdivides the
process into the various component factors that are
likely to influence bargaining outcomes. Finally, the
&dquo;stages&dquo; model approaches negotiation as social inter-
35
Downloaded from jme.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 14, 2015
action that evolves over time, and attempts to specify
what the bargainer must do at each stage of the time
process, from beginning to end. Each of these models
will be described below, with attention given to the
more current writings and research.
Types of negotiation. Probably the single most
popular description of negotiation processes applied to
organizational settings is drawn from the work of
Walton and McKersie (1965). Walton and McKersie
described four different &dquo;models&dquo; or types of negotia-
tion : distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining,
attitudinal structuring and intraorganizational
bargaining.
1. Distributive bargaining is best described as win-
lose bargaining, or negotiating under conditions of
zero-sum conflict. Using simple concepts of utility
theory and game theory, Walton and McKersie devel-
oped a reward-cost model for assessing negotiating
issues that are structured such that one party will gain
at the expense of the other (e.g., negotiating a wage
rate). Central to distributive bargaining is the deter-
mination of target points (outcomes desired as a result
of negotiation), resistance points (minimal outcomes
that one will settle for before refusing to bargain fur-
ther), and positive and negative settlement ranges
(overlap or nonoverlap of target points such that both
parties can achieve a possible settlement above their
resistance points). Determining these points for
himself will enable a bargainer to decide what to aim
for in negotiation, and when to &dquo;walk away&dquo; and re-
ject an unacceptable offer. The opponent’s target and
utility points may then be determined by interrogation,
and/or influenced by tactics designed to persuade the
opponent to reveal the resistance point, to modify the
perception of how realistic the target point is, or to
convince the opponent that achievement of the objec-
tives is unlikely.
2. Integrative bargaining is usually described as
&dquo;win-win&dquo; bargaining, &dquo;nonzero-sum conflict,&dquo; or
even &dquo;problem solving.&dquo; Integrative bargaining is
most amenable to negotiating problems when the par-
ties desire to arrive at a solution that is mutually
satisfactory to both sides, and when such a solution is
feasible given the issues in dispute. Rather than to
develop target points and resistance points, parties
approach negotiation as a &dquo;problem to be solved&dquo;;
they then mutually develop a strategy for commonly
identifying the problem, searching for alternative solu-
tions, developing preference orderings for various
solutions, and developing joint agreement on a par-
ticular solution that will satisfy both sides. This
process is described by Walton and McKersie,
elaborated by Filley (1975), and well summarized in a
note by Ware (1980).
Integrative bargaining is a significantly different
process than distributive bargaining, requiring dis-
tinctly different attitudes and behaviors on the part of
negotiators. In order to be successful in distributive
bargaining, negotiators must distort and manipulate
information, use threats and bluffs, and be minimally
honest and trustworthy in their conduct. In contrast,
successful integrative bargaining requires the
disclosure of factual and valid information, the
absence of threats and bluffs, and increasing levels of
trust and openness in order to be successful. Dif-
ferences between the two models, and implications of
these differences, are well summarized in a subsequent
article by Walton and Dutton (1969).
3. Attitudinal structuring defines the nature of the
relationship between the parties. Walton and McKersi6
argue that there are four major attitudinal determi-
nants of the relationship between negotiating parties:
(1) motivational orientation and action tendencies,
(2) beliefs about the other party’s legitimacy, (3) feel-
ings of trust toward the other, and (4) feelings of
friendliness-hostility toward the other. Differences in
these elements lead to one of five basic patterns in the
relationship: conflict, or a state of high competitive-
ness ; containment-aggression, or a state of moderate
competitiveness; accommodation, a state of in-
dividualistic orientation in which each side tries to
obtain only its own outcomes; cooperation, a state of
cooperative relationship; and collusion, in which par-
ties actively form a coalition to pursue common ends.
Walton and McKersie demonstrate how this model
accounts for differences and changes in bargaining
relationships, and actively employ balance theory
(Heider, 1958) as a vehicle for analyzing and bringing
about changes in relationships.
