International Human Rights (UDHR)

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 104768, July 21, 2003

Facts:
 EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be
necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and the
power "(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman
Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.
 The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Commanding General of the
Philippine Army).

Findings and Evaluation

 Ramas owned two houses located in Quezon City and Cebu City, respectively.
 Equipment/items and communication facilities were found in the premises of
Elizabeth Dimaano (mistress of respondent). These items could not have
been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
 The raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano.
 It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of
income.
 The Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth in the amount of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

Recommendation
 It is recommended that Ramas be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and RA 1379 (The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property).
  The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under RA 1379 against Ramas. Dimaano
was impleaded as co-defendant.
 Petitioner requested for several postponements for its inability to present further
evidence.
 The Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioner’s complaint.
 Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties
confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized and therefore
inadmissible in evidence. 
 Petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search
applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the
1987 Constitution.

Issue:
1) Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the interregnum.
 2) Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
remained in effect during the interregnum.

Ruling:
1) No. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the
extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the
1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the
interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill
of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
during the interregnum. 

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due
to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution
had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential
election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s
Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state
evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the
administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the
Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in
effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. 

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,

directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as
these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also
violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary
government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary
government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus
valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the
warrant. The warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles. The seizure of these items was
therefore void. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful
owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could
not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to
Dimaano.

2) Yes. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its
Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally
binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international
law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was
also obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals
under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration
during the interregnum.
 Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
Aerial Incident Case (Israel v. Bulgaria, 27 July 1955; U.S. v. Bulgaria, 1959)

Facts:
 An El Al Israel airliner was driven off course by strong winds in very bad weather.
The plane innocently crossed over into Bulgarian air space.
 The plane was shot down by Bulgarian military fighter planes. All fifty-one
passengers and seven crew members aboard were killed, including six American
nationals.
 Israel instituted proceedings before the Court by means of an Application in
October 1957.
 Bulgaria having challenged the Court’s jurisdiction to deal with the claim,
Israel contended that, since Bulgaria had in 1921 accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice
for an unlimited period, that acceptance became applicable, when Bulgaria was
admitted to the United Nations in 1955, to the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice by virtue of Article 36, paragraph 5, of the present Court’s
Statute, which provides that declarations made under the Statute of the
PCIJ and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties
to the present Court’s Statute, to be acceptances applicable to the
International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in
accordance with their terms.
 The U.S. applied to the ICJ for action against Bulgaria based on the
violations of international law and the injuries to U.S. nationals. The U.S. asked
Bulgaria for an award of $257,875 in damages, plus interest.
 The U.S. acceded to the optional clause, thereby accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ, in August 1946.
 During the ratification process for that accession, however, Senator Connally
added a critical phrase to a U.S. reservation including “disputes with
regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
the United States of America as determined by the United States of
America.”
 On the grounds of reciprocity and the consensual basis of ICJ jurisdiction,
Bulgaria invoked the Connally Amendment reservation.
 Bulgaria contended that its airspace security and anti- aircraft defenses were
within its domestic jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the ICJ has jurisdiction.

Ruling:

1) No (Israel v. Bulgaria). The Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction on
the grounds that Bulgaria’s acceptance of the optional clause in the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (the PCU,
precursor to the ICJ) did not carry over to acceptance of the optional
clause for the ICJ when Bulgaria joined the UN in December 1955, since
Bulgaria had not been an original party to the UN Charter and the Statute
of the ICJ.
2) The US withdrew its application.
Reciprocity- “Reciprocity in the case of Declarations accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court enables a Party to invoke a reservation to that
acceptance which it has not expressed in its own Declaration but which the
other Party has expressed in its Declaration.”
 Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
Nicaragua v. US (ICJ, 1984)

Facts:
 On 14 August 1946, the United States made an Optional Clause
Declaration with a reservation which said that declaration shall remain in
force for a period of five years and thereafter until the expiration of six
months after notice.
 When its dispute with Nicaragua was placed before the Court in 1984, the
US Government deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations a notification signed by the Secretary of State referring to the
1946 declaration stating that the aforesaid declaration shall not apply to
disputes with any Central American State or arising out of or related to
events in Central America, any of which disputes shall be settled in such
manner as the parties to them may agree.
 In order to be able to rely upon the United States declaration of 1946 to found
jurisdiction in the present case, Nicaragua has to show that it was a “State
accepting the same obligation” as the United States within the meaning of
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

Issue: Whether the ICJ has jurisdiction.

