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Introduction. Journal of Modern European History
Introduction. Journal of Modern European History
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Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift für moderne europäische Geschichte / Revue
d'histoire européenne contemporaine
On 12 December 1943 Ignaz («Roman») Krakus, aged 34, dressed as a German sol-
dier, entered the Lyon house of a French magistrate who had condemned one of his
young comrades in the resistance to death, and executed him. Krakus was a Pol-
ish-Jewish communist who had fought in the International Brigades in Spain and,
prompted by the defeat of the Spanish Republic in 1939, fled to France where he was
interned with hundreds of other former Brigadists and Spanish republicans in the
high-security Pyrenean camp of Le Vernet. Escaping in a dustbin, he became one of
the leaders of a group of foreign resisters in Lyon, answering to Norbert Kugler, a
German anti-Nazi and also a former Spanienkämpfer, and commanding young Pol-
ish, Hungarian and Romanian Jews who had escaped arrest and deportation to the
death camps. After the liberation of France, he joined the American army that was
invading Germany with the aim of building a socialist society in his Polish home-
land. His career continued in the Polish army until the Communist regime’s anti-Se-
mitic purges of 1968, when he returned to France, finding work in a nylon factory,
dying in 1970.2
Little more than a year after the Lyon incident, at the close of the Second World
War, similarly unlikely transnational encounters were tested to the extreme: it was in
the rubble of what was left of Nazi Germany’s capital, in the government district of
Berlin, that the remnants of a multi-national SS volunteer division unsuccessfully
defended the logistical headquarters of the Holocaust, the Reich Security Main Of-
fice (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA) against the advancing Red Army.3 The
level, it involved, among others, French, Spanish and Dutch anti-Bolsheviks who
perceived Hitler’s Europe as a much less threatening prospect than a Europe ruled
by Stalin. Many of those who actively collaborated with the Nazis had been operating
on the right-wing margins of their respective societies before the war (with the obvi-
ous exception of the Spanish Falange), but on a pan-European level, active collabora-
tion was a mass phenomenon. If we take the most extreme case of institutionalized
collaboration, the Waffen-SS with its roughly 500.000 non-German members, it is
difficult to dispute that we are looking at one of the largest transnational armies of
the time.
The intention here is to offer a fresh perspective on related (but often separately
treated) subjects that have varying degrees of scholarly attention since 1945. In re-
cent years, there has been a noticeable increase in scholarly books and articles on
both resistance and collaboration.6 The timing of the emergence of renewed interest
in resistance and collaboration since 1990 is not coincidental. It could be argued that
in both Western and Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War marked the beginning
of the real post-(Second World) war period. Up until then, difficult historical subjects
were discussed and explained within limits set by the context of the Cold War: the
official ideology of anti-fascism in Communist Eastern Europe and the devotion to
reconstruction (combined with silence over widespread collaboration with Nazism)
in the West.7
S. Courtois / D. Peschanski / A. Rayski, Le Sang de
6 Occupation in Hitler’s Europe, Basingstoke 1999;
l’étranger. Les immigrés de la MOI dans la Résistance, T. Kirk / A. McElligott, Opposing Fascism. Communi-
Paris 1989; C. Pavone, Une guerra civile. Saggio ty, Authority and Resistance in Europe, Cambridge
storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza, Torino 1991, 1999; B. Moore (ed.), Resistance in Western Europe,
translated as A Civil War: A History of the Italian Oxford, New York 2000; P. Cook / B. H. Shepherd
Resistance, London, New York 2013; T. Judt (ed.), Re- (ed.), European Resistance in the Second World War,
sistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe Barnsley 2013; O. Wieviorka, Une Histoire de la Ré-
1939–1948, London 1989; J.-M. Guillon / R. Menche- sistance en Europe Occidentale, Paris 2017.
rini (eds.), La Résistance et les Européens du Sud. Act- 7
D. Stone, Goodbye to all that? The Story of Europe
es du colloque tenu à aix-en-Provence, 20–22 mars since 1945, Oxford 2014, viii.