&dquo;Managing relationships&dquo; in negotiation has
received surprisingly little attention in more contem-
porary negotiating literature. Perhaps this is because
so much of the research in negotiation has occurred
under controlled laboratory conditions, which can
readily simulate a short-term negotiation but not
understand or measure complex long-term relation-
ships between parties. Yet much of the negotiation
that occurs in organizations -
even at the intergroup
and interorganizational levels -
is concerned with the
development and maintenance of long-term relation-
ships (leases, sales, purchasing, labor relations, etc.).
A great deal of longitudinal research still needs to be
done on the development and change of relationships
between negotiators, and the impact of these relation-
ships on specific negotiating outcomes.
36
Downloaded from jme.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 14, 2015
4. Intraorganizational bargaining is discussed in
the context of boundary roles and role conflict.
Negotiators are often faced with inconsistent demands
and pressures from their constituency and from the
opposing negotiator role. Walton and McKersie
address the nature of role conflict, and suggest a
number of tactics that can be used to manage the ex-
pectations and objectives of one’s constituency.
More recent research has made progress in this
area. Research by Adams (1976) and his associates has
extensively explored the nature of &dquo;boundary roles&dquo;
and boundary role conflict, analogous to the pressures
felt by a negotiating representative. Moreover, a
number of authors (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980;
Abell, 1975) have begun to focus on the use of
bargaining strategy and tactics as a mechanism for
managing influence and resolving interunit disputes,
etc. Bacharach and Lawler have made some distinct
theoretical progress in this regard.
Components of negotiation. Walton and McKer-
sie’s description of various types of negotiation have
continued to be useful descriptors of various forms of
negotiation. Their distinction between distributive and
integrative bargaining has been particularly useful for
recognizing the polar opposites of competitive vs.
cooperative dispute resolution processes. Yet most
negotiation is not purely distributive, integrative, atti-
tudinal or intraorganizational, but a blend of these
processes as various parties become involved, as the
issues change, and as negotiation evolves over time. As
a result, efforts have been made to develop more
sophisticated descriptors of the negotiation process.
The efforts of behavioral scientists to reduce com-
plex negotiations to manageable research proportions
led to the evolution of the &dquo;component&dquo; models of
negotiation. Much of the laboratory research in
experimental gaming and bargaining evolved by
treating various bargaining outcomes as the dependent
variable in an experimental design, and identifying
several independent variables that would affect the
dependent variable. For example, what is the impact
of differences in personality &dquo;type&dquo; (e.g., internal vs.
external control) on outcomes? Or what is the impact
of the availability and use of threats on bargaining
outcomes? Massive volumes of research have explored
the wealth of independent variables that can affect
bargaining results. When this research is classified and
examined according to the types of independent
variables studied, it is possible to identify major
categories of variables, called &dquo;components&dquo; in this
review. The single most comprehensive and integrative
review of this research is provided by Rubin and
Brown (1975); a number of other compilations of
research (e.g., Deutsch, 1973; Druckman, 1977;
Harnett and Cummings, 1980) are also extremely
useful.
After describing the basic characteristics of a
bargaining relationship, Rubin and Brown identify six
key components of negotiation: the goals and motiva-
tions of the negotiator, the social structure in which
the negotiation occurs, the nature of the issues, the
physical characteristics of the negotiation site, the time
frame available, and the personality characteristics of
negotiators. Each of these are important to negotia-
tion in the following ways:
1. Elements of goal structure determine the nature
of the interdependence between the parties. Several
aspects of goal structure are important. The first is the
degree of compatability or interdependence in their
goals -
that is, the extent which the accomplishment
of goals and objectives of one party are strongly tied to
the goals and objectives of the other. Goals may be
promotively interdependent (in which one party’s
accomplishment of goals facilitates the other party’s
accomplishment), contriently interdependent (in which
accomplishment by one party of their goals actively in-
hibits the other party’s accomplishment), or indepen-
dent, in which one party can achieve goals without
affecting the other’s efforts (Deutsch, 1973). Goal
compatibility typically contributes to situations being
defined as competitive or cooperative, zero-sum or
nonzero-sum, distributive or integrative. More will be
said about this later when the nature of issues are
reviewed.
