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12. ADA v.

BAYLON
FACTS:
Sps Baylon owned 43 parcels of land. When the spouses died, they were survived by their
legitimate children. Subsequently, Lilia B. Ada et al. filed a petition for partition alleging that her
sister, Rita, took possession of the said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income
from the same after their parents died. During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of
Donation conveyed 1.5 parcels of land to Florante. After the death of Rita, learning of the said
donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading praying
that the said donation in favor of the respondent be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4)
of the Civil Code. They further alleged that Rita was already sick and very weak when the said
Deed of Donation was supposedly executed and, thus, could not have validly given her consent
thereto.

ISSUE:
W/N the actions of partition and rescission can be joined in a single action.

RULING:
The actions of partition and rescission cannot be joined in a single action.

By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of
two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of
action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could
be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff
may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action
in one declaration, complaint or petition.

The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties
and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all
matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to
expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to
avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants.

Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as they may have against an opposing party, such joinder of
causes of action is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special
civil actions governed by special rules.

In this case, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the
petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos
in favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action
governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil
action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the
special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their
joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in
determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the
determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action.

35. ARCADIO & CARANDANG vs. HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN


G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006

FACTS:
De Guzman and the Sps Carandang are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay
Broadcasting System (MBS for brevity). The capital stock of MBS was increased, from
₱500,000 to P1.5 million and ₱345,000 of this increase was subscribed by the spouses
Carandang. MBS again increased its capital stock, from ₱1.5 million to ₱3 million, [the spouses
Carandang] yet again subscribed to the increase. They subscribed to ₱93,750 worth of newly
issued capital stock. De Guzman claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were
paid by him. Thus, on March 31, 1992, de Guzman sent a demand letter to the spouses
Carandang for the payment of said total amount.

The sps Carandang refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-incorporation agreement
was executed between them, whereby the de Guzman promised to pay for the stock subscriptions
of the former without cost, in consideration for Carandang’s technical expertise, his newly
purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment
therefore, there is no indebtedness on their part.

De Guzman filed his complaint, seeking to recover a sum of money together with damages.
Subsequently, RTC decided the case in favor of De Guzman. The spouses Carandang claims that
the Decision of the RTC, having been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for
failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC Decision is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court.

RULING:
No, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court.

SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within
thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground
for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order the legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named
shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs.

In the present case, there had been no court order for the legal representative of the deceased to
appear, nor had any such legal representative appeared in court to be substituted for the
deceased; neither had the complainant ever procured the appointment of such legal representative
of the deceased, including appellant, ever asked to be substituted for the deceased. As a result, no
valid substitution was effected, consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant
for the purpose of making her a party to the case and making the decision binding upon her,
either personally or as a representative of the estate of her deceased mother. However, unlike
jurisdiction over the subject matter which is conferred by law and is not subject to the discretion
of the parties, jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. Implied waiver comes in the form of either voluntary appearance or a
failure to object.

In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, because of the express waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons,
and because there had been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further
proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzman’s counsel.

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