1997, Paris 1999; R. Bennett, Under the Shadow of
the Swastika. The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and
JMEH 16 / 2018 / 2
tarily (or under various kinds of pressures) fought for Hitler. The «myth of resist-
ance», as Henry Rousso and Tony Judt have demonstrated, fulfilled a clear political
function: in order to «move on» from the complex realities of collaboration and
complicity in war crimes, it was easier to sentence a handful of prominent collabo-
rators and maintain that the people had been fundamentally opposed to Nazism
and the New Order.8 In reality, in most occupied countries, the active resistance was
heavily outnumbered by those who collaborated in various ways, notably in Western
Europe.9
The Cold War also shaped the ways in which resistance and collaboration was
seen. The late Stalinist USSR and Communist Eastern Europe were hostile to any-
one who had resisted outside the Red Army of partisan units over which they had full
control. They were seen as cosmopolitans, Zionists and agents of Western imperial-
ism and many of them were purged, put on trial and even executed in the period
1948–1952.10 In Western Europe, the communist story of their contribution to resis
tance held up well until 1948. After that, they were seen as agents of Moscow who
had fought not for France or Italy, for example, but for the triumph of international
communism.11
The Cold War also shaped the way in which collaboration was perceived. In East-
ern Europe, a number of show trials were held with the aim of publicly «cleansing»
society from the «traitors» who, for whatever reason, had worked with the Germans.
Similar trials were held in Western Europe, but the logic of the Cold War quickly put
an end to them, as many former collaborators were now redefined as people who had
not fought with the Germans but against Communism. Western governments often
turned a blind eye on those Ukrainians, Croats and others with shady pasts who were
now re-settling in the Unites States, Ireland or South America – a point often used
in Communist propaganda to underline that Western capitalism was merely a varia-
tion of fascism.
In both West and East, the complexities of collaboration and resistance were
omitted and alternative, more suitable and simplified narratives were created. This
point is well made in Xosé M. Núñez Seixas’ comparative article on the experiences
of Spanish and Italian soldiers fighting alongside the Germans on the Eastern front
and the politics of memory in Franco’s Spain and post-Mussolini Italy. Regardless of
the political differences between the Francoist regime and Italian democracy, both
countries cultivated an enduring legend according to which Italian and Spanish sol-
diers had been «nice occupants» in the former Soviet territories while all crimes had
been perpetuated by the Germans.
the Balkans and the Soviet Union in 1941. Displaced rulers and national govern-
ments fled into exile, leaving their peoples to fend for themselves, or else stayed put,
collaborating with the occupying powers and acting as a conduit for their demands.
At an individual and group level, changes were also dramatic. Wartime conditions
cast doubt on many things that have previously been taken for granted, forcing peo-
ple to reflect on their experiences and expectations, on their lives up to that point and
perhaps on the core of their identity.14
The impact of these shocks on resistance and collaboration was powerful and
complex. As Jochen Böhler and Jacek Andrzej Młynarczyk remind us in their essay
on collaboration and resistance in wartime Poland, the various ethnic and political
interest groups within occupied nations could be both local and internationally con-
nected at the same time. Between 1939 and 1945, Poland constituted a particularly
extreme case, not just because of the country’s ethnic diversity or the fact that it suf-
fered a double occupation (by Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia) against which many
Poles resisted. The country also became the major site for the Nazis’ extermination
camps, to which millions of Jews from all over Europe were deported. Surveying the
political and ethnic vicissitudes of collaboration with – and resistance against – the
Nazis and Soviets in occupied Poland, Böhler and Młynarczyk offer detailed discus-
sion on two specific case studies: the multi-ethnic «Trawniki men», an inter-ethnic
group who were entirely complicit in the German genocide against the Jewish and
Polish populations and the Polish Underground State, co-ordinated from the Lon-
don-based Polish government-in-exile.
(XVIIIè–XIXè siècles), Paris 1988; M. Werner / cization: National Socialism and its Place in His
B. Zimmermann, «Beyond Comparison: histoire tory», in: K. Jarausch / T. Lindenberger (eds.), Con-
croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity», in: Theory flicted Memories. Europeanizing Contemporary
and History 45 (2006), 30–50; M. Pernau, Transna- Histories, New York, Oxford 2007, 96–116. See,
tionale Geschichte, Göttingen 2011, 49–56. too: A.
Bauerkämper, «Ambiguities of Transna-
P. Clavin, «Defining Transnationalism», in: Con-
16 tionalism: Fascism in Europe between Pan-Euro-
temporary European History 14 (2005), 421–439. peanism and Ultra-Nationalism, 1919–1939», in:
Clavin, «Defining Transnationalism», 422.
17 Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London
K. K. Patel, «In Search of a Transnational Histori
18 29 (2007), 43–67.
JMEH 16 / 2018 / 2
Collectively, the essays in this special issue indicate new ways of approaching the
complex topics of resistance and collaboration in the age of the Second World War.
Without suggesting that this is the only way of thinking about both subjects, we hope
that these approaches will further enrich what has become a much more open-ended
discussion about some of the most contested aspects of that war.
Robert Gerwarth
University College Dublin
School of History
Belfield
IL–Dublin 4
robert.gerwarth@ucd.ie
Robert Gildea
University of Oxford
Worcester College
UK–Oxford OX1 2HB
robert.gildea@history.ox.ac.uk
JMEH 16 / 2018 / 2