The second component of goals is the tangible and
intangible objectives at stake. Tangible objectives
determine the formal, &dquo;above the table&dquo; goals that
parties seek to obtain in negotiation: specific rates,
prices, wages, terms, contract language, etc. Intangi-
ble goals are the psychological elements of the negotia-
tion that each party seeks to obtain: winning for its
own sake, looking strong, getting a good deal, not los-
ing, gaining or maintaining power, preserving a repu-
tation, etc. Identification of the intangibles is essential
in any negotiation, for these &dquo;psychological&dquo; factors
frequently impact on negotiation outcomes, but are
never actually &dquo;put on the table&dquo; for formal
discussion.
2. Elements of social structure dictate the factors
that contribute to negotiation outcomes as a result of
reviewing negotiation as a socially complex inter-
personal or intergroup process. The number of parties
involved in a negotiation will directly affect the
negotiation outcomes; teams of negotiators tend to
lead to more &dquo;formalized&dquo; and complex negotiations
than two individuals. Moreover, the presence of con-
stituencies and/or audiences exert pressures on
37
Downloaded from jme.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 14, 2015
negotiators that do not exist when negotiators perform
in private, and/or when their performance is not held
accountable to peers or superiors. The presence of
accountability pressures create expectations in
negotiators to look good, to be tough, and to not yield
under pressure. Research by Brown (1968) on face sav-
ing behavior in negotiation has dramatically high-
lighted the power of this effect. Finally, the nature of
negotiation as a social process also contributes to the
emergence of certain &dquo;norms&dquo; or expectations that
shape the way bargainers are expected to behave.
Strong emergent norms of rationality (&dquo;be rational,&dquo;
&dquo;stick to the facts,&dquo; &dquo;be logical&dquo;), reciprocity (&dquo;trade
concession for concession,&dquo; &dquo;tit for tat,&dquo; &dquo;give a little
-
get a little&dquo;) and equity (&dquo; be fair,&dquo; &dquo;split the dif-
ference&dquo;), are powerful social rules that bargainers
can endorse -
or intentionally violate -
in order to
gain negotiation leverage.
3. The structure of the issues in negotiation
process. If the goals or objectives in negotiation are
framed according to the attainment of particular
issues, then these issues may also take on win-win,
win-lose or lose-lose characteristics. It should be noted
here that the determination of goals and/or issues as
&dquo;win-win&dquo; or &dquo;win-lose&dquo; can be an objective process,
but such objectivity is rare among parties who are
deeply involved and emotionally committed to specific
objectives. Pressures toward competition and winning
lead to perceptual distortions that maximize perceived
differences on the issues, and minimize perceived simi-
larities. As a result, many issues which objectively
have strong integrative potential are perceived as dis-
tributive ; these perceptions produce a self-fulfilling
prophecy that forces the process toward win-lose. For
example, the increased scarcity of natural resources,
and increasing economic pressures in the United States
have led many groups to view complex social problems
in strictly win-lose terms. In such situation, third par-
ties may be required to assist the competitive parties in
widening their view to recognize possible win-win
alternatives.
One determinant of the nature of a particular issue
in negotiation is the ability to ’ ’fractionate&dquo; it (Fisher,
1971). This refers to the ease with which negotiators
can devise ways to divide issues into smaller pieces so
that each side may gain something. For example,
&dquo;dollars and cents&dquo; issues in a budget negotiation are
easier to fractionate than an issue of &dquo;principle&dquo; or
&dquo;precedent,&dquo; such as whether the two parties will
agree to fund any new programs at all. A second
characteristic of issues is the ease with which multiple
issues can be linked and tied together. Issue &dquo;packag-
ing,&dquo; tradeoffs and building multiple-issue agreements
are essential to successful negotiations. The strategy of
packaging and repackaging individual demands and
offers into acceptable groupings is instrumental in
accomplishing negotiation objectives (Fisher, 1969).
Finally, much of the writing on the nature of issues
naturally leads to the selection of particular persuasion
tactics by which particular issues can be presented and
won. Not only are many of the &dquo;how to do it&dquo; books
(presented below) valuable in this regard, but the in-
structor in negotiation will find a great deal of useful
material in the social psychological writings on persua-
sion and attitude change. The nature of source, mes-
sage, target and context factors as they affect impact
and acceptability of communications can be made very
relevant to a perspective on negotiation that equates it
with sales and marketing. King and McGinnies (1972),
and Zimbardo, Ebbesen and Maslach (1977) have
done an outstanding job of reviewing the relevant
literature in persuasion for more applied purposes.