Ruling: Yes. The acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court by the United States on
which Nicaragua relies is the result of the United States declaration of 14 August 1946.
However, the United States argues that effect should be given to the letter sent to the
Secretary- General of the United Nations on 6 April 1984. It is clear that if this
notification were valid as against Nicaragua at the date of filing of the Application, the
Court would not have jurisdiction under Article 36 of the Statute.

The Court points out that the most important question relating to the effect of the 1984
notification is whether the United States was free to disregard the six months’
notice clause which, freely and by its own choice, it has appended to its
declaration, in spite of the obligation it has entered into vis-a-vis other States
which have made such a declaration.

The United States has argued that the Nicaraguan declaration, being of undefined
duration, is liable to immediate termination, and that Nicaragua has not accepted “the
same obligation” as itself and may not rely on the time-limit proviso against it.

The Court does not consider that this argument entitles the United States validly to
derogate from the time-limit proviso included in its 1946 declaration.

In the Court’s opinion, the notion of reciprocity is concerned with the scope and
substance of the commitments entered into, including reservations, and not
with the formal conditions of their creation, duration or extinction. Reciprocity
cannot be invoked in order to excuse departure from the terms of a State’s own
declaration. The United States cannot rely on reciprocity since the Nicaraguan
declaration contains no express restriction at all. On the contrary, Nicaragua can
invoke the six months’ notice against it, not on the basis of reciprocity, but
because it is an undertaking which is an integral part of the instrument that
contains it. The 1984 notification cannot therefore override the obligation of the United
States to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court vis-a-vis Nicaragua.
 Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
El Salvador V. Honduras

Facts:
 El Salvador and Honduras notified to the Court a Special Agreement
whereby the Parties requested the Court to form a Chamber — consisting of
three Members of the Court and two judges ad hoc — in order to (1) delimit the
frontier line in the six sectors not delimited by the 1980 General Treaty of
Peace concluded between the two States in 1980 and (2) determine the legal
situation of the islands in the Gulf of Fonseca and the maritime spaces
within and outside it.
 Nicaragua asked for permission to intervene in the case to protect its rights
in the Gulf of Fonseca. The Chamber found that Nicaragua had a legal interest
which might be affected by part of the Judgment of the Chamber on the merits,
with regard to the legal regime of the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca.
 The Chamber began by noting the agreement of both Parties (El Salvador
and Honduras) that the fundamental principle for determining the land
area is the uti possidetis juris, i.e., the principle, generally accepted in Spanish
America, that international boundaries follow former colonial
administrative boundaries.
 The Chamber was, moreover, authorized to take into account, where
pertinent, a provision of the 1980 Peace Treaty that a basis for
delimitation is to be found in documents issued by the Spanish Crown or
any other Spanish authority during the colonial period, and indicating the
jurisdictions or limits of territories, as well as other evidence and arguments of a
legal, historical, human or any other kind.
 With regard to the legal situation of the islands in the Gulf, the Chamber
considered that, although it had jurisdiction to determine the legal situation
of all the islands, a judicial determination was required only for those in
dispute, which it found to be El Tigre, Meanguera and Meanguerita.
 With respect to the maritime spaces within the Gulf, El Salvador claimed
that they were subject to a condominium of the three coastal States and
that delimitation would hence be inappropriate; Honduras argued that
within the Gulf there was a community of interests necessitating a judicial
delimitation.

Issue: Whether the Chamber has jurisdiction to effect a delimitation, whether inside or
outside the Gulf.

Ruling: No. Applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation to the Special
Agreement and the Peace Treaty, the Chamber found that it had no jurisdiction
to effect a delimitation, whether inside or outside the Gulf.

As for the legal situation of the waters of the Gulf, the Chamber noted that, given
its characteristics, the Gulf was generally acknowledged to be a historic bay. The
Chamber examined the history of the Gulf to discover its “régime”, taking into account
the 1917 Judgment of the Central American Court of Justice in a case between El
Salvador and Nicaragua concerning the Gulf. It found that the Gulf waters, other than
the three-mile maritime belt, were historic waters and subject to the joint sovereignty of
the three coastal States. It noted that there had been no attempt to divide the waters
according to the principle of uti possidetis juris. A joint succession of the three
States to the maritime area thus seemed to be the logical outcome of the uti
possidetis principle. The Chamber accordingly found that Honduras had legal
rights in the waters up to the bay closing line, which it considered also to be a
baseline. 

Regarding the waters outside the Gulf, the Chamber observed that entirely new
concepts of law, unthought of when the Central American Court gave its Judgment in
1917, were involved, in particular those regarding the continental shelf and the
exclusive economic zone, and found that, excluding a strip at either extremity
corresponding to the maritime belts of El Salvador and Nicaragua, the three joint
sovereigns were entitled, outside the closing line, to a territorial sea,
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, but must proceed to a division
by mutual agreement.