4. Physical site characteristics in negotiation refer
to the impact of the spatial environment and site on
bargaining outcomes. Factors such as the shape of the
table, the use of various types of furniture, the for-
mality or informality of the negotiation environment,
and the neutrality of &dquo;ownership&dquo; of the physical
space take on great symbolic significance in negotia-
tion. Rubin and Brown have reviewed what little
research exists in this area, and what can be deduced
from social ecology studies; more interesting teaching
materials can be derived from popular treatments such
as Korda (1975), in which the author gives a number of
graphic examples of the use of furniture and space to
convey power.
5, Temporal factors in negotiation determine the
importance of time and time allocation. Skilled
negotiators employ time-related tactics in a variety of
ways: stalling, delaying or filibustering to wear the
opposition down, or setting artificial deadlines and
options to speed the process up. In addition, most
negotiators are aware that the settlement of many
issues is related to Parkinson’s law - i.e., work fills
the time available, and fatigue or time expiration are
used as justification for concession making, rather
than actually coming to believe the validity or
significance of the other side’s point of view. Time
management has been generally neglected in negotia-
tion research, again perhaps because these studies have
focused on such limited time perspectives.
6. Personality factors are the sixththat shape
area
negotiation outcome. Although students
most of
negotiation agree that the personality characteristics of
the negotiator affect outcomes, the research has pro-
38
Downloaded from jme.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 14, 2015
ceeded in an almost futile search to ascertain which
characteristics are most consistently discriminating.
Both Rubin and Brown (1975) and Hamner (1980)
review a large volume of early experimental studies in
this regard. Rubin and Brown conclude that the per-
sonality variable can best be summarized as a dimen-
sion called &dquo;Interpersonal Orientation,&dquo; broadly
defined as the degree to which the individual
negotiator attends to the interpersonal and social cues
of his opponent as a determinant of (his) own strategy.
This dimension may be combined with motivational
orientation (cooperative individualistic
-
com- -
petitive) to define the personal style the negotiator will
use. To my knowledge, this idea has never been direct-
ly tested in research. Other recent authors e.g., -
Thomas (1976, 1979), have experimented successfully
with conflict management style as a variable that will
broadly account for differences. Even though authors
continue to propose broad descriptors of personal
style that should have significant impact in negotiation
e.g., Maccoby (1976) or Warschaw (1980) prob- -
-
lems of style measurement and demonstrated relation-
ship to negotiation strategy continue to plague the
research and writing in this area. We can conclude that
research summaries on the impact of personality vari-
ables have been largely inconclusive. If this result is
taken at face value, it would suggest that negotiation
effectiveness is more responsive to skill training and
development, and that the &dquo;personality&dquo; of the
negotiator is less of a factor than was traditionally
assumed.
The component approach to negotiation as stated
earlier, approaches negotiation by analyzing the
bargaining process and disecting it into cause and
effect elements. The advantage of this approach is that
it has facilitated the grouping of hundreds of research
studies into some coherent organizing scheme. Once
such a grouping has occurred, it is also easier to iden-
tify areas in which research results are conclusive,
inconclusive, directly conflicting, or even absent. For
these reasons, the component model has appealed to
research scholars and teachers of negotiation.
Even though much work is left to be done, one way
this research can be used is to evolve &dquo;contingency
models&dquo; of negotiation behavior, style and tactics.
This approach would combine research on particular
negotiation styles (Walton and McKersie) and compo-
nent elements in order to achieve particular types of
negotiation results. Since most actual negotiations are,
in fact, a mix of distributive and integrative processes,
attitudinal restructuring, and intraorganizational
bargaining elements, such &dquo;contingency models&dquo;
would be extremely useful for advancing the integra-
tion of research and practice by specifying what
negotiators need to do to achieve particular outcomes.
Finally, extensive reviews of research on component
elements would allow the opportunity to comprehend
which component elements are most likely to account
for the end result in negotiation. Do the goals and/or
nature of the issues tend to explain or predict negotia-
tion outcomes more than the social structure or time
available?
On the other hand, the primary liability of the
component model is that it does not explain negotia-
tion as most negotiators experience it. Even though the
component model may provide for analytical richness
in segmenting and diagnosing negotiations before and
after the fact, actual bargaining proceeds by a linear,
time-series fashion. It begins with a planning and
preparation process, followed by actual negotiations,
followed by procedures for reaching agreement,
resolving disputes, and implementing the negotiated
agreement. To date, no single work in the research
literature has approached negotiation from this
perspective. Although the Walton and McKersie
models do approach negotiation from a time series
perspective, they divide negotiations into separate
types that are likely to be complexly interwoven in
most actual bargaining. One work now in progress
(Lewicki and Litterer, 1982b) will hopefully fulfill this
need. The only works currently available, however,
exist in the applied managerial, or &dquo;how to do it&dquo;
literature.
Time series models of negotiation. There are a
number of books written for the manager who wishes
to learn something about negotiation. Books in this
area vary widely in their organization and treatment of
individual topics, and often propose their own simple
models. However, in one form or another, most of the
books include treatment of elements that would consti-
tute a time-series model - that is, treating negotiation
as a series of definitive stages evolving over time.
These stages typically include planning and prepara-
tion processes, the conduct of the actual negotiations,
and techniques for concluding negotiations and
managing a long-term relationship between the
parties.
Many of these books will leave the academically-
based instructor frustrated and unsatisfied.- Platitudes,
half-truths, overgeneralizations from selected &dquo;war
stories&dquo; and even gross inaccuracies will offend the
research-oriented academic. Nevertheless, these books
have been prepared by experienced negotiators and
management consultants, and several of them are
worth considering as classroom materials, particularly
39
Downloaded from jme.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 14, 2015
for executive development groups and MBAs. The best
works in this area are by Nierenberg (1973), Cohen
(1980), and Levin (1980). Each of the stages in the
time-series model will now be described:
1. Preparation and planning. Planning for
negotiation requires that the parties consider several
factors. First, they need to determine the nature of the
conflict situation they are in facts, history, and how
-
each party perceives it. Second, they need to determine
their own goals and objectives. This may include a
range of goals and objectives, from a &dquo;wish list&dquo; of
most desired objectives on the one hand, to &dquo;minimal-
ly acceptable settlements&dquo; or bottom lines on the other
hand. Third, parties need to evaluate the other side’s
goals and objectives. What are they likely to ask for,
what might they be willing to settle for, and how can
we meet their needs or influence them if their goals are
unrealistic or unachievable? (Nierenberg, 1973, pro-
vides a strong framework for evaluating needs, and
Richardson, 1977, is excellent for using MBO in nego-
tiation to set objectives.) Finally, parties need to
develop a strategy, or a plan for achieving their objec-
tives. Evaluating the length of the negotiation, the par-
ties who must be represented at the table, and proce-
dures for presenting information in order to persuade
the other, are parts of strategy planning. (Strategic
planning on a larger organizational scale has received
extensive treatment in recent years. MacMillan, 1978,
presents an excellent model for the ways that negotia-
tion and politics are integral processes in the develop-
ment of corporate strategy.) This planning and
preparation needs to occur when organizations con-
sider a merger, when a lease is negotiated, or when a
manager plans to ask for a raise from his boss.
2. Actual negotiations. The conduct of the actual
negotiations can be divided into a number of sub-
processes, again determined by their evolution over the
life-span of the negotiation:
a. Entry and initial contact. During this phase,
negotiators endeavor to strike agreement on the basic
ground rules and procedures that they will follow.
Number of parties in the negotiation, place of the
negotiation, time boundaries to be observed, issues of
the agenda and order of discussion, procedures for
caucusing, all are ground rules to be discussed.
Negotiators frequently treat the deliberation of these
ground rules as symbolic predictors of the actual
negotiations; cooperative agreement on ground rules
may bode well for the settlement of the actual issues,
while competitive and hostile disagreement may bode
ill for the discussion of the issues. During this phase,
the parties also exchange their initial proposals or
demands. For example, these &dquo;preliminary meetings&dquo;
are a common occurrence prior to long contract
deliberations between union and management.
b. Clarification and justification. Once initial
positions are exchanged, parties explain, amplify,
clarify, bolster and justify their initial demands. Large
amounts of supporting information and documenta-
tion are provided (c.f., Beckman, 1977, for examples
in buyer-seller negotiations). &dquo;Expert&dquo; testimony and
evidence may be solicited. Parties seek to educate and
inform each other on the issues and their importance.
Personal styles and the use of tactics. The
c.
strength many of the managerial books on negotia-
of
tion is that they provide interesting and graphic
descriptions of how to maintain personal power and
control in negotiations, as well as of the range of tac-
tics that are available to the negotiator. Cohen (1980)
is particularly useful on clarifying how individual
information, power and the management of time are
critical to negotiation effectiveness, even in the simple
process of buying a refrigerator. A similarly useful
treatment is provided by Illich (1980), while
Nierenberg (1973), Levin (1980) and Buskirk (1976)
provide good treatments of tactical alternatives and
their use in negotiation. Karrass (1974) provides the
fullest treatment of tactics in this literature, but the
lack of coherent organization in the book will frustrate
many readers.
d. Hard bargaining and problem solving.
Cohen and others have stressed that most negotiation
fills the time available. One implication is that most
agreements will be arrived at in the last 10-15 percent
of the time allocated for negotiation. Issues which
require win-lose settlements will lead to concession
making and hard bargaining in the final stages; other
issues, which may be amenable to win-win, mutually
satisfactory settlements, will lead to generating and
selecting alternative solutions in this same time phase.
Cohen and Nierenberg provide good treatments of this
process.
Closure and implementation. Most of the
e.
managerially-oriented books provide some informa-
tion on the factors that need to be observed in con-
cluding and implement agreements, wording of con-
tracts and agreements, and developing procedures for
implementation and monitoring. However, they do
not provide extensive treatment of the problems that
arise in managing the agreement, or in building and
maintaining high quality, long-run relationships be-
tween the negotiating parties. Most of the negotiated
40
Downloaded from jme.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 14, 2015
agreements that occur in business are long-term con-
tracts : agreements, purchasing contracts, leasing
agreements, labor contracts, etc. The nature of these
relationships require that parties remember that they
cannot use negotiating strategy and tactics which will
damage the ongoing working relationship between the
parties, and conversely, that developing and monitor-
ing the working relationship in between negotiations
will definitely affect the quality of the negotiation.
Although several of the volumes give brief acknowl-
edgment to this phenomenon, interim relations be-
tween parties deserves much more treatment in the
negotiation literature.
Integrating Negotiation into Typical
Organizational Behavior Courses
The purpose of this review has been to acquaint the
Organizational Behavior instructor with the intellec-
tual roots and current trends of the bargaining and
negotiation literature. In the Organizational Behavior
curriculum, elective courses in negotiation, power, and
conflict management have been appearing with sys-
tematic regularity. At least one previous article in this
journal (Lewicki, 1975) has dealt with the structure
and format of such a course. However, negotiation
also needs to be more fully integrated into introduc-
tory OB courses.
There are a variety of mechanisms for achieving
this integration. In courses that are taught largely by
the case method, cases which are actively concerned
with interpersonal, intergroup or interorganizational
conflict can focus on negotiation as a satisfactory
mechanism for dispute resolution. Analysis of the
situation can proceed by determining the objectives of
each party, the issues at stake, and the negotiating
positions that could be taken by each party in the con-
flict. In courses which employ experiential exercises, a
number of simulations and role plays are available to
illustrate the negotiation process (c.f., Hall, Bowen,
Lewicki and Hall, 1981; Lewicki and Litterer, 1982a).
In both types of courses, negotiation processes can be
readily demonstrated in the classroom, and supported
with lecture and reading materials that are developed
from sources mentioned in this review. Finally, in
courses which are largely theory presentation and lec-
ture in their format, negotiation and bargaining may
be actively integrated with the topics of power, conflict
management, intraorganizational relations, strategy
formulation, and relationships between organizations
and their environments. Treatment of these topics can
include an examination of bargaining and negotiation
as mechanisms for exercising power and managing
relationships within and across organizational boun-
daries. Descriptive, analytical insights may be drawn
from the &dquo;components&dquo; models described earlier,
whereas the course of actual deliberations may be
assessed through the &dquo;types&dquo; or &dquo;time-series&dquo; models.
Summary
The future of teaching and research in negotiations
will involve a deeper and richer treatment of bargain-
ing as a central management skill. Managers of the
future will be operating in environments in which the
economic pressures are strong, in which the resources
-
natural and human resources as well as time and
money - are scarce. Moreover, a number of diverse
and competing groups within the organization
women, minorities, and special interest groups - and
outside the organization environmental lobbies,
-
political parties, advocacy groups, and regulatory
agencies will continue to claim strong and legitimate
-
influence on the goals and directions of the organiza-
tion. Negotiation is a central skill to the management
of conflict under these types of pressures. In the
instructional system, negotiation can no longer be
relegated solely to courses in labor management rela-
tions ; in research, it can no longer be disected into
minute component parts that destroy comprehension
of the gestalt of negotiation. More sophisticated treat-
ment of negotiation in teaching and research is critical,
and more thorough investigation of complex negotia-
tions in all areas of management will enrich both the
research evidence and the quality of instructional
materials.
The Beginner’s Guide
to the Negotiation Literature
If you’ve read any of this material, and you
never
are considering &dquo;once over lightly&dquo; treatment of
a
negotiation, the following sources are suggested. All
references are in the bibliography:
For basicconceptual materials on negotiation:
· The Note by Ware, &dquo;Bargaining Strategies&dquo;
. Walton and
McKersie, Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5
.
Cohen, You Can Negotiate Anything
For teaching materials:
~
Hall, Bowen, Lewicki and Hall. The first edition
(1975) included several negotiation games and role
plays, and the revised edition (available Fall, 1981)
will have more.
~ Lewicki and Litterer, available Spring,
For of concepts:
more sophisticated understanding
· Rubin and Brown, The Social Psychology of
Bargaining and Negotiation
Downloaded from jme.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 14, 2015
Bibliography and References
To promote the identification of those references
which are primarily applied in their orientation as
distinct from those references which are primarily
research, this bibliography has grouped the references
accordingly. Obviously, some sources perform both
roles well, and the author apologizes for any arbitrari-
ness in classification.
Applied (Managerially-Oriented) References
Beckman, N., Negotiations. Lexington, Massachusetts:
Lexington Books, 1977.
- Buskirk, R., Handbook of Management Tactics. New York:
Hawthorne Books, 1976.
Cohen, H., You Can Negotiate Anything. Secaucus, New
Jersey: Lyle Stuart Books, 1980.
Hall, D. T., Bowen, D. D., Lewicki, R. J., and Hall, F.,
Experiences in Management and Organizational Behavior. Revised
Edition. New York: John Wiley, 1981.
Ilich, J., Power Negotiating. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison
Wesley, 1980.
Karrass, C., Give and Take. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell,
1974.
Korda, M., Power: How to Get It, How to Use It. New York:
Random House, 1975.
Levin, E., Levin’s Laws. New York: M. Evans and Company,
1980.
Lewicki, R. J., "A Course in Bargaining and Negotiation."
The Teaching of Organization Behavior, 1(1), 1975, 35-40.
Lewicki, R. J., and Litterer, J., Readings and Experiences in
the Dynamics of Bargaining (tentative title). Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1982a.
Maccoby, M., The Gamesman. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1976.
MacMillan, I. C., Strategy Formulation: Political Concepts. St.
Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing, 1978.
McDonald, J., The Game of Business. New York: Doubleday,
1975.
New York:
Nierenberg, G., Fundamentals of Negotiating.
Hawthorne Books, 1973.
Richardson, R. C., Collective Bargaining by Objectives.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977.
Warschaw, T., Winning by Negotiation. New York: McGraw
Hill, 1980.
Research (Conceptual) References
Abell, P., Organizations as Bargaining and Influence Systems.
New York: Halsted Press, 1975.
Adams, S., "The Structure and Dynamics of Behavior in
Organizational Boundary Roles." In M. L. Dunnette (ed.), Hand-
book of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1976.
Bacharach, S. B., and Lawler, E. G., Power and Politics in
1982 Organizations. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1980.
Brown, B., "The Effects of the Need to Maintain Face on
Interpersonal Bargaining." Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 4, 1968, 107-122.
Davis, M., Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction. New
York: Basic Books, 1970.
41
 Deutsch, M., The Resolution of Conflict. New Haven, Connec-
ticut : Yale University Press, 1973.
Douglas, A., Industrial Peacemaking. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962.
Druckman, D., Negotiations: Social Psychological Perspec-
tives. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1977.
Elkouri, F., and Elkouri, E. A., How Arbitration Works, 3rd
Edition. Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,
1978.
Filley, A., Interpersonal Conflict Resolution. Glenview,
Illinois: Scott Foresman, 1975.
Fishbein, M., and Azjen, I., Belief, Attitude, Intention and
Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading,
Massachusetts: Addison Wesley, 1975.
Fisher, R., "Fractionating Conflict." In Smith, C., Conflict
Resolution: Contributions of the Behavioral Sciences. Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1971.
Fisher, R., International Conflict for Beginners. New York:
Harper and Row, 1969.
Hamner, C., "The Influence of Structural, Individual and
Strategic Differences." In Harnett, D. L., and Cummings, L. L.,
Bargaining Behavior: An International Study. Houston, Texas:
Dame Publications, 1980.
Harnett, D. L., and Cummings, L. L., Bargaining Behavior:
An International Study. Houston, Texas: Dame Publications, 1980.
Heider, F., The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New
York: John Wiley, 1958.
I. L., and Kelley, H. H., Communi-
Hovland, C. I., Janis,
cation and Persuasion. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University
Press, 1953.
Ikle, F. C., How Nations Negotiate. New York: Harper and
Row, 1964.
Kelman, H., International Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1965.
King, B. T., and McGinnies, E., Attitudes, Conflict and Social
Change. New York: Academic Press, 1972.
Lewicki, R., and Litterer, J., Dynamics of Bargaining (tenta-
tive title). Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Company, 1982b.
Mintzberg, H., "The Manager’s Job: Folklore and Fact."
Harvard Business Review, July-August 1975, 49-61.
42
Downloaded from jme.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on June 14, 2015
Rappaport, A., Two Person Game Theory: The Essential
Ideas. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966.
Rubin, J., and Brown, B., The Social Psychology of Bargaining
and Negotiation. New York: Academic Press, 1975.
Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1963.
Sherif, M., In Common Predicament. Boston, Massachusetts:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966.
Shubik, M. (ed.), Game Theory and Related Approaches to
Social Behavior. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964.
Smith, C. G. (ed.), Conflict Resolution: Contributions of the
Behavioral Sciences. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
1971.
Stevens, C. M., Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negoti-
ation. New York: McGraw Hill, 1963.
Tedeschi, James (ed.), The Social Influence Process. Chicago:
Aldine-Atherton, 1972.
Thomas, K., "Conflict and Conflict Management." In M. L.
Dunnette (ed.), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational
Psychology. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976.
Thomas, K., "Organizational Conflict." In S. Kerr (ed.),
Organizational Behavior. Columbus, Ohio: Grid Publishing Co.,
1979.
Walton, R. E., and McKersie, B., A Behavior Theory of Labor
Negotiation. New York: McGraw Hill, 1965.
Walton, R. E., and Dutton, J. M., "The Management of Inter-
departmental Conflict: A Model and Review." Administrative
Science Quarterly, 14, 1969, 73-84.
Ware, J., "Bargaining Strategies: Collaborative vs. Competi-
tive Approaches." Boston: Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse,
1980.
Wrightsman, L., O’Connor, J., and Baker, N., Cooperation
and Competition: Readings on Mixed Motive Games. Belmont,
California: Belmont Publishing Co., 1972.
Young, O., Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation.
Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1975.
Zimbardo, P., Ebbesen, E., and Maslach, C., Influencing Atti-
tudes and Changing Behavior. Second Edition. Reading,
Massachusetts: Addison Wesley, 1977.